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Rule 39 (Execution)

412 SCRA 1 (2003)

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Corpuz
Facts: Francisco Lu (Lu) was the defendant in a civil case for ejectment raffled to Judge Siapno. On 7
September 1995, Judge Siapno rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution filed a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and
executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of the rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. xxx

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered against Francisco Lu the following (sic):
1. Ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the premises;
2. The plaintiff may get the amount of P18,000.00 from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, representing back rentals since August, 1992;
3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
4. In accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued. (Emphasis supplied).

Section 8, Rule 70 explicitly provides that although execution is immediately executory, judgment
may be stayed by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court and periodically
paying the rents during the pendency of the appeal. As explained in Kaw v. Judge Anunciacion, Jr.,
[13] a party is not in a position to stay execution unless he receives notice of the filing of a motion for
execution. After all, a party has 15 days to perfect his appeal and stay execution by filing a notice of
appeal and supersedeas bond and periodically depositing the rentals. Unless he receives notice of a
motion for execution, he cannot take these steps to stay execution. While the MTC decision authorized
Corpuz to issue a writ of execution, its issuance prior to receipt by Lu of the decision was precipitate and
against all sense of fair play. Clearly, Corpuz abused her authority.

Lus counsel received the decision on 13 September 1995. Lu filed a Notice of Appeal on the same
day. Meanwhile, on 11 September 1995, Corpuz issued a writ of execution. Sheriff Domingo S. Lopez[6]
(Sheriff Lopez) implemented the writ on the same date by forcibly ejecting Lu from the premises.

G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005

Balajonda vs. COMELEC

Lu elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta and issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and declared void the writ of execution earlier issued by the MTC-Urdaneta.

Facts: On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman (Punong Barangay), having won the office in the barangay elections held the previous
day.2 Her margin of victory over private respondent Maricel Francisco (Francisco) was four-hundred
twenty (420) votes.3 Francisco duly filed a petition for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date
of proclamation, lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35. 4

Lu filed an administrative complaint against Judge Siapno, Sheriff Lopez, and Atty. Joselino A.
Viray. The Court, in its Decision dated 6 July 2000, found Judge Siapno guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for declaring, in the dispositive portion, the immediate execution of his decision.
The Court required respondent Corpuz, Clerk of Court, to comment on the administrative
complaint against her- denies the charges against her. Corpuz alleges that she never signed any court
process or writ without instruction from her superior. She claims that Judge Siapno angrily told her to
implement the decision as it already directed the issuance of a writ of execution. She feared that Judge
Siapno might cite her for insubordination. Corpuz admits that she issued the writ of execution. However,
Corpuz claims that she issued the writ with the knowledge of Judge Siapno who instructed her to sign the
writ. Corpuz further claims that the stenographer had already typed the writ when it was presented to her
for signature.

In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Franciscos petition stated no cause of action and that the
allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were "baseless, conjectural, flimsy, frivolous, preposterous
and mere figments of the latters wild imagination." She also laid stress on the fact that although the
grounds relied upon by Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been
prosecuted for violation of the same.51vvphi1.nt

During the investigation, Corpuz admitted that there were several instances when she issued
writs of execution immediately after Judge Siapno promulgated the decisions. Corpuz admitted that there
were three ejectment cases Civil Cases Nos. 4007, 4009, and 4124 - wherein the decisions and the writs
of execution were signed, promulgated and issued on the same dates but no one complained.
Investigating Judge Costales deduced that Judge Siapno did not force or coerce Corpuz into signing the
writ of execution previously prepared by the stenographer. There was no reason for Judge Siapno to force
or coerce Corpuz into signing the writ of execution because this was their practice as shown by the three
ejectment cases Corpuz mentioned.

Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution.12 In
the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for Execution dated 5 February 2004, praying for a writ of
execution in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court [Sec. 2(a), Rule 39],
which allows discretionary execution of judgment upon good reasons to be stated in the order.14

Investigating Judge Costales observed that Corpuz took literally what Judge Siapno declared in
his Decision of 7 September 1995 that [I]n accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued.
Investigating Judge Costales believed that as second in command in the office, Corpuz should have
guided or assisted her presiding judge. Investigating Judge Costales opined that Corpuz should have read
the rules and procedure regarding the issuance of a writ of execution and could not simply reason out
that she was doing a ministerial duty.
Issue: WON Corpuz may be held administratively liable for issuing a writ of execution without a motion
for execution or a hearing?
The Courts Ruling: There is no dispute that Lus counsel received the MTC decision on 13 September
1995 and filed a notice of appeal on the same day. Corpuz issued the writ of execution on 11 September
1995. Sheriff Lopez implemented the writ on the same day. In short, Corpuz issued the writ, and Sheriff
Lopez implemented the same, at least two days before Lus counsel received the MTC decision. Clearly,
this is an improper procedure because the clerk of court issued the writ of execution before the losing
party received the decision. As held in Felongco v. Dictado,[9] reiterating the earlier case of Dy v.
Court of Appeals,[10] the losing party must first receive notice of the judgment before the court or its
personnel can execute the judgment. The reason is that if such judgment is immediately executed without
prior notice to the losing party, then such a party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not support
the judgment.
Moreover, even if the MTC decision itself ordered that a writ of execution be issued, this does not
mean that notice of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary.[11] The court cannot
direct the issuance of a writ of execution motu proprio. This is what Section 8 of Rule 70[12] provides:
SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the

After the issues were joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-nine (69) ballot boxes, and
eventually, the ballots in thirty-nine (39) precincts were revised. 6 After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest
with its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by four hundred eighteen (418) votes.

Balajonda duly opposed15 the Motion for Execution, arguing in the main that under Sec. 2(a), Rule 39,
only the judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of discretionary execution pending
appeal. However, in its Order16 dated 26 November 2004, the COMELEC First Division after due hearing
granted the motion and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution,17 ordering Balajonda to cease and
desist from discharging her functions as Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections has power to order the immediate execution of its
judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay chairmanship?
Held: Early last year, the Court, through Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Batul v. Bayron,21 affirmed a
similar order of the COMELEC First Division directing the immediate execution of its own judgment.
Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering
that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Batul also clearly shows that the judgments which may be executed pending appeal need not be only
those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well. It stated, thus:
Considering that there are good reasons for the issuance of an Order of Execution, to wit: dictates of
public policy and the shortness of the remaining period, we have to grant the Motion. 26
It cannot be disputed with success that public interest demands that the winner on the basis of a full and
incisive recount and new appreciation of votes should be installed in office without delay. Indeed, "It is
neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right is under suspicion." 28
Balajondas corollary argument that the public interest involved or the will of the electorate is fully
determined only after the election contest becomes final 29 would, if sustained, negate altogether the
purpose of allowing executions pending appeal in the first place. Indeed, the argument begs the question.
In this regard, Balajondas filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision likewise did not divest the

COMELEC First Division of jurisdiction to rule on the Motion For Execution. Once more, Batul30 instructs us
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions resolution with the COMELEC
en banc does not suspend the execution thereof.

Liens which were acquired by virtue of judgments or levies of execution, and which have become barred
by limitations or by delay in enforcing them, and sales based on such hens, have been held to be
removable as clouds. (65 Am Jur 2nd 163-164).

108 SCRA 102 (1981)

Jalandoni vs. PNB

185 SCRA 751 (1990)

Fiestan vs. CA

Facts: CFI of Manila rendered a judgment ordering Eduardo Jalandoni to pay the Philippine National Bank
the sum of P63,297.53, together with daily interest of P12.57 from March 6, 1959 until fully paid, and ten
percent of the total amount due as attorney's fees, plus the costs.

Facts: Lot No. 2-B was acquired by the DBP as the highest bidder at a public auction sale on August 6,
1979 after it was extrajudicially foreclosed by the DBP in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, for failure of petitioners to pay their mortgage indebtedness. Petitioners executed a Deed of
Sale in favor of DBP.

That judgment became final and executory. Within five years from the entry of judgment in that case, or
on March 9, 1964, the sheriff of Silay City, pursuant to an alias writ of execution, levied upon Lot No. 657C of the Silay cadastre, with an area of seventeen hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T1827, which was later cancelled and replaced in 1969 by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3202 in the
name of Eduardo Jalandoni.

Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property within the one (1) year period which expired on
September 28, 1980, petitioners' TCT T-13218 over Lot No. 2-B was cancelled by the Register of Deeds
and in lieu thereof TCT T-19077 was issued to the DBP upon presentation of a duly executed affidavit of
consolidation of ownership.

No effort was made by the bank up to this time to have that land sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment against Jalandoni.

DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria in a Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, the DBP's title over the lot
was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT T-19229 was issued to Francisco Peria.

On April 22, 1974, or more than ten years after the levy was made, Jalandoni filed with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental at Silay City in the land registration proceeding, LRC Cadastral Record No.
86 for Lot No. 657-C, a petition for the cancellation of the levy on the ground of prescription. The petition
was opposed by the bank.

Petitioners filed on August 23, 1982 a complaint for annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of
transfer certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag City, PNB Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and
the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

The lower court in its order of October 31, 1974 directed Jalandoni to ask the Manila court to quash the
writ of execution on the ground of prescription and thereafter to refile his petition in the lower court.
The said court also adverted to the rule that relief under section 112 of Act No. 496 can be granted only
when there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of
an interested party.
On May 20, 1975, Jalandoni filed in the same court an action to quiet title or for the cancellation of the
notice of embargo on the ground that, although more than ten years had elapsed from the time the levy
was made, no execution sale had been held and, therefore, the levy had become inefficacious and was a
cloud on his title (Civil Case No. 685).
The Jalandoni heirs, in support of their contention that the levy cannot be enforced after the expiration in
1969 of the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment, rely on the rule laid down in Ansaldo vs. Fidelity
and Surety Co. of the P.I., 88 Phil. 547, a 1951 case, that "properties levied upon by execution must be
sold in public auction within the period of ten years during which the judgment can be enforced by action "
The reason for that rule is that an execution is enforced (and therefore accomplished) by levy and sale,
not by levy alone.
Issue: May the judgment debtor's land, which was levied upon within five years from the entry of
judgment, be sold at an execution sale after the expiration of the ten-year period for enforcing the
Held: We hold that the trial court erred in not applying the ruling in the Ansaldo case which is on all fours
with this case.
The employees of the bank were negligent. They did not require the sheriff to sell Jalandoni's land at
public auction. The bank is bound by its employees' negligence. This case should teach the responsible
officers of the bank to be more vigilant in exercising its rights and in supervising its employees. The law
helps the diligent and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
For laches and neglect on the part of those, who, under the law are entitled to require of others the
fulfillment of their obligations, the statute of limitations has been enacted, which provides that such rights
prescribe after a certain period of time, in order that it may serve alike as a punishment for those who do
not know how to look after their own interests, and as a source of reassurance to those who may have
rested in the belief that their creditors had waived their rights, and also to insure economic stability and
the certainty of rights. (Villareal, J., in Lutero vs. Siuliong & Co., 54 Phil. 272, 280.)
We find that the "notice of embargo" annotated in 1964 on Jalandoni's title is no longer enforceable and
has become a cloud upon his title. Following the rule in the Ansaldo case, he and his heirs have a good
cause of action under article 476 of the Civil Code for the removal of that state encumbrance.
Moreover, article 478 of the Civil Code provides that "there may also be an action to quiet title or remove
a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has
terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription". (See sec. 112 of Act No. 496.)
A court of equity will remove a cloud cast upon title to property by a lien, interest, or title which has
become barred by reason of laches or the running of the statute of limitations. ...

After trial, the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20, rendered its decision 2 on November 14, 1983
dismissing the complaint, declaring therein, as valid the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
property in favor of the DBP as highest bidder in the public auction sale held on August 6, 1979, and its
subsequent sale by DBP to Francisco Peria as well as the real estate mortgage constituted thereon in
favor of PNB Vigan as security for the P115,000.00 loan of Francisco Peria.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur on June 20, 1987.
Issue: WON the extrajudicial foreclosure sale being null and void by virtue of lack of a valid levy?
Held: The Court finds these contentions untenable.
The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39
and a valid attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not basic requirements before an
extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction. At the outset, distinction should be made
of the three different kinds of sales under the law, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial
foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, because a different set of law applies to each class
of sale mentioned. An ordinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court applies in cases of judicial foreclosure sale. On the other
hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of
Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages" applies in cases of
extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Levy, as understood under Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to execution of money
judgments, has been defined by this Court as the act whereby a sheriff sets apart or appropriates for the
purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment-debtor's property. 5
In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed need not be identified or set
apart by the sheriff from the whole mass of property of the mortgagor for the purpose of satisfying the
mortgage indebtedness. For, the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has
been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of
default of payment. By virtue of the special power inserted or attached to the mortgage contract, the
mortgagor has authorized the mortgagee-creditor or any other person authorized to act for him to sell
said property in accordance with the formalities required under Act No. 3135, as amended.
The Court finds that the formalities prescribed under Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
were substantially complied with in the instant case. Records show that the notices of sale were posted by
the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and the same were published in Ilocos Times, a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Ilocos Sur, setting the date of the auction sale on August 6, 1979 at 10:00
a.m. in the Office of the Sheriff, Vigan, Ilocos Sur. 6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-04-1857 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-P), March 16, 2005
Dagooc vs. Erlina

Issue: WON Erlinda of RTC Surigao del Sur is guilty of misconduct and ignorance of the law?
Facts: Complainant alleged that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. L-695 before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The court rendered judgment by compromise
agreement which immediately became final and executory. Complainant moved for the execution of the
decision and, on February 28, 2002, a writ of execution was issued which was endorsed to respondent
deputy sheriff Erlina for execution. The defendants, however, could not pay the money judgment. Instead
of levying on the properties of the defendants to satisfy the judgment, however, sheriff Erlina asked them
to execute promissory notes in favor of complainant which he asked the latter to collect from the
defendants. Complainant further alleged that respondent sheriff indicated in his return of service that
defendants were insolvent. But upon verification with the assessors office of Tandag, Surigao del Sur,
complainant discovered that defendants owned real properties, as evidenced by the real property field
appraisal and assessment sheet.
In his comment, respondent sheriff averred that he served a copy of the writ of execution on the
defendants but they could not pay the money judgment despite repeated demands. So he went to the
residence of the defendants to levy on some of their personal properties but he found them to be exempt
from execution pursuant to Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He then went to the office of the
provincial assessor to verify if the defendants owned real properties which he could levy on. He alleged
that he was given a certification that there was none. So he made a return of service stating that
defendants were insolvent. He denied calling up complainant for her to collect defendants payment by
means of promissory notes. But he advised her to secure an alias writ of execution so he could eventually
go after defendants real properties in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
Held: Yes
Section 9 Rule 39 mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the judgment debtor
shall pay either in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of
payment acceptable to the latter. Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a form of payment.
The only exception is when such form of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it was
obviously not acceptable to complainant, otherwise she would not have filed this case against respondent
sheriff. In fact, she objected to it because the promissory notes of the defendants did not satisfy the
money judgment in her favor.
If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or
other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the money judgment shall be satisfied by
levying on the properties of the judgment debtor. Section 9(b), Rule 39
Respondent sheriff not only failed to levy on the properties of the judgment debtor when they
could not pay the money judgment in cash but also claimed the exemption for them. His conduct blatantly
manifested his incompetence and ineptitude in discharging his functions. Moreover, respondent sheriff was
seriously remiss in his duties when he stated in his return of service that the defendants were insolvent
without first diligently verifying such fact. As it turned out, the defendants had real properties he could
have levied on to satisfy the money judgment.
Either to desperately cover his tracks after it was pointed out to him that the defendants were
not insolvent at all or out of sheer ignorance of the law, respondent sheriff advised complainant to file a
motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution allegedly so that he could levy on the properties of
the defendants. But there was no need for an alias writ of execution for him to levy on the real properties
of the defendants. The life of the writ was for five years and the judgment of the court had not yet been
fully satisfied. Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court states that:
Section 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in
full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment
may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. x x x (emphasis
Considering that respondent sheriffs primary duty was the execution of the writ strictly according
to its terms, there was apparently more than mere harmless ignorance involved here, which makes us
wonder about the very lame and docile penalty of P5,000 being recommended by the OCA. Applying Rule
4, Section 52 B(2) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, we find
respondent guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his official duties and suspend
him from the service for one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find respondent sheriff ROBERTO A. ERLINA of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Tandag, Surigao del Sur, GUILTY of inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of his official duties. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year and
WARNED that the commission of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. SO

129 SCRA 513 (1984)

Campillo vs. CA
Issue: Whether who has a better right or title to the herein disputed two (2) parcels of land Simplicio
Santos who earlier purchased them in a private sale but failed to register his sale, or petitioner Sostenes
Campillo who subsequently purchased them at an execution sale and obtained a certificate of title.
Facts: On February 27, 1961, Tomas de Vera and his wife Felisa Serafico sold two (2) parcels of land
located in Tondo, Manila, designated as Lots 1 and 2 of the consolidation and subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs.
888 and segregated from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37277 under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
63559, to Simplicio Santos, now deceased and is represented by his administratrix, Zenaida Diaz Vda. de
Santos, the herein private respondent. Said sale was however never presented for registration in the
office of the Registry of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title covering the property.
On January 27, 1962, petitioner Sostenes Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against
Tomas de Vera in Civil Case No. 49060 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. That judgment became
final and executory, and petitioner obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ was
issued on April 4, 1962 and pursuant thereto, the City Sheriff levied on three (3) parcels of land covered
by TCT No. 63559 in the name of Tomas de Vera, including the two (2) parcels of land which the latter
previously sold to Simplicio Santos.
On July 25, 1962, the three parcels of land were sold at public auction for P17,550.81 in favor of
petitioner who was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, the City Sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of petitioner over the three (3) parcels of land levied and sold on
execution. On February 4, 1964, TCT No. 63559 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 73969 was
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of petitioner Sostenes Campillo.
Claiming to be the owner of the two parcels of land by reason of the previous sale to him by Tomas de
Vera, Simplicio Santos filed an action to annul the levy, notice of sale, sale at public auction and final deed
of sale of Lots 1 and 2 in favor of petitioner Campillo, with damages. In resisting the complaint, the herein
petitioner as one of the defendants below, alleged that he is an innocent purchaser for value and that the
supposed previous sale could not be preferred over the levy and sale at public action because it was not
After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment sustaining the validity of the levy and sale at public
auction primarily because at the time of the levy and sale, the disputed properties were still registered in
the name of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera. Besides, the trial court ruled, the sale to Simplicio
Santos which was not registered nor noted in the title of the subject lots, cannot bind third persons.
On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent, the respondent appellate court modified the
decision of the lower court, (1) The dismissal of the amended complaint as against defendant Sostenes
Campillo only and ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit are set aside;(2) Declaring the levy,
sheriff's sale and sheriff's certificate in favor of defendant Sostenes Campillo null and void and of no
effect;(3) Declaring plaintiff Simplicio Santos, now his estate, to be the owner of the two parcels of land
under litigation and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63559; and(4) Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 74019 and 74020 in the name of defendant
Sostenes Campillo and to issue the proper certificate of title in the name of the estate of Simplicio Santos.
Held: We are constrained to reverse the judgment of the respondent appellate court and rule in favor of
the herein petitioner.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction
or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date of
its registration. 1 Consequently, and considering that the properties subject matter hereof were actually
attached and levied upon at a time when said properties stood in the official records of the Registry of
Deeds as still owned by and registered in the name of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera, the
attachment, levy and subsequent sale of said properties are proper and legal. The net result is that the
execution sale made in favor of the herein petitioner transferred to him all the rights, interest and
participation of the judgment debtor in the aforestated properties as actually appearing in the certificate
of title, unaffected by any transfer or encumbrance not so recorded therein.
Section 51, PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides as follows:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.
But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (Italics for emphasis)

paid or offset first. There was no mention of the contract to sell with Marquez on February 7, 1990.
Fourth, Marquez has not intervened in any of these proceedings to assert and protect his rights to the
subject property as an alleged purchaser in good faith.

The petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such
right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted
therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title
which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.

At any rate, even if it be assumed that the contract to sell in favor of Marquez is valid, it cannot prevail
over the final and executory judgment ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby reversed and set aside,
and the judgment of the lower court is reinstated. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Regarding the refusal of the petitioner to execute the absolute deed of sale, Section 10 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court reads as follows:

231 SCRA 281(1994)

Manila Remnant Co., Inc. vs. CA
Facts: The trial court rendered a decision declaring the contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas valid
and subsisting, and annulling the contract to sell in favor of Crisostomo. It ordered the MRCI to execute
an absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, free from all liens and encumbrances. Damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P210,000.00 were also awarded to the Ventanillas for which the
MRCI, AUVCI, and Crisostomo were held solidarily liable.
The lower court ruled further that if for any reason the transfer of the lots could not be effected, the
defendants would be solidarily liable to the Ventanillas for reimbursement of the sum of P73,122.35,
representing the amount paid for the two lots, and legal interest thereon from March 1970, plus the
decreed damages and attorney's fees. Valencia was also held liable to MRCI for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
From this decision, separate appeals were filed by Valencia and MRCI. The appellate court, however,
sustained the trial court in toto. The Court of Appeals and declared the judgment of the trial court
immediately executory.

Sec. 10. Judgment for specific act; vesting title If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance
of land, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act, and the party fails to
comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient
party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if
done by the party. If real or personal property is within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may enter judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and such
judgment shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
In sum, we find that:
1. No legal impediment exists to the execution, either by the petitioner or the trial court, of an absolute
deed of sale of the subject property in favor of the respondent Ventanillas; and
2. The lower court did not abuse its discretion when it required the posting of a P500,000.00 cash bond
for the lifting of the garnishment order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

The Present Case

170 SCRA 667 (1989)

Malonzo vs. Mariano

On January 25, 1991, the spouses Ventanilla filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 26411. The writ was issued on May 3, 1991, and served upon MRCI on May 9,

Issue: whether or not a writ of possession issued by a Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) in
accordance with Act 3135, to give possession of property sold at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the
purchaser thereof, may be enforced against persons other than the mortgagor

In a manifestation and motion filed by MRCI with the trial court on May 24, 1991, the petitioner alleged
that the subject properties could not be delivered to the Ventanillas because they had already been sold
to Samuel Marquez on February 7, 1990, while their petition was pending in this Court. Nevertheless,
MRCI offered to reimburse the amount paid by the respondents, including legal interest plus the
aforestated damages. MRCI also prayed that its tender of payment be accepted and all garnishments on
their accounts lifted.

Facts: The property in question consists of two (2) parcels of land and the apartment and commercial
building thereon standing, located at R. Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila. A mortgage was
constituted over this property by its owner then, Universal Ventures, Inc., in favor of Banco Filipino
Mortgage & Savings Bank, as security for the payment of a loan of P350,000.00. 1 The mortgage deed
authorized the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property in the event of default in the repayment of the
loan. It was later amended to extend to and cover an additional and total consolidated loan of
P400,000.00. 2 Universal Ventures, Inc. failed to repay the loan. Consequently, Banco Filipino caused the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the property by the City Sheriff of Manila. The foreclosure sale took place in
due course; the mortgaged property was struck off to the bank, as highest bidder, and the bank
registered the sheriff's certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila and on July 27, 1976
obtained a certificate of title in its name, numbered 122496, in lieu of that of the mortgagor, which was
accordingly cancelled. 3

The Ventanillas accepted the amount of P210,000.00 as damages and attorney's fees but opposed the
reimbursement offered by MRCI in lieu of the execution of the absolute deed of sale. They contended that
the alleged sale to Samuel Marquez was void, fraudulent, and in contempt of court and that no claim of
ownership over the properties in question had ever been made by Marquez.
Issue: WON portion of the decision ordering the MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the
Ventanillas became final and executory when the petitioner failed to appeal it to the Supreme Court
Held: The petition must fail.
The validity of the contract to sell in favor of the Ventanilla spouses is not disputed by the parties. Even in
the previous petition, the recognition of that contract was not assigned as error of either the trial court or
appellate court. The fact that the MRCI did not question the legality of the award for damages to the
Ventanillas also shows that it even then already acknowledged the validity of the contract to sell in favor
of the private respondents.
On top of all this, there are other circumstances that cast suspicion on the validity, not to say the very
existence, of the contract with Marquez.
First, the contract to sell in favor of Marquez was entered into after the lapse of almost ten years from the
rendition of the judgment of the trial court upholding the sale to the Ventanillas.
Second, the petitioner did not invoke the contract with Marquez during the hearing on the motion for the
issuance of the writ of execution filed by the private respondents. It disclosed the contract only after the
writ of execution had been served upon it.
Third, in its manifestation and motion dated December 21, 1990, the petitioner said it was ready to
deliver the titles to the Ventanillas provided that their counterclaims against private respondents were

Banco Filipino filed a petition for a writ of possession with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The writ of possession issued on March 4, 1980 and on the strength thereof, the Sheriff of Manila
attempted to evict the persons in occupancy of the property. 8
Three of the persons sought to be evicted, Enrico Malonzo, husband of Avelina Malonzo, Barbara Brown,
and Bonifacia Monzon, filed suit against Banco Filipino and the City Sheriff in the same Court of First
Instance of Manila seeking to perpetually restrain the enforcement of the writ of possession against them,
and to recover damages resulting from the defendants' attempts to enforce it.
Held: There being no dispute about the fact that no redemption had been made within one (1) year from
registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, there can be no question about the absolute right of
Banco Filipino, as purchaser, to a writ of possession, 11 or stated otherwise, the ministerial duty of the
Court to issue the writ, 12 upon mere motion, without need of instituting a separate action for the purpose
. 13 The question is whether or not that writ of possession which is the final process to carry out or
consummate the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage may be enforced by the sheriff against
persons other than the mortgagor who are in occupancy of the foreclosed property. To this question this
Court has already had occasion to give an affirmative answer, grounded particularly on the provisions of
Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which are inter alia suppletory to act 3135. 14
Under section 6 of Act No. 3135 and Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of

Court, in case of an extra-judicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, the possession of the property
sold may be given to the purchaser by the sheriff after the period of redemption had expired, unless a
third person is actually holding the property adversely to the mortgagor. An ordinary action for the
recovery of possession is not necessary. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a
sheriffs sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the
one year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs final certificate of sale.
(Tan Soo Huat vs. Ongwico 63 Phil. 746, 749). The same rule was followed in a judicial foreclosure of
mortgage and in an execution sale (Rivera vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 61 Phil. 201 and
Republic vs. Nable, L-4979, April 30, 1952). If the court can issue a writ of possession during the period
of redemption there is no reason why it should not also have the same power after the expiration of that
period. 15

2) whether PDCP can interpose as defense the provision in the Deed of Assignment and the MOA that the
assignment of the receivables shall not be affected by this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 73198, be

The situation is not significantly different from that contemplated by Section 49 (b) of Rule 39, declaring a
final and executory judgment or order conclusive and hence enforceable not only against the parties but
also "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding." Pursuant to this provision, a judgment in personam directing a party to deliver possession of
property to another is binding not only against the former but also against his successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action, i.e., those whose possessory rights are derived from
him, 16 e.g., lessees, possessors by tolerance, assignees. As regards the latter, it is not required that a
separate action be instituted against them to litigate the issue of possession; due process is satisfied by
holding a hearing, with notice to them, on the nature of their possession, and thereafter denying or
acceding to the enforcement of a writ of possession against them as the findings at said hearing shall
warrant. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 is conclusiveness of
judgment. This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two suits is the same. It refers to a situation where the judgment in the prior action operates
as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or which were necessarily included therein.

G.R. No. 150134, October 31, 2007

Del Rosario vs Far East Bank and Trust Company

Held: The petition is bereft of merit.

Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down two main rules. Section 49(b) enunciates
the first rule of res judicata known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which states that
the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their
privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
either before the same or any other tribunal.[29]

The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of bar by prior judgment, viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.[34]

Facts: petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and respondent Private Development Corporation
of the Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP extended to DATICOR a
foreign currency loan of US $265,000 and a peso loan of P2.5 million or a total amount of approximately
P4.4 million, computed at the then prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with the peso.

There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case No. 94-1610 (that
rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not only did it dispose of the case on the
merits; it also became executory as a consequence of the denial of FEBTCs motion for reconsideration and

The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land one situated in
Manila (the Otis property) which was registered in the name of petitioner Ernesto C. Del Rosario, and five
in Mati, Davao Oriental and chattel mortgages over pieces of machinery and equipment.

609 SCRA 198

Napocor vs. Maruhom

Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied to interest, service
fees and penalty charges. This left petitioners, by PDCPs computation, with an outstanding balance on the
principal of more than P10 million as of May 15, 1983.

Facts: Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom,
Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G.
Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom,
Mohamad M. Ibrahim and Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim (respondents) are owners of a 70,000-square meter lot
in Saduc, Marawi City. Sometime in 1978, NPC, without respondents knowledge and consent, took
possession of the subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground tunnels. The
tunnels were used by NPC in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NPCs Agus II, III,
IV, V, VI, and VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and
Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. Respondents only discovered the existence of the tunnels sometime
in July 1992. Thus, on October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NPC pay damages and vacate the
subterranean portion of the land, but the demand was not heeded.
Hence, on November 23, 1994, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession
of land and damages against NPC with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1298-94.

By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages. The
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 82-8088, was dismissed by the CFI.
On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) set aside the CFIs dismissal of the
complaint and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the loan agreement between
DATICOR and PDCP. PDCP appealed the IACs decision to this Court where it was docketed as G.R. No.
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages it
was holding over the Mati real properties and the machinery and equipment, and to return the
corresponding certificates of title to petitioners. And it ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners the amount of
P965,000 with legal interest from the date of the promulgation of its judgment.
The trial court moreover noted that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC clearly stated
that the pending litigation before the Supreme Court of the Philippines with respect to the Loan exclusive
of the Receivables assigned to FEBTC shall prevail up to the extent not covered by this Agreement. That
statement in the MOA, the trial court ruled, categorically made only the loan subject to this Courts
Decision in G.R. No. 73198, hence, it was with the parties full knowledge and consent that petitioners
agreed to pay P6.4 million to FEBTC as consideration for the settlement. The parties cannot thus be
allowed to welsh on their contractual obligations, the trial court concluded.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] of the July 10, 2001 decision of the trial court
was denied by Order of September 24, 2001. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: issues of 1) whether FEBTC can be held liable for the balance of the overpayment of P 4.335
million plus interest which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in Civil Case No. 94-1610, and

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision,[2] the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying [respondents] prayer for [NPC] to dismantle the underground tunnels
constructed beneath the lands of [respondents] in Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII5) 2278;
2. Ordering [NPC] to pay to [respondents] the fair market value of said 70,000
square meters of land covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5)
2278 less the area of 21,995 square meters at P1,000.00 per square meter or a total of
P48,005,000.00 for the remaining unpaid portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6%
interest per annum from the filing of this case until paid;
3. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] a reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per
square meter of the total area of 48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of
the foregoing area in 1978 or a total of P7,050,974.40.
4. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages;

5. Ordering [NPC] to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and the
Respondents then filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal. On the
other hand, NPC filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, it filed a vigorous opposition to the motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal with a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision.
On August 26, 1996, NPC withdrew its Notice of Appeal to give way to the hearing of its
motion for reconsideration. On August 28, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting execution pending
appeal and denying NPCs motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the RTC was executed pending
appeal and the funds of NPC were garnished by respondents.
To satisfy the judgment, respondents filed with the RTC a motion for execution of its
August 7, 1996 decision, as modified by the CA.
NPC then filed a Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA, arguing that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion when it granted the motion for execution without ordering respondents to
transfer their title in favor of NPC. The CA granted NPCs prayer and issued a TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution and the notice of garnishment.
The CA rendered the now assailed Decision,[10] dismissing NPCs petition for certiorari.
Rejecting NPCs argument, the CA declared that this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732 intended NPC to
pay the full value of the property as compensation without ordering the transfer of respondents title to
the land.
Issue: NPC added that by granting respondents motion for execution, and consequently issuing the writ
of execution and notice of garnishment, the RTC and the CA allowed respondents to retain title to the
property even after the payment of full compensation. This, according to NPC, was a clear case of unjust
Held: The petition lacks merit.
It is a fundamental legal axiom that a writ of execution must conform strictly to the
dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. A writ of execution may not vary from, or go
beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. When a writ of execution does not conform strictly
to a decisions dispositive portion, it is null and void.[13]
Clearly, the writ of execution issued by the RTC and affirmed by the CA does not vary, but is, in fact,
consistent with the final decision in this case. The assailed writ is, therefore, valid.

amended its offer to five (5) hectares.

On August 11, 1954, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89[12] accepting CHS amended offer.
Mariano and Gimenez thereafter delivered possession of the lots described as Blocks 25 and 26 to the City
Government of Naga (city government). Eventually, the contract for the construction of the city hall was
awarded by the Bureau of Public Works through public bidding to Francisco O. Sabaria, a local contractor.
This prompted Mariano and Gimenez to demand the return of the parcels of land from petitioner. On
assurance, however, of then Naga City Mayor Monico Imperial that petitioner will buy the lots instead,
Mariano and Gimenez allowed the city government to continue in possession of the land.
Mariano directed Atty. Eusebio Lopez, Jr., CHS General Manager, to disregard the proposed donation of
lots and insist on Mayor Imperials offer for the city government to purchase them.
In a Letter[16] dated September 3, 2003, Danilo D. Mariano, as administrator and representative of the
heirs of Macario A. Mariano, demanded from petitioner the return of Blocks 25 and 26 to CHS. Alas, to no
Thus, on February 12, 2004, respondent filed a Complaint[17] for unlawful detainer against petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City, Branch 1. In a Decision[18] dated February 14, 2005
of the MTC in Civil Case No. 12334, the MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the
citys claim of ownership over the lots posed an issue not cognizable in an unlawful detainer case.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the court a quo by Decision[19] dated June 20, 2005 in Civil Case No. RTC
2005-0030. It directed petitioner to surrender physical possession of the lots to respondents with
forfeiture of all the improvements, and to pay P2,500,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the land; P587,159.60 as attorneys fees; and the costs of suit.
On October 13, 2005, respondents manifested that they will not seek execution against the
NBI, City Hall and Hall of Justice in case the writ of preliminary injunction is denied.
On August 17, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed Order, thus:
WHEREFORE, let the corresponding Writ of Execution Pending Appeal be issued in
this case immediately pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 70. However, in view of the
MANIFESTATION of plaintiffs dated October 13, 2005 that they will not take possession of
the land and building where the City Hall, Hall of Justice and National Bureau of
Investigation are located while this case is still pending before the Court of Appeals, this
writ of execution shall be subject to the above-cited exception.
Consequently, Clerk of Court Atty. Jesus Mampo issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Sheriff Jorge
B. Lopez on the other hand, served a notice to vacate on respondents, and a notice of garnishment on
Land Bank, Naga City Branch.

It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.
Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires
that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as
they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.[22] We,
therefore, write finis to this litigation.
574 SCRA 661
MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
557 SCRA 528
City of Naga vs. Asuncion
Facts: Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez were the registered owners of a 229,301-square meter
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 671[9] located in Naga City. The land was
subdivided into several lots and sold as part of City Heights Subdivision (CHS).
In a Letter[10] dated July 3, 1954, the officers of CHS offered to construct the Naga City Hall on a two
(2)-hectare lot within the premises of the subdivision. Said lot was to be designated as an open space for
public purpose and donated to petitioner in accordance with the rules and regulations of the National
Urban Planning Commission. By Resolution No. 75[11] dated July 12, 1954, the Municipal Board of Naga
City (Municipal Board) asked CHS to increase the area of the land to four (4) hectares. Accordingly, CHS

The pertinent issues, in our view, are as follows: (1) whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy to
contest the disputed order, resolution, and notices; (2) whether petitioner was guilty of forum-shopping in
filing the instant petition pending the petition for review before the Court of Appeals; (3) whether RTC
Judge Montenegro committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal; and (4)
whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Held: The petition is partly meritorious.
In the interest of justice, we decided to give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition
concerning the August 17, 2006 Order of the RTC. As a rule, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against an RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. [27] Under the present
circumstance however, we agree to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of

hierarchy of courts.[28] For while it has been held by this Court that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the grant of a writ of certiorari, nevertheless such requirement may be
dispensed with where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government.[29] Such is the situation in the case at bar.
Thus, we find no merit in respondents contention that petitioner erred in its choice of remedy before this
Court. Under Section 1(c) and (f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an
interlocutory order and an order of execution, respectively. An interlocutory order is one which does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Such is the nature of an order
granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction; hence, not appealable. The proper remedy,
as petitioner did in this case, is to file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65.
The judgment of the RTC against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately executory. Unlike
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules, Section 21 does not provide a means to prevent execution; hence, the
courts duty to order such execution is practically ministerial. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the
defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the RTC and
decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution
without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the
appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.
524 SCRA 55
Iligan Bay Manufacturing Corp. vs. Dy
Facts: In the late 1970s, petitioner Iligan Bay Manufacturing Corp. (IBMC) constructed its oil mills on a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4,789 in the Province of Lanao del Norte.
Respondent Henry Dy was one of the suppliers that provided electrical and construction supplies for the
said oil mills. IBMC subsequently became part of co-petitioner United Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM), a
conglomerate of oil mills which thrived during the martial law era. In 1984, when UNICOM took over its
management, IBMC became bankrupt which led to its creditors initiating suits for the collection of unpaid
obligations. Also, on September 24, 1984, UNICOM acquired the right, title, and interest of the
Development Bank of the Philippines over the loan accounts of IBMC, including the mortgage on the land
covered by TCT No. T-4,789, where IBMCs oil mill was located.[4]
On March 14, 1985, UNICOM, as assignee of IBMCs loan obligations, foreclosed the
mortgage and acquired the lot covered by TCT No. T-4,789 in a public auction sale as it was the highest
bidder for twenty million pesos (PhP 20,000,000).[5]
In 1988, the Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte certified that IBMC and/or UNICOM
was delinquent in paying its real estate taxes since 1984, which prompted the provincial government to
levy on the disputed lot. On November 9 of the same year, it was then sold at public auction where
respondent Henry Dy emerged as the highest bidder for PhP 290,692.26 plus PhP 10,000. A Certificate of
Sale was subsequently issued which he immediately registered with the Register of Deeds of Lanao del
Due to IBMCS unpaid obligations, respondent filed collection suits in Civil Case No. 1300 on
January 4, 1989 and Civil Case Nos. 1322 and 1324 on February 10, 1989 before the Lanao del Norte
RTC. In connection with these civil actions, a writ of attachment was issued over the disputed lot covered
by TCT No. T-4,789.
On April 26, 1989, respondent, as an attachment creditor in Civil Case Nos. 1300, 1322,
and 1324, exercised his right of redemption in the tax delinquency sale pursuant to Sections 78 and 80 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 464 by tendering to the Provincial Treasurer a check amounting to PhP
319,718.34. The Office of the Provincial Treasurer then issued the June 1, 1989 PTO Official Receipt No.
11553915 as acknowledgment to the receipt of the check.[9]
On June 14, 1989, respondent sent a letter to the Provincial Treasurer, asking that a
certificate of redemption be issued in his favor, as he claimed that he had redeemed the subject property
in accordance with the first paragraph of Sec. 78, PD 464. The Provincial Treasurer, however, did not
accede to Henry Dys demand.
The Provincial Treasurer reiterated that redemption can only be done legally by means of
court proceedings to be instituted by the person who claims to have a lien on the property
subject of the auction sale. In effect, this letter denied respondents request for the
issuance of a final deed of sale in his favor.[15]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

petitioner UNICOM had redeemed the subject property within the time allowed by law (Sec.
78 of PD 464), which is one (1) year from the date the certificate of sale was issued. It also stated that
UNICOM had paid the full redemption price as it had even paid more than what was required of it, and
that the discrepancy of PhP 13,742.11 was a mere miscomputation of the Provincial Treasurer, which
UNICOM cannot be blamed for.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the issue of redemption, the CA concluded that UNICOM failed to pay the additional amount demanded
by the Provincial Treasurer as additional redemption price. Due to such failure, UNICOM failed to satisfy
the total redemption price; thus, the redemption made by UNICOM was not valid.[28]
Issue: Petitioners assert six (6) errors that were committed by the appellate court; however, the main
issue is whether UNICOM had validly redeemed the subject property.
Held: On the validity of the redemption made by UNICOM, the petition has merit.
The applicable law to resolve the main issue is PD 464,[33] entitled Enacting a Real Property Tax Code,
that was in effect at the time of the initiation of the action.
Sec. 78 of PD 464 provides for the redemption of real property after the sale on execution due to tax
delinquency. Sec. 78 reads as follows:
Redemption of real property after sale.Within the term of one year from the date of the
registration of sale of the property, the delinquent taxpayer or his representative, or in his
absence, any person holding a lien or claim over the property, shall have the right to
redeem the same by paying the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy the total amount
of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the costs of sale and the interest
at the rate of twenty per centum on the purchase price, and such payment shall invalidate
the sale certificate issued to the purchaser and shall entitle the person making the same
to a certificate from the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy, stating that he had
redeemed the property.
The provincial or city treasurer or his deputy shall, upon surrender by the purchaser of
the certificate of sale previously issued to him, forthwith return to the latter the entire
purchase price paid by him plus the interest at twenty per centum per annum herein
provided for, the portion of the cost of the sale and other legitimate expenses incurred by
him, and said property shall thereafter be free from the lien of said taxes and penalties.
In the present case, the tax delinquency sale was conducted on November 9, 1988, when Henry Dy
emerged as the highest bidder. On the same day, Henry Dy registered a Certificate of Sale with the
Register of Deeds of Lanao del Norte. UNICOM then exercised its right to redeem on November 2, 1989;
therefore, UNICOM had exercised its right to redeem the property within the one (1) year redemption
As provided in Sec. 78 of PD 464, the redemption price should consist of: (1) the total amount of taxes
and penalties due up to the date of redemption, (2) the costs of sale, and (3) the interest at the rate of
twenty per centum (20%) on the purchase price. We find no error in the CAs finding that there was a
deficiency of PhP 13,742.11 in UNICOMs redemption price. However, we find no evidence that UNICOM
was notified of this deficiency. The Provincial Treasurers letters,[39] which were submitted as evidence to
prove that there was a deficiency in UNICOMs redemption payment, did not prove that UNICOM received
such letters; thus, there was substantial compliance of the requirements of the law.
574 SCRA 66
Premiere Development Bank vs. Flores
Facts: Panacor applied for a loan of P4.1 million with Premiere Development Bank. After an extensive
study of Panacors creditworthiness, Premiere Bank rejected the loan application and suggested that its
affiliate company, Arizona Transport Corporation (Arizona for short), should instead apply for the loan on
condition that the proceeds thereof shall be made available to Panacor. Eventually, Panacor was granted a
P4.1 million credit line as evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement.
Since the P2.7 million released by Premiere Bank fell short of the P4.1 million credit line which was
previously approved, Panacor negotiated for a take-out loan with IBA-Finance Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as IBA-Finance) in the sum of P10 million, P7.5 million of which will be released outright in
order to take-out the loan from Premiere Bank and the balance of P2.5 million (to complete the needed
capital of P4.1 million with Colgate) to be released after the cancellation by Premiere of the collateral
mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. T-3475. Pursuant to the said take-out agreement, IBA-

Finance was authorized to pay Premiere Bank the prior existing loan obligations of Arizona in an amount
not to exceed P6 million.
Premiere Bank refused to turn over the requested documents on the ground that Arizona had existing
unpaid loan obligations and that it was the banks policy to require full payment of all outstanding loan
obligations prior to the release of mortgage documents. Thereafter, Premiere Bank issued to IBA-Finance
a Final Statement of Account showing Arizonas total loan indebtedness. On October 19, 1995, Panacor
and Arizona executed in favor of IBA-Finance a promissory note in the amount of P7.5 million. Thereafter,
IBA-Finance paid to Premiere Bank the amount of P6,235,754.79, representing the full outstanding loan
account of Arizona. Despite such payment, Premiere Bank still refused to release the requested mortgage
documents specifically, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-3475.
Panacor and Arizona filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Premiere Bank
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 65577. On June 11, 1996, IBAFinance filed a complaint-in-intervention praying that judgment be rendered ordering Premiere Bank to
pay damages in its favor. On May 26, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Panacor and
IBA-Finance, the decretal portion of which reads: x x x
Respondent corporations filed a motion for execution dated 25 August 2005 13 asking for the issuance of a
writ of execution of our decision in G.R. No. 159352 where we awarded P800,000.00 as damages in their
favor.14 The RTC granted the writ of execution sought. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order.
Issue: only question before us is the propriety of the grant of the writ of execution by the RTC.
Held: The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. In such a situation, the prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court. 16 This policy is
clearly and emphatically embodied in Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice
to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisprudentially, the Court has recognized certain exceptions to the rule as where in cases of special and
exceptional nature it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its
execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the
judgment unjust.17
G.R. No. 143312, August 12, 2005
Silverio et al vs. Filpino Business Consultants Inc
Facts: On 22 September 1995, Esses and Tri-Star executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
in favor of FBCI. Esses and Tri-Star failed to redeem the Calatagan Property. On 27 May 1997, FBCI filed a
Petition for Consolidation of Title of the Calatagan Property with the RTC Balayan. 2 FBCI obtained a
judgment by default. Subsequently, TCT No. T-55200 in the names of Esses and Tri-Star was cancelled
and TCT No. T-77656 was issued in FBCIs name. On 20 April 1998, the RTC Balayan issued a writ of
possession in FBCIs favor. FBCI then entered the Calatagan Property. When Silverio, Jr., Esses and TriStar learned of the judgment by default and writ of possession, they filed a petition for relief from
judgment and the recall of the writ of possession. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star alleged that the

judgment by default is void because the RTC Balayan did not acquire jurisdiction over them. FBCI
allegedly forged the service of summons on them. On 28 December 1998, the RTC Balayan nullified and
set aside the judgment by default and the writ of possession. The RTC Balayan found that the summons
and the complaint were not served on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star. The RTC Balayan directed the
service of summons anew on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star.
The RTC Balayan ruled that FBCI could not be deprived of possession of the Calatagan Property because
FBCI made substantial improvements on it. Possession could revert to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star only
if they reimburse FBCI. The RTC Balayan gave Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star 15 days to file their
responsive pleadings. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star moved for the partial reconsideration of the 14 April
1999 Order. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star argued that since the judgment by default was nullified, they
should be restored to their possession of the Calatagan Property. FBCI did not file any opposition to the
On 8 May 2000, the RTC Balayan issued the writ of possession to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star. On 12
May 2000, FBCI filed with the RTC Balayan a Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Possession on the
ground that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56924 was not yet final and FBCIs
motion for reconsideration was still pending. The RTC Balayan set the hearing on 26 May 2000. On 23
May 2000, FBCI filed with the RTC Balayan an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend Enforcement of Writ of
Possession. FBCI pointed out that it is now the new owner of Esses and Tri-Star having purchased the
"substantial and controlling shares of stocks"4 of the two corporations.
Issue: whether appeal is the proper remedy against an order suspending the execution of a writ of
Held: The petition has merit.
First, interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of
the case or put an end to the proceedings. 8 The proper remedy to question an improvident interlocutory
order is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not Rule 45.9 A petition for review under Rule 45 is the
proper mode of redress to question final judgments. 10
An order staying the execution of the writ of possession is an interlocutory order. 11 Clearly, this order
cannot be appealed. A petition for certiorari was therefore the correct remedy. Moreover, Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star pointed out that the RTC Balayan acted on an ex-parte motion to suspend the writ of
possession, which is a litigious matter, without complying with the rules on notice and hearing. Silverio,
Jr., Esses and Tri-Star also assail the RTC Balayans impending move to accept FBCIs evidence on its
subsequent ownership of Esses and Tri-Star. In effect, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star accuse the RTC
Balayan of acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, which is within the
ambit of certiorari.
However, in the exercise of our judicial discretion, we will treat the appeal as a petition under Rule 65. 12
Technical rules must be suspended whenever the purposes of justice warrant it, such as in this case
where substantial and important issues await resolution.
Second, the RTC Balayans 15 June 2000 Order lifting the suspension of the writ of possession was issued
to correct its action on FBCIs ex-parte motion, which did not have the required notice and hearing. This
issue has thus become a fait accompli. However, while the 15 June 2000 Order is supposed to have
mooted the suspension of the execution of the writ of possession by lifting the suspension on 17 June
2000, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star claim that the writ has not been executed in their favor. Thus, the
issues in this petition are far from being moot. Also, the existence of a supervening event is another issue
that must be resolved since the RTC Balayan had instead submitted to the "higher courts" the resolution
of this issue.