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No. 14-1290
MOUNIA ELYAZIDI,
Plaintiff Appellant,
v.
SUNTRUST BANK; MITCHELL RUBENSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C., d/b/a
Rubenstein and Cogan,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:13-cv-02204-DKC)
Argued:
Decided:
March 5, 2015
Elyazidi
(Appellant)
overdrew
her
checking
A debt
and let the matter drop, filed this lawsuit against the bank and
its lawyers (collectively, Appellees).
We affirm.
I.
Appellant
lives
in
Fairfax
County,
Virginia.
In
In
J.A. 38. 1
Those rules
and
regulations
include
provision
addressing
the
account
SunTrust
hired
Maryland
law
firm,
Mitchell
MR&A
filed
suit
on
SunTrusts
behalf
in
the
general
of
drafting
warrant
in
debt,
detailed
standardized
complaint,
pleading
MR&A
that
utilized
the
Virginia
owe
25.
Appellees
and
filled
$ _____
in
the
attorneys
blanks
to
indicate
that
J.A. 31.
its own affidavit, dated June 11, 2012, in support of the claim
4
attorney
an
reasonable
award
fee,
arrangement
which
with
client
25%
Kaplan
percent
equal
in
this
to
Revesman
[sic]
or
as
less
case.
(Revesman)
a
than
Id.
at
just
the
and
actual
32.
Her
affidavit attests that her billable rate was $250 per hour and
that she spent approximately one hour preparing the warrant in
debt.
Id.
Appellants social
When, in December
personal
financial
information,
the
judge
agreed
to
J.A. 151.
In
She
The
Id. at 174-75.
B.
Appellants response to her defeat in the collection
suit
was
circuit
to
file
court
in
complaint
Montgomery
against
County,
SunTrust
and
Maryland.
Her
MR&A
in
amended
in
this
appeal. 5
The
first
four
counts
challenged
Specifically:
Appellees
removed
the
case
to
the
MR&A
separately
filed
motions
to
United
States
There, SunTrust
dismiss
all
claims.
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
deprived
the
district
court
of
the
district
court
rejected
MR&As
Elyazidi v.
Count
VI
could
not
survive
the
disclosure
of
oversight
documents.
that
was
cured
by
redaction
of
the
relevant
Id. at *7.
all
federal
claims,
it
was
under
no
WL
824129,
Nevertheless,
the
at
*7
court
(citing
opted
28
to
U.S.C.
exercise
obligation
to
See Elyazidi,
1367(c)(3)).
supplemental
Id.
on
the
ground
that
the
extraterritorial effect.
Maryland
statutes
have
no
that
the
Id. at *8.
II.
On
appeal,
Appellees
renew
their
argument
threshold
issue
addressing
the
that
this
merits
of
court
must
Appellants
investigate
claims.
before
Jones
v.
Am.
Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999).
Appellees argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
Counts
III
and
MR&As
pursuit
IV
because
of
attorneys
premised
on
awarded
SunTrust
Appellees
doctrine
the
Br.
theory
25%
10.
provides
decisions
lies
exclusively
that
the
that
191,
omitted).
196
superior
However,
Cir.
a
--
in
the
lower
state
courts
--
erred
when
the
the
are
it
judgment.
Rooker-Feldman
review
federal
and,
challenging
court
court
speaking,
to
both
state
fees
jurisdiction
with
(4th
in
state
attorneys
counts
fees
Generally
not
with
these
state
court
courts,
but
ultimately,
the
federal
(internal
court
is
not
quotation
stripped
marks
of
its
on
the
federal
district
9
courts
Rather, the
jurisdiction
is
caused
by
state-court
judgments
rendered
before
the
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (emphasis
supplied); see Davani v. Va. Dept of Transp., 434 F.3d 712,
718-19 (4th Cir. 2006).
The instant appeal poses no challenge to the Virginia
courts
judgment.
That
judgment
reflected
post-trial
fees
for
the
13.9
hours
of
work
put
into
the
case.
Her
We hold,
represented that Appellant owed $2,372.71 in attorneys fees -an amount exactly equal to 25 percent of Appellants debt to
SunTrust.
Appellant
argues
that
these
representations
were
Second, she argues that she could not have owed the
of
statements
15
as
U.S.C.
an
1692e.
unfair
or
Count
IV
unconscionable
condemns
means
of
the
debt
allegations
and
drawing
the
allegations
reasonable
inferences
in
all
must
advance
the
plaintiffs
claim
Walters v.
McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
11
Appellant, we
15 U.S.C.
any
debt
1692e(2).
collector
for
the
collection
of
debt.
Id.
Powell v.
collectors
representation
consumer.
representation
from
the
vantage
is
of
misleading,
the
least
we
view
the
sophisticated
12
F.3d
385,
394
omitted).
(4th
Under
Cir.
this
2014)
standard,
(internal
we
quotation
consider
how
do
not
give
interpretations;
credit
we
to
assume
naive
marks
However,
bizarre
or
idiosyncratic
quotient
of
reasonableness
Id.
There
litigation
Wolpoff
&
is
no
denying
activity
is
Abramson,
485
that,
subject
F.3d
to
226,
as
the
231
general
FDCPA.
(4th
Cir.
matter,
Sayyed
2007);
v.
see
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 293, 299 (1995) (holding that a
car loan borrower could pursue FDCPA claims against the lenders
counsel for falsely asserting in a letter that the borrower owed
money for a particularly broad substitute insurance policy on
the car).
sought
no
more
than
applicable
law
allowed
and
13
argument
that
he
had
no
evidence
to
support
this
allegation.
It is true that the standardized warrant-in-debt form
uses the word owe, id. at 30, suggesting perhaps that the
14
This language,
debtor
affidavit
would
owe
at
clarifies
request[ing]
reasonable
an
fee.
the
that
award
J.A.
of
32
conclusion
SunTrusts
25%
the
counsel
percent
(emphasis
of
[sic]
as
supplied).
case.
was
a
The
simply
just
It
and
further
explains that SunTrusts counsel had spent one hour on the case
to date, and that counsel anticipated spending at least 23 more
hours pursuing and executing a judgment in SunTrusts favor.
Under
the
circumstances,
any
consumer
--
no
matter
how
Accordingly, we affirm
IV,
alleging
violation
Section
of
15
1692f
U.S.C.
condemns
collect
any
debt,
and
provides
15
non-exhaustive
list
of
proscribed conduct.
Appellant
invokes,
15 U.S.C. 1692f.
prohibits
[t]he
collection
of
any
amount
principal
obligation)
unless
such
amount
is
expressly
Id. 1692f(1).
Appellants
complaint
alleges
that
the
request
for
J.A. 15.
the
amount
owed
to
the
bank.
Id.
at
56.
in
Virginia
the
Virginia
law
an
debt
collection
award
reasonable . . . under
the
of
suit.
attorneys
facts
and
Though
fees
circumstances
under
must
be
of
the
in
the
September
encourages
2010
plaintiffs
agreement.
to
include
Indeed,
such
the
estimates
supplies a blank space for attorneys fees along with the spaces
provided for the alleged debt and court costs.
Though we draw
here
is
that
Appellees
sought
to
enforce
their
To
claim,
or
as
Appellant
does,
that
such
activity
is
unfair
therefore,
that
Count
IV
fails
to
state
claim
We
for
relief.
B.
We turn now to Count VI, which asserts that MR&As
disclosure of Appellants social security number in the bank
statements accompanying the bill of particulars constituted an
unfair or unconscionable means of debt collection, in violation
of 15 U.S.C. 1692f.
Section
1692f
lists
unconscionable practices.
eight
examples
of
unfair
or
properly
notifying
the
drawer
of
when
it
will
be
1692f(3);
making
disclosing
the
1692f(5);
threatening
debtor
of
collect
true
property,
purpose
calls
of
nonjudicial
even
though
to
the
without
communication,
action
the
debtor
to
debt
id.
dispossess
collector
the
has
no
of
it,
see
id.
1692f(6)(A)-(B);
[c]ommunicating
sending
to
consumer
via
envelopes
that
plainly
of
these
enumerated
activities
have
in
common
What
is
the
doubt,
the
public
disclosure
of
ones
social
Appellees
with
the
corrected.
bill
of
particulars,
Though
Appellant
an
error
the
characterizes
court
the
consumer will simply pay the debt rather than risk identity
theft, J.A. 16-17, her logic is dubious at best.
here
belies
her
assertion
that
counsel
would
The record
have
no
Id. at 17.
Appellant
The
the MCDCA, which provides that debt collectors may not [c]laim,
attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the
right does not exist.
Count
II
accuses
SunTrust,
exclusively,
of
making
false
MCPA.
See
Md.
Code
Ann.,
Com.
Law
13-301(1),
-303
or
written
statement,
visual
description,
or
other
The district
conduct
occurring
entirely
in
Virginia.
Elyazidi
v.
SunTrust Bank, No. 13-2204, 2014 WL 824129, at *7-8 (D. Md. Feb.
28, 2014).
In
construed
contrary
as
Maryland,
not
regulatory
having
legislative
statutes
extra-territorial
intent
is
expressly
are
effect
stated.
generally
unless
Consumer
Prot. Div. v. Outdoor World Corp., 603 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992); see also Chairman of Bd. of Trs. of Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Waldron, 401 A.2d 172, 177 (Md. 1979) (stating that
a Maryland statute prohibiting a state pensioner from accepting
paid legal work does not prohibit the pensioner from practicing
law outside of Maryland, as the states General Assembly has no
power to regulate whom our sister jurisdictions may authorize to
engage in the practice of law within their borders); State ex
rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 62 A.2d 568, 569 (Md. 1948) (Ordinarily a
20
v.
Outdoor
World
Corp.,
In Consumer Protection
Maryland
appellate
court
activity
affecting
Maryland
residents.
sales
States.
practices
Id. at 1383.
that
occur
entirely
within
other
the
locations.
company
allegedly
employed
at
those
out-of-state
See id.
In an attempt to frame the challenged activities as
debt
Virginia.
21
The
allegedly
offensive
they
might
have
inflicted
could
have
occurred
only
in
likewise
find
no
significance
in
Appellants
related argument -- raised, in the first instance, on appeal -that virtually every act that would create liability under the
Maryland statutes occurred in Maryland.
23.
all
legal
documents
received instructions
at
from
its
SunTrust
Maryland
there;
and,
office;
from
that
Id.
even
we
could
infer
them
from
the
stated
Marylands
consumer
protection
laws
to
Appellant cannot
gin
up
lawsuit
IV.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
judgment
of
the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
23