Legal Realist Perspective

I. The Law as the Product of the Judicial Process

A. Ratio Decidendi

Ratio decidendi of a case acquires an important character and function.

As the product of legal reasoning ratio decidendi becomes a vital factor

in the prognostication of the result of other similar or nearly similar
cases.

According to Justice Holmes, if there are no interstices or lacuna in

the statute or rule under consideration in which the molar to molecular
motion can play or operate, then, there is simply no place for judicial
elaboration. This rule of thumb posited by Justice Holmes simply note
that courts cannot judicially legislate, in this given situation, in a
wholesale manner.

B. Judicial Realist View of Modern Judicial Process

The judicial legal realist view of modern judicial process presented in a

mathematical formula:

(jR x mF) x (m1S x jP) =L

First Quantity
Based on the formula presented above the first quantity (jR x MF)
represents the modification of the formalist concept of the judicial
process with the qualification of raw facts (rF) into material facts (mF).
The variable jR as involve in the first quantity represents the jural
rules while mF signify the element of material facts.
Furthermore, material facts as distinguished from the raw facts simply
means, that not all raw facts (rF) go into adjudicative function. With
regard to material facts, it does not mean that it only pertains
necessarily to the actual facts but this also includes circumstances
relied upon or even assumed by judges as basis of their decisions in a
particular case.

Notably, facts become important in the determination of the

dipositive portion of the decision and the underlying principle of the
case which alone can be precedent in the future case.
Second Quantity
In the second quantity, (m1S) represents the metalegal stimuli which
affects the judicial personality (jP).
II. EXCLUSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE & EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
In judicial legal realism both executive and legislative organs are
considered only as producing agencies of law. The explanation behind
the exclusion of the two organs rests on the fact that in the
adjustments of conflicting or overlapping interests and purposes, the
judicial organ is the ultimate authority in the interpretation and
application of legal rules.
John Chipman views that statutes enacted by the legislative and orders
issued by the executive department are only sources of law. Thus, this
simply means that all agencies of the government engaged in decisionmaking form part of the adjudicative organ, regardless of their political
and governmental classification.