PEOPLE VS.

LAUGA
FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies
revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his father was having drinking
spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant has the
habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out
with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid
inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear.
Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the
victims brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim
for staying out late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, victim recounted to
her brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother
and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant
in his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which
he obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because
he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible
in evidence?
HELD: Negative.
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case
of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the
specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly
on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the
color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as evidence, it does not
warrant the acquittal of the accused. The appellants conviction is upheld because of
the strong evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 125333

March 20, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO FELIXMINIA Y CAMACHO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45,1 Urdaneta, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-8668 imposing on accused-appellant
Rolando Felixminia the penalty of death.
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an Information which
reads thusly:
That on or about the 19th day of September, 1995, in the afternoon, at Brgy. San
Vicente, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, have carnal knowledge with (sic) Maria Lourdes
Galinato, alias "Tisay", a six (6) year old girl, against her will, and to conceal his criminal
act, accused kill (sic) and bury (sic) said Maria Lourdes Galinato near the Macalong
River in aforesaid barangay, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Contrary to Article 335, No. 3, in relation to Article 249, Revised Penal Code.2
On November 15, 1995, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded "not
guilty."3 Thereafter, trial ensued.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under
Republic Act No. 7659, the offense having been committed with the attendant
circumstances of "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed" and "when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old,"
hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the heirs of the victim
Ma. Lourdes Galinato the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity; P30,699.00 as actual
damages and P500,000.00 as moral damages.
And to pay the costs.
Penultimately, it is said: "Dura lex, sed lex" translated as "The law is harsh, but that is
the law!"
SO ORDERED.4
Accused-appellant now attributes the following errors to the trial court, viz:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED PURELY ON THE
BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT DO NOT HOWEVER MEET THE
REQUISITES PROVIDED FOR BY LAW FOR CONVICTION BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF THE "FRUIT
OF THE POISONOUS TREE" AND IN NOT REJECTING EVIDENCES (SIC) AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINED AND DERIVED IN A MANNER THAT SHOULD HAVE
MADE THEM CONSTITUTIONALLY INADMISSIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE UNREBUTTED
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE ACCUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS AND
SUPPORT HIS DEFENSE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AND SENTENCING
HIM TO THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.5
The records disclose that on September 19, 1995, at about seven oclock in the morning,
accused-appellant was drinking gin with his cousin, Ronnie Garcia, in a canteen at Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.6 Thereafter, they proceeded to Bayaoas, also in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, where
they continued drinking.7
Around ten oclock in the morning of the same day, prosecution witness Rosita Mangunay saw
accused-appellant and Ronnie Garcia walking along Ambrosio Street in the poblacion. When
they passed her, they greeted her and she noticed that they both smelled of liquor.8
In the early afternoon of the same day, the already inebriated accused-appellant went to look for
the six-year old Maria Lourdes Galinato, also known as "Tisay" and found her playing inside a
jeepney. He took her.9
At around two forty-five in the afternoon of the same day, witness Mangunay again saw the
accused-appellant walking along Ambrosio Street, Urdaneta, at the corner or the crossroad of a
small sari-sari store owned by a certain Soling. She saw accused-appellant carrying a child who
was crying and struggling. She recognized the child as "Tisay." She declared that she clearly
saw the accused-appellant because they were walking towards each other coming from
opposite directions. Accused-appellant proceeded to the west.10
Between three to four oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Natividad Bernardo, a
resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, saw accused-appellant pass by their house. He
was parrying a child who looked about five to six years old. They were heading towards the
Macalong River.11

At approximately the same time, prosecution witness Leah Magno, also resident of the same
barangay, saw accused-appellant carrying a child. They were heading towards the wooded area
in the Macalong River.12
At around five oclock in the afternoon to six-thirty in the evening of the same day, witness
Magno saw accused-appellant again, this time he was walking alone to town coming from the
direction of the Macalong River.13
Meanwhile, the parents of Maria Lourdes were frantically searching for their child. When their
search proved futile, they reported her missing to the barangay captain and to the police.14
Upon receipt of reports that accused-appellant was seen with the missing child during the day,
the police together with the barangay captains of Camantiles and Bayaoas of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan and some relatives of the Galinatos went to the residence of accused-appellant at
Sitio Lico, Yatyat, Manaoag, Pangasinan.15 As they approached the said house, they saw the
accused-appellant jump out of the window carrying a black bag.16Accused-appellant fled. They
gave chase. After searching three barangays for more than twenty exhausting hours, the
pursuers finally caught up with him at an open field in Magalong, Laoac, Pangasinan at around
three oclock in the afternoon of September 20, 1995.17 He was brought to the Urdaneta police
station where he admitted that he raped, killed and buried Maria Lourdes near the Macalong
River in San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.18
Thereafter, the police brought him to the Macalong River. There, he trembled and hysterically
cried as he pointed to the place where he raped, killed and buried Maria Lourdes.19 True
enough, they found the lifeless body of the little child lying half-buried in the creek with her head
hanging on her shoulder.20
An autopsy conducted on the body of Maria Lourdes revealed the following findings:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
-

Washerwomans hands and feet.

Bleeding from nares.

Laceration of Hymen.
3-5 oclock
6-8 oclock

Introitus admits two (2) fingers.

- Ecchymosis on center of throat and right hyoid area, below left eye and
frontal region of face and bridge of nose and right eye.
-

Obvious non-alignment of neck.

SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:

50 cc to 100 cc blood in cranium mostly from basal area.

CAUSE OF DEATH:
Brain stem injury.1wphi1.nt
Hymenal laceration.21
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and in not rejecting as inadmissible the evidence derived
therefrom.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1997 Constitution, which embodies the mandatory protection
afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the corresponding duty
of the State to enforce such mandate, provides:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferable of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
The ruling of the Court in People v. Bravo22 is instructive. Thus:
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the
time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission
of a crime although not yet in custody (People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95; Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 412,
citing People v. Mara, 236 SCRA 565). The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition
that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and
psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It
was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily
and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced
to admit although untrue (People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626). Law enforcement
agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a person under
investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
requirement is considered a denial of such right(People v. Santos, 283 SCRA
443; People v. Januario, 267 SCRA 609). Courts are not allowed to distinguish between

preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the

exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which
may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an
independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible. (Gamboa v. Cruz, 162
SCRA 642; People v. Isla, 278 SCRA 47; People v. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232). It has
been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the
accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule (People v. Andan, supra.)
In the instant case, the admission made by accused-appellant was not in the form of a written
extra-judicial confession; the admission was made verbally to the PO3 Roberto Reyes, a
member of the Philippine National Police stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. PO3 Reyes
testified that after accused-appellant was taken into custody, he "interviewed and interrogated"
the latter and in the course of their "conversation," accused-appellant said that he "raped, killed
and buried" Maria Lourdes.23 There is no doubt, therefore, that accused-appellant was taken
into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of the crime. Hence,
the constitutional mantle of protection clearly covers the instant situation. While said officer
testified that he apprised the accused-appellant of his right to remain silent and to have a
counsel of his own choice, accused-appellants alleged admission was made without the
presence of a counsel. It does not appear either that accused-appellant manifested that he
could not afford the services of a counsel nor waived his right to one in writing and in the
presence of a counsel as no such written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented in
evidence. Therefore, the Court finds the extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant invalid
since he was deprived of his right to counsel during said custodial investigation. Consequently,
the exclusionary rule applies and the extra-judicial confession should be struck down as
inadmissible.
Consonant with the constitutional precept that a person under custodial investigation should
have a right to counsel "in every phase of the investigation,"24 the Court has held in a number of
cases that a person under custodial investigation should enjoy the right to counsel from its
inception to its termination. Truly, the accuseds counsel of choice must be present and must be
able to advise and assist his client from the time he answers the first question until the time he
signs the extra-judicial confession.25 In People v. Morial,26 the Court elucidated on the need for
requiring a counsels continuing presence throughout the custodial investigation in order to
guarantee the accuseds rights.
In seeking the reversal of the challenged decision, accused-appellant contends that his extrajudicial confession which was extorted from him by the police officers in violation of his
constitutional rights cannot be made the basis for his conviction.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession executed by the accusedappellant, he was properly convicted by the trial court because (a) compromising circumstances
were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with moral certainty to
the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged and (b) the totality of such circumstances
eliminated beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of his innocence. In People v. Mahinay,27 this
Court held that conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following
requisites concur, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Stated differently, the circumstantial evidence
which warrant conviction in this case (a) constitute an unbroken chain of events which
reasonably led to the conclusion pointing to the accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others,

as the person guilty of the crime;28 (b) were consistent with each other and with the hypothesis
that the accused-appellant is guilty; and (c) were at the same time, inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.29
In the case at bar, the trial court gave credence to several circumstances, which upon thorough
review of this Court are more than sufficient to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances are as follows:
1. Rosita Mangunay saw accused-appellant at about ten oclock in the morning of
September 19, 1995, walking along Ambrosio Street, Poblacion, Urdaneta Pangasinan;30
2. Rosita Mangunay saw accused-appellant at about two forty-five in the afternoon of
September 19, 1995, walking and carrying the victim who was then struggling and
crying;31
3. Natividad Bernardo saw accused-appellant between three to four oclock in the
afternoon of September 19, 1995 carrying the victim going to the Macalong River where
the body of the victim was later found;32
4. Leah Magno, while at her yard at San Vicente East, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, at about
three to four oclock in the afternoon of September 19, 1995, saw the accused-appellant
carrying a child and headed towards the Macalong River;33
5. Leah Magno, at about six-thirty in the evening of September 19, 1995, saw accusedappellant walking alone coming from the direction of the Macalong River;34
6. Accused-appellant told Johnny Galinato that he played with the victim and left her at a
jeepney when Johnny Galinato talked to accused-appellant in the evening of September
19, l995;35
7. Accused-appellant did not go with Johnny Galinato when the latter invited him to go to
the police headquarters in order to tell the police authorities that he did not know the
whereabouts of the victim.36 His failure to reveal the same is unnatural for an innocent
person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter
of self-preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A
persons silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify that he is not
innocent;37
8. Accused-appellant jumped out of the window of his house and ran away when police
officers Reyes and Peralta together with Johnny Galinato went back to said
house.38 Such act of flight by accused-appellant strongly indicate his consciousness of
guilt;
9. Accused-appellant ran away when he saw Johnny Galinato at about six-thirty in the
morning of September 20, 1995, in the field at the back of the house accusedappellant;39
10. Accused-appellant told Johnny Galinato that the victim was with his aunt at Sta.
Maria when he was apprehended at Barangay Magalong, Laoac, Pangasinan:40

11. Accused-appellant testified that in the morning of September 19, 1995, he fetched
the victim who was playing inside a jeepney allegedly upon the request of Ronnie
Garcia.41
12. Accused-appellant, in the afternoon of September 19, 1995, went to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan carrying the crying and struggling victim and in which place the
body of the victim was later found;42
13. Accused-appellant testified that he was with the victim when she died, allegedly
because she was killed by Ronnie Garcia;43 and
14. Accused-appellant did not tell the police that it was Ronnie Garcia who raped and
killed the victim when he saw Ronnie Garcia at the police station.44
It is settled in our criminal jurisprudence that "(c)onspiracy and/or direct participation in a crime
may be proven by circumstantial evidence."45 An accused can be convicted if the compromising
circumstances duly proven are consistent with each other and lead with moral certainty to only
one conclusion; and if the totality of such circumstances eliminated beyond reasonable doubt
the possibility of innocence.46 Indeed, the circumstantial evidence herein warrant conviction of
the accused-appellant as they constitute an unbroken chain of events which reasonably lead to
the conclusion that the accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is the person guilty of
the crime.47 The circumstances are consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused-appellant is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.48 Moreover, Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules provides that an accused can still be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, provided that enough circumstantial evidence has been established by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.49Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting
felons free and deny proper protection to the community. Circumstantial evidence is not a
"weaker form of evidence vis--visdirect evidence,"50 and cases have recognized that
circumstantial evidence in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its
effect upon the Court.51
It cannot be denied that there is no evidence as to the manner by which the rape was committed
or to the acts done by the perpetrator which ultimately led to or caused the death of the victim. It
bears stressing that in crimes of rape with homicide, it is seldom, if not ever, that there is an
eyewitness to the act itself. Consequently, the courts must rely on the aforementioned
circumstantial evidence, which lead to the obvious conclusion that accused is the perpetrator of
the crime, more so when there is corroborative evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused.
Here, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in court and the findings made in the autopsy
report of Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr.,52 autopsy report of the Philippine National Police,53 joint
affidavit of police officers Reyes and Rubianes,54 and affidavit of witness Mangunay,55 show
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, it is unbelievable that accused-appellant just brought the victim to Ronnie Garcia, and
that it was only the latter who raped and killed her. "Evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself - such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the

miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance."56 Surely, such testimony is too uncertain and
too easily fabricated for the purpose of deceiving, to be relied upon by this Court.
Accordingly, since it was clearly established that Maria Lourdes was only six years old when she
was raped and killed by the accused-appellant, the proper imposable penalty is
death57 pursuant to Section 335, No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
In line with recent judicial prescription, the indemnification for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of P125,000.00 if the crime of rape with homicide is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable
amendatory laws. Accordingly, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court is increased
to P 125,000.00. Moral damages may additionally be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00
without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.
Accordingly, the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court is reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan in
Criminal Case No. U-8668, finding accused-appellant Rolando Felixminia y Camacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and imposing upon him the penalty
of death, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of civil indemnity is
increased from P50,000.00 to P125,000.00 and the award of moral damages is reduced from
P500,000.00 to P50,000.00.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency or
pardoning power.

G.R No. 134056

July 6, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERT FIGUEROA and BEATRICE VALERIO, accused.
ROBERT FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant ROBERT FIGUEROA (hereafter OBET) appeals from the 18 May 1998
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 97306, convicting him of violation of Section 14-A2 , Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-accused Beatrice
Valerio (hereafter Betty) was acquitted.
OBET and Betty were indicted under an information, dated 2 April 1997, whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:

That on 16 February 1997 and for sometime prior thereto in Paraaque City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously manufacture, produce, prepare or process methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a 2.4 liters, directly by means of chemical synthesis.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned OBET and Betty each entered a plea of not guilty.4 Trial on the merits then
ensued.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas,
NBI Special Investigator III Pio M. Palencia (hereafter PALENCIA), and NBI Intelligence Agent II
Martin Soriano (hereafter SORIANO).
PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of SORIANO at Project 6,
Quezon City, when they received a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that a
certain OBET was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA
and SORIANO forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with OBET for a buy-bust
operation. After several hours, the informant reported that OBET was already waiting for her at
No. 1485 Soliman Street, Makati City, with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she
was ready with P150,000. PALENCIA then caused the dusting of fluorescent powder over ten
pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them to the informant.5
On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant proceeded to the rendezvous area.
They arrived at half past twelve o'clock in the early morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate
was already open, the informant entered the premises, while PALENCIA and
SORIANO discreetly crawled and positioned themselves near the gate of the house.
Strategically positioned, PALENCIA overheard OBET ask the informant whether she had the
money. PALENCIA then saw the informant hand over the money to OBET. While counting the
money, OBET sensed the presence of other people in the area. OBET, who was in possession
of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of PALENCIA, while hurrying towards the
house. OBET then held hostage his mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the
next three hours until the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom OBET surrendered.
PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered buy-bust money to the
WPD Headquarters for recording purposes and, thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.6
At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically interrogated OBET about the
source of his shabu. OBET eventually volunteered that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El
Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. PALENCIA and SORIANO took OBET to Betty's
house as a follow-up operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, 16 February
1997. As OBET called Betty earlier to tell her that he was arriving, Betty already had the gate
opened for them. After parking, PALENCIA saw Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET in
handcuffs, Betty asked what happened. OBET replied that he was just caught in a buy-bust
operation. PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to convince Betty to surrender the shabu that
OBET insisted was hidden inside the house. As Betty persistently denied the existence of the
shabu, PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while, OBET proceeded to the kitchen
of the guesthouse located outside the main house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly
pointed to what he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug
paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.7

Thereafter, PALENCIA requested a laboratory examination of all the seized items and an
ultraviolet light examination over the persons of OBET, Betty and a certain Eva
Baluyot.8 PALENCIA claimed that based on the certification issued by the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the NBI, all the items seized from Betty's residence were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride except specimen no.7; while from among the persons
subjected to ultraviolet light examination, only OBET was found positive for fluorescent powder.9
On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO conducted the search
without a search warrant, but with the consent of Betty.10 He also admitted that he did not
actually see OBET or Betty in the act of manufacturing shabu.11
NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony. He likewise admitted
that the custodial investigation of OBET, during which he divulged Betty as the source of shabu,
was conducted in the absence of any counsel. SORIANO also confirmed PALENCIA's testimony
that they were not armed with a search warrant, but that they conducted the follow-up operation
at Betty's house under the hot pursuit theory.12 He further maintained that OBET, after conferring
with Betty, uttered, "Ako na nga, ako na nga"(I will do it, I will do it). OBET then proceeded to the
dirty kitchen, pointed to the refrigerator and had it moved. Thereafter, SORIANO saw a plastic
pail containing liquid with floating brown substances.
SORIANO admitted that he and PALENCIA neither witnessed OBET and Betty manufacture
shabu in the manner described in Section 2(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act13 ; nor did they
possess evidence, independent of the items they had seized, that OBET and Betty were
engaged in the labeling or manufacturing of shabu.14
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas testified that on 16 February 1997, she conducted a
laboratory examination for the presence of any prohibited or regulated drug on eleven different
specimens (Exhibits "B"-"L").15 The result of the examination disclosed that all the specimens
except specimen no. 7 (Exhibit "H") were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.16 She
further observed that specimen no. 8 (Exhibit I- I-2), the brown liquid with floating solid flakes
contained in a plastic pail, was positive for epedrine,17 a substance used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. She opined that this crude form of shabu would have to
undergo chemical processes, like extraction, crystallization, distillation, before it could be finally
converted into shabu's crystalline form. She also conducted a fluorescent powder examination
over the persons of OBET and Betty. Only OBET gave a positive result.18
On the other hand, OBET testified that while he was watching television on the night of 15
February 1997, he heard the doorbell rang. Upon seeing Eva Baluyot, his childhood friend, he
opened the door for her. Inside the house, Eva handed him a bundle of money and stated that
she was buying shabu from him. OBET emphatically told Eva that he was not engaged in such
illegal trade and returned the money. OBET then accompanied Eva out of the house. At the
garage, OBET noticed someone peeping from the dark; so he told Eva to go back inside the
house with him. Eva ignored the request. OBET thus left Eva at the garage and got his .45
caliber gun from his house. While he was locking the door, his handgun accidentally fired off, as
he forgot that it had already been cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of people outside
claiming that they were NBI men. Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the house but instead told
the alleged NBI men to call the Makati Police, specifically Major Reyes. The NBI agents,
however, persisted in convincing OBET to go out of the house. He did get out of his house after
three hours when he heard the voice of Major Reyes. OBET gave to Major Reyes his gun. The
Makati Police and the NBI men thereafter conducted a joint search inside OBET's house which,

however, yielded nothing. OBET was then brought to the Makati Police Headquarters where the
incident was recorded. Thereafter, PALENCIA, SORIANO and another NBI man brought OBET
to the house of Betty, his former live-in partner, at El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque
City, upon the insistence and information of Eva Baluyot.19
Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to call and tell Betty that he was already
near. The gate was already opened when they arrived, and the NBI men freely parked their car
at the garage. Then, PALENCIA and SORIANO alighted from the car and entered Betty's house.
OBET was left in the car under the charge of the third NBI man; hence, he knew nothing of what
happened inside Betty's house.20
For her part, Betty admitted that she was romantically involved with OBET and had a child by
him. She recalled that on 16 February 1997, OBET called at around 6:00 a.m. and requested
her to open the gate for him, as he was already near. She ran down to the garage and opened
the gate. Since her car was parked halfway through the garage, she went to the main house to
get her car keys to make way for OBET's car. But as she came out of the main house, OBET's
car was already parked inside the garage. She noticed that OBET had two companions with
long firearms. The two, whom Betty later found out as NBI men PALENCIA and SORIANO,
informed her that they had just come from a buy-bust operation and that OBET had led them to
her house, as there were illegal chemicals kept in the premises. Shocked andamazed, she then
asked for a search warrant, but the NBI men could not produce any.21
Betty further recalled that the NBI men claimed that they found contraband items near the dirty
kitchen at a small space behind the refrigerator where cases of softdrinks were stored. Betty
denied any knowledge that there were illegal chemicals inside her house and that these were
manufactured into shabu. She also denied knowing Eva Baluyot.22
On cross-examination, Betty disclaimed her alleged consent to the search of her house, for she
specifically asked the NBI men for a search warrant. She asserted that she did not see the NBI
men find the shabu paraphernalia because she went up to the second floor of her house. She
only saw that the NBI men were bringing several items out of her house.23
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless arrests of OBET and
Betty were conducted within the purview of valid warrantless arrests enumerated in Section
5,24 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search
conducted at the house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very items seized by the NBI
agents at the kitchen of Betty's guesthouse were admissible as thecorpus delicti of the violation
of Section 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the
paraphernalia seized were indispensable to the processing or manufacturing of shabu into
crystallized form. Although it conceded that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see the
crystallization processes, the trial court observed that the Dangerous Drug Act does not require
that there be actual manufacturing activities at the time of the seizure.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence that
she, in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured shabu without the requisite authority. It did not
arrive at a similar conclusion as far as OBET was concerned, but declared that based on the
evidence on record, OBET's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, in the decision of 18 May 1998 the trial court decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the conviction of accused Beatrice
Valerio y del Rosario for Violation of Sec. 14-a of Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A.
7659, this court pronounces her NOT GUILTY and considering that she is detained at the NBI
the NBI is directed to immediately release her from custody unless there be some reasons for
her detention. Finding, however, accused Robert Figueroa GUILTY as charged [of] the same
offense in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and
to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law, specifically Art. VI [sic] of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of Robert
Figueroa to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to us. He principally premises his
prayer for acquittal on the failure of the State to show by convincing evidence that shortly prior
to or during custodial investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent,
to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed
of such rights. He asserts that he did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were
allegedly extracted from him are inadmissible in evidence. Even assuming that his extrajudicial
statements were admissible, Betty's acquittal would work in his favor because the indictment is
based on conspiracy. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Therefore, the acts imputed
to him were also the acts of Betty, and vice versa. Since the trial court considered insufficient for
conviction the acts of Betty, then he, too, should be acquitted.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that not all
warrantless searches and seizures are illegal. For one, a warrantless search and seizure is not
unreasonable and offensive to the Constitution if consent is shown. In this case, the prosecution
convincingly proved that Betty consented to the search of her house. With her consent, Betty
validly waived her constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Consequently, the items seized in her house by virtue of the consented search are admissible in
evidence against her and OBET.
The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per se work to absolve OBET of the
crime charged. Betty's believable disavowal of the location of the paraphernalia and other
circumstances on record reasonably indicative of her innocence cannot redound in favor of
OBET. The latter apparently knew the exact location of the hidden paraphernalia. By such
disclosure, it is not far-fetched to conclude that OBET had been actually engaged in the
manufacture of shabu.
We first resolve the question of whether Betty's acquittal would benefit OBET.
We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on conspiracy, the acquittal of
a conspirator likewise absolves a co-conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is wellsettled that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the
conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators.25 It follows then that if
the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually
responsible for their own respective acts. Accordingly, OBET's criminal liability in this case must

be judged on the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof required in
criminal cases.
We should then determine whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt OBET's guilt for unauthorized manufacture of shabu, a regulated drug.
After a meticulous review of the records and of the evidence adduced by the parties in this case,
we find that what PALENCIA and SORIANO did left much to be desired, thereby resulting in a
bungled prosecution of the case. The evidence for the prosecution miserably failed to prove
OBET's guilt of the offense charged.
The buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug
was found in OBET's person and residence. No evidence was adduced to show that OBET
handed shabu over to the informant. Yet, he was placed in custody. For what offense he was
held in custody does not, initially, appear very clear on the record.
It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of PALENCIA and SORIANO
and held hostage his mistress and her two children. Yet he was not placed under custodial
investigation for such crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or crimes
other than that with which he was charged.
On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source of
the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust operation. In short he was held in
custody as a consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the
source and establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the
source was Betty. On the basis of that admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together with
OBET, proceeded to the residence of Betty. Needless to state, OBET cannot be investigated for
anything in relation to shabu while under custody without informing him of his rights to remain
silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any
waiver of such rights should be in writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to
Section 12 (1)26 , Article III of theConstitution. It has been held that these rights attach from the
moment the investigation starts, i.e. when the investigating officers begin to ask questions to
elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.27
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody
questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of
regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence.28 Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these
constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made
during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a
case.29 In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of
the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third
persons.30 This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.31 Such
statements are useless except as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the
suspect's rights.32
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted without the
presence of a lawyer, and there is no proof that OBET waived said right and the right to remain
silent. No waiver in writing and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any admission obtained from OBET in

the course of his custodial investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a
justification for the search without a warrant.
The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by Betty. Indeed, a
consented search is one of the exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. In People v.
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San,33 we pointed out that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to
an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.34 The third condition does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a
search warrant, thus:
Q And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?
A No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.
Q And what was their reply?
A They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property.35
Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of
either Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the
search. Second, per the prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale
of regulated or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He surrendered
after taking hostage Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter held in custody for
further questioning on illegal drugs.
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles confiscated therefrom
belong to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA and SORIANO the places where the articles
were found provides no sufficient basis for a conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the
articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally used
against him to establish his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid
custodial investigation.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 May 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City, convicting herein accused-appellant Robert Figueroa of
violation of Section 14-A, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and
ORDERED immediately released from confinement or detention unless his continued detention
is warranted by virtue of a valid legal cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to submit within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this decision a report on the
release of accused-appellant.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151286

March 31, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
AZCUNA and CATALINO DUEAS, JR., appellant.
DECISION
CORONA J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision,1 dated October 26, 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. 2220 finding the appellant,
Catalino Dueas, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Appellant was
sentenced to death.
On April 1, 1997, Provincial Prosecutor Charlaw W. Ronquillo filed with the RTC Baler, Aurora
an information charging appellant with the crime of murder:
That at about 8:00 oclock in the morning on November 29, 1996 at Gabgab Buhangin,
Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused who
was convicted of Murder on October 2, 1990, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon Elva Ramos-Jacob, also known as Elving Jacob, by shooting her
at the head with a .38 caliber revolver that caused her death not long thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3

The following facts are uncontroverted.

Appellant was a convicted felon for the crime of homicide4 in Criminal Case No. 1414 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Baler, Aurora. He was serving sentence in the Iwahig Prison
Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, when he escaped from confinement on July 11, 1995.
On November 29, 1996, at around 8:00 a.m., Cesar Friginal was cutting grass in his rice field in
Sitio Gabgab, Brgy. Buhangin, Baler, Aurora, when he heard two gunshots. He instinctively
turned to the direction where he heard the shots and, from about a hundred meters away, saw a
short man wearing green clothes running away. At first, he ignored the occurrence but when he
saw people trooping to the vicinity, he joined the crowd and there saw a dead woman on the
ground. The woman was later identified as his cousin and neighbor, Elva "Ka Elving" RamosJacob.5
On December 6, 1996, Dr. Nenita S. Hernandez, municipal health officer of Baler, Aurora,
conducted a post mortem examination on the victim. Her autopsy report showed the following:
I - Head:
1. wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape about 1 cm. diameter at the right
parieto-temporal area.
2. wound, gunshot, exit, stollate in shape, edges everted about 1.5 cm. diameter
with an exposed brain matter and fractured bone fragment located at the
temporal area, right side.
3. wound lacerated about 1.5 cm. long at the right parietal area.
II - Arm:
1. wound lacerated 4 cm. long, lateral aspect, right wrist.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
The most probable cause of death was brain damage and hypovelmic shock due to
gunshot wounds of the brain.6
In a manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrated what it viewed as the
factual antecedents of the case:
On December 18, 1996, appellant tried to enter the house of one Benny Poblete in Brgy.
Buhangin, Baler, Aurora, without permission. Benny and his father Harold Poblete tied
appellants hands until the police arrived. Police Officer Noel C. Palmero then
apprehended and detained appellant at the Baler Police Station.
The next day, or on December 19, 1996, appellant sought voluntary confinement for
"safekeeping" because there were threats upon his life brought about by his involvement
in the aforementioned incident of theft against the Pobletes.

Right after his apprehension, appellant intimated to Police Officer Palmero that he has
information regarding the death of Ka Elving. Police Officer Palmero then instructed
appellant to think about it over (sic) first.
Four days after or on December 23, 1996, Police Officer Palmero asked the still
detained appellant if he was ready to divulge the information regarding Ka Elvings
death, to which appellant answered yes. Appellant was then informed of his
constitutional rights, including the right to secure the services of a lawyer of his own
choice. Police Officer Palmero told appellant that if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he would even be provided with one for free.
By eleven oclock that same morning, Atty. Josefina S. Angara, upon the polices
invitation, arrived at the Baler Police Station to talk to appellant. Atty. Angara spoke with
appellant in private for about thirty (30) minutes. Appellant blamed Benny for kicking him
and causing him to suffer chest pains. Atty. Angara asked appellant what really
happened. Before long, appellant admitted that he was commissioned by Benny to kill
the victim. Atty. Angara warned him of the seriousness of his implications but appellant
was adamant in confessing to the murder of Ka Elving. The lawyer-client conference
was briefly interrupted by lunchtime. By one-thirty in the afternoon, however, the
inquisition resumed. Between the hours of three thirty and four oclock in the afternoon,
appellant completed his Sinumpaang Salaysay where he confessed to the killing of Ka
Elving. The statement of appellant was initially written on pad paper, thereafter it was
typewritten. However, by the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was finalized, it was
already past office hours such that the attestation before the municipal mayor was
postponed until the following morning.
Afterwards, because of persistent chest pains, appellant was then brought to the Aurora
Memorial Hospital to be medically examined. However, Police Officer Palmero did not
inquire as to the results of the medical examination. The results of the medical
examination were not offered in evidence.
The following morning, December 24, 1996, appellant, who was escorted by the police,
was brought before the then Municipal Mayor of Baler, Aurora, Arturo S. Angara. Mayor
Angara read the signed Sinumpaang Salaysay before administering the oath. He probed
appellant if the signature appearing in the Sinumpaang Salaysay was his and whether
he understood the contents of the said document. Subsequently, Mayor Angara affixed
his signature on appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay.
In substance, the contested Sinumpaang Salaysay states that Benny Poblete
commissioned one Cesar to kill Ka Elving. Cesar, in turn, contacted appellant for the hit.
For more than a week, appellant and Cesar, together with a certain Manny Gonzales,
stalked the victim. On November 29, 1996, appellant acted as a lookout while his
companions shot the victim.7
On the other hand, appellant testified that, before noon on December 14, 1996,8 he went to the
house of one Benny Poblete to see his brother-in-law, Erwin Bernardo, who was working for the
Pobletes. Since his brother-in-law was not around, Harold, son of Benny Poblete, invited him to
a drinking spree. While they were drinking, police officers Alfredo Miel and Amoranto Aquino
arrived and arrested him. He was brought to the municipal hall where he was forced to admit
the killing of Elving Jacob. For three consecutive nights, he was mauled. As a result, his eyes

became swollen and his chest ached. Unable to endure the pain any longer, he owned up to the
crime.9
On December 23, 1996, PO3 Noel C. Palmero, in the presence of Atty. Josefina Angara, took
appellants statement. Appellant claimed that neither investigating officer Palmero nor Atty.
Josefina Angara apprised him of his constitutional rights during the custodial investigation. The
following day, he was brought to Mayor Arturo Angara before whom he swore to his affidavit
containing his confession.10
Dr. Roberto A. Correa of the Aurora Memorial Hospital testified that he conducted a medical
examination of the appellant at around 2:00 p.m. on December 23, 1996. During the
examination, he found a three-inch lacerated wound on appellants right arm and a biositis
tenderness (inflammation of the muscle) in his right scapular area. He further testified that the
lesions were caused by a sharp instrument. Aside from these lesions, Dr. Correo did not notice
any other injuries on the body of the appellant.11
On rebuttal, Atty. Angara belied the accusation of Dueas. She testified that at past 10:00 a.m.
on December 23, 1996, policemen came to her office and requested her to assist the appellant
who was then under custodial investigation. She arrived at the police station at past 11:00 a.m.
and was introduced to the appellant. During her private conversation with the appellant, she
apprised him of his constitutional rights and told him that whatever he said could be used
against him. She discouraged him from giving his confession but appellant was determined to
do so. The questioning resumed at about 1:30 p.m. and lasted up to 4:00 p.m. While the
investigation was going on, appellant complained of chest pains so she requested that appellant
be brought to the hospital for medical attention.
PO3 Palmero was also presented as rebuttal witness. He disclaimed mauling the appellant. He
admitted that appellant was indeed complaining of chest pains but it was allegedly the result of
the kick by Harold Poblete. In contrast with his previous declaration that he fetched Atty. Angara
at around 3:30 p.m. to assist appellant during the investigation, PO3 Palmero now claimed that
the interrogation lasted about three hours, that is, from 1:00 p.m. up to about 4:00 p.m. on
December 23, 1996. He also declared that appellant was given medical attention after the
interrogation.12
Relying principally on the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on December 23, 1996 (which
was later repudiated), the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the crime
charged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Catalino Dueas, Jr.
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder qualified by evident
premeditation, and considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences him to
suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and further orders him to indemnify the heirs of the
victims in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, this automatic appeal.

According to appellant, the extrajudicial confession which the trial court relied on heavily for his
conviction was infirm because the confession was secured through force and intimidation, a
violation of his constitutional rights.
For the State, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of appellees brief, seeking the
reversal of the challenged decision and the acquittal of Dueas on the ground of involuntariness
of his extrajudicial confession. The OSG underscored the fact that it was forced out of appellant
by means of threats, violence and intimidation, thus violating his rights.
The appeal is meritorious.
In convicting the appellant, the court a quo reasoned as follows:
The extrajudicial confession of accused Dueas, Jr. was freely and voluntarily given and
that his retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances
and efforts of exculpation.
The statement (Exh. B-Stip.) itself reveals that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, thus:
PASUBALI: Ikaw Catalino Dueas, Jr., ipinagbibigay alam ko sa iyo, na ikaw ay inuusig
sa isang kasalanan, pinapaalala ko sa iyo na sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas ay
karapatan mo ang manahimik at hindi sumagot sa mga tanong ko sa iyo at magkaroon
ng Abogado ng sarili mong pili, ito ba ay nauunawaan mo?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Alam mo ba at naipaliwanag ng iyong abogado na anumang salaysay mo sa
pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaring gamitin laban sa iyo?
SAGOT: Opo.
The Court finds no merit in the insinuation of the defense that Atty. Josefina Angara was
not Dueas own choice as counsel for the interrogation (TSN, October 4, 2001, p. 4).
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the present case, accused even admitted that he trusted Atty. Angara when he signed
his sworn statement in the presence of the said counsel (TSN, November 23, 2000, p.
9).
Absent any showing that the lawyer who assisted the accused was remissed (sic) in her
duties, it can be safely concluded that the custodial investigation of Dueas was
regularly conducted.
As could be observed, the confession is replete with details that could not have been
concocted by the police authorities. According to Dueas, he is one of those who killed
Elva Jacob; that his companions were Manny Gonzales and one Cesar; that Benny
Poblete contacted Cesar who in turn contacted him (accused) for the purpose of killing

Elving Jacob because his (Benny Pobletes) daughter Rhea who died in September,
1996 might still be alive were it not for the witchcraft of Elving Jacob and her siblings;
that he (accused) was contacted by Cesar in November, 1996 at the market near the
terminal of Baliwag Transit in Cabanatuan City; that he and Cesar were together when
they went to Baler, Aurora and they just fetched Manny Gonzales at the gasoline station
in Maria Aurora, Aurora; that they hatched the plan of executing Elving Jacob in the
middle of November, 1996 at the house of Benny Poblete; that at that place and time,
Cesar was given three thousand pesos (P3,000.00); that he (accused) did not know
Cesar well but could describe the latters distinctive features; that Cesar and Manny
Gonzales were armed with a .38 cal. revolver; that they conducted a surveillance on
Elving Jacob for more than a week to determine her movement in going to and from the
ricefield she is working on at Sitio Gabgab, Brgy. Buhangin, Baler, Aurora; that on
November 29, 1996, at about eight oclock in the morning, they positioned themselves
under a canal, feigning to be catching fish, until Elving Jacob passed by; that his two
companions followed Elving Jacob, while he remained on top of the canal and acted as
a look out; that, not long thereafter, he heard two gunshots; that they left the scene and
reunited at Santiagos house in Brgy. Suklayin, Baler, Aurora; that on December 18,
1996, at around one oclock in the afternoon, he was instructed by Cesar to go to the
house of Benny Poblete to collect the balance of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
that he was arrested there by the police. "The confession is replete with details that only
the confessant could have known and which, therefore, show that the confession was
executed voluntarily (People vs. Jimenez, 105 SCRA 721)."
Also, the confession of the accused is exonerative in nature as it points to other member
of the group as the triggerman. "The exculpatory tone of admission of the crime and the
abundance of details negate violence and maltreatment in obtaining a confession. A
guilty person seldom admits his guilt fully and completely. He has a tendency to explain
away his conduct or minimize his fault or crime or shift the blame to others."
xxx

xxx

xxx

The defense tried to impress to the Court that the policemen subjected the accused to
cruel and painful punishment to extract his confession, thus:
ATTY. NOVERAS TO THE ACCUSED
Q During the third time they mauled you and told you to admit responsibility for the death
of Elving Jacob, what happened?
A I already admit (sic) because I could not bear the pain anymore, Sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q What else, if there are any?

A They could (sic) not allow me to sleep. They just throw water on me so I could not
sleep or rest. (TSN, October 4, 2000, pp. 3-4).
But,

Q You said you were forced and intimidated to give the confession in connection with the
death of Mrs. Jacob, did you tell Atty. Angara about the fact?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A HOW COULD I TELL THAT WHEN THE POLICE OFFICERS WERE THERE
SURROUNDING ME? (Emphasis ours) (Ibid, p. 6)
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROS. RONQUILLO TO THE ACCUSED

Q Did you file any charge to (sic) the policemen who mauled you?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A BECAUSE I HAVE NO ONE TO TELL ON AND I AM AFRAID FOR THEM,
SIR (sic). (TSN, November 23, 2000, p. 11)
A review of appellants extrajudicial confession discloses certain facts and circumstances
which put his culpability in doubt.
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, persons under custodial
investigation have the following rights:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) x x x

xxx

xxx

There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions covered by this constitutional
provision: (1) those resulting from third degree methods like torture, force, violence, threat and
intimidation, and (2) those given without the benefit of the Miranda warnings.14

Viewed against this backdrop, certain circumstances in this case need to be carefully reviewed
and considered.
On December 18, 1996,15 appellant was arrested for theft on the request of a certain Benny
Poblete. PO3 Palmero admitted that at the time of the arrest, appellant was not committing any
crime. He was detained overnight without any charges. The following day, PO3 Palmero claimed
that appellant supposedly sought "voluntary confinement for his own protection." The police
blotter entry, however, was not offered in evidence. Only a certification of such entry was
presented, which certification was not even signed by appellant. Under the circumstances, the
"voluntary confinement" tale appears to be an afterthought to cover up the appellants illegal
arrest and detention. No person in his right mind, already behind bars, will still seek "voluntary
confinement" when there are no charges against him.
Appellant executed his sworn statement on his alleged involvement in the killing of Ka Elving on
December 23, 1996 or five days after his arrest. Immediately after accomplishing the affidavit,
appellant sought medical attention, during which Dr. Correa found positive marks of violence on
the latters body, an indication that physical coercion occurred at one point from the time of his
arrest up to the execution of his extrajudicial confession. The only purpose of the maltreatment
could have been to force him to admit guilt against his will. When confronted on this matter,
rebuttal witness PO3 Palmero had nothing but evasive and unresponsive answers:
Q Did you personally bring Dueas to the hospital?
A I could not remember, anymore, Sir. But he was brought to the hospital.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q If you could not remember anymore if you were the one who bring (sic) him to the
hospital, do you know who was the police officer who brought him?
A I do not know the jailer at the time.
Q Were you still in the police station when he was brought back?
A Maybe I was not there.
Q Did you try to inquire what was the result of the examination being conducted upon
Catalino Dueas?
A Not anymore, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I could not remember anymore the person who accompanied him.16
The trial court considered appellants claim of maltreatment as but a lame excuse. It stated that
the failure of the accused to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the

person(s) who allegedly maltreated him, although he had the opportunity to do so, meant that
the confession was voluntary. But appellant adequately explained why he did not tell anybody
about the police brutality he had suffered. He testified:
Q You said you were forced and intimidated to give the confession in connection with the
death of Mrs. Jacob, did you tell Atty. Angara about that fact?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A How could I tell that when the police officers were there surrounding me.17
On cross-examination, appellant made the following declaration:
PROS. RONQUILLO
Q Did you file any charge to (sic) the policemen who mauled you?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I have no one to tell on and I am afraid for them, sir. (sic)18
Furthermore, the trial court misapplied the rule that a confession is presumed voluntary where
the same contains details and facts unknown to the investigator which could have been supplied
only by the perpetrator of the crime. In People vs. Abayon,19 we held:
It is a settled rule that where an alleged confession contains details and is replete with
facts which could have possibly been supplied only by the perpetrator of the crime, and
could not have been known to or invented by the investigators, the confession is
considered to have been voluntarily given. This rule, however, was erroneously applied
by the trial court in the case at bar.
The facts and details contained in at least three of the confessions, those of Reynaldo
Abayon, Mariano Aragon and Jose Juarez, were already known to the PC investigators
at the time the statements were allegedly signed by the said accused-appellants. The
three confessions referred to all appear to have been executed after the body of the
deceased Pedro Eslamado had been exhumed by the PC team on July 15, 1971.
Abayon's statement is dated July 16, Aragon's statement, July 22, and Juarez'
statement, July 23, 1971. On those dates, the PC would have known details and facts
such as, that Pedro Eslamado was abducted and killed, where his remains were buried,
that he was tied around the mouth by towels, that his hands were tied with shoe strings,
all of which were stated in the confessions.
In this case, the police authorities already knew of the murder of Ka Elving. As succinctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General:

xxx at the time of the execution of the extrajudicial confession, and even before
appellants arrest, the post mortem examination was already available to the police. Data
regarding the murder weapon, the wounds sustained by the victim, the whereabouts of
the cadaver were properly within the knowledge of the investigating officers. The latter,
then, could have easily filled up the details of the crime in the extrajudicial confession. It
must be emphasized that the presumption of voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession
arises only when the replete details could have been supplied by no other person but the
perpetrator himself [People vs. Base, 105 SCRA 721 (1981)], which is not the case here.
Also worth mentioning is the belated appearance of Atty. Angara, incidentally not of appellants
choice, who assisted him in the execution of his extrajudicial confession. This fell terribly short
of the standards demanded by the Constitution and Section 2 of RA 7438.20 Appellant was
arrested before noon on December 18, 1996. The extrajudicial confession was taken five days
later, on December 23, 1996. Atty. Angara testified that policemen came to her office at past
10:00 a.m. on December 23, 1996 requesting her to assist a suspect under custodial
investigation. She arrived at the police station at around 11:00 a.m. and conferred with the
appellant for about 30 minutes. The interrogation resumed after lunch and lasted till 4:00 p.m.
From the foregoing, it is evident that appellant had already been in detention for five days before
he came to be assisted by a lawyer, just before he was about to put his confession in writing.
We entertain no doubt that the constitutional requirement was violated. In People vs.
Bolanos,21 we held that:
An accused who is on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already
under custodial investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the
Constitution.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellants arrest, the latter already insinuated to
him that he would confess his participation in the killing. As he testified on cross-examination:
Q On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he actually told (sic) you?
A Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told us that he has (sic) to
reveal something about the death of Elvira Jacob.
Q So you already know that on December 18, 1996 that whatever Catalino Dueas will
reveal to you will give you lead in solving the investigation in connection with the death
of Elvira Jacob, isnt it?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that revelation, isnt it?
A Yes, sir. Thats all, your honor.22
Well-settled is the doctrine that the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting a confession, even through the
slightest coercion which might lead the accused to admit something untrue.23 What is sought to

be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation
for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him."24 These constitutional guarantees are meant to protect a person from the
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.25
Finally, the court notes the material discrepancy between the testimony of PO3 Palmero and
that of Atty. Angara. When PO3 Palmero was first put on the witness stand, he testified that he
fetched Atty. Angara to assist appellant at about 3:30 p.m. on December 23, 1996. The
interrogation lasted more or less an hour. However, on rebuttal, PO3 Palmero changed his story
and declared that the interrogation of appellant lasted about three hours from about 1:00 p.m. to
4:00 p.m. The adjustment in the time cited may have been made to conform to the earlier
testimony of rebuttal witness Atty. Angara who said that the interrogation of appellant lasted
from about 1:30 p.m. up to about 4:00 p.m. But how could the interrogation of appellant have
taken place within that time-frame when, according to Dr. Correo and the appellants medical
record, the doctor conducted his medical examination of the appellant at around 2:00 p.m. on
December 23, 1996?26
In view of the foregoing, since the extrajudicial confession of appellant was given in violation of
the safeguards in Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, we hold that the appellants
extrajudicial confession dated December 23, 1996 was inadmissible as evidence. And with the
exclusion thereof, the record is bereft of any substantial evidence to sustain the judgment of
conviction. While it is true that one Cesar Friginal was presented as a witness by the
prosecution, his testimony did not implicate the appellant in the murder of Elving Jacob, the
witness having said only that he saw a short man in green clothes running away from the vicinity
of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal
Case No. 2220, convicting appellant Catalino Dueas, Jr., is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder and his immediate release is ordered
unless there is reason to return him for confinement at the Iwahig Prison Farm in Puerto
Princesa City or to detain him for some other valid cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to
inform this Court of his compliance within ten days from receipt of this decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, JAIME OCHOA, all of
the National Power Corporation, and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas, Alias George
Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo (At large), Accused. JAIME OCHOA, Appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended
for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan
Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,1 Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial
Documents defined and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, in an amended Information,2 docketed as Criminal Case No. 19558, which
alleges
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a
public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR),
Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of the Loan
Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst,
respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George
Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange trader, said
public officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave abuse of authority and
committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with their private co-accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify or cause to be falsified the NPCs application for managers checks with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and
TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase
of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account number
of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the
Payment Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the
account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial
documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency
from the National Power Corporation, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate
and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National
Power Corporation in the aforementioned sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while Gutierrez has
remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated
1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the NPC;
2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information was (sic) the
Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED);

3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time
mentioned in the information;
4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;
5. That accused Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to take custody or
control of public funds;
6. That the application forms for cashiers check or Managers check are not accountable forms
of the NAPOCOR.3
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial
Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine equal
to the amount malversed which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa
shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against the accused.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Document. However,
because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages suffered by the
NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against the
accused embodied in this Courts Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is recalled.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George
Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Mabini Street, Ermita,
Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in
1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;
2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;
3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.6
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not disputed by the
parties:
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC") became embroiled in a controversy
involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which were originally on deposit

with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch ("PNB") but were subsequently used to
purchase two (2) managers/cashiers checks (the first check was in the amount of
P70,000,000.00 while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its loan
obligations to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"). As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was in yen,
NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a
local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which
local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in
this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the
US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then
credit the funds to the account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks
(embodied in three [3] "Payment Instructions") included a "value date" (which was July 13,
1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned procedure, culminating in
the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted Japanese
Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per routing procedure,
UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said value date the amount of
US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued
two (2) managers/cashiers checks ("Managers check" for brevity) for such purpose, did not
make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the
funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered
explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of
P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.7
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two PNB
Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an "Application for Cashiers
Check" (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after
the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the
insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to
prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs savings account did not contain any
account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds
from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George
Aonuevo @ Mara Aonuevo, who is still at large.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed any of the acts
alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that he deposited the
checks subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with
any of his co-accused. He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement
and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC
personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that
he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center and upon
assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he
apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
a.] The offender is a public officer;
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.8
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the information without
violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him.
He points out that the information alleges willful and intentional commission of the acts
complained of while the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to
malice.
Appellants contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act
of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence by allowing
another to commit such misappropriation.9 To sustain a charge of malversation, there
must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence10 and while the prevailing facts of a case
may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both areequally
punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through
deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty
therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of
commission of the offense.11 Explicitly stated
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be
in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper.12
The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means
of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first
impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,13 we ruled that an accused charged with
willful or intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in
our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the
greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case.
Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties,
the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of
the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper
and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary
prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the

rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the
cases decided by this Tribunal.
....
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having
alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time
that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the
concept of negligence.
In People v. Consigna, et al.,14 we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also applies to the felony
of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful malversation, in an information
containing allegations similar to the present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense
of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating
the offense.
Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn
statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the
NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken
without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a "custodial" investigation where
a suspect has already been taken into police custody15 and the investigating officers begin to
ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.16 More
specifically
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory
question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.17
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular person as a suspect.18 Such a situation contemplated has been more precisely
described thus where

After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating
and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence....19
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accusedappellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture.20 Thus we held in
one case21 that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by
Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the
constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private
individual,22 or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation,23 or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official
capacity.24
Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his
guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the provision
although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take extreme caution in further admitting similar
confessions because we recognized the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance
of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions
and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television.25
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime,26 nor to a person undergoing an
audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.27
Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during
the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team28and before he was taken into custody. As
such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was,
as yet, no specific suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the
time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police
authorities.29 Appellant can hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances at the time,
whatever degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the
unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and
incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing
so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the
ambit of the exclusionary constitutional provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the
sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the

constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is
based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the
NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran30 in insisting that the constitutional safeguard should
have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested or under detention at the time.
He also invites our attention to the pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas31 that "the right to
counsel is available if a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in
custody but he is a suspect."
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional protection covers
not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the ruling with the statement that what
is being eschewed is the evil of "extorting" a confession from the mouth of the person being
interrogated. As defined, "extortion" is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a
person by illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats or any undue exercise of power.32 In the
context of obtaining an admission, "extorting" means "compelling or coercing a confession or
information by any means serving to overcome his power of resistance, or making the
confession or admission involuntary."33 In this case, we find nothing on record to support
appellants claim that his statements were extorted from him.
Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on what was later
to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to the conclusion that the rights are
available when the person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even
if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas34 qualified this statement
by saying that "[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently held,
following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only when the person
is already in custody."35
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were admissible in
evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. He contends that
although his statement was supposedly gathered from the transcript of stenographic notes of
the conversation between him and Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually
prepared the sworn statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as witness Atty.
Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him the prepared statement
and to verify from him the truth of its contents.36 Atty. Melencio testified that he asked appellant
to go over the document before affixing his signature thereto.37 He also inquired whether or not
appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the statement was
taken.38 Appellant denied that he was coerced or intimidated,39 affirmed the contents of the
document as a true reflection of his statements,40 and signed the same.41 It need not be
overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which has in its favor
the presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only by clear and convincing
evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary weight
conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as well as the statements
and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.42
In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at the time he signed
the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore not physically and mentally fit to

assess the significance of his signature. This pretext however collides with the testimony of his
own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days and,
who, when queried whether "ischemic heart disease" had any emotional or psychological effect,
gave the inconclusive reply that it "may or may not." Moreover, as aptly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the alleged falsity of
the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is supposedly astute in business matters as he
then occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it
unnecessary to execute another affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from illness.
Verily, evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.43
Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the transcript of
stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. The record, however,
shows that the prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators who conducted
the investigation, although his testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the
existence and due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of
its contents. If at all, the admission of the reports existence is an acknowledgment that it is
neither spurious nor counterfeit.
All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant to prop up his
cause, his appeal must fall.
WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects.
SO ORDERED.

People vs Samolde
Facts:
Accused-appellant Ramil Samolde was charged, together with Armando Andres, with the crime
of murder. However, when arraigned both accused pleaded not guilty. Accused-appellant
Samolde claimed that he was beaten up by the police. He testified that during his detention,
he was not allowed to be seen, lest visitors notice his swollen face. As regards his counsel,
accused-appellant stated that, contrary to what was stated in his extrajudicial confession, his
lawyer did not really assist him. He was not informed of his constitutional rights when he
executed his extrajudicial confession, and he did so only after he had been subjected to some
brutality by the police.
Issue:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant admissible in evidence.

Held:
No. The extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is not admissible in evidence, he was
not informed of his constitutional rights before his statement was taken.
Clearly, accused-appellant was not properly apprised of his constitutional rights. Under Art.
III, 12(1) of the Constitution, a suspect in custodial investigation must be given the following
warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that
anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right
to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. As the
above quoted portion of the extrajudicial confession shows, accused-appellant was given no
more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more than a feigned
compliance with the constitutional requirements. This manner of giving warnings has been
held to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. For this reason, we hold accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is invalid.

People vs Judge Ayson

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code
of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent
by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team
were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by
the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.
Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to
counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation
are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the
questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his

freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial
investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.
--------------Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights

People vs Maqueda
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba,
Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza wasbadly battered with lead pipes
on the occasion of a robbery. Two householdhelpers of the victims identified
Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike
Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house
of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for
directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag,
Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his
constitutional rights before he signed suchdocument. Afterwards he was brought to
the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion
to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to
Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.
Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan

Salaysay is admissible as evidence.

Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of
his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled
to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was
already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to
counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well
that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have
to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights
anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been
issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not
confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but
are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission
of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extrajudicialadmission is inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean
Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of
their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admissionbecause such
testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them
to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with
Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him.

G.R. No. 95604 April 29, 1994

LUCIANO KIMPO y NIANUEVO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Augusto S. Sanchez & Associates Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Luciano Kimpo y Nianuevo, a Special Collecting Officer of the Bureau of Domestic
Trade at General Santos City, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Sandiganbayan
of malversation of public funds. He appealed to this Court.
The case was initiated by Special Prosecution Officer Mothalib C. Onos who, on 29 March
1989, filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner with having committed the
following offense:
That on or about April 30, 1985 and/or sometime prior thereto, in General Santos
city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luciano Kimpo,
a public officer, being the Special Collecting Officer, Bureau of Domestic Trade,
General Santos City, and as such is an accountable officer responsible for the
funds collected by him by reason of the duties of his office, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, appropriate,
embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit the sum of Fifteen
Thousand Three Hundred Nine Pesos (P15,309.00), which amount constitutes
his collection, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforesaid
amount.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, 1 pleaded, "not guilty."
At the pre-trial inquest conducted by the Sandiganbayan, the following exhibits were admitted:
1. Exhibits A and A-1, as well as the fact that they are faithful reproductions of the
originals. In connection therewith, the accused admitted that he was on or before
April 30, 1985, Special Collecting Officer, Bureau of Trade, General Santos City;
2. That an audit-examination of the cash and accounts of the accused was
conducted on April 30, 1985; that the corresponding Report of Examination
(Exhibit B), Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms without Money
Value (Exhibit B-1), and Reconciliation Statement of Accountability (Exhibit B-3)
were made and signed, and that the signatures appearing on the dorsal side of
Exhibits B and B-1 are those of the accused, all these admissions being subject
to the qualification that the accused is questioning the validity of the audit
examination and the accuracy of the results thereof on constitutional grounds;
3. The existence of Exhibits C, E, F, M and M-1, including the fact that they are
faithful copies of the originals, subject to the same qualification made with
respect to Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2;

4. The existence of Exhibits D and D-1, including the fact that they are correct
copies of the originals, but not their relevance;
5. Exhibit H as the Official Cash Book of the accused and his signatures
appearing between the entries therein beginning August 1, 1984 and up to April
31, 1985, with the qualification that the said entries were not made by him;
6. The existence of Exhibits I, I-1 to I- 40, J, J-1 to J-95, K,
K-1 to K-26, and L, L-1 to L-44 (carbon copies of official receipts) and his
signatures thereon, subject to the qualification that the entries therein were not
made by him;
7. Exhibit N, subject to the qualification that the data mentioned therein were
based on the results of the audit examination, the validity and accuracy of which
are questioned;
8. Exhibits A 1-1, N 2-2, T 2-1, L 3-1, F 4-2, A 5, L 7, N 7-1, U 7-2, B 8-1, C 8, D 8, E 8, G 8,
G 8, H 8, M 8-2, Y8-2 AND Y 8-2 AND Y 8-3 (xerox copies of official receipts),
including the fact that they are faithful reproductions of the originals;
9. Exhibits J 8 to O 8, as well as the signatures appearing on the last page of each
exhibit and the fact that they are true copies of the originals.
The testimonial evidence consisted of the testimonies of Lydia Mendoza, State Audit Examiner
of the Commission on Audit, for the prosecution, and of Milda de la Pea, Trade and Industry
Analyst of the Department of Trade and Industry at its South Cotabato Provincial Office, as well
as that of petitioner Kimpo himself, for the defense.
From all the evidence adduced, the Sandiganbayan concluded, thus:
Accused herein having admitted his public position as alleged in the information
and the existence of a shortage of P15,309.00 upon audit examination of his
accountabilities, then what remains to be resolved only is whether any criminal
liability is attributable to him by reason of such shortage. As can be deduced from
the defense evidence, testimonial and documentary, accused lays the blame for
the shortage on one Yvette Samaranos, whom he admitted to have been
retained by him as his unofficial clerk/collector in his office and who attended to
the receipt of payments for the registration of business names and issuance of
certifications and official receipts for such payments, including penalties, and
fees for repair shop establishments. While the certifications and official receipts
were pre-signed by him, the collections thereunder were made by Samaranos,
who also entered the amounts collected by her in accused's cashbook.
The amounts collected between the period from July 17, 1984 to April 30, 1985
totalled P100,486.50, from which should be deducted total remittances of
P85,177.50, leaving a balance of P16,221.50. An Inventory of Cash and/or
allowed Cash Items produced P912.50, leaving a shortage of P15,309.00 which
was determined by Auditor Lydia R. Mendoza as the difference between the
amounts appearing in the originals of the Official Receipts/Letter of Confirmation
and the duplicate Official Receipts. In other words, what were collected and

reflected in the duplicate ORs were not the correct amounts appearing in the
original ORs issued to the payees and which were verified and confirmed later by
the payees.
Auditor Mendoza supported her findings of a shortage and the reasons for such
shortage thru a formal "Comparison of Duplicate Official Receipts of P2.00 per
Report of Collections with the Confirmation Letter and/or Original Official
Receipts" for the period from July 17, 1984 to April 30, 1985. Therein, it clearly
appeared that while the amounts to be officially collected should be P110.00 or
P112.00, the amounts reported to have been collected and which were reflected
in the duplicate ORs were only P2.00. The unreported and unrecorded
collections of P108.00 or P110.00 from individual payees were reflected in the
original ORs which were confirmed by said payees through confirmation letters
and which totalled P15,309.00.
After the cash count made by Auditor Mendoza as a prelude to her Report of
Examination and subsequent verification/confirmation, she sent a letter of
demand to the accused on October 14, 1985, which the accused received on the
same date. Therein, he was required to produce immediately the balance of
P3,418.50, due to the fact that he had made deposits amounting to P11,890.50,
"after cash count and confirmed by us (Please see Scheduled 2)." On October
17, 1985, accused submitted his letter-explanation to Auditor Mendoza wherein
he laid the blame for the shortage on his office clerk whom he had already
relieved and alleged that he had not benefited, directly or indirectly, from the
missing funds. On October 18, 1985 and November 7, 1985, accused "restituted
and deposited with the Bureau of Treasury thru PNB, GSC" the amounts of
P2,933.50 and P485.00, respectively, which, if added to his previous deposits
from June 2, 1985 to August 23, 1985 amounting to P11,890.50, would total
P15,309.50.
There being no dispute, therefore, as to the existence of the shortage in the
accounts of the accused, as found by Auditor Mendoza as of April 30, 1985,
amounting to P15,309.00 and the fact of accused's settlement for such shortage
through installments deposited with the PNB, General Santos City between June
2, 1985 to November 7, 1985, then it behooves the Court to determine if accused
herein had rendered himself liable or not under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code by reason of such shortage. Such determination must perforce go into the
merits of his claim that the responsibility for such shortage should be laid on the
doorstep of Yvette Samaranos, a private individual, whom he inherited from his
predecessor who had allowed her to work in the office as clerk-collector and
whom he retained for the following reasons: (1) the Office of the Bureau of
Domestic Trade at General Santos City, of which he was the Provincial Trade
Development Officer, was a one-man operation, hence, understaffed; (2) he had
to go out to the field to campaign for increased registration of business names,
hold symposiums of consumers' groups, conduct meetings for retailers and
consumers and repair shop establishments; (3) he occasionally goes out to
attend raffles conducted by private establishments as representative of the
Bureau of Domestic Trade; and (4) he had to leave someone in the office to
attend to the general public in the registration and/or renewal of business names
and the issuance of certifications and official receipts for the collection of the

proper fees. For the reason that he was out in the field for days at times, he presigned official receipts in blank, as well as certifications, which he entrusted to
Samaranos who then fills up the said receipts and certifications and makes the
corresponding entries in his cashbook. As it turned out, however, Samaranos
collected the proper official fees, issued the original receipts with the proper
amounts, filled up the duplicates thereof with reduced amounts, made the
corresponding entries in the cashbook based on the amounts reflected in the
duplicates and made the proper remittances based on the improper entries.
Accused's defense cannot be accepted, nor can it absolve him from criminal
liability for the missing public funds which the audit examination on his
accountabilities as of April 30, 1985 had revealed. As Special Disbursing Officer,
he was the primary accountable officer for such funds and the fact, which was
not definitely or conclusively established by his evidence, that another person,
albeit a private individual, was responsible for the misappropriation thereof,
cannot be considered in exculpation or justification of such primary accountability.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, accused herein cannot blame anyone else for the predicament
that he found himself in. First of all, he should not have allowed Yvette
Samaranos, who did not possess any appointment, to perform official acts which
he was ordained to do. Secondly, since the collection of official fees was a
sensitive area, he should have refrained from pre-signing official receipts and
certifications. Thirdly, if he were that desirous of rendering conscientious public
service, he should have ensured that the collection of official fees was properly
made, recorded and remitted. Fourthly, his admission that he had to pay the
salaries of Samaranos through honoraria received by him from raffles is fatal to
his cause since he should have realized that, under such circumstance,
Samaranos would be subject to the most severe temptation to fool around with
the agency's collections. Apparently, accused was more interested in conducting
field trips and raffles whereby he would be able to collect per diems, travelling
allowances and honoraria from private firms. To allow public accountable officers
to adopt the practice resorted to by the accused in allowing private individuals to
perform public functions would lead to chaos and anarchy and would render
nugatory all applicable norms of public trust and accountability. His bare and
unsupported claim that, after discovery of the shortage upon audit examination,
he took steps to charge Yvette Samaranos for Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents does not, in any way, erase his criminal liability which could be
characterized as malversation of Public Funds through negligence. In his case,
such negligence may be described as gross and inexcusable, amounting to a
definite laxity resulting in the deliberate non-performance of his duties.
On the basis of the above findings, judgment was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting
petitioner Kimpo and sentencing him, accordingly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Luciano Kimpo y
Nianuevo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Malversation of
Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, and favorably appreciating the mitigating circumstances of

voluntary surrender and full restitution, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
the minimum, to ELEVEN (11) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE
(21) DAYS, likewise of prision mayor as the maximum; to further suffer perpetual
special disqualification; to pay a fine of P15,309.00 equal to the amount
malversed and to pay the costs of this action. No civil liability is awarded in view
of the full restitution of the amount involved.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, petitioner submitted the following assignment of errors: That
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED
EXHIBITS B TO B-3 AGAINST THE ACCUSED OVER ACCUSED'S
OBJECTIONS ANCHORED ON ARTICLE III, SECTIONS 12 & 17 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED
OVER PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS ALLEGED CONFIRMATION LETTERS
NOT SIGNED OR NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED, AS EVIDENCE TO PROVE
ALLEGED SHORTAGE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
ACCUSED IS PRESUMED TO HAVE MALVERSED P15,309.00 BECAUSE HE
FAILED TO HAVE THE AMOUNT FORTHCOMING UPON DEMAND.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING ACCUSED LIABLE
FOR MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH NEGLIGENCE.
The appeal has no merit.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for having considered Exhibits "B" to "B-3," inclusive,
despite what he claims to be an impairment of his constitutional rights under Article III, Section
12 paragraphs (1) and (3), and Section 17, 2 of the 1987 Constitution. We cannot agree. The
questioned exhibits pertain to the Report of Examination, the Statement of Accountability for
Accountable Forms without Money Value, and a Reconciliation Statement of Accountability,
which are official forms prepared and accomplished in the normal course of audit regularly
conducted by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner, not being at the time under investigation for
the commission of a criminal offense, let alone under custodial investigation, clearly cannot be

said to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogatives he invokes (Villaroza vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79636, 17 December 1987; People vs. Olivares, 186 SCRA 536).
On the so-called confirmatory letters, respondent court concluded thus
III. The Letters of Confirmation (Exhibits Z to II, JJ to SS, TT to GGG, HHH to
WWW, XXX to ZZZZ, AAAA to JJJJJ, KKKKK to KKKKKKK to JJJJJJJJ and
JJJJJJJJ) were not the primary evidence presented by the prosecution to prove
the manipulations and irregularities in question but theoriginals and duplicates of
the Official Receipts (Exhibits L to I-40, J to J-95, K to K-26 and L to L-44), all of
which were admittedly signed by the accused, wherein it could clearly be seen
that payments for P110.00 were reflected as P2.00 only. Thus, the Letters of
Confirmation are only secondary evidence to support and prove the principal
facts in issue. Accused had not, REPEAT, had not, denied that the abovementioned official receipts, originals and duplicates, are genuine and correctly
reflect the amounts which appear to be listed therein.
Hardly can the above findings be validly challenged. Indeed, considering all the evidence on
record, there is not much that the questioned letters could have lent to augment the case for the
prosecution.
Petitioner has been charged with having violated Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which,
in full, reads:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of
malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is
less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
The validity and constitutionality of the presumption of evidence provided in the above Article,
which petitioner questions, has long been settled affirmatively in a number of cases heretofore
decided by this Court; 3 that point need not again be belabored.
Even while an information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may, nevertheless, be adjudged as the evidence so yields. Malversation, unlike
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is consummated, and the same penalty
is imposed, regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence. 4
Petitioner argues that the restitution made by him of the full amount should exonerate him from
criminal liability. The argument not only is an inappropriate defense in criminal cases but it also
even at times tightens a finding of guilt. In malversation of public funds, payment,
indemnification, or reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime,
does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the
accused's civil liability thereunder 5 and be considered a mitigating circumstance being
analogous to voluntary surrender. 6
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the appealed decision of respondent
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.

People vs. Pacito Ordono and Apolonio Medina GR 132154, June 29, 2000
FACTS
The case is an automatic review of the decision of the La Union RTC convicting the accused of
the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing them to death. The decomposing body of
15-year-old Shirley Victore was found among the bushes in Brgy. Poblacion, Santol. La Union.
Unidentified sources pointed to the accused as the culprits. The police invited them
to the police station for questioning, but were released later on due to insufficient evidence. A
week later, accused went to the police station and freely admitted that they were responsible for
the death of Shirley Victore. The police then conducted the custodial investigation after
apprising the accused of their rights. Since there were no practicing lawyers in the area, they
invited the parish priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers to
witness the investigation. A f t e r n e w s o f t h e c r i m e s p r e a d , R o l a n d
A l m o i t e , a l e a d i n g a n n o u n c e r o f r a d i o s t a t i o n D Z N L , v i s i t e d a n d interviewed
the accused. The interview was broadcast and heard by thousands of listeners Two days later,
the accused were brought to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) where they had a closeddoor session with PAO Lawyer Oscar Cruz. Atty. Cruz likewise apprised the accused of their
rights and explained to them the questions as well as the implication of their answers during the
investigation. The accused were then b r o u g h t t o t h e B a l a o a n M T C w h e r e J u d g e

F a b i a n B a u t i s t a a s k e d t h e m i f t h e y w e r e c o e r c e d t o g i v e t h e i r confession,
to which they answered in the negative, and the accused affixed their thumb marks
to the signed statement. On arraignment, in a complete turn-about, the accused pleaded not
guilty.
ISSUE
Whether the accused's confessions should be inadmissible as evidence against them.
HELD
YES, insofar as they were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.
Although the Parish Priest, Municipal Mayor and Chief of Police were present when the
accused made their admission, this did not cure the defect in the custodial investigation
particularly the deprivation of their right to competent and independent counsel. RA
7438, which defines the rights of persons under custodial investigation, allows certain
exceptions to the right to counsel as long as they meet the following conditions: (1)
counsel of the accused must be absent and (2) a valid waiver must be executed. In
this case, there was no lawyer available but there was no valid waiver executed. Even
if they were brought to a PAO lawyer days later, it still did not remedy this omission. There was
also no evidence that the accused were effectively informed of their rights. In fact, at the time
they were arrested, they were not informed of their rights so that when they made their
admission later on, it actually violated their right to self-incrimination. Even the advice given by
the PAO lawyer were given in a cursory
andp e r f u n c t o r y m a n n e r w h e n , i d e a l l y, h e s h o u l d h a v e m a d e a c o n s c i o u s e f
f o r t t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e a c c u s e d understood their rights. However, his interview with
Almoite was admissible as evidence as it was voluntary and spontaneous

G.R. No. 112177

January 28, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TITO ZUELA y MORANDARTE, MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES, and NELSON GARCIA y
TEMPORAS,accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and
Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Libmanan,
Branch 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentencing
each of them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the amount of one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao, and fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.2
On July 29, 1985, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Julian C. Ocampo III filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur an information charging accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson
Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte with "robbery with triple homicide" committed as
follows:

That in the evening of April 27, 1985 in Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding each
other, with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with violence
and intimidation gainst [sic] persons, that is by shooting and stabbing one Hegino
Hernandez, Sr., Maria S. Abendao and John-John Abendao, thereby inflicting upon them
mortal injuries that caused their instantaneous death, take, rob and carry away the following
personal properties belonging to the said Maria Abendao, to wit:
(1) Cash money
(2) one gold ring
(3) one Seiko wrist watch

P 21,000.00
P 750.00
P 1,250.00
P 23,000.00

That as a consequence of the felonious act of the accused, the heirs of the deceased
suffered damages in the amount of P25,000.00 each, representing indemnity for death, loss
of earning capacity and moral damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On June 1, 1985 Maximo Velarde was arrested at Magallanes, Sorsogon, while accused Nelson
Garcia and Tito Zuela were arrested at Cabusao, Camarines Sur on June 4, 1985 and June 9, 1985,
respectively.
On March 26, 1987, all three accused, were arraigned with the assistance of their counsel, and
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued.
The evidence established the following facts:
Maria Abendao was engaged in business. She has a store operated a passenger jeepney and
engaged in the buy and sale of palay. Her house cum store was beside that of her sister Romualda
Algarin's house, by the roadside in Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Romualda also had a
store.
1wphi1.nt

Accused Nelson Garcia was Maria's store helper. Accused Tito Zuela alias "Anting" helped
Romualda in her store during palay season. The other accused Maximo Velarde was known to
Romualda because she met him at a birthday party held at Maria's house on April 19, 1985. The
three accused were friends.
On April 27, 1985, Maria made three (3) deliveries of palay on board to her jeepney, driven by
Hegino Hernandez, Jr., to the ricemill of Gerardo Benitez in San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
Every delivery costs seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos. The three deliveries were made at 9:00 in
the morning, 2:00 in the afternoon and 7:30 in the evening.4
Between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening of that day, from a distance of five (5) arms length, Romualda
saw the three (3) accused board the jeepney of Maria, bound for San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines
Sur. Because the jeepney was filled with palay, they merely hold on the railing of the jeepney.5 There
were other passengers namely, Pablo Abendao and Roberto Echiaca.6
Gerardo Atienza, the buyer of palay, saw Maximo inside the jeepney during the second and third
delivery of palay to his ricemill.7 For each delivery, Gerardo paid Maria the amount of seven
thousand (P7,000.00) pesos.

The following morning, the bodies of Hegino Hernandez, Maria and John-John Abendao were
found in rigor mortis condition at New Poblacion, Cabusao, Camarines Sur.8
Dr. Restituto Sampilo, municipal health officer of Cabusao, found Maria in a reclining position on the
front seat of the jeepney. John was in a semi-kneeling position, facing his mother with both hands
clasping her left hand. Hegino was at the steering wheel with his body, from the abdomen up, resting
on the side of the vehicle and his head outside of it.9 A bullet that exited from Hegino's left eyebrow
caused the wound near his right ear.10
Maria had a horizontal stab wound at the front part of her neck just above the xyphoid process. 11 Her
seven (7) year old son, John, had a three (3) inch slashed horizontal wound at the front base of the
neck, a two (2) inch wound on the left upper arm and two (2) stab wounds on the lateral side of the
neck at the junction of the right shoulder.12 Hegino had a small wound with slightly depressed edges,
about an inch from the highest tip of the right ear, a wound with everted and lacerated edges above
the middle part of the left eyebrow, and seven (7) stab wounds at the back. 13
Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was committed with
the testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the extrajudicial admission given by
Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the Camaligan municipal jail on June 6,
1985.
Maximo, Tito and Nelson conceived the plan to hold-up Maria while drinking in front of Romualda's
store because Maximo needed money for his fare to Manila.
When the palay-laden jeepney of Maria left for Libmanan, Camarines Sur Maximo, Tito and Nelson
boarded it. They alighted at sitio Cagumpis, Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur to attend a
wedding.14 Maximo was supposed to board the jeepney on its way back to Barcelonita, while the
other two (2) accused, Tito and Nelson would wait along the road at the crossing of New Poblacion
and Camagong, Camarines Sur to board the jeepney and hold-up Maria.
Everything went according to plan. Nelson and Tito hailed the jeepney at the crossing of Cabusao,
Camarines Sur. Upon reaching an uninhabited place, Tito alias "Anting" told Velarde: "Oragui na
ngaya ang driver."15 Maximo poked a gun at the driver and shot him. He also shot Maria at the neck
when the latter shouted.16
Nelson and Tito alighted from the jeepney. Nelson went to the front side of the jeepney, while Tito
approached the right front side of the jeepney, in the process stepping on the sleeping John-John
who was then awakened. The boy stood up and said, "You will see I will tell my father that you killed
my mother."17 To avoid being identified by the boy, Tito told Maximo "Oragui na ini."18 Maximo took
hold of the boy's hair and slashed his neck.
Tito took Maria's money and divided it, each accused receiving about seven thousand (P7,000.00)
pesos from the loot.
Tito and Nelson went back to Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Maximo proceeded to Manila.
On June 1, 1985, Lt. Ernesto J. Idian, Station Commander, Cabusao Police Station, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur assisted by two (2) other policemen, arrested Maximo in Magallanes, Sorsogon.
Though no warrant of arrest had been issued, Maximo was immediately brought to the Camaligan
police station in Camaligan, Camarines Sur where he was investigated and asked to give a written

statement in the presence of Atty. Jose Ocampo from the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO),
Naga City.19
On June 4, and 9, 1985, Tito and Nelson were taken into police custody without a warrant. They
underwent custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel because no lawyer could be
found in Cabusao, Camarines Sur.
On the last page of each accused's confession appeared a statement, in their own handwriting, to
the effect that they voluntarily gave their statements and that no one coerced or promised them
anything to admit responsibility for the crime.
Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual statements before Judge Lore R. Valencia
Bagalacsa, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur on three (3) different dates. 20 She
followed the same procedure and line of questioning, using the local dialect, in ascertaining the
voluntariness of the three (3) accused's confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his companions to
leave her and the accused inside the chamber.21Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their
rights and that they voluntarily executed their statements, she had them sign their individual
extrajudicial statements.
Antonio Abendao, the husband of Maria, was working at Saudi Arabia when his family was killed.
He came to know about the tragic death of his wife and son through an overseas call from his
brother Renato Abendao. When he learned about it, he became unconscious. He arrived in the
Philippines five (5) days after.22 He knew Nelson Garcia because he was the son of his cousin. He
was also familiar with Tito Zuela, but he did not know Maximo Velarde. He spent twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos for the funeral of his wife and son. He gave one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos
financial assistance to the family of their driver, Hegino.23
On the other hand Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial and (2) that
they were tortured and forced to make a confession. In addition, Tito and Nelson claimed they were
not assisted by counsel when their confessions were taken, while Maximo alleged the defense
of alibi saying that he did not leave Magallanes, Sorsogon anytime in 1985.
On June 1, 1985, five (5) persons, led by Lt. Idian, went to the house of Maximo Velarde in
Magallanes, Sorsogon to fetch him because his parents wanted him at Cabusao, Camarines Sur as
his brother Benito Velarde died. He was shown the picture of the cadaver of his brother. Maximo
went with the group of Lt. Idian on board a red car and traveled to Naga City, arriving there between
7:00 and 8:00 in the evening.
In a dark place before reaching Naga City, the driver stopped the vehicle to urinate. Before the driver
could return, Maximo felt a hard object hit his head and he passed out. When he regained
consciousness, he was already handcuffed. Pointing a gun at him, Lt. Idian told him that he had two
choices, either to die or sign the statement they prepared because his brother had wronged them.
He was warned not to tell anyone that he was mauled. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Camaligan
municipal jail.
Two days later or on June 3, 1985, Maximo was brought out of the jail and ushered into a small room
where he saw three persons, namely Lt. Idian, Atty. Jose Ocampo from CLAO; Naga City and Pat.
Gonsalo Refe, a police investigator from Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Atty. Ocampo read to him the
contents of a prepared statement, which in substance mentioned that some people died and that he
was responsible for their death. Maximo refused to sign. Atty. Ocampo stepped out of the room,
followed by Lt. Idian and he overheard that he would be made to sign the statement in Atty.
Ocampo's office in Naga City. Atty. Ocampo then left and Lt. Idian returned to the room.

Upon Lt. Idian's return to the smaller room, he kicked Maximo in the stomach and poked a gun at
him. Consumed by fear, Maximo promised that he would sign the prepared statement. He was then
handed a piece of paper and ordered to copy its contents on the prepared statement. Found on
page 5 of his extrajudicial confession was this statement, in his own handwriting:
Opo binasa ko po ang apedabeth na ito na may 5# pahina na pawang totoo at sasareling
kagustohan at walang nantakot o nangako.24
On June 4, 1985, Maximo again signed the statement before Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. From the time accused Maximo was
arrested, he was never released. Maximo denied that he saw and talked to Romualda on June 6,
1985 at the Camaligan municipal jail because he had been detained at the Libmanan municipal jail
since June 4, 1985.
For his part, Nelson Garcia denied any knowledge of the crime. On June 4, 1985, the group of Pat.
Gonsalo Refe went to his house and invited him to the office of Lt. Idian. He was brought to the
Camaligan Police Station. Upon their arrival, Lt. Idian talked to him and tried to convince him to
confess to the killing of the Abendaos. Because Nelson refused, Lt. Idian brought him upstairs and
mauled him. He was transferred to Nage City jail, where he was detained for two (2) hours.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cabusao Police Station where Pat. Rodolfo O. Cario subjected
him to another investigation. Because of his continued refusal to confess, he was mauled again, this
time by Pat. Cario.
To avoid further injury to his person, on June 5, 1985, Nelson Garcia was forced to sign the prepared
statement. He was neither informed of its contents nor assisted by counsel. He was handed a piece
of paper, the contents of which he was ordered to copy, in his own handwriting, and in substance
was similar to what Maximo was ordered to copy as his own extrajudicial statement. He was brought
to the office of Judge Bagalacsa that same afternoon so that he could sign his extrajudicial
statement.
From the time he was invited to the office of Lt. Idian, Nelson was never released from police
custody. He was first detained at the Libmanan municipal jail, and later on transferred to the Tinangis
Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur. Though he suffered physically from the beatings he got from the
policemen, he was never permitted to see a doctor. His relatives were not able to visit or talk to him
because the policemen prohibited visitors.25
Like Nelson, Tito alias "Anting," denied participation in the crime. On July 9, 1985, Pat. Refe invited
him to the office of Lt. Idian in Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Upon arrival at the police station, he was
investigated about his knowledge of the crime. Failing to elicit any information from him, he was
brought to Libmanan jail where he spent the night.
The following day, Tito was again brought to Cabusao Police Station and presented to Lt. Idian. In Lt.
Idian's office, he was investigated about his involvement in the crime. When he could not provide
any answer, he was made to board the police jeep, to be brought back to the Libmanan jail.
Along the way, the police jeep stopped and Pat. Cabrera got off and kicked Tito who fell to the
ground. He heard a gunshot and was shown the piece of paper that he was ordered to sign before
Judge Bagalacsa. He was threatened with death should he refuse to sign the prepared statement.
Out of fear for his life, Tito promised to sign. Thereafter, they boarded the police jeep and proceeded
to the office of Judge Bagalacsa Libmanan, in Camarines Sur.

Upon arrival at the office of Judge Bagalacsa, he was ordered to sign the statement without the
assistance of counsel and without being informed of its contents. Thereafter, he was brought to
Libmanan municipal jail and later to Tinangis Penal Farm. Like his co-accused, he was never
released from police custody from the time of arrest.
On August 26, 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the three (3) accused of
robbery with homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a careful and serious evaluation of the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the defense, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt, that
the three (3) accused Maximo Velarde, Tito Zuela and Nelson Garcia had committed the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and, therefore, sentences them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally an indemnity in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS for the Heirs of Maria
Abendao and John Abendao and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for the Heirs
of Hegino Hernandez, without imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 26th day of July, 1993 at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Philippines.
(Sgd.) SALVADOR G. CAJOT
Presiding Judge26
On the same day, all three (3) accused filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.
In their appeal, accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in:
(1) relying on Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial confession notwithstanding the violation of his
constitutional rights;
(2) giving full faith and credit to Romualda Algarin's testimony; and
(3) finding all three (3) accused guilty as charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, the extra-judicial
confessions of the three (3) accused play a pivotal role in the determination of their culpability. The
Court is duty-bound, therefore, to resolve the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial confessions
were executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, in light of the fact that the
crime took place in 1985.
The pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Art. IV, Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means, which vitiates the free will, shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 27

The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this point that the law requires the
assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or
confessions from the person undergoing interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a move
or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel."28
Lt. Idian's team apprehended appellant Maximo in Magallanes Sorsogon on June 1, 1985 when no
warrant had been issued for his arrest. Immediately thereafter, the arresting peace officers
investigated appellant Maximo. His statement was reduced in writing when they were in Camaligan,
Camarines Sur. It was in Camaligan that CLAO lawyer Ocampo was summoned to assist appellant
Maximo in the execution of his written confession. Atty. Ocampo was not present during the entire
duration that accused Maximo was subjected to custodial investigation as could be inferred from the
testimony of Pat. Rodolfo Cario, to wit:
Q: And after taking the statement of Velarde, what did you do with the statement of Velarde?
A: It was presented to Atty. Ocampo.
Q: Do you want to tell me that inspite of the fact that he was present when the confession
was made you still present the statement to Atty. Ocampo?
A: In order to let him sign the statement.
Q: And where did Atty. Ocampo sign the confession of Velarde?
A: It was sign [sic] at Naga because he went ahead.
Q: Do you mean to tell me now that after the confession was made, the confession was left
to you and after the confession was brought to his office at the CLAO Office in Naga, is that
what you want to tell this court.
A: We went to Naga with Lt. Idian and Velarde.
Q: But it remains a fact that Atty. Ocampo was already at Naga when the statement of
Velarde was presented to him for signature, is that correct?
A: Yes he went ahead to Naga.29
There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts,
we are constrained to the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in
evidence.30 "An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence." 31
The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and Nelson were likewise inadmissible in
evidence because they were executed without the assistance of counsel. Despite the fact that the
reason for the absence of lawyer during the custodial investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the
area, the Court could not be lenient in this case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any given
place is not a valid reason for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled confessions.

Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not
cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants' sworn statements did not leave a void in the
prosecution's case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to
Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is
admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the
Rules of Court stating that the "act, declaration for omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to
Romualda's testimony. In People vs. Maqueda,32 we held:
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under
the Bill of Rights. Masqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the
course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state
witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of
the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist
without the governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that
government has the duty to protect; or restrictions on the power of the government found
"not in particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps
alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited." They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse
of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the
people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals.
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe
vs. People (183 SCRA 196 [1990]), this Court held that the declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and
any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The
said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its
substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admission. (Emphasis
supplied)33
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan34 the Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in
the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that "when the accused talked with the mayor as
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime." Of course, accusedappellant Maximo attempted to discredit Romualda's credibility as a witness when he swore that he
could not have been in Camaligan on June 6, 1985 because since June 4, 1985 until some three
weeks later, he was detained at the Libmanan jail.35 The trial court correctly disregarded this selfserving uncorroborated assertion.
The defense failed to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Romualda for testifying on accusedappellant Maximo's admission and therefore the presumption that in so testifying, she was impelled
by no other reason than to tell the truth, stands. The fact that she is related to two of the victims did
not render her testimony incredible. Relationshipper se is not proof of prejudice.36 She might have
been mistaken as to the date when she talked with accused-appellant Maximo while he was
detained considering the more than three-year gap between June 1985 and September to October

1988 when Romualda testified. However, it is not necessary that the witness should be able to fix
accurately the date of the conversation in which the admission was made. What is important is that
the witness is able to state the substance of the conversation or declaration. 37
Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission sealed not only the latter's fate but
also that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon
the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because the latter has no opportunity to
cross-examine the confessant and therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay,38 is not
applicable here. What is involved here is an admission, not a confession. Wharton distinguished
these terms as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but
an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 39
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witness Romualda on
accused-appellant Maximo's declaration. They could have questioned its veracity by presenting
evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so they could put to test Romualda's
credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualda's testimony, which the trial court correctly considered as
credible, stands unscathed.
Romualda's testimony on the substance of accused-appellant Maximo's admission standing alone,
may not be the basis for conviction of the appellants. However, such testimony, taken with
circumstances duly established by the prosecution, point unerringly to accused-appellants'
culpability. These circumstances are: (1) accused-appellants and the victims were all residents of
Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur, a small barangay where everyone knew everybody; (2)
accused-appellants Tito and Nelson helped in the stores of the sisters Maria and Romualda a week
before the incident; (3) Romualda saw the three accused-appellants as they boarded Maria's
jeepney during its last palay delivery to Libmanan; (4) Gerardo Atienza saw accused-appellant
Maximo with Maria's group during the jeepney's second delivery of palay; (5) Atienza saw accusedappellant Maximo riding in Maria's jeepney after the last delivery; (6) after the commission of the
crime, accused-appellants Tito and Nelson no longer went to the store of Romualda; (7) accusedappellants never attended the wake of the victims, and (8) accused-appellant Maximo fled to Manila.
These circumstances form an unbroken chain, which, by themselves lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellants were the culprits in the robbery with homicide. 40 Under the law,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient basis for conviction as long as: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved, and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.41 These requisites were present in this case.
Accused-appellants' diverse course of action after the commission of the crime, with accusedappellant Maximo going to Manila and accused-appellants Tito and Nelson staying in Barcelonita, do
not negate their guilt. As regards accused-appellant Maximo, his flight to Manila and to Magallanes,
Sorsogon with no plausible explanation therefor is a clear indication of guilt. 42 With respect to
accused-appellants Tito and Nelson, their decision to stay in Barcelonita did not mean that they were
not equally guilty as accused-appellant Maximo. As this Court once said:

Accused-appellant argues that had he participated in the crime, his natural reaction would
have been to flee. We do not agree. Each culprit behaves differently in externalizing and
manifesting his guilt. Others may escape or flee which circumstance is strongly indicative
of guilt, while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of
normalcy, careful not to arouse suspicion in the community.43
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime, which indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.44 Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the conspiracy are also guilty as principals in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless
there is no proof that they tried to prevent the crime. 45 There is no evidence that any of the accusedappellants desisted from the malevolent intent of the others to kill the victims during the robbery. As
such, they shall equally bear the responsibility for the resulting crime.
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and
Maria from behind was proven reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance.46 As regards seven-year-old John, even if the manner by which
he was attacked was not shown, treachery may be deemed to have attended his killing. Treachery
exists when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death. 47
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized in
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the crime as robbery with
homicide and not "robbery with triple homicide" as charged in the information. The term "homicide" in
Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing not only the act which results in death but also
all other acts producing anything short of death.48 Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the
number of killings in connection with the robbery.49The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of
the robbery is only appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous
situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be
treated in the same way that robbery with multiple killings would be.50
Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. By the presence of two aggravating circumstances, namely, treachery and
multiplicity of slain victims, the proper penalty should be death in view of Article 63 (1) of the same
Code.51 However, considering that when this case happened, the imposition of the death penalty was
proscribed, the proper imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. The heinousness of the crime they
committed notwithstanding, accused-appellants may not be deprived of such favorable factor in their
case.
The Solicitor General's plea for modification of the penalty in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659
which "has already expressly converted reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty" and on account
of the decision in People vs. Lucas,52 is untenable. It must be stressed that the Lucas ruling has
been reconsidered and, accordingly, the Court has held:
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the
Court concludes that although Section 17 of the R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration
of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was
no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall
then remain as an indivisible penalty.53
The trial court failed to award the heirs of Maria Abendao the amount of twenty three thousand
(P23,000.00) pesos in reimbursement of the stolen cash, ring and wristwatch and the expenses

amounting to twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for her wake and that of her son, which were duly
proved.54 The heirs are entitled to those amounts as reparation of the damage caused by accusedappellants. They shall also be liable for exemplary damages in view of the presence of two
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. 55
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial court. The Court
renders judgment finding accused-appellants Tito Zuela y Morandarte, Maximo Velarde y de los
Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences each of them
to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay civil indemnity of one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao and fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, Jr.
In addition, the Court sentences each of the accused-appellants solidarily to pay the additional
amounts of forty three thousand (P43,000.00) pesos as reimbursement of damages to the heirs of
Maria Abendao, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages to the heirs of each
of the three (3) victims.
1wphi1.nt

With costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133026

February 20, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin
alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once shared.
1wphi1.nt

On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry
Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by
the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to
free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was
foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered
for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he
collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical
attention. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-

respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the
heart."1
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward
Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as
both accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the
case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo
and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken
into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was
fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of
the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin
was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting
his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after
attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother,
was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas,
where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading
for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was
shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the testimony of Clara
Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino standing outside the Soundlab
Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and without
any prior warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who
harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized Edward and Gerry
because the street was sufficiently lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of Dennis, who
testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together with a
companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab
Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard a Instinctively,
she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while she anxiously waited for her
seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine who was out of the house for an errand for her. Soon enough
she heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because she said herKuya Dennis had
been shot and stabbed.3
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin stab
her KuyaDennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose. 4
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of
Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife
Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the 16th of October when she
was discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.5
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the alibi of accusedappellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the child's birth on 13 December 1993 or
more than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar that the child's father was
"unknown."6 His story was also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at
the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant was fetched by a

neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with the news that his wife was
having labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was
induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession
was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III,
of the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police
officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his
confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of
hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers' assertion that it was even
accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national television
for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his
allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by treachery 9 and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages. The case against his
nephew and co-accused Edward Endino remained in the archives without prejudice to its
reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested. 10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and admitting his
videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16 October 1991 as
he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of that month, is not
persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines Load
Controller of the Puerto Princesa City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their
passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be relied upon
inasmuch as he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers' real identities. The
testimonies of accused-appellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14 October 1991 did not
fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not categorically state that they saw him in
Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one
who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leong's identification of
accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her confidence as to
the attacker's identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his
nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to implicate accusedappellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her
naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of spite, but was impelled
by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with intense incriminating effect, were his
immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak 12 revealing a guilty conscience, hence,
his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession

does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in
an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced
into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would
have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision 13 Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed
Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the
interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth
of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, 14 it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For
in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed
rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
1wphi1.nt

We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such
as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given
under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and
therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is
admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be
vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents itself is
whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless,
the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply
standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's
criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the slightest
provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to
murder.15
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant GERRY GALGARIN
alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P72,725.35 as actual damages, isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
is further ordered to compensate the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their
emotional and mental anguish. Costs against accused-appellant.