877 F.

2d 60
13 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1024

Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of
unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
Helen MARTIN-TRIGONA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joel P. BENNETT, P.C., Joel P. Bennett, Q. Russell Hatchl,
Clohan, Adams & Dean, A Partnership, William C.
Clohan, Jr., John E. Dean, Scott G.
Adams, Defendants-Appellees.
Helen MARTIN-TRIGONA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joel P. BENNETT, P.C., Joel P. Bennett, Q. Russell Hatchl,
Clohan, Adams & Dean, A Partnership, William C.
Clohan, Jr., John E. Dean, Scott G.
Adams, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 88-1800, 89-1402.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 9, 1989.
Decided June 12, 1989.

Helen Martin-Trigona, appellant pro se.

Q. Russell Hatchl for appellees.
Before DONALD RUSSELL and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

Helen Martin-Trigona appeals two orders of the district court: one denying her
motion for a preliminary injunction and one granting a motion for summary
judgment for the defendant in Martin-Trigona's suit seeking declaratory relief
and damages. We affirm both orders.

Martin-Trigona filed this suit pro se against a law firm and several of its
attorneys [hereinafter "Bennett"], seeking damages and declaratory relief for an
allegedly "false" judgment recorded against her. Jurisdiction was sought in the
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, the federal question jurisdiction
statute. Martin-Trigona asserted that Bennett caused to be recorded in Virginia
an order rendered by the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia which awarded fees due to Bennett under a contract with MartinTrigona. She alleged that the order was not a valid judgment upon which
execution could be had. In addition to monetary and declaratory relief, MartinTrigona sought a preliminary injunction directing the clerk of records in
Virginia to expunge the order.

The district court denied injunctive relief, reasoning that until the judgment of
the D.C. district court was vacated, set aside, or stayed, it was properly
recordable in Virginia. The court also granted a motion for summary judgment
for Bennett, and dismissed Martin-Trigona's suit.1

Martin-Trigona asserts that the D.C. district court's order was not recordable in
Virginia because the order did not comply with the requirements of a valid final
judgment contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Contrary to this
assertion, the "Amended Order" dated September 29, 1988, complied with the
requirements of Rule 58.2 Further, the separate document requirement of Rule
58 goes only to the finality of a judgment for the purposes of appeal, not to the
judgment's validity for other purposes, such as recordation. See Bankers Trust
Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 623-24
(4th Cir.1981).

Martin-Trigona contends that the order was not recordable because the clerk of
the D.C. district court did not sign it, as required under Rule 58. This argument
is unavailing because the absence of a clerk's signature from a judgment which
is approved by the court, as evidenced by the judge's signature, does not
undermine the validity of the judgment. See Wyzik v. Employee Benefit Plan
of Crane Co., 663 F.2d 348, 349 n. * (1st Cir.1981); Scola v. Boat Frances, R.,
Inc., 618 F.2d 147, 151 (1st Cir.1980).

Martin-Trigona next argues that the judgment was not properly recordable

because when it was recorded, the D.C. district court had before it timely
motions to vacate or for a new trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59.3 A timely Rule 59
motion does not automatically suspend the authority to record a federal
judgment in a state court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(b); Marcelletti & Son Constr.
Co. v. Millcreek Township Sewer Auth., 313 F.Supp. 920, 925 (W.D.Pa.1970);
Van Huss v. Landsberg, 262 F.Supp. 867 (W.D.Mo.1967); 7 J. Moore & J.
Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 62.04 n. 4 (2d ed. 1987); 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2903 (1973). Martin-Trigona's
reliance on Anastos v. M.J.D.M. Truck Rentals, Inc., 521 F.2d 1301, 1304 n. 5
(7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976), is misplaced. The court in
Anastos held that the recordation of a federal judgment in Illinois did not create
a valid lien under Illinois law because a pending Rule 59 motion in the federal
court deprived the judgment of finality. The Anastos court expressly
differentiated, however, between the recordation of a judgment, and the
creation of a valid lien by virtue of the recordation, with the pendency of a Rule
59 motion preventing the latter, not the former. Anastos, 521 F.2d at 1303-04.
In the instant case, there is no indication in the record that Bennett ever did
anything to enforce the judgment of the D.C. district court, other than recording
it in Virginia. Indeed, at the hearing on Martin-Trigona's motion for injunctive
relief, she conceded that no action other than recordation had been taken in
pursuit of the judgment's enforcement. Anastos therefore provides no basis for
relief from recordation of the judgment in Virginia.
7

Next, Martin-Trigona contends that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1963 prevented recordation

of the judgment in Virginia. That statute has no application to this case because
it only addresses the registration of federal judgments in other federal courts.
See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1963; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 815 F.2d 857, 86162 (2d Cir.1987).

Finally, Martin-Trigona asserts that the judgment rendered by the D.C. district
court was void because the underlying contract dispute between Martin-Trigona
and Bennett was properly the subject of arbitration under the contract. This
contention is not relevant to the validity of the judgment for the purpose of
recordation. Instead, it is properly cognizable only in a direct attack (as on
appeal) of the judgment.

Finding all of Martin-Trigona's contentions of error by the district court in

denying injunctive relief and granting summary judgment for Bennett to be
without merit, we affirm the orders of the district court. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the
briefs and record and argument would not aid the decisional process.

10

AFFIRMED.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment "[f]or the reasons stated
from the bench." Because the transcript of the proceedings on the motion for
summary judgment is not part of the record on appeal, the basis for the district
court's judgment is not apparent. However, because we determine that
summary judgment was appropriate (see below), the omission from the record
of the transcript is of no moment

On appeal, Martin-Trigona also complains about the execution of an order by

the D.C. district court dated May 9, 1988. The recordability of that order, which
was subsequently modified by the order of September 29, 1988, was not before
the district court below. We therefore do not consider the issue

According to the Appellees' Brief, the Rule 59 motions were denied by order
dated December 21, 1988. Assertedly, Martin-Trigona has filed a timely notice
of appeal from the September 29, 1988, order and now has an appeal pending
with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals