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AFZAL HUSSAIN,
Petitioner,
v.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 05-2350
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jennifer Sheethel Varughese, Herndon, Virginia, for Petitioner. Ernesto Horacio Molina, II, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON
HUSSAIN v. GONZALES
OPINION
FLOYD, District Judge:
Afzal Hussain, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions this Court
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)
denying his appeal from the immigration judges order which denied
his motion to reopen and disposed of his motion to remand. Hussains
only challenge is to the denial of his motion to remand. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for review.
I.
On December 6, 2000, a notice to appear was issued to Hussain,
alleging that he entered the United States at an unknown location on
or about April 1992. (J.A. at 5.) The notice further averred that Hussain was not admitted or paroled after inspection, nor did he have any
valid reentry documents. Id.
On October 3, 2002, the immigration judge denied Hussains
request for relief from removal in absentia. (J.A. at 23.) On January
26, 2005, more than two years after the immigration judges order,
Hussain filed a motion to reopen with the immigration judge. (J.A. at
31-58.) Hussain claimed that 1) the in absentia removal order should
be rescinded because his failure to appear at the hearing was due to
exceptional circumstances; 2) the denial of relief under the Violence
Against Women Act, in which he claimed that he was abused by his
first wife, was in error; and 3) he was now eligible for adjustment of
status to that of a lawful permanent resident on the basis of a labor
certification filed on his behalf by his employer on April 24, 2001.
(J.A. at 31-58.)
HUSSAIN v. GONZALES
The immigration judge denied the motion to reopen for the reasons
stated in the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) response.
(J.A. at 178.) The DHS had argued that Hussains motion was
untimely and that he did not establish exceptional circumstances.
(J.A. at 150-51.)
Hussain appealed the immigration judges decision to the Board.
(J.A. at 174-76.) While the appeal was pending, Hussain filed a
motion to remand his case to the immigration judge. (J.A. at 186.)
According to Hussain, his new wife had filed an Immigrant Petition
on his behalf. (J.A. at 187.) Hussain argued that his circumstances had
materially changed and that he was entitled to a rehearing before the
immigration judge. Id. Hussain attached several documents to his
motion to remand, claiming that he was eligible for immediate and
comprehensive relief. (J.A. at 186-238.) The Government neglected
to file a response to the motion to remand.
The Board found that Hussains motion to reopen the immigration
judges order of removal entered in absentia was untimely. (J.A. at
259-60.) The Board further noted that Hussain "is also seeking to
reopen proceedings to apply for adjustment of status. An alien is not
required to rescind his or her deportation order under [the applicable]
Act if he or she is pursuing an application for new relief, and provided
there is no evidence that the respondent received the required warnings" for failing to appear. Id. (citing Matter of M-S, 22 I. & N. Dec.
349 (BIA 1998)). The Board found that motion to be untimely, as
well. Id. at 260. This petition followed.
II.
Hussain limits his petition for review to challenging the disposition
of the motion to remand. We review the denial of a motion to remand
for abuse of discretion. Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 408 (4th
Cir. 2005). The Board abuses its discretion when it "fails to offer a
reasoned explanation for its decision, distorts or disregards important
aspects of the aliens claim." Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A.
Hussain argues that the Board erred by failing to mention or
address his motion to remand in the order denying relief. The Govern-
HUSSAIN v. GONZALES
ment admits that the Board failed to refer specifically to the motion
to remand. The Government contends, however, that the Board referenced the motion to remand when it discussed Hussains motion to
reopen to apply for adjustment of status.
Because Hussains motion was filed while the appeal was pending,
it is properly classified as a motion to remand. See 8 C.F.R.
1003.2(c)(4)(2005). Thus, Hussain is correct in his contention that
the Board failed to dispose specifically of the motion to remand.
The record supports the finding that the Boards reference to the
motion to reopen was a reference to the motion Hussain filed before
the immigration judge. As noted above, in that motion, Hussain
sought reopening as a result of exceptional circumstances causing him
to be absent from his hearing, an adjustment of status because of a
labor certification filed by his attorney and relief under the Violence
Against Women Act. (J.A. at 247-55.)
The Boards order initially referenced Hussains argument that
exceptional circumstances were present when he missed his immigration hearing. (J.A. at 259.) As observed above, however, the Board
found the motion for relief as to that request to be untimely. Id. It continued by stating that Hussain "is also seeking to reopen proceedings
to apply for adjustment of status."1 Id. The Board also noted that an
alien is not obligated under some circumstances to have a deportation
order rescinded if the alien is pursuing an application for new relief.
(J.A. at 260 (citing Matter of M-S, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349).)
In Matter of M-S, the petitioner sought to have the immigration
judge rescind the order of removal so as to apply for adjustment of
status. Id. The Board held that in some circumstances the order does
not have to be rescinded. Id. at 356.
1
The Government claims that the Boards use of the word "also"
implies it was moving from the appeal to the motion to remand. It is
equally possible, however, that the use of the term "also" meant that the
Board was moving from considering reopening the in absentia order to
reopening to consider the labor certification.
HUSSAIN v. GONZALES
In the instant case, after noting that an order does not have to be
rescinded in certain cases, the Board continued by finding that,
despite the fact that rescission is sometimes unnecessary, Hussains
motion to reopen to seek new relief was untimely.2 The Boards discussion of whether rescission is essential relates to Hussains motion
to reopen, in which he did seek rescission, rather than the motion to
remand, in which he did not specifically seek rescission. Therefore,
based on the case citation in the order, the fact that the Board referred
to the motion as one to reopen, instead of referring to a motion for
remand, the discussion of rescission, and the fact that the motion to
reopen filed before the immigration judge sought an adjustment of
status, we are convinced that the Board was not referring to the
motion to remand when it disposed of the "motion to reopen."
In addition, the Government did not oppose Hussains motion to
remand. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(g)(3), if the Government does
not file a response to a motion, it is deemed unopposed. An unopposed motion to remand for adjustment of status may be remanded.
In re Erales, A75-512-988, 2005 WL 649163 (BIA Jan 11, 2005)
(unpublished); In re Marquez-Ledezma, No. A78-153-433, 2004 WL
2418722 (BIA Oct. 8, 2004) (unpublished). The Boards failure to
make reference to the Governments lack of a response lends support
to Hussains claim that the Board neglected to consider the motion.
Moreover, the finding that the motion was untimely apparently
refers to Hussains motion to reopen filed before the immigration
judge. That motion was filed more than two years after the immigration judges decision. A motion to reopen must be filed no later than
ninety days after the date of the administrative decision at issue. 8
C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(2). The parties have not submitted, and we have
not found, either a comparable regulation for motions to remand or
an instance in which a motion to remand, filed while an appeal was
2
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HUSSAIN v. GONZALES
This Court has also noted that a remand is necessary for the Board to
make an initial determination on a factual issue if it is necessary to dispose of the case. Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2005).
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to establish a prima facie case for adjustment of status "is a legal, not
a factual, conclusion." Ante at 8.
Significantly, the majority opinions decision to address the merits
of Hussains Motion to Remand in the first instance violates the ordinary remand rule as recently reiterated and applied in the Supreme
Courts immigration decisions in INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002)
(per curiam) and Gonzales v. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. 1613 (2006) (per
curiam).
In Ventura, the Ninth Circuit had addressed and rejected an argument by the government that political conditions in Guatemala had
improved to the point that political persecution was no longer likely
in Guatemala. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13. The Board had not addressed
the issue. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit insofar
as it had denied remand to the Board. In so reversing, the Supreme
Court applied the ordinary remand rule, which rule provides that, in
reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, "[a] court of
appeals is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into
the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on
such an inquiry. Rather, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation." Id. at 16 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As rationale for the ordinary remand rule, the Court explained
that the administrative "agency can bring its expertise to bear upon
the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later to determine whether its decision exceeds the
leeway that the law provides." Id. at 17. The Court held that the Ninth
Circuit should have applied the ordinary remand rule, and therefore,
had erred by deciding the "changed circumstances" issue "without
giving the [Board] the opportunity to address the matter in the first
instance." Id. at 17.
In Thomas, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Ninth Circuit
had erred in considering, in the first instance, whether a given group
of persons fell within the statutory term "particular social group"
under 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), when the Board had not formally considered such question. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. at 1614. Applying the ordi-
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HUSSAIN v. GONZALES
nary remand rule, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit had again
usurped the relevant administrative agencys role by making basic
asylum eligibility decisions. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. at 1615. The Board
had yet to consider whether "Boss Ronnies family presents the kind
of kinship ties that constitute a particular social group," which
"matter," the Court stated, "requires determining the facts and deciding whether the facts as found fall within a statutory term." Id. The
Supreme Court, therefore, vacated and remanded, holding that, absent
"special circumstances" not present in that case, the relevant administrative agency must first opine on issues about which it has expertise
prior to appellate review. Id.
In addressing Hussains Motion to Remand on the merits in the
first instance, the majority opinion attempts to rely upon a distinction
between factual and legal issues. The majority opinion states that in
discussing the ordinary remand rule in Ventura and Thomas, "[t]he
Supreme Court did not speak to whether the [federal] appellate courts
have authority to review in the first instance statutory issues . . . ."
Ante at 7. Therefore, the majority opinion reasons, Ventura and
Thomas present no bar to our court, in the first instance, denying Hussains Motion to Remand based upon a legal ruling. Ante at 7-8.
In my view, the majority opinion misreads Ventura and Thomas.
The issues remanded in Ventura and Thomas both involved factual
and legal aspects. In Ventura, the "changed circumstances" issue called not only for the Boards review of evidence in the record, but for
the Boards application of the law to the facts, Ventura, 537 U.S. at
16-17. Such application of the law to the facts brings into play the
Boards conferred interpretative expertise in the field of immigration
law, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (holding that
Chevron deference applies to the Board based on the statutory allocation of power laid out by Congress in the INA); see also 8 C.F.R.
1003.1(d) ("[T]he Board, through precedent decisions, shall provide
clear and uniform guidance to the Service, the immigration judges,
and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration
of the Act and its implementing regulations."). Similarly, the issues
remanded in Thomas called for the Boards review of the evidence in
the record as well as the Boards exercise of its conferred interpretive
expertise in the field of immigration law. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. at 1615
("The agency has not yet considered whether Boss Ronnies family
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