Swaine Arms Sales/CBMS Aff Wave 1

7 Week Seniors BFHLR

Notes
Thanks to the small, but effective group that was able to put this aff together in short order:
Kaplan, Jackson, Emily, and Josh. Its really amazing that a group so small was able to put
together an aff as quickly as they did.

The Aff needs a little additional work, but the bulk of the heavy lifting is done. The Neg Taiwan
Core file has a bunch of cards that are useful against the possible negs to this aff in the sections
vs. alternate affs ie abandon Taiwan. The Aff also has quite a bit of overlap with the Juniors
Taiwan aff and many of those cards can be used for that aff and vis-versa.

Case work

Plan Mechanism/Text Stuff

Plan: The United States federal government should offer to the Peoples
Republic of China a staged agreement consisting of restrictions on United
States arms sales to The Republic of China and a promise not to place
United States military forces in the Republic of China in return for
verifiable limits on Chinese military production and deployments relevant
to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike aircraft, and credible
assurances by the Peoples Republic of China that it would not use force
against The Republic of China in any conceivable contingency short of an
outright declaration of de jure independence by The Republic of China or
the United States placement of forces in the Republic of China.
Plan: The United States federal government should offer to the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) a staged agreement consisting of restrictions on
United States arms sales in return for verifiable limit on PRC military
production and deployment relevant to the Republic of China (ROC) and a
promise that the PRC will not use force against the ROC.

Example 1AC
Observation one: War!
Risk of war is growing in the Taiwan strait- The PRC is unsatisfied with
Tsais promises of sticking to the status quo on ambiguous relations
greater reassurances are necessary to preserve cross-strait relations
Glaser 2016 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, she is
concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with
CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia, prior she served as
a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and
State, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in
Taiwan, April, 2016, A Report of the CSIS CHINA POWER PROJECT, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf, silbs)
During the presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen set out her basic stance on her
policy toward China, which was that she would maintain the status quo . By adopting this position,
she adroitly positioned herself in the mainstream of Taiwan public opinion, which favors preservation of the status quo over independence or reunification. Tsai also
sought to reassure the public that cross-Strait economic ties would not suffer under DPP
rule. Although on a few occasions she offered some elaboration of what she meant by her pledge to maintain the status quo, for most of the campaign Tsai focused on the
domestic economy and social issues, not cross-Strait relations. Since she held a significant lead in public opinion polls and the
majority of Taiwans voters supported her stance, there was no electoral need for Tsai to
provide greater specificity despite repeated demands from the candidates from the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Peoples First Party (PFP) to do so.
The most detailed explication of Tsai Ing-wens policy toward Beijing prior to Taiwans January 16 election
was delivered not in Taiwan, but rather in the United States, where concern about her ability to maintain
cross-Strait stability had sparked U.S. official criticism in her first bid for the presidency four years earlier.2 In a carefully
worded speech, which Tsai gave at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., on June 3, 2015,
she made a deliberate attempt to respond, albeit indirectly, to Chinas demands that the DPP
accept the 1992 Consensus and its core connotation that the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. In her speech, Tsai called for the
Tsai Ing-wens Policy toward China

two sides of the Taiwan Strait to treasure and secure the accumulated outcomes of
more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges, adding that these accumulated
outcomes will serve as the firm basis of my efforts to further the peaceful and stable
development of cross-Strait relations.3 Tsais use of the phrase more than twenty years was a clear allusion to the talks that produced
what later came to be called the 1992 Consensus and marked a significant departure from her position when she ran for president four years earlier. At that time, Tsai had
argued that the 1992 Consensus did not exist and proposed instead a Taiwan consensus, which, she said, would be achieved by a democratic nonpartisan mechanism so

Tsai pledged that

she would push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations in
accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing ROC constitutional
order. In the question-and-answer session, she elaborated that the order included not only the original constitution, but also subsequent amendments, interpretations,
that Taiwans policies toward China would be consistent and unaffected by changes in administration.4 On the issue of the core connotation,

court decisions, and practices by the government and different sectors of the population. This left ambiguous whether she intended to accept the existence of one China, of

in one of the presidential debates, Tsai went a bit further. Referring to the meeting that took place in
she maintained that although everyone had different opinions, they agreed
on pushing forward cross-Strait relations based on mutual understanding and seeking
common ground while reserving differences. Tsai stated clearly that the DPP does not deny this historical fact, but rather accepts
which Taiwan is a part. Six months later
Hong Kong in 1992,

She then called on the Chinese leader to recognize that party alternation is normal in
democratic societies and to show us some respect.5 On other occasions, Tsai encouraged Beijing
to respect Taiwans public opinion. For example, in a TV interview, she said that the Mainland was closely monitoring public trends in Taiwan,
and if the people reached a consensus on cross-Strait relations, she expected the
Mainland authorities will respect Taiwans public opinions and take them into consideration when making
decisions.6 In her victory speech on election night, Tsai reaffirmed that she would build a
consistent, predictable and sustainable cross-strait relationship. She asserted that both sides of the Strait have a
responsibility to find mutually acceptable means of interaction that are based on dignity and reciprocity, and stressed the importance of
ensuring that no provocations or accidents take place. Attributing her victory to the will of the Taiwanese people, Tsai
stated that the Republic of China is a democratic country whose democratic system, national identity and international space must be respected. In a warning
it.

to Beijing, she said that any forms of suppression will harm the stability of cross-Strait
relations .7 As if she had more to say, but had decided to not say it in her victory speech, Tsai gave an interview to the pro-Green newspaper, Liberty Times, five days
later. Addressing the 1992 talks again, she noted that those negotiations had achieved several common understandings and acknowledgements, adding that I understand and
respect this historical fact.8 As noted Taiwan affairs expert Alan Romberg analyzed, this was a significant step in the direction of Beijings demand that what was achieved in
1992 was not simply a process but substantive agreements.9 Tsai also told Liberty Times that it is incumbent on both sides of the Strait to cherish and protect the

she said that peace,

stability, and development of cross-Strait relations should continue . Tsai then proceeded to define the existing
accumulated status quo and outcomes that resulted from the 1992 talks. Referring to this fact and the existing political foundation,

political foundation as comprising four elements: 1) the historical fact of the 1992 talks and the resulting shared understanding to seek common ground and reserve differences;
2) the Republic of Chinas constitutional order; 3) the accumulated results of more than 20 years of cross-Strait negotiations, exchanges, and interactions; and 4) Taiwans

effort by Tsai Ing-wen to establish the

existing political foundation as a new formulation for cross-Strait relations . For Beijing,
the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence comprise the common
political foundation, which the DPP cannot accept. Like the 1992 Consensus, however, Tsai evidently
hoped that the two sides of the Strait could use a similar phrase, but reserve their
respective interpretations. However, Beijing wasnt satisfied with this positive gesture and demanded more. DPP sources
underscore that Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to provide reassurances to the PRC that she will not
democratic principles and the will of the Taiwan people.10 The Liberty Times interview suggests an

pursue Taiwan independence not only through words, but also in her actions. For example, in the DPPs version
of the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act, Tsai consciously took into account
Beijings concerns about the use of terminology that might imply a state-to-state
relationship, opting to use the term cross-Strait instead of China-Taiwan.11

And the recent accidental launch is contributing to increasingly tense

China-Taiwan relations
Guerrero 7/1, (Kay, 7/1/16, Taiwan accidentally launches missile toward China, kills fishing
boat captain, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/01/asia/taiwan-fires-missile-onchina/index.html)//kap
(CNN)A

Taiwan warship mistakenly launched a supersonic "aircraft carrier killer" missile

toward China Friday, hitting a fishing boat and killing the boat's captain in an incident
China called "a serious matter." A spokesman for Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense apologized on behalf of the
military. "The Ministry of National Defense sincerely apologizes for the incident that caused the
death of the captain (of the boat) and injured other crew members," Maj. Gen. Chen Chung-Chi said in a news conference. The
ministry has also asked the Navy to provide assistance and compensation to the family of the victims. The deceased captain has
been identified as Huang Wen-Chung, the defense ministry confirmed, according to Taiwan Focus, the English-language service of
state-run Central News Agency. Chung-Chi said the

missile, the "Hsiung Feng III," ripped through the fishing

boat but did not explode. An investigation into the incident has begun, Chung-Chi added. China's top official in
charge of Taiwan policy, Zhang Zhijun, said Friday that Taiwan must provide a "responsible
explanation" for the launch of the missile, calling it a "serious matter." Relations between

Taiwan -- officially the Republic of China -- and the People's Republic of China have been
increasingly tense since the landslide election of Tsai Ing-wen, whose party has
traditionally leaned in favor of formal independence from China.

Arms sales ensure regional instability, makes conflict inevitable, and

destroys regional stability
An 1-17-13
Xiao, This article was first published in Chinese and translated by Chen Boyuan, US' arms sales
to Taiwan impede Sino-US relationship, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/201301/17/content_27716480.htm, msm
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan not only directly harm Chinas essential interest , but also impede
U.S. strategic interest over the long run . They are also one of the main sources of anti-U.S.
sentiment in China and mistrust between the two countries. They will ultimately obstruct
bilateral cooperation and increase the risk of military confrontation . The balance of military
strength across the Taiwan Strait has been a primary reason for Washington to justify
arms sales to Taiwan. But the past few years have seen a remarkable improvement
between the two sides and the cross-Strait situation is now easing . And the U.S. leadership has openly and
explicitly expressed its support to a stable cross-Strait relationship.

U.S. insistence on arms sales to Taiwan will be

detrimental to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations , and violates U.S. policy. From Chinas point of
view, its military along its southeast coast are entirely internal affairs, and are only against separatist forces, not against the people of Taiwan. As early as January 2009, Chinas
Ministry of Defense noted that all military deployments in China are meant to preserve the fundamental interest of the nation and the state. "The adjustment to these
deployments will also be judged according to the situations development," said Colonel Hu Changming, spokesperson of the MOD. Despite creating a huge obstacle that
prevents the development of China-US relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain a complex problem. The United States will not draft policies to fit Chinas essential interest,
nor will China abandon its interests just to preserve its relationship with the U.S. But every problem has a solution. Some U.S. scholars have proposed a variety of solutions,
such as breaking down large scale arms sales into small pieces, gradually reducing U.S. commitments to Taiwans defense affairs, asking China to write off U.S. debt to trade off
arms sale suspension and even promoting Taiwans Finlandization. These trends have not yet taken hold in the U.S., and some seem ridiculous to China. However marginalized

The times have changed, and China is growing, meaning that the
U.S. ought to review its Taiwan policies so as to better suit its future global strategic
framework. The United States also needs to realize that Taiwan is no longer an
as they appear, these ideas all lead to one fact:

unsinkable aircraft carrier, and that China will step up its defence modernization and
prevent the country from breaking apart. The United States cannot count on China to
accept its arms sales even if they are broken into smaller components, or that China will
soften its attitude, because to China and the Chinese people, any issue that touches
sovereignty does not allow external intervention. The only thing that the U.S. can do is to
return to the Communiqu, and in the foreseeable future reduce arms sales to Taiwan . Only then can the China-US
relationship develop in a stable and smooth manner .

Economic and cultural ties dont check poor political relations outweigh
Wen-cheng 5
(Lin Wen-cheng, Dean of Social Sciences at National Sun Yat-sen University and Executive Director of the Institute for National
Policy Research in Taiwan, December 2005, Cross-strait Confidence Building Measures, p. 1, JH)

Taiwan and China have the most unique bilateral relationship in the world. The two countries have very close socioeconomic and cultural ties. About ninety-eight percent of the people in Taiwan are Han Chinese whose ancestors
originally came from China. After the Republic of China (ROC) lifted the ban on visits to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for
humanitarian reason on November 2, 1987, cross-strait people-to-people exchanges have increased dramatically. The Taiwanese
made more than 3.68 million trips to China in 2004.1 On average more than ten thousand Taiwanese travel to China everyday.

There were more than 222,800 cross-strait marriages between 1993 to June 2004.2 According to the Ministry of Commerce of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC), two-way trade between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait totaled $91.2 billion in 2005,3 and
Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus of $58.13 billion. In addition, exports to China accounted for 25.83% of Taiwans total exports in
2004. Taiwans investment in China is even more impressive. According to official Chinese data, Taiwans total investment had risen
to about $87 billion by November 2005.4 The real figure is much higher. More than one million people from Taiwan live or work in
China. However,

politically Taiwan and China are two rival states which have no official
contacts, play a zero-sum game competing for international recognition, and have
entered an arms race for a possible military showdown. Political integration theory or
functionalism, which argues that exchanges in non-political areas between two states will
spillover into their political relationship, encouraging them to solve their conflicts by
peaceful means, has so far failed to apply for the Taiwan Strait case. Instead, political conflict
between the two sides threatens to spillback, negatively effecting economic relations.

Miscalculation in the strait is the most probable cause of nuclear war

strategic mistrust makes escalation likely
Lowther, 13 citing a CSIS report (William, Tapei Times, 3/16, Taiwan could spark nuclear
war: report, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211)
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China
and the US, a new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension
and conflict between the US and China, says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS). Prepared

by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a yearlong study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent
Taiwans independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although
tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the
situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military
capabilities and persistent political disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at
the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. The
report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan
crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation ,
Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which
nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of
the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Titled Nuclear Weapons
and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between
China and the US, but they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a
number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as
Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.
Although

Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management

mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the
establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for
miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs
of suspicion, the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands
what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To
make things worse, neither side seems to believe the others declared policies and intentions,
suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially
difficult in any conflict, it says. Although conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be
ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With both sides

possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be
tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.

Causes nuclear war that wipes out all life on the planet
Wittner 11
(Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University
of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University,
2011Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?, Huntington News, November
28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for
centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest
weapons . The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing
us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the
United States and China is clear

enough. Disturbed by Chinas growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently

challenged Chinas claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations

need
this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could . After all, both the United
in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was asserting our own position as a Pacific power. But

States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China
with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of Chinas offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst
of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you
would use a bullet or anything else. Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will
be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear

Some pundits argue that

nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very
manyat least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nucleararsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.

armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost
slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use any weapon in its arsenal.
During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on
Pakistan. At the least, though, dont nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didnt feel deterred, for, throughout the
Cold War, NATOs strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the
nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to
championing Star Wars and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensiveand probably unworkablemilitary
defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans
convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese
counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total
inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United

A nuclear attack by China would

immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire,
while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The
Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher . Both nations would be reduced
States would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail?

to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear
explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a nuclear winter around the globe
destroying agriculture , creating worldwide famine , and generating chaos and
destruction . Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding
its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S.
government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars modernizing its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next

decade. To

avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious

actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed
to do but thus far have resisted doing.

The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve

U.S.-China relations . If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their
survival and that of the world , they should be working to encourage these policies .

The aff solves miscalculation- a reduction in arms sales allows adverse

impacts to be avoided
Lowther 15- William, staff writer, Beijing too passive over Taiwan: Chinese analysts,
(http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/04/25/2003616749) JB
Swaine is described by Carnegie as one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. He said in the
report that neutralizing

the cross-strait threat would require the US to cut arms sales to

Taiwan in return for verifiable limits on Chinese ballistic missiles and strike aircraft deployed
near Taiwan. Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not
use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence or
the US placement of forces on the island, Swaine said. He said Beijing might view such a conditional limitation of its right to employ
force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of an overall stable balance of power in the western Pacific. Chinese
leaders might also regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland, Swaine said. He said that

US

decisionmakers are extremely loath to make significant adjustments in the current

status of the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan. Any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of the US
security commitment to these two actors could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms and/or threats or attacks from North
Korea or China, he said. However,

if understandings could be reached on the overall need for

strategic adjustment, then specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities would
become more possible. Swaine concludes the report by saying that if both US and Chinese leaders
could convince Taipei of the benefits of mutual assurances and restraints none of
which would require US abandonment of Taiwan adverse outcomes , including a resort
to nuclear weapons, could be avoided .

Observation two: Retaliation!

First, Chinese calculations have changed they will retaliate to future U.S.
arms sales with sanctions
Harrell 16- Peter, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former
deputy assistant secretary of state for counter-threat finance and sanctions, China threatens
sanctions against U.S. companies: Is this the future?, (http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2016/01/26/china-threatens-sanctions-against-u-s-companies-is-this-the-future/) JB

Chinas recent threat to impose sanctions on U.S. defense companies that sell arms to
Taiwan should come as no surprise to American officials or corporate executives: Washington has been
issuing sanctions of these sorts for years. It was only a matter of time before U.S.
competitors started copying its tactics. Regardless of whether China follows through on
its threat, Washington needs to be ready for a new normal in which the United States must
defend against sanctions as well as impose them. China is taking a page from the
sanctions playbook Washington developed against Iran. Between 2010 and 2015, the United States
effectively gave companies a choice: If they did prohibited business with Iran, like buying oil, they would get cut off from doing any
business in the United States. Forced to choose between access to the worlds most important financial system and an Iranian
market less than 1/30th the size, most companies stuck with Washington and avoided Tehran. Chinas

threat mirrors
this approach trying to force U.S. companies to choose between defense sales to
Taiwan and access to a Chinese economy that is nearly 20 times larger. While U.S. companies do
not currently sell military equipment to China, many U.S. defense contractors do sell civilian passenger aircraft, aviation parts and

For Beijing, this is a

change in official position. China has long argued that only sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council
other civilian equipment in China and could find their ability to continue those sales cut off by Beijing.

are legitimate. Yet, Beijing has not strictly adhered to this policy. In 2012, for example, it unilaterally limited imports of fruit and
vegetables from the Philippines in retaliation for a dispute over claims in the South China Sea. But

Chinas public threat

over Taiwan marks a major escalation in its apparent willingness to deploy sanctions of
its own against U.S. companies engaging in business, particularly business that is expressly authorized
by the Obama administration and publicly supported by many in Congress. Chinese policymakers understand
that their growing economic and financial clout makes sanctions threats more credible.
China is a critical market for U.S. products from cars to computer chips, and companies like Wal-Mart, Apple, MasterCard and
Starbucks are among the leading American firms that generate at least 10 percent of their business in China, according to data
compiled last year by Factset Research.

And, U.S arms sales are inevitable and result in Chinese sanctions vs.
Boeing Boeing is at-risk Sanctions collapse Boeings civilian sector and
take down the whole company even if China doesnt SANCTION Boeing,
theyll shift business which still triggers the impact
Chesson 11
(Roy David, currently a Foreign Area Officer in the US Navy. BS in Physics
from the University of Wisconsin, and MA degree in Security Studies (East
Asian) from the Naval Post Graduate School and an MA degree in
Engineering Management from Old Dominion University, How China could
Affect the Future of US Defense Corporations, pg online @
https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal111/China3.pdf //um-ef)
the continuous sales to Taiwan by the US have been much to the chagrin of the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) who hopes to one day reunite with Taiwan. In certain cases the PRC has responded by
securing military relations and taking extreme diplomatic measures to dissuade the US
from continuing with sales to Taiwan. Even with such responses by the PRC, these stern
remarks appear to have no effect on the decisions of the United States. The US has not
However

only continued to provide Taiwan with weapons, but has also increased the amount of
arms exported to Taiwan over the past decade. From 2001 to 2004, the US delivered US$3.7 billion and from 2005 to 2008 US$3.9 billion worth of

Not only have attempts

by the PRC failed in preventing sales to Taiwan, but it also appears that the US is
weapons to Taiwan.3 To further this trend, on January 29, 2010, the US announced that it would be selling US$6.4 billion worth of weapons to Taiwan.4

ramping up the amount of weapons that they sell . What is most striking about this new
declaration is not the amount that the US has promised, but the new reaction that China
is taking to influence US decisions in sales to Taiwan. In response to the announcement by the US, Beijing curtailed military
exchanges with Washington and, for the first time, announced the possibility of sanctions on the US corporations
involved in the arms sale .5 This list of US corporations includes Northrop Grumman,
Boeing, United Technologies (UTC), Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon - all of which are defense
corporations in the United States.6 To ensure that these corporations understand the severity of the claims against them, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxu, directly threatened the corporations involved by stating: Some
US companies, which ignore the stern objections of the Chinese government and decide
to sell weapons to Taiwan regardless, will face sanctions.7 Instead of a typical retaliation
on the just the US Government, the Chinese have turned their focus on the US
corporations involved in the deal and are prepared to hold them accountable if they continue
with the decision of the US Government . To best understand what the PRC spokesman meant by the threatened sanctions, one must analyze how China
can effectively employ pressure on US corporations. The overarching goal of any corporation is to maximize profit. For China to effectively place pressure on US defense corporations they must have a viable
means by which to enact profit constriction and, therefore, must have a vulnerable target to attack. Initially, one would be inclined to believe that China has neither of these capabilities considering that US defense
corporations are highly protected by the US Government and, being that China is not allowed to buy US weapons, the PRC is not part of the US defense market. So exactly how can China impose effective
sanctions on the US defense sector? To answer this question this research paper will first analyze the different forms of protection and decipher whether international norms and regulations would prohibit or allow
such sanctions. By analyzing the existing forms of protection for the US defense corporations, vulnerabilities can be detected and legitimization can be shown in the threatened sanctions. The next section will
analyze the business structures of these five corporations and highlight their alarming level of dependency on civilian revenue and therefore the China market. I argue that although the defense sectors of the
corporations are highly protected, the civilian sectors of these same corporations are open for attack and depend on the Chinese market for future sales and growth. By analyzing Boeing in particular, it can be
shown that US defense corporations have already been under political pressure by China and stand to lose major competitive ground if China were to enact sanction or cause problems for these corporations.

The information presented in this paper should serve as an example of exactly how China can
create effective and legitimate pressure on US defense corporations and therefore serve as a
warning to US strategists that sales of weapons to Taiwan can and will have problematic
costs that may not have been realized . Are US Defense Corporations Vulnerable to Foreign Sanctions? In response to the
recent US arms sales to Taiwan, the PRC has utilized the threat of sanctions as a form of
coercion . They have not only challenged the decision of the US to sell weapons to
Taiwan, but have also challenged the corporations involved in the decision of the US
Government. For the sanctions to have any teeth against these corporations, they must
have a viable means of being legally employed against the US corporations involved.
Their validity must be unhindered by global institutions and unchallengeable by the international community. This therefore calls into
question whether or not the international norms and regulations could allow China to invoke such a serious action against US corporations. The unifying organization in international economics is the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Adopting the provisions of the General Agreements to Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO strives to facilitate and foster liberalized trade amongst its members. This international organization
not only establishes a framework for negotiations, but also provides a dispute resolution process to ensure participants adhere to the WTO rules and regulations. Considering that China and the US are both
members of the WTO, it would be through this organization that China would operate in placing overt sanctions on another country.

While sanctions by their very

nature are counter-intuitive to the overarching goal of the WTO, they are still legal . Article XXI of
the GATT states: As can be seen, Article XXI not only gives nations the clearance to immediately interrupt trade relations, but it also allows the sanctions to occur without being bogged down with the WTO dispute
resolution process.9 Therefore China has the ability to levee sanctions on US corporations if it is deemed necessary under the auspice of essential security interests. As officially published on the embassy
website of the PRC in the United States, Zhang Hanlin, director of the WTO Institute of the University of International Business and Economics, stated: As the sales to Taiwan poses a threat to Chinas national
security, China has the right to penalize the companies.10 Considering that the sovereignty of Taiwan is not recognized by the WTO, it would appear as though China has a valid point in perceiving the sales to
Taiwan as an illegal transport or trafficking of arms into their own territory and therefore can be considered a security concern for the PRC. Under the guidance of Article XXI, China has a legitimate reason to
believe the arms sales are contrary to essential security interests. Even though the WTO resolutions would allow China to impose sanctions on these corporations, exactly how could the PRC effectively sanction
US defense corporations? China, albeit a robust militarized nation, does not receive weapons from the US. Following the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the US president, under the provisions of the Arms
Export Control Act, placed embargoes on military articles and services to the PRC. A mere twenty days later the European Community enacted the same embargo on the PRC and neither has lifted them since.11
Therefore China has no part in the market of the defense sectors of the US defense corporations. The idea in sanctioning is to impose large costs on products entering the country; however, due to the decision of
the United States, the PRC is not an authorized nation to currently receive any weapons from the US. They therefore have no means to attack these defense articles considering they are not part of the US
weapons market and can not affect pricing or marketability. From this information it can be seen that the threatened sanctions by the PRC appear not to be aimed at the defense sectors of these defense
corporations. Perhaps there is another sector within the defense corporations that could be the target of the threatened sanctions by the PRC. Whether or not Beijing places sanctions on these corporations, the
PRC must believe there is a targetable weakness in the operations of current US defense corporations, otherwise the threat could call Chinas credibility into question. A clue into the possible target of the PRC
was found in a public statement by the Chinese Embassy in the United States which reminded the US Government that China had never signed the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and therefore has the right
to decide whether or not they purchase US civilian aircraft from certain corporations.12 The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft is a WTO agreement entered into force in 1980 that attempts to mitigate import
duties on all aircraft with the exception of those purchased for military use.13 This agreement also extends to aircraft parts, components and flight simulators. Because China refused to sign this agreement, they
are therefore free to place import duties on all foreign civilian aircraft and components, thus allowing them to affect the cost and competitiveness of certain foreign corporations that are involved in the sector.

While Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon take part in certain
components involving civilian aircraft, they are small compared to the level of investment
that Boeing has in this sector. This therefore appears to be a direct threat against a
civilian sector that is part of a US defense corporation. Does this mean that civilian sectors of the defense corporations are vulnerable to
sanctions by the PRC? What Makes the Civilian Sector an Easier Target? By their very nature, the defense sectors of the US defense corporations are intertwined with the US Government. Unlike civilian

corporations, because of the sensitively of their products to US security, they are under high supervision and are highly scrutinized by the government. Over the years, the US has installed many programs,
regulations, laws, and supervisory boards to help control the export of US defense articles to foreign countries. One of the most significant defining measures to ensure such actions take place is the US code Title
22, Chapter 39, which outlines the arms export controls.14 According to Subchapter III, 2778 of Chapter 39, the US president has direct control on all exports and imports of defense articles and can provide
foreign policy guidance to those designated to receive US weapons or defense services. The president is also authorized to determine what is designated as a defense article or a defense service, thereby
controlling the export of everything deemed US weapons.15 The decision of whom the defense sector can sell weapons to is not the corporations but the US Presidents. Unlike defense articles,

products of the civilian sector are able to flow across borders relatively unchecked. The
freedom of commerce allows civilian sectors of the defense corporations to extend their
supply chain logistics across oceans without the prior approval of the US president as it
is with the defense sector. The internationalization of these products allows for the
civilian sectors of the defense corporations to create efficiencies in production, increase economies of
scale, and access new markets .16 These corporations are becoming integrated within foreign national borders and becoming accustomed to their way of life. Because of the
pure competitiveness of other international civilian corporations, it has almost become a necessity for the civilian sectors of the defense corporations to internationalize in order to maintain their competitive

Because of their freedom to integrate with the global markets, the civilian sectors of
the defense corporations are not as protected as the defense corporations. In response to rising questions
over governmental control of civilian operations, a top defense executive stated, The best thing government could do for our international business would be to get out of the way.18 However as
the civilian sectors become internationalized, they have opened themselves up to new
dynamics. The continued operations in foreign countries create new pressures and
difficulties for these corporations.19 As the civilian sectors of the defense corporations venture into new markets they deal with new laws, customs, and market
edge.17

demands. Plagued by different desires in different countries, the civilian sectors of the defense corporations have worked hard and responded to ensure maximization of profit regardless of their host national ties.
There are ever-growing fears that, while defense corporations have host nations, their allegiance to their host nation may weaken due to continued operations in the world market. Analysts generally agree that,
due to their dispersed productions and competitive international nature, corporations will fight any restriction on their ability to globalize and reap benefits, even if this is to the chagrin of their host nation.20 These

the ties between the civilian sectors of the defense corporations

and their host nation have in fact thinned as they continue to globalize. Dealing with new governments, pressures,
notions and observations serve to highlight the fact that

and international competition, the civilian sectors of the defense corporations are more likely today to act against host national interests than when they were autarkic and located solely within national borders.
This only gives a sense of reality that, because of the existence of the unprotected and unregulated civilian sectors of the defense corporations, there exists the possibility that these corporations under the right

the continual
operation of these corporations in multiple nations raises the likelihood that political
confrontation between the foreign nations and the corporation may occur.21 As can be seen, the defense
circumstances may acquiesce to foreign national interests in hopes of increasing benefits and profits. An example of this will be explored later in this research. Therefore

corporation is composed of two major components: the defense sector and the civilian sector. Each has a different market to respond to. The defense sector answers to the United States and only works with
foreign governments if the US President allows it. However, the civilian sector can be just as engrained in a foreign market as it is in the US market. Its products and supply chains still flow across borders and into
new territories. Regardless of their differences,

both sectors are tied together in that they are still part of the same

corporations with the same goal of maximizing profit. If China were to place effective
sanctions on the civilian sectors of the defense corporations, it would still hurt the same
defense corporation involved in selling weapons to Taiwan . An important observation in assessing the true connection between
these two sectors of the defense corporations is that of Jonathan Galloway who addresses, among many things, the global implications of defense corporations by differentiating the driving mechanisms for these
corporations.22 He explains that the basic needs and interactions between defense corporations are different based on their level of dependency on foreign sales and operations. Defense corporations that
depend more on foreign sales than military sales are more apt to react to foreign market pressures.23 However, while this is true, he highlights that even if civilian operations are only a fifth of a corporations
revenue, the defense corporation cannot stand to lose that income and is more likely to work harder to maintain it despite it being a smaller part of the corporations overall revenue. Therefore he concludes that all
defense corporations are dependent to some extent on the three markets: governmental, foreign, and domestic civilian. He argues that these defense corporations will take any action necessary to preserve the
balance among these markets regardless of their individual percentages.24 Galloway states: It stands to reason that their managements will be interested in preserving the dynamic equilibrium between these
markets. If the equilibrium between these markets is upset, then the consequences for the firm may become unacceptable. Coupling the arguments of Galloway with the arguments that civilian operations are
graying the connection to nationalism as they internationalize, one can start to see the plausibility in defense corporations acting to mitigate sanctions from a foreign country like China. This sort of situation is not
an unlikely scenario considering that defense corporations in the past have been caught between their host nation and foreign national interests. The well-documented BoeingMcDonnell Douglas merger
highlights this very argument. In 1997, Boeing made a bold move to buy and merge with their long-standing US rival, McDonnell Douglas, another US defense corporation that specialized in aerospace
manufacturing and defense contracting. Although the US authorities had approved the merger, the European Union (EU) ruled that the merger was not in the EUs best interests and demanded that Boeing make
changes. Both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are based out of the United States; however, the EU was concerned that the combined power of the two companies would hinder the European aeronautics
corporation, Airbus. Since Airbus is 80%-owned by EADS and 20%-owned by BAE (both of which are defense corporations of the EU) it was speculated that such a merger would cause Boeing to gain a larger
competitive edge and would hurt their own defense corporations in the long run.25 In their defense, Boeing first argued that the US Federal Trade Commission, not the EU, should take the lead in investigating the
deal and its legitimacy. The EU, however, went forward with its own commission and unanimously voted that the merger be blocked by any means necessary. Faced with the threat of EU pressure to band
together and only buy planes from Airbus, Boeing acquiesced to the concerns of the EU and changed the conditions of the merger so as to satisfy the EU.26 Even though the United States demanded that Boeing
maintain its original deal and had a legitimate reason for stating that the original terms were fair, Boeing feared the loss of market share in Europe and, therefore, believed the foreign governments interests were
in their own best interests. This incident is significant for several reasons. First, this showcases how an international organization was able to pressure two US corporations to conform to their interests and not act
solely on the interests of the corporation. They were able to create enough pressure on Boeing to ensure that Boeing conceded to their desires. It was not the fear of losing defense contracting, but the fear of
losing sales in commercial jets that ultimately caused Boeing to acquiesce to the desires of a foreign nation. Second, as mentioned above, the rest of the world perceived this move by the EU as a way to protect
the European corporation Airbus. This was not because Boeing did not make a good product. It was because of nationalistic reasons that differentiated Airbus from Boeing, which is a dynamic that foreign defense
corporations must fight hard to resolve and overcome. Still, the most important point is that the deepening of integration into other parts of the world due to internationalization over the years has transferred more
regulatory powers from host authorities to foreign nations. Companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and UTC will find that their civilian actions, regardless of how small, will invite
the attention of the international world and cause great political pressure. Or, in the case of the Taiwan arms sale, the action of their defense sector will invite foreign political pressure and hardship on their
internationalized civilian sector. How Invested are Defense Corporations in the Civilian Sector in China? Considering that all the defense corporations from the Taiwan arms sale are multinational in their civilian

China has an ability to sanction portions of the exposed

civilian sectors of the defense corporations.27 Therefore to be able to understand the effectiveness of such sanctions it is important to register how
much these defense corporations rely on their civilian sectors and how much of a role China plays in the calculations of their future prospect. In analyzing the chart below, one can see that both
operations and have civilian sectors that extend across the globe,

Boeing and UTC show a large reliance on their civilian sector . According to their financial data, both
companies rely heavily upon their civilian sectors total revenue to maintain operations.
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon have a significant amount of civilian revenue; however, their business structure does not rely as heavily on civilian revenue and would therefore not be in
major jeopardy if sanctions were imposed on their civilian sectors. This is not to say that their civilian revenue is insignificant; the lowest percentage is 7%, which equals US$2.3 billion.

For Boeing

and UTC, 49% and 83% are significant enough that these corporations depend on
civilian revenue just as much if not more than on their defense revenue and would
therefore be extremely vulnerable to Chinese sanctions . This highlights that these two companies stand to lose more than the other
three due to their extreme reliance on civilian revenue.29 Both Boeing and UTC have been a part of the American business
structure for almost 100 years, but only recently started shifting attention to conducting
business transactions overseas. They have seemingly found the rich potential that lies within Chinas borders and over the past couple of decades, have developed
long-term relations with the Chinese government. Each one has found their own niche in Chinas economy with Boeing selling commercial aircraft to the Chinese airlines and UTC selling Otis elevators and Carrier
brand heating and air-conditioning to the Chinese people.30

For Boeing a complication in the Chinese market would

severely hurt their civilian revenue . Over the next two decades, Boeing expects China to spend US$400 billion to purchase approximately 3,770 planes from
certain manufacturers, thereby making China the second largest commercial aircraft market in the world.31 According to UTCs CEO, Louis Chenevert, [Chinas market] feels really good right now. Chenevert
added that he sees no evidence of Chinas market slowing down and noted that the companys Otis elevators were up by double digits. Furthermore, orders for its Carrier air conditioning systems were starting to
come up. For UTC, the revenue from Otis Corporation accounted for the bulk of the US$3.1 billion in sales in China last year, and it is estimated that Chinas economy will grow 9.9% this year.32 With results and
high expectations for both companies and a large reliance on their civilian sectors total revenue to maintain operations, it appears as though

these two defense

corporations have a large reliance on the civilian Chinese market and would therefore be
highly vulnerable to Chinese sanctions on their civilian products . If China does impose the threatened sanctions against
these defense corporations it could prove to be detrimental to their international operations. While the military sectors of these defense corporations would not be affected by sanctions from China, the civilian
sectors are left relatively unprotected. The combined dynamics of a large reliance on civilian revenue and pressure from a government that has a lucrative market for their civilian sectors to operate in only

Another way
in which China can exploit a major weakness in certain civilian sectors of the defense
corporations is through pre-existing competitive rivalries. In most cases, Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, Raytheon, UTC, Northrop Grumman, and other defense corporations are in tight
contention for defense contracts relating to their respective fields; however, as was discussed in a previous
section, China does not have an ability to affect this. There are pre-existing rivalries in the civilian sectors that can be
exploited to create even more pressure on the defense corporations involved in the
Taiwan arms sale. The targeting of corporations with strong rivals can serve two purposes: it can cause
civilian revenue of the defense corporations to decrease, and it can increase the
competitive gain of their key competitor. Not only do they lose that part of the market,
demonstrates a larger possibility that certain defense corporations will be more likely to adhere to the foreign governments will over that of their host national governments desires.

but their competitor also ends up gaining from it, thereby delivering a double blow to
the defense corporation under fire . In tight competition for new markets like China, this
sort of altercation can result in a major setback to the defense corporations civilian
revenue and could become a long-term effect. Not only does the rival gain from a sanction in China, but also, due to the increased capital, will he
have the ability to use this gain in other competitive areas to help increase funding in his global market. There are many different types of rivalries that exist in the market. Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and
Northrop Grumman mainly compete with each other for defense contracts and their civilian revenue is relatively low compared to others. This indicates that they are somewhat protected from a Chinese
exploitation of their key rivalries. Conglomerate corporations might have several different rivals by the existence of multiple sectors and markets under which they operate. Therefore no one company is completely
identical to that of another conglomerate corporation and the existence of a specific rivalry is rare. UTC is a conglomerate that has different civilian sectors like Otis elevators and Carrier air-conditioners.33 The
sanctions against UTC would result in fewer Otis elevators and Carrier products; however, there are many different elevator and air-conditioner companies operating in China and therefore no specific competitor
would gain from such sanctions. This does not affect the global competitiveness of the civilian sector of UTC; rather it affects local competitiveness in the Chinese market. With this in mind, it is fair to say that the

Boeing on the other hand has one major rival, Airbus. As most would claim, the rivalry
between Boeing and Airbus is the largest international rivalry in the world.34 Both companies are identical in
sanctions will not make UTC as vulnerable.

that their civilian sectors develop comparable commercial aircraft that are competitive on the global market. Foreign corporations that choose to buy a commercial jet are usually considering whether or not they
choose Airbus or Boeing and at times will use the two corporations to play each other off in a bidding war.

The stakes are extremely high for each

corporation, meaning that a single deal with an airline could be a deciding factor
between success and failure in a multibillion-dollar investment .35 Therefore one of the best strategies for both Boeing and
Airbus is that of persuading prospective buyers, such as nationally owned airlines, to purchase their own planes instead of those of the respective other.36

The competition

between Boeing and Airbus has been extremely tight over the years . Neither company has been able to pull away
from the other,

so the slightest change in their global market share can give a company an

advantage over the other . For such a close race it can be seen how important the Chinese market is to both companies. According to Chinas own projections, they believe they
will quadruple their aircraft fleet to 3,900 by 2025, which could create a large amount of potential revenue for Boeing or Airbus.37 To further this, Boeing expects China to spend over US$400 billion to purchase
planes over the next couple of years, thus making China the second largest aeronautics market in the world.38 According to Airbus China President Laurence Barron, China probably has the most potential of
any significant market in the world.39 However, despite tight contention, is Boeing at a point where it can handle a head-to-head challenge with Airbus in China, especially if sanctions by the Chinese government
are enacted? With airlines in other markets struggling and Boeing still trying to recover from its muchdelayed Dreamliner 787 project,

Boeing seems to be on shaky

grounds and stands to lose more than Airbus.40 To make matters worse, before the arms sales to Taiwan, Airbus was already winning more orders

from China than Boeing.41 While Boeing currently has 736 Boeing planes operating in China (and another 30 from McDonnell-Douglas, which Boeing acquired in 1997), Airbus only has 547. However, over the
past couple of years, Airbuss orders from China have dramatically shifted to give Airbus the advantage. As of February 2010, Chinese airlines have placed orders for 358 Airbus planes and have options for
another 14, while they have only ordered 244 new planes from Boeing and have placed no options for further units. Airbus has also acquired letters of intent towards future sales of 60 planes, compared to 40 for

Because the three largest airline companies (China Southern, China Eastern, and Air China) are still controlled
by the Chinese government, the purchasing of commercial airliners is highly politicized.
Because of this, Chinese officials have the direct ability to reward foreign governments
with airplane sales that meet the interests of China.43 In response to such a system, Airbus, in June 2008, built an assembly base in
Boeing.42

Tianjin.44 By developing an assembly factory in Tianjin, Airbus is hoping that building aircraft in China (and the corresponding transfer of technology) will strengthen its position with the Chinese government,
effectively beating out Boeing. To further this, Airbus has also developed an engineering center in Beijing that will train up to 200 local engineers to assist in the plant operations in Tianjin.45 Peter Harbison,
executive chairman of the Center for Asia Pacific Aviation in Sydney noted that in China, if you allow for more local production and information-sharing, the purchaser is going to be a lot more willing to accept
your aircraft.46 Boeing on the other hand is at a disadvantage. Hindered by unions and concerns over the company shifting jobs overseas, Boeing has had to maintain production in the US. However, Boeing has
argued that their presence in China is significant because Boeing buys parts from seven local manufacturers in China. Boeing spokesman, Yukui Wang, stated that Boeing is the Chinese aviation industrys largest
foreign customer. He stresses that over the years Boeing has bought US$1.5 billion in aircraft parts and services from China and that this figure will double in the next few years.47 Mr. Wang also added,
Chinese suppliers now have a role in all of Boeing airplanes.48 Along with this, to emphasize their commitment to China, Boeing ramped up its efforts and sent a sales director to Beijing to become the

Boeing is now at
a large disadvantage because of their defense sectors sales of the Harpoon missiles to
Taiwan. If China enacts the sanctions against Boeing, Boeing will have to face a strong rival
who just became much stronger. This is while they simultaneously lost major ground in the battle over the Chinese market. Even if China
does not impose the sanctions, the Chinese government will probably be more likely to
purchase planes from and support a company that does not sell weapons to areas of
concern as well as one that complies with their interests. The defense corporations that are more reliant on their defense sales and
companys first Chinabased sales executive - something that is not normally practiced by Boeing.49 Even with the past level of competition between Boeing and Airbus,

therefore are not as competitive in the civilian sectors (e.g. Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin) are not under the same kind of pressure to expand their international production base and depend

China were to enact sanctions against Boeing they

would be able to meet their aeronautical needs by buying planes from Airbus , who is Boeings tight
on foreign markets as is Boeing (due to its competitive nature with Airbus). If

competitor. Not only is Boeing losing the revenue, but their main competitor is gaining from the sanctions. This double-edged sword would increase pressure on Boeing to try and mitigate the sanctions and
adhere to the Chinese request, thereby restoring their share of the world market and their political favor in the eyes of the Chinese. As can be seen from this report,

the threats of

sanctions by China are quite real . China stands in a position in which they have the
capability and means to legally sanction US defense corporations for their involvement
in the sales of weapons to Taiwan . While provisions and laws of the US government
protect the defense sectors of these corporations, their internationalized civilian sectors
are vulnerable to separate sanctions and pressures from the PRC. To further this point, those defense
corporations that rely heavily on civilian revenue appear to be even more vulnerable to
Chinese pressure because of the potential of the Chinese market. Boeing displays the
most characteristics that make it vulnerable to pressure from the PRC. In their direct statement about not signing
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,

it appears as though China is aware of this fact and is directly

threatening Boeing with this statement. With a highly politicized process of procuring orders and an
ever-tightening competition in China between Boeing and Airbus, Boeing can ill afford
the repercussions of the arms sales . They will not only lose the potential revenue of the
Chinese economy, but will also lose ground to their major competitor, Airbus . In response to the threat of
sanctions, David Wang, President of Boeing in China, stated that any arms sales to foreign countries or entities are decided by
the US government [] Its a governmentto-government issue.50

And, Boeing is the key to U.S. Aerospace thats key to the U.S.
Manufacturing base
Platzer 9
(Michaela D. Platzer, Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business, U.S. Aerospace
Manufacturing:
Industry Overview and Prospects, pg online @ https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40967.pdf //umef)

The large commercial jet aviation market is a duopoly shared by the U.S. aircraft
manufacturer Boeing and the European aircraft maker Airbus, with fierce competition between these two
companies. The regional jet market is dominated by two non-U.S. headquartered manufacturers, Brazils Embraer and Canadas Bombardier, both of which utilize a high level of U.S.-produced
content in their products. The general aviation market includes companies such as Cessna and Gulfstream. Aerospace manufacturing is an important
part of the U.S. manufacturing base . It comprised 2.8% of the nations manufacturing
workforce in 2008 and employed over 500,000 Americans in highskilled and high-wage
jobs. More than half (61%) of the nations aerospace industry jobs are located in six states: Washington state, California, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and Arizona. Several smaller aerospace manufacturing
clusters are found in states such as Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Missouri, and Alabama. Other aerospace centers are beginning to emerge in southern states, such as South Carolina, where Boeing is now building a

Aerospace manufacturing contributes significantly to the U.S.

economy, with total sales by aerospace manufacturers (including defense and space) comprising 1.4% of the U.S. gross domestic
product in 2008. U.S. aircraft manufacturers depend heavily on the international market
second production line to produce the 787 Dreamliner.

for their sales . The aerospace industry sold more than $95 billion in aerospace vehicles and equipment (including defense and space) to overseas customers in markets such as Japan,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and imported over $37 billion in aerospace products from abroad, providing a significant positive contribution of $57.7 billion to the U.S. trade balance in 2008.

other markets are becoming important as an opportunity to increase U.S. sales, but
also because of the potential for future competitors to challenge the U.S. aerospace
industrys competitive position. U.S. aerospace exports to China have increased since
2003, totaling $5.5 billion in 2008. At the same time, some analysts maintain that China could become a global competitor in the commercial aerospace market. Already, China is working to develop
Increasingly,

airplanes that could become globally competitive in both the regional jet and large commercial jet aviation market. Russia has stated that it wants to become the worlds third-largest aircraft manufacturer by 2015.

And, manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S.

deterrence prevents conflict
OHanlon et al 2k12
(Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa,
Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The
Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in
Defense Industrial Policy January 2012, pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial
%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon //um-ef)

the U.S. d efense i ndustrial b ase

is in a much different place than it was in the past . D efense industrial issues are too
often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts .
But the overall health of the firms that supply the techn ologies our armed forces
utilize does have national security resonance . Qualitative superiority in weaponry and
other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as

in the modern era not only for winning wars but for deterring them . That requires
world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities which in turn can also generate civilian
and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

And, the issue is escalating despite claims that China wont retaliate
failure to resolve the issues increases the risk of retaliation and stokes
Nationalism

Feng 12
(Zhu Feng is a professor in the School of International Studies and the deputy director of the
Center for International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University, What the U.S. Needs to
Realize About Chinas Nationalism, pg online @
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/23/should-the-us-continue-selling-arms-totaiwan/what-the-us-needs-to-realize-about-chinas-nationalism //um-ef)

The United States and China have been wrestling over the issue of arms sales to Taiwan since
the 1980s. But the friction has been growing in recent years, with Beijing raising its voice
and sounding less tolerant. For example, when the Obama administration announced its first arms sale package to Taiwan in January of 2010, China
threatened to put sanctions on American companies involved with exporting weapons to Taiwan and quickly suspended military exchanges.
When the Obama administration informed Congress this week that it plans to sell Taiwan $5.8 billion worth of arms, China reacted similarly in strong terms. Despite fierce
opposition from Beijing, most American analysts regard this as a hollow bell ringing
Some of these analysts believe that the White House
does not need to take China's opposition more seriously. As a result, they're likely to
Beijing is more likely to put its opposition in rhetoric rather than in substance.

overlook the negative consequences of Chinas opposition.

China understands why the U.S. wants to keep the status quo. The

arms sales have long helped the U.S. maintain influence in the Taiwan Strait, allowing it to keep a delicate military balance between the mainland and Taiwan. And it reflects well on the U.S. commitment to a
peaceful solution on the Taiwan issue. However,

there is no other foreign relations issue that inflames Beijing -- and

ordinary Chinese -- more than the arms sales issue . The U.S. cannot ignore the strong
Chinese nationalistic sentiments over Taiwan . China has always considered Taiwan as an inseparable part of itself. There is no need to go through
under America's one-China" policy, the fate of Taiwan
remains undecided," thereby validating these arms sales. This policy was initiated in 1979 but has not changed for 32 years.
further legal routes to vindicate Chinas sovereign claim over the island. But

During this period, China has changed tremendously and has become the most important business partner to the U.S. In the coming decades, the U.S.-China relations will only become more important.

Without any new policy framework to recalibrate these arms sales, mainland Chinese will
continue to be wary of the U.S. Understandably, this issue cannot be solved quickly.
Washington and Beijing must work together to find ways to tackle the challenges.

And, Nationalism controls the CCPs response to foreign actionsthe

public will not tolerate signs of weakness and will respond violently to
attacks on their national identity new arms sales risk T-Bill Sell-off or
Coup de-tat
Garver 2016 (John, is Emertius Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at
the Georgia Institute of Technology. He specializes in Chinas foreign relations. He served for
many years on a the editorial boards of the journals China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary
China, Issues and Studies, and Asian Security. He is a member of the National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, has testified before the U.S. Congress, and is the author of twelve books
and seventyfive refereed articles and book chapters dealing with China 's foreign relations,
Chinas Quest: the History of the Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China, Chapter
28, Chinas Quest for Modernity and the Tides of World History, Oxford University Press, 2016,
silbs)
Analysts differ about the extent
nationalism influences CCP foreign
policy decisions
The twenty-four-hour
cable news cycle, combined with the availability of that coverage via Internet and Hong
to which autonomous (non-state-directed) popular

. One scholar argued that web-based popular nationalism constitutes a sort of echo chamber that significantly influenced foreign policy decisions.23

Kong broadcasts, meant that news of international events reached Chinas public quickly
and unfiltered by government censors
. The ability of the state to restrict or ban access to information had been greatly reduced. This meant that when a hot crisis occurred, party leaders

were aware that news of the event would almost immediately spread through the Chinese public. News presented by foreign news sources would probably be sensationalistic and focus on violence, since that attracts readers in China as in other countries.

Once the news of some insult of China hit the streets, there would be a strong impulse
for the leaders to make known their own position, stressing their anger over the newest
insult of China There would be a strong tendency for the government, and
leaders
vulnerable to challenge by rivals, to try to put themselves at the head of nationalist
public opinion lest they become the target of that public opinion for being slow and weak
in defense of Chinas honor To position itself before mobilized nationalist opinion as a
resolute defender of Chinas interests and honor, the government would probably define
the offensive episode as part of a deliberate long-term strategy The government would
probably demand a change in the policies of the foreign transgressing state
.

for individual

, along with an apology for the

Communication with the offending party may well be refused , since even to speak
with the foreign transgressor can be seen as a sign of weakness.
China showed its other face, an
aggressive and threatening face, in response to hot crises, when Chinas government
was acting under the mobilized attention of its nationalist public. In these cases, the
government could not afford to be seen as weak. The incentive was to be stern and
tough defenders of China against ruthless foreign aggression.
Nationalist bloggers felt Beijings,
policies were not tough enough
Politburo members
paid considerable attention to them Chinas leaders would make foreign policy moves
with an awareness of how moves would be received by a handful of cyber nationalists.
Those cyber nationalists soon come to understand this, and this sense of importance
and actual influence might inspire them to take even more extreme positions.
transgression.

There were two faces of Chinas power. One face was calm and

reasonable, and sought to reassure other countries, both the United States and Chinas neighbors, that China was and would remain peaceful and nonbelligerent.

It may be that nationalist bloggers critical of Beijings foreign policies

functioned as a sort of pressure group.

who

that

or perhaps the MFAs,

were, of course, a relatively small number of people (perhaps a few tens of thousands). Yet when their views were aggregated, systematized, and put in a top-secret report under the imprimatur of the MSS,
.

Other scholars stress that party

leaders, while using web nationalism to legitimize party rule and mobilize support, remained in full charge of foreign policy and continued to act on the basis of interests associated with Chinas long-term development.24 A sort of state-tolerated civil society evolved

Spontaneous web-based nationalist activism, including demands

for tougher state policies, erupted in response to various issues reported by the
international and Chinese media
The state legitimized and in effect authorized
this activity by its own criticism of foreign actions The state then tolerated popular
nationalist agitation, or even encouraged it
Freelance
nationalist groups watched state policy closely for clues of official
support
and responded quickly when they saw such signs.
around this popular and spontaneous, bottom-up nationalism.

. Web-based nationalists formed organizations and undertook a range of independent activities: circulating petitions; organizing boycotts, demonstrations and protests;

and lobbying state legislative bodies and party-directed mass organizations to adopt more assertive policies on nationalist issues.

, as long as it stayed within bounds of not endangering social order or party authority.

toleration, perhaps even conditional

Cyber nationalist efforts to mobilize opinion were often assisted by Chinas commercial press, which understood

that sensationalist, nationalist content sold papers. The state set parameters for permissible nationalist agitation, but editors learned to navigate between the party line and the bottom line, selling papers by peddling fire-breathing nationalist resentment against

The CCP state used this popular

nationalist activism to legitimize its authority and to gain leverage in negotiating with
foreign governments . But
foreign transgressors. The commercial press was considerably more nationalist than the party press, which is less dependent on market appeal.

CCP leaders clearly understood that the costs of belligerent and confrontational policies might be heavy, and calmly and reasonably settled disputes with foreign statesalthough they

sometimes insisted on doing this behind closed doors and while concealing from Chinas popular nationalists their reasonable, nonconfrontational approach. The PRC state attempted to bring nationalist cyber discussion under its control in a number of ways. One
was insulation of Chinas Internet from the World Wide Web. Chinese web users were routed through Chinese servers, where access to politically objectionable content on the World Wide Web was blocked. Sophisticated Chinese web users, armed with special
software, could circumvent these obstacles, but for the great majority of Chinese web users this great firewall of China was effective in blocking access to material that might challenge the orthodox narrative. The Ministry of State Security also employed a large
number of people (reportedly over one million) to censor online commentaryprobably routing it for further analysis and investigation. The MFA also set up a website of its own to host a discussion of Chinas foreign affairs. Critical questions and comments were

Beijings handling of
conflict with other states sometimes touched on the political survival of the incumbent
paramount leader
perceived weakness in dealing with foreign
invited and responded to by MFA specialists. Finally, special reports on the substance of online criticism of Chinas foreign policies were routinely prepared by the MSS for perusal by the Politburo.

. Susan Shirk outlined several ways in which

humiliation might lead to leadership change Rivals within the Politburo might use the
opportunity to oust the incumbent paramount leader The PLA might withdraw its support
for the incumbent paramount leadera development which would almost certainly lead
to the removal of that leaderor hesitate to carry out an order by the paramount leader
to use violent force to suppress nationalist demonstrations and movements
.

. Developments along these lines could

The likely trigger of any

of these forms of regime change would be nationalist street demonstrations followed by
quick emergence of nationalist movements Nationalist street demonstrations are
potentially very dangerous to the party. The centers handling of the Belgrade embassy
bombing, the Falun Gong convergence, the EP-3 episode, and the fishing-boat captain
incident all demonstrate the deep elite apprehension that foreign transgressions might
be transformed into challenges to the party-state Once people are in the streets venting
hatred against
US transgressions, it is very easy for the target of anger to shift from
those countries to Chinas internal shortcomings , with CCP leaders held responsible
Any hint of weakness by
the CCP in confronting the foreign humiliation du jour could prompt a shift from
foreign to internal demands
Chinese students once again swarming from Beijings
university district to Tiananmen
carrying posters saying Down with the Americaloving CCP toadies Protests over nationalist issues are also dangerous because those
causes cut across social groups and regions.
Nationalist issues appeal instantaneously to people in different cities, regions,
and groups Protests over nationalist causes are also more dangerous for Chinas central
authorities because nationalist causes are able to tap into deep emotions of group
identity and individual meaning in ways that mere economic issues cannot Nationalist
appeals can rouse in people intense anger and a deep sense of identification that makes
them willing to kill and even sacrifice their own lives to avenge the insults against their
nation.
. Passions are
contagious, and people feel empowered by numbers and protected by seeming
anonymity. Seemingly lost in a crowd, people may do things that would be unthinkable
under normal circumstances, perhaps introduce antiregime slogans into a protest or
confront the police. A final linkage between Chinas aggrieved nationalism and foreign
policy is the interaction between PLA views and CCP elite politics
compel the CCP to enter a path of dialogue with the opposition, a path that would probably lead to a power-sharing arrangement, effectively ending the CCPs monopoly control over state power.

Japanese or

. State-

condoned nationalist demonstrations are virtually the only form of organized public political activity tolerated in China, and people quickly seize such opportunities to raise other grievances.

. Shirk imagines

Square

.25

Protests against land seizures or environmental hot spots are intrinsically parochial, although there are sometimes copycat

actions in other cities.

Lost wages or pensions, official corruption, or environmental pollution is less likely to rouse such passion. The mob psychology associated with large street protests also enhances their volatility

. While there is no evidence of PLA foreign policy lobbying since the

on seven
occasions PLA officers either called for or themselves dealt
out tougher treatment of the U S : calling for China to sell
off US Treasury bonds in retaliation for US arms sales to
Taiwan,

19951996 Taiwan Strait situation, there is abundant evidence of expression of hard-line PLA views on how to deal with the United States and Japan.

nited

In

just one year,

2010

, for example,

tates

calling the United States hegemonist at the Security and Economic Dialogue, verbally challenging US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at a Singapore conference, protesting Secretary of State Clintons assertion that the

calling for PLA-N warships to

be deployed to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
The CCP center
is extremely lenient in its handling of this sort of expression of PLA views In 2005
General Zhu Chenghu told a foreign reporter that in the event the United States
United States had a national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, warning the United States and South Korea that joint military exercises threatened China,

and reprimanding a former Japanese foreign minister at a conference in Singapore.26

, for instance,

intervened in a cross-Strait conflict and attacked China with conventional weapons,

China should respond by
the United States

being willing to sacrifice every city east of Xian.27 Implicitly but clearly, Zhu was suggesting

a Chinese nuclear strike on

, moreover a first strike. The MFA explained Zhus comments as his personal views, and several weeks later it stated that Chinas policy continued to be no first use of nuclear weapons. Regarding General Zhu,

five months later he received one demerit, which meant no promotion for one year.

Two main factors incline the Politburo to be attentive to and

solicitous of PLA views on foreign policy issues. The first factor is the method of
selecting Chinasthat is the CCPsparamount leader There is a group of several
.

hundred people
who have an effective vote in what
individual will become paramount leader Top leaders of the PLA are among this
selectorate. Ambitious CCP leaders who aspire to the position of highest power, and to
consolidate that power, need to pay close attention to PLA views A second major reason
for the Politburo to heed PLA views on foreign policy is that at some point it might again
become necessary for CCP leaders to call on the PLA to repress a challenge to the
regime
Only with complete military loyalty to the party is the survival of the
regime ensured. Thus, the Politburo must pay close heed to PLA views.
, civilian and military leaders at the apex of the organizations that run Chinese society,
.28

. A paramilitary Peoples Armed Police, initially set up in 1982, has been vastly strengthened for use as an internal stability force since 1989. Still, the multiple lessons of the years 19891991 indicate that the military is the ultimate guarantee of

the Communist Partys dictatorship of the proletariat.

That triggers multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict

Perkinson 12
(Jessica, MA International Affairs, American University, frmr Program
Coordinator Center for Asian Studies, American University, The Potential
for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark, pg
online @
http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson_american_0
008N_10238display.pdf?sequence=1 //um-ef)
There are a number of areas of concern among Chinas immediate regional
neighbors and partners, including those on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and
India. Though China currently adheres to a strict foreign policy regime based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence151 and has been able to significantly advance
their own interests internationally using this method, the potentially destabilizing effect that forced political reform
could have on the country may derail their relations and security with their neighbors.
Chief among these regional concerns are North Koreas dependence on Chinas exports,
South Koreas dependence on Chinas North Korea deterrence and trade, the security
and stability of the Taiwan Strait, Japans reliance on Chinese trade and message consistency regarding territorial disputes, and stability
of the Sino-Indian border area. First, the stability of the Korean Peninsula rests in large part
Regional Security

on the stability of Chinas political system . Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the continued stability of the CCP for
their own security. As is generally well-known in the international community, North Korea relies in large part on China
superseding international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs
such as food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North Korea over two decades ago in
response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted
the support and participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked property and interests in property, banned
transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean
regime to change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating effect on the North Korean people, including
depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition, due to a succession of floods and droughts and
the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to up to one million excess deaths since the
1990s.155 In order to maintain stability on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, China continues to export both luxury goods and basic
commodities into North Korea. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Koreas international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions
have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Koreas international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of
North Koreas $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition,

China has been a facilitator of

the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum for handling tensions on
the Korean Peninsula. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the
first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157 During the talks, China served as a moderator between the US and North Korea
during tense times of debate, also insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks, such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though
the talks have remained in an on-and-off pattern over the last decade,

China still makes consistent efforts to bring North

Korea back to the diplomatic negotiations over their nuclear regime.159 South Koreas
dependence on Chinas continued stability is twofold. Not only does South Korea rely on
Chinas continued deterrence of North Korean aggression both through diplomacy and
satisfaction of their trade needs, but they also rely on China as a trade partner . For example, on
November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the Souths Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating tension on the

China focused their energy on deterring an

armed response by the South Koreans, which could have potentially led to protracted
civil war between the two countries. Though the international community has expressed
deep disagreement with Chinas soft-line approach toward North Korea, it appears their
understanding, big-brother style of handling North Korean aggression toward South
Korea has at least prevented a violent, protracted conflict, though not necessarily further North Korean acts of
Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response,

aggression.161 Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration and
dependence on Chinese trade. For example, in 2010, South Korea was Chinas fourth-largest trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In
other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity, but also for the survival of their people and territorial security.

Should the Chinese government undergo a period of reform and instability great enough
to interrupt these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, the international system may be
faced with a serious nuclear and conventional military conflict between North and South Korea . A
second region that relies heavily on the continued stability of Chinas government is the island of Taiwan. Because China and Taiwan have a long history of conflict over the
status of Taiwans sovereignty, maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to be an issue of critical interest to the international community as a whole. For example, in
1995, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in response to what may seem like a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave
threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the
visit alone sparked some controversy between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the
Taiwan Strait. In his address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China on multiple occasions, and made references to nation and country.163 These events led the
Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired missiles off the coast of
Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community including the US into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this was to deter the US from developing closer
ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very
moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has been very careful not to make any inflammatory statements that could set off conflict on the Strait However, a period
of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take
advantage of the CCP and PLAs distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwans most
recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous
about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a

A third region that has a deep interest in Chinas political stability

is their neighbor Japan. Not only is Japan deeply integrated economically into the
Chinese trade system, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes with the
country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1%
protracted conflict between the two regions.

increase)167, a clear indicator that China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, Japan and China continue to disagree over the
status of some hotly contested territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do both countries have a territorial claim to the islands, but the area contains vast
amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains
up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the worlds second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise 14% by

Tension in the region has been rising as China

has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the
islands, at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though
tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to Chinas stance and actions. However, should the CCP
undergo a period of instability and reform, and if their message or actions were to
change regarding the status of these islands, it could cause a significant conflict over
these territories between China and Japan, and could severely destabilize an already
2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169

weakened Japanese economy. Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, the destabilization of the
East China Sea region could draw the countries regional neighbors and international
partners into a protracted conflict between the two nations. A fourth region that would
be negatively affected by political destabilization in China is their southern neighbor, India. Though
China and India are becoming increasingly reliant on one another economically, they still
suffer from a number of serious areas of conflict, including a hotly contested border area
and Indias support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the
Himalayas that had previously been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from
the region171,

the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and Chinas
the inconsistency of Chinas

enduring theme of territorial integrity. Similar to the destabilization of the two regions mentioned above,

message during a time of political destabilization or reform could lead the Indian military
to either panic from the unpredictability of Chinas potential actions or move to take the
Arunachal Pradesh region by force. Not only could political instability in China cause a
border conflict between India and China, but it could also cause an influx of Tibetans into
the country, as Indias government is sympathetic to the Tibetan plight. Though China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force
working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from
around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this

should the CCP undergo a

period of significant political reform, this could encourage Tibetans to either take
advantage of the CCPs distraction to seek independence by force, or could cause
massive immigrant flows across the Sino-Indian border. Both China and India already have a regional example of
destabilization due to immigrant flows, as China already suffers from this issue on its border with North Korea. In addition, any political stability
area in an attempt to prevent flows of Tibetans out of Tibet and into India to reach the Dalai Lama.173 However,

within the CCP would spell disaster for the Indian economy , which is becoming
increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. Partially as a counterweight to the two nations conflict, India and
China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades . Though
this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant
on Chinas continued stability for its economic prosperity . For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had
bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics
that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that Indias economy is deeply intertwined with Chinas. The consistency of Chinas message on the contested

if
China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable
messages and actions from China on these disagreements could change, and cause
aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India economy in the process.
Outside of Chinas immediate vicinity, there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability in China. Due to intense and
growing economic and military integration between China, the East Asian region and the
world, these other countries have a significant reliance on the continued stability of the
CCP. Chief among these global concerns are Chinas growing integration with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into
border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two nations. However,

developing countries, primarily on the African continent.

Observation three: Solvency

US CBMs with China and Taiwan over US arms sales and PLA military
deployments would lead to greater stability in the region by getting rid of
the ineffective status quo policies and increasing trust among nations
which leads to effective and long-lasting cross-strait dialogue
Swaine 11- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, America's Challenge:
Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace) JB

despite significant improvements

in the cross-Strait situation U.S. policy toward the island has essentially remained
unchanged since the early 1980s. And yet as has been clearly shown, underlying
conditions have evolved enormously since that time, in some areas (for example, in the military realm and regarding the largely zerosum nature of domestic politics on Taiwan) in decidedly negative ways. In particular, since the mid-1990s, when China began
Regarding Washington's political and security relations with Taiwan, as indicated in chapter 2

building up its military capabilities vis-a-vis Taiwan. Washington's security-related

position toward the resulting growing cross-Strait military imbalance has remained
largely limited to telling Beijing that it must reduce its military presence in order to give Taipei the confidence to engage in cross-Strait talks,
while making clear that it will sell more arms to Taipei and increase U.S. surveillance and
military deployments relevant to a Taiwan conflict as long as Beijing refuses to comply.
Though it has worked thus far. the problem with this position is that it is founded on the assumption
that the United States will retain the capacity and will to deter Beijing indefinitely from
adopting more assertive means toward the island, despite the fact that China's
economic, political, and military capabilities will likely grow steadily along its periphery, and that
the United States might continue to experience serious economic problems that could
affect its ability to maintain its military predominance in the Western Pacific. Under such
circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over People's Liberation Army (PLA)
deployments and arms sales will probably depend almost entirely on the ability of Taipei
and Beijing to reach a strong political understanding that permits mutual restraint in the
military realm. And yet such an understanding is unlikely without some level of credible
prior understanding between Beijing and Washington regarding

both

arms sales

and larger

political calculations. As indicated in chapter 2 in the very likely absence of far more domestic political unity on Taiwan in favor of cross-Strait political
talks. Beijing will probably maintain if not substantially increase its military deployments relevant to Taiwan during the current decade, regardless of how
much progress occurs in advancing cross-Strait economic and social links, thus almost certainly provoking further significant U.S. arms sales to the

Beijing will also likely attempt to make

any future major US arms sale decisions increasingly costly for Washington, thus greatly
feeding mutual security suspicions and undermining US attempts to maintain or enhance
both strategic reassurance and deterrence.1" Such a situation could ultimately prove
disastrous for the Sino-US relationship, greatly increasing the risk of confrontation and
even armed conflict. In this context, a continued US. commitment to its long-standing
essentially "hands-off" approach to the cross-Strait political process, including a refusal to engage in
discussions with Beijing over each side's respective military deployments and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, will become increasingly
island. Most important, assuming that China continues to grow in power and confidence.

counterproductive for stability * in the Western Pacific. Only the United States can alter China's
calculus toward Taiwan in ways that would facilitate a military drawdown and genuine
movement toward a more stable cross-Strait modus vivendi through political dialogue.
Therefore. Washington

policymakers should consider negotiating directly with Beijing in

consultation with Taipei, a set of mutual assurances regarding PLA force levels and
deployments on the one hand, and major U.S. arms sales and defense assistance to
Taiwan on the other hand, that are linked to the opening of a cross-Strait political
dialogue .31 Such an agreement would need to be designed as a combined military and political
confidence-building measure, intended to create some level of trust that each side would
stop directly threatening the other with military deployments specifically aimed at the
Taiwan situation, while providing a basis for an open-ended (and almost inevitably long-lasting)
political dialogue. It would not need to require either Washington or Beijing to give up its
military deployments in other areas.32

The plan solves for all possible alt causes to effective cross-strait relations
and confidence building measures

*This card is also very good at answering the politics DA, Alliance DA, and Taiwan DA
*This card also draws a distinction between reducing arms sales to the necessary materials
needed for self-defense and getting rid of all arms sales

Swaine 11- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, America's Challenge:
Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace) JB
The feasibility and parameters of such an agreement could be initially explored via an authorized Track II dialogue, given its many
obvious sensitivities. Indeed, any such

approach would confront three major problems for the United

States. First and foremost, some politicians and pundits in both the United States and Taiwan
(and perhaps also in Japan) would attempt to label any effort by Washington to negotiate with
Beijing, even in consultation with Taipei, as a "sell-out" of Taiwan's interests that could
result in China eventually coercing or seizing the island and. more broadly, in irreparable
damage to America's credibility and strategic position in Asia and perhaps beyond.
Second, both the United States and China might face considerable difficulties in defining
what constitutes a reasonable exchange of forces, deployments, and arms sales to
Taiwan. A third consideration, often voiced by some observers of the Taiwan situation, is that any such U.S.
attempt to intervene in the cross-Strait imbroglio could easily expose Washington to
manipulation by both Taipei and Beijing while possibly increasing the chances of a
miscalculation by all three parties. The first objection is the most serious because it is directly related to
the domestic political environments in the United States and Taiwanarguably the most serious obstacles to a resolution of the
Taiwan problem. There is no doubt that those in both places who want Washington to treat Beijing as a mortal enemy and Taiwan as
an independent, sovereign nation entirely separate from China would highlight (and in some instances distort or exaggerate) the
dangers confronting such an approach. In fact, while

pursuing such an option. Washington would

obviously also need to enhance its larger security posture in Asia, partly in support of its basic
commitment to an uncoerced and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Also, in this regard, one should not assume
that Taipei would inevitably regard Washington's efforts to negotiate with Beijing as a
form of coercion toward the island. Taiwan's objections to opening a cross-Strait
dialogue could be reduced considerably if this dialogue were presented as seeking with
a more active U.S. role, higher levels of cross-Strait economic interdependence:
negotiated Chinese commitments to more political, economic, and personal freedoms
than those currently contained within the "one country, two systems" formula: and
significant, tangible reductions in Beijing's capacity to launch a rapid attack on the
island. Also, it is by no means clear that other Asian nations would regard Washington's
efforts to negotiate with Beijing about the Taiwan problem as an unambiguous indication
of America's weakness or as a loss of its credibility , as some would argue. Most Asian nations
would doubtless prefer for the issue to be addressed through some form of direct talks
designed to place it on a more stable long-term footing It is also possible that many
Americans would support US efforts to negotiate with China to stabilize, if not resolve,
the Taiwan issue. This is suggested by the fact that most US citizens view Taiwan as the
least critical threat to U.S. vital interests out of a litany of threats. Moreover, a vast majority of
Americans are opposed to using U.S. troops to prevent China from invading Taiwan."
The second objection would obviously be addressed through negotiations and
consultations between Washington and both Beijing and Taipei and is not on the face of

it unsolvable.

Some observers disagree, asserting that Beijing would need to severely limit or destroy most if not all of its

more advanced power projection capabilities to provide significant assurances to Washington and Taipei as part of any negotiations
a highly unlikely possibility. Others argue that the United States could not in any event conclusively verify Chinese commitments
to limit or destroy military capabilities such as ballistic missiles. In this author's view, neither

objection is convincing
Some PLA capabilities, such as short-range ballistic missiles and amphibious attack
platforms, are really only relevant (and critical) to Taiwan-based scenarios. Beijing would thus not be
sacrificing its capabilities in other areas by limiting such forces as part of a Taiwan
agreement.

Other PLA capabilities of relevance to Taiwansuch as deployments of certain levels of air or naval forces to

bases or ports within rapid striking distance of the island-could also be subject to limitation without arguably affecting China's other
security interests. Given

the potentially significant benefits for China of reaching a stable

agreement on this matter, it is also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit or
provide convincing levels of verification. The third objectionthat U.S. efforts in this
arena could backfire and hurt America's interestshighlights the need for considerable
caution and much skill on the part of U.S. negotiators, but again should not prevent a
serious consideration of this option. In truth, the United States would inevitably play a major
role in the calculations of both China and Taiwan in any cross-Strait discus-sion. Hence,
it is misleading and potentially dangerous to pretend otherwise by asserting that the
Taiwan problem can only be solved by direct discussions between the two sides of the
Strait without U.S. involvement. The question is: What role should the United States play in encouraging the creation
of a more stable modus vivendi between Taipei and Beijing? As stated, the current U.S. stance is probably not sustainable. Overall,

none of these three objections should deter Washington from taking a serious look at the
long-term strategic implications of the negative security trends involving Taiwan outlined in
this study and the possible benefits that could result from a more active US. policy stance
aimed at creating a more stable political understanding across the Taiwan Strait. The
Taiwan problem remains by far the most serious obstacle to defusing the arguably
worsening strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing, and it is wrong to blithely
assume that recent improvements in cross-Strait economic and social ties will inevitably
create the basis for a more enduring modus vivendi. especially in the face of significant
conflicting political and security trends. Ultimately, it is in America's long-term interest to
get ahead of the curve on this issue by more closely examining the relative importance of the political versus
strategic considerations influencing the Taiwan problem and by exploring alternatives to its current hands-off stance that might open
a pathway to a more stable Sino-US. relationship. In

the absence of any new U.S. initiative along the

above-described lines. Washington has no viable alternative to continuing its longstanding policy of "dual deterrence and reassurance" regarding Taiwan. in order to
maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait and to sustain the glowing prospects for an
improvement in Taipei-Beijing relations.14 As part of this ongoing effort. Washington should
continue to strengthen, where possible, its ability to detect and rapidly respond to a possible
Chinese use of force. Toward Taipei, it should deempha-size the provision of new "big ticket"
weapons systems and focus on providing the essential infrastructure, logistics,
ordnance, and other materials that will better operationalize Taiwan's defensive capacity.
Washington should

also

strongly oppose any attempt by Taipei to acquire an offensive

deterrent of any kind. Finally. Washington should continue to discourage or prevent

Beijing's acquisition of military capabilities or related technologies that could directly
challenge U.S. military superiority in critical areas relevant to Taiwan. To maintain advantages in
these areas, the United States should maintain its arms embargo and export controls and should encourage the European Union to
do likewise. But it should focus such efforts on the most advanced and "high-impact" technologies and weapons systems.

Swaine 15
(Michael, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The
Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, pg online @
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominancein-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi //um-ef)
In general,

true balance-of-power environments can at least potentially increase both risk

taking and miscalculation , especially if one or both sides conclude that they must
confirm or consolidate a perceived increaseor compensate for a perceived declinein
leverage by acting more aggressively to test the resolve of the other side, advance specific interests, or
manage a serious political-military crisis. Avoiding or effectively controlling such situations will require not
only a variety of crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) beyond
what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also high levels of mutual strategic
reassurance and restraint, involving substantive and verifiable limits on each sides freedom of action or ability to prevail militarily along Chinas
sensitive maritime periphery, as well as the maintenance of deterrent and shaping capabilities in those areas that count most. Many knowledgeable
observers have offered a variety of recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and
enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense
spending to mutual, limited concessions or understandings regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, and clearer, more calibrated bottom-line statements on alliance

many of these initiatives make eminent sense, they generally fail to address both
the underlying problem of clashing assumptions and beliefs about the requirements for
continued order and prosperity in Asia and the basic threat perceptions generated by
inaccurate historical analogies about Chinas past and domestic nationalist views and
pressures. Moreover, almost no observers offer recommendations designed to significantly
alter the power structure in volatile areas along Chinas maritime periphery, such as on the
Korean Peninsula and in and around Taiwan , in ways that could significantly defuse those areas as
sources of conflict over the long term. In order to minimize the potential instabilities inherent in a roughly equal balance-of-power environment,
specific actions must be taken to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources of
commitments and core interests.3 While

future U.S.-China crises and the propensity to test each sides resolve, and to enhance
the opportunities for meaningful cooperation over the long term . In particular, Washington and
Beijing will need to reach reliable understandings regarding the future long-term status
of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the management of maritime territorial disputes, and the scope and function of U.S. (and other foreign) military activities within the
first island chainor at the very least within both Chinas and Japans exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Such understandings should almost certainly involve some credible
form of neutralization of these areas as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, or the creation of a stable U.S.-China balance of power within them, thereby
creating a de facto buffer zone along Chinas maritime periphery. In the case of Korea, this implies the emergence of a unified, nonaligned (or loosely aligned) peninsula free
from foreign military forces. This would require prior credible security assurances by both the United States and China that a unified Korea would remain free from coercion and
always open to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve a continuation in some form of a greatly reduced security relationship
with Washington, at least in the short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified Korea, at least to the extent of agreeing
to not acquire nuclear weapons or some types of conventional weapons that Korea might find threatening, such as precision ballistic and cruise missile strike capabilities. Of
course, none of this could happen as long as the Korean Peninsula remains divided, with South Korea under threat of attack from North Korea. Thus, ideally, the development of
a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific will require Korean unification sooner rather than later. Failing that, a clear, credible understanding must be reached as soon as

In the case of Taiwan, any credible

neutralization of the cross-strait issue as a threat to either sides interests would require,
as a first step, a U.S.-China understanding regarding restrictions on U.S. arms sales in
possible among the powers concerned regarding the eventual disposition of the Korea problem.

return for certain types of verifiable limits on Chinese military production and
deployments relevant to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike aircraft . Beijing
would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not use force against

Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de

jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island . In the past, Beijing has
resisted providing assurances regarding any non-use of force toward the island, viewing
such an assurance as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. However, as in the
case of Korea, Beijing would likely view such a conditional limitation on its right to
employ force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of an overall
stable balance of power in the Western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also regard it as a
step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland . In addition, Beijing
would also likely need to accept: a) explicitly that such unification could only occur on
the basis of a peaceful process involving the willing consent of the people of Taiwan, and
b) tacitly that eventual unification would likely not occur, if at all, for many decades . For its part,
the United States would likely need to provide assurances to China that it would neither
place forces on the island nor provide any new level of defense assistance to Taipei, as
long as Beijing abides by its own assurances . And both countries would need to consult closely with Taiwan and Japan at each
step of this process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them. Regarding territorial disputes in the East China Sea and
South China Sea, the United States needs to make clear that it has little if any direct interest in the interactions occurring between the disputants, beyond clear security threats
leveled against the two U.S. allies involved: Japan and the Philippines. While supporting, in an even-handed manner, a binding code of conduct and established legal
procedures for resolving clashes and arbitrating claims, Washington should avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a noncoercive process is followed in every instance. That
said, it should also make clear that it will oppose, forcefully if necessary, any attempt to establish an exclusion zone or de facto territorial waters beyond accepted 12-nauticalmile limits. For its part, Beijing must clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and that it will never seek to dislodge rivals
forcefully from occupied areas. It must also credibly and convincingly state, privately if not publicly, that those waters in the South China Sea located within its so-called ninedashed line and outside the territorial waters and EEZs of specified land features constitute open ocean. Although doubtless difficult to achieve, such understandings will likely
become more possible in the larger context of a neutralized first island chain as U.S.-China suspicions abate. In the larger conventional military realm, U.S. military primacy
within at least the first island chain will need to be replaced by a genuinely balanced force posture and accompanying military doctrine. This should likely be centered on what is
termed a mutual denial operational concept in which both China and the United States along with its allies possess sufficient levels of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)
type air, naval, missile, and space capabilities to make the risks and dangers of attempting to achieve a sustained advantage through military means over potentially volatile
areas or zones clearly prohibitive. In such an environment, neither side would have the clear capacity to prevail in a conflict, but both sides would possess adequate defensive
capacities to deter or severely complicate an attack, for example, on Taiwan, on the Chinese mainland, and against U.S./allied territory, or any effort to close or control key
strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific. This will likely require agreed-upon restraints on the production and/or deployment of certain types of weapon
systems operating in the Western Pacific, such as deep-strike stealth aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and deployed surface and subsurface warships. On the nuclear level,
a stable balance-of-power environment in the Western Pacific requires a clear set of mutual assurances designed to strengthen the deterrence capacity of each sides nuclear
arsenal and thereby reduce significantly the dangers of escalation from a conventional crisis or conflict into a nuclear confrontation. To attain this goal, American and allied
defense analysts need to discard the dangerous notion that U.S. primacy must extend to the nuclear realm, via the establishment of a clear ability to neutralize Chinas nuclear
arsenal. Instead, Washington should authoritatively indicate that it accepts and will not threaten Chinas retaliatory nuclear strike capability. In other words, it must
unambiguously affirm the validity of a U.S.-China nuclear balance based on a concept of mutual deterrence, something it has never done. Moreover, to make this credible,
Washington must abandon consideration of a long-range, precision global strike system, or any other new type of system capable of destroying Chinas nuclear arsenal through
both nuclear and conventional means, and provide greater assurances that its ballistic missile defense capabilities cannot eliminate a Chinese second strike. For its part, Beijing
must be willing to accept such U.S. assurances and eschew any attempt to transition beyond its existing modest minimal deterrent, second-strike nuclear capability to a much

these sorts of changes will present major implications for U.S. allies and
friends in the region. Japan in particular would play a major role in any effort to create a stable U.S.-China
balance of power in the Western Pacific. In order for Tokyo to provide Seoul with the kind of assurances identified above, and to accept the above
adjustments in the U.S. force posture and stance toward Taiwan, certain clear understandings with
Washington and Beijing would be necessary. In general, the creation of a de facto buffer zone or a neutral/balanced area within the
larger force. Obviously,

first island chain would almost certainly require that Japan significantly strengthen its defense capabilities, either autonomously or, more preferably from the U.S. perspective,
within the context of a more robust yet still limited U.S.-Japan security alliance. In the latter case, Tokyo would become a critical partner in the creation of the sort of defensive,
mutual denial operational concept. This would entail the creation of a more fully integrated U.S.-Japan C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance) infrastructure, stronger passive defenses against possible Chinese ballistic and cruise missile threats to U.S. and Japanese military assets,
and enhanced Japanese logistics and support facilities, alongside improvements in specific defensive-oriented Japanese military capabilities, such as ASW (antisubmarine
warfare) and interceptor aircraft. However, this would not require Japan to become a fully normalized security partner alongside the United States, undertaking alliance-based
security activities across the Western Pacific and beyond. For China, acceptance of a strengthened but still limited U.S.-Japan alliance, a unified, largely nonaligned Korean
Peninsula, verifiable limits on Chinese capabilities vis--vis Taiwan, and the other elements of the stable balance-of-power structure mentioned above would require a clear
willingness to forgo those more ambitious security objectives toward which some Chinese might aspire, either now or in the future. These include, most notably, the clear ability
to establish control over the waters and airspace along Chinas maritime periphery and a Sino-centric Asian economic and political order that largely excludes the United States.
This will likely require, in turn, that Beijing make concerted, public efforts to reject and invalidate among the Chinese citizenry those more extreme interpretations of Chinese
nationalism that call for China to dominate Asia and to employ aggressive or violent means to resolve various sovereignty and other disputes with its neighbors. Although not
mainstream at present, such notions nonetheless could become more popular and influential as Chinas power grows (and if Washington responds to such growth by seeking to

The benefits for China of these

accommodations would be an enhanced level of security via a reduced U.S. threat to vital
Chinese interests and the avoidance of a costly and likely increasingly dangerous
security competition. These new circumstances would also allow China to concentrate even more than at present on establishing a stable and prosperous
domestic environment. OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHING A STABLE BALANCE IN ASIA Several obstacles stand in the way of
Washington and Beijing undertaking such a substantial change in perceptions and practices, force deployments,
sustain its past predominance), and would in turn represent a clear threat to regional stability.

and power relations in the Western Pacific. On the U.S. side, first and foremost is the general refusal of most if not all U.S. decisionmakers and officials to contemplate an
alternative to U.S. military predominance in this vital region. Such maritime predominance has arguably served Washington and most of the region well for many decades, and it

accords with the deep-seated notion of American exceptionalism, which prescribes a dominant U.S. leadership role throughout the world. In addition, the short-term perspective,
natural inertia, and risk avoidance of bureaucrats and policy communities in Washington (and elsewhere) militate against major shifts in policy and approach, especially in the
absence of an urgent and palpable need for change. Indeed, it is extremely difficult for any major power, much less a superpower, to begin a fundamental strategic shift in
anticipation of diminished relative capabilities before that diminishment fully reveals itself. In the Western Pacific in particular, with regard to both U.S. ISR activities along the
Chinese coast and the larger U.S. military presence within the first island chain, the United States Navy and many U.S. decisionmakers are wedded to the notion that American
power (and in particular naval power) must brook no limitation in areas beyond a nations 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace. This derives in part from the belief that
any constraints on U.S. naval operations will lead to a cascade of coastal states challenging the principle of U.S. maritime freedom of action and to possible reductions in the
level of resources and the scope of operations available to support U.S. naval power. Moreover, the specific U.S. desire to maintain a strong naval presence along Chinas
maritime periphery reflects a perceived need to acquire more accurate intelligence regarding Beijings growing offshore air and naval capabilities. Such a presence is also
viewed as essential to sustaining U.S. credibility with Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and to the maintenance of deterrent capabilities against a possible Chinese
attack on Taiwan. This combination of service interests, intelligence needs, and perceived security requirements reinforces the general U.S. bias in favor of continued maritime
predominance. However, an inevitable Chinese refusal to accept that predominance over the long term will be expressed first and foremost in opposition to the past level of U.S.
naval activities along the Chinese coastline, that is, within Chinas EEZ at the very least, and possibly within the entire first island chain. Second, and closely related to the prior

U.S. decisionmakers are extremely loath to contemplate significant adjustments in the

current status of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. From the U.S. perspective, any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of
point,

the U.S. security commitment to these two actors (a U.S military ally and a de facto U.S. protectorate, respectively) could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms, and/or

, Japan might react to such movement by questioning

Washingtons basic security commitment to Tokyo, which could result in a break in the
U.S.-Japan alliance and/or Japanese acquisition of nuclear arms. These concerns are real, if
no doubt exaggerated by some in Tokyo or Taipei in order to justify maintenance of the
threats or attacks from North Korea or China. In addition

existing U.S. relationship , and in some cases to avoid undertaking costly defense improvements
of their own. On the Chinese side, perhaps the most significant obstacle to undertaking a transition toward a stable balance of power in Asia derives from the
insecurities and weaknesses of the Chinese government, both domestically and abroad. Chinas leaders rely, for their legitimacy and support, not only on continued economic
success and rising living standards, but also on a form of nationalism that prizes the ability of the regime to correct past injustices meted out by imperialist powers during
Chinas so-called century of humiliation and to stand up to current slights, both real and imagined. Thus, their policies often capitalize on the resentments felt by many Chinese
citizens toward the supposedly arrogant West and Japan. This viewpoint makes the Chinese leadership hesitant to quell the more extreme forms of nationalism described above
and deeply suspicious of the United States and its allies. It also makes it more receptive to the notion that a rising yet still underdeveloped and relatively weak China must
continue to conceal its military capabilities while developing its overall capacities to the maximum extent possible. In other words, the Chinese regime is both excessively
vulnerable to ultranationalist pressures and disinclined to contemplate self-imposed limitations on its sovereign rights (for example, with regard to Taiwan) and its political,
economic, and military abilities, especially in Asia. While this does not translate into a drive for predominance, it does make Beijing less willing to accept the kind of mutual

NO GRAND BARGAIN, BUT A CLEAR

UNDERSTANDING AND A STAGED PROCESS ARE REQUIRED These obstacles clearly indicate that
restraints necessary to achieve a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much less reach, a formal grandbargain-type of agreement to establish a new regional security environment anytime
soon .4 Such a fundamental shift in policies and approaches can only occur gradually, in
stages, and over an extended period of time. But it can only begin if elites in Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals seriously
examine the enduring trends under way in Asia and accept the reality of the changing power distribution and the need for more than just marginal adjustments and assurances.
Only then will they undertake a systematic examination of the requirements of a stable balance of power over the long term, involving a serious consideration of the more

Such an examination and acceptance must initially occur domestically, then

among allies and protectorates, and finally via a bilateral U.S.-China strategic dialogue
fundamental actions.

aimed at developing understandings about the process and actions required. Such understandings must provide for ample opportunities and means for both sides to assess and

If such understandings can be reached regarding the overall need for

strategic adjustment, then the specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities and
arrangements for meaningful cooperation, involving Korea, Taiwan, and maritime issues within the first island chain,
will become much more possible. In particular, a strategic understanding designed to achieve a peaceful and stable transition to a genuine
evaluate the credibility and veracity of the actions of the other side.

balance of power in the Western Pacific could make Beijing more likely to pressure or entice North Korea to abandon or place strong limits on its nuclear weapons program and
undertake the kind of opening up and reforms that would almost certainly result eventually in a unified peninsula. While difficult to envision at present, such a shift in Chinese
policy is certainly possible, given the obvious incentives to do so. While South Korea might also resist movement toward a nonaligned status in a post-unification environment,

Regarding Taiwan, if
both U.S. and Chinese leaders can convince Taipei of the benefits of the kind of mutual
assurances and restraints necessary to neutralize the cross-strait issue, none of which
the obvious benefits that would result from a stable balance of power, if presented properly, could very likely overcome such resistance.

require the U.S. abandonment of the island , these possible adverse outcomes of the
proposed or ongoing shift, including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost
certainly be avoided .

Miscalc/War Advantage

1ac
Risk of war is growing in the Taiwan strait- The PRC is unsatisfied with
Tsais promises of sticking to the status quo on ambiguous relations
greater reassurances are necessary to preserve cross-strait relations
Glaser 2016 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, she is
concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with
CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia, prior she served as
a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and
State, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in
Taiwan, April, 2016, A Report of the CSIS CHINA POWER PROJECT, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf, silbs)
During the presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen set out her basic stance on her
policy toward China, which was that she would maintain the status quo . By adopting this position,
she adroitly positioned herself in the mainstream of Taiwan public opinion, which favors preservation of the status quo over independence or reunification. Tsai also
sought to reassure the public that cross-Strait economic ties would not suffer under DPP
rule. Although on a few occasions she offered some elaboration of what she meant by her pledge to maintain the status quo, for most of the campaign Tsai focused on the
domestic economy and social issues, not cross-Strait relations. Since she held a significant lead in public opinion polls and the
majority of Taiwans voters supported her stance, there was no electoral need for Tsai to
provide greater specificity despite repeated demands from the candidates from the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Peoples First Party (PFP) to do so.
The most detailed explication of Tsai Ing-wens policy toward Beijing prior to Taiwans January 16 election
was delivered not in Taiwan, but rather in the United States, where concern about her ability to maintain
cross-Strait stability had sparked U.S. official criticism in her first bid for the presidency four years earlier.2 In a carefully
worded speech, which Tsai gave at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., on June 3, 2015,
she made a deliberate attempt to respond, albeit indirectly, to Chinas demands that the DPP
accept the 1992 Consensus and its core connotation that the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. In her speech, Tsai called for the
Tsai Ing-wens Policy toward China

two sides of the Taiwan Strait to treasure and secure the accumulated outcomes of
more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges, adding that these accumulated
outcomes will serve as the firm basis of my efforts to further the peaceful and stable
development of cross-Strait relations.3 Tsais use of the phrase more than twenty years was a clear allusion to the talks that produced
what later came to be called the 1992 Consensus and marked a significant departure from her position when she ran for president four years earlier. At that time, Tsai had
argued that the 1992 Consensus did not exist and proposed instead a Taiwan consensus, which, she said, would be achieved by a democratic nonpartisan mechanism so

Tsai pledged that

she would push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations in
accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing ROC constitutional
order. In the question-and-answer session, she elaborated that the order included not only the original constitution, but also subsequent amendments, interpretations,
that Taiwans policies toward China would be consistent and unaffected by changes in administration.4 On the issue of the core connotation,

court decisions, and practices by the government and different sectors of the population. This left ambiguous whether she intended to accept the existence of one China, of

in one of the presidential debates, Tsai went a bit further. Referring to the meeting that took place in
Hong Kong in 1992, she maintained that although everyone had different opinions, they agreed
on pushing forward cross-Strait relations based on mutual understanding and seeking
common ground while reserving differences. Tsai stated clearly that the DPP does not deny this historical fact, but rather accepts
it. She then called on the Chinese leader to recognize that party alternation is normal in
which Taiwan is a part. Six months later

democratic societies and to show us some respect.5 On other occasions, Tsai encouraged Beijing
to respect Taiwans public opinion. For example, in a TV interview, she said that the Mainland was closely monitoring public trends in Taiwan,
and if the people reached a consensus on cross-Strait relations, she expected the
Mainland authorities will respect Taiwans public opinions and take them into consideration when making
decisions.6 In her victory speech on election night, Tsai reaffirmed that she would build a
consistent, predictable and sustainable cross-strait relationship. She asserted that both sides of the Strait have a
responsibility to find mutually acceptable means of interaction that are based on dignity and reciprocity, and stressed the importance of
ensuring that no provocations or accidents take place. Attributing her victory to the will of the Taiwanese people, Tsai
stated that the Republic of China is a democratic country whose democratic system, national identity and international space must be respected. In a warning
to Beijing, she said that any forms of suppression will harm the stability of cross-Strait
relations .7 As if she had more to say, but had decided to not say it in her victory speech, Tsai gave an interview to the pro-Green newspaper, Liberty Times, five days
later. Addressing the 1992 talks again, she noted that those negotiations had achieved several common understandings and acknowledgements, adding that I understand and
respect this historical fact.8 As noted Taiwan affairs expert Alan Romberg analyzed, this was a significant step in the direction of Beijings demand that what was achieved in
1992 was not simply a process but substantive agreements.9 Tsai also told Liberty Times that it is incumbent on both sides of the Strait to cherish and protect the

she said that peace,

stability, and development of cross-Strait relations should continue . Tsai then proceeded to define the existing
accumulated status quo and outcomes that resulted from the 1992 talks. Referring to this fact and the existing political foundation,

political foundation as comprising four elements: 1) the historical fact of the 1992 talks and the resulting shared understanding to seek common ground and reserve differences;
2) the Republic of Chinas constitutional order; 3) the accumulated results of more than 20 years of cross-Strait negotiations, exchanges, and interactions; and 4) Taiwans

effort by Tsai Ing-wen to establish the

existing political foundation as a new formulation for cross-Strait relations . For Beijing,
the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence comprise the common
political foundation, which the DPP cannot accept. Like the 1992 Consensus, however, Tsai evidently
hoped that the two sides of the Strait could use a similar phrase, but reserve their
respective interpretations. However, Beijing wasnt satisfied with this positive gesture and demanded more. DPP sources
underscore that Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to provide reassurances to the PRC that she will not
democratic principles and the will of the Taiwan people.10 The Liberty Times interview suggests an

pursue Taiwan independence not only through words, but also in her actions. For example, in the DPPs version
of the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act, Tsai consciously took into account
Beijings concerns about the use of terminology that might imply a state-to-state
relationship, opting to use the term cross-Strait instead of China-Taiwan.11

And the recent accidental launch is contributing to increasingly tense

China-Taiwan relations
Guerrero 7/1, (Kay, 7/1/16, Taiwan accidentally launches missile toward China, kills fishing
boat captain, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/01/asia/taiwan-fires-missile-onchina/index.html)//kap
(CNN)A

Taiwan warship mistakenly launched a supersonic "aircraft carrier killer" missile

toward China Friday, hitting a fishing boat and killing the boat's captain in an incident
China called "a serious matter." A spokesman for Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense apologized on behalf of the
military. "The Ministry of National Defense sincerely apologizes for the incident that caused the
death of the captain (of the boat) and injured other crew members," Maj. Gen. Chen Chung-Chi said in a news conference. The
ministry has also asked the Navy to provide assistance and compensation to the family of the victims. The deceased captain has
been identified as Huang Wen-Chung, the defense ministry confirmed, according to Taiwan Focus, the English-language service of
state-run Central News Agency. Chung-Chi said the

missile, the "Hsiung Feng III," ripped through the fishing

boat but did not explode. An investigation into the incident has begun, Chung-Chi added. China's top official in
charge of Taiwan policy, Zhang Zhijun, said Friday that Taiwan must provide a "responsible
explanation" for the launch of the missile, calling it a "serious matter." Relations between
Taiwan -- officially the Republic of China -- and the People's Republic of China have been

increasingly tense since the landslide election of Tsai Ing-wen, whose party has
traditionally leaned in favor of formal independence from China.

Miscalculation in the strait is the most probable cause of nuclear war

strategic mistrust makes escalation likely
Lowther, 13 citing a CSIS report (William, Tapei Times, 3/16, Taiwan could spark nuclear
war: report, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211)
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China
and the US, a new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension
and conflict between the US and China, says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS). Prepared

by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a yearlong study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent
Taiwans independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although
tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the
situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military
capabilities and persistent political disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at
the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. The
report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan
crisis. This

is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation ,

Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which
nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of
the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Titled Nuclear Weapons
and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between
China and the US, but they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a
number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as
Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.
Although

Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management

mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the
establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for
miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs
of suspicion, the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands
what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To
make things worse, neither side seems to believe the others declared policies and intentions,
suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially
difficult in any conflict, it says. Although conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be
ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With both sides
possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be
tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.

That causes extinction

Wittner, 12 - Professor of History emeritus, SUNY Albany (Lawrence, Is a Nuclear War With
China Possible? Huffington Post, 1/30, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclearwar-china_b_1116556.html
An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would
immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while
But what would that victory entail?

leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese
death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to
smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear
explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a nuclear winter around the globe
destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

US-China nuclear war over Taiwan likely now mutually assured

destruction isnt factored into PRC strategy
Littlefield and Lowther 15, Alex Littlefield is Senior Editor at Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,
Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) at Maxwell Air
Force Base, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-andamerica/)//kap
Chinas aggressive efforts to assert questionable
claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and
build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict
between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American
political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and
particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could
escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight
into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the
use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess
that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike
the United States if fired from Chinas eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that
could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast home
to the nations capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also
developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31
land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile
missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to
potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the
quantity, though not the quality, of Chinas nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock
of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear
arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory)
strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a nonuclear-first policy which makes its arsenal purely defensive while its other
capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia,

States are fully aware that Chinas investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow,

China
is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year.
While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States
will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a
number of actions that are against its interests. Chinas fears are not unfounded. Unlike
China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum
flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to
and, soon, Washington within reach of the East Wind. While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S.,

use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given
American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean
attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario
While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a

conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would
come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to
accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S.
from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy,
beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting
the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the
United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A
kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to
escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regimes relative weakness and the
probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against
PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may
escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in Chinas self-declared waters for example) as
a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of
its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus
making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter,
any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese,
makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric
response to American conventional superiority. Given

that China is incapable of executing and

sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China
would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States far
more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in
retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear
one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually
assured destruction (MAD) is not part of Chinas strategic thinking in fact it is explicitly
rejected the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no
desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However,
China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan.

Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional
hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a
literal and symbolic barrier to Chinas power projection beyond the East China Sea.
Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. Chinas
maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of
Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is
greatly diminished. Chinas relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.
Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is

actively seeking to supplant

the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer
view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that
demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to Chinas ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of
the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the
importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them even the
use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes

China sees the U.S.

as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for
the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan
Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as
the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by
bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.

then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainlands antics when the

U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to

China has not

be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the

expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.
forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will

Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China
seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. While the scenario
described is certainly not inevitable, the

fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not

impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to
understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the
United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the United States may
be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe .

Arms sales ensure regional instability, makes conflict inevitable, and

destroys regional stability
An 1-17-13
Xiao, This article was first published in Chinese and translated by Chen Boyuan, US' arms sales
to Taiwan impede Sino-US relationship, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/201301/17/content_27716480.htm, msm
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan not only directly harm Chinas essential interest , but also impede
U.S. strategic interest over the long run . They are also one of the main sources of anti-U.S.
sentiment in China and mistrust between the two countries. They will ultimately obstruct
bilateral cooperation and increase the risk of military confrontation . The balance of military
strength across the Taiwan Strait has been a primary reason for Washington to justify
arms sales to Taiwan. But the past few years have seen a remarkable improvement
between the two sides and the cross-Strait situation is now easing . And the U.S. leadership has openly and
explicitly expressed its support to a stable cross-Strait relationship.

U.S. insistence on arms sales to Taiwan will be

detrimental to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations , and violates U.S. policy. From Chinas point of
view, its military along its southeast coast are entirely internal affairs, and are only against separatist forces, not against the people of Taiwan. As early as January 2009, Chinas
Ministry of Defense noted that all military deployments in China are meant to preserve the fundamental interest of the nation and the state. "The adjustment to these
deployments will also be judged according to the situations development," said Colonel Hu Changming, spokesperson of the MOD. Despite creating a huge obstacle that
prevents the development of China-US relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain a complex problem. The United States will not draft policies to fit Chinas essential interest,
nor will China abandon its interests just to preserve its relationship with the U.S. But every problem has a solution. Some U.S. scholars have proposed a variety of solutions,
such as breaking down large scale arms sales into small pieces, gradually reducing U.S. commitments to Taiwans defense affairs, asking China to write off U.S. debt to trade off
arms sale suspension and even promoting Taiwans Finlandization. These trends have not yet taken hold in the U.S., and some seem ridiculous to China. However marginalized

The times have changed, and China is growing, meaning that the
U.S. ought to review its Taiwan policies so as to better suit its future global strategic
framework. The United States also needs to realize that Taiwan is no longer an
as they appear, these ideas all lead to one fact:

unsinkable aircraft carrier, and that China will step up its defence modernization and
prevent the country from breaking apart. The United States cannot count on China to
accept its arms sales even if they are broken into smaller components, or that China will
soften its attitude, because to China and the Chinese people, any issue that touches
sovereignty does not allow external intervention. The only thing that the U.S. can do is to
return to the Communiqu, and in the foreseeable future reduce arms sales to Taiwan . Only then can the China-US
relationship develop in a stable and smooth manner .

Economic and cultural ties dont check poor political relations outweigh
Wen-cheng 5

(Lin Wen-cheng, Dean of Social Sciences at National Sun Yat-sen University and Executive Director of the Institute for National
Policy Research in Taiwan, December 2005, Cross-strait Confidence Building Measures, p. 1, JH)

Taiwan and China have the most unique bilateral relationship in the world. The two countries have very close socioeconomic and cultural ties. About ninety-eight percent of the people in Taiwan are Han Chinese whose ancestors
originally came from China. After the Republic of China (ROC) lifted the ban on visits to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for
humanitarian reason on November 2, 1987, cross-strait people-to-people exchanges have increased dramatically. The Taiwanese
made more than 3.68 million trips to China in 2004.1 On average more than ten thousand Taiwanese travel to China everyday.
There were more than 222,800 cross-strait marriages between 1993 to June 2004.2 According to the Ministry of Commerce of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC), two-way trade between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait totaled $91.2 billion in 2005,3 and
Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus of $58.13 billion. In addition, exports to China accounted for 25.83% of Taiwans total exports in
2004. Taiwans investment in China is even more impressive. According to official Chinese data, Taiwans total investment had risen
to about $87 billion by November 2005.4 The real figure is much higher. More than one million people from Taiwan live or work in
China. However,

politically Taiwan and China are two rival states which have no official
contacts, play a zero-sum game competing for international recognition, and have
entered an arms race for a possible military showdown. Political integration theory or
functionalism, which argues that exchanges in non-political areas between two states will
spillover into their political relationship, encouraging them to solve their conflicts by
peaceful means, has so far failed to apply for the Taiwan Strait case. Instead, political conflict
between the two sides threatens to spillback, negatively effecting economic relations.

The aff solves miscalculation- a reduction in arms sales allows adverse

impacts to be avoided
Lowther 15- William, staff writer, Beijing too passive over Taiwan: Chinese analysts,
(http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/04/25/2003616749) JB
Swaine is described by Carnegie as one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. He said in the
report that neutralizing

the cross-strait threat would require the US to cut arms sales to

Taiwan in return for verifiable limits on Chinese ballistic missiles and strike aircraft deployed
near Taiwan. Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not
use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence or
the US placement of forces on the island, Swaine said. He said Beijing might view such a conditional limitation of its right to employ
force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of an overall stable balance of power in the western Pacific. Chinese

US
decisionmakers are extremely loath to make significant adjustments in the current
status of the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan. Any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of the US
leaders might also regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland, Swaine said. He said that

security commitment to these two actors could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms and/or threats or attacks from North
Korea or China, he said. However,

if understandings could be reached on the overall need for

strategic adjustment, then specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities would
become more possible. Swaine concludes the report by saying that if both US and Chinese leaders
could convince Taipei of the benefits of mutual assurances and restraints none of
which would require US abandonment of Taiwan adverse outcomes , including a resort
to nuclear weapons, could be avoided .

Reducing arms sales to Taiwan facilitates dialogue between China, Taiwan,

and the US which would lower the possibility of conflict
Swaine 03- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China, Reverse
Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.China Relations,
(http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief22.pdf) JB

The

Bush administration and Congress must recognize that, despite the current improvement in relations , a very

real danger of a U.S.China conflict over Taiwan remains. Avoiding such a conflict
requires a careful balancing of deterrence and more credible reassurance directed at
both Beijing and Taipei. While recognizing the need to maintain a strong deterrent against Beijing, the U.S. government should
pay greater attention to the sources of provocative behavior within Taiwan. The administration and
Congress should seek to constrain such Taiwanese behavior (and in the process reassure Beijing) by asserting as policy what some U.S. officials have stated unofficially: that
the United States will actively oppose what it regards as any unilateral change in the status quo by either side. The United States should also reiterate at the highest level that,
while it remains committed to protecting Taiwan from any use of force by the Mainland, it has no strategic interest in permanently separating Taiwan from China and supports a
stable, prosperous, and secure China. On the basis of such assurances, Washington should also indicate that China would gain by increasing not only its economic but also its
political attractiveness to Taiwan. The U.S. governmentincluding Congress should be prepared to support this effort by assisting China more directly in a long-term effort to
strengthen the rule of law and to carry out more meaningful political reforms. Yet Washington also should encourage Beijing to adopt a more flexible position toward Taiwans
involvement in international organizations. The recent change of leadership in Beijing might provide an opportunity to undertake such initiatives, once that leadership has

y, as an essential precondition for all of these initiatives, Washington should

work to lower Taiwans intense distrust of the Mainland and encourage China to reduce
its destabilizing arms buildup opposite Taiwan . The only way to do so is to open a
consolidated its position. Finall

serious dialogue with Beijing on mutual arms reductions , in consultation with Taipei.
Chinese president Jiang Zemin recently indicated that Beijing might be prepared to engage in such a dialogue by
offering to withdraw Chinas short-range mobile ballistic missiles facing Taiwan in return
for a reduction in U.S. arms sales to the island. This offer is unacceptable on its face, because mobile missiles constitute only one
of several possible threats to Taiwan and can be easily repositioned, whereas U.S. arms sales constitute Taiwans most important military acquisitions and require long-term

the offer suggested for the first time that Beijing might be willing to
engage in a dialogue on reversing the trend toward militarizing crossStrait relations. This
potential opening should be fully explored by the Bush administration.
planning and implementation. However,

Uniq: Yes War/Rels Collapse

China-Taiwan relations disintegrating now missile tests prove
Japan Times 6/27, (6/27/16, Taiwan to test-fire missiles in U.S. as China tensions rise, The
Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/27/asia-pacific/taiwan-test-firemissiles-u-s-china-tensions-rise/#.V3WMCI-cGu6)//kap
TAIPEI Taiwan

plans to test-fire its newest anti-missile system for the first time in the U nited
States next month as relations with rival China deteriorate, a defense source and media reports said
Monday. Relations between China and Taiwan have cooled rapidly under the islands new
Beijing-skeptic president, Tsai Ing-wen, who took office in May, ending an eight-year
rapprochement. The test of the U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system will be
launched at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in early July, a defense ministry source said, in a move
likely to irk Beijing even though it was arranged before Tsai took the helm. According to the
source, the test will be conducted in the U.S. to avoid China collecting information about it ,
and due to space restrictions in Taiwan. The American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy, would not comment on the
test, which was also reported in Taiwans Liberty Times newspaper. Despite

having no official diplomatic ties

with Taipei after recognizing Beijing in 1979, the U.S. is still Taiwans greatest ally and
main arms supplier. The missile system was purchased in 2008, well before Tsais leadership, and the test was approved
by the U.S. last year, according to the Liberty Times. Taiwan bought three earlier model PAC-2 systems in the 1990s and also tested
them in the US. They were deployed in the densely populated greater Taipei area. It then bought the new PAC-3 a system
designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles near the end of their trajectory as part of a $6.5 billion arms sale by the U.S. in

The system is already partly operational and will shield

Taipei, as well as central Taichung and southern Kaohsiung from any Chinese missile attacks, according to the
2008, which infuriated Beijing at the time.

defense ministry. The Taiwanese missile unit involved in the July drill will fire two missiles to intercept a missile launched by the U.S.
military, which will simulate an incoming Chinese ballistic missile, the Liberty Times reported. Japan has also tested the PAC-3 on
U.S. soil. In

the latest setback for cross-strait ties, China said Sunday that communications with
Taiwan had been suspended after the islands new government failed to acknowledge the
concept that there is only one China. China still insists self-ruling Taiwan is part of its
territory awaiting reunification, by force if necessary, even though the two sides split in 1949 after a civil
war. According to Taiwans defense ministry, there are 1,500 Chinese missiles aimed at the
island. China launched ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 in an attempt to deter voters in the islands first
democratic presidential elections.

Uniq: Now Key/Risk High

Ing-wens presidential victory means now is the crucial time to determine
the future of the US-China-Taiwan relationship
Paal 16, previously served as vice chairman of JPMorgan Chase International and as
unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute in Taiwan, (Douglas,
1/21/16, Maintaining Peace Across Taiwan Strait Can Benefit All, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/21/maintaining-peace-acrosstaiwan-strait-can-benefit-all-pub-62558)//kap
Tsai Ing-wen, candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, won Taiwan's leadership election on Saturday.
The elections in Taiwan have the potential to lead to strains between the United States,
Chinese mainland, and Taiwan for the first time in over seven years. Paal previously served as vice
chairman of JPMorgan Chase International and as unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute in
Taiwan. Parallel

interests in all three leaderships do not fundamentally clash, leaving space

for careful and creative management of the Taiwan political transition. But there is enough
suspicion and mistrust across the Taiwan Strait that a vicious circle of action and
reaction cannot be ruled out and probably should be subject to active policy prevention.
It is important at the outset to note that the policy objectives of all three sides in some way call for the
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the U.S. government, this should
form the core of its private and public messaging as events unfold. Steadiness will be required as both the
Chinese mainland and Taiwan will persuade Washington to help each to restrain or
mollify the other. If the U.S. does not grasp and establish its own principled position from the outset, it risks entrapment by
events. That position starts with the formal and almost ritual adherence to the three Sino-U.S. communiques and the Taiwan

Chinese mainland will look for

public indications that Tsai has taken seriously the mainland's repeated warnings that
the basis for continued cross-Strait cooperation lies in an acknowledgement of the
concept of One China, however formulated. It is at this juncture that U.S .policymakers will need to kick in. It is in the
U.S. interest that Tsai continue the moderate, even conservative and reassuring approach to cross-Strait
affairs that she adopted before the election. Her posture this time toward cross-Strait relations is markedly more
Relations Act (TRA), but it may have to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. The

constructive in terms of maintaining the status quo than her ambiguous stance in 2012, and this deserves to be recognized. Tsai's
revised posture won her American acquiescence to her candidacy after a visit to Washington in 2015. That was something she failed
to achieve in her 2012 unsuccessful bid for the leadership. Washington seemed persuaded, temporarily at least, that she had
developed safe hands to manage cross-Strait policy. Some in the U.S. and other circles, including in Japan and Taiwan, argue that
Washington

should seize the change in Taiwan to raise the level of official dealings in
U.S.-Taiwan relations, embed Taiwan in the "rebalance" to Asia, and promote closer
security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. That is an option, but in light of
the increasingly interdependent agendas of the United States and Chinese mainland, and the extreme sensitivity of issues involving
sovereignty for the Chinese, pursuing such an option would be fraught with costs difficult to predict or control. For the Barack

Chinese
mainland will naturally have its own levers to try to influence Tsai's government. The mainland will have four months
to signal publicly or communicate privately warnings or inducements to shape Tsai's
cross-Strait policy choices. There are hints that Tsai's team is preparing to manage any such
setbacks. They may seek U.S. criticism of the moves. The best public U.S. response is
probably to revert to a desire to see peace and stability maintained in the region and to
repeat the mantra of the communiqus and the TRA. The Taiwan election has already caught the attention
Obama administration, on its way out and in search of a positive legacy, this seems an unlikely choice. The

of some of those running to succeed Obama. But on the whole, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are relatively subordinate to the
Middle East, the Iran nuclear agreement, Russia-Eastern Europe relations, and other hot button issues in this U.S. election. The

Chinese mainland would be smart to remind itself of that fact and contain its instincts appropriately with respect to managing the
transition with Taiwan.

Uniq: Relations on Brink

DPP election puts China-Taiwan relations on the brink
Hewitt, 5/19
(Duncan Hewitt, 5-19-2016, "Relations Between Mainland China And Taiwan On A Tightrope As New Taiwanese President Tsai Ingwen Takes Office," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/relations-between-mainland-china-taiwan-tightrope-newtaiwanese-president-tsai-ing-2371192, accessed 7/2/16, JH)
SHANGHAI Experts are predicting a bumpy start to Tsai Ing-wens presidency, as Taiwans new
head of state the first female leader of an ethnic Chinese territory squares up with the mainland. Tsai, who won a landslide
victory in January on a platform of boosting a Taiwanese identity separate from China, takes office Friday. Tsai, 59, has said she will
not seek to provoke Beijing, but China is deeply suspicious of her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which
until the 1990s publicly called for formal independence from the mainland. Beijing has said it would use force in the event Taiwan
formally declared itself an independent state. Beijing has claimed the island, which lies off its southeastern coast, as part of its
territory since 1949, when Chinas Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) fled there after losing the Chinese Civil War to Mao
Zedongs Communist Party. After her election victory, Tsai

promised to maintain the status quo for peace

and stability across the Taiwan Strait and ensure that no provocation or accidents take
place. But the former legal scholar, a graduate of Cornell University and the London School of Economics, also pledged
to defend Taiwans sovereignty, and called for respect for the islands national identity
and international space. Thats not an idea that goes down well in Beijing , which insists that
any country it has diplomatic relations with cannot maintain formal ties with Taiwan. Consequently, the island has only 21 diplomatic
partners. Since Tsais election, Beijing has established relations with one country, Gambia, which formerly had ties with Taiwan. It
also intervened to have Taiwanese criminal suspects in Kenya repatriated to mainland China rather than to Taiwan itself, causing
much anger in Taipei. And it has sent blunt signals it can block Taiwans participation in international bodies such as the World
Health Assembly should it choose to do so. In recent days, Beijing has staged war games, including a simulated
coastal landing exercise, off its southeastern coast, opposite Taiwan. Chinese officials said these were routine operations, but few in
Taiwan doubt their intent. And

one Chinese newspaper, the Global Times, recently published a

survey showing that 85 percent of readers wanted reunification by force, preferably

within five years. China has signaled that it will play hardball over Taiwans international
space, and weve already seen an end to the diplomatic truce. [Beijing] wont give Tsai an easy time,
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, head of the department of government and international studies at Hong Kong Baptist University and former
head of the French Research Center on Contemporary China in Taipei, told International Business Times. Cabestan said it marked a
stark contrast with the era of outgoing President Ma Ying-jeou, a KMT stalwart who confirmed his partys rapprochement with
Chinas Communists by negotiating a series of trade agreements, opening direct air and sea links for the first time since 1949, and
even holding historic talks with Chinas President Xi Jinping in November, the first meeting between the heads of the two sides since
the end of the civil war.

Uniq: CBMs Now Key

Now is key- the DPP president offers more opportunities for confidencebuilding measures
Turner 16- Jennifer, specializes in China Studies and previously served as a Navy civilian
electrical engineer and as a U.S. Army officer in Korea, DPP Plans to Enhance Taiwan Defense:
Prospects and Cross Strait Implications,
(http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news
%5D=44973&cHash=8f92be95d5297ca78d025cd5724cdcc6#.V3V_K_krLAs) JB
In the run-up to the election, the DPPs New Frontier Foundation think tank, with input
from Taiwanese and U.S. defense officials, has released 12 Defense Policy Blue Papers
(DPP International Site, June 2013December 2015). The papers discuss modernization and expansion of
current programs like cyber defense. Defense governance initiatives aim to bring greater legislative oversight to the
National Security Council, improve bi-partisan and inter-agency cooperation, and improve dialogue with democracies and allies. [2]
A senior

defense official said the ideas were not very different from the current
[policies] This suggests that there is already a great deal of continuity in thinking about
military policy by both parties (China Brief, November 19, 2009). The papers have been reasonably well received by
the U.S. defense policy community (China Brief, August 23, 2013). According to the papers, the current, Kuomintang (KMT)
administration has misunderstood Taiwans strategic situationjust because Taiwans external situation has improved does not
mean Taiwan can afford to spend less on defense. Historically, the DPP has been more focused on social policy, but following a

DPP has seized the opportunity to

strengthen its defense credentials and improve deterrence (Focus Taiwan, September 5, 2015). The
DPP may even be able to conduct confidence building measures with China that the
period of rapprochement with China that has displeased many Taiwanese, the

KMT could not pursue without being criticized for selling out to China. [4] The DPPs
image-building campaign included Tsais speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that
reassured China by pledging to preserve the accumulated outcomes under the
Republic of China constitutional order, implying acceptance of the One China
principle (Apple Daily, June 6, 2015). DPP campaign staff describe Tsais strategy as cautious, proceeding slowly and
monitoring the PRC statements and other channels to judge the reaction to DPP policies. Regarding a future inauguration speech,
they say that [acknowledgement of] the One China principle will not happen but will work with China and the United States to
create a statement both ambiguous and concrete enough to satisfy everyone.

Uniq: Independence Now

Taiwan will declare independence soon Hong Kong is giving
independence movement enough momentum
Baulch, 2/8 [William, is an International Relations and International Security Studies graduate
from the Australian National University, Australian Strategic Policy Institute: The Strategist,
Beijings steady reinterpretation: One China, One System, 2/8/16,
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/beijings-steady-reinterpretation-one-china-one-system/,
7/5/16]JRO
Taiwan hasnt sought independence for several reasons. Beijing maintains an arsenal of missiles facing Taiwan, capable of causing
immediate and widespread destruction. Beijings Three Links policy and financial incentives to invest in the mainland have made
Taiwan economically reliant on China. The pro-China Kuomintang Party (KMT) also took back the presidency after the tense years
under Chen Shui-bian. Most importantly, many Taiwanese retain a Chinese identity and wish to maintain the status quo. But

military threats, economic dependence and a Chinese identity may no longer be enough
to forestall the independence movement in Taiwan. The number of people living in
Taiwan identifying as Chinese is falling and most now identify as Taiwanese. A clear
majority of the population prefer independence to unification and a growing number of
Taiwans youth seek immediate independence even at the risk of conflict. The recent
election of a DPP president and legislature is indicative of this transition. Pro-unification
advocates will have to rely more heavily on distinctions within the one country, two systems
argument to maintain support. But with the apparent failure of that policy in Hong Kong, theyll be
on shaky ground. President-elect Tsai Ing-wens support for the status quo should prevent an immediate deterioration in
cross-Strait relations. However, calls for independence are growing and the situation in Hong Kong
lends the movement additional strength. China appears to recognise the risk, warning Taiwan
just hours after the election that any push for independence would be poison. Yet Beijings parading of Mr Gui on state media just
days later reveals a concerning failure of judgement, if not a degree of apathy. Those troubles go far beyond China, Hong Kong and
Taiwan. If

Beijing continues to pressure Hong Kong, the one country, two systems argument may become
pro-independence campaigners to dominate the
debate. In those circumstances, BeijingTaipei relations will break down. Any subsequent confrontation in the
Taiwan Strait could trigger the USTaiwan security commitment, putting two East Asian
powers on a collision course and essentially forcing US allies, including Australia, to
choose between Beijing and Washington. This potential collision course implicates all regional actors in ensuring
untenable for Taiwans pro-unification forces, enabling

Hong Kong retains its autonomy.

Solvency: CBMs Solve/Reduce Miscalc

Miscalc causes U.S.-draw in CBMs key to effective negotiations and
reductions in military risk
Glaser and Cossa 10- Bonnie, senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power
Project at CSIS, Ralph, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, Building Trust Across the Taiwan
Strait, (https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/100107_Glaser_BuildingTrust_Web.pdf) JB
A central reason that the United States has backed cross-strait CBMs is that a PRCTaiwan military conflict, even if triggered by an accident or miscalculation, would likely
result in U.S. involvement. The easing of cross-strait political tensions and promotion of
economic cooperation has already contributed to the reduced possibility of military
conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and the United States has welcomed this process. The establishment of
communication and transparency measures, and the implementation of steps that
introduce greater predictability, would lower the risk of unintended conflict, and could
further increase political trust. Moreover, U.S. support for cross-strait military CBMs is consistent
with the long-standing U.S. position that differences between the two sides of the strait
should be settled peacefully through negotiations.

CBMs lowers the risk of misunderstanding and gets rid of over-reaction

Sheffield 09- Joseph, member of the US Air Force, MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONFIDENCE
BUILDING MEASURES AND COOPERATION WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
(http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a539454.pdf) JB
Cross-Strait tensions regarding Taiwan are the primary reason behind unsettled
SinoAmerican military relations . China views Taiwan as part of the PRC and wants to
reclaim it. It sees Taiwans return to the motherland as an inevitable internal matter and an essential part of their control over the Greater China area.20 The PRC also maintains that Taiwan is a
critical component of their national security interest and a subject which they will not compromise. Since the mid-1990s, China has focused its military
modernization on developing a force capable of returning Taiwan to the PRC.21 The PRCs military growth
and modernization over the past decade is unmatched. In fact, from 1998 to 2007, the Chinese defense budget grew at an annual rate of almost 16%, and in 2007 their defense budget increased by over 20%.22
The PLA is also developing new high-technological systems. They have produced new F-10 jet fighters which are on par with fourth-generation fighters. They are also developing anti-satellites, anti-aircraft, quiet

current PLA modernization appears focused on 5 countering U.S. military

intervention during a potential Cross-Strait crisis as well as making China a credible regional
and global military power. Despite Chinas rapid military modernizations and expanding defense budgets, they maintain having no intentions of
reclaiming Taiwan by force. However, the PRCs lack of transparency, ambiguous
decision-making process, and Cross-Strait security overtones and posturing towards
Taiwan concern the U.S. Section One of Chinas National Defense in 2008 gives a view of the PRCs determination of defeating Taiwan: The attempts of the separatist forces for
subs, and new ballistic missiles.23 The

Taiwan independence to seek de jure Taiwan independence have been thwarted[but the PRC still] face disruption and sabotage by separatist and hostile force[and these] Separatist forcespose threats to
Chinas unity and security.24 The U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlight the U.S.s commitment to the defense of Taiwan.25 The PRCs intensions toward
Taiwan and its rapid military advancements triggered the U.S. Congress to monitor the situation more closely. In 2000, Congress mandated DoD to provide an annual report updating current Chinese military

China has the greatest potential to compete

militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over
time setoff traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies.26 This is one of the
capabilities and potential security implications. Additionally, the most recent QDR states that,

reasons why the DoD has increased military coordination and planning with the ROC. The PRC security concern has also led to an increase in official military exchanges and arms sales between the U.S. and the
ROC. In fact, the Taiwan government is now one of the premier in terms of arms quantity and quality Foreign Military Sales customers of the United States.27 China views these U.S. military relations with

Taiwan as a violation of the principles established in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqus (which state that the U.S. acknowledges that there is only one China and that 6 Taiwan is a part of China), causing
serious harm to Sino-U.S. relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.28 Options Chinas rapid military modernization; its commitment to reunify with Taiwan; and its lack of transparency and
reciprocity, combined with Americas pledge to do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan, leave the United States Department of Defense and the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army with an unsettled relationship

of suspicion, misunderstanding, and misperception .29 This unsettled relationship increases the potential
of unintended Sino-American confrontations and presents problems not only for the U.S. and China, but for
the entire international community. The United States and Chinas military-to-military relationship is at a crossroads. This paper outlines the available military
confidence-building measures, military exercises, and military security cooperation that DoD should implement with the PLA to improve national security and preserve U.S. national interests while decreasing the

CBM) are a set of actions or

procedures that reduce military tensions between two (or more) states. In practice, CBMs
likelihood of potential conflicts in the future. II. Implementation Military Confidence Building Measures Confidence building measures (

function to assist the calculability and predictability of a countrys conduct , so that

states will have certain expectations regarding the behavior of other states.30 Although there are many
forms of effective confidence building, such as economic, diplomatic, or military, each method aims at reducing military tensions. The effectiveness of confidence building measures begins with the quality and 7
specificity of agreed parameters. Consequently, any CBM will entail at least some degree of political diplomacy. In fact, the most comprehensive CBM model in history is the East-West negotiations which
culminated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. At the height of the Cold War, this CBM solidified the status quo in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and engendered military-to-military
cooperation between the East and the West. This military CBM initiated mutual observation of military readiness activities on both sides.31 During the Helsinki Conference, the Swiss Prime Minister, Olof Palme,

Military balance, which is generally considered a guarantee of peace, could be

maintained at a lower level if states knew more about one anothers preparations and
intentions. Confidence would deepen. Over-reaction and arguments based on worst case assumptions could be
argued: The

avoided.

Solvency: CBMs QPQ

CBMs in return for a reduction of arms sales solves for stability in the
region
Kan 14- Shirley, specialist in Asian Security, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,
(https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf) JB
There has been interest

among U.S. academic circles and think tanks for Washington to pursue talks with
Beijing on its military buildup and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (instead of simply enhancing security assistance
to Taiwan).152 One catalyst for this debate arose out of the U.S.- PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwans
legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and reported in Taiwans media, then-PRC ruler Jiang Zemin offered in vague

terms a

freeze or reduction in Chinas deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for

restraint in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan .153 President Bush reportedly did not respond directly to Jiangs linkage. Editorials in
as a
reduction in actual deployments of the PLAs missile and other units, would improve the
chances for cross-strait political dialogue on Taiwans status and lead to sustained
stability. They said that the United States could explore or even negotiate with the PRC how it might
reduce the threat against Taiwan, such as dismantling missile brigades in a verifiable
manner, since sales of U.S. systems are based on Taiwans defense needs. They argued that
Taiwan were divided on whether to pursue Jiangs offer. Some argued that confidence building measures ( CBMs), such

Jiangs offer represented the first time that the PRC offered meaningfully to discuss its forces opposite Taiwan. Others said that a freeze or
redeployment of missiles would not eliminate the PRCs continuing and broader military threat against Taiwan (including mobile missiles that can be redeployed) and that the PRC should hold direct talks with leaders in Taipei instead. They argued that Jiang did not seek to reduce the PLAs coercive
threat but to undermine the relationship between Washington and Taipei, including arms sales which take years to complete. They noted that the PLAs
missile buildup has continued.

Solvency: Dialogue/Eng Key Solve

US views of China as an enemy only serves to exaggerate threat
perceptions and escalate the risk of conflict peaceful dialogue is key to
resolving tensions
Nye 7, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, (Joseph, 1/14/17, "Taiwan and
Fear in US-China Ties",
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17851/taiwan_and_fear_in_uschina_ties.html)//ka
p
Opinion polls indicate that one-third

of Americans believe that China will "soon dominate the

world," while nearly half view China's emergence as a "threat to world peace." In turn, many
Chinese fear that the US will not accept their "peaceful rise." Americans and Chinese
must avoid such exaggerated fears. Maintaining good US-China relations will be a key
determinant of global stability in this century. Perhaps the greatest threat to the bilateral
relationship is the belief that conflict is inevitable. Throughout history, whenever a rising power
creates fear among its neighbors and other great powers, that fear becomes a cause of
conflict. In such circumstances, seemingly small events can trigger an unforeseen and
disastrous chain reaction. Today, the greatest prospect of a destabilizing incident lies in the
Taiwan Strait. The US does not challenge China's sovereignty over Taiwan, but it wants a
peaceful settlement that will maintain Taiwan's democratic institutions. In Taiwan, there
is a growing sense of national identity, but a sharp division between pragmatists of the
pan-blue alliance, who realize that geography will require a compromise with the
mainland, and the ruling pan-green alliance, which aspires in varying degrees to achieve
independence. Some observers fear that President Chen Shui-bian () will seek a pretext to prevent defeat in March's
presidential elections. He is advocating a referendum on whether Taiwan should join the UN, which China views as provocative.
Chen has replied that it is China "that is acting provocatively today." Washington

is concerned. US Secretary of State

to apply to the UN under the name
`Taiwan' is a provocative policy. It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait and
it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage." She also
Condoleezza Rice told reporters that "we think that Taiwan's referendum

reiterated the administration policy opposing unilateral threats by either side that change the status quo. The same day, US
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized China for curtailing US naval visits to China over arms sales to Taiwan. Gates said he
told the Chinese that the sales were consistent with past policy and that "as long as they continued to build up their forces on their
side of the Taiwan Strait, we would continue to give Taiwan the resources necessary to defend itself." Gates added, however, that

despite China's rising defense budget, "I don't consider China an enemy, and I think
there are opportunities for continued cooperation in a number of areas." In principle, crossstrait tensions need not lead to conflict. With increasing change in China and growing economic and social
contacts across the Strait, it should be possible to find a formula that allows the Taiwanese to maintain their market economy and

US has tried to allow for this evolution by stressing

two themes: no independence for Taiwan and no use of force by China. But given the
danger that could grow out of political competition in Taiwan or impatience in the
People's Liberation Army, the US would be wise to encourage more active contacts and
negotiations between the two sides. The US has a broad national interest in maintaining good relations with China,
as well as a specific human rights interest in protecting Taiwan's democracy. But the US does not have a national
interest in helping Taiwan become a sovereign country with a seat at the UN, and efforts by
democratic system without a placard at the UN. The

some Taiwanese to do so present the greatest danger of a miscalculation that could create enmity between the US and China.
Some Chinese already suspect the US of seeking an independent Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" against a future
Chinese enemy. They are wrong, but such suspicions can feed a climate of enmity. If

the US treats China as an

enemy, it will ensure future enmity. While we cannot be sure how China will evolve, it
makes no sense to foreclose the prospect of a better future. Washington's policy
combines economic integration with a hedge against future uncertainty. The US-Japan
security alliance means China cannot play a "Japan card." But while such hedging is natural in world
politics, modesty is important for both sides. If the overall climate is one of distrust, what looks like a hedge to one side can look like
a threat to the other. There is no need for the US

and China to go to war. Both must take care that an incident

over Taiwan does not lead in that direction, and avoid letting exaggerated fears create a selffulfilling prophecy.

AT: Missile Defense Deters PRC

Chinese missile defense systems are structured to increase escalation in
Chinese self-defense
Kulacki 14, promoted dialogue between experts from both countries on nuclear arms control
and space security and has consulted with Chinese and U.S. governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the U.S. House China Working Group, the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the U.S. National Academies, NASA, and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, (Gregory, July 2014, Chinese Concerns About U.S. Missile Defense,
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/china-missiledefense.pdf)//kap
Over

the last several decades China dramatically expanded its arsenal of conventionally
armed missiles. The Second Artillery, which was originally created to operate Chinas nuclear-armed missiles, also operates
this increasingly large conventional missile force. The utility and effectiveness of Chinas conventional
missiles, and their relationship with Chinese nuclear strategy, is an emerging focus of Chinese concerns
about the possibility and consequences of military conflict, especially with the United States.
Missile defense is presumably a consideration, but its effect on Chinese thinking about
the relationship of its conventional and nuclear missile forces is difficult to discern. In a
classified 2003 text on the Second Artillery operations, conventional missiles are treated in a manner similar to nuclear missiles, as
strategic rather than tactical weapons (Yu 2004).2 The General Command Department of Chinas Peoples Liberation Army, which
authored and published the text, emphasizes the important political and psychological effects of all missile attacks. It repeatedly
instructs the officers who operate Chinas conventional missiles on the need for Chinas political leadership to maintain absolute
control over their use, which can only be authorized by the supreme military command and not by the Second Artillerys
operational commanders. This extraordinary level of control over Chinas conventionally armed missiles is deemed necessary
because: Second

Artillery conventional missile attack operations will take place under

conditions of nuclear threat. Even though future wars will primarily be conventional
regional wars, there are major nuclear powers in the world that have never committed not
to use nuclear weapons first, and which have, moreover, threatened to use nuclear
weapons in several recent regional wars. (Yu 2004, p. 59) Chinese strategists imagine future
scenarios in which China might engage in some forms of conventional military activity
without the risk of starting a nuclear war. But they also seem to recognize there is a risk of
escalation if those activities include conventional missile strikes. Somewhat surprisingly, missile defense does not
appear to be a significant consideration in Chinese thinking about the use of Chinas
conventional missile forces under these conditions. There appears to be no concern that the missile
defense systems the United States is currently deploying in Asia might affect the actual use of conventional missiles in a regional
conflict. During an off-the-record discussion in Beijing several years ago, a technically trained Chinese expert on hit-to-kill
technology who runs a related research and development facility in one of Chinas leading defense labs said, The United States
can deploy as many PAC-33 missiles in Asia as it wants without causing serious concern in China. Missile defense is barely
mentioned in the 2003 text discussing Second Artillery operations. This lack

of Chinese concern about the

impact of U.S. missile defense on the use of its conventional missiles might reflect
Chinese technical assessments of the performance of the defenses, the capabilities of
Chinese missiles or the effectiveness of Chinese countermeasures. It could also reflect a belief that
the sheer numbers of Chinese missiles could overwhelm any imaginable missile defense system. Whatever the reason, Chinese
analysts do not seemed overly concerned that attempts to use conventional missiles in
conflict scenarios involving the United States will be rendered ineffective by missile
defenses. There is, however, a very pronounced concern about being able to protect Chinas conventional missile forces from a
possible preemptive strike, either against the missiles themselves or against their command and control systems. The radars the

United States is deploying in the region, including those that support missile defense, are a significant concern
for Chinese military planners, as are the satellites the United States can use to identify, track and strike potential
Chinese targets. Wu Riqiang, a technically trained Chinese security analyst from Peoples University, argues the U.S. radars in the
region associated with its missile defense program, when used to observe Chinese missile testing programs, could provide U.S.
observers with useful information on the capabilities of Chinese missiles and missile defense countermeasures (Wu 2013). When
discussing U.S. reports of a Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile, Wu hypothesized that China might be reluctant to test the missile
because of the possibility of unnecessarily exposing information about the missile.

Impacts: Conventional War Escalates

US-China war goes nuclear
Talmadge 16, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George
Washington University, (Caitlin, February 2016, Conventional Counterforce as a Pathway to
Nuclear Escalation,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf)//kap
Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. But if
such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalationthat is, actual detonation of
nuclear weapons likely would be high er than many observers realize. Some aspects of a likely U.S.
campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at
conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still
could. This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For
example, in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal
of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander who is physically
able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of

Nuclear escalation in response to an opponents perceived

attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear
escalation. It can arise when one sides conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to
infringe on the other sides ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal. For example,
conventional military attacks by one side against the others command and control
networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the
potential not only to degrade that sides conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command
and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of
nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear
nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses.

operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites can house both

a state subject to attack on these targets may

have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal
conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the states nuclear capabilities. If the
state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to
do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more
conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location). For all of these reasons,

decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch. Ultimately,

escalation depends on how a state perceives an aggressive conventional campaign

against it. The state waging the campaign might use conventional force to target the opponents nuclear capabilities inadvertently, not realizing that the conventional
campaign was starting to look to the opponent like counterforce. Or it might do so deliberately, actively embracing this risk as a way to increase pressure on the adversary.
Either way, the target states fear of disarmament could lead that state to use nuclear weapons. The Dangers of Nuclear Escalation in the Event of U.S.China Conflict Five

United States embraces highly offensive

conventional concepts of operations in the Pacific, despite the nuclear pressures these
approaches might place on China. A U.S. campaign in a conventional war with China could target Chinese submarines, missile sites, command
factors suggest that a U.S.China conventional war could activate this escalatory mechanism. First, the

and control systems, air defense networks, and other sites well inside the Chinese mainland. From Chinas perspective these assets may be relevant to Chinas assured

what the United States may view as a purely conventional operation might look
to China like the prelude to a counterforce strike, creating strong useor-lose pressures. Indeed, some Chinese statements
indicate that conventional attacks on Chinas nuclear capabilities could vitiate Chinas no-firstuse pledge. Second, U.S. alliance commitments could further exacerbate this danger. The Pacific
Ocean may insulate the United States from much of Chinas striking power, but U.S. allies, particularly Japan and Taiwan, would be much more
militarily and economically exposed in the event of a U.S.China war. Even if the United States believed it
could achieve security through a slower and more limited conventional campaign, U.S. allies might not share that conviction. This reality again suggests that U.S.
conventional operations could quickly expand in ways that could appear to impinge on
retaliation capability. Thus

Chinese nuclear capabilities. Third, the U.S. militarys organizational tendencies also tilt in the direction of a more conventionally aggressive
campaign. For understandable reasons, militaries have a well-developed general preference for the offense. Militaries also tend to pursue tactical and operational advantages at
the expense of broader strategic and political objectives. Historically this behavior has resulted in a U.S. approach that is very good at general deterrence (preventing the
outbreak of war) but less adept at intra-war deterrence (that is, preventing ongoing wars from escalating). Fourth, civilian control of the U.S. military is unlikely to check these
tendencies. Some civilian policymakers may not be fully aware of the potentially escalatory implications of such approaches, while others may actually embrace these

situational
awareness is likely to deteriorate rapidly for the United States and especially China during a conventional
conflict, in ways that further compound all of the escalatory pressures just discussed. After all, denying
approaches. The historical record suggests that civilian oversight of conventional operations with nuclear implications has not always been robust. Fifth,

China knowledge of the battle space through the destruction of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (ISR) and command and control networks is likely to be
one of the primary objectives of any U.S. military strategy. These sorts of attacks will be essential to U.S. conventional success but also will make it increasingly difficult for
China to feel confident that U.S. aims are limited and that Chinas nuclear retaliatory capabilities remain intact. Similarly, the United States may cross Chinese nuclear tripwires
without realizing it.

Trade Retaliation Advantage

1ac
First, Chinese calculations have changed they will retaliate to future U.S.
arms sales with sanctions
Harrell 16- Peter, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former
deputy assistant secretary of state for counter-threat finance and sanctions, China threatens
sanctions against U.S. companies: Is this the future?, (http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2016/01/26/china-threatens-sanctions-against-u-s-companies-is-this-the-future/) JB
Chinas recent threat to impose sanctions on U.S. defense companies that sell arms to
Taiwan should come as no surprise to American officials or corporate executives: Washington has been
issuing sanctions of these sorts for years. It was only a matter of time before U.S.
competitors started copying its tactics. Regardless of whether China follows through on
its threat, Washington needs to be ready for a new normal in which the United States must
defend against sanctions as well as impose them. China is taking a page from the
sanctions playbook Washington developed against Iran. Between 2010 and 2015, the United States
effectively gave companies a choice: If they did prohibited business with Iran, like buying oil, they would get cut off from doing any
business in the United States. Forced to choose between access to the worlds most important financial system and an Iranian
market less than 1/30th the size, most companies stuck with Washington and avoided Tehran. Chinas

threat mirrors
this approach trying to force U.S. companies to choose between defense sales to
Taiwan and access to a Chinese economy that is nearly 20 times larger. While U.S. companies do
not currently sell military equipment to China, many U.S. defense contractors do sell civilian passenger aircraft, aviation parts and
other civilian equipment in China and could find their ability to continue those sales cut off by Beijing.

For Beijing, this is a

change in official position. China has long argued that only sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council
are legitimate. Yet, Beijing has not strictly adhered to this policy. In 2012, for example, it unilaterally limited imports of fruit and
vegetables from the Philippines in retaliation for a dispute over claims in the South China Sea. But

Chinas public threat

over Taiwan marks a major escalation in its apparent willingness to deploy sanctions of
its own against U.S. companies engaging in business, particularly business that is expressly authorized
by the Obama administration and publicly supported by many in Congress. Chinese policymakers understand
that their growing economic and financial clout makes sanctions threats more credible.
China is a critical market for U.S. products from cars to computer chips, and companies like Wal-Mart, Apple, MasterCard and
Starbucks are among the leading American firms that generate at least 10 percent of their business in China, according to data
compiled last year by Factset Research.

And, U.S arms sales are inevitable and result in Chinese sanctions vs.
Boeing Boeing is at-risk Sanctions collapse Boeings civilian sector and
take down the whole company even if China doesnt SANCTION Boeing,
theyll shift business which still triggers the impact
Chesson 11
(Roy David, currently a Foreign Area Officer in the US Navy. BS in Physics
from the University of Wisconsin, and MA degree in Security Studies (East
Asian) from the Naval Post Graduate School and an MA degree in

Engineering Management from Old Dominion University, How China could

Affect the Future of US Defense Corporations, pg online @
https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal111/China3.pdf //um-ef)
the continuous sales to Taiwan by the US have been much to the chagrin of the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) who hopes to one day reunite with Taiwan. In certain cases the PRC has responded by
securing military relations and taking extreme diplomatic measures to dissuade the US
from continuing with sales to Taiwan. Even with such responses by the PRC, these stern
remarks appear to have no effect on the decisions of the United States. The US has not
However

only continued to provide Taiwan with weapons, but has also increased the amount of
arms exported to Taiwan over the past decade. From 2001 to 2004, the US delivered US$3.7 billion and from 2005 to 2008 US$3.9 billion worth of
Not only have attempts
by the PRC failed in preventing sales to Taiwan, but it also appears that the US is
weapons to Taiwan.3 To further this trend, on January 29, 2010, the US announced that it would be selling US$6.4 billion worth of weapons to Taiwan.4

ramping up the amount of weapons that they sell . What is most striking about this new
declaration is not the amount that the US has promised, but the new reaction that China
is taking to influence US decisions in sales to Taiwan. In response to the announcement by the US, Beijing curtailed military
exchanges with Washington and, for the first time, announced the possibility of sanctions on the US corporations
involved in the arms sale .5 This list of US corporations includes Northrop Grumman,
Boeing, United Technologies (UTC), Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon - all of which are defense
corporations in the United States.6 To ensure that these corporations understand the severity of the claims against them, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxu, directly threatened the corporations involved by stating: Some
US companies, which ignore the stern objections of the Chinese government and decide
to sell weapons to Taiwan regardless, will face sanctions.7 Instead of a typical retaliation
on the just the US Government, the Chinese have turned their focus on the US
corporations involved in the deal and are prepared to hold them accountable if they continue
with the decision of the US Government . To best understand what the PRC spokesman meant by the threatened sanctions, one must analyze how China
can effectively employ pressure on US corporations. The overarching goal of any corporation is to maximize profit. For China to effectively place pressure on US defense corporations they must have a viable
means by which to enact profit constriction and, therefore, must have a vulnerable target to attack. Initially, one would be inclined to believe that China has neither of these capabilities considering that US defense
corporations are highly protected by the US Government and, being that China is not allowed to buy US weapons, the PRC is not part of the US defense market. So exactly how can China impose effective
sanctions on the US defense sector? To answer this question this research paper will first analyze the different forms of protection and decipher whether international norms and regulations would prohibit or allow
such sanctions. By analyzing the existing forms of protection for the US defense corporations, vulnerabilities can be detected and legitimization can be shown in the threatened sanctions. The next section will
analyze the business structures of these five corporations and highlight their alarming level of dependency on civilian revenue and therefore the China market. I argue that although the defense sectors of the
corporations are highly protected, the civilian sectors of these same corporations are open for attack and depend on the Chinese market for future sales and growth. By analyzing Boeing in particular, it can be
shown that US defense corporations have already been under political pressure by China and stand to lose major competitive ground if China were to enact sanction or cause problems for these corporations.

The information presented in this paper should serve as an example of exactly how China can
create effective and legitimate pressure on US defense corporations and therefore serve as a
warning to US strategists that sales of weapons to Taiwan can and will have problematic
costs that may not have been realized . Are US Defense Corporations Vulnerable to Foreign Sanctions? In response to the
recent US arms sales to Taiwan, the PRC has utilized the threat of sanctions as a form of
coercion . They have not only challenged the decision of the US to sell weapons to
Taiwan, but have also challenged the corporations involved in the decision of the US
Government. For the sanctions to have any teeth against these corporations, they must
have a viable means of being legally employed against the US corporations involved.
Their validity must be unhindered by global institutions and unchallengeable by the international community. This therefore calls into
question whether or not the international norms and regulations could allow China to invoke such a serious action against US corporations. The unifying organization in international economics is the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Adopting the provisions of the General Agreements to Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO strives to facilitate and foster liberalized trade amongst its members. This international organization
not only establishes a framework for negotiations, but also provides a dispute resolution process to ensure participants adhere to the WTO rules and regulations. Considering that China and the US are both
members of the WTO, it would be through this organization that China would operate in placing overt sanctions on another country.

While sanctions by their very

nature are counter-intuitive to the overarching goal of the WTO, they are still legal . Article XXI of
the GATT states: As can be seen, Article XXI not only gives nations the clearance to immediately interrupt trade relations, but it also allows the sanctions to occur without being bogged down with the WTO dispute

resolution process.9 Therefore China has the ability to levee sanctions on US corporations if it is deemed necessary under the auspice of essential security interests. As officially published on the embassy
website of the PRC in the United States, Zhang Hanlin, director of the WTO Institute of the University of International Business and Economics, stated: As the sales to Taiwan poses a threat to Chinas national
security, China has the right to penalize the companies.10 Considering that the sovereignty of Taiwan is not recognized by the WTO, it would appear as though China has a valid point in perceiving the sales to
Taiwan as an illegal transport or trafficking of arms into their own territory and therefore can be considered a security concern for the PRC. Under the guidance of Article XXI, China has a legitimate reason to
believe the arms sales are contrary to essential security interests. Even though the WTO resolutions would allow China to impose sanctions on these corporations, exactly how could the PRC effectively sanction
US defense corporations? China, albeit a robust militarized nation, does not receive weapons from the US. Following the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the US president, under the provisions of the Arms
Export Control Act, placed embargoes on military articles and services to the PRC. A mere twenty days later the European Community enacted the same embargo on the PRC and neither has lifted them since.11
Therefore China has no part in the market of the defense sectors of the US defense corporations. The idea in sanctioning is to impose large costs on products entering the country; however, due to the decision of
the United States, the PRC is not an authorized nation to currently receive any weapons from the US. They therefore have no means to attack these defense articles considering they are not part of the US
weapons market and can not affect pricing or marketability. From this information it can be seen that the threatened sanctions by the PRC appear not to be aimed at the defense sectors of these defense
corporations. Perhaps there is another sector within the defense corporations that could be the target of the threatened sanctions by the PRC. Whether or not Beijing places sanctions on these corporations, the
PRC must believe there is a targetable weakness in the operations of current US defense corporations, otherwise the threat could call Chinas credibility into question. A clue into the possible target of the PRC
was found in a public statement by the Chinese Embassy in the United States which reminded the US Government that China had never signed the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and therefore has the right
to decide whether or not they purchase US civilian aircraft from certain corporations.12 The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft is a WTO agreement entered into force in 1980 that attempts to mitigate import
duties on all aircraft with the exception of those purchased for military use.13 This agreement also extends to aircraft parts, components and flight simulators. Because China refused to sign this agreement, they
are therefore free to place import duties on all foreign civilian aircraft and components, thus allowing them to affect the cost and competitiveness of certain foreign corporations that are involved in the sector.

While Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon take part in certain
components involving civilian aircraft, they are small compared to the level of investment
that Boeing has in this sector. This therefore appears to be a direct threat against a
civilian sector that is part of a US defense corporation. Does this mean that civilian sectors of the defense corporations are vulnerable to
sanctions by the PRC? What Makes the Civilian Sector an Easier Target? By their very nature, the defense sectors of the US defense corporations are intertwined with the US Government. Unlike civilian
corporations, because of the sensitively of their products to US security, they are under high supervision and are highly scrutinized by the government. Over the years, the US has installed many programs,
regulations, laws, and supervisory boards to help control the export of US defense articles to foreign countries. One of the most significant defining measures to ensure such actions take place is the US code Title
22, Chapter 39, which outlines the arms export controls.14 According to Subchapter III, 2778 of Chapter 39, the US president has direct control on all exports and imports of defense articles and can provide
foreign policy guidance to those designated to receive US weapons or defense services. The president is also authorized to determine what is designated as a defense article or a defense service, thereby
controlling the export of everything deemed US weapons.15 The decision of whom the defense sector can sell weapons to is not the corporations but the US Presidents. Unlike defense articles,

products of the civilian sector are able to flow across borders relatively unchecked. The
freedom of commerce allows civilian sectors of the defense corporations to extend their
supply chain logistics across oceans without the prior approval of the US president as it
is with the defense sector. The internationalization of these products allows for the
civilian sectors of the defense corporations to create efficiencies in production, increase economies of
scale, and access new markets .16 These corporations are becoming integrated within foreign national borders and becoming accustomed to their way of life. Because of the
pure competitiveness of other international civilian corporations, it has almost become a necessity for the civilian sectors of the defense corporations to internationalize in order to maintain their competitive

Because of their freedom to integrate with the global markets, the civilian sectors of
the defense corporations are not as protected as the defense corporations. In response to rising questions
over governmental control of civilian operations, a top defense executive stated, The best thing government could do for our international business would be to get out of the way.18 However as
the civilian sectors become internationalized, they have opened themselves up to new
dynamics. The continued operations in foreign countries create new pressures and
difficulties for these corporations.19 As the civilian sectors of the defense corporations venture into new markets they deal with new laws, customs, and market
edge.17

demands. Plagued by different desires in different countries, the civilian sectors of the defense corporations have worked hard and responded to ensure maximization of profit regardless of their host national ties.
There are ever-growing fears that, while defense corporations have host nations, their allegiance to their host nation may weaken due to continued operations in the world market. Analysts generally agree that,
due to their dispersed productions and competitive international nature, corporations will fight any restriction on their ability to globalize and reap benefits, even if this is to the chagrin of their host nation.20 These

the ties between the civilian sectors of the defense corporations

and their host nation have in fact thinned as they continue to globalize. Dealing with new governments, pressures,
notions and observations serve to highlight the fact that

and international competition, the civilian sectors of the defense corporations are more likely today to act against host national interests than when they were autarkic and located solely within national borders.
This only gives a sense of reality that, because of the existence of the unprotected and unregulated civilian sectors of the defense corporations, there exists the possibility that these corporations under the right

the continual
operation of these corporations in multiple nations raises the likelihood that political
confrontation between the foreign nations and the corporation may occur.21 As can be seen, the defense
circumstances may acquiesce to foreign national interests in hopes of increasing benefits and profits. An example of this will be explored later in this research. Therefore

corporation is composed of two major components: the defense sector and the civilian sector. Each has a different market to respond to. The defense sector answers to the United States and only works with
foreign governments if the US President allows it. However, the civilian sector can be just as engrained in a foreign market as it is in the US market. Its products and supply chains still flow across borders and into
new territories. Regardless of their differences,

both sectors are tied together in that they are still part of the same

corporations with the same goal of maximizing profit. If China were to place effective
sanctions on the civilian sectors of the defense corporations, it would still hurt the same
defense corporation involved in selling weapons to Taiwan . An important observation in assessing the true connection between
these two sectors of the defense corporations is that of Jonathan Galloway who addresses, among many things, the global implications of defense corporations by differentiating the driving mechanisms for these
corporations.22 He explains that the basic needs and interactions between defense corporations are different based on their level of dependency on foreign sales and operations. Defense corporations that
depend more on foreign sales than military sales are more apt to react to foreign market pressures.23 However, while this is true, he highlights that even if civilian operations are only a fifth of a corporations
revenue, the defense corporation cannot stand to lose that income and is more likely to work harder to maintain it despite it being a smaller part of the corporations overall revenue. Therefore he concludes that all
defense corporations are dependent to some extent on the three markets: governmental, foreign, and domestic civilian. He argues that these defense corporations will take any action necessary to preserve the
balance among these markets regardless of their individual percentages.24 Galloway states: It stands to reason that their managements will be interested in preserving the dynamic equilibrium between these
markets. If the equilibrium between these markets is upset, then the consequences for the firm may become unacceptable. Coupling the arguments of Galloway with the arguments that civilian operations are
graying the connection to nationalism as they internationalize, one can start to see the plausibility in defense corporations acting to mitigate sanctions from a foreign country like China. This sort of situation is not
an unlikely scenario considering that defense corporations in the past have been caught between their host nation and foreign national interests. The well-documented BoeingMcDonnell Douglas merger
highlights this very argument. In 1997, Boeing made a bold move to buy and merge with their long-standing US rival, McDonnell Douglas, another US defense corporation that specialized in aerospace
manufacturing and defense contracting. Although the US authorities had approved the merger, the European Union (EU) ruled that the merger was not in the EUs best interests and demanded that Boeing make
changes. Both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are based out of the United States; however, the EU was concerned that the combined power of the two companies would hinder the European aeronautics
corporation, Airbus. Since Airbus is 80%-owned by EADS and 20%-owned by BAE (both of which are defense corporations of the EU) it was speculated that such a merger would cause Boeing to gain a larger
competitive edge and would hurt their own defense corporations in the long run.25 In their defense, Boeing first argued that the US Federal Trade Commission, not the EU, should take the lead in investigating the
deal and its legitimacy. The EU, however, went forward with its own commission and unanimously voted that the merger be blocked by any means necessary. Faced with the threat of EU pressure to band
together and only buy planes from Airbus, Boeing acquiesced to the concerns of the EU and changed the conditions of the merger so as to satisfy the EU.26 Even though the United States demanded that Boeing

maintain its original deal and had a legitimate reason for stating that the original terms were fair, Boeing feared the loss of market share in Europe and, therefore, believed the foreign governments interests were
in their own best interests. This incident is significant for several reasons. First, this showcases how an international organization was able to pressure two US corporations to conform to their interests and not act
solely on the interests of the corporation. They were able to create enough pressure on Boeing to ensure that Boeing conceded to their desires. It was not the fear of losing defense contracting, but the fear of
losing sales in commercial jets that ultimately caused Boeing to acquiesce to the desires of a foreign nation. Second, as mentioned above, the rest of the world perceived this move by the EU as a way to protect
the European corporation Airbus. This was not because Boeing did not make a good product. It was because of nationalistic reasons that differentiated Airbus from Boeing, which is a dynamic that foreign defense
corporations must fight hard to resolve and overcome. Still, the most important point is that the deepening of integration into other parts of the world due to internationalization over the years has transferred more
regulatory powers from host authorities to foreign nations. Companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and UTC will find that their civilian actions, regardless of how small, will invite
the attention of the international world and cause great political pressure. Or, in the case of the Taiwan arms sale, the action of their defense sector will invite foreign political pressure and hardship on their
internationalized civilian sector. How Invested are Defense Corporations in the Civilian Sector in China? Considering that all the defense corporations from the Taiwan arms sale are multinational in their civilian

China has an ability to sanction portions of the exposed

civilian sectors of the defense corporations.27 Therefore to be able to understand the effectiveness of such sanctions it is important to register how
much these defense corporations rely on their civilian sectors and how much of a role China plays in the calculations of their future prospect. In analyzing the chart below, one can see that both
operations and have civilian sectors that extend across the globe,

Boeing and UTC show a large reliance on their civilian sector . According to their financial data, both
companies rely heavily upon their civilian sectors total revenue to maintain operations.
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon have a significant amount of civilian revenue; however, their business structure does not rely as heavily on civilian revenue and would therefore not be in
major jeopardy if sanctions were imposed on their civilian sectors. This is not to say that their civilian revenue is insignificant; the lowest percentage is 7%, which equals US$2.3 billion.

For Boeing

and UTC, 49% and 83% are significant enough that these corporations depend on
civilian revenue just as much if not more than on their defense revenue and would
therefore be extremely vulnerable to Chinese sanctions . This highlights that these two companies stand to lose more than the other
Both Boeing and UTC have been a part of the American business
structure for almost 100 years, but only recently started shifting attention to conducting
business transactions overseas. They have seemingly found the rich potential that lies within Chinas borders and over the past couple of decades, have developed
three due to their extreme reliance on civilian revenue.29

long-term relations with the Chinese government. Each one has found their own niche in Chinas economy with Boeing selling commercial aircraft to the Chinese airlines and UTC selling Otis elevators and Carrier
brand heating and air-conditioning to the Chinese people.30

For Boeing a complication in the Chinese market would

severely hurt their civilian revenue . Over the next two decades, Boeing expects China to spend US$400 billion to purchase approximately 3,770 planes from
certain manufacturers, thereby making China the second largest commercial aircraft market in the world.31 According to UTCs CEO, Louis Chenevert, [Chinas market] feels really good right now. Chenevert
added that he sees no evidence of Chinas market slowing down and noted that the companys Otis elevators were up by double digits. Furthermore, orders for its Carrier air conditioning systems were starting to
come up. For UTC, the revenue from Otis Corporation accounted for the bulk of the US$3.1 billion in sales in China last year, and it is estimated that Chinas economy will grow 9.9% this year.32 With results and
high expectations for both companies and a large reliance on their civilian sectors total revenue to maintain operations, it appears as though

these two defense

corporations have a large reliance on the civilian Chinese market and would therefore be
highly vulnerable to Chinese sanctions on their civilian products . If China does impose the threatened sanctions against
these defense corporations it could prove to be detrimental to their international operations. While the military sectors of these defense corporations would not be affected by sanctions from China, the civilian
sectors are left relatively unprotected. The combined dynamics of a large reliance on civilian revenue and pressure from a government that has a lucrative market for their civilian sectors to operate in only

Another way
in which China can exploit a major weakness in certain civilian sectors of the defense
corporations is through pre-existing competitive rivalries. In most cases, Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, Raytheon, UTC, Northrop Grumman, and other defense corporations are in tight
contention for defense contracts relating to their respective fields; however, as was discussed in a previous
section, China does not have an ability to affect this. There are pre-existing rivalries in the civilian sectors that can be
exploited to create even more pressure on the defense corporations involved in the
Taiwan arms sale. The targeting of corporations with strong rivals can serve two purposes: it can cause
civilian revenue of the defense corporations to decrease, and it can increase the
competitive gain of their key competitor. Not only do they lose that part of the market,
demonstrates a larger possibility that certain defense corporations will be more likely to adhere to the foreign governments will over that of their host national governments desires.

but their competitor also ends up gaining from it, thereby delivering a double blow to
the defense corporation under fire . In tight competition for new markets like China, this
sort of altercation can result in a major setback to the defense corporations civilian
revenue and could become a long-term effect. Not only does the rival gain from a sanction in China, but also, due to the increased capital, will he
have the ability to use this gain in other competitive areas to help increase funding in his global market. There are many different types of rivalries that exist in the market. Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and
Northrop Grumman mainly compete with each other for defense contracts and their civilian revenue is relatively low compared to others. This indicates that they are somewhat protected from a Chinese
exploitation of their key rivalries. Conglomerate corporations might have several different rivals by the existence of multiple sectors and markets under which they operate. Therefore no one company is completely
identical to that of another conglomerate corporation and the existence of a specific rivalry is rare. UTC is a conglomerate that has different civilian sectors like Otis elevators and Carrier air-conditioners.33 The
sanctions against UTC would result in fewer Otis elevators and Carrier products; however, there are many different elevator and air-conditioner companies operating in China and therefore no specific competitor
would gain from such sanctions. This does not affect the global competitiveness of the civilian sector of UTC; rather it affects local competitiveness in the Chinese market. With this in mind, it is fair to say that the

Boeing on the other hand has one major rival, Airbus. As most would claim, the rivalry
between Boeing and Airbus is the largest international rivalry in the world.34 Both companies are identical in
sanctions will not make UTC as vulnerable.

that their civilian sectors develop comparable commercial aircraft that are competitive on the global market. Foreign corporations that choose to buy a commercial jet are usually considering whether or not they

choose Airbus or Boeing and at times will use the two corporations to play each other off in a bidding war.

The stakes are extremely high for each

corporation, meaning that a single deal with an airline could be a deciding factor
between success and failure in a multibillion-dollar investment .35 Therefore one of the best strategies for both Boeing and
Airbus is that of persuading prospective buyers, such as nationally owned airlines, to purchase their own planes instead of those of the respective other.36

The competition

between Boeing and Airbus has been extremely tight over the years . Neither company has been able to pull away
from the other,

so the slightest change in their global market share can give a company an

advantage over the other . For such a close race it can be seen how important the Chinese market is to both companies. According to Chinas own projections, they believe they
will quadruple their aircraft fleet to 3,900 by 2025, which could create a large amount of potential revenue for Boeing or Airbus.37 To further this, Boeing expects China to spend over US$400 billion to purchase
planes over the next couple of years, thus making China the second largest aeronautics market in the world.38 According to Airbus China President Laurence Barron, China probably has the most potential of
any significant market in the world.39 However, despite tight contention, is Boeing at a point where it can handle a head-to-head challenge with Airbus in China, especially if sanctions by the Chinese government
are enacted? With airlines in other markets struggling and Boeing still trying to recover from its muchdelayed Dreamliner 787 project,

Boeing seems to be on shaky

grounds and stands to lose more than Airbus.40 To make matters worse, before the arms sales to Taiwan, Airbus was already winning more orders
from China than Boeing.41 While Boeing currently has 736 Boeing planes operating in China (and another 30 from McDonnell-Douglas, which Boeing acquired in 1997), Airbus only has 547. However, over the
past couple of years, Airbuss orders from China have dramatically shifted to give Airbus the advantage. As of February 2010, Chinese airlines have placed orders for 358 Airbus planes and have options for
another 14, while they have only ordered 244 new planes from Boeing and have placed no options for further units. Airbus has also acquired letters of intent towards future sales of 60 planes, compared to 40 for

Because the three largest airline companies (China Southern, China Eastern, and Air China) are still controlled
by the Chinese government, the purchasing of commercial airliners is highly politicized.
Because of this, Chinese officials have the direct ability to reward foreign governments
with airplane sales that meet the interests of China.43 In response to such a system, Airbus, in June 2008, built an assembly base in
Boeing.42

Tianjin.44 By developing an assembly factory in Tianjin, Airbus is hoping that building aircraft in China (and the corresponding transfer of technology) will strengthen its position with the Chinese government,
effectively beating out Boeing. To further this, Airbus has also developed an engineering center in Beijing that will train up to 200 local engineers to assist in the plant operations in Tianjin.45 Peter Harbison,
executive chairman of the Center for Asia Pacific Aviation in Sydney noted that in China, if you allow for more local production and information-sharing, the purchaser is going to be a lot more willing to accept
your aircraft.46 Boeing on the other hand is at a disadvantage. Hindered by unions and concerns over the company shifting jobs overseas, Boeing has had to maintain production in the US. However, Boeing has
argued that their presence in China is significant because Boeing buys parts from seven local manufacturers in China. Boeing spokesman, Yukui Wang, stated that Boeing is the Chinese aviation industrys largest
foreign customer. He stresses that over the years Boeing has bought US$1.5 billion in aircraft parts and services from China and that this figure will double in the next few years.47 Mr. Wang also added,
Chinese suppliers now have a role in all of Boeing airplanes.48 Along with this, to emphasize their commitment to China, Boeing ramped up its efforts and sent a sales director to Beijing to become the

Boeing is now at
a large disadvantage because of their defense sectors sales of the Harpoon missiles to
Taiwan. If China enacts the sanctions against Boeing, Boeing will have to face a strong rival
who just became much stronger. This is while they simultaneously lost major ground in the battle over the Chinese market. Even if China
does not impose the sanctions, the Chinese government will probably be more likely to
purchase planes from and support a company that does not sell weapons to areas of
concern as well as one that complies with their interests. The defense corporations that are more reliant on their defense sales and
companys first Chinabased sales executive - something that is not normally practiced by Boeing.49 Even with the past level of competition between Boeing and Airbus,

therefore are not as competitive in the civilian sectors (e.g. Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin) are not under the same kind of pressure to expand their international production base and depend

China were to enact sanctions against Boeing they

would be able to meet their aeronautical needs by buying planes from Airbus , who is Boeings tight
on foreign markets as is Boeing (due to its competitive nature with Airbus). If

competitor. Not only is Boeing losing the revenue, but their main competitor is gaining from the sanctions. This double-edged sword would increase pressure on Boeing to try and mitigate the sanctions and
adhere to the Chinese request, thereby restoring their share of the world market and their political favor in the eyes of the Chinese. As can be seen from this report,

the threats of

sanctions by China are quite real . China stands in a position in which they have the
capability and means to legally sanction US defense corporations for their involvement
in the sales of weapons to Taiwan . While provisions and laws of the US government
protect the defense sectors of these corporations, their internationalized civilian sectors
are vulnerable to separate sanctions and pressures from the PRC. To further this point, those defense
corporations that rely heavily on civilian revenue appear to be even more vulnerable to
Chinese pressure because of the potential of the Chinese market. Boeing displays the
most characteristics that make it vulnerable to pressure from the PRC. In their direct statement about not signing
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,

it appears as though China is aware of this fact and is directly

threatening Boeing with this statement. With a highly politicized process of procuring orders and an
ever-tightening competition in China between Boeing and Airbus, Boeing can ill afford
the repercussions of the arms sales . They will not only lose the potential revenue of the
Chinese economy, but will also lose ground to their major competitor, Airbus . In response to the threat of

any arms sales to foreign countries or entities are decided by

the US government [] Its a governmentto-government issue.50
sanctions, David Wang, President of Boeing in China, stated that

And, Boeing is the key to U.S. Aerospace thats key to the U.S.
Manufacturing base
Platzer 9
(Michaela D. Platzer, Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business, U.S. Aerospace
Manufacturing:
Industry Overview and Prospects, pg online @ https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40967.pdf //umef)

The large commercial jet aviation market is a duopoly shared by the U.S. aircraft
manufacturer Boeing and the European aircraft maker Airbus, with fierce competition between these two
companies. The regional jet market is dominated by two non-U.S. headquartered manufacturers, Brazils Embraer and Canadas Bombardier, both of which utilize a high level of U.S.-produced
content in their products. The general aviation market includes companies such as Cessna and Gulfstream. Aerospace manufacturing is an important
part of the U.S. manufacturing base . It comprised 2.8% of the nations manufacturing
workforce in 2008 and employed over 500,000 Americans in highskilled and high-wage
jobs. More than half (61%) of the nations aerospace industry jobs are located in six states: Washington state, California, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and Arizona. Several smaller aerospace manufacturing
clusters are found in states such as Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Missouri, and Alabama. Other aerospace centers are beginning to emerge in southern states, such as South Carolina, where Boeing is now building a

Aerospace manufacturing contributes significantly to the U.S.

economy, with total sales by aerospace manufacturers (including defense and space) comprising 1.4% of the U.S. gross domestic
product in 2008. U.S. aircraft manufacturers depend heavily on the international market
second production line to produce the 787 Dreamliner.

for their sales . The aerospace industry sold more than $95 billion in aerospace vehicles and equipment (including defense and space) to overseas customers in markets such as Japan,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and imported over $37 billion in aerospace products from abroad, providing a significant positive contribution of $57.7 billion to the U.S. trade balance in 2008.

other markets are becoming important as an opportunity to increase U.S. sales, but
also because of the potential for future competitors to challenge the U.S. aerospace
industrys competitive position. U.S. aerospace exports to China have increased since
2003, totaling $5.5 billion in 2008. At the same time, some analysts maintain that China could become a global competitor in the commercial aerospace market. Already, China is working to develop
Increasingly,

airplanes that could become globally competitive in both the regional jet and large commercial jet aviation market. Russia has stated that it wants to become the worlds third-largest aircraft manufacturer by 2015.

And, manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S.

deterrence prevents conflict
OHanlon et al 2k12
(Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa,
Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The
Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in
Defense Industrial Policy January 2012, pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial
%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon //um-ef)

the U.S. d efense i ndustrial b ase

is in a much different place than it was in the past . D efense industrial issues are too
often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts .
But the overall health of the firms that supply the techn ologies our armed forces
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as

utilize does have national security resonance . Qualitative superiority in weaponry and
other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power
in the modern era not only for winning wars but for deterring them . That requires
world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities which in turn can also generate civilian
and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

And, Nationalism controls the CCPs response to foreign actionsthe

public will not tolerate signs of weakness and will respond violently to
attacks on their national identity new arms sales risk T-Bill Sell-off or
Coup de-tat
Garver 2016 (John, is Emertius Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at
the Georgia Institute of Technology. He specializes in Chinas foreign relations. He served for
many years on a the editorial boards of the journals China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary
China, Issues and Studies, and Asian Security. He is a member of the National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, has testified before the U.S. Congress, and is the author of twelve books
and seventyfive refereed articles and book chapters dealing with China 's foreign relations,
Chinas Quest: the History of the Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China, Chapter
28, Chinas Quest for Modernity and the Tides of World History, Oxford University Press, 2016,
silbs)
Analysts differ about the extent
nationalism influences CCP foreign
policy decisions
The twenty-four-hour
cable news cycle, combined with the availability of that coverage via Internet and Hong
Kong broadcasts, meant that news of international events reached Chinas public quickly
and unfiltered by government censors
to which autonomous (non-state-directed) popular

. One scholar argued that web-based popular nationalism constitutes a sort of echo chamber that significantly influenced foreign policy decisions.23

. The ability of the state to restrict or ban access to information had been greatly reduced. This meant that when a hot crisis occurred, party leaders

were aware that news of the event would almost immediately spread through the Chinese public. News presented by foreign news sources would probably be sensationalistic and focus on violence, since that attracts readers in China as in other countries.

Once the news of some insult of China hit the streets, there would be a strong impulse
for the leaders to make known their own position, stressing their anger over the newest
insult of China There would be a strong tendency for the government, and
leaders
vulnerable to challenge by rivals, to try to put themselves at the head of nationalist
public opinion lest they become the target of that public opinion for being slow and weak
in defense of Chinas honor To position itself before mobilized nationalist opinion as a
resolute defender of Chinas interests and honor, the government would probably define
the offensive episode as part of a deliberate long-term strategy The government would
probably demand a change in the policies of the foreign transgressing state
.

for individual

, along with an apology for the

Communication with the offending party may well be refused , since even to speak
with the foreign transgressor can be seen as a sign of weakness.
China showed its other face, an
aggressive and threatening face, in response to hot crises, when Chinas government
was acting under the mobilized attention of its nationalist public. In these cases, the
government could not afford to be seen as weak. The incentive was to be stern and
tough defenders of China against ruthless foreign aggression.
Nationalist bloggers felt Beijings,
policies were not tough enough
Politburo members
paid considerable attention to them Chinas leaders would make foreign policy moves
transgression.

There were two faces of Chinas power. One face was calm and

reasonable, and sought to reassure other countries, both the United States and Chinas neighbors, that China was and would remain peaceful and nonbelligerent.

It may be that nationalist bloggers critical of Beijings foreign policies

functioned as a sort of pressure group.

who

that

or perhaps the MFAs,

were, of course, a relatively small number of people (perhaps a few tens of thousands). Yet when their views were aggregated, systematized, and put in a top-secret report under the imprimatur of the MSS,
.

with an awareness of how moves would be received by a handful of cyber nationalists.

Those cyber nationalists soon come to understand this, and this sense of importance
and actual influence might inspire them to take even more extreme positions.

Other scholars stress that party

leaders, while using web nationalism to legitimize party rule and mobilize support, remained in full charge of foreign policy and continued to act on the basis of interests associated with Chinas long-term development.24 A sort of state-tolerated civil society evolved

Spontaneous web-based nationalist activism, including demands

for tougher state policies, erupted in response to various issues reported by the
international and Chinese media
The state legitimized and in effect authorized
this activity by its own criticism of foreign actions The state then tolerated popular
nationalist agitation, or even encouraged it
Freelance
nationalist groups watched state policy closely for clues of official
support
and responded quickly when they saw such signs.
around this popular and spontaneous, bottom-up nationalism.

. Web-based nationalists formed organizations and undertook a range of independent activities: circulating petitions; organizing boycotts, demonstrations and protests;

and lobbying state legislative bodies and party-directed mass organizations to adopt more assertive policies on nationalist issues.

, as long as it stayed within bounds of not endangering social order or party authority.

toleration, perhaps even conditional

Cyber nationalist efforts to mobilize opinion were often assisted by Chinas commercial press, which understood

that sensationalist, nationalist content sold papers. The state set parameters for permissible nationalist agitation, but editors learned to navigate between the party line and the bottom line, selling papers by peddling fire-breathing nationalist resentment against

The CCP state used this popular

nationalist activism to legitimize its authority and to gain leverage in negotiating with
foreign governments . But
foreign transgressors. The commercial press was considerably more nationalist than the party press, which is less dependent on market appeal.

CCP leaders clearly understood that the costs of belligerent and confrontational policies might be heavy, and calmly and reasonably settled disputes with foreign statesalthough they

sometimes insisted on doing this behind closed doors and while concealing from Chinas popular nationalists their reasonable, nonconfrontational approach. The PRC state attempted to bring nationalist cyber discussion under its control in a number of ways. One
was insulation of Chinas Internet from the World Wide Web. Chinese web users were routed through Chinese servers, where access to politically objectionable content on the World Wide Web was blocked. Sophisticated Chinese web users, armed with special
software, could circumvent these obstacles, but for the great majority of Chinese web users this great firewall of China was effective in blocking access to material that might challenge the orthodox narrative. The Ministry of State Security also employed a large
number of people (reportedly over one million) to censor online commentaryprobably routing it for further analysis and investigation. The MFA also set up a website of its own to host a discussion of Chinas foreign affairs. Critical questions and comments were

Beijings handling of
conflict with other states sometimes touched on the political survival of the incumbent
paramount leader
perceived weakness in dealing with foreign
invited and responded to by MFA specialists. Finally, special reports on the substance of online criticism of Chinas foreign policies were routinely prepared by the MSS for perusal by the Politburo.

. Susan Shirk outlined several ways in which

humiliation might lead to leadership change Rivals within the Politburo might use the
opportunity to oust the incumbent paramount leader The PLA might withdraw its support
for the incumbent paramount leadera development which would almost certainly lead
to the removal of that leaderor hesitate to carry out an order by the paramount leader
to use violent force to suppress nationalist demonstrations and movements
The likely trigger of any
of these forms of regime change would be nationalist street demonstrations followed by
quick emergence of nationalist movements Nationalist street demonstrations are
potentially very dangerous to the party. The centers handling of the Belgrade embassy
bombing, the Falun Gong convergence, the EP-3 episode, and the fishing-boat captain
incident all demonstrate the deep elite apprehension that foreign transgressions might
be transformed into challenges to the party-state Once people are in the streets venting
hatred against
US transgressions, it is very easy for the target of anger to shift from
those countries to Chinas internal shortcomings , with CCP leaders held responsible
Any hint of weakness by
the CCP in confronting the foreign humiliation du jour could prompt a shift from
foreign to internal demands
Chinese students once again swarming from Beijings
university district to Tiananmen
carrying posters saying Down with the Americaloving CCP toadies Protests over nationalist issues are also dangerous because those
causes cut across social groups and regions.
Nationalist issues appeal instantaneously to people in different cities, regions,
and groups Protests over nationalist causes are also more dangerous for Chinas central
authorities because nationalist causes are able to tap into deep emotions of group
identity and individual meaning in ways that mere economic issues cannot Nationalist
appeals can rouse in people intense anger and a deep sense of identification that makes
them willing to kill and even sacrifice their own lives to avenge the insults against their
nation.
. Passions are
.

. Developments along these lines could

compel the CCP to enter a path of dialogue with the opposition, a path that would probably lead to a power-sharing arrangement, effectively ending the CCPs monopoly control over state power.

Japanese or

. State-

condoned nationalist demonstrations are virtually the only form of organized public political activity tolerated in China, and people quickly seize such opportunities to raise other grievances.

. Shirk imagines

Square

.25

Protests against land seizures or environmental hot spots are intrinsically parochial, although there are sometimes copycat

actions in other cities.

Lost wages or pensions, official corruption, or environmental pollution is less likely to rouse such passion. The mob psychology associated with large street protests also enhances their volatility

contagious, and people feel empowered by numbers and protected by seeming

anonymity. Seemingly lost in a crowd, people may do things that would be unthinkable
under normal circumstances, perhaps introduce antiregime slogans into a protest or
confront the police. A final linkage between Chinas aggrieved nationalism and foreign
policy is the interaction between PLA views and CCP elite politics

. While there is no evidence of PLA foreign policy lobbying since the

on seven
occasions PLA officers either called for or themselves dealt
out tougher treatment of the U S : calling for China to sell
off US Treasury bonds in retaliation for US arms sales to
Taiwan,

19951996 Taiwan Strait situation, there is abundant evidence of expression of hard-line PLA views on how to deal with the United States and Japan.

nited

In

just one year,

2010

, for example,

tates

calling the United States hegemonist at the Security and Economic Dialogue, verbally challenging US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at a Singapore conference, protesting Secretary of State Clintons assertion that the

calling for PLA-N warships to

be deployed to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
The CCP center
is extremely lenient in its handling of this sort of expression of PLA views In 2005
General Zhu Chenghu told a foreign reporter that in the event the United States
United States had a national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, warning the United States and South Korea that joint military exercises threatened China,

and reprimanding a former Japanese foreign minister at a conference in Singapore.26

, for instance,

intervened in a cross-Strait conflict and attacked China with conventional weapons,

China should respond by
the United States

being willing to sacrifice every city east of Xian.27 Implicitly but clearly, Zhu was suggesting

a Chinese nuclear strike on

, moreover a first strike. The MFA explained Zhus comments as his personal views, and several weeks later it stated that Chinas policy continued to be no first use of nuclear weapons. Regarding General Zhu,

five months later he received one demerit, which meant no promotion for one year.

Two main factors incline the Politburo to be attentive to and

solicitous of PLA views on foreign policy issues. The first factor is the method of
selecting Chinasthat is the CCPsparamount leader There is a group of several
hundred people
who have an effective vote in what
individual will become paramount leader Top leaders of the PLA are among this
selectorate. Ambitious CCP leaders who aspire to the position of highest power, and to
consolidate that power, need to pay close attention to PLA views A second major reason
for the Politburo to heed PLA views on foreign policy is that at some point it might again
become necessary for CCP leaders to call on the PLA to repress a challenge to the
regime
Only with complete military loyalty to the party is the survival of the
regime ensured. Thus, the Politburo must pay close heed to PLA views.
.

, civilian and military leaders at the apex of the organizations that run Chinese society,
.28

. A paramilitary Peoples Armed Police, initially set up in 1982, has been vastly strengthened for use as an internal stability force since 1989. Still, the multiple lessons of the years 19891991 indicate that the military is the ultimate guarantee of

the Communist Partys dictatorship of the proletariat.

That triggers multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict

Perkinson 12
(Jessica, MA International Affairs, American University, frmr Program
Coordinator Center for Asian Studies, American University, The Potential
for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark, pg
online @

http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson_american_0
008N_10238display.pdf?sequence=1 //um-ef)
There are a number of areas of concern among Chinas immediate regional
neighbors and partners, including those on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and
India. Though China currently adheres to a strict foreign policy regime based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence151 and has been able to significantly advance
their own interests internationally using this method, the potentially destabilizing effect that forced political reform
could have on the country may derail their relations and security with their neighbors.
Chief among these regional concerns are North Koreas dependence on Chinas exports,
South Koreas dependence on Chinas North Korea deterrence and trade, the security
and stability of the Taiwan Strait, Japans reliance on Chinese trade and message consistency regarding territorial disputes, and stability
of the Sino-Indian border area. First, the stability of the Korean Peninsula rests in large part
Regional Security

on the stability of Chinas political system . Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the continued stability of the CCP for
their own security. As is generally well-known in the international community, North Korea relies in large part on China
superseding international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs
such as food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North Korea over two decades ago in
response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted
the support and participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked property and interests in property, banned
transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean
regime to change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating effect on the North Korean people, including
depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition, due to a succession of floods and droughts and
the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to up to one million excess deaths since the
1990s.155 In order to maintain stability on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, China continues to export both luxury goods and basic
commodities into North Korea. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Koreas international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions
have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Koreas international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of
North Koreas $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition,

China has been a facilitator of

the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum for handling tensions on
the Korean Peninsula. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the
first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157 During the talks, China served as a moderator between the US and North Korea
during tense times of debate, also insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks, such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though

China still makes consistent efforts to bring North

Korea back to the diplomatic negotiations over their nuclear regime.159 South Koreas
dependence on Chinas continued stability is twofold. Not only does South Korea rely on
Chinas continued deterrence of North Korean aggression both through diplomacy and
satisfaction of their trade needs, but they also rely on China as a trade partner . For example, on
the talks have remained in an on-and-off pattern over the last decade,

November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the Souths Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating tension on the

China focused their energy on deterring an

armed response by the South Koreans, which could have potentially led to protracted
civil war between the two countries. Though the international community has expressed
deep disagreement with Chinas soft-line approach toward North Korea, it appears their
understanding, big-brother style of handling North Korean aggression toward South
Korea has at least prevented a violent, protracted conflict, though not necessarily further North Korean acts of
Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response,

aggression.161 Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration and
dependence on Chinese trade. For example, in 2010, South Korea was Chinas fourth-largest trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In
other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity, but also for the survival of their people and territorial security.

Should the Chinese government undergo a period of reform and instability great enough
to interrupt these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, the international system may be
faced with a serious nuclear and conventional military conflict between North and South Korea . A
second region that relies heavily on the continued stability of Chinas government is the island of Taiwan. Because China and Taiwan have a long history of conflict over the
status of Taiwans sovereignty, maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to be an issue of critical interest to the international community as a whole. For example, in
1995, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in response to what may seem like a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave
threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the
visit alone sparked some controversy between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the
Taiwan Strait. In his address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China on multiple occasions, and made references to nation and country.163 These events led the
Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired missiles off the coast of
Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community including the US into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this was to deter the US from developing closer

ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very
moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has been very careful not to make any inflammatory statements that could set off conflict on the Strait However, a period
of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take
advantage of the CCP and PLAs distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwans most
recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous
about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a

A third region that has a deep interest in Chinas political stability

is their neighbor Japan. Not only is Japan deeply integrated economically into the
Chinese trade system, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes with the
country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1%
protracted conflict between the two regions.

increase)167, a clear indicator that China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, Japan and China continue to disagree over the
status of some hotly contested territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do both countries have a territorial claim to the islands, but the area contains vast
amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains
up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the worlds second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise 14% by

Tension in the region has been rising as China

has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the
islands, at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though
tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to Chinas stance and actions. However, should the CCP
undergo a period of instability and reform, and if their message or actions were to
change regarding the status of these islands, it could cause a significant conflict over
these territories between China and Japan, and could severely destabilize an already
2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169

weakened Japanese economy. Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, the destabilization of the
East China Sea region could draw the countries regional neighbors and international
partners into a protracted conflict between the two nations. A fourth region that would
be negatively affected by political destabilization in China is their southern neighbor, India. Though
China and India are becoming increasingly reliant on one another economically, they still
suffer from a number of serious areas of conflict, including a hotly contested border area
and Indias support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the
Himalayas that had previously been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from

the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and Chinas
the inconsistency of Chinas
message during a time of political destabilization or reform could lead the Indian military
to either panic from the unpredictability of Chinas potential actions or move to take the
Arunachal Pradesh region by force. Not only could political instability in China cause a
border conflict between India and China, but it could also cause an influx of Tibetans into
the country, as Indias government is sympathetic to the Tibetan plight. Though China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force
the region171,

enduring theme of territorial integrity. Similar to the destabilization of the two regions mentioned above,

working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from
around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this

should the CCP undergo a

period of significant political reform, this could encourage Tibetans to either take
advantage of the CCPs distraction to seek independence by force, or could cause
massive immigrant flows across the Sino-Indian border. Both China and India already have a regional example of
destabilization due to immigrant flows, as China already suffers from this issue on its border with North Korea. In addition, any political stability
area in an attempt to prevent flows of Tibetans out of Tibet and into India to reach the Dalai Lama.173 However,

within the CCP would spell disaster for the Indian economy , which is becoming
increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. Partially as a counterweight to the two nations conflict, India and
China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades . Though
this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant
on Chinas continued stability for its economic prosperity . For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had
bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics
that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that Indias economy is deeply intertwined with Chinas. The consistency of Chinas message on the contested
border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two nations. However,

China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable

if

messages and actions from China on these disagreements could change, and cause
aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India economy in the process.
Outside of Chinas immediate vicinity, there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability in China. Due to intense and
growing economic and military integration between China, the East Asian region and the
world, these other countries have a significant reliance on the continued stability of the
CCP. Chief among these global concerns are Chinas growing integration with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into
developing countries, primarily on the African continent.

Amanda anderson the way we argue

2AC U.S. Retal

And, Trade retaliation on Boeing has significant impact on sales and will
escalate results in U.S. retaliation
Global Times 10
(Aerospace sector fears sanctions, pg online @
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/502758.shtml //um-ef)
Boeing said Monday it had not been notified of any sanctions imposed by China in
retaliation for a major US arms sale to Taiwan, AFP reported. Beijing on Saturday canceled military exchanges with Washington, announcing that
Aerospace giant

China would implement sanctions on US companies involved in the sale. Through its McDonnell Douglas unit, Boeing is one of the companies. "We have yet to receive any notice" related to possible sanctions,
Boeing China spokesman Wang Yukui told the Global Times, adding that any arm sales by the company in the military defense field is decided by the US government.

biggest international market. Until June 2009, among a total of

1,383

China is Boeing's

China's civil aircraft , 736 (53 percent) are

Boeing aircraft. Aerospace executives reacted with concern Sunday to a Chinese threat to
impose sanctions on US firms.

According to the Financial Times, Giovanni Bisignani, director-general of the International Air Transport Association, called for fresh talks

At a moment in which the world is in crisis (and) China is

playing a very important role in overcoming and pushing for recovery it would be a very,
very difficult and unhappy situation" for sanctions to be imposed, he said. But US Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
between Beijing and Washington to avert a crisis over the arms package. "

Asia-Pacific region Wallace Gregson said yesterday in Tokyo that the US remained committed to helping Taiwan arm itself. "The US is ... obligated to ensure Taiwan's self-defense capability, and the United States
fully intends to meet every one of our obligations there, and we will continue to do so into the future," he said. The Pentagon on Friday approved the $6.4 billion sale of Patriot missiles, Black Hawk helicopters,
mine-hunting ships and other weaponry supplied by Boeing, United Technologies, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to Taiwan. Ye Hailin, a researcher with the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese

From now on, US arms sales

to Taiwan have to pay the costs, but this cost will keep rising. As long as China continues to do so firmly, I believe that, in the
Academy of Social Sciences, said that since it is the first time Beijing has vowed sanctions on US companies, "it will not just pay lip service." "

end, as the cost gets higher, the US will back off," Jin Canrong, a professor in the Inter-national Relations Department at the People's University of China, told the Global Times. Song Xiaojun, chief editor of
Chinese military magazine Naval and Merchant Ship, questioned whether the sanctions would be enough to make the US act otherwise. "Both parties in the US are now focused on midterm elections scheduled
for November. The major arms companies are increasing their political contributions for fiscal year 2010. Both Lockheed Martin and Boeing have more than $1 million in donations, and more than 50 percent of it
will go to the Democratic Party. The sales to Taiwan bring big benefits to arms companies. So unless their business in China earns them more than the arms sales, the sanction is only symbolic," he said. News
analyst Zhang Shaowei warned that

China should be aware that the US may hit back by increasing tariffs for

Chinese products , giving China a hard time on intellectual properties, network security
and fair competition issues, as well as limiting the cooperation between American and
Chinese companies .

2AC Trade Add-on

And, the issue is escalating despite claims that China wont retaliate
failure to resolve the issues increases the risk of retaliation and stokes
Nationalism
Feng 12
(Zhu Feng is a professor in the School of International Studies and the deputy director of the
Center for International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University, What the U.S. Needs to
Realize About Chinas Nationalism, pg online @
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/23/should-the-us-continue-selling-arms-totaiwan/what-the-us-needs-to-realize-about-chinas-nationalism //um-ef)

The United States and China have been wrestling over the issue of arms sales to Taiwan since
the 1980s. But the friction has been growing in recent years, with Beijing raising its voice
and sounding less tolerant. For example, when the Obama administration announced its first arms sale package to Taiwan in January of 2010, China
threatened to put sanctions on American companies involved with exporting weapons to Taiwan and quickly suspended military exchanges.
When the Obama administration informed Congress this week that it plans to sell Taiwan $5.8 billion worth of arms, China reacted similarly in strong terms. Despite fierce
opposition from Beijing, most American analysts regard this as a hollow bell ringing
Beijing is more likely to put its opposition in rhetoric rather than in substance. Some of these analysts believe that the White House
does not need to take China's opposition more seriously. As a result, they're likely to
overlook the negative consequences of Chinas opposition.

China understands why the U.S. wants to keep the status quo. The

arms sales have long helped the U.S. maintain influence in the Taiwan Strait, allowing it to keep a delicate military balance between the mainland and Taiwan. And it reflects well on the U.S. commitment to a
peaceful solution on the Taiwan issue. However,

there is no other foreign relations issue that inflames Beijing -- and

ordinary Chinese -- more than the arms sales issue . The U.S. cannot ignore the strong
Chinese nationalistic sentiments over Taiwan . China has always considered Taiwan as an inseparable part of itself. There is no need to go through
further legal routes to vindicate Chinas sovereign claim over the island. But under America's one-China" policy, the fate of Taiwan
remains undecided," thereby validating these arms sales. This policy was initiated in 1979 but has not changed for 32 years.
During this period, China has changed tremendously and has become the most important business partner to the U.S. In the coming decades, the U.S.-China relations will only become more important.

Without any new policy framework to recalibrate these arms sales, mainland Chinese will
continue to be wary of the U.S. Understandably, this issue cannot be solved quickly.
Washington and Beijing must work together to find ways to tackle the challenges.

Trade War Impact

Uniq: Yes sanctions

Continued arm sales from the US to Taiwan are prompting Chinese
sanctions on US companies
Forsythe 15, New York Times Asia analyst, (Michael, 12/17/16, China Protests Sale of U.S.
Arms to Taiwan, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/asia/taiwan-arms-sales-uschina.html?_r=0)//kap
HONG KONG The Obama

administrations announcement that it would sell $1.83 billion

worth of arms to Taiwan, including two warships and antitank missiles, has drawn a swift rebuke
from China, which threatened to penalize the companies that made the armaments and summoned a United States diplomat to
register an official protest. Assistant Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang told the American diplomat, Kaye A. Lee, in the meeting
Wednesday night that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinas territory and that Beijing strongly opposed the sale, according to a

China has decided to

take necessary measures, including imposing sanctions against companies involved in
the arms sale, Mr. Zheng said at the meeting, according to the statement. The United States is required to
provide weapons for Taiwans defense under a law dating to 1979, when Washington was shifting diplomatic
recognition to Beijing and away from Taipei. In many ways, Chinas reaction to the latest arms sale followed
a familiar pattern. The last American arms sale to Taiwan, four years ago and bigger than the sale just
announced, also resulted in a United States diplomat being summoned at night also on a Wednesday to the
Foreign Ministry in Beijing to receive stern rebukes, as the Chinese view arms sale to Taiwan as
an affront to their sovereignty. Taiwan has been governed separately from the mainland since 1949, when the
statement posted Thursday on the Foreign Ministrys website. To safeguard our national interests,

American-supported Nationalist forces retreated to the island after being defeated in the Chinese civil war by the Communists. Evan
S. Medeiros, who until this year was the top official overseeing Asia at the National Security Council, said that the explicit threat of
sanctions against companies differed from earlier sales, when the threat was more implicit. At the same time, Mr. Medeiros noted,
earlier arms sales resulted in the suspension of meetings between the two militaries, which was not part of Chinas initial response
to the sale this time. Mr. Medeiros, who now leads the Asia practice for the Eurasia Group in Washington, said that the timing of the
sale, coming before next months presidential elections in Taiwan, helped to reduce the diplomatic fallout. Government officials from
both China and Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, issued statements on Tuesday about a United States arms delivery to
the island. Taiwans president, Ma Ying-jeou, has sought to improve ties with mainland China and met last month in Singapore with
President Xi Jinping of China, the first time the leaders of Taiwan and China had ever held a summit meeting. But Mr. Mas party, the
Kuomintang, is expected to lose the presidency to the Democratic Progressive Party, which favors a more distant relationship with
the mainland and the assertion of Taiwans own identity. The timing clearly was calibrated to avoid having to do it after the election,
Mr. Medeiros said, speaking in a telephone interview from Taiwan, where he was meeting officials. That would have been
particularly provocative. The sale is significantly smaller than the $5.8 billion package approved by the United States in 2011, and it
is not expected to alter the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, which has tilted in Beijings favor after years of large increases
in military spending by the mainland, whose annual military budget is now more than 13 times greater than Taiwans. Absent from
the arms package is any assistance from the United States to help build diesel-electric submarines, a top priority for Taiwan, which
wants to replace its aging fleet. The proposed sale includes two Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, ships first commissioned by the
United States Navy in the 1970s; data link systems; surface-to-air missiles; antitank missiles; amphibious assault vehicles; and
shipborne rapid-fire guns intended to counter missiles. Any

sanctions against military contractors would

most likely be limited because American weapons makers have been banned for more
than a quarter-century from selling arms to mainland China. The United States and the European Union
imposed arms embargoes on China after the deadly crackdown on student protests and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing in
1989. Still,

some military contractors, such as Boeing and United Technologies, have

extensive nonmilitary businesses in China. The companies that manufacture the weapons
systems the United States government announced on Wednesday include Raytheon, which makes antitank
missiles, a shipborne close-in weapons system and the shoulder-launched Stinger antiaircraft missile. Lockheed Martin
makes the Javelin antitank missile with Raytheon, which was also part of the proposed sale. The Chinese can react to this as they
see fit, John Kirby, a spokesman for the State Department, told reporters in Washington on Wednesday. This is nothing new.
Again, its a cleareyed,

sober view of an assessment of Taiwans defense needs. And thats

what drove this. Theres no need for it to have any derogatory effect on our relationship
with China, just like there was no need in the past for it to ever have that effect on
China. The weapons sale to Taiwan is subject to congressional approval. Members of both the Republican and Democratic
parties have expressed support for the sale.

US arm sales to Taiwan usher in new era of sanctions on US arms

manufacturing companies
Fan 15, (Yang, 12/18/15, Beijing's Reaction to Taiwan Arms Sale Could Herald New Era of
Sanctions: Analysts, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/reaction-12182015105736.html)//kap
The United States' announcement Wednesday that it will sell U.S.$1.83 billion of arms

to Taiwan has prompted an

immediate protest and threat of sanctions from Beijing, which sees the island as a breakaway province
awaiting reunification. Washington has said the deal, the first in more than four years, is based solely on Taiwans defense needs.
Taiwan has been governed separately from mainland China throughout the Japanese occupation (1895-1945) and since the KMT
nationalist regime fled to the island in 1949. Many of the democratic island's 23 million residents identify as Taiwanese rather than
Chinese, and there is broad political support for de facto self-rule, as well as concern over Beijing's ongoing threat to use military
force, should Taiwan seek formal statehood. If the

sale goes through, Beijing officials say they will

retaliate with economic sanctions following a formal diplomatic protest. "China
resolutely opposes the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the U.S.," vice foreign minister Zheng Zeguang
was quoted as saying in a meeting with a U.S. diplomat in Beijing. "In order to safeguard the nations interests,
the Chinese side has decided to take necessary measures, including the imposition of sanctions against
companies participating in the arms sale to Taiwan," Zheng said in comments quoted on his ministry's official website. The proposed
arms deal includes two decommissioned U.S. Navy frigates, anti-tank missiles, amphibious assault vehicles, and Stinger surface-toair missiles, according to the Associated Press. Also included are equipment to support intelligence collection, surveillance, and
reconnaissance and a weapons system to defend against anti-ship missiles, it said. A

chilling effect While the threat

of sanctions may do little to deter the U.S. and EU defense industries, which are both barred from
selling to China, it could herald a new era of assertive sanctions from Beijing with
repercussions for many of its economic partners in the Asia Pacific region , analysts said.
"Everyone knows that the main beneficiaries of this sale, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, don't do much business with mainland
China, so for the Chinese government to instigate sanctions against them isn't going to affect their bottom line much," Taiwan

if they expand such a policy in future, it

will probably have a chilling effect ... on other countries who might want to sell weapons
or security equipment to Taiwan," Zheng said. "For example, would Japan transfer technology or sell submarines to
military affairs commentator Zheng Shaoru told RFA. "But I think that

Taiwan, which has been in the market for them for several years now?" he asked, adding that many Japanese manufacturers of
military and security equipment are private concerns that lack state backing. "Doing

so is bound to incur
considerable economic losses for them, especially given the depth and breadth of
economic ties between China and Japan," he said. Just getting started Wu Fei, a senior researcher at the
Charhar Institute diplomatic think-tank, said that the threat of sanctions heralds a new era of assertive foreign policy, and that its
impact will be felt most keenly by China's neighbors. "What we are seeing now is the first phase in a geopolitical game between
China and the United States," Wu said. "The question of cross-straits relations has always been a core issue for Beijing, and the
United States has continued to challenge China on its core policies," he said. "Actually, China

has long used its

regional muscle and power to impose sanctions on the sale of arms to Taiwan [within the
region]." He said Beijing could also use economic sanctions to advance its claims in disputed maritime territories in the South and
East China Seas. "I think they have only just got started with their sanctions," Wu said.

Arm sales ensure sanctions against US arms manufacturers

Garcia 15, (12/16/15, China threatens sanctions after US arm sales to Taiwan,
http://theweek.com/speedreads/594811/china-threatens-sanctions-after-arms-sale-taiwan)//kap
In protest of the Obama administration authorizing a $1.83 billion weapons sale to Taiwan
on Wednesday, China summoned Deputy Mission Chief Kaye Lee of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and threatened sanctions
against companies involved in the sale. "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory,"
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang said in a statement, adding that the deal is a "serious violation of
international laws, as well as China's territory and security interest." Zheng said China decided to take
" necessary measures, including imposing sanctions, against the companies involved in
the arms sal e." The U.S. State Department said Raytheon and Lockheed Martin were the main contractors for weapons in the sale, Reuters
reports. David McKeeby, a spokesman for the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, said the package includes amphibious assault
vehicles and anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems. "Our longstanding policy on arms sales to Taiwan has been consistent across six different U.S.
administrations," he said. "We

believe our consistent policy has contributed to the security of

Taiwan, and has also supported the maintenance of peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait."

China is retaliating on the US for arm sales to Taiwan suspends US-China

military exchanges, imposes sanctions on US companies, and collapses
the positive trend of the overall bilateral relationship
Nasaw and Batty 10, (1/30/10, China retaliates over US arms sales to Taiwan,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/30/china-sanctions-taiwan-arms-sales)//kap
The

Chinese government has announced retaliatory measures over a planned sale of

advanced US weaponry to Taiwan . China's defence ministry said it would suspend

military exchanges with the US , impose sanctions on companies selling arms to Taiwan
and review wider co-operation on international issues . The confrontation over the $6.3bn
(4bn) arms

sale to Taiwan a self-governing island that Beijing considers part of its sovereign territory threatens

to strain a relationship already troubled by disputes about internet censorship and trade.
The planned arms sales, announced by the US military yesterday, could hinder Washington's efforts to
win Chinese support for sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme and exacerbate
disputes over the standoff between Beijing and internet giant Google over censorship. Specially crafted for Windows 10, this app
gives you full access to the Guardian's award-winning content. With automatic caching, you can keep reading even when youre
offline. The state-run Xinhua news agency cited the defence ministry as saying the suspension was due to the "severe harm" of the
arms sales on relations between the US and China. Included in the proposed arms deal are two Osprey mine-hunting ships, 60
Black Hawk helicopters, missiles, machine guns and ammunition, night vision gear, radar equipment and information technology.
"This is definitely going

to cause considerable tension in the relationship ," a US official who has served
in China told the Guardian. The official added that relations between the US, China and Taiwan had improved in
the past two years under Taiwan's president, Ma Ying-jeou. Officially the US downplayed the threat to the
bilateral relationship, claiming that the sale would not alter the balance in the region. The sale indicates that Barack Obama will
continue the US policy of maintaining the diplomatic status quo between China and
Taiwan, while providing the island with weapons to deter Chinese military action. In 2008, for
example, the Pentagon announced the sale of $6.4bn in aircraft and missiles. "We have worked through these issues before," a
state department official said. "We will work through them again. "This is a clear demonstration of the commitment that this
administration has to provide Taiwan the defensive weapons it needs. We think this action contributes to maintaining security and
stability across the Taiwan Strait." The announcement comes in an unusually tense period between China and the US, which
maintain close economic links. Last week the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, called on Beijing to investigate claims by Google of

a co-ordinated attack on the email accounts of rights activists that originated in China. She likened Chinese online censorship to the
rise of communist Europe, warning that an "information curtain" threatened to descend on the world unless action to protect internet
freedom was taken. Beijing called the charges baseless and said Clinton's remarks hurt the relationship between the two countries.
With the miserable state of the US economy contributing to tension with China, America's largest creditor nation, the US public and
members of Congress are becoming restless for action on China's rights record. China and Taiwan have had an uneasy relationship
since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Taiwan

maintains significant defence

capabilities, in large part due to decades of arms purchases from the US. Its primary
military mission remains defence against aggression from China, which has not renounced the use
of force against to the island. The US recognises Beijing as the sole legal government but
maintains significant unofficial links with Taipei. The US does not support Taiwanese independence and
opposes unilateral action by either side to alter the status quo. Taiwan maintains an economic and cultural representative in
Washington.

Internals: Arms Sales = Nationalism

Arms sales do nothing and only serve to fuel Chinese Nationalism
Hallinan 11- Colin, staff writer, U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Accomplishes Little More Than
Pushing Chinas Buttons,
(http://fpif.org/us_arms_sales_to_taiwan_accomplishes_little_more_than_push_chinas_buttons/
) JB
decision by the Obama Administration to sell $5.8 billion in arms to Taiwan is a bit
of a head scratcher, rather like the hunter who goes into the woods with one bullet. Seeing a deer to his left and a turkey to his right, he shoots in the middle.
It will annoy Taipei, irritate Beijing, stir up the China bashers in the U.S., and increase
tensions in a region of the world that is already pretty tense. So whats the point here? The plan
The recent

would upgrade Taiwans 140 U.S.-made F-16 A/B jet fighters, plus supply Taipei with Blackhawk helicopters and anti-ballistic missiles. The Obama administration has more than
doubled the Bush administrations arms sales to Taiwan, and this sale would bring that figure to slightly more than $12 billion. Taipei had asked to buy 66 new F-16 C/Ds, but the
White House turned that down, annoying the Taiwanese. These years, China is showing stronger and stronger reaction to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales, complained Taipeis deputy
defense minister Andrew Yang, and that has turned Americans more wary with arms sales. While PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing firmly opposes the
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Chinas reaction was generally low key, certainly more so than when a similar arms sales went through in 2008. Then Beijing canceled joint military
consultation with the U.S. and put capital-to-capital relations into a deep freeze for many months. After a similar arms sale in 2010, Chinese military leaders went as far as to
suggest that China cash in some of Americans $1.1 trillion debt to Beijing. While the White House cant get bi-partisan agreement on the budget, it brought Republicans and
Democrats together on this issue. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tx) have joined hands to introduce legislation demanding that the administration sell
the new F-16s to Taiwan. The Taiwan Air Modernization Act cites the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for providing defensive weapons to Taipei and resisting any effort by
the PRC to forcibly reunite Taiwan with the mainland. Cornyn thundered that the decision to upgrade rather than sell was capitulation to Communist China and a slap in the
face to a strong ally and a long-time friend. In language straight out of the Cold War, a Cornyn-Menendez letter to Obamasigned by 13 Democrats and 23 Republicans
warned that a failure to sell the new fighter aircraft means Taiwan will be dangerously exposed to Chinese military threats, aggression and provocation, which pose significant
security implications for the United States. A similar letter, signed by 181 House members, also demanded that Washington approve the sales of new F-16s. Tucked in amidst
the red dragon scare rhetoric is pork: We are deeply concerned that further delay of the decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan could result in closure of the F-16 production line, the
letter argues. Lockheed Martin, maker of the aircraft, has a plant in Cornyns Texas, and the company employs 750 workers in Menendezs New Jersey. The company is the
largest arms manufacturer in the world and has a formidable lobbying presence in Washington. In many ways the whole matter seems mired in the past, particularly the letters
warning that Taiwan risked losing its qualitative advantage in defensive arms. Taipei has not had aqualitative advantage over the PRC in any category for the past two
decades. Even the Taipei Times writes that Taiwan would have at most only a few days to hold off China and get help from the outside, most likely the U.S., if they were going
to stand any chance. According to the Pentagon, the PRCs fighter aircraft fleet outnumbers Taiwans 1,680 to 388, and many of the latters planes are obsolete. Besides the
140 F-16 A/Bs, Taipeis forces include 1960s vintage F-5s (its day is long past), 60 aging French Mirage 2000s (vintage 1982), and 130 domestically produced, but
underpowered, Indigenous Defensive Fighter, the Ching-Kuo. The PRCs fleet features Sukhoi-27 and Sukhoi-30the latter a match for the U.S.s premier fighter, the F-15
and Chinas domestic fighter, the J-10. A J-20 stealth fighter is in the testing phase but will not be deployed until 2017. Upgrading the F-16s, or even selling Taiwan new ones,
will not alter this balance. The PRC maintains that Taiwan is part of China (and virtually no country in the world, including the U.S., disagrees) and reserves the right to use

China has carefully

lowered nationalist rhetoric around Taiwan and cross-straits ties are warmer than they
were three years ago. Current Chinese President Hu Jintao has pushed rapprochement with Taipei, but as the Financial Times points out, his
approach to Taiwan is not uncontested within the Chinese Communist Party, and it
notes that the Party is also preparing to elect a new generation of leaders next year. That
new generation tends to be more nationalistic than the older generation. The PRCs armed forces mirror currents in the
military force if Taipei tries to establish independence. But reserves the right is very different than ramping up the landing craft. Indeed,

Communist Party, with a wing that advocates a more assertive roleat least in local waters like the Taiwan Straits and South China Seaand a more cautious wing that wants
to avoid a confrontation with the U.S. Similar currents exist within the U.S. military establishment, although the Pentagons caution wing has recently gone silent because of all

Much of the recent China threat talk is aimed at derailing efforts to

cut the huge military budget, and, to that end, generals and admirals have closed ranks behind the dragon is coming, the dragon is coming gang.
the talk about cutting military spending.

One suspects the American hawks have counterparts among the Chinese chiefs of staff. The arms deal will make Presidents Hus job more difficult, although he will probably
portray the F-16 upgrade as a compromise. Of course, all bets are off if Congress throws a monkey wrench into the deal and insists on new aircraft that wont change the
military balance, but will worsen an already charged diplomatic atmosphere. The White House is nervous about January elections in Taiwan, which will pit the nationalist
Kuomintang Party against the more independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPPs leader, Tsai Ing-Wen, apparently had a recent falling out with
Obama administration officials over the independence issue. One U.S. official told the Financial Times, that while she [Tsai] understood the need to avoid gratuitous
provocations of China, it was far from clearthat she and her advisors fully appreciate the depth of [Chinese] mistrust of her motives and DPP aspirations. DPP leader Chen
Shui-bian, Taiwans president from 2000 to 2008 pushed for formal independence and cut off formal negotiations with Beijing during his administration. If this all seems like a
terrible muddle, thats because it is. On one hand Washington insists on a robust military presence on Chinas doorstep, and continues to supply arms to Taiwan. These are not
minor matters. If there is a confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC, and it pulls in the Americans, it will pit two nuclear powers against one another. The growth of the
Chinese navyBeijing got its first aircraft carrier this year, albeit one half the size of a U.S. flat topis being portrayed in Washington as a threat to U.S. naval power in the
Pacific and Indian oceans. But the PRCs buildup is about protecting its oil and gas supplies80 percent travel by seaand recent history. The PRC is still smarting over having
to back down when the U.S. sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Straits in 1995 during a particularly tense standoff between Taipei and Beijing. The increase in
Chinas military spending dates from that confrontation, although Beijings budget is still only about one eighth of what the Americans spend. On the other hand, the White
House is leaning on the DPP not to push independence and watering down the arms package to Taipei. Bi-polar diplomacy anyone? It is clear that Washington and Beijing are
of two minds about their relationship. Both are riding conflicting internal political currents, and over the next decade, threading a path between cooperation and competition
promises to be tricky.

Arms sales accomplish little more than pushing Chinas nationalist button.

The

jobs they create in the U.S. are marginal (and the same amount spent on civilian projects produce more employment), and the
tensions they create are real.

Internals: China retaliates with Sanctions

China has gone through a change in position regarding arms sales- makes
retaliation with sanctions very likely
Harrell 16- Peter, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former
deputy assistant secretary of state for counter-threat finance and sanctions, China threatens
sanctions against U.S. companies: Is this the future?, (http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2016/01/26/china-threatens-sanctions-against-u-s-companies-is-this-the-future/) JB
Chinas recent threat to impose sanctions on U.S. defense companies that sell arms to
Taiwan should come as no surprise to American officials or corporate executives: Washington has been
issuing sanctions of these sorts for years. It was only a matter of time before U.S.
competitors started copying its tactics. Regardless of whether China follows through on
its threat, Washington needs to be ready for a new normal in which the United States
must defend against sanctions as well as impose them. China is taking a page from the
sanctions playbook Washington developed against Iran. Between 2010 and 2015, the United States
effectively gave companies a choice: If they did prohibited business with Iran, like buying oil, they would get cut off from doing any
business in the United States. Forced to choose between access to the worlds most important financial system and an Iranian
market less than 1/30th the size, most companies stuck with Washington and avoided Tehran. Chinas

threat mirrors
this approach trying to force U.S. companies to choose between defense sales to
Taiwan and access to a Chinese economy that is nearly 20 times larger. While U.S. companies do
not currently sell military equipment to China, many U.S. defense contractors do sell civilian passenger aircraft, aviation parts and
other civilian equipment in China and could find their ability to continue those sales cut off by Beijing.

For Beijing, this is a

change in official position. China has long argued that only sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council
are legitimate. Yet, Beijing has not strictly adhered to this policy. In 2012, for example, it unilaterally limited imports of fruit and
vegetables from the Philippines in retaliation for a dispute over claims in the South China Sea. But

Chinas public threat

over Taiwan marks a major escalation in its apparent willingness to deploy sanctions of
its own against U.S. companies engaging in business, particularly business that is expressly authorized
by the Obama administration and publicly supported by many in Congress. Chinese policymakers understand
that their growing economic and financial clout makes sanctions threats more credible.
China is a critical market for U.S. products from cars to computer chips, and companies like Wal-Mart, Apple, MasterCard and
Starbucks are among the leading American firms that generate at least 10 percent of their business in China, according to data
compiled last year by Factset Research.

China will put sanctions in place in response to arms sales

RFA 2015- RFA, Beijing's Reaction to Taiwan Arms Sale Could Herald New Era of Sanctions:
Analysts, (http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/reaction-12182015105736.html) JB
The United

States' announcement Wednesday that it will sell U.S.$1.83 billion of arms to

Taiwan has prompted an immediate protest and threat of sanctions from Beijing, which sees
the island as a breakaway province awaiting reunification. Washington has said the deal, the first in more than four years, is based
solely on Taiwans defense needs. Taiwan has been governed separately from mainland China throughout the Japanese occupation
(1895-1945) and since the KMT nationalist regime fled to the island in 1949. Many of the democratic island's 23 million residents
identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, and there is broad political support for de facto self-rule, as well as concern over Beijing's
ongoing threat to use military force, should Taiwan seek formal statehood. If the sale goes through,

Beijing officials say

they will retaliate with economic sanctions following a formal diplomatic protest. "China
resolutely opposes the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the U.S.," vice foreign minister Zheng Zeguang
was quoted as saying in a meeting with a U.S. diplomat in Beijing. "In order to safeguard the nations interests, the Chinese
side has decided to take necessary measures, including the imposition of sanctions
against companies participating in the arms sale to Taiwan," Zheng said in comments quoted on his
ministry's official website. The proposed arms deal includes two decommissioned U.S. Navy frigates, anti-tank missiles, amphibious
assault vehicles, and Stinger surface-to-air missiles, according to the Associated Press. Also included are equipment to support
intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance and a weapons system to defend against anti-ship missiles, it said. A
chilling effect While

the threat of sanctions may do little to deter the U.S. and EU defense
industries, which are both barred from selling to China, it could herald a new era of
assertive sanctions from Beijing with repercussions for many of its economic partners
in the Asia Pacific region, analysts said. "Everyone knows that the main beneficiaries of this sale, Raytheon and
Lockheed Martin, don't do much business with mainland China, so for the Chinese government to instigate sanctions against them
isn't going to affect their bottom line much," Taiwan military affairs commentator Zheng Shaoru told RFA. "But I think that

if they

expand such a policy in future, it will probably have a chilling effect ... on other countries who might
want to sell weapons or security equipment to Taiwan," Zheng said. "For example, would Japan transfer technology or sell
submarines to Taiwan, which has been in the market for them for several years now?" he asked, adding that many Japanese
manufacturers of military and security equipment are private concerns that lack state backing. "Doing so is bound to incur
considerable economic losses for them, especially given the depth and breadth of economic ties between China and Japan," he
said. Just getting started Wu Fei, a senior researcher at the Charhar Institute diplomatic think-tank, said that the threat of sanctions
heralds a new era of assertive foreign policy, and that its impact will be felt most keenly by China's neighbors. " What

we are
seeing now is the first phase in a geopolitical game between China and the United
States," Wu said. "The question of cross-straits relations has always been a core issue for Beijing, and the United States has
continued to challenge China on its core policies," he said. "Actually, China has long used its regional
muscle and power to impose sanctions on the sale of arms to Taiwan [within the region]." He said
Beijing could also use economic sanctions to advance its claims in disputed maritime territories in the South and East China Seas. "I
think they have only just got started with their sanctions," Wu said.

China responds to arms sales with sanctions- empirics

VOA News 15- VOA News, China Threatens Sanctions Over US Arms Sale to Taiwan,
(http://www.voanews.com/content/china-issues-angry-protest-over-us-arms-sale-totaiwan/3106891.html) JB
The Obama

administration's Wednesday announcement that it plans to sell $1.83 billion in

arms to Taiwan has drawn official protest from China, which is threatening arms
manufacturers with sanctions.

China's Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang summoned U.S. Charge d'Affaires

Kaye Lee, the second-highest ranking U.S. diplomat in Beijing. The Chinese

foreign ministry said in a statement that

will "take necessary measures, including the imposition of sanctions
against companies participating in the arms sale to Taiwan." The U.S. State Department formally
Zheng said China

notified Congress Wednesday of its plan to sell two naval warships, anti-tank missiles, amphibious assault vehicles and Stinger
surface-to-air missiles. It's the first arms package sale to Taiwan in four years. China

regards Taiwan as part of its

territory, and has threatened to invade the island if it declares its independence. A spokesman
for China's foreign ministry urged the Obama administration to cancel the sale "and do something
more conducive for China-U.S. relations and the peaceful development of the cross-Strait
relations."

Chinese retaliation to arm sales

AP 15, (12/17/15, China slams US over $1.83B weapons sale to
Taiwan, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/17/china-slams-us-over-183b-weapons-sale-to-taiwan.html)//kap
The Obama administration announced a $1.83 billion arms sale to Taiwan on Wednesday,
drawing an immediate rebuke and threats of retaliation from Taipei's rival Beijing. The arms
package is the first offered by the U.S. to the self-governing island in four y ears. Even before its
announcement, Beijing, which regards Taiwan as part of its territory, demanded it be scrapped to avoid
harming relations across the Taiwan Strait and between China and the U.S . That was followed
formal diplomatic protest late Wednesday, although at a lower level than in previous such instances. "China
resolutely opposes the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the U.S.," Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang
by a

said in a meeting with Washington's second-highest ranking diplomat in Beijing. "In order to safeguard the nation's interests, the

Chinese side has decided to take necessary measures, including the imposition of sanctions against
companies participating in the arms sale to Taiwan," Zheng said, according to a statement posted on the
ministry's website. Such sanctions have been threatened in the past, although there's no evidence they've had any meaningful
effect. American and European Union companies are banned from selling military technology to China, and Chinese companies
have extensive links with major overseas firms that often have weapon-making divisions. A U.S. Embassy spokesman, speaking on
routine condition of anonymity, declined to comment on the meeting, saying, "we don't get into the content of our diplomatic
discussions." The U.S. maintained there's no need for it to hurt the relationship, which has also been strained by China's islandbuilding in the South China Sea and alleged cybertheft. The administration notified Congress that the proposed arms package
includes two decommissioned U.S. Navy frigates, anti-tank missiles, amphibious assault vehicles and Stinger surface-to-air
missiles. There's also support for Taiwan's capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and a weapons system to
defend against anti-ship missiles. Congress has 30 days to review the sale, but it's unlikely to raise objections. There's been
mounting

bipartisan concern that Taiwan is inadequately armed to defend itself against an

increasingly powerful mainland China. U.S. lawmakers welcomed the announcement. There were calls from
both parties for more frequent arms sales to Taiwan. Rep. Eliot Engel, D-NY, the ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, said the sale would contribute to peace and stability across the strait. "I wish we would see them on a regular basis," he
said. The committee's chairman, Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., said the administration had "needlessly dragged out" the approval
process, and that other Taiwanese requests "have still not seen the light of day." Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, said the U.S. should avoid extended periods during which " fear

of upsetting the

U.S.-China relationship may harm Taiwan's defense capabilities." Taiwan's Foreign Ministry cheered
the announcement as a sign of healthy ties between Taipei and Washington and rejected claims it would harm relations with Beijing.
The sale

will "help maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and increase our
confidence as we engage in dialogue and improves relations across the Taiwan Strait," the
ministry said in a statement. "It also highlights the fact that U.S.-Taiwan relations are indeed at their best ever," the statement said.
However, a pro-Taiwan business group in the U.S. lamented the amount of time taken to process the sale and questioned whether it
was adequate in the face of China's rapid military advancements. "While China has deployed new fighters, submarines, and
missiles during the last four years, the U.S. has consistently refused to consider providing Taiwan access to similar platforms, or
even aiding their indigenous development," Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, said in a
statement. The administration has announced more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2010, but none since $5.9 billion
in sales in September 2011 that included upgrades for Taiwan's F-16 fighter jets. That drew a high-level diplomatic protest from
Beijing, which suspended some military exchanges with the United States. It did not seriously impair ties. In the meantime,
President Barack Obama

has sought greater cooperation with China on issues such as climate

change, and the two sides have increased military exchanges to reduce the risk of
conflict. State Department spokesman John Kirby said the U.S. was in contact with both Taiwan and China about the sale,
which he said was consistent with U.S. support for Taiwan's ability to defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act. "There's no need
for it to have any derogatory effect on our relationship with China," Kirby told reporters. "We still want to work to establish a better,
more transparent, more effective relationship with China in the region and we're going to continue to work at that." Relations across
the Taiwan Strait have undergone a steady improvement over the past two decades, especially under the China-friendly
administration of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou.

Recent arms sales sparked serious backlashrisks sanctions, halting

aircraft purchases, denying entry, discourages business collaboration, and
blocking participation in bilateral investment
Wong 2015 (Chun Han, writes about politics, labor and urbanization issues in China from The
Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, China Has Few Options in Protesting U.S. Arms Sales to
Taiwan; Washington's $1.83 billion arms deal with Taiwan this week drew ire from Beijing, Wall
Street Journal, December 17, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-few-options-inprotesting-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan-1450373290, silbs)
Even as China lashes out at Washington over a $1.83 billion arms package for
Taiwan, its options for punishing U.S. companies involved in the sales are limited. This week's
deal, the first arms sales to Taiwan authorized by the Obama administration in four years ,
quickly drew anger from Beijing, which sees such sales as interference in its sovereignty
claims over the self-ruled island. The deal "seriously impairs China's sovereignty and
security," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Thursday. "China's government and enterprises won't
cooperate with or do business with companies" involved in arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing has
often used its economic clout to help defend what it sees as key national interests, whether by imposing punitive measures or offering incentives. It first
threatened sanctions against U.S. companies selling arms to Taiwan nearly six years
ago. But Beijing has limited means for swaying U.S. defense suppliers, which are barred
from military sales to China. "Such threats may work when companies like Boeing are
involved," said J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the University of Nottingham's China Policy Institute. "But Raytheon and other purely defense firms
that under U.S. law cannot operate in, or sell to, China? Much less so, evidently." China could try to apply pressure on U.S.
suppliers by attacking their civilian commercial interests, some analysts say, though this may trigger
BEIJING--

retaliation from the U.S. against Chinese firms--something Beijing can ill afford amid a deepening economic slowdown. Raytheon Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp., the main
contractors involved in the latest arms deal, have commercial interests in China. Lockheed Martin's newly acquired unit Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. sells civilian helicopters in China,
while Raytheon has sold civilian air-traffic control systems and provided consultancy services in the mainland. Neither firm immediately responded to requests to comment.
China has considered Taiwan a renegade province since 1949, when the Nationalists retreated there after their defeat in a civil war. The U.S. established diplomatic relations

U.S. defense companies have sold

more than $500 million in weapons to Taiwan since the last big government-brokered
deal in 2011, which was valued at $5.9 billion. The latest sale comes just a month ahead of
Taiwan elections, in which the opposition Democratic Progressive Party--which attracts
supporters of Taiwanese independence--is tipped to regain the presidency, buoyed by
public resentment over the ruling Nationalist Party's push to forge closer economic ties
with the mainland. Chinese state media acknowledged the significance of the deal's
timing, alleging that the U.S. was seeking to undermine cross-Strait efforts to ease
tensions--including last month's historic dialogue between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, the first such meeting since the Chinese
civil war. "The latest U.S. arms sale will set back the positive momentum as it serves the interests of those seeking
Taiwan's independence," the official Xinhua News Agency said in a Thursday commentary. It also accused Washington of breaking
promises made in a 1982 joint communiqu in which the U.S. pledged to gradually
reduce and eventually halt arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing's latest warnings mirrored those it issued in 2010 after the U.S.
with Beijing in 1979, but also passed a law that year obliging Washington to help Taiwan defend itself.

approved $6.4 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. At the time, China also issued diplomatic protests and suspended some military exchanges with the U.S., though its threats didn't
appear to yield any significant impact. Boeing Co. and United Technologies Corp. were major suppliers on that deal, but neither firm had direct military sales in China--such
sales have been banned by the U.S. since the 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests. Both firms continued to export civilian goods to China, a major

It isn't clear what steps China may take this

time. Under the World Trade Organization's rules, members can cite "essential security
interests" to justify trade restrictions. This could let Beijing quickly halt imports from
U.S. corporations without going through the WTO dispute-settlement process, according
market for Boeing's commercial-airplane arm and United Technologies' elevator division.

to a 2010 paper written by a U.S. Navy official on China's sanction threats. China could
also apply nontrade measures to punish U.S. companies, such as curbing their ability to
participate in bilateral investment, denying their executives entry into the mainland or discouraging
Chinese firms from doing business with them, said Cui Fan, an international trade expert at the University of International Business
and Economics in Beijing. Chinese authorities can also block U.S. contractors from government
tenders, given that Beijing isn't a signatory to the WTO side agreement on government procurement, Mr. Cui said. Another option is to halt
purchases of civilian aircraft from U.S. firms, a move that would hurt the likes of Boeing. In 2010, Chinese
state media said Beijing could do so because it wasn't a signatory to an international trade pact
that curbs import duties on planes and aircraft components, except for those bought for
military use. But such a move would also hurt China's aviation sector, which remains highly reliant on imported technology. U.S. manufacturers provide key
components for Chinese-made commercial aircraft--including electronic systems and engines--and Beijing isn't likely to punish these suppliers, said Zhou Jisheng, a retired

Beijing's interests could still be served

whether or not its threats lead to economic loss for its targets, some analysts say. From China's perspective, such
aerospace engineer who helped design China's first passenger jet, the ARJ21 regional aircraft. Yet

warnings have had a deterrent effect on the U.S., discouraging them from selling big-ticket weapons--such as advanced fighter jets and modern submarines--to Taiwan, said
Steve Tsang, an expert on Chinese politics at the University of Nottingham. "The Chinese know that they can't prevent the U.S. from selling arms to Taiwan," Mr. Tsang said.
"What they want to do is to limit those sales and keep them to a minimum."

Continued arm sales from the US to Taiwan are prompting Chinese

sanctions on US companies
Forsythe 15, New York Times Asia analyst, (Michael, 12/17/16, China Protests Sale of U.S.
Arms to Taiwan, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/asia/taiwan-arms-sales-uschina.html?_r=0)//kap
HONG KONG The Obama

administrations announcement that it would sell $1.83 billion

worth of arms to Taiwan, including two warships and antitank missiles, has drawn a swift rebuke
from China, which threatened to penalize the companies that made the armaments and summoned a United States diplomat to
register an official protest. Assistant Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang told the American diplomat, Kaye A. Lee, in the meeting
Wednesday night that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinas territory and that Beijing strongly opposed the sale, according to a

China has decided to

take necessary measures, including imposing sanctions against companies involved in
the arms sale, Mr. Zheng said at the meeting, according to the statement. The United States is required to
provide weapons for Taiwans defense under a law dating to 1979, when Washington was shifting diplomatic
recognition to Beijing and away from Taipei. In many ways, Chinas reaction to the latest arms sale followed
a familiar pattern. The last American arms sale to Taiwan, four years ago and bigger than the sale just
announced, also resulted in a United States diplomat being summoned at night also on a Wednesday to the
Foreign Ministry in Beijing to receive stern rebukes, as the Chinese view arms sale to Taiwan as
an affront to their sovereignty. Taiwan has been governed separately from the mainland since 1949, when the
statement posted Thursday on the Foreign Ministrys website. To safeguard our national interests,

American-supported Nationalist forces retreated to the island after being defeated in the Chinese civil war by the Communists. Evan
S. Medeiros, who until this year was the top official overseeing Asia at the National Security Council, said that the explicit threat of
sanctions against companies differed from earlier sales, when the threat was more implicit. At the same time, Mr. Medeiros noted,
earlier arms sales resulted in the suspension of meetings between the two militaries, which was not part of Chinas initial response
to the sale this time. Mr. Medeiros, who now leads the Asia practice for the Eurasia Group in Washington, said that the timing of the
sale, coming before next months presidential elections in Taiwan, helped to reduce the diplomatic fallout. Government officials from
both China and Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, issued statements on Tuesday about a United States arms delivery to
the island. Taiwans president, Ma Ying-jeou, has sought to improve ties with mainland China and met last month in Singapore with
President Xi Jinping of China, the first time the leaders of Taiwan and China had ever held a summit meeting. But Mr. Mas party, the
Kuomintang, is expected to lose the presidency to the Democratic Progressive Party, which favors a more distant relationship with
the mainland and the assertion of Taiwans own identity. The timing clearly was calibrated to avoid having to do it after the election,
Mr. Medeiros said, speaking in a telephone interview from Taiwan, where he was meeting officials. That would have been
particularly provocative. The sale is significantly smaller than the $5.8 billion package approved by the United States in 2011, and it
is not expected to alter the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, which has tilted in Beijings favor after years of large increases

in military spending by the mainland, whose annual military budget is now more than 13 times greater than Taiwans. Absent from
the arms package is any assistance from the United States to help build diesel-electric submarines, a top priority for Taiwan, which
wants to replace its aging fleet. The proposed sale includes two Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, ships first commissioned by the
United States Navy in the 1970s; data link systems; surface-to-air missiles; antitank missiles; amphibious assault vehicles; and
shipborne rapid-fire guns intended to counter missiles. Any

sanctions against military contractors would

most likely be limited because American weapons makers have been banned for more
than a quarter-century from selling arms to mainland China. The United States and the European Union
imposed arms embargoes on China after the deadly crackdown on student protests and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing in
1989. Still,

some military contractors, such as Boeing and United Technologies, have

extensive nonmilitary businesses in China. The companies that manufacture the weapons
systems the United States government announced on Wednesday include Raytheon, which makes antitank
missiles, a shipborne close-in weapons system and the shoulder-launched Stinger antiaircraft missile. Lockheed Martin
makes the Javelin antitank missile with Raytheon, which was also part of the proposed sale. The Chinese can react to this as they
see fit, John Kirby, a spokesman for the State Department, told reporters in Washington on Wednesday. This is nothing new.
Again, its a cleareyed,

sober view of an assessment of Taiwans defense needs. And thats

what drove this. Theres no need for it to have any derogatory effect on our relationship
with China, just like there was no need in the past for it to ever have that effect on
China. The weapons sale to Taiwan is subject to congressional approval. Members of both the Republican and Democratic
parties have expressed support for the sale.

Continued US arms sales to Taiwan cause strict economic sanctions

Demick 2010 (Barbara, visiting professor at Princeton University in 2006-2007 teaching
Coverage of Repressive Regimes through the Ferris Fellowship at the Council of the
Humanities.[16] She moved to Beijing for the Los Angeles Times in 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/31/world/la-fg-china-taiwan31-2010jan31, China threatens
sanctions over arms sale to Taiwan: Angered by a $6 billion U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, Beijing
puts security exchanges with U.S. on hold and threatens sanctions against U.S. firms selling to
Taipei., January 31, 2010, silbs)
The Chinese government Saturday announced a series of harsh retaliatory
measures in protest of the Pentagon's $6-billion arms sale to Taiwan, including a
suspension of security exchanges and threatened sanctions on U.S. companies selling
to Taiwan. "The U.S. decision seriously endangers China's national security and harms
China's core interests," the Defense Ministry said in a statement attributed to spokesman Huang Xueping. Denunciations from Beijing over arms sales to
Taiwan have an element of ritual about them, but the threat of sanctions on U.S. arms contractors is a new one. It
remains to be seen whether China will follow through, given its need for commercial aircraft and aviation systems. " The United States has been
telling China how much they need their cooperation on a range of issues from climate
change to the economy. This has fed a sense from Beijing that they have more leverage
than in the past," said Bonnie Glaser, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "But Beijing doesn't want to
Reporting from Beijing

overreach. . . . In the aftermath of the Google incident, Beijing needs to think carefully before taking measures that would sour the business community on China."

Tensions have flared in recent months over Google's accusation that China was behind a series of computer attacks, and U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton has stepped in to chide China about Internet censorship. The United States has also admonished
Beijing over its reluctance to join in a fresh round of international sanctions against Iran
for its nuclear program. And the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, plans to visit the U.S. next month and is expected to seek a meeting with President
Obama -- a move sure to infuriate Beijing. The biggest immediate casualty of the Taiwan arms sale may be Obama's nuclear security summit planned for April. It had been

an expected visit to
Beijing by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates this year could be put off. But in various
hoped that Chinese President Hu Jintao would attend; now China is more likely to send a lower-ranking official. In addition,

statements Saturday, the Chinese government used the word "postpone" rather than "cancel," hinting that normal dialogue will resume after several months. On Saturday, the
U.S. State Department defended the arms deal, saying, "such sales contribute to maintaining security and stability across the Taiwan Strait." Under the Taiwan Relations Act of
1979, the United States is committed to supplying Taiwan with arms to defend itself against an attack by the mainland. China considers Taiwan to be a breakaway province.

China's tough language may be aimed at preventing the United States from selling the F16 fighter planes that Taiwan has been requesting to replace its aging fleet. The Obama administration
has not made a decision on the planes. The arms sale is part of a larger package that was approved in 2001 by then-President George W. Bush. The U.S.
company most likely to be affected if China follows through on its threat to punish
contractors is Boeing Co., which manufactures the Harpoon missiles that are part of the
Taiwan package. Boeing also sells commercial aircraft in China. The arms sale comes at
a time when China's relations with Taiwan are better than ever before, with a mainland-friendly government
in place in Taipei since 2008. Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told reporters Saturday that the arms sale would give "Taiwan more confidence and a sense of security to go
forward in developing cross-strait relations."

Internals: PLA Demonize U.S./Nationalism

Violent Chinese nationalism allowed for the rise of the CCPthey villainize
the US to increase their internal credibility by giving in to nationalist
demands
Garver 2016 (John, is Emertius Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at
the Georgia Institute of Technology. He specializes in Chinas foreign relations. He served for
many years on a the editorial boards of the journals China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary
China, Issues and Studies, and Asian Security. He is a member of the National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, has testified before the U.S. Congress, and is the author of twelve books
and seventyfive refereed articles and book chapters dealing with China 's foreign relations,
Chinas Quest: the History of the Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China, Chapter
1, Fateful Embrace of Communism, Oxford University Press, 2016, silbs)
Another factor

feeding CCP fear in the post-1989 period was Americas increasing propensity to
concern itself with Chinas internal governance, or even more dangerous for the CCP
the inclination of the US government to go beyond words and act on the basis of its
opinions. During the Cold War, the awesome geopolitical imperative of countering the USSR had limited the US inclination to criticize Chinas
grievous human rights shortcomings. After the end of the Cold War, that restraint was gone, freeing Americans and their elected representatives to
concern themselves with Chinas domestic failings. The stark contrast between the nonviolent transitions from communist rule in Eastern Europe and
the violent communist repression of demands for freedom in China further encouraged US concern with Chinas continuing repressive political
arrangementsabout dissidents and political prisoners, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang and in prison camps, workers rights, religious groups, and
environmental issues. The

liberal-minded United States also occupied a position of immense,

indeed unparalleled, global power. The major global rival of the United States, the USSR, had disappeared, and for the first
several years of the 1990s, there seemed to be the possibility that Russia might gravitate toward its European home and the Western camp.
Moscows former allies in Eastern Europe joined the US-led camp. Indeed, former Soviet satellites became some of the most enthusiastic members of
the US-led NATO camp. Contrary

to long-standing PRC predictions of the arrival of a multipolar

era, the Western alliance system held together. Europe and Japan did not pull away from the United States. The grand
America-centric alliance of Europe, North America, and democratic East Asia held firm. A new power, India, gravitated toward that camp for the first
time. Survival

of the CCP regime in this newly threatening environment of Act III shaped
PRC foreign relations in two main ways. First, Beijing sought to deter, constrain, and/or
defeat US interference in China in support of dissident elements, but to do this in ways that did not undermine US
willingness to continue supporting Chinas emergence as a rich and strong power. These
conflicting objectives led to a combination of strength and toughness toward the United States on
the one hand, and search for partnership with it on the other. The second key dimension
has been CCP utilization of Leninist-style campaigns touting aggrieved nationalism to legitimize the CCP.
Assertive nationalism uses emotionally evocative rhetoric and symbols to depict China
as the victim of assaults, aggression, insults, and injury by foreign powers, especially the United States and Japan.25
Frequently, these depictions of foreign moves and motives are grossly distorted or even
downright wrong. Nonetheless, these putative foreign attacks are linked to Chinas
century of national shame and humiliation in an attempt to rouse a sense of grievance and resentment against foreign
enemies of China. The CCPs resort to this sort of assertive nationalism serves to mobilize
domestic support for the regime in an era of eroding belief in Marxism. Since Chinas opening, Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong
Thought has steadily been reduced to an intra-CCP regime credo. Party members must still master and profess belief in the ideology, and this helps
provide coherence to the party, a sort of esoteric knowledge that binds its adherents together. The public legitimization of CCP rule, however, is no
longer Marxism-Leninism but assertive nationalismthe propensity of hostile foreign powers to harm China and the need for a tough-minded regime

Assertive foreign policies and nationalist

rhetoric are used to appeal to injured nationalist pride, legitimizing the CCP regime that
like that of the CCP to defend against evil foreign transgression against China.

defends China so well. In line with this, the media and state-sponsored popular culture portray the world as a dark and sinister place,
with the firm and steady CCP thwarting all sorts of nefarious schemes against China. CCP policies that are perceived to be
inadequately resolute by the nationalist opinion fostered by the state undermine regime
legitimacy.26 For several years after the Beijing Massacre of June 1989, the CCP clamped down on any autonomous political activity. By the
2000s, however, the CCP had adapted to a new pattern of interaction with spontaneous and
independent nationalist political activity, including especially new web-based
nationalism. Autonomous nationalist political activitydemonstrations, online petitions, blog activitywas now
sometimes tolerated, and even occasionally rewarded with government acceptance of some of the
demands advanced by that activism. Yet activists understood the limits of CCP tolerance, and the
state retained the capacity to end this activity when it deemed it necessary to protect
social order or important diplomatic objectives. What had developed was interaction
between bottom-up nationalist activism and top-down party guidance of mass
participation in political activity. In this fashion, the party diverts grievances from itself onto foreign enemies, especially Japan
and the United States, while legitimizing itself as defender of Chinas interest and honor.27

The PLA thinks China is too soft on the UStheyre using violent rhetoric
against the US to mobilize a nationalistic response and acquire greater
power in the CCP
Robertson 2015 (Matthew, China news editor for Epoch Times based in New York City,
One-Sided War of Words Erupts Over US-China Military Posture: While the United States has
sought in a recent Pentagon report and other public statements to be conciliatory toward China,
prominent statements in the Chinese press have been aggressive, if not bellicose,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1509339-us-china-military-developments/full/, The Epoch
Times, October 1, 2015, silbs)
Analysts have posited a number of explanations for the Chinese regimes rhetoric,
including that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is playing the nationalism card to boost its
legitimacy or taking advantage of the United States accommodating approach to seize the geopolitical upper hand, or the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to increase its influence on the Chinese leadership. U.S.
Takes Soft Approach U.S. Defense officials were careful not to give any hint of politicking when discussing the Pentagons report on Chinas military power on Aug.
16. A senior defense official, when briefing reporters, pointed out that the publication is very factual in nature the tone of the report and our efforts in writing the report is to be

report has even been criticized as too soft

very, very straightforward, factual, descriptive and analytical The

. After being embargoed
for five months by the administration, and having its title changed by Congress (from Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China to Military and Security Developments
Involving the Peoples Republic of China), defense experts say it hedges far too much and lacks substance in addressing the implications of its own findings. News was that
the NSC [National Security Council] thought the information was too provocative, said Michael Mazza, senior research associate with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), in
an interview with The Epoch Times. Updates by the Department of Defense adopt a similarly conciliatory tone. Headlines read Gates Urges Positive U.S.-China Military

the administration is still struggling to come to terms with its China policy, Mr.
Mazza says. After oscillating between a soft and firm line on China over the last several months , the
Relations, and U.S. Wants Renewed Military Contacts with China. It seems

United States has recently been at pains to project dovish intentions. The United States has committed itself to the pursuit of a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive

The recent release of the military report appears

along the lines of the strategic reassurance policy, a pillar of the Obama
administrations foreign policy, which seeks to accommodate Beijing and provide
assurance that the United States is a partner. The CCP may take the United States more conciliatory tone, however, as an opening
for more aggressive rhetoric and behavior, according to the AEIs Mazza. Nationalist Tendencies After the United States
announced its intentions to carry out war games with South Korea in international waters
in the Yellow Sea, which commenced on Aug. 16, the response from nationalist elements in China was
strong. Huanqiu, printed by the official Party mouthpiece Peoples Daily, is leading the way in hawkish rhetoric. An article published on Aug. 13 ran
with headline Thoroughly Abandon Illusions About the U.S.! The Biggest Obstacle to
Chinas Rise is the U.S. The contents of the piece, which ran with no byline, upheld the
relationship with China, a senior defense official said at the press briefing.

bluster. The article argued that America sending ships to the Yellow Sea is a direct
provocation to China, despite whatever statements have been made to the contrary. In
doing this, the United States is publicly declaring that China is a significant enemy, the article
says in its first paragraph. The sensitivity may be related to the Communist Partys expanded definition of its core interests, a phrase which has until now been used to refer

The CCP now wants to include the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea in
its manifesto of core interests, according to an analysis by Willy Lam of the Jamestown Foundation . With the Party having extended Chinas core
interests into international watersand to the whole of the Korean Peninsula, according to South Korean media the United States
encroachments can only be seen in the most unforgiving light: Since the Pentagon
insists on making China its military rival, China is only left with becoming a qualified
opponent: We must let the U.S. know that its strategic mistakes must come at a great
price, the Huanqiu editorial rails. It is unclear to what extent Huanqiu represents the views of the CCP leadership; it is not a mouthpiece of the
CCP Central Committee, according to Chinese media analysts. The strident editorials go down
well with Internet users, however, attracting numerous remarks that laud Chinese
communist predominance and demonize the United States. The bellicose tones may also
be a way for the CCP to maintain its credibility among the masses, according to Mr. Mazza. In the context of constant domestic
pressures, the CCP needs to rely more heavily on its appeal to its nationalistic credentials to
assure its legitimacy, and I think thats where some of the stronger statements come
from, he said. PLA to the Fore Important figures in the Chinese military have put forward
views similar to that found in Huanqiu, with some going even further. For two days after the Pentagon report was
released, the PLA Daily, which is the mouthpiece of the Peoples Liberation Army, carried
the headline Defense Spokesperson: Resolutely Oppose U.S. Report on Chinas
Military. The final paragraph of the press release, reprinted in major state media channels, requires the United States
to look objectively and fairly at Chinas national defense and military development,
dispense with words and deeds that are detrimental to the US-China relationship and
military trust, and finally, simply stop publishing the so-called report altogether. Air
Force colonel Dai Xu, perhaps Chinas number one military hawk, wrote an Aug. 5 editorial for Xinhua for which the headline
is: Using the Countrys Power to Send a Warning and Counter-Attack, Thats the Only
Way to Gain Americas Respect. According to Colonel Xu, America has continually carried out war
and sought out adversaries. This is the normal state of its societal development. Without
war, the U.S. economy loses impetus. America has absolutely no right to brazenly, again and
again, take actions that harm Chinas security. Those forces that dare to threaten China
should be given a warning and be beaten back with the nations power Our velvet glove
of diplomacy should have hidden within it the strength of iron. This way may seem to directly invite opposition, but
actually, its the simplest way of avoiding conflict. America respects this sort of adversary , he
writes. A parallel argument is put forward by Major General Luo Yuan. In a heavily publicized speech on Aug. 12, he argues that
Americas sending an aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea would be deliberately provocative,
and another demonstration of Americas three -isms: hegemonism, gunboatism, and
unilateralism, according to Luo. The United States tries to extend its security borders to other
countrys doorsteps. The so-called maritime security is actually Americas holy and inviolable gunboat,
just guaranteeing its own security, but what about others? Luo asks. The conspiracy theory that the United
States is intent on containing and harming China has been reported in the Chinese media
for a long time, but the recent outbursts by major figures may signal a shift in the
militarys assertiveness, according to Howard Jia, editor with the Washington, D.C.-based think tank Chinascope. Over the past 20
years, members of the military have not held high positions in central CCP bodies. No
military staff are in the Politburo, and only a few are in the Standing Committee. The PLA might be using this
opportunity to ask for more funding and gain more power. There might even be internal
political fighting going on, though on the surface its about an external issue. But in the top leaders
mostly to Xinjiang and Tibet.

minds, they know very well the consequences of having a war with the United States, he said.

Internals: China k Boeing

Chinese markets are key to Boeing success
Trefis 15, Forbes, (9/25/15, Why Is A China Plant Important For Boeing?,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/09/25/why-is-china-plant-important-forboeing/#7b70b1682871)//kap
Why Is A China Plant Important For Boeing? Boeing

will build an aircraft completion center in China for

companys first plant outside the U.S., and a rather important one. Boeings key rival
Airbus already has a final assembly line operational in China and it has helped it gain market share in the region . China will
need airplanes worth $1 trillion, reflecting nearly half of the total airplane deliveries in
Asia-Pacific region in next two decades. Boeing wants to grab a significant share in such huge market and this
737 aircraft, marking the

new plant will help it scale up airplane deliveries in the region. On that note, we discuss the China airplane market and why is it

China Is A Mammoth Market For Airplanes Demand for new airplanes in

China is primarily driven by low cost carriers (LCCs), which have been successful in other regions, including
important for Boeing.

North America and Europe. LCCs have led to growth in air passenger traffic and this has fared well for airplane manufacturers, such
as Boeing and Airbus, in the past. Lower fares offered by these carriers have made air travel more affordable for a larger population,
fueling growth in air passenger traffic. A similar low-cost-model is being employed by China among other emerging markets and this

China
market is different from North America or Europe, where demand is for replacing old aircraft with new ones;
while in China, there is growing demand to expand the fleet to cater to the rising air traffic .
Given these factors, Boeing has a huge potential market in China to drive growth in its airplane
is likely to boost air traffic in coming years. In turn, this higher passenger traffic will require a larger airplane fleet. Now, the

sales . Boeing now sells one in three 737s in China, and one in four of its models overall, highlighting how big this market already
is for Boeing. Going forward, Boeing estimates China will need 7,210 airplanes worth around $1 trillion in next 20 years. Passenger

Growing
Competition Is A Concern But The New Plant Will Help Ramp Up Deliveries And Enable
Boeing To Compete Better While there is a strong demand outlook for airplanes in China, Boeing faces
growing competition with Chinas Comac, along with Airbus, which has managed to gain market share in the region with
traffic and air cargo is projected to grow at an average annual rate of around 7% during the same period.

its final assembly line. Looking at Comac, its C919 is a single-aisle airplane designed to seat between 156 and 174 passengers,
making it versatile for several routes. In this segment, Boeing has its highly successful 737 series and Airbus has its A320 series.
While Comac faces a tough challenge in establishing itself against such successful airplane models, it will likely benefit from an
element of state ownership, with regional airlines placing more orders for C919. Comacs order book currently stands at over 500
airplanes, primarily from various Chinese airlines. Boeings

new plant in China will be a final assembly line, primarily

to reduce pressure on the U.S. plant, which plans to ramp up deliveries in the coming years. This is
important because Boeing has a massive order backlog (roughly $500 billion) and it receives a significant portion of its payment at
the time of airplane delivery. The company has been aggressive in ramping up airplane deliveries in the past and Boeings global
market share in commercial airplane deliveries also improved from 31% in 2008 to 45% in 2014 (see Boeing Will Sustain Its

Boeings commitment for setting up a completion

plant in China is likely to follow with a huge order from the region. The recent announcement was for
300 airplanes valued at $38 billion, but a bigger order will likely follow. With this new assembly line, Boeing will
be able to increase its delivery rate in the China and compete better with Airbus, along with Conac,
Current Market Share In Commercial Airplane Deliveries).

which is steadily gaining orders from China-based airlines.

Internals: Aerospace k Airpower

Strong aerospace key to overall US air power
Thompson 9
(David, President American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, The Aerospace
Workforce, Federal News Service, 12-10, Lexis)
Aerospace systems are of considerable importance to U.S. national security, economic prosperity, technological
vitality, and global leadership. Aeronautical and space systems protect our citizens, armed forces,
and allies abroad. They connect the farthest corners of the world with safe and efficient air
transportation and satellite communications, and they monitor the Earth, explore the solar system, and study the wider universe. The U.S. aerospace
sector also contributes in major ways to America's economic output and high- technology employment. Aerospace research and development and manufacturing companies generated approximately $240 billion
in sales in 2008, or nearly 1.75 percent of our country's gross national product. They currently employ about 650,000 people throughout our country. U.S. government agencies and departments engaged in
aerospace research and operations add another 125,000 employees to the sector's workforce, bringing the total to over 775,000 people. Included in this number are more than 200,000 engineers and scientists -one of the largest concentrations of technical brainpower on Earth. However, the U.S. aerospace workforce is now facing the most serious demographic challenge in his 100-year history. Simply put, today, many
more older, experienced professionals are retiring from or otherwise leaving our industrial and governmental aerospace workforce than early career professionals are entering it. This imbalance is expected to
become even more severe over the next five years as the final members of the Apollo-era generation of engineers and scientists complete 40- or 45-year careers and transition to well-deserved retirements. In
fact, around 50 percent of the current aerospace workforce will be eligible for retirement within just the next five years. Meanwhile, the supply of younger aerospace engineers and scientists entering the industry is
woefully insufficient to replace the mounting wave of retirements and other departures that we see in the near future. In part, this is the result of broader technical career trends as engineering and science
graduates from our country's universities continue a multi-decade decline, even as the demand for their knowledge and skills in aerospace and other industries keeps increasing. Today, only about 15 percent of
U.S. students earn their first college degree in engineering or science, well behind the 40 or 50 percent levels seen in many European and Asian countries. Due to the dual-use nature of aerospace technology
and the limited supply of visas available to highly-qualified non-U.S. citizens, our industry's ability to hire the best and brightest graduates from overseas is also severely constrained. As a result, unless effective
action is taken to reverse current trends, the U.S. aerospace sector is expected to experience a dramatic decrease in its technical workforce over the next decade. Your second question concerns the implications
of a cutback in human spaceflight programs. AIAA's view on this is as follows. While U.S. human spaceflight programs directly employ somewhat less than 10 percent of our country's aerospace workers, its
influence on attracting and motivating tomorrow's aerospace professionals is much greater than its immediate employment contribution. For nearly 50 years the excitement and challenge of human spaceflight
have been tremendously important factors in the decisions of generations of young people to prepare for and to pursue careers in the aerospace sector. This remains true today, as indicated by hundreds of
testimonies AIAA members have recorded over the past two years, a few of which I'll show in brief video interviews at the end of my statement. Further evidence of the catalytic role of human space missions is
found in a recent study conducted earlier this year by MIT which found that 40 percent of current aerospace engineering undergraduates cited human space programs as the main reason they chose this field of
study. Therefore, I think it can be predicted with high confidence that a major cutback in U.S. human space programs would be substantially detrimental to the future of the aerospace workforce. Such a cutback
would put even greater stress on an already weakened strategic sector of our domestic high-technology workforce. Your final question centers on other issues that should be considered as decisions are made on
the funding and direction for NASA, particularly in the human spaceflight area. In conclusion, AIAA offers the following suggestions in this regard. Beyond the previously noted critical influence on the future supply
of aerospace professionals, administration and congressional leaders should also consider the collateral damage to the space industrial base if human space programs were substantially curtailed. Due to low

the domestic supply chain for space systems is relatively

fragile. Many second- and third-tier suppliers in particular operate at marginal volumes today, so even a small
reduction in their business could force some critical suppliers to exit this sector. Human space
programs represent around 20 percent of the $47 billion in total U.S. space and missile systems sales from 2008. Accordingly, a major cutback in human space spending could have
large and highly adverse ripple effects throughout commercial, defense, and scientific space programs as
well, potentially triggering a series of disruptive changes in the common industrial supply base that
our entire space sector relies on.
annual production rates and highly-specialized product requirements,

Internals: Aerospace Innovation Good

Aerospace innovation is key to staying ahead of the tech curve
Abrams 13, (Michael, March 2013, Top 5 Aerospace Trends of Now and the Future,
https://www.asme.org/engineering-topics/articles/aerospace-defense/top-5-aerospace-trendsnow-future)//kap
Flying cars, hybrid vehicles, massive jets, sleek new fighters, and Mars-bound rockets. These are the kinds of things we consider
when we think of our latest heights in the endless evolution of human flight: hardware. Indeed, the old clich about there being a
million parts in an airplane is truer now than ever. But those million parts are only a fraction of the story behind what puts any vehicle
in the airand what keeps it there. Take a look at the cost of a Boeing 787, says Vigor Yang, chair of the School of Aerospace
Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Fifty percent goes to hardware, fifty percent goes to navigation, guidance,
and control. And of that, fifty percent goes to software. The newest flying machines are only the most visible part of what goes on in
the air. How the systems on a vehicle control that vehicle; how a vehicle talks to ground control; how a vehicle talks to other
vehicles; how vehicles collect data and what they do with that datathis is the silent face of aerospace engineering. Its not tactile,
its not photogenic, and its largely unsung. But its where the latest advances are taking place. 1.

System Software on

the Rise The code at the heart of any aircraft isnt something that can be slapped together by the latest Silicon Valley wiz kid.
Unlike the programming that makes our apps and video games, airborne software is system dependent. Whoevers writing
the code has got to know every aspect of the hardware. And the software must be bug
free. Otherwise everyone will be in serious trouble, says Yang. Software is handling ever-greater
percentages of the jobs done on an aircraft. And, more and more, these systems are developed and put in
place by companies such as Ultra-Electronics, Rockwell Collins, and Ramco Aviation. Increased communication with ground control
will soon allow for more efficient landings. Currently planes approaching an airport do so in a stair-step process. This allows the
control tower to maintain safety at each stage. But when the exact position of each plane is known, the approach can be continuous.
The smoothness of the descent will mean every flight will be shorter by two or so minutes and save about 100 gallons of gas. That
time may be minuscule for the passenger, perhaps, but worldwide, the savings are enormous. Boeing

is working on a
drone swarming system that will eventually impact passenger planes. 2. Craft-to-Craft
Communication How a message gets from the cockpit to the landing gear, rudder, or anywhere else, is a relatively selfcontained problem, not too different from the controls found in land-based vehicles. But how vehicles talk to each other is another
issue. In a video that went viral, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania orchestrated miniature quadrotors to play the James
Bond theme. The bots knew each others location, and avoided collision, thanks to a central system that plotted their locations in
space. The U.S. Air Force recently released a video showing how tiny drones will soon be able to similarly swarm together for the
purposes of surveillance, targeting, and assassination. Boeing is at work creating a swarming system for larger drones.

Eventually the technology will work its way into passenger planes. 3. Data Handling
Surveillance vehicles get a lot of attention for political, military, and techie reasons. But in
the field of aerospace engineering their development and employment is a much smaller challenge than that of what to do with their
product. How does the vast quantity of data collected from each vehicle get integrated with that from other vehicles and satellites?
How does it get sifted in a way that will make it useful? How will it be streamlined and delivered to allow for effective decisionmaking? The answer is likely to be found with the $200 million the government recently marked for big data handling. Some of that
will go into DARPAs XDATA program, which aims to meet challenges presented by this volume of data, according to the
Department of Defense. The Martin Jetpack has a gasoline engine with two ducted fans to provide lift. Image: Martin Jetpack 4.

Flying Commuters Passenger jets and drones are not the only vehicles that will need to talk to each other in the none-toofar-off future. Though flight-minded laymen still have not seen a Jetsons-like age arrive, the personal air commute is, at least, closer
than it was before. Jet pack ideas abound, (such as the Martin Jetpack and Marc Newsons Body Jet) and flying cars are on the
make (for example, Terrafugia and Moller Internationals Skycar). Sure, the morning commute is not likely to crowd the sky the way it
does our streets anytime soon. However, if the air is thick with nine-to-fivers, there will have to be some traffic system in place.
Current air-traffic control is not designed to handle localized takeoffs and landings. But, just as vehicle-to-vehicle communication is
soon to keep automatic cars from colliding, aircraft-to-aircraft interaction is soon to make the man in manned aircraft a little less

unmanned aircraft systems

to fly in U.S. airspace by 2015. Flying commuters can piggyback on those changes. 5. Aerospace Engineering Education
Whos going to put together these systems? The kids, of course. Perhaps the biggest trend in aerospace is the
growing interest among students. There are now 65 programs in the U.S., and 25 are stand alone programs. Of the
necessary. Congress has ordered the FAA to pave the waylegally and technicallyfor

38,000 new aerospace engineering jobs that opened up last year, 4,000 of them were taken by students. Aerospace is the third
most popular field for engineering students. A large percentage of them go into programming, because they know their software will
be implemented on real hardware, says Yang. The aerospace profession has expanded form hardware-based science, technology,

and engineering, to systems, and even systems of systems-based engineering. At a very

high level that trend has become even more important, he adds.

Internals: U.S. Industrial Base on Brink

And, industrial base on the brink and key to U.S. economy and U.S.
manufacturing Boeing at risk
OHanlon 11
(Michael, Senior Fellow at Brookings, pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/defenseohanlon/02_defense_ohanlon.pdf //um-ef)
THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BASE AND CORE CONCERNS

The above considerations lead to the

subject of the defense industrial base and its future prospects . Any such analysis
should begin with a clear understanding of the state of the national security industrial
base today . Several considerations are important to bear in mind; many came out of a series of discussions at Brookings in 2010 under the auspices of a national
security working group that included members of industry, the Department of Defense, the Congress, the financial and consulting sectors, and the think tank world. For one

the U.S. national security industrial base has greatly downsized, with the aerospace
and defense sector now employing somewhat more than 600,000 workers in contrast to
numbers twice as large in the fairly recent past.38 That said, employment over most of the last decade has been reasonably
stable.39 This sector is a high-wage and high-export sector for the U.S. economy . Yet the
profit margins of the defense and aerospace sectors of the economy, while hardly bad,
are often only about half of what is commonly believed due to certain costs that cannot be billed to the government and
thing,

related matters. In fact, the sector averages profit margins of five to nine percent, less than many industries that tend to achieve margins in the teens.40 It is perhaps partly for
this reason (and partly out of expectations of coming defense budget cuts) that defense stocks are underpriced in the eyes of many. Whether this is a reasonable and fair state
of affairs or not is debatable. Some suggest that companies with a sure customer and dependable market (the U.S. government) should not be entitled to as much profit as
those operating in a more unpredictable marketplace, whereas others counter that the U.S. government is hardly a consistent customer or an easy customer to work with.

The stakes here are high . Restoring lost assets or capabilities within the defense
industrial base, while generally feasible, can be a slow and uncertain process . It can also
be much harder than enlarging the size of a given military service by a certain
percentage. In other words, the loss of key industrial capabilities may be a greater worry
than having a force structure that proves temporarily too small . (This is not to argue for either a weak industrial
base or an inadequate force structure, only to frame the issue in terms of possible tradeoffs.) The above concern is reinforced by the
fact that, today, many companies are showing greater interest in the most lucrative and
least capital-intensive parts of the DoD acquisition agendaservice contracting, information technology, cybersecurity,
and so on. To the extent they can make money in these areas, they may have less incentive than before to sustain inherently expensive production facilities and related
hardware.41 Some are concerned about the current DoD interest in moving back to fixed-price contracts, rather than costplus contracts which reimburse contractors for their
documented expenses and then add a profit margin. The fixed-price contracts are designed to discourage gold-plating. The cost-plus approach, by contrast, is designed to
ensure that firms stay financially healthy, and also to reflect the reality that inventing new technology is an inherently unpredictable process that can entail unexpected costs. As
such, moving back towards the former approach will worry some. It was attempted two decades ago with unfortunate results for the industry. That said, there are mitigating
factors. For example, most of today's top defense executives cut their teeth in the industry during that previous downturn, so they are experienced at dealing with tough periods.

the industry has numerous survival skills. For example, greater use of fixed-price contracts by the department may lead to higher
The most likely outcome is
that the big five U.S. defense primes, plus BAE Systems and other larger firms, will find ways to survive the
coming expected downturn. But the country could lose key capabilities in the process,
and affordability issues could grow. In addition, as noted earlier, the subcontractor industrial base
Also,

bids for a given system (as contractors try to ensure that any unexpected cost growth will not preclude achieving a profit).

could be jeopardized . There are other challenges for the industry too. They include: increasing burdens from regulation and oversight, ongoing hurdles
from export controls (even if they are gradually lessening), the difficulty of turning profits based on R&D and prototyping work, demographic trends in the defense workforce (with
many experienced workers retiring en masse), and the uncertainty of attracting young talent into a business that may not be as likely to produce new systems in the future as in
the past.42 Finally, the next few years will be important, as we are in a transition period. A case in point: for the first time in the history of aviation, the United States does not

have a manned aircraft program in the R&D phase. Only the long-range bomber (which is likely to include a manned-unmanned option) fits that category, illustrating a significant
shift underway in the very nature of the products aviation firms provide. Of note, the bomber development program will ultimately keep one companys design and development

there are three main American actors, out of the primes

Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing). In addition, the C-17, C-130, F/A-18E/F, F-22, F-15, and F-16
team alive in coming years but not those of other firms (in aircraft,

production lines are all now slated to close by 2015. But above all, a core immediate concern of the industry is the bottom-line: the possible impact of any coming defense
budget reductions on funds available for acquisition. The broader subject of defense budget reductions was addressed above, but the following section explores what might be
seen by some in the industry as a plausible worst case should deficit reduction be pursued in a serious way in the coming years. In fact, there is a serious case for such deficit
reduction, as it could strengthen the nations long-term economic foundations and thus the pillars of long-term national security. But it would also understandably cause some
angst in industry circles. The below is my best estimate of what the implications of such plausible reductions (amounting to about ten percent in the real peacetime defense
budget) might be for procurement as well as research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E).43 EFFECTS ON ACQUISITION OF A DEFICIT REDUCTION PLAN As
noted above, any effort to reduce the base defense budget by ten percent in real terms would presumably include numerous efficiencies and management reforms, perhaps
some additional base closures, as well as at least modest reductions in force structure. These would probably be concentrated in the ground forces, which were built up over the
last decade even as the rest of the nations force posture continued to be streamlined. Another, complementary way to find savings is to propose reductions in modernization
plans for the U.S. militarys acquisition of equipmentin both procurement and advanced development/prototyping efforts. Other types of savings might be explored too, beyond
those emphasized below. For example, intelligence spending has grown greatly in the last decade and in largely unregulated, unscrutinized ways given classification issues.
Those same issues complicate my efforts to analyze intelligence thoroughly here, but that does not rule out the possibility of savings in such accounts. My view is that all these
types of efficiencies will need to be pursued if there is to be any realistic hope of reducing defense spending while posing minimum risk to the countrys security. My purpose
here is not to advocate such cuts but to outline them as a way of framing the likely parameters for the future acquisition budget and its potential impact on the industry. The long
and short of the analysis presented below is that acquisition budgets might be expected to undergo up to ten percent real cutsat a maximumin the coming years, above and
beyond those reductions that result directly from reduced war expenditures pursuant to force redeployments from Iraq and Afghanistan back to the United States. Reducing
funding for acquisition was already pursued once in recent times, in the 1990s, when annual procurement budgets were reduced by two-thirds relative to earlier Reagan-era
highs. But that was an unusual historical moment. The United States could take a procurement holiday of sorts since it had recently bought so much new equipment during
that Reagan buildup, and since the concomitant reduction of the combat force structure allowed older equipment to be selectively retired first. These cutbacks were not easy on
industry or the economy. Softening the pain to an extent, however, was the fact that the 1980s had been a fairly good decade for defense business. In addition, even though the
economy was tough in the early part of the 1990s in the United Statesand even though defense cutbacks exacerbated the difficulty in some cases44the situation rapidly
improved. As the 1990s progressed, the general health of the U.S. economy strengthened, creating new jobs in other sectors. The situation is different today. In addition, even
though current acquisition budgets are sizeable by historical standards in real-dollar terms, the growing cost of weaponry means that these budgets can fund fewer major
programs than was the case before. That reality is reinforced by the fact that more of todays acquisition budget is devoted to research and development rather than production
understandable to a degree at a time of rapid technology change, but still a tendency that deprives procurement accounts of the share of funds they used to receive.
Historically RDT&E budgets have usually been less than half as large as procurement accounts; today they are nearly as large, and this trend may thus have gone too far. The
number of workers in aerospace and defense is down from more than 1,000,000 in 1991 to just over 600,000 two decades later, exemplifying the tendency of the U.S.

there are now just five major U.S. contractors in

the defense businessBoeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and
General Dynamics, plus BAE and EADS from Europeand often the number capable of creating a given
type of weapon system is just one or two. As such, the competitive health of the
industrial base needs to be kept in mind to an even greater extent than during the last
comparable period, since budgets are not so large as to guarantee a diverse and strong national security industrial base absent considerable care and
attentiveness.46 Certain capabilities could simply be lost, and take years to recreate.47 The ability to keep costs in check through
manufacturing base writ large to lose lots of jobs over that period.45 In addition,

competition can also be lost. 48

Impacts: Nationalism = War

Chinese nationalism ensures conflict in the region will push US forces
out and retake Taiwan
Mearsheimer, 14 [John J., is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago and serves on the Advisory Council of The
National Interest, The National Interest, Say Goodbye to Taiwan, 2014,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show, 7/3/16]JRO
power is rarely static.

But
The real question that is often overlooked is what happens in a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply
against Taiwan and the United States, in which China controls much more relative power than it does today, and in which China is in roughly the same economic and military
league as the United States. In essence: a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today. That world may seem forbidding, even ominous, but it is one that may

the continuing rise of China will have huge consequences for Taiwan,
almost all of which will be bad. Not only will China be much more powerful than it is today, but it will also remain deeply
committed to making Taiwan part of China. Moreover, China will try to dominate Asia the way
the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere, which means it will seek to reduce, if not
eliminate, the American military presence in Asia. The United States, of course, will resist mightily, and go to great lengths to
contain Chinas growing power. The ensuing security competition will not be good for Taiwan , no matter how it turns
be coming. It is my firm conviction that

out in the end. Time is not on Taiwans side. Herewith, a guide to what is likely to ensue between the United States, China and Taiwan. IN AN ideal world, most Taiwanese would
like their country to gain de jure independence and become a legitimate sovereign state in the international system. This outcome is especially attractive because a strong
Taiwanese identityseparate from a Chinese identityhas blossomed in Taiwan over the past sixty-five years. Many of those people who identify themselves as Taiwanese
would like their own nation-state, and they have little interest in being a province of mainland China. According to National Chengchi Universitys Election Study Center, in 1992,
17.6 percent of the people living in Taiwan identified as Taiwanese only. By June 2013, that number was 57.5 percent, a clear majority. Only 3.6 percent of those surveyed
identified as Chinese only. Furthermore, the 2011 Taiwan National Security Survey found that if one assumes China would not attack Taiwan if it declared its independence, 80.2
percent of Taiwanese would in fact opt for independence. Another recent poll found that about 80 percent of Taiwanese view Taiwan and China as different countries. However,

, China has made it

clear that it would go to war against Taiwan if the island declares its independence. The
Taiwan is not going to gain formal independence in the foreseeable future, mainly because China would not tolerate that outcome. In fact

antisecession law, which China passed in 2005, says explicitly that the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures if Taiwan moves toward de jure
independence. It is also worth noting that the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, and according to President Obama, Washington fully supports a
one-China policy. Thus, the best situation Taiwan can hope for in the foreseeable future is maintenance of the status quo, which means de facto independence. In fact, over 90
percent of the Taiwanese surveyed this past June by the Election Study Center favored maintaining the status quo indefinitely or until some later date. The worst possible
outcome is unification with China under terms dictated by Beijing. Of course, unification could happen in a variety of ways, some of which are better than others. Probably the
least bad outcome would be one in which Taiwan ended up with considerable autonomy, much like Hong Kong enjoys today. Chinese leaders refer to this solution as one
country, two systems. Still, it has little appeal to most Taiwanese. As Yuan-kang Wang reports: An overwhelming majority of Taiwans public opposes unification, even under
favorable circumstances. If anything, longitudinal data reveal a decline in public support of unification. In short, for Taiwan, de facto independence is much preferable to
becoming part of China, regardless of what the final political arrangements look like. The critical question for Taiwan, however, is whether it can avoid unification and maintain de

Two different logics, one revolving

around nationalism and the other around security, shape its views concerning Taiwan. Both
logics, however, lead to the same endgame: the unification of China and Taiwan. The nationalism story is straightforward and
uncontroversial. China is deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. For Chinas elites, as
well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory that has
been part of China since ancient times, but was taken away by the hated Japanese in 1895when China was weak and vulnerable. It
must once again become an integral part of China. As Hu Jintao said in 2007 at the Seventeenth Party Congress: The two
sides of the Straits are bound to be reunified in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The unification of China and
Taiwan is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. There is simply no
compromising on this issue. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Chinese regime is bound up with
making sure Taiwan does not become a sovereign state and that it eventually becomes
an integral part of China. Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later and that hopefully it can be done
peacefully. At the same time, they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other
recourse. The security story is a different one, and it is inextricably bound up with the rise
of China. Specifically, it revolves around a straightforward but profound question: How is China likely to behave in Asia over time, as it grows increasingly powerful? The
facto independence in the face of a rising China. WHAT ABOUT China? How does it think about Taiwan?

answer to this question obviously has huge consequences for Taiwan. The only way to predict how a rising China is likely to behave toward its neighbors as well as the United
States is with a theory of great-power politics. The main reason for relying on theory is that we have no facts about the future, because it has not happened yet. Thomas Hobbes

we have no
choice but to rely on theories to determine what is likely to transpire in world politics . My own
put the point well: The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all. Thus,

realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power.
The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states
seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. To be more specific, the international system has
three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great
powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty,
especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germanys or Japans intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025. In a world where
other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic
system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as
powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or
Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam. But great powers do not merely strive to be the

Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemonwhich means

being the only great power in the system. What exactly does it mean to be a hegemon in the modern world? It is almost impossible for
any state to achieve global hegemony, because it is too hard to sustain power around the globe and project it onto the territory of distant great powers. The best
outcome a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, to dominate ones own
geographical area. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere since about 1900. Although the United States is clearly the
strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome.

most powerful state on the planet today, it is not a global hegemon. States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other regions
from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers, so
that those states will compete with each other and be unable to focus their attention and resources on them. In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only
regional hegemon in the world. The United States enjoys that exalted position today. What does this theory say about how China is likely to behave as it rises in the years

China will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will try to become a
regional hegemon. In particular, China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its
neighbors, especially India, Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure it is so powerful that
no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so it can go on a
ahead? Put simply,

rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to

An increasingly powerful China

is also likely to attempt to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European
neighboring countries, much the way the United States lets other states in the Americas know that it is the boss.

great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the
1930s. These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers a
militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. What state in its right mind would want other powerful states located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what
happened in the previous two centuries when Japan was powerful and China was weak. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept U.S. military forces operating in its
backyard? American policy makers, after all, go ballistic when other great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces are invariably seen as

Why would China feel safe with U.S. forces

deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would Chinas
security not be better served by pushing the American military out of Asia? Why should we expect
a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China.

China to act any differently than the United States did? Are Chinese leaders more principled than American leaders? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic? Less concerned

why China is likely to imitate the United States and

try to become a regional hegemon. WHAT ARE the implications of this security story for Taiwan? The answer is that there is a
powerful strategic rationale for Chinaat the very leastto try to sever Taiwans close
ties with the United States and neutralize Taiwan. However, the best possible outcome for China, which
it will surely pursue with increasing vigor over time, would be to make Taiwan part of China. Unification would work to Chinas strategic
advantage in two important ways. First, Beijing would absorb Taiwans economic and military resources, thus
shifting the balance of power in Asia even further in Chinas direction. Second, Taiwan is
effectively a giant aircraft carrier sitting off Chinas coast ; acquiring that aircraft carrier would
enhance Chinas ability to project military power into the western Pacific Ocean. In short, we see
that nationalism as well as realist logic give China powerful incentives to put an end to
Taiwans de facto independence and make it part of a unified China. This is clearly bad news for Taiwan,
about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is

especially since the balance of power in Asia is shifting in Chinas favor, and it will not be long before Taiwan cannot defend itself against China. Thus, the obvious question is
whether the United States can provide security for Taiwan in the face of a rising China. In other words, can Taiwan depend on the United States for its security? LET US now
consider Americas goals in Asia and how they relate to Taiwan. Regional hegemons go to great lengths to stop other great powers from becoming hegemons in their region of
the world. The best outcome for any great power is to be the sole regional hegemon in the system. It is apparent from the historical record that the United States operates
according to this logic. It does not tolerate peer competitors. During the twentieth century, there were four great powers that had the capability to make a run at regional
hegemony: Imperial Germany from 1900 to 1918, Imperial Japan between 1931 and 1945, Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945 and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Not
surprisingly, each tried to match what the United States had achieved in the Western Hemisphere. How did the United States react? In each case, it played a key role in
defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemons. The United States entered World War I in April 1917 when Imperial Germany looked like it might win the war and rule
Europe. American troops played a critical role in tipping the balance against the Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November 1918. In the early 1940s, President Franklin
Roosevelt went to great lengths to maneuver the United States into World War II to thwart Japans ambitions in Asia and Germanys ambitions in Europe. The United States
came into the war in December 1941, and helped destroy both Axis powers. Since 1945, American policy makers have gone to considerable lengths to put limits on German and
Japanese military power. Finally, during the Cold War, the United States steadfastly worked to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia and then helped relegate it to
the scrap heap of history in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Shortly after the Cold War ended, the George H. W. Bush administrations controversial Defense Planning
Guidance of 1992 was leaked to the press. It boldly stated that the United States was now the most powerful state in the world by far and it planned to remain in that exalted
position. In other words, the United States would not tolerate a peer competitor. That same message was repeated in the famous 2002 National Security Strategy issued by the
George W. Bush administration. There was much criticism of that document, especially its claims about preemptive war. But hardly a word of protest was raised about the
assertion that the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position in the global balance of power. The bottom line is that the United Statesfor
sound strategic reasonsworked hard for more than a century to gain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Since achieving regional dominance, it has gone to great lengths
to prevent other great powers from controlling either Asia or Europe. Thus, there is little doubt as to how American policy makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia.
The United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In

essence, the United States is likely to behave toward China much the way it acted toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Chinas neighbors are certain to fear its rise as
well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan and
Russia as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam are worried about Chinas ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will
join an American-led balancing coalition to check Chinas rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and even China joined forces with the United States to
contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. How does Taiwan fit into this story? The United States has a rich history of close relations with Taiwan since the early days of the
Cold War, when the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island from the Chinese mainland. However, Washington is not obliged by treaty to come to the

the United States will have powerful incentives to

make Taiwan an important player in its anti-China balancing coalition. First, as noted, Taiwan has
significant economic and military resources and it is effectively a giant aircraft carrier
that can be used to help control the waters close to Chinas all-important eastern coast.
The United States will surely want Taiwans assets on its side of the strategic balance , not on Chinas side.
Second, Americas commitment to Taiwan is inextricably bound up with U.S. credibility in the
region, which matters greatly to policy makers in Washington. Because the United States
is located roughly six thousand miles from East Asia, it has to work hard to convince its
Asian alliesespecially Japan and South Koreathat it will back them up in the event
they are threatened by China or North Korea. Importantly, it has to convince Seoul and Tokyo
that they can rely on the American nuclear umbrella to protect them. This is the thorny problem of extended
deterrence, which the United States and its allies wrestled with throughout the Cold War. If the United States were to sever its military
ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a crisis with China, that would surely send a strong
signal to Americas other allies in the region that they cannot rely on the United States for
protection. Policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths to avoid that outcome and instead maintain Americas reputation as a reliable partner. This means
defense of Taiwan if it is attacked by China or anyone else. Regardless,

they will be inclined to back Taiwan no matter what. While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there
are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United
States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today. In addition,
geography works in Chinas favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a
competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy
makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also
work to Chinas advantage. One might argue that there is a simple way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-

because the United States is

not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is being overrun by China. The stakes
are not high enough to risk a general thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart
too-distant future: put Americas nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem, however,

strategy for America is to not even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan. There is a second reason the United States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it is an especially
dangerous flashpoint, which could easily precipitate a Sino-American war that is not in Americas interest. U.S. policy makers understand that the fate of Taiwan is a matter of
great concern to Chinese of all persuasions and that they will be extremely angry if it looks like the United States is preventing unification. But that is exactly what Washington
will be doing if it forms a close military alliance with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost on the Chinese people. It is important to note in this regard that Chinese nationalism,
which is a potent force, emphasizes how great powers like the United States humiliated China in the past when it was weak and appropriated Chinese territory like Hong Kong

Chinese
nationalism will surely be a force for trouble in those crises, and China will at some point
have the military wherewithal to conquer Taiwan, which will make war even more likely.
and Taiwan. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine crises breaking out over Taiwan or scenarios in which a crisis escalates into a shooting war. After all,

There was no flashpoint between the superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition. Some commentators
liken Berlin in the Cold War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred territory for the Soviet Union and it was actually of little strategic importance for either side. Taiwan is different.
Given how dangerous it is for precipitating a war and given the fact that the United States will eventually reach the point where it cannot defend Taiwan, there is a reasonable
chance that American policy makers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and allow China to coerce it into accepting unification. All of
this is to say that the United States is likely to be somewhat schizophrenic about Taiwan in the decades ahead. On one hand, it has powerful incentives to make it part of a
balancing coalition aimed at containing China. On the other hand, there are good reasons to think that with the passage of time the benefits of maintaining close ties with Taiwan

in the near term, the United States will protect

Taiwan and treat it as a strategic asset. But how long that relationship lasts is an open question. SO FAR, the discussion about Taiwans
will be outweighed by the potential costs, which are likely to be huge. Of course,

future has focused almost exclusively on how the United States is likely to act toward Taiwan. However, what happens to Taiwan in the face of Chinas rise also depends greatly
on what policies Taiwans leaders and its people choose to pursue over time. There is little doubt that Taiwans overriding goal in the years ahead will be to preserve its
independence from China. That aim should not be too difficult to achieve for the next decade, mainly because Taiwan is almost certain to maintain close relations with the United
States, which will have powerful incentives as well as the capability to protect Taiwan. But after that point Taiwans strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in significant ways,
mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not clear that
the United States will be there for Taiwan over the long term. In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has three options. First, it can develop its own nuclear deterrent. Nuclear
weapons are the ultimate deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal would markedly reduce the likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan. Taiwan
pursued this option in the 1970s, when it feared American abandonment in the wake of the Vietnam War. The United States, however, stopped Taiwans nuclear-weapons
program in its tracks. And then Taiwan tried to develop a bomb secretly in the 1980s, but again the United States found out and forced Taipei to shut the program down. It is
unfortunate for Taiwan that it failed to build a bomb, because its prospects for maintaining its independence would be much improved if it had its own nuclear arsenal. No doubt
Taiwan still has time to acquire a nuclear deterrent before the balance of power in Asia shifts decisively against it. But the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and
Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear. The United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South
Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States.
To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation where Taiwan can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States. China will
adamantly oppose Taiwan obtaining a nuclear deterrent, in large part because Beijing surely understands that it would make it difficultmaybe even impossibleto conquer
Taiwan. Whats more, China will recognize that Taiwanese nuclear weapons would facilitate nuclear proliferation in East Asia, which would not only limit Chinas ability to throw
its weight around in that region, but also would increase the likelihood that any conventional war that breaks out would escalate to the nuclear level. For these reasons, China is
likely to make it manifestly clear that if Taiwan decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it will strike its nuclear facilities, and maybe even launch a war to conquer the island. In short,
it appears that it is too late for Taiwan to pursue the nuclear option. Taiwans second option is conventional deterrence. How could Taiwan make deterrence work without nuclear
weapons in a world where China has clear-cut military superiority over the combined forces of Taiwan and the United States? The key to success is not to be able to defeat the

Chinese militarythat is impossiblebut instead to make China pay a huge price to achieve victory. In other words, the aim is to make China fight a protracted and bloody war
to conquer Taiwan. Yes, Beijing would prevail in the end, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory. This strategy would be even more effective if Taiwan could promise China that the
resistance would continue even after its forces were defeated on the battlefield. The threat that Taiwan might turn into another Sinkiang or Tibet would foster deterrence for sure.
This option is akin to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitzs famous risk strategy, which Imperial Germany adopted in the decade before World War I. Tirpitz accepted the fact that
Germany could not build a navy powerful enough to defeat the mighty Royal Navy in battle. He reasoned, however, that Berlin could build a navy that was strong enough to
inflict so much damage on the Royal Navy that it would cause London to fear a fight with Germany and thus be deterred. Moreover, Tirpitz reasoned that this risk fleet might
even give Germany diplomatic leverage it could use against Britain. There are a number of problems with this form of conventional deterrence, which raise serious doubts about
whether it can work for Taiwan over the long haul. For starters, the strategy depends on the United States fighting side by side with Taiwan. But it is difficult to imagine American
policy makers purposely choosing to fight a war in which the U.S. military is not only going to lose, but is also going to pay a huge price in the process. It is not even clear that
Taiwan would want to fight such a war, because it would be fought mainly on Taiwanese territorynot Chinese territoryand there would be death and destruction everywhere.
And Taiwan would lose in the end anyway. Furthermore, pursuing this option would mean that Taiwan would be constantly in an arms race with China, which would help fuel an
intense and dangerous security competition between them. The sword of Damocles, in other words, would always be hanging over Taiwan. Finally, although it is difficult to
predict just how dominant China will become in the distant future, it is possible that it will eventually become so powerful that Taiwan will be unable to put up major resistance
against a Chinese onslaught. This would certainly be true if Americas commitment to defend Taiwan weakens as China morphs into a superpower. Taiwans third option is to
pursue what I will call the Hong Kong strategy. In this case, Taiwan accepts the fact that it is doomed to lose its independence and become part of China. It then works hard to
make sure that the transition is peaceful and that it gains as much autonomy as possible from Beijing. This option is unpalatable today and will remain so for at least the next
decade. But it is likely to become more attractive in the distant future if China becomes so powerful that it can conquer Taiwan with relative ease. So where does this leave
Taiwan? The nuclear option is not feasible, as neither China nor the United States would accept a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Conventional deterrence in the form of a risk strategy
is far from ideal, but it makes sense as long as China is not so dominant that it can subordinate Taiwan without difficulty. Of course, for that strategy to work, the United States
must remain committed to the defense of Taiwan, which is not guaranteed over the long term. Once China becomes a superpower, it probably makes the most sense for Taiwan
to give up hope of maintaining its de facto independence and instead pursue the Hong Kong strategy. This is definitely not an attractive option, but as Thucydides argued long
ago, in international politics the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. By now, it should be glaringly apparent that whether Taiwan is forced to give up
its independence largely depends on how formidable Chinas military becomes in the decades ahead. Taiwan will surely do everything it can to buy time and maintain the
political status quo. But if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China. THERE IS one set of circumstances under which Taiwan can

Taiwanese should hope there is a drastic slowdown in Chinese

economic growth in the years ahead and that Beijing also has serious political problems
on the home front that work to keep it focused inward. If that happens, China will not be in a position to
pursue regional hegemony and the United States will be able to protect Taiwan from
China, as it does now. In essence, the best way for Taiwan to maintain de facto independence is for China to be economically and militarily weak.
avoid this scenario. Specifically, all

Unfortunately for Taiwan, it has no way of influencing events so that this outcome actually becomes reality. When China started its impressive growth in the 1980s, most
Americans and Asians thought this was wonderful news, because all of the ensuing trade and other forms of economic intercourse would make everyone richer and happier.
China, according to the reigning wisdom, would become a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and its neighbors would have little to worry about. Many
Taiwanese shared this optimistic outlook, and some still do. They are wrong. By trading with China and helping it grow into an economic powerhouse, Taiwan has helped create
a burgeoning Goliath with revisionist goals that include ending Taiwans independence and making it an integral part of China. In sum,

isnt just a problem for Taiwan. It is a nightmare.

a powerful China

Impacts: Nationalism

empirics prove the PLA generated nationalistic spirit to get the public on
board to intervene in Koreaalso provided the government a clear avenue
to control dissidents and prevent further US encroachment in the region
Garver 2016 (John, is Emertius Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at
the Georgia Institute of Technology. He specializes in Chinas foreign relations. He served for
many years on a the editorial boards of the journals China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary
China, Issues and Studies, and Asian Security. He is a member of the National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, has testified before the U.S. Congress, and is the author of twelve books
and seventyfive refereed articles and book chapters dealing with China 's foreign relations,
Chinas Quest: the History of the Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China, Chapter
3, War in Korea and Indochina, Oxford University Press, 2016, silbs)
the CCP center that linking Chinese intervention to the crossing
of the 38th parallel by US forces would be politically and militarily advantageous.
Politically, this would enable the CCP to cast the upcoming war as a defensive struggle
to protect Chinas Northeast, something that would be useful with both Chinese and international audiences. Militarily, waiting
for US/UN forces to cross the 38th parallel would shorten PLA logistic lines (which PLA planners knew
would be exposed to US air attack). Mao and the Politburo adopted the proposal . It was essential to convince the Chinese
Also in late August, the NEBDA suggested to

people that the war was necessary to defend China and thus appeal to their nationalism
and patriotism. In line with this tactic, in late September and early October Zhou Enlai made several
statements linking possible Chinese entry to crossing of the 38th parallel by US forces . As
noted earlier, US leaders regarded these warnings as a bluff; they simply did not imagine that
Chinas leaders would feel they could gain from a war with the United States. They were
also confident that US military superiority was so vast that if China did intervene, easy
US victory could be achieved. The US landing at Incheon forced a rapid northward retreat of North Korean forces. Retreat became a rout.
Shortly after the Incheon landing, Stalin (not Kim Il Sung!) cabled Mao asking if China was in a
position to send forces to Korea. Or, Stalin asked, would China allow Kim Il Sung to set up an exile government in Chinas Northeast? Kim Il
Sung himself did not request foreign intervention of Stalin, not Maountil September 29, the day before the first South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel. At that point,
Kim cabled Stalin asking for direct military aid from the Soviet Union or, if that was not possible, assistance in the creation of international volunteers in China. Stalin replied

The CCP Politburo met the next day, October 2, to consider

Kims request. Mao opened the session by saying that the question was not whether but
how fast to intervene. After the session, Mao cabled Stalin that China would send forces to Korea.
Mao explained why: If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and Korean
revolutionary forces were fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be
by telling Kim to address his query to Mao.24 Kim complied.

more rampant, and such a situation would be unfavorable to the whole East. 25 In other words,
the balance between revolution and reaction across Asia would be adversely affected. At the end of another Politburo session on October 4, convened to review difficulties likely
to be encountered during the upcoming Korean intervention, Mao, after listening to a long list of concerns, concluded: All you have said is not without ground. [But] When other
people are in a crisis, how can we stand aside with our arms folded?26 Peng Dehuai, selected by Mao to command Chinas forces in Korea, addressed one of the concerns

Some comrades had expressed apprehension that war with the United
States would make achievement of domestic unity difficult. In fact, Peng asserted, war
raised during the Politburo session.

would provide an opportunity to deflate the bluster of domestic reactionary forces.

On

October 7, a US division crossed the 38th parallel. The next day Mao ordered 200,000 of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV), as the NEBDA had been renamed, to enter
North Korea to assist the Korean revolutionary forces and confront the American invaders. The appellation Chinese Peoples Volunteers was a ploy designed to make Chinas
entry look unofficial, making a formal state of war, and thus activation of the February 1950 treaty, somewhat less likely. The operational objective of Chinese forces when they

entered Korea in October 1950 was nothing less than expulsion of US forces from the Korean peninsula. Following a decisive Politburo meeting on October 2, Mao informed
Stalin of Chinas decision to intervene, explaining: [W]e shall aim at resolving the conflict, that is, to eliminate the US troops within Korea or to drive them and other countries
aggressive forces out [of Korea]. we must prepare for the possibility that the US would declare a general war on China or it would at least bomb Chinas major cities and
industrial base [But we are] more concerned about whether Chinese troops could wipe out the American forces within Koreas boundary As long as our troops are able to
eliminate the Eighth Army [one of Americas old armies, with considerable combat effectiveness] the danger of US declaration of war on China would not be grave In
other words, since the Korean conflict can actually be resolved on the basis of defeating the US such a war would be limited in scale and would not last long. 27 (Emphasis

If the United States prevailed in Korea, Washington would become more arrogant
and undertake increased aggression in the Taiwan Strait, Indochina, the Philippines, and
elsewhere in Asia. If unchecked, US imperialism would encircle China. Then China might be compelled to
added.)

fight a war on two or even several fronts. The US intervention in Korea was, Mao believed, part of a grand US strategy of encircling China. If US intervention in Korea was

Allowing the United States to

perennially threaten Chinas industrial heartland would also mean, Mao explained to the decisive Politburo
session on October 2, that We would have to wait there year after year, unsure of when the enemy will
attack us.29
defeated, the United States would be more cautious, and revolutionary forces across Asia would be encouraged.28

Impacts: CCP Collapse

Triggers multiple scenarios for conflict
Perkinson 12
(Jessica, MA International Affairs, American University, frmr Program
Coordinator Center for Asian Studies, American University, The Potential
for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark, pg
online @
http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson_american_0
008N_10238display.pdf?sequence=1 //um-ef)
There are a number of

points of instability that have caused large-scale unrest in China in the past,

and that continue to threaten the stability of the CCP as the sole governing body of
China today . Examined as case studies and analyzed through the lens of IR theory, the issues of economic and environmental instability in China are
enlightening as a framework through which to understand specific challenges that the
CCP faces to the satisfaction of its people with its governance. Though China continues to grow at an astounding rate
(upwards of 10% growth in GDP, annually1 ) there are a number of critical issues facing the economic planners in
the Chinese government, including a staggering income gap, a historically unsustainable
growth rate, a disagreement between economic and political ideologies and rising
unemployment. In addition, as China grows economically, environmental degradation has begun to weigh heavily on the lives of the Chinese people. Among the most pervasive environmental
issues are indiscriminate dam building, critically polluted water resources, and waste-dumping by foreign countries into Chinas loosely environmentally regulated society. If China is unable
to correct for these conditions through economic and environmental policy reform, it is likely that the country
will see increased level of unrest from the Chinese population . Should the CCP undergo
some sort of dramatic transformation whether that be significant reform or complete
collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 the implications for international and US national security are
vast . Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the
maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many
members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade.
China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Koreas only allies, and it
is argued that

instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the

already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait . For the United
States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the
United States largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP
could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US . In addition, China is the
largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US. It is with this in mind that China scholars within the
United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because

the potential for reform, instability or even collapse

of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole . For
the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that
the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability,

China watchers who predict the complete collapse or

fall of the CCP in the near future are likely missing some of the more subtle nuances of
particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

the CCPs rule. My research documents that while China has a number of obstacles to overcome in order to avoid economic, environmental and social crises, there is no evidence that such
crises will unequivocally result in the complete collapse or overthrow of the CCP. In addition, a number of persuasive and thoroughly-researched works by preeminent scholars suggest that the CCP has shown a
high level of flexibility in the past and has been able to overcome social unrest and political movements through various tactics. However, the CCP must overcome its looming economic and social challenges in
the near future, or they may be forced to take on significant reforms in response to more significant domestic crises. Literature Review There is a significant amount of research that has investigated how Chinese
leadership structures have collapsed in the past, and how unrest and political movements might lead to significant government reform in regard to Chinas environmental challenges and points of potential
economic instability. Likewise there have been 11 theoretical speculations about what significant reform of the current Chinese government could mean for the regional and international community345. However,
there is very little if any work done that synthesizes the fragmented body of knowledge into one comprehensive work focusing on the potential for environmental and economic instability as triggers to unrest
and political instability in China, and, thus, to regional and international security. The first group of materials relates to how Chinese leadership structures have collapsed in the past. The first work, Holy War In
China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877 by Hodong Kim outlines the events leading up to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912. Specifically, the book details the revolutions that
began in the Xinjiang city of Kucha, a province that continues to suffer from a great deal of conflict and unrest today, and its spread to neighboring provinces and eventually to greater China. This rebellion
compounded with other rebellions across China and culminated in the eventual overthrow of the Chinese Qing government in 1912.6 These events are also detailed in Jack Grays Rebellions and Revolutions:
China from the 1800s to the 1980s. Gray details the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties and government from the 1800s through the 1980s, including rebellions that overthrew them and how subsequent
governments were put in place. This is a useful work in comparing the rule of the CCP today with that of previous rulers (such as the Qing dynasty and the founder of the modern-day CCP, Mao Zedong) as it is

There are also scholarly works detailing

distinct differences between the way the highly inflexible leadership of the Qing dynasty
handled the demands of political leadership and how the CCP has thus far dealt with
demands for change outside their control. For example, according to David Shambaugh in his book Chinas Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation,
inclusive of a number of leading groups and gives the reader a thorough understanding of Chinese political history.7

though the CCP clearly has many challenges facing the stability of its current form of rule, it has shown a great deal more flexibility than the Qing dynasty did and has committed to some moderate reforms in
order to prevent or postpone imminent danger to their rule.8

Another set of materials consists of theoretical analyses of

how unrest can lead to widespread conflict . One particularly informative and intriguing theoretical work on how unrest and political movements can lead
to significant government reform is Peter C. Sederbergs Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change. This book examines one particular theory that is useful for my analyses, namely,

social-psychological theory . His methodology illustrates a particularly intriguing way to theorize about
social unrest and government reform, namely interpretive analyses, in which social
scientists examine the motives, interactions and expectations of those involved in social
movements. This approach often advances the assumption that social movements tend to succeed because a group of people with similar motives gather and interact, and coalesce off each
others zeal for the movement and to work toward a common goal9 in this case, reformation of the standing government. A second work, Stephen K. Sandersons Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to
Political and Social Change, outlines two more theories useful to the analysis of unrest and political change - Marxist theory and state-centered theory. Sanderson argues, for example, that although the last
century has essentially disproven fundamentalist Marxist theory (as no advanced capitalist societies have seen full-scale socialist revolution), modern theories continue to draw from the Marxist theme that
economic exploitation and class struggle are the primary drivers behind revolution.10 One example lies in the anthropologist Eric Wolfs Peasant Wars of the 20th Century (1969), in which he examined social

This
finding is significant when used in examining Chinas economic situation today because,
though the Chinese people are used to growth and development, there are flaws in the
Chinese economy that could lead this system to be disrupted in the near future. On the other hand,
unrest leading to reform in Mexico, Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba. Wolf found that, when economic equilibrium is disrupted, the chance for social movements is increased.11

state-centered theory claims that states or nations cannot be viewed in isolation, and that the international context within which states operate contributes greatly to revolutionary situations and outcomes.12 In
his book Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Political and Social Change, Sanderson references Theda Skocpols Theory of Great Revolutions. Skocpols primary argument is that, when examining the
causes and outcomes of revolutions, one must always take into account the state as an actor, and not just the smaller groups driving the revolution.13 These works lay a solid foundation for my research. Though
they do not relate their theories directly to my case studies of the potential for political instability in China, they provide a groundwork of theory with which to analyze the case studies. A third group of materials
focuses specifically on the cases of environmental and economic instability in China. There are two works in particular that detail Chinas environmental challenges. The first book, When A Billion Chinese Jump by
Jonathan Watts, is a methodical account of the authors travels throughout China as he sought to learn about all the ways in which the stunning rate of growth of the Chinese economy was degrading the
environment and harming its people. From indiscriminate dam-building, particularly in Sichuan Province, to the cancer villages of Henan, to the recycling facilities in Guangdong and Guanxi, Watts lays out for
the reader a sad tale of destruction and suffering in the wake of the Chinese desire for growth.14 A second work, Chinas Dilemma, edited by Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo, is a compilation of articles by
numerous authors. This book outlines various challenges that China is facing in the wake of its unprecedented economic growth, from emissions, to water resources, to the coal industry. Its focus is on economic
effects on the environment, how China has responded to them, and what the implications are for the future of Chinese growth.15 In addition, there are two works that detail Chinas economic instability. The first is
China: Is Rapid Growth Sustainable?, edited by Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, which is a compilation of articles by preeminent scholars in the field of international economics and Chinese economy studies. The
articles contained in this book focus on the rapidity and sustainability of Chinas growth, detailing such struggles as unemployment levels and the income gap.16 The second work that details Chinas economic
instability is One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary China, edited by Martin King Whyte. These author focus specifically on the income gap in China and its implications for economic
and social stability in the country. They discuss a number of factors that lead to this income gap at length, including the hukou system in China, which continues to deny some Chinese citizens access to
professional and educational opportunities.17 A fourth group focuses on the possible implications for regional and international security should the Chinese government undergo significant reforms, during which
uncertainty could shift the balance of security in the East Asian region and international community. An article by Geoff Dyer, Jamil Anderlini and Henny Sender of the Financial Times titled Chinas Lending Hits

developing countries

News Heights, details Chinas recent push to invest heavily in

. They point out that China signed loans of at least $110 billion to other developing countries
governments and companies in 2009 and 2010, more than the World Bank lent to developing nations in those years.18 This phenomenon is also detailed in Joshua Kurlantzicks Charm Offensive19, suggesting

these countries are now significantly dependent upon the stability of the
Chinese government and economy for their economic stability and well-being. A second work, Chinas
the importance of the topic

North Korea Policy by Bates Gill of the United States Institute of Peace, does just as its title suggests it details the China-North Korea relationship, relating it to regional and international security. In general, the
author concludes that Chinas North Korea policy is centered largely on maintaining security in the region by bolstering North Koreas economic growth, based on its experience with economic growth as a
stabilizing force.20 China is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, weighing in on critical decisions related to international security.

Without a stable

government, its participation in international organizations and the maintenance of

international security could be interrupted during times of uncertainty and reform. It is obvious to anyone who
understands even the basics of the relationship between China and the international
community that the potential for instability of the CCP could mean the potential
instability of the entire Asian continent , and of the international structure as a whole . It is
therefore critical to have a deep, meaningful understanding of what Chinese instability could mean for world order, in order to be prepared for how the CCP may handle large-scale social or political movements
that threaten its rule. A last set of materials focuses on the possible implications for US national security should the Chinese government undergo significant reforms and destabilization. The first work, Americas
Coming War With China by Ted Galen Carpenter, details the debate between Taiwan, China and the US over the status of the island of Taiwan. Specifically, Carpenter claims that the Taiwan debate is so tense
that the United States should prepare for an eventual military conflict with China over the issue.21 This is closely related to my research topic because both China and Taiwan have made statements in the past
and taken actions that suggest that they would act to reclaim the others territory in the event of political instability. Should the U.S. become engaged in some serious conflict with China that disrupts their
burgeoning economic partnership, the national security of the U.S. may in turn be in jeopardy. There are a number of resources that detail the United States dependence on China as an economic and trading
partner. The United States Censuss database titled Top Trading Partners Total Trade, Exports, Imports, shows China as the top trading partner of the United States outside of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).22 In addition, the United States Department of the Treasury has a resource titled Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, that lays out the USs continued dependence on China as a
lender the primary holder of US treasury securities funding the federal government.23

The United States remains dependent upon China

not only as a trade partner, but also as a source of stability for international threats such
as nuclear weapons and regional concerns which the US is involved in, such as security
across the Taiwan Strait.

Impacts: Retal Collapses Rels/SCS Stab

And, arms sales spurs retal collapses relations and escalates south china
sea instability
CBN 2015 (China Business News, US Arms Deal For Taiwan: A New Apple Of Discord
Between China and US, http://www.chinabusinessnews.com/1986-us-arms-deal-for-taiwan-anew-apple-of-discord-between-china-and-us/, December 17, 2015, silbs)
China has protested the US administration's go ahead of $1.83 billion arm sales to Taiwan
and threatened to impose penalties on the companies involved, according to Reuters on Thursday. China
considers Taiwan as an indisputable part of its territory and therefore, strongly condemns the sale of US arms to it. Vice Foreign Minister of China
Zheng Zeguang called for US charge Kaye Lee and recorded a formal protest over the deal. The current deal represents first arms sale
to Taiwan in last four years. It is believed to provide the rogue province as termed by China with amphibious assault
vehicles, Javellin missiles, anti-tank missiles and stinger missiles. The deal, which is believed to be
facilitated by Lockheed Martin Coropration (NYSE:LMT) and Raytheon company of Thailand, is also going to provide close-in-weapon
systems to Taiwan. According to Chinese news agency Xinhua, the Chinese government is taking the issue
very seriously and terms the authorization of US arms sales to Taiwan as a grave
concern to the Asian giants sovereignty. Mr. Zheng believes that the deal is a severe
violation of the international law and basic norms of international relations. Therefore, China
has decided to take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interest including
imposing sanctions on the companies that facilitate the arms deal. The US State Department has announced that the main contractors for
the latest apple of discord between China and US include Raytheon RTN.N and Lockheed Martin Corporation (NYSE:LMT). The US-based global security and aerospace
company Lcokheed Martin signed an agreement with Thailand based reignwood group to build a 10 Megawatt offshore plant for providing energy to a luxury resort in Southern

China considers its national security and sovereignty with utmost seriousness and is
likely to consider this deal as a breach of international protocol of respecting national
boundaries by the US. The Asian giant is already reckoned by many as the next superpower and therefore, there is an unofficial
China.

cold war between US and China . We believe that these kinds of events are only likely to add fuel
to fire . It remains to be seen to what extent China penalizes the involved companies. The Chinese stakeholders in both
Lockheed Martin as well as Raytheon are likely to feel the heat of the retaliatory
measures that China is going to undertake . However, CBN believes that the current advance of US in terms
of selling arms to Taiwan at such a massive scale is only going to sour relations
between US and China. The relations between US and China are already tense due to
Chinas advances in the South China sea region and this deal is going to spur up the
tension.

Impacts: Aerospace k Airpower

Global nuclear war
Pfaltzgraff 10 Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at.
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and
Policy, Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century, p. xiii-9
with its inherent characteristics of
speed , range , and flexibility , airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces

In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how,

vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare.

Control of the air has become indispensable to national

security because it allows the U nited S tates and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free
from enemy air attack. With control of the air the U nited S tates can leverage the advantages of
air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force
possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility , long-range strike , and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ). The benefits of airpower extend
beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber
domains are increasingly interdependent . General Schwartz stated that the Air Forces challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements
of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high
and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler

the U nited S tates

faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and
cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will
put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative
but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition,

strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmen who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with
innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid
the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and
penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then
loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called
attention to the need for what he described as a family of systems that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single
purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this
effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and
situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing
access to the four global commons maritime, air, space, and cyberspace will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is
endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to Americas ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is
essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as
cold atoms, pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber
capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector
collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: How can the Air Force better
address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and
viability of the nations nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs,
especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables?
How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in
bandwidth-constrained environments? In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? How should the USAF posture its overseas
forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to
ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? How can the Air
Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues
were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session
included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge acceptable risks. Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would
be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions.
However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is
maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and
tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti
relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor
such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an

major challenges for the U nited S tates and its allies, including technology
proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing
infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical
infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack ; unconventional warfare and irregular
impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines

challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security , U.S. energy
dependence , demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars
(particularly over access to water ), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or
failing states . TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing
multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and
efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/ biological agents. The battlefields of
the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and
as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced
missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely
to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles
become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that
the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century
security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy

the number of actors

states and armed non-state groupsis growing, together with strategies and capabilities
based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of
Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First,

categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to
ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies
and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and
its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply,
and its space assets. Fourth,

the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state

conflict. This includes North Korea , which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran , which
is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S.
Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if
necessary, enforce Chinas influence over its neighbors including our regional allies and partners weaponry.2 These threats include ballistic missiles ,
aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may

the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically

with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed nonstate actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will
supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Fifth,

resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet
another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and
other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends show an
unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of
threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop

scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: A nuclear Iran that engages in or
supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy An unstable Pakistan
that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists A
Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war A nuclear North Korea that escalates
tensions on the Korean peninsula What all of these have in common is the
indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management .

Impacts: Aerospace key to Competitiveness

The aerospace industry is key to US competitiveness
Tomkins 4/14- Richard, staff writer, Aerospace, defense sector largest contributor to U.S.
exports, (http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2016/04/14/Aerospace-defensesector-largest-contributor-to-US-exports/4161460649985/) JB
The U.S.

aerospace and defense sector's gross exports increased by $5 billion in 2015 and are
expected to rise this year, according to a Deloitte report. The report -- U.S. Aerospace & Defense Export
Competitiveness Study -- said the $5 billion achieved in 2015 represents a 58.9 percent increase in
the last five years. The increase for 2016 is expected to be 3.2 percent. Deloitte says new defense platform products and expected

U.S. aerospace and

sector was the largest contributor to America's net exports during the 2010 to 2015
period, making it one of the few domestic industrial sectors with a positive trade
balance," said Tom Captain, vice chairman, Deloitte LLP, and aerospace and defense sector leader. "The sector is also
a top employer, taxpayer and contributor to the nation's gross domestic product , making
foreign military sales by U.S. defense contractors are expected to contribute to 2016 increases. "The
defense

it key to U.S. manufacturing competitiveness." Deloitte said that in analyzing the period 2010 to 2015 it found
the aerospace and defense sector accounted for 9.5 percent of total U.S. exports in 2015,
with the sector's contribution increasing from 7.1 percent of total exports in 2010; the total aerospace and defense gross exports in
2015 were $143.3 billion; and China was the largest aerospace and defense export market for the U.S. in 2015, followed by the U.K.
and France.

Impacts: Aerospace k Econ

The US aerospace industry is key to the US economy and keeping
Americans safe- collapse of the industry destroys any chance of economic
recovery and devastates the US manufacturing base
AIA 4/21- AIA, AIA: REPORT HIGHLIGHTS POSITIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY, (http://www.aiaaerospace.org/news/aia_report_highlights_positive_economic_impact_of_aerospace_and_defe
nse_industry/) JB
The American

aerospace and defense industry is a vital component of the U.S. economy,

not solely for the role the industry plays in national security, transportation and
technological innovation, but also because its influence spans many sectors and every
state countrywide. This is the conclusion of a new study commissioned by AIA from business information firm IHS Inc.
about the industrys economic impact. This new study demonstrates definitively that Americas aerospace and
defense industry is an engine of economic progress, in addition to its having a vital role
in helping keep our citizens safe and secure , said AIA President and CEO David F. Melcher. When you hear
people talk about the importance of ensuring we keep good manufacturing jobs in the U.S., you can start with the solid foundation of
our industry. In the study, IHS estimates that in 2015 the U.S.

aerospace and defense industry fueled the following

1.7 million jobs within businesses producing end-user
goods and services and within the industrys supply chain, with about 531,000 jobs in the industrys
contributions to the U.S. economy: Supported

commercial aerospace segment (e.g. civil and general aviation aircraft, helicopters and space systems) and 511,000 jobs in the
defense and national security segment of the industry (e.g. military aircraft, ground and sea systems, armaments and space
systems). Represented

approximately two percent of the nations employment base and 13

percent of the nations manufacturing employment base. Generated $300 billion in
economic value, representing 1.8 percent of total nominal Gross Domestic Product in the U.S., and 10 percent of
manufacturing output. Produced labor income approximately 44 percent above the national
average $93,000 average labor income per job reflecting the highly skilled nature of the workforce. Provided tax
receipts to federal, state and local governments from companies and their employees of
$63 billion, or about 1.7 percent of total tax revenues. Melcher noted that contributing to economic performance of
the American aerospace and defense industry of late has been strong growth in
international markets, including a record balance of trade in 2015 of $69.6 billion, which
has helped accelerate our countrys recent economic recovery. Melcher pointed out that the good
news abroad helped

our industry deal with the negative headwinds caused by cuts to

federal defense, civil aviation and space budgets

market forces

mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and global

that have negatively impacted the U.S. manufacturing base.

Impacts: Aerospace key to U.S. Econ

And, U.S. aerospace is critical to the U.S. economy exports outweigh all
other industries
U.S. International Trade Administration 16
(AEROSPACE SPOTLIGHT The Aerospace Industry in the United States,
pg online @ https://www.selectusa.gov/aerospace-industry-unitedstates //um-ef)
U.S. aerospace manufacturers are very competitive internationally. In 2015, the U.S. aerospace
industry contributed $144.1 billion in export sales to the U.S. economy. The industrys positive
trade balance of $82.5 billion that year was the largest trade surplus of any manufacturing
industry, supporting high-wage jobs for hundreds of thousands of American workers. At the end
of 2013, the inward stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) into U.S. aerospace manufacturing
industry totaled $22.7 billion, growing annually since 2008. The 7.7 percent compound annual
growth rate through 2013 outpaced the compound annual growth rate of FDI in all industries
over the same period. An indication of the strong appeal of the United States as a platform for
aerospace manufacturing is the Aerospace FDI Expo that was cosponsored by the U.S.
Department of Commerce in October 2015. Participants included 64 representatives of non-U.S.
companies from 23 countries. Foreign firms are attracted to the U.S. aerospace market because
it is the largest in the world and has a skilled and hospitable workforce, extensive distribution
systems, diverse offerings, and strong support at the local and national level for policy and
promotion. According to a study by the U.S. Department of Commerce, aerospace exports
directly and indirectly support more jobs than the export of any other commodity. The U.S.
aerospace industry directly employs about 500,000 workers in scientific and technical jobs
across the nation and supports more than 700,000 jobs in related fields. Investment in the U.S.
aerospace industry is facilitated by a large pool of well-trained machinists, aerospace engineers,
and other highly-skilled workers with experience in the aerospace industry. Investors in the U.S.
aerospace industry are supported by the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) gold standard
of aviation safety, boosting the confidence worldwide in the safety of aircraft and aircraft parts
manufactured in the United States. The FAA has Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASAs)
that facilitate the airworthiness approval in 47 countries outside the United States of American
made aerospace products. (By contrast, the European Union has three such agreements.)

Econ Advantage

1ac econ v.1

Taiwan/China tensions are rising because of Tsais electionChina will use
its economic stake in Taiwan to isolate it from global trade to pressure her
to into falling in line
Glaser 2016 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, she is
concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with
CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia, prior she served as
a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and
State, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in
Taiwan, April, 2016, A Report of the CSIS CHINA POWER PROJECT, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf, silbs)
U.S. Interests in Cross-Strait Relations U.S. officials often say that the United States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in
the Taiwan Strait.1 This may be truer today than ever before. Although

relations between the United States and

China remain a complex mix of cooperation and competition, friction in the security
realm is increasing, especially in the maritime areas around Chinas periphery. The South and East China Seas have been the primary
focus of U.S.-Chinese rivalry in recent years, while the Taiwan Strait has been relatively calm. With the
presidential inauguration on May 20 of Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Peoples Progressive Party (DPP),
which has long advocated independence for Taiwan, many observers are watching the
cross-Strait situation for any signs of a resurgence of tensions. The principal reason that the United States
prioritizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is that a spike in cross-Strait tension increases the risk of a
wider conflict through political and even military escalation, which could draw in the
United States . During both the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies, heightened Chinese concern about the
potential that Taiwan could break away from the Mainland and become independent produced tensions
that raised the specter of Chinese use of military force against the island. In both cases, Chinese
pressure on Taiwan resulted in the United States becoming involved in various ways.
The United States also has a strong interest in Taiwans economic prosperity and in a
greater meaningful role for Taiwans government and NGOs in the international
community. Chinese distrust of Tsais intentions would almost certainly lead Beijing to take
measures that would be harmful to Taiwans economy , including creating difficulties in
implementation of existing cross-Strait economic agreements , and preventing Taipei
from signing free-trade agreements with other countries and participating in regional
economic integration . China would also seek to constrain Taiwans participation in
regional and multilateral organizations. Cross-Strait discord was kept in check in the past eight years, primarily due to
the policies of Taiwans President Ma Ying-jeou who accorded priority to achieving a stable and normal relationship with China. Early in his
presidency, Ma adopted a pledge of no unification, no independence, and no use of force. On the basis of the 1992 Consensus an understanding
reached after talks in Hong Kong between representatives from Beijing and Taipei that Taiwan and the Mainland belong to one China, even as they
disagreed on whether China meant the Republic of China (ROC) or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)the two sides of the Strait reestablished

The improvement in cross-Strait relations

benefited the United States, since it removed Taiwan as an irritant in U.S.-China relations
and enabled the Obama administration to focus on other challenges. If cross-Strait
tensions resurface during Tsai Ing-wens term in office, it would bring Taiwan back to the
front burner of U.S.-China relations at a time when there is likely to be a high level of mutual distrust and substantial
channels of dialogue and cooperation and signed 23 economic agreements.

friction over other issues. There

is a great deal at stake, therefore, for the United States as well as

for Taiwan and China in the future development of relations across the Taiwan Strait. This
report outlines Tsai Ing-wens policy toward China and Beijings policy toward Taiwan. It then analyzes cross-Strait relations going forward by laying out
three alternative scenarios. Finally, it proposes policy recommendations for the United States at the current juncture. The report is informed by
interviews conducted in China and Taiwan March 14 19, 2016.

Chinas using economic coercion strategieswithdrawal of international

institution support, stealing diplomatic allies, and slowing tourism
Kazer 5/16/16 (William, expert on Asian politics, correspondent for the Wall Street Journal
and Dow Jones News based in Beijing. He also worked as a correspondent and editor for
Reuters in Beijing where he covered the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests in 1989 and had
postings in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Bangkok, as well as New York. Kazer helped
Reuters set up its Chinese-language financial newswire and has worked as a consultant and
adviser in the media sector in China, Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen to Face China Tensions and
Sagging Economy; Beijing has increased pressure on Tsai by obstructing Taiwan's participation
in international meetings, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tensions-sagging-economy-awaittaiwans-new-leader-1463599803, Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2016, silbs)
TAIPEI--When Taiwan's new president takes the oath of office this week, two vital constituencies--one at home, the other across the strait in mainland

Tsai Ing-wen heads a political party nominally in favor of

Taiwan's independence from China, a red line for Beijing that would formalize a split from
a stalemated civil war more than six decades ago. At Friday's inauguration, she is expected to reiterate her campaign
China--will be listening hard, but for different things.

pledge to maintain the status quo, even though many voters who propelled her to a landslide election victory want her to check China's growing sway
over the island. Beijing, meanwhile, has

increased pressure on Ms. Tsai by obstructing Taiwan's

participation in international meetings, stopping cooperation on cross-border criminal
investigations and hinting at economic retaliation--all to extract assurances that she will
pursue policies more to China's liking. "She will do what she can but she can't just ignore what the Taiwanese people want,"
said William Stanton, a former diplomat who ran the U.S.'s de facto embassy in Taiwan and is now director of the Center for Asia Policy at National
Tsing Hua University. China's Taiwan Affairs Office didn't respond to requests for comment on the government's tactics. Since Ms. Tsai's election in
January, the office has said Beijing will work with any political group that opposes Taiwan independence and supports "one China." A tricky balancing

Ms. Tsai needs calm on the China front to be able to turn her
attention to domestic issues. She must retool a flagging economy that had its worst
performance in six years in 2015 and is heavily reliant on exports, many of which flow to
China. Bad relations between Taipei and Beijing can exact a toll on the island's economy.
Tensions also threaten to enmesh the U.S., which by law is supposed to help Taiwan maintain its defense capability and
whose credibility in the region could be at risk if it abandons the democratic island to pressure from China. Taiwan's departing
president, Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party, managed to keep relations with China on an even keel. He
act confronts Taiwan's first woman president.

expanded economic and political ties with the mainland during his eight years in office, even holding a brief meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping,

Key to that progress, according to Mr. Ma, was his

support for a vague 1992 accord in which both sides agreed they were part of " one China" -- without defining what that means. The
the first face-to-face meeting between leaders from the two sides since 1945.

understanding, which became known as the "92 consensus," is embraced by Beijing, which sees it as a commitment by Taiwan to the status quo and
perhaps to eventual reunification. In Taiwan, however, some people see it as a convenient formulation that allows relations to move forward, while

Ms. Tsai has thus far

refrained from using the terms "one China " or "92 consensus" -- words that Beijing
wants to hear. To encourage her to utter them, Beijing has been sending signals of
possible consequences should Ms. Tsai hold out. "Beijing is trying to test her," said Lin Ting-Hui, vice president at
Taiwan Brain Trust, a policy research organization in Taipei. "They are trying to see how much pressure she can
endure." Tsai Ing-wen, 59 Taiwan President-elect * Education: Masters of Law from Cornell University, Ph.D. from London School of Economics.
others, particularly supporters of Ms. Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party, reject that any such consensus exists.

* Career: A negotiator on Taiwan's entry to the WTO; headed the Mainland Affairs Council. * Platform: Promised to revitalize Taiwan's economy and
reduce dependence on China, while not provoking Beijing.

A first move, analysts said, is further constraining the

already limited role Beijing allows Taiwan to have internationally. Two months after Ms. Tsai's election,
China renewed diplomatic relations with Gambia , breaking a tacit truce against picking
off Taiwan's dwindling band of diplomatic partners, now down to 22 mostly smaller countries. Beijing and
Taipei have refused to diplomatically recognize any nation that recognizes the other.
Taiwan also experienced trouble attending international meetings, one with the World
Health Assembly, which gathers members of the World Health Organization, and the other a steel conference in
Brussels. In two separate cases of alleged international telephone fraud, Kenya and Malaysia last month handed Taiwanese suspects over to
China for investigation, despite protests from Taipei. China said its citizens were victims of fraud and it should lead the criminal investigations. In some

Taiwan's media have for weeks reported that China may

reduce the number of mainland tourists to the island, threatening a range of businesses
from hotels to restaurants and airlines to tour operators. In the January-March period, tourist arrivals from
past cases, suspects were handed back to Taiwan.

China, who account for around 40% of the visitors to the island, were actually higher than a year ago, but new applications for permits have been
declining, according to local media reports. Taiwan's tourism bureau said more-recent figures are still being compiled; its Chinese counterpart didn't
respond to a request for comment. Ms .

Tsai's administration plans to re-gear Taiwan's economy by

boosting trade and other economic ties with Southeast Asia, Japan, and India. But
economists said it won't be easy to make up for any lost business from China--the
world's second-largest economy. Barring Ms. Tsai's acknowledging the "92 consensus," she is likely to get little near term help
from the mainland. "Relations between Tsai and Beijing will not warm up instantly," said Lin Chong-Pin, a former deputy defense minister and an expert
on mainland affairs. "It will take time."

Taiwans export reliant economy is being dragged down by the Chinese

economic slowdownthey need to pull away and diversify trade partners
The Economist 2015 (Taiwans economy Straitened circumstances Weaker growth
exposes the downside of ties with China, November 14, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21678276-weaker-growth-exposesdownside-ties-china-straitened-circumstances, silbs)
THE Chinese theory about economic integration with Taiwan is that it will bind the two
together politically. Taiwan will become ever more reliant on China for its prosperity, paving the way to eventual unification. Many in
Taiwan fear this process is under way. But now the premise of the theorythat closer ties with China are essential for growth
is being tested by a sharp economic slowdown in Taiwan. Over his nearly eight years in office, Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwans president, has pushed
for a detente with China. A flurry of deals, including a limited free-trade agreement, has
fuelled business ties. Taiwanese exports to China have soared, as has Chinese investment in Taiwan. A recent meeting between Mr Ma
and Xi Jinping, Chinas president, in Singaporethe first between leaders of the two countrieswas meant to show the promise of more co-operation.

Awkwardly, though, Taiwans economy is in a slump. GDP shrank by 1% year on year in the third quarter, its first
contraction since 2009. Last year Taiwan grew by 3.8%. Many analysts had expected about the same this year. Instead, it will do well to hit 1%, says

The global slowdown in trade is partly to blame.

Exports are the lifeblood of Taiwans economy, accounting for nearly three-quarters of its
output. Yet other export-driven economies in Asia such as South Korea and Singapore
are not suffering as much. The benefits from Taiwans rapprochement with China appear
to be topping out. Taiwans trade surplus with China was 18% smaller in the first nine months of this year than in the same period in 2014.
Gordon Sun of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research.

Chinese investment is down by nearly two-thirds from a year earlier. Even Chinese tourists, still flocking to Europe and other parts of Asia, are showing

Taiwan is simply a victim of

Chinas slowing growth. But there is widespread concern that something deeper is at
work: that Taiwan is losing ground to China and ill-equipped to fight back. So prevalent is this view that Taiwanese
less interest in Taiwan: visitor numbers are up by just 5% this year. One interpretation is that

routinely refer to the threat from Chinese firms as the red supply chain. Until a few years ago, the economic relationship between China and Taiwan
was symbiotic. Taiwanese firms, among the worlds biggest makers of electronic components, needed Chinas cheap labour; China craved Taiwans
technical know-how. But this complementarity has given way to competition. Chinese producers of petrochemicals, steel, computers and digital
displays have moved into terrain once occupied by Taiwan. Taiwanese firms with operations in China are themselves buying more materials and

The
structural challenge does not come from China alone. Taiwans greatest strength is in
making parts for computers and mobile phones. But the global markets for both are
machinery from Chinese suppliers. Chinese firms are now trying to break into semiconductors, Taiwans last big industrial redoubt.

increasingly saturated. Short of a new consumer crazesome firms pin their hopes on wearables or 3D printersthe hardware
industrys future looks bleak. For an export-led economy like Taiwan to reinvent itself, it needs to stay
immersed in global trade. Here, though, it faces the cold reality of its geopolitical
ostracism. Absent Chinas express approval, other countries are reluctant to engage in free-trade talks with Taiwan. Yet Japan, South
Korea and ChinaTaiwans main competitorsare signing lots of their own deals. The easiest answer would be for Taiwan to open itself yet wider to
trade with China. Politically, though, this is a non-starter. Taiwanese students last year occupied the parliament to protest against a services trade deal
with China. Tsai Ing-wen, Mr Mas likely successor , is

determined to tilt Taiwan away from China. She wants

to foster closer links with South-East Asia and to bring Taiwan into the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, an American-led free-trade deal that covers 40% of the global economy but
excludes China (see article). It will be very hard for Taiwan to escape Chinas economic orbit. If Ms
Tsai gets her way, it will not be for lack of trying.

The PRC is unsatisfied with Tsais promises of sticking to the status quo on
ambiguous relationsgreater reassurances are necessary to preserve
cross-strait relations
Glaser 2016 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, she is
concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with
CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia, prior she served as
a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and
State, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in
Taiwan, April, 2016, A Report of the CSIS CHINA POWER PROJECT, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf, silbs)
During the presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen set out her basic stance on her
policy toward China, which was that she would maintain the status quo . By adopting this position,
she adroitly positioned herself in the mainstream of Taiwan public opinion, which favors preservation of the status quo over independence or reunification. Tsai also
sought to reassure the public that cross-Strait economic ties would not suffer under DPP
rule. Although on a few occasions she offered some elaboration of what she meant by her pledge to maintain the status quo, for most of the campaign Tsai focused on the
domestic economy and social issues, not cross-Strait relations. Since she held a significant lead in public opinion polls and the
majority of Taiwans voters supported her stance, there was no electoral need for Tsai to
provide greater specificity despite repeated demands from the candidates from the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Peoples First Party (PFP) to do so.
The most detailed explication of Tsai Ing-wens policy toward Beijing prior to Taiwans January 16 election
was delivered not in Taiwan, but rather in the United States, where concern about her ability to maintain
cross-Strait stability had sparked U.S. official criticism in her first bid for the presidency four years earlier.2 In a carefully
worded speech, which Tsai gave at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., on June 3, 2015,
she made a deliberate attempt to respond, albeit indirectly, to Chinas demands that the DPP
accept the 1992 Consensus and its core connotation that the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. In her speech, Tsai called for the
Tsai Ing-wens Policy toward China

two sides of the Taiwan Strait to treasure and secure the accumulated outcomes of
more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges, adding that these accumulated
outcomes will serve as the firm basis of my efforts to further the peaceful and stable
development of cross-Strait relations.3 Tsais use of the phrase more than twenty years was a clear allusion to the talks that produced
what later came to be called the 1992 Consensus and marked a significant departure from her position when she ran for president four years earlier. At that time, Tsai had
argued that the 1992 Consensus did not exist and proposed instead a Taiwan consensus, which, she said, would be achieved by a democratic nonpartisan mechanism so

Tsai pledged that

she would push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations in
accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing ROC constitutional
that Taiwans policies toward China would be consistent and unaffected by changes in administration.4 On the issue of the core connotation,

order. In the question-and-answer session, she elaborated that the order included not only the original constitution, but also subsequent amendments, interpretations,
court decisions, and practices by the government and different sectors of the population. This left ambiguous whether she intended to accept the existence of one China, of

in one of the presidential debates, Tsai went a bit further. Referring to the meeting that took place in
Hong Kong in 1992, she maintained that although everyone had different opinions, they agreed
on pushing forward cross-Strait relations based on mutual understanding and seeking
common ground while reserving differences. Tsai stated clearly that the DPP does not deny this historical fact, but rather accepts
it. She then called on the Chinese leader to recognize that party alternation is normal in
democratic societies and to show us some respect.5 On other occasions, Tsai encouraged Beijing
to respect Taiwans public opinion. For example, in a TV interview, she said that the Mainland was closely monitoring public trends in Taiwan,
and if the people reached a consensus on cross-Strait relations, she expected the
Mainland authorities will respect Taiwans public opinions and take them into consideration when making
decisions.6 In her victory speech on election night, Tsai reaffirmed that she would build a
consistent, predictable and sustainable cross-strait relationship. She asserted that both sides of the Strait have a
responsibility to find mutually acceptable means of interaction that are based on dignity and reciprocity, and stressed the importance of
ensuring that no provocations or accidents take place. Attributing her victory to the will of the Taiwanese people, Tsai
stated that the Republic of China is a democratic country whose democratic system, national identity and international space must be respected. In a warning
which Taiwan is a part. Six months later

to Beijing, she said that any forms of suppression will harm the stability of cross-Strait
relations .7 As if she had more to say, but had decided to not say it in her victory speech, Tsai gave an interview to the pro-Green newspaper, Liberty Times, five days
later. Addressing the 1992 talks again, she noted that those negotiations had achieved several common understandings and acknowledgements, adding that I understand and
respect this historical fact.8 As noted Taiwan affairs expert Alan Romberg analyzed, this was a significant step in the direction of Beijings demand that what was achieved in
1992 was not simply a process but substantive agreements.9 Tsai also told Liberty Times that it is incumbent on both sides of the Strait to cherish and protect the

she said that peace,

stability, and development of cross-Strait relations should continue . Tsai then proceeded to define the existing
accumulated status quo and outcomes that resulted from the 1992 talks. Referring to this fact and the existing political foundation,

political foundation as comprising four elements: 1) the historical fact of the 1992 talks and the resulting shared understanding to seek common ground and reserve differences;
2) the Republic of Chinas constitutional order; 3) the accumulated results of more than 20 years of cross-Strait negotiations, exchanges, and interactions; and 4) Taiwans

effort by Tsai Ing-wen to establish the

existing political foundation as a new formulation for cross-Strait relations . For Beijing,
the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence comprise the common
political foundation, which the DPP cannot accept. Like the 1992 Consensus, however, Tsai evidently
hoped that the two sides of the Strait could use a similar phrase, but reserve their
respective interpretations. However, Beijing wasnt satisfied with this positive gesture and demanded more. DPP sources
underscore that Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to provide reassurances to the PRC that she will not
democratic principles and the will of the Taiwan people.10 The Liberty Times interview suggests an

pursue Taiwan independence not only through words, but also in her actions. For example, in the DPPs version
of the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act, Tsai consciously took into account
Beijings concerns about the use of terminology that might imply a state-to-state
relationship, opting to use the term cross-Strait instead of China-Taiwan.11

Tsais Reforms are key to Taiwans economy

Nicholas Consonery 16, Asia Director at Eurasia Group, 1/19/2016, What
Taiwans Elections Mean for Chinas Economic Future,
http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/
Taiwans election over the weekend was an important milestone for the islands democracy. The Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), long the opposition in the legislature, is now in full power as the ruling party for the first time since its formation in 1986.
While the DPP has held the presidency before, under Chen Shui-bian from 2000-2008, this election marks the partys full rise as a
competitor to the once-dominant Kuomintang, the party of General Chiang Kai-shek and current President Ma Ying-jeou. Investors

Tsai Ing-wens strong victory in the presidential

race, coupled with her partys legislative majority, have given her a mandate to pursue
should pay attention to the ramifications of this election: DPP candidate

substantial economic reforms. It may also embolden her to press harder against mainland China. Tsais victory
rests on the deep disenchantment among Taiwans voters with years of slow GDP and wage
growth, underemployment, and rising housing prices. Tapping into this disenchantment through a focus on
social welfare and stimulating new sources of growth, Tsai crafted a compelling narrative for voters, particularly young
voters, about growth based on trade diversification, domestic liberalization, innovation, and
job creation. Her vision is to reestablish Taiwan, once a heralded East Asian tiger, as one of the regions most dynamic
economic heavyweights. The main goal is to position Taiwan for inclusion in one of the worlds biggest trade
deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, in its eventual second round of negotiations. The question for
investors is how much Tsai can move the needle on her economic agenda let alone achieve inclusion in the TPP in the face of
looming economic and geopolitical headwinds. The economic challenges are great: Taiwans growth was less than 1% in 2015. It
hopes for more than 2% this year, but the economys

outsized exposure to China (40% of exports, which are 70%

of GDP) looks to be a major vulnerability in 2016. The aging population is also a growing strain on the
governments fiscal account, limiting its resources to spend on social welfare, infrastructure, or innovation. Taipei projects that its
population will start to shrink in 2019. Taiwan, with a fertility rate of just around an average of 1 child per woman, has among the
worst demographic trend lines of Asias major economies. That will put major strain on the governments fiscal resources and on its

Tsais team is focused on promoting

innovation via smarter industrial policies; it also hopes to substantially liberalize and
diversify its trade and investment partners to moderate its exposure to China and find new sources of growth.
Her party is targeting key industries for the future, like biotechnology, precision machinery, and
defense. Underpinning these goals is a new dynamic in Taiwans relationship with China. Taiwan has been a major beneficiary
widely-respected social services, particularly the healthcare system.

of Chinas rising economy, with its once-dominant edge in higher technology and manufacturing. But now Beijing is pushing its own
firms toward higher technology, and is replacing the goods and services offered by Taiwanese firms with Chinese ones. Tsais
historic election comes just as the era of win-win economic ties between China and Taiwan is coming to a close. If Taiwan continues
to innovate and moves more aggressively into a services-based economy, it still stands to benefit enormously from Chinas growth.

need for real reform in Taiwan

has never been higher. There is reason to be optimistic about Tsais ability to drive economic
reform: the DPPs victory in the legislature over the weekend has given her a newfound ability to implement policy. The bar
is high, as it is now on the DPP to prove that it can govern effectively. The bar to TPP entry is even higher. The deal itself wont
But the bilateral economic relationship is becoming much more complicated, and the

come into full effect until 2017, and the US will wait until at least then to show any inclination of its thinking on Taiwans inclusion.

Taipei will have to build a broad coalition of allies supporting its inclusion in the second
round, including the existing participants, but also new ones that will seek to enter the deal like South Korea, which is Taiwans
leading economic competitor.

US diplomacy and moderation is key to maintain peace harder

approaches risk escalation
Paal 2016 (Douglas, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES, vice chairman of JPMorgan Chase
International and as unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute
in Taiwan, PhD, History and East Asian Languages, Harvard University, Maintaining Peace
Across Taiwan Strait Can Benefit All, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/21/maintainingpeace-across-taiwan-strait-can-benefit-all-pub-62558, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 21, 2016, silbs)
The elections in Taiwan have the
potential to lead to strains between the United States, Chinese mainland, and Taiwan for
the first time in over seven years. Parallel interests in all three leaderships do not fundamentally clash, leaving space for careful and creative
management of the Taiwan political transition. But there is enough suspicion and mistrust across the Taiwan Strait
that a vicious circle of action and reaction cannot be ruled out and probably should be subject to active policy
prevention. It is important at the outset to note that the policy objectives of all three sides in some way call for the
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the U.S. government,
Tsai Ing-wen, candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, won Taiwan's leadership election on Saturday.

this should form the core of its private and public messaging as events unfold . Steadiness will be
required as both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan will persuade Washington to help each to restrain or mollify the other. If the U.S. does not grasp
and establish its own principled position from the outset, it risks entrapment by events.
That position starts with the formal and almost ritual adherence to the three Sino-U.S. communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), but it may have to adapt quickly to

The Chinese mainland will look for public indications that Tsai has taken
seriously the mainland's repeated warnings that the basis for continued cross-Strait
cooperation lies in an acknowledgement of the concept of One China, however formulated. It is at this
juncture that U.S .policymakers will need to kick in. It is in the U.S. interest that Tsai
continue the moderate, even conservative and reassuring approach to cross-Strait affairs
that she adopted before the election. Her posture this time toward cross-Strait relations is markedly more constructive in terms
of maintaining the status quo than her ambiguous stance in 2012, and this deserves to be recognized. Tsai's revised posture won her American
changing circumstances.

acquiescence to her candidacy after a visit to Washington in 2015. That was something she failed to achieve in her 2012 unsuccessful bid for the leadership.

Washington seemed persuaded, temporarily at least, that she had developed safe hands
to manage cross-Strait policy. Some in the U.S. and other circles, including in Japan and Taiwan, argue that
Washington should seize the change in Taiwan to raise the level of official dealings in
U.S.-Taiwan relations, embed Taiwan in the "rebalance" to Asia, and promote closer
security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. That is an option, but in light of
the increasingly interdependent agendas of the United States and Chinese mainland, and
the extreme sensitivity of issues involving sovereignty for the Chinese, pursuing such an
option would be fraught with costs difficult to predict or control. For the Barack Obama administration, on its way
out and in search of a positive legacy, this seems an unlikely choice. The Chinese mainland will naturally have its own levers to try to influence Tsai's government. The mainland

Tsai's team
is preparing to manage any such setbacks. They may seek U.S. criticism of the moves.
The best public U.S. response is probably to revert to a desire to see peace and stability
maintained in the region and to repeat the mantra of the communiqus and the TRA. The
will have four months to signal publicly or communicate privately warnings or inducements to shape Tsai's cross-Strait policy choices. There are hints that

Taiwan election has already caught the attention of some of those running to succeed Obama. But on the whole, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are relatively subordinate to

The Chinese mainland

would be smart to remind itself of that fact and contain its instincts appropriately with
respect to managing the transition with Taiwan.
the Middle East, the Iran nuclear agreement, Russia-Eastern Europe relations, and other hot button issues in this U.S. election.

1ac econ v.2

Tsai has public supportshes promised to distance the Taiwanese
economy from mainland China and will do whatever she can to maintain
peace
Romberg 16 (Alan, distinguished fellow and the director of the East Asia program at Stimson,
What Taiwans Presidential Election Means For Cross-Strait Relations, January 19, 2016,
http://www.stimson.org/content/what-taiwan%E2%80%99s-presidential-election-means-crossstrait-relations, silbs)
Tsai Ing-wen's resounding victory in Taiwan's January 16 presidential election, as well as that
of her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the legislative elections, follows on the
party's successes in the local elections in November 2014. Polls had consistently indicated Tsai held a very big lead
over her rivals, but many thought that, while she would very likely win, the large lead polls suggested would not hold up at the end of the day. The fact that it did - and that the
unclear picture regarding the legislature resolved itself in such a strong way in the DPP's favor - may have stemmed in part from an ill-defined but nonetheless very

real

desire for "change" among Taiwan voters. But it also clearly stood as a repudiation of Kuomintang (KMT) governance under the
outgoing Ma administration. This included the handling of both domestic issues and cross-Strait relations. A significant level of concern has
developed over time about whether Taiwan was becoming too dependent on the
Mainland economically - with not only economic but also long-term political implications.
Tsai addressed that concern by saying she would stand up more strongly for Taiwan's interests, including in diversifying
external economic linkages to a greater degree. She also pledged to ensure that the
benefits of cross-Strait economic dealings would be more equitably shared. Nonetheless, it would be
a mistake to interpret the election as a mandate for total overhaul of cross-Strait relations. The crucial importance of cross-Strait
economic ties to Taiwan's well-being is simply a reality, and it is well-understood that if those relations were badly
damaged, it would be to Taiwan's serious detriment. Tsai fully understands that, and while adjusting those relations, she will also seek to maintain robust cross-Strait ties. No

she campaigned heavily on the notion of maintaining the status quo of peace
and stability in relations with the Mainland. While everyone recognizes that this has a heavy political
component, it also is based on maintenance of a strong economic relationship. Some may worry that
one should forget that

this would represent a compromise of her - and the DPP's - principles. In fact, however, all of this is fully consistent with her commitment to govern in accordance with the will of

setting aside the very difficult challenges Tsai will face in seeking to
reinvigorate and redirect Taiwan's economy along the lines she has outlined, much
hinges on the degree to which she can persuade Beijing that she not only is not a "second Chen Shui-bian," the
independence-oriented DPP president from 2000-2008, but also that she buys into the political basis underlying the dramatic
development of cross-Strait ties at least to a degree sufficient to cause the Mainland to hold
off on the kinds of "punitive" steps that one might otherwise expect. In its first response to the election outcome, Beijing once again
rejected a view Tsai has expressed, i.e., that the DPP's substantial win that reflected the democratically
expressed will of the Taiwan people would lead Beijing to adjust in a pragmatic way and come to terms with the reality of present-day
Taiwan. Reiterating points Xi Jinping has personally made in the past, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office was particularly insistent that " major policies and
principles toward Taiwan are consistent and clear and will not change because of the
outcome of elections in the Taiwan region." Expressing a willingness to deal with all who recognize that the two sides of the Strait
the people. Accordingly, even

belong to "one China" and maintain the "common political foundation" of adherence to the "1992 Consensus" and opposition to "Taiwan independence," the statement

Tsai has tried to suggest she will not

upset what has been achieved over the past several years or take issue with the basis on which it has been achieved, and that that she will not
expressed a "rock-hard" determination to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. So far,

promote "Taiwan independence." But it would be astounding if she either embraced the "1992 Consensus" or renounced the idea of "Taiwan independence;" she will not do that.
So the issue becomes whether, in the period between now and inauguration day on May 20, she and the Mainland can come up with a set of measures and formulations Tsai

As the United
States proceeds to strengthen relations across a broad spectrum of issues with both
Taiwan and the PRC, it will continue to watch cross-Strait developments very closely
can adopt that, while not directly adhering to the mantra Beijing has insisted upon, nonetheless are seen by Beijing as sufficient to check the box.

consistent with what it has openly labeled its "profound interest" in the maintenance of
peace and stability in the Strait. "Restraint and flexibility" will remain central tenets of Washington's approach to both sides. Clearly neither
side wants a security crisis, and I don't believe there will be one. But there is always a danger that at some
point emotions will rise, with unforeseeable consequences. Hence Washington will
continue to play an active role to ensure that doesn't happen, a role that is already
playing out with the dispatch of senior envoys to both Taipei and Beijing.

Taiwan/China tensions are rising because of Tsais electionChina will use

its economic stake in Taiwan to isolate it from global trade to pressure her
to into falling in line
Glaser 2016 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, she is
concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with
CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia, prior she served as
a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and
State, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in
Taiwan, April, 2016, A Report of the CSIS CHINA POWER PROJECT, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf, silbs)
U.S. Interests in Cross-Strait Relations U.S. officials often say that the United States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in
the Taiwan Strait.1 This may be truer today than ever before. Although

relations between the United States and

China remain a complex mix of cooperation and competition, friction in the security
realm is increasing, especially in the maritime areas around Chinas periphery. The South and East China Seas have been the primary
focus of U.S.-Chinese rivalry in recent years, while the Taiwan Strait has been relatively calm. With the
presidential inauguration on May 20 of Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Peoples Progressive Party (DPP),
which has long advocated independence for Taiwan, many observers are watching the
cross-Strait situation for any signs of a resurgence of tensions. The principal reason that the United States
prioritizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is that a spike in cross-Strait tension increases the risk of a
wider conflict through political and even military escalation, which could draw in the
United States . During both the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies, heightened Chinese concern about the
potential that Taiwan could break away from the Mainland and become independent produced tensions
that raised the specter of Chinese use of military force against the island. In both cases, Chinese
pressure on Taiwan resulted in the United States becoming involved in various ways.
The United States also has a strong interest in Taiwans economic prosperity and in a
greater meaningful role for Taiwans government and NGOs in the international
community. Chinese distrust of Tsais intentions would almost certainly lead Beijing to take
measures that would be harmful to Taiwans economy , including creating difficulties in
implementation of existing cross-Strait economic agreements , and preventing Taipei
from signing free-trade agreements with other countries and participating in regional
economic integration . China would also seek to constrain Taiwans participation in
regional and multilateral organizations. Cross-Strait discord was kept in check in the past eight years, primarily due to
the policies of Taiwans President Ma Ying-jeou who accorded priority to achieving a stable and normal relationship with China. Early in his
presidency, Ma adopted a pledge of no unification, no independence, and no use of force. On the basis of the 1992 Consensus an understanding
reached after talks in Hong Kong between representatives from Beijing and Taipei that Taiwan and the Mainland belong to one China, even as they
disagreed on whether China meant the Republic of China (ROC) or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)the two sides of the Strait reestablished

The improvement in cross-Strait relations

benefited the United States, since it removed Taiwan as an irritant in U.S.-China relations
channels of dialogue and cooperation and signed 23 economic agreements.

and enabled the Obama administration to focus on other challenges. If cross-Strait

tensions resurface during Tsai Ing-wens term in office, it would bring Taiwan back to the
front burner of U.S.-China relations at a time when there is likely to be a high level of mutual distrust and substantial
friction over other issues. There is a great deal at stake, therefore, for the United States as well as
for Taiwan and China in the future development of relations across the Taiwan Strait. This
report outlines Tsai Ing-wens policy toward China and Beijings policy toward Taiwan. It then analyzes cross-Strait relations going forward by laying out
three alternative scenarios. Finally, it proposes policy recommendations for the United States at the current juncture. The report is informed by
interviews conducted in China and Taiwan March 14 19, 2016.

Taiwans export reliant economy is being dragged down by the Chinese

economic slowdownthey need to pull away and diversify trade partners
The Economist 2015 (Taiwans economy Straitened circumstances Weaker growth
exposes the downside of ties with China, November 14, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21678276-weaker-growth-exposesdownside-ties-china-straitened-circumstances, silbs)
THE Chinese theory about economic integration with Taiwan is that it will bind the two
together politically. Taiwan will become ever more reliant on China for its prosperity, paving the way to eventual unification. Many in
Taiwan fear this process is under way. But now the premise of the theorythat closer ties with China are essential for growth
is being tested by a sharp economic slowdown in Taiwan. Over his nearly eight years in office, Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwans president, has pushed
for a detente with China. A flurry of deals, including a limited free-trade agreement, has
fuelled business ties. Taiwanese exports to China have soared, as has Chinese investment in Taiwan. A recent meeting between Mr Ma
and Xi Jinping, Chinas president, in Singaporethe first between leaders of the two countrieswas meant to show the promise of more co-operation.

Awkwardly, though, Taiwans economy is in a slump. GDP shrank by 1% year on year in the third quarter, its first
contraction since 2009. Last year Taiwan grew by 3.8%. Many analysts had expected about the same this year. Instead, it will do well to hit 1%, says

The global slowdown in trade is partly to blame.

Exports are the lifeblood of Taiwans economy, accounting for nearly three-quarters of its
output. Yet other export-driven economies in Asia such as South Korea and Singapore
are not suffering as much. The benefits from Taiwans rapprochement with China appear
to be topping out. Taiwans trade surplus with China was 18% smaller in the first nine months of this year than in the same period in 2014.
Gordon Sun of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research.

Chinese investment is down by nearly two-thirds from a year earlier. Even Chinese tourists, still flocking to Europe and other parts of Asia, are showing

Taiwan is simply a victim of

Chinas slowing growth. But there is widespread concern that something deeper is at
work: that Taiwan is losing ground to China and ill-equipped to fight back. So prevalent is this view that Taiwanese
less interest in Taiwan: visitor numbers are up by just 5% this year. One interpretation is that

routinely refer to the threat from Chinese firms as the red supply chain. Until a few years ago, the economic relationship between China and Taiwan
was symbiotic. Taiwanese firms, among the worlds biggest makers of electronic components, needed Chinas cheap labour; China craved Taiwans
technical know-how. But this complementarity has given way to competition. Chinese producers of petrochemicals, steel, computers and digital
displays have moved into terrain once occupied by Taiwan. Taiwanese firms with operations in China are themselves buying more materials and

The
structural challenge does not come from China alone. Taiwans greatest strength is in
making parts for computers and mobile phones. But the global markets for both are
increasingly saturated. Short of a new consumer crazesome firms pin their hopes on wearables or 3D printersthe hardware
industrys future looks bleak. For an export-led economy like Taiwan to reinvent itself, it needs to stay
immersed in global trade. Here, though, it faces the cold reality of its geopolitical
ostracism. Absent Chinas express approval, other countries are reluctant to engage in free-trade talks with Taiwan. Yet Japan, South
machinery from Chinese suppliers. Chinese firms are now trying to break into semiconductors, Taiwans last big industrial redoubt.

Korea and ChinaTaiwans main competitorsare signing lots of their own deals. The easiest answer would be for Taiwan to open itself yet wider to
trade with China. Politically, though, this is a non-starter. Taiwanese students last year occupied the parliament to protest against a services trade deal
with China. Tsai Ing-wen, Mr Mas likely successor , is

determined to tilt Taiwan away from China. She wants

to foster closer links with South-East Asia and to bring Taiwan into the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, an American-led free-trade deal that covers 40% of the global economy but
excludes China (see article). It will be very hard for Taiwan to escape Chinas economic orbit. If Ms
Tsai gets her way, it will not be for lack of trying.

Chinas using economic coercion strategieswithdrawal of international

institution support, stealing diplomatic allies, and slowing tourism
Kazer 5/16/16 (William, expert on Asian politics, correspondent for the Wall Street Journal
and Dow Jones News based in Beijing. He also worked as a correspondent and editor for
Reuters in Beijing where he covered the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests in 1989 and had
postings in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Bangkok, as well as New York. Kazer helped
Reuters set up its Chinese-language financial newswire and has worked as a consultant and
adviser in the media sector in China, Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen to Face China Tensions and
Sagging Economy; Beijing has increased pressure on Tsai by obstructing Taiwan's participation
in international meetings, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tensions-sagging-economy-awaittaiwans-new-leader-1463599803, Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2016, silbs)
TAIPEI--When Taiwan's new president takes the oath of office this week, two vital constituencies--one at home, the other across the strait in mainland

Tsai Ing-wen heads a political party nominally in favor of

Taiwan's independence from China, a red line for Beijing that would formalize a split from
a stalemated civil war more than six decades ago. At Friday's inauguration, she is expected to reiterate her campaign
China--will be listening hard, but for different things.

pledge to maintain the status quo, even though many voters who propelled her to a landslide election victory want her to check China's growing sway
over the island. Beijing, meanwhile, has

increased pressure on Ms. Tsai by obstructing Taiwan's

participation in international meetings, stopping cooperation on cross-border criminal
investigations and hinting at economic retaliation--all to extract assurances that she will
pursue policies more to China's liking. "She will do what she can but she can't just ignore what the Taiwanese people want,"
said William Stanton, a former diplomat who ran the U.S.'s de facto embassy in Taiwan and is now director of the Center for Asia Policy at National
Tsing Hua University. China's Taiwan Affairs Office didn't respond to requests for comment on the government's tactics. Since Ms. Tsai's election in
January, the office has said Beijing will work with any political group that opposes Taiwan independence and supports "one China." A tricky balancing

Ms. Tsai needs calm on the China front to be able to turn her
attention to domestic issues. She must retool a flagging economy that had its worst
performance in six years in 2015 and is heavily reliant on exports, many of which flow to
China. Bad relations between Taipei and Beijing can exact a toll on the island's economy.
Tensions also threaten to enmesh the U.S., which by law is supposed to help Taiwan maintain its defense capability and
whose credibility in the region could be at risk if it abandons the democratic island to pressure from China. Taiwan's departing
president, Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party, managed to keep relations with China on an even keel. He
act confronts Taiwan's first woman president.

expanded economic and political ties with the mainland during his eight years in office, even holding a brief meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping,

Key to that progress, according to Mr. Ma, was his

support for a vague 1992 accord in which both sides agreed they were part of " one China" -- without defining what that means. The
the first face-to-face meeting between leaders from the two sides since 1945.

understanding, which became known as the "92 consensus," is embraced by Beijing, which sees it as a commitment by Taiwan to the status quo and
perhaps to eventual reunification. In Taiwan, however, some people see it as a convenient formulation that allows relations to move forward, while

Ms. Tsai has thus far

refrained from using the terms "one China " or "92 consensus" -- words that Beijing
wants to hear. To encourage her to utter them, Beijing has been sending signals of
possible consequences should Ms. Tsai hold out. "Beijing is trying to test her," said Lin Ting-Hui, vice president at
Taiwan Brain Trust, a policy research organization in Taipei. "They are trying to see how much pressure she can
endure." Tsai Ing-wen, 59 Taiwan President-elect * Education: Masters of Law from Cornell University, Ph.D. from London School of Economics.
others, particularly supporters of Ms. Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party, reject that any such consensus exists.

* Career: A negotiator on Taiwan's entry to the WTO; headed the Mainland Affairs Council. * Platform: Promised to revitalize Taiwan's economy and

A first move, analysts said, is further constraining the

already limited role Beijing allows Taiwan to have internationally. Two months after Ms. Tsai's election,
China renewed diplomatic relations with Gambia , breaking a tacit truce against picking
off Taiwan's dwindling band of diplomatic partners, now down to 22 mostly smaller countries. Beijing and
Taipei have refused to diplomatically recognize any nation that recognizes the other.
Taiwan also experienced trouble attending international meetings, one with the World
reduce dependence on China, while not provoking Beijing.

Health Assembly, which gathers members of the World Health Organization, and the other a steel conference in
Brussels. In two separate cases of alleged international telephone fraud, Kenya and Malaysia last month handed Taiwanese suspects over to
China for investigation, despite protests from Taipei. China said its citizens were victims of fraud and it should lead the criminal investigations. In some

Taiwan's media have for weeks reported that China may

reduce the number of mainland tourists to the island, threatening a range of businesses
from hotels to restaurants and airlines to tour operators. In the January-March period, tourist arrivals from
past cases, suspects were handed back to Taiwan.

China, who account for around 40% of the visitors to the island, were actually higher than a year ago, but new applications for permits have been
declining, according to local media reports. Taiwan's tourism bureau said more-recent figures are still being compiled; its Chinese counterpart didn't
respond to a request for comment. Ms .

Tsai's administration plans to re-gear Taiwan's economy by

boosting trade and other economic ties with Southeast Asia, Japan, and India. But
economists said it won't be easy to make up for any lost business from China--the
world's second-largest economy. Barring Ms. Tsai's acknowledging the "92 consensus," she is likely to get little near term help
from the mainland. "Relations between Tsai and Beijing will not warm up instantly," said Lin Chong-Pin, a former deputy defense minister and an expert
on mainland affairs. "It will take time."

US diplomacy and moderation is key to maintain peace harder

approaches risk escalation
Paal 2016 (Douglas, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES, vice chairman of JPMorgan Chase
International and as unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute
in Taiwan, PhD, History and East Asian Languages, Harvard University, Maintaining Peace
Across Taiwan Strait Can Benefit All, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/21/maintainingpeace-across-taiwan-strait-can-benefit-all-pub-62558, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 21, 2016, silbs)
The elections in Taiwan have the
potential to lead to strains between the United States, Chinese mainland, and Taiwan for
the first time in over seven years. Parallel interests in all three leaderships do not fundamentally clash, leaving space for careful and creative
management of the Taiwan political transition. But there is enough suspicion and mistrust across the Taiwan Strait
that a vicious circle of action and reaction cannot be ruled out and probably should be subject to active policy
prevention. It is important at the outset to note that the policy objectives of all three sides in some way call for the
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the U.S. government,
this should form the core of its private and public messaging as events unfold . Steadiness will be
required as both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan will persuade Washington to help each to restrain or mollify the other. If the U.S. does not grasp
and establish its own principled position from the outset, it risks entrapment by events.
Tsai Ing-wen, candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, won Taiwan's leadership election on Saturday.

That position starts with the formal and almost ritual adherence to the three Sino-U.S. communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), but it may have to adapt quickly to

The Chinese mainland will look for public indications that Tsai has taken
seriously the mainland's repeated warnings that the basis for continued cross-Strait
cooperation lies in an acknowledgement of the concept of One China, however formulated. It is at this
juncture that U.S .policymakers will need to kick in. It is in the U.S. interest that Tsai
continue the moderate, even conservative and reassuring approach to cross-Strait affairs
that she adopted before the election. Her posture this time toward cross-Strait relations is markedly more constructive in terms
of maintaining the status quo than her ambiguous stance in 2012, and this deserves to be recognized. Tsai's revised posture won her American
changing circumstances.

acquiescence to her candidacy after a visit to Washington in 2015. That was something she failed to achieve in her 2012 unsuccessful bid for the leadership.

Washington seemed persuaded, temporarily at least, that she had developed safe hands
to manage cross-Strait policy. Some in the U.S. and other circles, including in Japan and Taiwan, argue that
Washington should seize the change in Taiwan to raise the level of official dealings in
U.S.-Taiwan relations, embed Taiwan in the "rebalance" to Asia, and promote closer

security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. That is an option, but in light of
the increasingly interdependent agendas of the United States and Chinese mainland, and
the extreme sensitivity of issues involving sovereignty for the Chinese, pursuing such an
option would be fraught with costs difficult to predict or control. For the Barack Obama administration, on its way
out and in search of a positive legacy, this seems an unlikely choice. The Chinese mainland will naturally have its own levers to try to influence Tsai's government. The mainland

Tsai's team
is preparing to manage any such setbacks. They may seek U.S. criticism of the moves.
The best public U.S. response is probably to revert to a desire to see peace and stability
maintained in the region and to repeat the mantra of the communiqus and the TRA. The
will have four months to signal publicly or communicate privately warnings or inducements to shape Tsai's cross-Strait policy choices. There are hints that

Taiwan election has already caught the attention of some of those running to succeed Obama. But on the whole, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are relatively subordinate to

The Chinese mainland

would be smart to remind itself of that fact and contain its instincts appropriately with
respect to managing the transition with Taiwan.
the Middle East, the Iran nuclear agreement, Russia-Eastern Europe relations, and other hot button issues in this U.S. election.

Tsai must tread carefullypro PRC policy will anger the NPP and make her
look weak domestically while pro independence policies will anger the PRC
Glaser 2016 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, she is
concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with
CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia, prior she served as
a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and
State, Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in
Taiwan, April, 2016, A Report of the CSIS CHINA POWER PROJECT, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf, silbs)
While China may not be raising the bar for Tsai, it is apparent that it
will not lower the bar for her either. Beijing is firm in its insistence that she state clearly that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the
same country. Ambiguity on the nature of the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China is deemed unacceptable, especially
Cross-Strait Relations Going Forward

since the Chinese are suspicious that Tsai plans to make strides toward Taiwan independence during her term in office. It cannot be ruled out that Chinas goal in making
demands of Tsai that it knows she cannot and will not meet is that

Beijing doesnt want to strike a deal with her that could

help the DPP remain in power for at least eight years, and perhaps longer. Instead, the
Chinese may want Tsais presidency to fail and hope that the KMT will revive and return
to power as soon as possible . Tsai Ing-wen may provide additional reassurances to Beijing in her May 20 inauguration speech, but it is unlikely
that she will satisfy the Mainlands demand of embracing the one China principle. Tsai is confident that she has the support of
the majority of Taiwans citizens who favor maintaining the cross-Strait status quo , but do not
support explicitly endorsing that China and Taiwan belong to one country. Public opinion polls bear this out. A survey conducted in March by the
Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, commissioned by the Taiwan Governments MAC, found that 72.7 percent of respondents do not agree with the claim by

Tsai will likely strive to strike a balance

between representing Taiwan public opinion as she interprets it and providing
reassurance to China. There are risks in leaning too far in either direction. As one DPP
adviser put it, if Tsai accepts the PRCs demands, there will be ramifications domestically
she would lose support and potentially undermine her ability to govern effectively . On the
other hand, if Tsai ignores Beijings demands, there will be negative consequences for cross-Strait relations.30 Tsai feels pressure not only from
within her own party, but also from the New Power Party (NPP), which emerged from the student-led Sunflower Movement that
occupied Taiwans legislature in 2014 over the KMTs handling of a trade pact with the PRC. On many issues such as energy, environment, and human rights,
the NPPs policies align closely with the DPP, but on the matter of Taiwan independence, the
NPPs stance is more radical than Tsais recent pronunciations. In addition, the NPP seeks to limit the concessions that the DPP makes on issues
China that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China.29 In her inaugural address,

where there is a divergence of opinion between the two parties, such as addressing U.S. concerns on Taiwans restrictions on imports of U.S. agricultural goods. With five seats

the NPP is now the third-largest party in legislature. If Tsai makes concessions to
Mainland China that are not supported by her party, the DPP could lose support to the
NPP in the 2018 local elections and beyond.
in the LY,

Tsais Reforms are key to Taiwans economy

Nicholas Consonery 16, Asia Director at Eurasia Group, 1/19/2016, What
Taiwans Elections Mean for Chinas Economic Future,
http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/
Taiwans election over the weekend was an important milestone for the islands democracy. The Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), long the opposition in the legislature, is now in full power as the ruling party for the first time since its formation in 1986.
While the DPP has held the presidency before, under Chen Shui-bian from 2000-2008, this election marks the partys full rise as a
competitor to the once-dominant Kuomintang, the party of General Chiang Kai-shek and current President Ma Ying-jeou. Investors

Tsai Ing-wens strong victory in the presidential

with her partys legislative majority, have given her a mandate to pursue
substantial economic reforms. It may also embolden her to press harder against mainland China. Tsais victory
rests on the deep disenchantment among Taiwans voters with years of slow GDP and wage
growth, underemployment, and rising housing prices. Tapping into this disenchantment through a focus on
social welfare and stimulating new sources of growth, Tsai crafted a compelling narrative for voters, particularly young
voters, about growth based on trade diversification, domestic liberalization, innovation, and
job creation. Her vision is to reestablish Taiwan, once a heralded East Asian tiger, as one of the regions most dynamic
economic heavyweights. The main goal is to position Taiwan for inclusion in one of the worlds biggest trade
deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, in its eventual second round of negotiations. The question for
should pay attention to the ramifications of this election: DPP candidate
race, coupled

investors is how much Tsai can move the needle on her economic agenda let alone achieve inclusion in the TPP in the face of
looming economic and geopolitical headwinds. The economic challenges are great: Taiwans growth was less than 1% in 2015. It
hopes for more than 2% this year, but the economys

outsized exposure to China (40% of exports, which are 70%

of GDP) looks to be a major vulnerability in 2016. The aging population is also a growing strain on the
governments fiscal account, limiting its resources to spend on social welfare, infrastructure, or innovation. Taipei projects that its
population will start to shrink in 2019. Taiwan, with a fertility rate of just around an average of 1 child per woman, has among the
worst demographic trend lines of Asias major economies. That will put major strain on the governments fiscal resources and on its

Tsais team is focused on promoting

innovation via smarter industrial policies; it also hopes to substantially liberalize and
diversify its trade and investment partners to moderate its exposure to China and find new sources of growth.
Her party is targeting key industries for the future, like biotechnology, precision machinery, and
defense. Underpinning these goals is a new dynamic in Taiwans relationship with China. Taiwan has been a major beneficiary
widely-respected social services, particularly the healthcare system.

of Chinas rising economy, with its once-dominant edge in higher technology and manufacturing. But now Beijing is pushing its own
firms toward higher technology, and is replacing the goods and services offered by Taiwanese firms with Chinese ones. Tsais
historic election comes just as the era of win-win economic ties between China and Taiwan is coming to a close. If Taiwan continues
to innovate and moves more aggressively into a services-based economy, it still stands to benefit enormously from Chinas growth.

need for real reform in Taiwan

has never been higher. There is reason to be optimistic about Tsais ability to drive economic
reform: the DPPs victory in the legislature over the weekend has given her a newfound ability to implement policy. The bar
is high, as it is now on the DPP to prove that it can govern effectively. The bar to TPP entry is even higher. The deal itself wont
But the bilateral economic relationship is becoming much more complicated, and the

come into full effect until 2017, and the US will wait until at least then to show any inclination of its thinking on Taiwans inclusion.

Taipei will have to build a broad coalition of allies supporting its inclusion in the second
round, including the existing participants, but also new ones that will seek to enter the deal like South Korea, which is Taiwans
leading economic competitor.

Uniq: PRC Killing ROC Econ

China is trying to curb attempts at Taiwanese economic growth
Rauhala, 5/20
(Emily Rauhala, 5/20/16, "Taiwans new president wants to revitalize the economy. Dont expect much help from China.,"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tsai-ing-wen-sworn-in-as-taiwans-first-female-president/2016/05/20/3c73d84a-1dff-11e682c2-a7dcb313287d_story.html, accessed 7/2/16, JH)
BEIJING Taiwans

new president faces a tough task: balancing the demands of the

Taiwanese electorate and the question of cross-strait ties with China. On Friday, in her first
speech as president, Tsai Ing-wen focused on the former, vowing to revitalize Taiwans flagging
economy and create new and better jobs. Her challenge will be to do so with no help
and perhaps some hindrance from Beijing.

Despite the fact that Taiwan is a vibrant, thriving democracy, Chinas

ruling Communist Party still insists it is the province that got away. In the run-up to Tsais inauguration, Beijing pressed her to accept the idea of one
China, a framework negotiated in 1992 that allows both sides to recognize that there is one China without specifying what that means. The Chinese
side calls this the 1992 consensus, but many Tsai supporters deny consensus was reached. In her closely watched inaugural speech, Tsai took a
cautious line, saying that she respects the 1992 meetings as historical fact, but did not venture further. Beijing, predictably, hit back, with the Taiwan

Tsai was elected in

a year-long campaign bolstered by the near-implosion of the outgoing Kuomintang
(KMT) government led by Ma Ying-jeou, whose policy of cross-strait rapprochement failed to deliver
sustained economic benefit and alienated many Taiwanese. Tsais speech suggested she
will make the economy her priority. She promised to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade relations rather than focusing on a
Affairs Office on Friday blasting her line as vague and comparing her remarks to an incomplete answer sheet.
February following

single market she means China as Taiwan has done in the past. She also vowed to protect labor rights, raise wages and protect the environment.
Tsai, a U.S. and British-educated former trade negotiator, campaigned on bread-and-butter issues and wants to create jobs. To please voters, thats
what she will need to do. But

Taiwans economic picture is complicated and often constrained by

international affairs.

Tsais rise was powered to some extent by the 2014 Sunflower movement. In March of that year, anger over how

the government was handling a trade pact with China boiled over into the occupation of Taiwans legislature. Long after protesters dispersed, their call
for greater transparency and autonomy lingered, setting the stage for Tsais successful campaign. Many young Taiwanese are worried about the future.
They feel that years of closer ties to China did little to create good jobs or make housing more affordable. They want the islands economy to be thriving
but independent and are wary of any policy that ties Taiwans fate to people or policies across the strait.

Tsais cross-strait

economic strategy will be tested quickly. The first item on the governments legislative agenda is a supervisory bill that
requires Taiwans government to get legislative go-ahead before, during and after talks with Beijing . Under the proposed rules, they cant sign
agreements with the Peoples Republic of China without all three stages of approval. The legislation is seen by Tsais supporters as the antidote to what
they considered a closed-door approach from Ma. But the bill has already been criticized by Taiwanese business groups and Taiwan-watchers in
Beijing. In March, Chinese officials said they would resolutely oppose any plan to put up man-made blocks. After that is sorted out,

the

president will then need to decide how to proceed on the trade pact that sparked the
2014 protests.

Both Washington

and Beijing will be watching her early moves closely. The

United States and Taiwan are old friends and unofficial allies, but the United States also wants and needs to engage with China. Over the last eight

Tsai campaigned for president in 2012, she was brushed

hard to ease U.S. fears, reiterating her cross-strait

years, Washington has been wary of anything, or anyone, that might rock the boat. When
aside by the White House. She has since pushed

status quo stance. With China-U.S. ties cooling and a presidential election in the United States, she may get a warmer welcome going
forward. China, though, has been anything but welcoming. In recent weeks, China pressured both Kenya and
Malaysia to deport Taiwanese suspects to the Chinese mainland, a move that many in Taiwan saw as an assertion of sovereignty, but Beijing insisted
was a matter of due course. China

has also taken new steps to curb Taiwans participation in

international affairs. In March, China established formal diplomatic ties with Gambia, ending
an eight-year diplomatic truce. Gambia had previously recognized Taiwan, but not
China. In April, Taiwans delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Developments steel committee was given the boot after China complained. And there
could be a similar showdown at the World Health Organizations annual summit in

Geneva, which Taiwanese observers are supposed to attend. China has said its
participation is predicated on Tsai acknowledging the 1992 consensus meaning it may
well be excluded.

And in case its message was lost, Beijing this week held large-scale war games on its Taiwan-facing coast.

Chinese officials and academics have also warned, repeatedly

should Tsai refuse to fall in line.

While

if vaguely,

of an economic toll

China could move to curb tourism or trade , some question

how far it is willing to go. China sees Taiwan as an integral part of its territory and aims to reunify. As such, it has an interest in deepening, not
destroying, ties to Taiwans business community, said Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a political scientist from Hong Kongs Baptist University. Wang Jianmin, a

a return to the kind of

frosty cross-strait ties of the past would constrain economic development, leaving
Tsais government doomed to fail. Chinas strategy is not to make Taiwan more isolated from China, but more dependent
research fellow with the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, said

on China. They have to walk a fine line there, he said. While Chinas foreign ministry and party-controlled papers cast cross-strait relations as
something to be won or lost by Taiwan, many outside observers see Beijing, not Taipei, as the wild card right now. They emphasize that Tsai has been
consistent on the question of cross-strait ties, sticking with her status quo formulation through the campaign, her election and the inauguration, while
Beijing has been less clear, publicly, about how it plans to proceed. What

happens next is going to depend on

China , said William A. Stanton, a career diplomat who served as de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan from 2009 to 2012 and now heads the
Center for Asia Policy at Taiwans National Tsing Hua University. They are not going to do Tsai Ing-wen any favors.

China will snub Taiwans attempts at growth

Chung, 5/19
(Lawrence Chung, 5/19/16, "Plenty of economic challenges ahead for Taiwans new president,"
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1946682/plenty-economic-challenges-ahead-taiwans-new-president,
accessed 7/2/16, JH)
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen wont

have time for a honeymoon period when her government rolls into
operation for the first day on Friday. She is facing an even bigger challenge than her Kuomintang
predecessor Ma Ying-jeou in reviving the islands long-sagging economy, analysts say. Tsai, of the
independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has said she plans to introduce five innovative
research projects to stimulate the local economy, covering green technology, the
internet, biomedicine, intelligent machinery and national defence. She also plans to
increase Taiwans economic exchanges with members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and India in order to cut the islands economic reliance on the mainland.
However, analysts predict little chance of success for at least two years. And they warn the
islands economy might become even grimmer than it was under Ma due to the
possibility of economic snubs from Beijing. Tsai replaced Ma as the islands leader on Friday following her
has criticised Mas cross-strait economic policy,
saying he had placed too much emphasis on the mainland over the past eight years,
leading to the islands overreliance on the mainland market. Taiwans exports to the mainland now
crushing victory in Januarys presidential election. She

account for 40 per cent of its total exports compared with between 35 per cent and 45 per cent under Mas predecessor, the DPPs
Chen Shui-bian with two-way trade worth US$190 billion last year, up from US$110 billion at the end of Chens presidency, which
ran from 2000 to 2008. That shows Taiwanese businessmen sensed the market was in the mainland even before Ma opened up
trading ties, but the wealth generated has not been evenly distributed among the general public, with large business groups
benefiting most. That upset middle-class and grass-roots people on the island, with election experts saying their dissatisfaction was
the main reason Ma lost the election. To promote a change in direction, Tsai recently named a former foreign minister, James
Huang, to head her New Southbound Policy Office. We

need to turn Asean into an extension of Taiwans

domestic market as soon as possible, Huang, who served as foreign minister from 2006 to 2008 during the final
years of Chen Shui-bians presidency, told a forum introducing the policy initiative on Tuesday. If we dont seize the opportunities in
the next five years, we will be left with no interests at all. Huang said that unlike the islands previous southbound policy,
introduced by then president Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s and later pursued by Chen, which focused on investment and trade, the new
one would emphasise the absorption of talent and bilateral exchanges. Instead of just tapping their markets, we also want their
people and their investments in our innovative industries, such as biomedicine, Huang said. But analysts and industrialists have
doubts about the effectiveness of the policy at least for the next two years. Businessmen are known for their business sense to

look for profits and if they think profits are really there, they should have long gone to Asean instead of clinging to the mainland
market, said Sun Yang-ming, a former vice-president of the Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation, an independent think tank
in Taiwan. He said the new policy was a politically motivated attempt to twist normal market behaviour. I am afraid our economy
might turn even worse in the next two years, given her plan to cut reliance on the mainland, he said. Besides, even if the new
measure works, it will take at least a couple of years to show effects. But can the general public wait? An opinion poll released by
Taiwan Think-Tank on Tuesday showed that 56.6 per cent of Taiwanese people hoped improving the economy would be Tsais
priority on taking office. The

islands gross domestic product declined for the third consecutive

quarter between January and March, with exports falling for the 15th straight month in April amid a global slump in
demand. A recent Ministry of Finance report showed the Ma government would be handing over a total debt of NT$5.7 trillion
(HK$1.36 trillion) to the new government, something that is likely to become a heavy burden for Tsai. Joyce Lin Juo-yu, director of

approaching Asean members would be a stiff

challenge for the Tsai government, given that Beijing which had a great deal of
influence in Southeast Asia was also introducing its one belt, one road economic
infrastructure initiative to woo the same countries. It is more important for the new
government to show where the beef is if it is to launch this policy, she said. Taiwanese
businessmen, however, are more concerned about Tsais plan to cut reliance on the
the Asean Studies Centre at Tamkang University in Taipei, said

mainland, fearing that it could lead to economic snubs from Beijing, including pressure
aimed at curtailing Taiwans participation in regional economic affairs.

I can see hard times

coming if we have to cut our business exchanges with the mainland, said Tien Yi-show, chairman of the Taiwan Travel Industry
Association. And the tourist industry here will be the first to suffer seriously, he said, referring to an expected reduction in the
number of mainland visitors, which topped 4 million last year. Steve Lai, executive director of Taiwans Supply Management Institute,
said: Transformation of our industries cannot happen instantly, and before that we need the mainland market dearly.

China has the tools to suppress Taiwanese independence effortsChina

controls their export economy and participation in international institutions
Lin and Mao 5/10/16 (Adela, writer for Taiwan Today, Debra, Taipei Bureau Chief for
Bloomberg News where she oversees coverage of the economy, politics, markets and
corporations. Mao previously covered securities regulation and judicial reform as a Hong Kongbased legal correspondent, China Heads for a Showdown with Taiwan, Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-10/china-taiwan-head-for-showdown-as-tsaitakes-power-in-taipei, May 10, 2016, silbs)
China and Taiwan are facing a confrontation not seen in years as the islands incoming
president refuses to accept Beijings bottom line for maintaining stable ties between the
one-time civil war foes. With little more than a week before her inauguration, Taiwanese President-elect Tsai Ing-wen has shown no sign shell bow to
Communist Party pressure and use the May 20 event to proclaim that both sides are part of "one China." That understanding -- known as the 1992 consensus -- underpinned
eight years of improving ties across the Taiwan Strait. That is, until Tsais pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party swept the more-Beijing-friendly Kuomintang from

Tsai has pledged to keep the peace, she also must satisfy an
electorate thats increasingly wary of economic dependence on their powerful neighbor
and overwhelmingly opposes the one-China idea. The islands first female president has vowed to
give public opinion greater sway over cross-strait policies, despite warnings from China,
including the mainlands prosecution of dozens of Taiwanese telephone fraud suspects
deported from Kenya last month. "Tsai isnt likely to address the 1992 consensus explicitly in her inauguration speech. That would risk offending
her supporters," said Tu Jin-lung, chairman of Taipei-based KGI Securities Investment Advisory Co. "Both sides are likely to act step-bystep to test each others bottom line." The dispute risks aggravating an old source of tension in Asia and straining ties between China and
power in a landslide election in January. While

the U.S., which is obligated to defend Taiwan under a 1979 law. The Communist Party considers the island a province, even though it has been governed separately for more

The DPPs charter officially

supports independence, although Tsai and other leaders have sought to play down the
provision. "If a stalemate or crisis develops, the responsibility rests on the one who changes the status quo," Ma Xiaoguang, spokesman for the mainlands Taiwan
Affairs Office, said Wednesday at a regular briefing in Beijing. "Our position on Taiwan wont change with any political change in Taiwan." Economic Leverage China
has already started showing Taiwan what a less-cooperative future might look like. In
than 66 years, and reserves the right to use force to prevent it from moving toward formal independence.

March, it scrapped a diplomatic truce with Ma and established relations with the tiny West African nation of
Gambia, one of a handful of states that still recognized Taiwan. Chinese authorities
decision last month to prosecute the Taiwanese fraud suspects from Kenya contrasted with a
similar case in 2011, when China sent suspects back to Taiwan under a deal signed by Ma. China
could also use its leverage to squeeze Taiwans struggling economy. During Mas tenure, China became
the worlds second-largest economy and now buys 40 percent of Taiwans exports. "Chinese authorities have
many cards to play," said Zhang Wensheng, a professor at Xiamen Universitys Taiwan Research Institute and a researcher with the state-backed CrossStrait Relations Studies Center. "They wont show all the good cards at the same time, but that also depends on whether Taiwan has seriously antagonized them." On Sunday,

the incoming DPP government accused Beijing of "political interference" in Taiwans

participation in the World Health Organization after the mainlands Taiwan Affairs Office said the islands membership in the groups
World Health Assembly was based on the one-China principle and could cease. Chinas push for Tsai to sign onto the "1992 consensus" is complicated by the fact that more
than 76 percent of Taiwanese arent sure what it means, according to a survey last month by the DPP-leaning Taiwan Brain Trust. A March poll by the Taiwan governments
Mainland Affairs Council found that 73 percent objected to the idea that both sides belong to one China, with "respective interpretations." At the same time, 87 percent support

Tsai has thus pledged to uphold the "status quo

keeping ties with Beijing unchanged. Status Quo

" without endorsing either the
1992 consensus or its one-China principle. The closest shes come has been to say she respects that China and Taiwan reached a mutual understanding in 1992 and that it

China has begun to lose patience as the inauguration approaches, with the Communist Partys top
dismissing Tsais status quo as nothing more than "empty talk" in a commentary
published last Wednesday. In March, Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to "resolutely contain Taiwan independence
secessionist activities in any form," a stark warning to Tsais incoming government. Wu Pingrepresents one option for maintaining ties.
newspaper, the Peoples Daily,

jui, the secretary general of the DPPs legislative caucus, described the one-China policy as an existential concern for Tsai and her party. There is no way for Tsais government
to accept the one-China policy," Wu said. "Tsai Ing-wen was elected as a president, rather than the chief executive of a special administration region. The DPP shall no longer
be the DPP, should it concede to that."

Uniq: PRC Pressure ROC Now

China wants Tsai to back the 1992 consensustheyre pressuring her with
withdrawal of international institution support, stealing diplomatic allies,
and slowing tourism
Kazer 5/16/16 (William, expert on Asian politics, correspondent for the Wall Street Journal
and Dow Jones News based in Beijing. He also worked as a correspondent and editor for
Reuters in Beijing where he covered the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests in 1989 and had
postings in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Bangkok, as well as New York. Kazer helped
Reuters set up its Chinese-language financial newswire and has worked as a consultant and
adviser in the media sector in China, Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen to Face China Tensions and
Sagging Economy; Beijing has increased pressure on Tsai by obstructing Taiwan's participation
in international meetings, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tensions-sagging-economy-awaittaiwans-new-leader-1463599803, Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2016, silbs)
TAIPEI--When Taiwan's new president takes the oath of office this week, two vital constituencies--one at home, the other across the strait in mainland

Tsai Ing-wen heads a political party nominally in favor of

Taiwan's independence from China, a red line for Beijing that would formalize a split from
a stalemated civil war more than six decades ago. At Friday's inauguration, she is expected to reiterate her campaign
China--will be listening hard, but for different things.

pledge to maintain the status quo, even though many voters who propelled her to a landslide election victory want her to check China's growing sway
over the island. Beijing, meanwhile, has

increased pressure on Ms. Tsai by obstructing Taiwan's

participation in international meetings, stopping cooperation on cross-border criminal
investigations and hinting at economic retaliation--all to extract assurances that she will
pursue policies more to China's liking. "She will do what she can but she can't just ignore what the Taiwanese people want,"
said William Stanton, a former diplomat who ran the U.S.'s de facto embassy in Taiwan and is now director of the Center for Asia Policy at National
Tsing Hua University. China's Taiwan Affairs Office didn't respond to requests for comment on the government's tactics. Since Ms. Tsai's election in
January, the office has said Beijing will work with any political group that opposes Taiwan independence and supports "one China." A tricky balancing

Ms. Tsai needs calm on the China front to be able to turn her
attention to domestic issues. She must retool a flagging economy that had its worst
performance in six years in 2015 and is heavily reliant on exports, many of which flow to
China. Bad relations between Taipei and Beijing can exact a toll on the island's economy.
Tensions also threaten to enmesh the U.S., which by law is supposed to help Taiwan maintain its defense capability and
whose credibility in the region could be at risk if it abandons the democratic island to pressure from China. Taiwan's departing
president, Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party, managed to keep relations with China on an even keel. He
act confronts Taiwan's first woman president.

expanded economic and political ties with the mainland during his eight years in office, even holding a brief meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping,

Key to that progress, according to Mr. Ma, was his

support for a vague 1992 accord in which both sides agreed they were part of " one China" -- without defining what that means. The
the first face-to-face meeting between leaders from the two sides since 1945.

understanding, which became known as the "92 consensus," is embraced by Beijing, which sees it as a commitment by Taiwan to the status quo and
perhaps to eventual reunification. In Taiwan, however, some people see it as a convenient formulation that allows relations to move forward, while

Ms. Tsai has thus far

refrained from using the terms "one China " or "92 consensus" -- words that Beijing
wants to hear. To encourage her to utter them, Beijing has been sending signals of
possible consequences should Ms. Tsai hold out. "Beijing is trying to test her," said Lin Ting-Hui, vice president at
Taiwan Brain Trust, a policy research organization in Taipei. "They are trying to see how much pressure she can
endure." Tsai Ing-wen, 59 Taiwan President-elect * Education: Masters of Law from Cornell University, Ph.D. from London School of Economics.
others, particularly supporters of Ms. Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party, reject that any such consensus exists.

* Career: A negotiator on Taiwan's entry to the WTO; headed the Mainland Affairs Council. * Platform: Promised to revitalize Taiwan's economy and
reduce dependence on China, while not provoking Beijing.

A first move, analysts said, is further constraining the

already limited role Beijing allows Taiwan to have internationally. Two months after Ms. Tsai's election,
China renewed diplomatic relations with Gambia , breaking a tacit truce against picking
off Taiwan's dwindling band of diplomatic partners, now down to 22 mostly smaller countries. Beijing and
Taipei have refused to diplomatically recognize any nation that recognizes the other.
Taiwan also experienced trouble attending international meetings, one with the World
Health Assembly, which gathers members of the World Health Organization, and the other a steel conference in
Brussels. In two separate cases of alleged international telephone fraud, Kenya and Malaysia last month handed Taiwanese suspects over to
China for investigation, despite protests from Taipei. China said its citizens were victims of fraud and it should lead the criminal investigations. In some

Taiwan's media have for weeks reported that China may

reduce the number of mainland tourists to the island, threatening a range of businesses
from hotels to restaurants and airlines to tour operators. In the January-March period, tourist arrivals from
past cases, suspects were handed back to Taiwan.

China, who account for around 40% of the visitors to the island, were actually higher than a year ago, but new applications for permits have been
declining, according to local media reports. Taiwan's tourism bureau said more-recent figures are still being compiled; its Chinese counterpart didn't
respond to a request for comment. Ms .

Tsai's administration plans to re-gear Taiwan's economy by

boosting trade and other economic ties with Southeast Asia, Japan, and India. But
economists said it won't be easy to make up for any lost business from China--the
world's second-largest economy. Barring Ms. Tsai's acknowledging the "92 consensus," she is likely to get little near term help
from the mainland. "Relations between Tsai and Beijing will not warm up instantly," said Lin Chong-Pin, a former deputy defense minister and an expert
on mainland affairs. "It will take time."

Uniq: Taiwan Econ on Brink

Taiwans economy is in huge dangerTsai wont be able to fulfill campaign
promise of growth without strong Beijing-Taipei ties
Jincui 5/10/16 (Yu, Editor Global Times, Taiwans economic future hinges on Tsais political
stance, Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/982212.shtml, May 10, 2016, silbs)
As economic contraction continues, concerns are mounting within Taiwan over the
island's bleak economic outlook. Early this month, "premier"-designate Lin Chuan said that Taiwan's growth rate
is unlikely to reach 1 percent this year, with the risk of even turning negative. General Chamber of
Commerce chairman Lai Cheng-i in a recent interview with Want Daily warned that there will be no solution to the
economic conundrum if the incoming Tsai Ing-wen government continues to avoid stating an explicit
position on the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus has been the foundation for the steady development of cross-Straits
ties. Unfortunately, "president-elect" Tsai has been skirting around endorsing the consensus. Tsai will be confronted with tough challenges soon after
she is sworn in. Taiwan's

economy shrank year-on-year for a third straight quarter as exports

tumbled without signs of abating, adding to the urgency for Tsai to fulfill her election
campaign pledge to revive growth after she takes office. However, Tsai's promises to
revitalize the economy will only be empty rhetoric if she worsens ties with the Chinese
mainland by negating the 1992 Consensus. The Taiwanese economy will come to a dead
end without connectivity with the mainland. In the island's trade-reliant economy, exports
to the mainland account for over 40 percent of its gross exports and the mainland is a
major contributor to Taiwan's trade surplus. The number of mainland tourists to Taiwan
hit a record high of 3.4 million last year. Mainland visitors are now spending more in Taiwan than any other group. The
mainland won't adopt abrupt measures to halt cross-Straits cooperation. Instead, based on its track record, it will continue to encourage trade and

Nonetheless, negating the 1992

Consensus or seeking "Taiwan independence" in whatever form, will [cripple] the trust the mainland has for
Taiwan, thus impairing the mainland-Taiwan cooperation and the interests of the Taiwanese public. Tsai
hopes to decrease economic reliance on the mainland. But the paradox is that as the
mainland has become the engine of world economic growth and also a driving force for
Taiwan's economy, it's impossible for Taiwan to be isolated from the mainland economy.
economic exchanges with Taiwan, including keeping preferential policies in some fields.

The current cross-Straits economic and trade bonds are naturally formed and cannot be easily changed given the gigantic size and the rising economic

If the mutual political trust based on the 1992 Consensus

collapses after the new government assumes power, it will lead to the sabotage of cross-Straits cooperation,
worsening Taiwan's economic predicament. The economic issue will be turned into a
political issue for the ruling party.
power of the mainland as well as the blood relationship of the two sides.

Internals: A/S T/off w/ Taiwan Econ

US arms sales trade off with the Taiwan economy- Taiwan needs to develop
its defense industry first
Schriver 15- Randall, Founding Partner, Armitage International
President & CEO, The Project 2049 Institute, Testimony of Randall G. Schriver,
(http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20160211/104457/HHRG-114-FA05-WstateSchriverR-20160211.pdf) JB
US-Taiwan Defense Industrial Cooperation: Another emerging area of economic
cooperation is in the area of defense industrial cooperation. Such cooperation not only supports the
broader U.S. goals surrounding our interest in strengthening Taiwans defense, but it also makes economic sense for both countries.

While some critics point to the need for Taiwan to raise its defense budget, many of
those same analysts ignore one of the most promising avenues for enhancing Taiwans
defense capabilities defense industrial cooperation associated with direct commercial sales of military equipment and
services. Trade-offs between expenditures on national defense, economic growth, and
social welfare are often contested, not only in Taiwan but in other societies as well. Defense spending,
given the proper set of circumstances, can contribute to economic growth and
development. The creation of jobs and income at the local level in Taiwan, along with
technology spin-offs, could increase support for greater defense spending. As long as
Taiwans defense industry remains weak, public support for a larger defense budget is
likely to be inadequate. This is especially true when faced with what is known as a
crowding out effect. With legal caps on deficit spending, an increase in defense expenditure incurs
opportunity costs, displacing spending in other sectors, such as education, social welfare, S&T, and
investment into economic infrastructure. Along these lines, a consensus exists in favor of major indigenous
programs, such as diesel electric submarines. Fair consideration of export licenses and other forms of technical assistance in
support of Taiwans indigenous submarine program is warranted.

Internals: US diplomacy key

Tsais refusal to embrace the 1992 consensus is fueling Beijing to lock
Taiwan out of global affairsthe US needs to reaffirm their commitment to
Taiwan
WSJ 5/23/16 (Wall Street Journal, China's Taiwan Squeeze,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-taiwan-squeeze-1463952782, May 23, 2016, silbs)
Tsai Ing-wen was sworn in as Taiwan's new President on Friday, marking another milestone in Taiwan's democratic development. Along with touting
the island's third transfer of power via elections and promising to lift its export-driven economy out of
recession, Ms. Tsai said that Taipei and Beijing should "set aside the baggage of history" and "engage in positive dialogue." Beijing is having
none of it. Her speech amounted to "an incomplete test answer," Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said on Friday, and unless she shapes
up, there will be no cross-Strait negotiations on trade or other issues. The implicit
message is that there will also be more Chinese pressure on Taiwan's economy,
diplomatic standing and security . Behind Beijing's rhetoric is the demand that Ms. Tsai
embrace the "1992 consensus." The tacit acceptance that Taiwan and the mainland both belong to "one China," even if they
disagree on its definition, became the basis of cross-Strait talks in the early 1990s. The so-called consensus is another way of saying that Taiwan must
sooner or later unify with China. But Taiwanese

people increasingly reject that prospect given Beijing's

enduring authoritarianism and the deepening of independent Taiwanese identity. The
Nationalist Party (KMT) government of Ma Ying-jeou revived the 1992 consensus over the past eight years and used it as the rubric for more than 20

fear of Chinese influence over Taiwan led to a backlash that

fueled the popularity of Ms. Tsai and her opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which now holds
a parliamentary majority for the first time. Ms. Tsai has consistently promised to maintain
the cross-Strait status quo and not pursue formal independence. But for Beijing it isn't
enough that she stresses her adherence to Taiwan's constitution and statutes that
include the one-China concept, as she reiterated Friday. Only explicit fealty to the 1992 consensus
will do. So Beijing defaults to a posture of threats and bullying that may alienate
Taiwanese all the more. Weeks after Ms. Tsai's election victory in January, Beijing ended the eight-year crossStrait "diplomatic truce" by accepting official recognition from the African state of
Gambia, leaving Taiwan with 22 formal diplomatic partners and the fear that it could soon have fewer. Days later, Beijing
arranged for Kenya to extradite 45 Taiwanese criminal suspects to the mainland, not
Taiwan, even after some were acquitted in Kenyan courts. Malaysia then extradited 32 more in a similar case.
Beijing also appears to be squeezing Taiwan's coveted observer status at the World
Health Organization, as Taipei's invitation to this year's annual assembly includes reference for the first time to the "one China" principle.
Chinese tourist flows to Taiwan, another lever of Beijing influence, were down 10% in
March from last year. China conducted large-scale military drills along its southeastern
coast opposite Taiwan days before Ms. Tsai's inauguration. As thousands of Taiwanese gathered Friday to hear
cross-Strait economic agreements. But

her speech outside the Presidential Office in Taipei, they could surely recall that last year Chinese state TV showed a military drill in which troops
stormed a replica of that office. If Beijing's leaders think they can pressure Taiwanese into loving them, there will be trouble ahead.

Now would

be a good time for the U.S ., including the presumptive presidential candidates, to
reaffirm Washington's commitment to its democratic Chinese partners in Taipei.

Internals: Tsai Reforms Solve Econ

Tsais going to revamp the Taiwanese economyinnovation expansion,
pursuing international trade, and industry diversification
DBS 2016 (leading financial services group in Asia, Group Research, Taiwan: after the
election, https://www.dbs.com.sg/sme/aics/pdfController.page?
pdfpath=/content/article/pdf/AIO/160119_insights_challenges_abound_as_opposition_takes_tai
wan.pdf, January 19, 2016, silbs)
the core concept of her economic policies is innovation,
employment and distribution making innovation as the key driver of growth, setting
job creation as the ultimate goal of economic development and allowing the fruits of
economic success to be shared among all citizens. First and foremost, Tsai calls for innovation
and industrial upgrading. As is widely known, Taiwan has been a major player in the global supply
chains of IT hardware. The manufacturing of electronics components, information & communication products and optical instruments accounts for some
40% of all exports and 15% of GDP (Chart 1, next page). But technology is maturing and productivity growth has
slowed (Chart 2, next page). Production costs have been rising due to more expensive mainland labor where many Taiwanese electronics manufacturers are located.
Against this backdrop, Taiwan needs to foster new industries to drive economic growth and to
further move up the value chains. From a longer-term perspective, industrial upgrading is essential if Taiwan is to create higher-quality, betterpaid jobs for its citizens. Tsai has designated several sectors as the priority for development in the
coming years, including green technology, smart machinery, the Internet of Things,
biotech / pharmaceuticals and national defense. In particular, she hopes to leverage Taiwans
strength in information and communication technology, enabling it to play an important
role in the global move towards digitalization, automation and Industry 4.0. To achieve this goal,
the new government is likely to relax rules regarding foreign investment, technology and
talent, provide incentives to encourage angel investment and business start-ups,
increase public spending on R&D and education, among others. Wealth distribution Another area emphasized by
As proposed by Tsai during the election campaign,

Tsai is the fairness of wealth distribution within the economy. A prevalent complaint amongst the Taiwanese public is that income growth for working class people has been
stagnant for a long time, whilst the allocation of national wealth has been tilted towards business owners and asset holders. The average regular wages for all employees in all
industries grew just about 1% per year during the past decade starting 2001 (Chart 3). The Gini Coefficient, albeit not high by international standards, has risen to 0.34-0.35
since 2001, up from 0.31-0.32 in the 1990s (Chart 4). In more recent years, the rocketing property prices across the island, as a result of excess global liquidity and low interest

Improving income distribution and

ensuring social stability are an important part of Tsais election pledges. On this front,
the possible measures to be pushed by the new government may include increasing the
supply of social housing, strengthening public supports on childcare and elderly-care
facilities, reforming the pension system and enacting a minimum wage law. External ties On external
relations, Tsai supports increasing Taiwans trade openness but calls for a higher degree of
diversification. Taiwan has been a laggard in the new wave of global trade liberalization based on bilateral/multilateral agreements outside the WTO framework.
Amongst the major trade partners, Taiwan has so far only established FTAs/quasi FTAs with China, Singapore and New Zealand. Geographically, Taiwans
external trade and investment highly concentrate on the Chinese market. Exports to China (including
indirect shipments via Hong Kong) account for 40% of Taiwans total exports. Investment in China comprises nearly 70% of
Taiwans outward FDI (Chart 5). Unsurprisingly, the slowdown of the Chinese economy in the past few
years has impacted Taiwan. GDP growth has been halved to about 2% in 2012-15, down from 4.4% in 2005-2011. This coincided with Chinas
deceleration to 7% from 10% in recent years (Chart 6). In order to restore trade competitiveness, Tsai has pledged to
push for the signing of multilateral and bilateral FTAs, particularly referring to the Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP). She has also said that her government will encourage Taiwanese firms to explore
business opportunities in other emerging markets outside of China, especially Southeast Asia and South Asia. Regarding
China ties, Tsai doesnt rule out continuing with the follow-up deals under the cross-strait
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), or joining the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
rates, have exacerbated problems as the inequality between home owners and non-home owners widened.

she insists on establishing a supervisory mechanism and seeking public support

before pushing ahead with China-related initiatives. It is likely that her government would take a cautious approach on
But

controversial issues such as allowing Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan, introducing blue collar workers from China and liberalizing rules governing Taiwans high tech
firms investment on the mainland. On the other hand, the new government may adopt an open attitude towards initiatives with direct and obvious benefits for Taiwans economy,

the economic reality is

challenging. Taiwan slipped into a technical recession last year. The outlook for this year remains lackluster, given the persistent weakness in global trade and the
such as expanding the cross-strait links in tourism and direct transport. Challenges Notwithstanding the reform ambitions,

heightened volatility in regional financial markets. A sluggish macroeconomic environment will weigh on corporate profits, constraining the capabilities of the private sector to

Fiscal resources could be

utilized to support short-term growth and facilitate long-term reforms . But the scope for such is limited. The
invest and innovate. Job and wage growth will be negatively impacted with knock-on effects for public livelihood.

total debt of central and local governments has risen to 45% of GDP as of 2014, not far from the legal limit of 50%. Nor has this factored in the governments potential
obligations related to pensions and other public insurance programs. In order to alleviate concerns about the health of public finances and sustainability of the pension system,

Tsai has promised not to allow the future growth in public debt to exceed the GDP growth
(averaged over the previous three years). Keeping debt stable will constrain the scope of fiscal policy. Besides injecting public resources, introducing foreign capital and
technology can hasten industrial upgrading and transition. But regional competition is intensive. China also has ambitions to move up the value chains and it has established
several free trade zones to attract FDI into the high-tech and services sectors. Japan and some ASEAN countries have recently made commitment to a higher degree of trade

Successful reforms
require strong leadership and policy coordination at all levels. Despite the DPPs control
over both presidency and parliament, the efficiency and effectiveness of policy
implementation still need to be monitored. Past experience shows that political squabbles in the parliament can delay the passage of
and investment openness through concluding the TPP. What niche Taiwan will find amidst these developments is an open question.

important bills even with a ruling party majority. How the DPP deals with China relations will also be important. Rising uncertainties in cross-strait relations could slow cross-strait
economic exchanges and create hurdles for Taiwans bilateral relationships with other countries as well.

Lapse in cross-strait relations tanks Tsais reforms

Nicholas Consonery 16, Asia Director at Eurasia Group, 1/19/2016, What
Taiwans Elections Mean for Chinas Economic Future,
http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/
The downside

risk is that any tension in the China relationship would distract from
domestic reform. TPP inclusion will be almost impossible for Taiwan if its relationship
with China deteriorates as that would make it much harder for TPP members, including the US, to support Taiwans
potential inclusion. The risk stems from the fact that Tsai does not accept the current political framework for cross-Strait relations
known as the 1992 consensus. She will work to find a new framework for relations with Beijing in
the weeks immediately following the election. The good news is that both sides appear to be
working toward a compromise, so Tsais victory is unlikely to spark an immediate crisis.
But Chinese President Xi Jinping wont wait long for an acceptable solution to be found.

Internals: exports k2 taiwan econ

Taiwanese exports are downthey account for about 70% of GDP
Trading Economics 2016 (Trading Economics, founded by Antonio J Fernandes Sousa,
10 years of experience performing global economics research and advanced computer
programming skills applied to the development of global macro and event driven trading
strategies, previously he was Chief Strategist for one of the world's largest financial trading
firms, and Anna Fedec, editor-in-chief for Trading Economics, Taiwan Exports, 2016,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/taiwan/exports, silbs
Exports in Taiwan dropped 2.1 percent year-on-year in June of 2016, led by fall in base metals and articles of base metal (2.6 percent), machinery (-3.2 percent) and plastics, rubber and articles thereof (-6.3 percent). Exports declined the most to China and Hong Kong (-4.5
percent) and ASEAN (-4.4 percent). Exports in Taiwan averaged 12167.48 USD Million from 1981 until 2016, reaching
an all time high of 28585.12 USD Million in August of 2014 and a record low of 1406.50 USD Million in February of 1981. Exports in Taiwan is reported
by the Ministry of Finace, R.O.C.. Taiwan's

economy is export-oriented. Exports account for around 70

percent of total GDP and its composition have changed from predominantly agricultural
commodities to industrial goods (now 98%) during the past 40 years. Main exports products
are: electronics (34% of total), basic metals (9%), plastics & rubber (7.5%), machinery (6.9 percent),
precision instruments, clocks and watches, musical instruments (6.5%) and chemicals (6.4%).
Main exports partners are Mainland China & Hong Kong (39% of total), USA (12.2%), Japan (7%), Europe (9%) and ASEAN countries (18%). This

statistics, economic calendar and news. Taiwan Exports - actual

last updated on July of 2016.

page provides - Taiwan Exports - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart,
data, historical chart and calendar of releases - was

Internals: taiwain semiconductors k2 taiwan econ/tech

Taiwan semiconductors and technology exports are key to the USs digital
economy
Bloom 2001 (Dan, freelance writer based in Asia since 1991, Taiwan protected by 'Silicon
Shield, October 19, 2001, Taiwan Today, http://taiwantoday.tw/fp.asp?
xItem=18985&CtNode=103, silbs)
The author of a new book titled "Silicon Shield: Taiwan's Protection Against Chinese Attack" has come up with a novel way of looking at issues across

Craig Addison, a Hong Kong-based writer and former editor of an electronics business magazine,
has fashioned and coined a very interesting new term: "silicon shield." His thesis , as articulated
in the book, is that since the ROC has become the world's third biggest producer of
information technology hardware and the fourth largest producer of semiconductors, a
so-called "silicon shield" currently covers Taiwan and is growing stronger year by year.
And this silicon shield, says Addison, may very well serve as long-term protection against any
military attack by Beijing because the silicon-based products being produced by Taiwan
the Taiwan Strait and it bears watching.

form the basis of the evolving digital economies of the United States and other advanced
industrialized countries. As a result, mainland China would never dare to attack Taiwan for fear of
antagonizing the United States and Europe, Addison states in his book. Any attempt by the mainland to
damage Taiwan's factories or supply lines would constitute an indirect but lethal hit
against U.S. firms

like IBM, Dell Computer, Hewlett-Packard and Cisco Systems. The silicon shield is thus an effective defense against

mainland aggression. In previous articles in several English-language newspapers, including the International Herald Tribune in Paris and the Taipei
Times in Taiwan, Addison has outlined his theory. "Regardless

of whether the United States decides to build

an East Asian missile shield, Taiwan can take comfort from a silicon shield that is already
in place," since according to Addison. "It will provide some protection for the island if [mainland] China seeks a military solution to the so-called
Taiwan problem." Addison's thesis can be summed up in a very simple way: the ROC's silicon shield grows stronger
each year and any mainland military aggression would cut off a large portion of the
world's supply of these products. Since the global information technology industry-dependent on silicon and software--would be disrupted in the event of such an attack,
the silicon shield now firmly in place is solid and geopolitically awesome. "China will have to think
long and hard before taking any military action to disrupt or destroy Taiwan's economy," Addison writes. "While officers in the Chinese armed forces
may not realize that

taking out a Taiwan semiconductor wafer fabrication plant would soon

undermine the global computer supply chain , President Jiang Zemin must know that it will. Trained as an engineer, he
served as minister of electronics during the early 1980s. His son, Jiang Mianheng, is a partner in a wafer fabrication project in Shanghai with Winston
Wang of Taiwan's Grace T.H.W. Group." Addison goes one step further, noting: "While China has been successful in restricting Taiwan's diplomatic

Taiwan is
now a key source of hardware for the digital economy. This has helped provide the
international recognition that it craves. It is also a deterrent against possible Chinese
aggression." In 1996, when Beijing test-fired missiles in the strait to intimidate voters ahead of the first direct presidential elections in Taiwan,
moves to gain greater international prominence, it has been unable to stop the island's rise as a technology provider to the world.

the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. The message was clear, according to historians. Not only would the United States
not tolerate an outright military attack on Taiwan, it would not allow any action that might disrupt the island's export. When asked if news about Taiwan
firms setting up factories and branches in the mainland changes his thesis at all, Addison said in a recent e-mail from Hong Kong: " The

silicon
shield thesis still stands, no matter whether the high-tech factories are in the mainland or
in Taiwan. Since the mainland factories are satellite operations of Taiwan head offices, they cannot operate effectively without control from
Taiwan. In fact, I believe that increased economic integration between China and Taiwan will only make it more difficult for China to take Taiwan by
force."

Impacts: Pharma
Tsais reforms key to Taiwanese Biopharma-Key to solve disease and
pharma globally
Matthew Fulco 6/30, Taipei-based business journalist with a focus on the
medical industry, 6/30/2016, Boosting Taiwans Biopharma Sector,
http://international.thenewslens.com/article/43192
Several Taiwan biopharma companies have developed promising new drugs, and the
new government taking office, which took office in May, is expected to place even more emphasis on this
sector. For the industry to become a major driver of economic growth, however, Taiwan will likely need to create a more
favorable environment to encourage investment, including regulatory changes and better
pricing for innovative drugs. Taiwan is at an economic crossroads. In 2015, years of inertia finally caught up with the once ascendant Asian
technology hub as export orders collapsed, dragging GDP growth down to just 0.75%. Policymakers were quick to blame the moribund performance on
Chinas economic slowdown it is Taiwans largest export market and falling oil prices. Yet Taiwans neighbors, which all of which count China as a
major trading partner, fared better. South Koreas economy expanded at a 2.6% clip, while Singapores grew at 2.1%, beating analyst forecasts. Even
Hong Kong, whose fortunes are the most tethered to China of any economy, managed a growth rate of 2.4%. The difference between those three
former Asian tigers (the first East Asian societies after Japan to grow rich) and Taiwan (the fourth tiger) is that the island has stalled on its way up
the value chain. South Korea has built global technology brands; Singapore and Hong Kong are global financial centers. By contrast, Taiwan remains
reliant on price-sensitive contract electronics manufacturing even as the global consumer electronics market is stagnating. Worse yet, China is set to
eclipse Taiwan in most of the electronics market segments where it has been a leader. Fortunately, Taiwan

looks ready to chart a

new economic course under President-elect Tsai Ing-wen, who has named biotech as one of the
five industries her administration will focus on developing as future growth engines. Taiwan, Tsai
says, should become a biotech research hub in the Asia-Pacific region. Investors, expecting Tsai will increase
incentives for the local biotech sector, cheered her victory in the January presidential election, pushing biotech shares to their highest
levels in three years. I think that the new president is committed to supporting the biopharma industry, says Grace Yeh, chief executive officer of
PharmaEngine, a Taipei-based drug manufacturer. Market insiders say Tsai has a deeper understanding of the biotech industry than her predecessors.
She is the co-founder and former chairwoman of HIV drug developer TaiMed Biologics Inc., a company that has raised more than US$200 million in
funding on the strength of its drug pipeline. TaiMeds HIV drug ibalizumab is on the Breakthrough Therapy Designation and Fast Track list of the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), qualifying it for expedited approval. In addition, Tsai has named Chen Chien-jen, an eminent epidemiologist and
former health minister, as her vice president. Chen was hailed as a hero in Taiwan for his efforts in containing the 2003 outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS). As the Tsai administration prepares

to take office, key biopharma infrastructure

is already in place. That includes strong clinical research capabilities, an abundance of
talented scientists, and cost-competitive R&D and manufacturing. As a country of origin for clinical
studies, Taiwan is always a reference, says Carol Cheng, chief operating officer of the Taiwan Research-based Biopharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (TRPMA), noting that the number of clinical trials conducted in Taiwan has risen steadily over the past decade. For
pharmaceutical giant Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD), Taiwan

is a prime location for clinical studies its fast,

high quality and thorough, says Joseph Romanelli, MSDs Taiwan managing director and zone leader of Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Taiwan has good scientists and physicians who have developed local capabilities and
brought back best practices from their time abroad. Taiwans own biopharma companies have grown steadily in
recent years, performing consistently well in the local equities market. A total of 94 biopharma companies are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and
the smaller, over-the-counter Taipei Exchange. Market capitalization in the sector soared from about US$6 billion in 2009 to US$22 billion in late 2015.
When the tech sector started to stall after the global financial crisis, hot money was redirected to biotech, says David Silver, president of the lifesciences consultancy BiotechEast. Retail investors saw biotech as new and exciting. Silver notes that local regulations permit companies to list before

Being able to go public before registering

profits has encouraged nascent companies to list early for access to easy financing, he says, which has given Taiwan a
reputation as a particularly favorable location for biotech IPOs. Success overseas Because of the small
they are profitable in contrast to the Hong Kong and Singapore exchanges.

domestic market, Taiwanese biopharma companies often ally with contract research organizations and pharma multinationals to develop high-end
drugs and expand overseas. Expansion typically occurs through distribution partnerships and strategic relationships. Taiwan biologics companies have
tended to focus heavily on cancer therapeutics. In October 2015, Taipei-based PharmaEngine and its licensing partner, U.S.-based Merrimack
Pharmaceuticals, introduced a pancreatic cancer drug called Onivyde to the U.S. market. It is the first cancer drug to begin its clinical development in
Taiwan and receive regulatory approval from the U.S. FDA. Onivyde is a proprietary irinotecan liposome injection used together with the chemotherapy
drugs fluorouracil and leucovorin. It is used to treat patients whose cancer has spread beyond the pancreas and who have completed first-line therapy
with the chemotherapy drug gemcitabine. In the battle against pancreatic cancer, Onivyde is significant as the first drug to increase survival in patients
who relapsed after being treated with gemcitabine, says Grace Yeh. It gives patients hope, she says, noting that one-fourth of the patients in the

global Phase III clinical trial survived for more than a year. If you can survive, there is the possibility you will be able to receive new therapies later on,
she notes, adding that this is all the more relevant given pancreatic cancer may become the second leading cause of cancer-related death after 2020.
Onivyde is competing with chemotherapy treatments from some of the worlds biggest pharma firms: Eli Lillys Gemzar, Roches Tarceva, and
Celgenes Abraxane. Patents for the three competing drugs expired in 2014. Taishin Securities estimates that Onivyde could boost PharmaEngine
earnings this year to NT$1.52 billion (US$47 million) or NT$14.93 per share, with sales likely to grow 25% to NT$2.11 billion from 2015. Another of

Taiwans niches is drug reformulation. TWi Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (TWi) focuses on the development
and commercialization of high-barrier generic drugs for the U.S. market. In March 2015, TWi
became the first Taiwanese pharmaceutical company to directly sell generic pharmaceutical products under its own label in the United States. David
Silver notes that local

expertise also exists in treating infectious viral diseases. One of the major success
TaiMeds monoclonal antibody ibalizumab an HIV entry
inhibitor is in Phase III trials in the United States and Taiwan, the last step before submitting the product for
stories in that area is TaiMed, which President-elect Tsai formerly chaired.

regulatory approval to the U.S. FDA. The U.S. FDA designated ibalizumab a breakthrough therapy based on preliminary clinical evidence indicating
that it may represent a substantial improvement over existing therapies on one or more clinically significant endpoints. In a Phase IIb clinical trial
conducted on 113 patients, the product significantly reduced viral load in multi-drug resistant HIV-infected patients, according to TaiMed. The U.S.
FDA has also granted ibalizumab orphan drug designation. The Orphan Drug Act allows the FDA, upon request of a sponsor, to grant special status
to a drug or biological product to treat a rare disease or condition. Orphan designation qualifies the drug sponsor for incentives that include tax credits
for qualified clinical testing. In April, TaiMed signed a 12-year agreement with Montreal-based pharma firm Theratechnologies Inc. to market ibalizumab
in the United States and Canada. Terms comprised a mix of cash, stock and 52% of the drugs future net sales, notes BiotechEasts Silver. It is a
niche, breakthrough treatment for multi-drug resistant HIV patients, said Luc Tanguay, president and chief executive officer of Theratechnologies, in a
company statement. These are the types of products we want to add to our portfolio as they hold the
potential to generate additional revenues while keeping us focused on our core business. Cross-Strait opportunities In addition to the United States,
China is a major market of interest to Taiwanese biopharma firms. Given Taiwans strength in clinical trials, more multinationals may choose to do the
clinical research on the island if China recognizes the trial data in the future. That development could substantially boost clinical investment in Taiwan.
In September 2014, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) announced that Taipei and Beijing had reached a consensus on cooperation in clinical tests
of drugs, mutual recognition of clinical data, and data use for reference in drug inspection and registration. To date, however, no concrete policy
changes have followed that announcement. For now, mutual clinical trial data recognition remains elusive. Under an ideal scenario for Taiwan,
companies would conduct Phase I and Phase II trials in Taiwan, where IPR legal protection is stronger and the approval process expeditious taking
two to three months in Taiwan, compared to one to two years in China. Phase III trials would be held in both Taiwan and China, with the objective of
simultaneous new-drug application if the results are favorable. Some observers say Taiwan could serve as a springboard for new biologics that would
be used to treat ethnic Chinese patients worldwide. We have excellent human resources in clinical medicine and research to study diseases specific to
ethnic Chinese, said President-elect Tsai during an October 2015 speech at Democratic Progressive Party headquarters. With a sufficient grasp of
certain inherited genes specific to [East Asian people], their lifestyle habits and the geographic environments, she said, Taiwan could respond to local
needs first before making the products available globally. In recent years, Beijing has begun highlighting the biotech industry in its five-year economic
plans as many Chinese researchers who have worked in the West return home to build companies, notes Danny Chou, president of Compassion
BioSolution, a Los Angeles-based biopharma consultancy. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecasts that
China could become the worlds overall top R&D spender by about 2019. China is serious about biotech even though it has a lot to do before its
products can be approved and accepted by the global market, says Chou. There is opportunity for collaboration between the industry in China and
Taiwan since they share one common goal to become recognized as a source of innovative technology and high-quality products. Chou, who visits
China regularly to hold workshops on biologic formulation development, says China has many talented scientists who want to build the next Amgen
[the worlds biggest independent biotech firm, based in California] with new drugs, while Taiwan has both experience and a reputation for high-quality

As Taiwans own biopharma firms expand overseas, foreign drug

makers say onerous regulations are hurting their businesses in the islands domestic
market. Since the introduction of Taiwans National Health Insurance system, pharmaceutical drugs have comprised roughly 25% of all medical
manufacturing. The price is not right

costs in Taiwan, which is higher than the OECD average of 16%, according to a January 2015 PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) report on Taiwans
pharmaceutical sector. To control drug spending, the government conducts frequent price-volume surveys and price cuts. Patented drugs largely
imported from the United States, Europe, and Japan account for about 70% of total prescription spending in Taiwan, but that share is projected to fall
as patents expire and the government promotes the use of cheaper generic products. Overuse of medical services exacerbates pricing pressures.
According to the PWC report, Taiwanese on average visit a doctor 15.7 times a year, compared to the OECD average of 5.9, and usually seek
treatment in hospitals. Given that most Taiwanese hospitals do not separate the prescribing and dispensing functions, it is relatively easy for doctors to
over-prescribe drugs. The pharmaceutical section of AmCham Taipeis 2015 Taiwan White Paper noted that the average price of new drugs in Taiwan is
just 51.8% that of the median for the benchmark A10 countries (a basket of 10 benchmarked developed markets). Every year or two in Taiwan, all
drugs face a price adjustment. Under those conditions, it is imperative to obtain a reasonable price when applying for new-drug reimbursement. But
from 2009 to mid-2015 (when the White Paper was published), just nine new drugs were granted breakthrough status, allowing them to be referenced
with international prices. Other drugs were priced based on low-priced comparators. The passage in 2013 of Article 46 of the second-generation
National Health Insurance Act, which introduces immediate price cuts for products that go off patent, is particularly problematic, says Heather Lin, chief
operating officer of the Taipei-based International Research-Based Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IRPMA). Prior to that legislation, drug
makers could still maintain a relatively long lifecycle for originator drugs even after their patents expired due to brand loyalty, allowing them to hold a
certain degree of market share, Lin explains. But since the legislation was enacted, the business environment for drug manufacturers has soured.
Drug prices here are already much lower than the global median, says Lin. No drug company wants to launch in a market if it will risk its product
being benchmarked at a low price. Further, she notes, it takes a long time [three to five years] for a drug to be listed in a Taiwanese hospital. By the
time the drug is finally available to physicians and their patients, it may no longer be cutting edge.

Taiwans reimbursement

system further complicates matters by allowing healthcare providers to be reimbursed in full for medicines sold to them at
discount. The incentive for additional income encourages hospitals to demand large discounts from drugmakers. Generic drugmakers may offer
discounts of up to 50%, while brand manufacturers usually offer a 5%-10% discount, according to the PWC report. That forces the R&D-based
pharmaceutical industry into a role of effectively subsidizing the operation of hospitals, the report says. Experts say the governments drive for cost
containment is ultimately acting as a disincentive for R&D-based pharma activity, threatening Taiwans viability as a future biopharma hub. The
regulatory environment has hurt Taiwans attractiveness as an environment for investment in new-drug launches, Lin says. People are happy with the
low prices, but it comes at the expense of a lot of infrastructure. No overnight cure T aiwans

biopharma sector faces many

challenges ahead. One of the foremost tasks will be narrowing the gap between sector
performance and investor expectations. Indeed, despite surging market valuations, the scale of Taiwans biotech industry
remains small. Government data includes about 500 companies categorized loosely as biotechnology, but with combined revenues of just US$2.5
billion. Speaking at an AmCham Taipei luncheon meeting on April 19, Chi Wei-kuang, director of the bioengineering group at the government-backed
Development Center for Biotechnology (DCB), estimated the current number of biologic drug companies in Taiwan at 40. Worryingly, there has been
little consolidation in the sector, raising questions about the true value of the companies. Calvin Chen, president of TWi Pharmaceuticals and a former
venture capitalist, warned about the lack of M&A activity in an interview with PharmaBoardRoom, a publication that tracks pharmaceutical industry
trends, published in November 2013. Noting that the valuations of some Taiwanese firms that had out-licensed their drug compounds to U.S.
companies had reached parity with or exceeded that of their U.S. partners, he said: That seems very strange to me. In my experience, unless a U.S.
biotech can sell its own product, they cannot become very profitable. The reason U.S. investors recognize the value of smaller biotechs is because the
typical expectation for these companies is that a larger player will acquire them. But I wonder about the biotechs in Taiwan, Chen added. What is the
ultimate exit for their investors? BiotechEasts Silver says Taiwans clinical trial environment and the prevalence of SMEs make the island well suited to
the acquire, develop, transfer biotech business model, whereby companies in-license assets at the preclinical or early clinical phase, develop them
locally in the clinic, and ultimately out-license them later to larger partners for marketing. PharmaEngine and TaiMed, two of Taiwans more successful
biopharma firms, use that model, he notes. There

is dubious risk return for small companies taking on

Phase III clinical trials themselves, he says. A failure could cost hundreds of millions. A huge multinational pharma could
absorb the loss, but it could be devastating for a small company. He cites the case of Taiwanese biopharma firm Medigen as an example. In July 2014,
Medigen announced disappointing preliminary results for the multinational Phase III trial of its new liver cancer drug, PI-88. Over a stretch of three
weeks, the companys shares cratered, erasing more than NT$45 billion (US$1.39 billion) in market capitalization. Compassion BioSolutions Chou
urges Taiwanese investors to better understand the dynamics of the sector. Investors in biotech companies need to be willing to tolerate a great deal
of volatility, he says. Its the nature of the business. Manufacturing capacity is also an issue for Taiwanese drug manufacturers, says Silver. He
explains that Taiwan currently has just three contract manufacturers that can provide batch quantities of drugs sufficient for clinical studies: Eirgenix
Inc., Mycenax Biotech Inc., and JHL Biotech Inc. In an April report for BioWorld, he notes that TaiMed in 2012 entered into a supply agreement with
Chinese contract manufacturer Wuxi PharmaTech to manufacture ibalizumab as no Taiwanese firm could meet its demand for batches of 1,000 to
2,000 liters. PharmaEngines Yeh urges the incoming government to focus on establishing a friendlier innovative environment to boost Taiwans
research and development capabilities, adopt regulations to encourage more talented individuals to come and work in Taiwan, and allocate resources

To build a more robust biotech industry, Chou suggests that

Taiwan build up expertise in pharmaceutical product development the science of turning a molecule
into a usable medicine. He advises the Taiwanese government to encourage scientists with such
expertise to start new business ventures in Taiwan. That would provide local industry with the know-how to bridge drug
to promising companies via an open peer-reviewed process.

discovery with cutting-edge product development and manufacturing. Government-led efforts could include offering funding to entrepreneurs who
possess practical knowledge and experience in guiding the development of biopharmaceuticals from discovery to commercialization, he says. The
government could also sponsor activities to educate the existing industry on how to integrate all aspects of biopharmaceutical development, including
rational drug-candidate selection, formulation optimization, the manufacturing of active pharmaceutical ingredients, and the final dosage form, Chou
adds. For

the Taiwan biopharma sector, the vision has been identified, says MSDs Romanelli,
referring to President-elect Tsais focus on making Taiwan a regional biotech hub. Now there
needs to be articulation of a strategy to get there.

Impacts: Climate
Taiwans Tech sector is successful now due to economic stability and the
US-Key to innovation and climate solutions
Mark Stokes and Sabrina Tsai 16, MARK A. STOKES is executive director of the
Project 2049 Institute. A 20 year U.S. Air Force veteran, Mark has served in a variety of military
and private sector positions, SABRINA TSAI was a research associate at the Project 2049
Institute, where she focused on U.S. policy in Asia, cross-Strait relations, and Chinese foreign
policy, 2/1/2016, The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait Driving
Forces and Implications for U.S. Security Interests,
http://www.project2049.net/documents/Future_US%20Policy%20Options%20in%20the
%20Taiwan%20Strait_Project%202049.pdf
Science and technology (S&T) is

critical for sustaining economic development, resolving

environmental challenges, mitigating the effects of natural disasters, and upgrading
military capabilities. Technology is also a key force that is shaping the future of the PRC, Taiwan, and the international
community as a whole. Technology is an intrinsic metric of national power and creates international competitive advantages.
Technological advances can accelerate powerful forces of globalization by altering traditional geostrategic concepts that dominate

Technological trends
most relevant to U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait include Chinas quest to become a
technological superpower; Taiwans ability to sustain its technological competitive
advantages; U.S.-Taiwan technology cooperation; and Taiwans contribution to multilateral
technological development. Chinas Quest to Become a Technological Superpower. Over the past 25 years, the PRC
the progression of public discourse on evolving technological challenges in a transnational space.

has made significant progress in reforming its S&T system and creating the conditions for successful R&D and sustainable
technological development. In the decades to come, China has the technological potential to rival the United States. The PRC faces
many challenges to achieving its goals. While it has achieved successes, particularly in within the defense realm, uncertainties
surround Chinas ability to master disruptive technologies that fundamentally alter the strategic landscape.118 Even with its
remarkable economic accomplishments to date, Chinas record of innovation in commercial technologies has been uneven. Despite
the swelling ranks of research personnel and increasingly generous funding for science and technology development, Chinese
technological capabilities have been failing to meet the nation's needs in areas such as energy, water and resource utilization,
environment protection, and public health. Adding to these difficulties, many of China's most stellar performers have opted for career
opportunities abroad, and a brain drain has slowed the development of high-level scientific leadership.119 These problems run in

much of the ROCs

success today can be attributed to its capacity for technological innovation. In fact, Taiwan
is arguably one of the most innovative societies in the world. According to the World Economic
Forums Global Competitiveness Report (2015-2016), Taiwans technological infrastructure ranked ninth in
the world. In 2014, Taiwan was among the top 10 most technologically innovative
societies in the world. Taiwans R&D spending has been comparable to the U.S. and other
major economies, and has consistently ranked fourth in the world in the number of foreign U.S. utility patents granted, a
the face of Chinas technological aspirations. Taiwans Technology Future. On the other hand,

common metric of innovation. It holds the largest number on a per capita basis. As Michael Porter, author of The Competitive
Advantage of Nations, notes, a nations competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade. 120
Taiwans success is based in part on a mix of public-private partnerships led in large part by the Hsinchu-based Industrial
Technology Research Institute (ITRI). ITRI produces commercial spin-offs that have grown into leading global enterprises.
Nevertheless, Taiwans ability to maintain its technological advantages could erode in the future, especially as the PRC continues to
stress innovation and technology partnerships with Taiwan while isolating Taiwan from other regional economic partners, and
Taiwans international cooperation diminishes amidst fierce regional and global competition. U.S.-Taiwan Technology Cooperation.

Taiwans success is also in part a result of the long history of S&T cooperation with the
United States, starting with a fateful meeting between ROC Vice President Yen Chia-kan and President Lyndon Johnson in May
1967. With the two sides agreeing to make bilateral S&T cooperation a foremost priority in the bilateral relationship, President
Johnson committed to sending his senior national technology advisor to Taiwan, Don Hornig, for an assessment of its technological
infrastructure, education, and planning. Out

of this September 1967 mission emerged a consensus for

Taiwan, with U.S. assistance, to adopt a centralized S&T policy with long term plans and
clearly defined goals and objectives. The Hornig Mission also stressed the need to dedicate up to 2% of
GDP toward R&D.121 In addition to assessment teams, major U.S. companies licensed key
microelectronic technologies and trained a cadre of scientists and engineers in design,
management, and manufacturing. The first major U.S. multinational firm to engage in Taiwans electronics industry was General
Instruments (GI), which established a fully-owned subsidiary in suburban Taipei in 1964. The plant produced electronic components,
such as transistors and tuners, for shipment back to the parent company. Taiwans

move toward the higher tech

integrated circuit arena began with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) signing of a tech transfer
licensing agreement with RCA in 1976. After signing of the agreement, RCA, which was considering getting out of the
microelectronics business, agreed to transfer older IC fabrication tools and know-how in exchange for modest royalties. RCA
engineers assisted ITRI in establishing its first IC manufacturing plant. Taiwans technological revolution was further boosted in the
1980s, when many Taiwan born engineers who found their way to Silicon Valley and formed networks with counterparts on Taiwan.
Up to at least 2004, Taiwan had continued to rely heavily on the U.S. to maintain its technological advantage. For example, Taiwans
National Science Council approved more joint research proposals with the U.S. than with the next four largest countries combined.
While U.S. partners accounted for 37% of all international research projects approved by Taiwan's National Science Council since
2004, senior Taiwan

technology policy authorities have lamented the diminishing role of the

United States in senior S&T advisory boards, such as the STAG.122 Cooperation in recent years
has involved technical information exchanges, atmospheric research, water resources
development, meteorology and forecast systems development, advanced computing and
modeling, and other areas. Representatives from the U.S. and Taiwan also have pooled resources out of shared concern over
environmental degradation and focused on natural disaster research.123 The most recent AIT-TECRO scientific and technical
cooperation agreement was signed on October 17, 2013, with the two sides agreeing to collaborate in satellite-based marine oil

Taiwan
and the U.S. are likely to expand their cooperation in science and technology into the
future, as research and exchange programs continue to take place between Taiwans top innovation institute ITRI and numerous
universities in the U.S.125 Regional Cooperation. Taiwan also has made regional contributions. Since Taiwan joined
APEC in 1991, it has engaged in various activities in support of regional cooperation
efforts, ranging from green energy and nanotechnology to small and medium sized enterprise (SME)
development, agricultural technical cooperation, and disaster recovery. Taiwan has provided
monitoring by sharing technical know-how, information, and assistance during oil spills or other natural disasters.124

members in ICT-related skills development through 60 training centers established in eight APEC economies. Taiwan also has
supported APECs energy policy goals of reducing the use of carbon-based emissions through development of green technology.
For example, Taiwan

has promoted cooperation and experience-sharing in fields such as

photovoltaic technology. 126 In summary, Taiwan capacity for technological innovation is intimately related to its ability
to deal with counterparts across the Taiwan Strait from a position of strength. The United States has an important
role to play. Technology, both at the global level and within Taiwan itself, is likely to influence the
sustainability of the type of economic success that Taiwan has been able to achieve to
date. Economic success, in turn, is essential for sustainment of democracy and critical for
maintaining a defense sufficient to deter and defend against resorts to use of military
force. S&T will be of even greater importance in the years ahead.

Taiwan key to global cooperation on renewables

Yuan-Ming Chiao 6/16, Reporter for the China Post Taiwan, 6/16/2016,
Taiwan premier discusses energy efficiency with US delegation,
http://www.asianews.network/content/taiwan-premier-discusses-energyefficiency-us-delegation-19915
A two-day conference jointly organised by Taiwan and the U.S. also includes invited speakers from Australia, Cambodia, India,

Premier Lin Chuan received a

U.S. delegation Tuesday and expressed the governments resolve to end nuclear power and
cut carbon emissions to combat climate change during the meeting. These goals formed the first
prong of the governments energy policy, with the second one comprising renewable
Indonesia, Laos, The Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka. Taiwan

energy, Lin told the delegation, which was led by Matthew J. Matthews, deputy assistant secretary and senior official for
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) of the U.S. State Department. Matthews, who is in Taiwan to attend the Global
Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF) conference on energy efficiency, said the issue was of critical global
importance. The two day conference jointly organised by Taiwan and the U.S. also includes invited speakers from Australia,
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, The Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka. Both countries have
valuable public and private expertise that could be shared on the matter, he said. Matthews
added that he was also looking forward to holding broader discussions with Taiwan regarding APEC. He said that the

multilateral trade forum could consider allowing green energy technology to be traded
tariff free. He hoped that consensus could be reached on decisions relating to alternative
energy and evaluation over the effectiveness of subsidizing fossil fuel industries. Energy
Goals Not Contradictory: Economics Minister Economics Minister Lee Chih-kung stated that there was no contradiction between the
planned 2025 nuclear phase out of and state-owned Taiwan Power Companys (Taipower) plan to invest NT$420 billion (approx.
US$12.9 billion) in alternative energy by 2030. The

goal would be to produce 3.5 million megawatts of

power through solar, wind and thermal energy. Concerns were raised that Taipower would not be able to meet
both goals together, with Lee responding that alternative energy investments would be able to produce 2.2 million megawatts of
power, more than the annual target of 2 million megawatts of alternative and renewable energy as planned for the non-nuclear
homeland policy. Lee stated that Taipower would be tasked with creating a 10-year plan for alternative energy development that is
in line with the plans for phasing out nuclear power. Energy Conservation Sought in Universities Meanwhile, Lin proposed that the
Ministry of Education set goals for energy conservation among the nations higher education institutions. The Economics Ministry
stated that universities have higher energy consumption due to central air conditioning facilities, especially in student dormitories. In
the weekly Cabinet meeting, Lin stated that intelligent electricity meters should be installed quickly in order to regulate power usage
more efficiently based on peak and off-peak energy needs. The premiers reasoning comes as greater energy demands come at a
critical time amid plans to phase out nuclear power. The

government predicts that the next two to three

years will be a time of major challenges and that more institutions needed to conserve
power.

Impacts: Cyber
Stability of Taiwans tech sector key to cyber-security measures
Andrea Moneton 6/22, Researcher and specialist on Taiwan for the East-West center,
6/22/2016, United States and Taiwan Increase Cybersecurity Cooperation,
http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/taiwan/us-taiwan-increase-cybersecurity-cooperation
The United

States and Taiwan signed a Statement of Intent at the US-Taiwan Cybersecurity Forum on May 24 to
increase cybersecurity cooperation. Marcus Jadotte, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis, led a trade
delegation from American technology companies including Cisco, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. The Taipei Computer Association ( TCA), a
private sector industrial organization dedicated to promoting Taiwans information communication technology (ICT) sector, signed the
statement on behalf of the island. The statement lays the groundwork for sharing market
research and best practices in cybersecurity. Both parties expressed the idea that
reducing risks related to cybersecurity is crucial to maintaining their robust trade . Since
Taiwan is the United States ninth largest trading partner, increased cybersecurity cooperation will encourage
growth in bilateral trade and investment. The partnership between the Commerce
Department and some of the largest American technology companies also demonstrates
the governments commitment to strengthening the two markets relationship. Although
cybersecurity is relevant in most industries, it can be most closely tied to the ICT sector. Cooperation
in ICT between the US and Taiwan has grown more than with most other Asian nations. The
balance in electronics trade rose 49% with Taiwan between 2005 and 2015. US-Taiwan electronics trade balance surpassed
Koreas 29% increase and is second only to China electronics trade growth. This surge in hardware trade has prompted
increased dialogue about the future of ICT trade between the US and Taiwan. In December 2013, the US-Taiwan
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council developed a set of trade principles specific to ICT adopted by the US Trade Representative
(USTR). Japan is the only other Asian country with which the US has developed bilateral ICT-specific trade principles. Later on, in December 2015, the

cooperation in the ICT sector was at the top

of the agenda. The week after TCA signed the Statement of Intent with the US delegation, TCA co-hosted Computex, Asias largest annual
ICT fair, which featured 25 American exhibitors including Intel, the worlds largest chip manufacturer. The last few years have
witnessed the development of a strong US-Taiwan relationship in the ICT sector, and the
latest US-Taiwan Cybersecurity Forum confirms that Taiwan will be an important partner in ICT and
in the fight against cybercrime. Thus, in US states with fast-growing technology industries like Minnesota, Utah, and Nebraska,
Taiwans rapidly growing ICT industry will be an important market for state-level trade
relations.
US and Taiwan held their first bilateral Digital Economy Forum, during which

Impacts: Semiconductors
Tech import drop off by China puts the Taiwanese economy in huge danger
Einhorn 2016 (Bruce, Asia regional editor in Bloomberg Businessweek 's Hong Kong bureau.
He was previously the Asia technology correspondent, Taiwans New Leader Inherits a Mess
The islands economy is deeply intertwined with Chinas, Bloomberg Businessweek, January
21, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-21/taiwan-s-new-leader-inherits-amess, silbs)
It was a total victory for Tsai Ing-wen. Not only did the Taiwanese opposition leader trounce the candidate of the ruling Kuomintang on Jan. 16 to become the islands first female

Tsai was addressing

worries that her partys pro-independence stance would hurt the economy by alienating
its biggest trade partner, China. I wont provoke, and there wont be any accidents, she told
supporters on election night. China and Hong Kong account for about 40 percent of Taiwans exports,
making the mainlands slowdown especially painful. Taiwanese exports to China and Hong Kong
dropped 12.3 percent last year. Taiwans economy grew only 0.9 percent in 2015, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg, down from an earlier
forecast of 1.6 percent. The Kuomintang strategy of boosting growth by improving mainland ties
turned off many Taiwanese. The KMT is too close to China, says Tsai supporter Li Yu-ju, a graduate student. Taiwans economy overrelies on
China. Tsai, a graduate of Cornell Law School, wants to reduce that dependence . The island is in economic
crisis. Slumping global demand for PCs imperils local companies such as Acer and Asustek that flourished during the PC boom. Smartphone maker HTC, once the
president but voters also rewarded her Democratic Progressive Party with its first parliamentary majority. Even as she celebrated,

premier example of a post-PC Taiwanese tech company, now has a market share of about 1 percent. Consumers around the world prefer Apple, Koreas Samsung, and Chinese

ainland electronics companies have an increasing number of homegrown

suppliers, prompting worries of what the Taiwanese call a red supply chain that will
make Taiwans companies irrelevant. In 2014 mainland chipmakers provided 29 percent
of Chinas semiconductors, up from 20 percent in 2010. Many Taiwanese companies find
it is too late to beat China and have no choice but exploring ways to participate in
Chinas rise, Sanford C. Bernstein analysts Mark Li and David Dai wrote in a Jan. 4 report. Beijing-based Tsinghua Unigroup in October said it had agreed to pay
brands Xiaomi and Huawei. M

$600 million for a major stake in Powertech Technology, a chip packaging and testing company based in Hsinchu, Taiwans tech hub. In December, Tsinghua Unigroup unveiled
plans to spend $2.1 billion for 25 percent positions in two other Taiwanese chip companies, Siliconware Precision Industries and ChipMOS Technologies. Taiwans regulator in

Tsai warned of the threat mainland

investment poses for Taiwan. The government will get around to easing restrictions on
mainland investment in the islands chip companies, Li and Dai argue, but the chance of that happening soon is nearly
impossible. Some Taiwanese see the whole island as a lab. Taiwan is not so big, so we are able to use the nation as a
test bed for new, innovative services, says Y.C. Chang, managing director of Far Eastern Electronic Toll Collection, part of the Far Eastern
charge of foreign investment has said approval of all three is unlikely. During the campaign,

Group. The conglomerate teamed up with software services company Systex, server maker Mitac, and industrial motor producer Teco Electric & Machinery to design and
operate an electronic toll collection system for Taiwanese roads, which started service in 2013. Today, Far Eastern is advising Vietnam on a toll system and has signed

Tsai spoke on the campaign trail of the need to focus on

potential growth industries such as biotechnology, Web-connected devices, and defense.
Tsais running mate, Chen Chien-jen, is a Johns Hopkins-educated researcher in epidemiology and genomics, and the pair want to promote Taiwan as
a center for medical research. Thanks in part to talk by Tsai and her running mate, Taiwans biotech stock index has gained 1 percent over the past
three months, compared with an 11 percent slump for the broader market. Beijing is counting on Taiwans economic
weakness to keep Tsai in line. Regardless of its relationship with the mainland, its
impossible for the DPP to reverse Taiwans stagnant economy, editorialized the Global Times, a paper controlled by
memoranda of understanding with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

the Communist Partys Peoples Daily. No matter what kind of political philosophy Tsai espouses, she has to face up to the reality. She should know she has limited options.

China wants to swallow up Taiwans semiconductor industry

Hung and Lee 2016 (Faith, Deputy Bureau Chief at Reuters, Yimou, Taiwan frets China
economic noose tightening as polls loom, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwanelection-china-investment-idUSKBN0UL2IS20160107, January 7, 2016, silbs)

state-linked Chinese firms launched a $3 billion cross-strait

investment grab, sparking fears Beijing was using economic clout to influence the island
as it looks to vote in an independence-leaning president. Mainland companies have a
brief window to get deals approved before a change of leadership may present more
hurdles, particularly if anti-Beijing sentiment flavours policy debates both before and after the polls in proudly-democractic Taiwan. The island votes in a new president
and parliament on Jan. 16, when the China-friendly ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party is expected to be defeated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Statebacked Chinese technology conglomerate Tsinghua Unigroup Ltd [TSHUAA.UL] is
seeking to buy stakes in three Taiwanese chip packaging firms for $2.6 billion. Some of the
In the weeks ahead of Taiwan's elections,

investments could get the regulator's sign-off before a new government is inaugurated on May 20. Tsinghua Unigroup's plans have raised questions among voters over China's
economic agenda and the dangers of a monopoly. "

China is switching to an aggressive attitude toward Taiwan

from previous elections," said Emile Chang, executive secretary of Taiwan's Investment Commission, noting that companies normally hold off on
investments ahead of elections. "It's aiming for economic ties to remain on track. " The Ministry of Economic Affair's investment
agency vets proposals on China and other foreign investments and usually announces a decision in two to three months. Approved investments cannot be challenged.

Tsinghua's investments, along with others connected to families of China's People's

Liberation Army, have put the spotlight on the uneasy relationship between Taipei and
Beijing. China regards Taiwan as a renegade province to be unified with the mainland, by force if necessary, while Taiwan insists on its rights to be a self-governing
entity. MOOD CHANGE Ties between China and Taiwan warmed under the government of President Ma Ying-jeou who took office in 2008. The years of engagement, however,
have not stopped jobs and manufacturing migrating abroad nor bolstered the economy from recession. Taiwan has only become more dependent on the mainland. "Unigroup is
backed by the China government. They are acquiring Taiwan's key companies, generating negative perceptions among Taiwanese people," said Huang Weiche, a lawmaker of

China has said it costs less to absorb Taiwan via economical means than military
force. That is what they are doing now." Tsinghua wants to take a stake of about 25
percent in each of three chip testing and packaging firms: ChipMOS Technologies Inc (8150.TW), Siliconware Precision
the DPP. "

Industries Co Ltd (2325.TW) and Powertech Technology Inc (6239.TW). U.S. film maker Dan Mintz has also agreed to acquire Taiwan's Eastern Broadcasting Corp (EBC) in a
deal valued at $600 million. Mintz is a co-founder of Shenzhen-listed DMG Entertainment and Media Co (002143.SZ); another co-founder Peter Xiao has links with the PLA.

Beijing is closely watching the outcome of the elections. A win by the DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen, the
front-runner in the polls, could see Chinese investments coming under more scrutiny in future. Tsai
has said she sees Tsinghua's investments as a "huge threat" to Taiwan's semiconductor
industry, concerned that a transfer of technological know-how will hurt domestic
industries. Taiwan is home to the world's biggest contract chip manufacturer who supports global brands such as Apple Inc. (AAPL.O). Some industry
leaders say tie-ups will help both sides: Taiwan's tech exporters could scale up and stay
relevant while Chinese firms could quickly acquire expertise. "Where is Taiwan's future? China has set two goals for
its economic development - overseas investment and technology development, and Taiwan should grab this opportunity," Tsinghua Unigroup chairman Zhao Weiguo said in a

Since 2009, Taiwan has approved far fewer investments by China than the other
way around. Some 745 Chinese investments worth $1.33 billion have been approved as of October - less than 1 percent of Taiwanese investments in China, said
Lee Rongmin, director general of the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics Products in Taipei. " We're sorry that
Tsinghua's planned investments have been seen as a threat of being taken over, creating
a barrier for cooperation across the Taiwan Strait," Lee said.
recent interview.

Taiwan is one of the worlds biggest semiconductor suppliers but their

domestic economy has been losing to competition in recent years
Rosier, OConnor, and Cuevas 2016 (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Analyst, Economics
and Trade, Shaun, Research Fellow, Economics and Trade, Rolando, Former Research Intern,
Economics and Trade, Taiwans Economy amid Political Transition, January 6, 2016,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Taiwan's%20Economy%20amid
%20Political%20Transition.pdf, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, silbs)
Although Taiwan is an innovative and technology-intensive economy, its competiveness
in innovation-driven sectors is declining. Taiwan ranks first globally for patent activity,* and is the tenth most innovative economy in the
world, according to Bloomberg rankings. 92 In addition to hosting major technology firms such as Foxconn and HTC, Taiwan is also one of the
worlds biggest semiconductor suppliers.93 Despite these impressive achievements,
policymakers across Taiwans political spectrum are attributing its stagnant growth and

wages in part to a slump in innovation, a topic that has become ubiquitous on both political parties campaign trails. Taiwans traditional
advantage in innovation refers primarily to the innovative capacity of its large technology companies. In this respect, Taiwan has performed well
over the past two decades, driving its high level of patent activity. Taiwan-based companies such as HTC won global renown in the 1990s and early
2000s by doing highly efficient contract work for brands such as Apple, Dell, and Toshiba.94 The spillover effects of producing foreign technology helped some Taiwan

In
recent years, however, corporate executives have grown concerned that their firms have
not been as adept at innovating as other global competitors. According to an official at the Taiwan Ministry of
contractors to innovate on their own; for example, HTC develops globally competitive smartphones and Asustek Computer (Asus) produces popular tablet computers.95

Economic Affairs, the legacy of Taiwans efficiency model of doing contract work for foreign firms is now a burden insofar as Taiwans technology experts are more adept at
advancing cost-effective ideas than truly creative ones.96 For example, 90 percent of the worlds laptop sales come from five manufacturing companies in TaiwanQuanta

increased competition from manufacturers in

China and Vietnam has decreased the profits of these companies by 50 percent over the
last decade.97 Without new innovations to improve the quality and capabilities of their products, Taiwans manufacturers are quickly losing ground in the global
Computer, Compal Electronics, Pegatron, Wistron, and Inventec. However,

market: In September 2015, HTC, a leading global smartphone manufacturer, cut 15 percent of its staff and was dropped from the Taiwan stock exchanges top 50 companies

Some analysts have said that the problem lies

in Taiwans corporate culture, where the drive to invent and market new products is not
sufficiently prized.99 Firms are banking on increased research and development (R&D)
as a remedy to their innovation slumps: overall R&D expenditures more than doubled in Taiwan from 2000 to 2014, and the share of R&D
index after competition from lower-cost factories in Asia led to a decline in profits. 98

expenditures by businesses increased from 64 percent to 77 percent over the same period.

Taiwan semiconductors down nowChinas stealing their market

Rosier, OConnor, and Cuevas 2016 (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Analyst, Economics
and Trade, Shaun, Research Fellow, Economics and Trade, Rolando, Former Research Intern,
Economics and Trade, Taiwans Economy amid Political Transition, January 6, 2016,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Taiwan's%20Economy%20amid
%20Political%20Transition.pdf, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, silbs)
Taiwans semiconductor industry, a hallmark of its export-oriented economy, is facing a
growing threat of decline as Chinese companies and the so-called red supply chain begin to dominate
regional information and communication technology (ICT) manufacturing. Cross-Strait trade is
largely formed by regional supply chains in the ICT sector, particularly semiconductor
trade. Chinas total semiconductor imports made up 56.6 percent of global semiconductor imports in 2014, an increase from 44 percent in 2013.136 Meanwhile,
Taiwan is the worlds leading semiconductor manufacturer, exporting a total of more than
$200 billion worth of semiconductor products globally in the first nine months of 2015. However, Chinese
manufacturers are increasingly sourcing from China based suppliers and placing fewer orders from Taiwan
firms. 137 As a result, Taiwans semiconductor exports have declined significantly; in the first nine months
of 2015, exports of microchips, semiconductors, and printed circuit boards to China declined 4.5 percent, 18.9 percent, and 3.3 percent, respectively, from the same period in

Taiwans semiconductor export orders declined 4 percent year-on-year, the first

To improve
its domestic semiconductor industry, China has begun buying stakes in Taiwans
semiconductor companies. In October 2015, Chinas state-owned Tsinghua Unigroup Ltd. bought a $600 million stake in Taiwans Powertech
2014.138 In April 2015,

drop since July 2013.139 China views semiconductors as crucial for national security and has pledged billions of dollars in investment in the sector. 140

Technology Inc., a microchip packaging and testing company. That same month, Tsinghua Unigroup hired the former head of Inotera Memories Inc., one of Taiwans largest

As China works to bolster its

semiconductor industry, it will continue producing parts and components at lower prices
to replace those made by Taiwan firms, further increasing competition and driving down
Taiwan companies profits. 142 Rather than relying on Taiwans established semiconductor suppliers, China is slowly taking
control of the global semiconductor business, threatening the survival of this industry in
Taiwan, where it has long been a key competitive advantage.143 Seeking Chinese tax advantages and looking to reduce costs, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
memory chip makers, to head up a joint venture between Micron and Taiwans Nanya Technology Corp.141

Company (TSMC) announced in December 2015 it will set up a wholly Taiwan-owned manufacturing plant in China.144 TSMC is the first company to take advantage of a

China is also
Taiwans top destination for FDI, accounting for 45.5 percent of Taiwans total outbound
FDI (see Figure 14). 146 According to official Taiwan data, Taiwan FDI into China in the first nine
September rule change that relaxed requirements mandating investments in China be done as a joint venture with a Chinese company.145

months of 2015 was approximately $7.3 billion, a decrease of 4.4 percent from the same
period in 2014.147 However, analysts believe this amount grossly understates the actual scale of investment. According to a 2011 study, many Taiwan firms use
third-party companiesmostly registered in Hong Kongto invest in China, which creates a discrepancy between the stated level of cross-Strait investment and Taiwans actual
level of investment in China. 148 Official Taiwan FDI flows had been declining since 2010, until seeing a 13 percent increase in 2014 and further increases in the first nine
months of 2015 due to new Taiwan FDI in Chinas electronic parts manufacturing and computer manufacturing sectors.

Economic stability and reforms are key to Taiwanese semiconductor

exports
Chen Hui-ping 16, Staff writer at the Taipei Times, 3/4/2016, Tsai pledges action in
semiconductor industry,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/03/04/2003640767
The government

must take a more active role in helping the semiconductor industry if the
nation expects to maintain its advantage in the field, president-elect Tsai Ing-wen () said yesterday during a
tour of industries at the Hsinchu Science Park (). Tsai cited Chinas supply chain in the industry as
the greatest competition, adding that Taiwan needs to foster its own talent while creating an environment that would retain talent in the
industry. Tsai said that she had not specifically included the semiconductor industry in her research and development plan in the five innovative
industries. The semiconductor

industry will prove mutually beneficial with the five innovative

industries green energy, Asian Silicon valley, national defense, biotechnology and
medicine and smart machinery as it will provide the impetus for research and
development, while benefiting from applications in different technologies, she said. They will serve
to pull along the other industries within their supply chains, just as a locomotive pulls carriages, Tsai said. The government must
become more active if the nation wishes to maintain its edge and it must form
partnerships with corporations, Tsai said, adding that the incoming government pledges stable
water and electricity supplies, as well as land, for companies to manufacture products .
Coordinating Taiwans expertise with that of other nations, such as software in the US, as well as industries in
Japan that supply key components, could solidify the nations foothold in foreign markets, with a
chance of becoming a major supply center for information and communications
technology products on a global scale, Tsai said. Meanwhile, Etron Technology president Nicky Lu () said that the
government should seek to manage Chinese investment in Taiwanese information and
communication design industries, rather than stonewalling Chinese investors. The Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association,
which Lu chairs, polled member companies on allowing Chinese investment in the Taiwanese integrated circuit (IC) design industry, with a majority
backing the idea, Lu said.

Taiwan Semiconductors key to US Tech leadership

Ian Easton 16, Visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairsin Tokyo.
Previously a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, March 2016, Strategic Standoff
The U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan, http://www.project2049.net/documents/Strategic
%20Standoff_US_China_Rivalry_Taiwan.pdf
Taiwan is currently America's ninth largest trading partner, ahead of Saudi Arabia, India,
and Brazil.32 The Taiwanese excel when it comes to researching, designing, and
manufacturing the advanced technology that drives much of America's economy. Integrated
circuits (or microchips) are the brains of our handheld devices and computers. The global chip making business as
we know it was invented by Taiwan in the 1980s, and the high-tech island nation still
occupies a strong position on the global supply chain. However, the PRC is rapidly catching
up, something that poses a serious threat to the security of the world's hardware.33
America needs Taiwan as a "Silicon Shield," keeping the technology of tomorrow from
being controlled and corrupted by an adversary.

Tech leadership key to heg

Adam Segal 4, Researcher for the Council on Foreign Relations, November/December
2004, Foreign Affairs, Is America Losing Its Edge?,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-11-01/america-losing-its-edge
The United

States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new
technologies and industries faster than anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific
innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and
military power. It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the Internet; other
countries merely followed the U.S. lead. Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping,
and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in
research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality
of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The

percentage of patents issued to and science journal

articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the secondlargest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the
world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even

China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers,

biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing.
Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of
research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system.
Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant
threat to it. The

United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new
technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than
everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological
entrepreneurship at home.

Solvency/Say Yes

1ac Solvency
US CBMs with China and Taiwan over US arms sales and PLA military
deployments would lead to greater stability in the region by getting rid of
the ineffective status quo policies and increasing trust among nations
which leads to effective and long-lasting cross-strait dialogue
Swaine 11- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, America's Challenge:
Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace) JB

despite significant improvements

in the cross-Strait situation U.S. policy toward the island has essentially remained
unchanged since the early 1980s. And yet as has been clearly shown, underlying
conditions have evolved enormously since that time, in some areas (for example, in the military realm and regarding the largely zerosum nature of domestic politics on Taiwan) in decidedly negative ways. In particular, since the mid-1990s, when China began
building up its military capabilities vis-a-vis Taiwan. Washington's security-related
position toward the resulting growing cross-Strait military imbalance has remained
largely limited to telling Beijing that it must reduce its military presence in order to give Taipei the confidence to engage in cross-Strait talks,
while making clear that it will sell more arms to Taipei and increase U.S. surveillance and
military deployments relevant to a Taiwan conflict as long as Beijing refuses to comply.
Though it has worked thus far. the problem with this position is that it is founded on the assumption
that the United States will retain the capacity and will to deter Beijing indefinitely from
adopting more assertive means toward the island, despite the fact that China's
economic, political, and military capabilities will likely grow steadily along its periphery, and that
the United States might continue to experience serious economic problems that could
affect its ability to maintain its military predominance in the Western Pacific. Under such
circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over People's Liberation Army (PLA)
deployments and arms sales will probably depend almost entirely on the ability of Taipei
and Beijing to reach a strong political understanding that permits mutual restraint in the
military realm. And yet such an understanding is unlikely without some level of credible
Regarding Washington's political and security relations with Taiwan, as indicated in chapter 2

prior understanding between Beijing and Washington regarding

both

arms sales

and larger

political calculations. As indicated in chapter 2 in the very likely absence of far more domestic political unity on Taiwan in favor of cross-Strait political
talks. Beijing will probably maintain if not substantially increase its military deployments relevant to Taiwan during the current decade, regardless of how
much progress occurs in advancing cross-Strait economic and social links, thus almost certainly provoking further significant U.S. arms sales to the

Beijing will also likely attempt to make

any future major US arms sale decisions increasingly costly for Washington, thus greatly
feeding mutual security suspicions and undermining US attempts to maintain or enhance
both strategic reassurance and deterrence.1" Such a situation could ultimately prove
disastrous for the Sino-US relationship, greatly increasing the risk of confrontation and
even armed conflict. In this context, a continued US. commitment to its long-standing
essentially "hands-off" approach to the cross-Strait political process, including a refusal to engage in
discussions with Beijing over each side's respective military deployments and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, will become increasingly
island. Most important, assuming that China continues to grow in power and confidence.

counterproductive for stability * in the Western Pacific. Only the United States can alter China's

calculus toward Taiwan in ways that would facilitate a military drawdown and genuine
movement toward a more stable cross-Strait modus vivendi through political dialogue.
Therefore. Washington

policymakers should consider negotiating directly with Beijing in

consultation with Taipei, a set of mutual assurances regarding PLA force levels and
deployments on the one hand, and major U.S. arms sales and defense assistance to
Taiwan on the other hand, that are linked to the opening of a cross-Strait political
dialogue .31 Such an agreement would need to be designed as a combined military and political
confidence-building measure, intended to create some level of trust that each side would
stop directly threatening the other with military deployments specifically aimed at the
Taiwan situation, while providing a basis for an open-ended (and almost inevitably long-lasting)
political dialogue. It would not need to require either Washington or Beijing to give up its
military deployments in other areas.32

The plan solves for all possible alt causes to effective cross-strait relations
and confidence building measures
*This card is also very good at answering the politics DA, Alliance DA, and Taiwan DA
*This card also draws a distinction between reducing arms sales to the necessary materials
needed for self-defense and getting rid of all arms sales

Swaine 11- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, America's Challenge:
Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace) JB
The feasibility and parameters of such an agreement could be initially explored via an authorized Track II dialogue, given its many
obvious sensitivities. Indeed, any such

approach would confront three major problems for the United

States. First and foremost, some politicians and pundits in both the United States and Taiwan
(and perhaps also in Japan) would attempt to label any effort by Washington to negotiate with
Beijing, even in consultation with Taipei, as a "sell-out" of Taiwan's interests that could
result in China eventually coercing or seizing the island and. more broadly, in irreparable
damage to America's credibility and strategic position in Asia and perhaps beyond.
Second, both the United States and China might face considerable difficulties in defining
what constitutes a reasonable exchange of forces, deployments, and arms sales to
Taiwan. A third consideration, often voiced by some observers of the Taiwan situation, is that any such U.S.
attempt to intervene in the cross-Strait imbroglio could easily expose Washington to
manipulation by both Taipei and Beijing while possibly increasing the chances of a
miscalculation by all three parties. The first objection is the most serious because it is directly related to
the domestic political environments in the United States and Taiwanarguably the most serious obstacles to a resolution of the
Taiwan problem. There is no doubt that those in both places who want Washington to treat Beijing as a mortal enemy and Taiwan as
an independent, sovereign nation entirely separate from China would highlight (and in some instances distort or exaggerate) the
dangers confronting such an approach. In fact, while

pursuing such an option. Washington would

obviously also need to enhance its larger security posture in Asia, partly in support of its basic
commitment to an uncoerced and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Also, in this regard, one should not assume

that Taipei would inevitably regard Washington's efforts to negotiate with Beijing as a
form of coercion toward the island. Taiwan's objections to opening a cross-Strait
dialogue could be reduced considerably if this dialogue were presented as seeking with
a more active U.S. role, higher levels of cross-Strait economic interdependence:
negotiated Chinese commitments to more political, economic, and personal freedoms
than those currently contained within the "one country, two systems" formula: and
significant, tangible reductions in Beijing's capacity to launch a rapid attack on the
island. Also, it is by no means clear that other Asian nations would regard Washington's
efforts to negotiate with Beijing about the Taiwan problem as an unambiguous indication
of America's weakness or as a loss of its credibility , as some would argue. Most Asian nations
would doubtless prefer for the issue to be addressed through some form of direct talks
designed to place it on a more stable long-term footing It is also possible that many
Americans would support US efforts to negotiate with China to stabilize, if not resolve,
the Taiwan issue. This is suggested by the fact that most US citizens view Taiwan as the
least critical threat to U.S. vital interests out of a litany of threats. Moreover, a vast majority of
Americans are opposed to using U.S. troops to prevent China from invading Taiwan."
The second objection would obviously be addressed through negotiations and
consultations between Washington and both Beijing and Taipei and is not on the face of
it unsolvable.

Some observers disagree, asserting that Beijing would need to severely limit or destroy most if not all of its

more advanced power projection capabilities to provide significant assurances to Washington and Taipei as part of any negotiations
a highly unlikely possibility. Others argue that the United States could not in any event conclusively verify Chinese commitments
to limit or destroy military capabilities such as ballistic missiles. In this author's view, neither

objection is convincing
Some PLA capabilities, such as short-range ballistic missiles and amphibious attack
platforms, are really only relevant (and critical) to Taiwan-based scenarios. Beijing would thus not be
sacrificing its capabilities in other areas by limiting such forces as part of a Taiwan
agreement.

Other PLA capabilities of relevance to Taiwansuch as deployments of certain levels of air or naval forces to

bases or ports within rapid striking distance of the island-could also be subject to limitation without arguably affecting China's other
security interests. Given

the potentially significant benefits for China of reaching a stable

agreement on this matter, it is also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit or
provide convincing levels of verification. The third objectionthat U.S. efforts in this
arena could backfire and hurt America's interestshighlights the need for considerable
caution and much skill on the part of U.S. negotiators, but again should not prevent a
serious consideration of this option. In truth, the United States would inevitably play a major
role in the calculations of both China and Taiwan in any cross-Strait discus-sion. Hence,
it is misleading and potentially dangerous to pretend otherwise by asserting that the
Taiwan problem can only be solved by direct discussions between the two sides of the
Strait without U.S. involvement. The question is: What role should the United States play in encouraging the creation
of a more stable modus vivendi between Taipei and Beijing? As stated, the current U.S. stance is probably not sustainable. Overall,

none of these three objections should deter Washington from taking a serious look at the
long-term strategic implications of the negative security trends involving Taiwan outlined in
this study and the possible benefits that could result from a more active US. policy stance
aimed at creating a more stable political understanding across the Taiwan Strait. The
Taiwan problem remains by far the most serious obstacle to defusing the arguably
worsening strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing, and it is wrong to blithely
assume that recent improvements in cross-Strait economic and social ties will inevitably

create the basis for a more enduring modus vivendi. especially in the face of significant
conflicting political and security trends. Ultimately, it is in America's long-term interest to
get ahead of the curve on this issue by more closely examining the relative importance of the political versus
strategic considerations influencing the Taiwan problem and by exploring alternatives to its current hands-off stance that might open
a pathway to a more stable Sino-US. relationship. In

the absence of any new U.S. initiative along the

above-described lines. Washington has no viable alternative to continuing its longstanding policy of "dual deterrence and reassurance" regarding Taiwan. in order to
maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait and to sustain the glowing prospects for an
improvement in Taipei-Beijing relations.14 As part of this ongoing effort. Washington should
continue to strengthen, where possible, its ability to detect and rapidly respond to a possible
Chinese use of force. Toward Taipei, it should deempha-size the provision of new "big ticket"
weapons systems and focus on providing the essential infrastructure, logistics,
ordnance, and other materials that will better operationalize Taiwan's defensive capacity.
Washington should

also

strongly oppose any attempt by Taipei to acquire an offensive

deterrent of any kind. Finally. Washington should continue to discourage or prevent

Beijing's acquisition of military capabilities or related technologies that could directly
challenge U.S. military superiority in critical areas relevant to Taiwan. To maintain advantages in
these areas, the United States should maintain its arms embargo and export controls and should encourage the European Union to
do likewise. But it should focus such efforts on the most advanced and "high-impact" technologies and weapons systems.

Swaine 15
(Michael, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The
Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, pg online @
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominancein-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi //um-ef)
In general,

true balance-of-power environments can at least potentially increase both risk

taking and miscalculation , especially if one or both sides conclude that they must
confirm or consolidate a perceived increaseor compensate for a perceived declinein
leverage by acting more aggressively to test the resolve of the other side, advance specific interests, or
manage a serious political-military crisis. Avoiding or effectively controlling such situations will require not
only a variety of crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) beyond
what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also high levels of mutual strategic
reassurance and restraint, involving substantive and verifiable limits on each sides freedom of action or ability to prevail militarily along Chinas
sensitive maritime periphery, as well as the maintenance of deterrent and shaping capabilities in those areas that count most. Many knowledgeable
observers have offered a variety of recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and
enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense
spending to mutual, limited concessions or understandings regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, and clearer, more calibrated bottom-line statements on alliance

many of these initiatives make eminent sense, they generally fail to address both
the underlying problem of clashing assumptions and beliefs about the requirements for
continued order and prosperity in Asia and the basic threat perceptions generated by
inaccurate historical analogies about Chinas past and domestic nationalist views and
pressures. Moreover, almost no observers offer recommendations designed to significantly
alter the power structure in volatile areas along Chinas maritime periphery, such as on the
commitments and core interests.3 While

in and around Taiwan , in ways that could significantly defuse those areas as
sources of conflict over the long term. In order to minimize the potential instabilities inherent in a roughly equal balance-of-power
environment, specific actions must be taken to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources
Korean Peninsula and

of future U.S.-China crises and the propensity to test each sides resolve, and to
enhance the opportunities for meaningful cooperation over the long term . In particular,
Washington and Beijing will need to reach reliable understandings regarding the future
long-term status of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the management of maritime territorial disputes, and the scope and function of U.S. (and other
foreign) military activities within the first island chainor at the very least within both Chinas and Japans exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Such understandings should
almost certainly involve some credible form of neutralization of these areas as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, or the creation of a stable U.S.-China
balance of power within them, thereby creating a de facto buffer zone along Chinas maritime periphery. In the case of Korea, this implies the emergence of a unified, nonaligned
(or loosely aligned) peninsula free from foreign military forces. This would require prior credible security assurances by both the United States and China that a unified Korea
would remain free from coercion and always open to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve a continuation in some form of a
greatly reduced security relationship with Washington, at least in the short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified
Korea, at least to the extent of agreeing to not acquire nuclear weapons or some types of conventional weapons that Korea might find threatening, such as precision ballistic
and cruise missile strike capabilities. Of course, none of this could happen as long as the Korean Peninsula remains divided, with South Korea under threat of attack from North
Korea. Thus, ideally, the development of a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific will require Korean unification sooner rather than later. Failing that, a clear, credible

In the case of
Taiwan, any credible neutralization of the cross-strait issue as a threat to either sides
interests would require, as a first step, a U.S.-China understanding regarding restrictions
understanding must be reached as soon as possible among the powers concerned regarding the eventual disposition of the Korea problem.

on U.S. arms sales in return for certain types of verifiable limits on Chinese military
production and deployments relevant to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike
aircraft . Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not
use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese
declaration of de jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island . In the
past, Beijing has resisted providing assurances regarding any non-use of force toward
the island, viewing such an assurance as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
However, as in the case of Korea, Beijing would likely view such a conditional limitation
on its right to employ force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of
an overall stable balance of power in the Western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also
regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland. In
addition, Beijing would also likely need to accept: a) explicitly that such unification could
only occur on the basis of a peaceful process involving the willing consent of the people
of Taiwan, and b) tacitly that eventual unification would likely not occur, if at all, for many
decades. For its part, the United States would likely need to provide assurances to China that it
would neither place forces on the island nor provide any new level of defense assistance
to Taipei, as long as Beijing abides by its own assurances . And both countries would need to consult closely with
Taiwan and Japan at each step of this process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them. Regarding territorial disputes in
the East China Sea and South China Sea, the United States needs to make clear that it has little if any direct interest in the interactions occurring between the disputants,
beyond clear security threats leveled against the two U.S. allies involved: Japan and the Philippines. While supporting, in an even-handed manner, a binding code of conduct
and established legal procedures for resolving clashes and arbitrating claims, Washington should avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a noncoercive process is followed
in every instance. That said, it should also make clear that it will oppose, forcefully if necessary, any attempt to establish an exclusion zone or de facto territorial waters beyond
accepted 12-nautical-mile limits. For its part, Beijing must clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and that it will never
seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied areas. It must also credibly and convincingly state, privately if not publicly, that those waters in the South China Sea located
within its so-called nine-dashed line and outside the territorial waters and EEZs of specified land features constitute open ocean. Although doubtless difficult to achieve, such
understandings will likely become more possible in the larger context of a neutralized first island chain as U.S.-China suspicions abate. In the larger conventional military realm,
U.S. military primacy within at least the first island chain will need to be replaced by a genuinely balanced force posture and accompanying military doctrine. This should likely
be centered on what is termed a mutual denial operational concept in which both China and the United States along with its allies possess sufficient levels of anti-access and
area denial (A2/AD)type air, naval, missile, and space capabilities to make the risks and dangers of attempting to achieve a sustained advantage through military means over
potentially volatile areas or zones clearly prohibitive. In such an environment, neither side would have the clear capacity to prevail in a conflict, but both sides would possess
adequate defensive capacities to deter or severely complicate an attack, for example, on Taiwan, on the Chinese mainland, and against U.S./allied territory, or any effort to close
or control key strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific. This will likely require agreed-upon restraints on the production and/or deployment of certain types of
weapon systems operating in the Western Pacific, such as deep-strike stealth aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and deployed surface and subsurface warships. On the
nuclear level, a stable balance-of-power environment in the Western Pacific requires a clear set of mutual assurances designed to strengthen the deterrence capacity of each
sides nuclear arsenal and thereby reduce significantly the dangers of escalation from a conventional crisis or conflict into a nuclear confrontation. To attain this goal, American
and allied defense analysts need to discard the dangerous notion that U.S. primacy must extend to the nuclear realm, via the establishment of a clear ability to neutralize
Chinas nuclear arsenal. Instead, Washington should authoritatively indicate that it accepts and will not threaten Chinas retaliatory nuclear strike capability. In other words, it
must unambiguously affirm the validity of a U.S.-China nuclear balance based on a concept of mutual deterrence, something it has never done. Moreover, to make this credible,
Washington must abandon consideration of a long-range, precision global strike system, or any other new type of system capable of destroying Chinas nuclear arsenal through
both nuclear and conventional means, and provide greater assurances that its ballistic missile defense capabilities cannot eliminate a Chinese second strike. For its part, Beijing

must be willing to accept such U.S. assurances and eschew any attempt to transition beyond its existing modest minimal deterrent, second-strike nuclear capability to a much

these sorts of changes will present major implications for U.S. allies and
friends in the region. Japan in particular would play a major role in any effort to create a stable U.S.-China
balance of power in the Western Pacific. In order for Tokyo to provide Seoul with the kind of assurances identified above, and to accept the above
adjustments in the U.S. force posture and stance toward Taiwan, certain clear understandings with
Washington and Beijing would be necessary. In general, the creation of a de facto buffer zone or a neutral/balanced area within the
larger force. Obviously,

first island chain would almost certainly require that Japan significantly strengthen its defense capabilities, either autonomously or, more preferably from the U.S. perspective,
within the context of a more robust yet still limited U.S.-Japan security alliance. In the latter case, Tokyo would become a critical partner in the creation of the sort of defensive,
mutual denial operational concept. This would entail the creation of a more fully integrated U.S.-Japan C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance) infrastructure, stronger passive defenses against possible Chinese ballistic and cruise missile threats to U.S. and Japanese military assets,
and enhanced Japanese logistics and support facilities, alongside improvements in specific defensive-oriented Japanese military capabilities, such as ASW (antisubmarine
warfare) and interceptor aircraft. However, this would not require Japan to become a fully normalized security partner alongside the United States, undertaking alliance-based
security activities across the Western Pacific and beyond. For China, acceptance of a strengthened but still limited U.S.-Japan alliance, a unified, largely nonaligned Korean
Peninsula, verifiable limits on Chinese capabilities vis--vis Taiwan, and the other elements of the stable balance-of-power structure mentioned above would require a clear
willingness to forgo those more ambitious security objectives toward which some Chinese might aspire, either now or in the future. These include, most notably, the clear ability
to establish control over the waters and airspace along Chinas maritime periphery and a Sino-centric Asian economic and political order that largely excludes the United States.
This will likely require, in turn, that Beijing make concerted, public efforts to reject and invalidate among the Chinese citizenry those more extreme interpretations of Chinese
nationalism that call for China to dominate Asia and to employ aggressive or violent means to resolve various sovereignty and other disputes with its neighbors. Although not
mainstream at present, such notions nonetheless could become more popular and influential as Chinas power grows (and if Washington responds to such growth by seeking to

The benefits for China of these

accommodations would be an enhanced level of security via a reduced U.S. threat to vital
Chinese interests and the avoidance of a costly and likely increasingly dangerous
security competition. These new circumstances would also allow China to concentrate even more than at present on establishing a stable and prosperous
domestic environment. OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHING A STABLE BALANCE IN ASIA Several obstacles stand in the way of
Washington and Beijing undertaking such a substantial change in perceptions and practices, force deployments,
sustain its past predominance), and would in turn represent a clear threat to regional stability.

and power relations in the Western Pacific. On the U.S. side, first and foremost is the general refusal of most if not all U.S. decisionmakers and officials to contemplate an
alternative to U.S. military predominance in this vital region. Such maritime predominance has arguably served Washington and most of the region well for many decades, and it
accords with the deep-seated notion of American exceptionalism, which prescribes a dominant U.S. leadership role throughout the world. In addition, the short-term perspective,
natural inertia, and risk avoidance of bureaucrats and policy communities in Washington (and elsewhere) militate against major shifts in policy and approach, especially in the
absence of an urgent and palpable need for change. Indeed, it is extremely difficult for any major power, much less a superpower, to begin a fundamental strategic shift in
anticipation of diminished relative capabilities before that diminishment fully reveals itself. In the Western Pacific in particular, with regard to both U.S. ISR activities along the
Chinese coast and the larger U.S. military presence within the first island chain, the United States Navy and many U.S. decisionmakers are wedded to the notion that American
power (and in particular naval power) must brook no limitation in areas beyond a nations 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace. This derives in part from the belief that
any constraints on U.S. naval operations will lead to a cascade of coastal states challenging the principle of U.S. maritime freedom of action and to possible reductions in the
level of resources and the scope of operations available to support U.S. naval power. Moreover, the specific U.S. desire to maintain a strong naval presence along Chinas
maritime periphery reflects a perceived need to acquire more accurate intelligence regarding Beijings growing offshore air and naval capabilities. Such a presence is also
viewed as essential to sustaining U.S. credibility with Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and to the maintenance of deterrent capabilities against a possible Chinese
attack on Taiwan. This combination of service interests, intelligence needs, and perceived security requirements reinforces the general U.S. bias in favor of continued maritime
predominance. However, an inevitable Chinese refusal to accept that predominance over the long term will be expressed first and foremost in opposition to the past level of U.S.
naval activities along the Chinese coastline, that is, within Chinas EEZ at the very least, and possibly within the entire first island chain. Second, and closely related to the prior

U.S. decisionmakers are extremely loath to contemplate significant adjustments in the

current status of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. From the U.S. perspective, any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of
point,

the U.S. security commitment to these two actors (a U.S military ally and a de facto U.S. protectorate, respectively) could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms, and/or

, Japan might react to such movement by questioning

Washingtons basic security commitment to Tokyo, which could result in a break in the
U.S.-Japan alliance and/or Japanese acquisition of nuclear arms. These concerns are real, if
no doubt exaggerated by some in Tokyo or Taipei in order to justify maintenance of the
threats or attacks from North Korea or China. In addition

existing U.S. relationship , and in some cases to avoid undertaking costly defense improvements
of their own. On the Chinese side, perhaps the most significant obstacle to undertaking a transition toward a stable balance of power in Asia derives from the
insecurities and weaknesses of the Chinese government, both domestically and abroad. Chinas leaders rely, for their legitimacy and support, not only on continued economic
success and rising living standards, but also on a form of nationalism that prizes the ability of the regime to correct past injustices meted out by imperialist powers during
Chinas so-called century of humiliation and to stand up to current slights, both real and imagined. Thus, their policies often capitalize on the resentments felt by many Chinese
citizens toward the supposedly arrogant West and Japan. This viewpoint makes the Chinese leadership hesitant to quell the more extreme forms of nationalism described above
and deeply suspicious of the United States and its allies. It also makes it more receptive to the notion that a rising yet still underdeveloped and relatively weak China must
continue to conceal its military capabilities while developing its overall capacities to the maximum extent possible. In other words, the Chinese regime is both excessively
vulnerable to ultranationalist pressures and disinclined to contemplate self-imposed limitations on its sovereign rights (for example, with regard to Taiwan) and its political,
economic, and military abilities, especially in Asia. While this does not translate into a drive for predominance, it does make Beijing less willing to accept the kind of mutual

NO GRAND BARGAIN, BUT A CLEAR

UNDERSTANDING AND A STAGED PROCESS ARE REQUIRED These obstacles clearly indicate that
restraints necessary to achieve a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much less reach, a formal grandbargain-type of agreement to establish a new regional security environment anytime
soon .4 Such a fundamental shift in policies and approaches can only occur gradually, in
stages, and over an extended period of time. But it can only begin if elites in Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals seriously

examine the enduring trends under way in Asia and accept the reality of the changing power distribution and the need for more than just marginal adjustments and assurances.
Only then will they undertake a systematic examination of the requirements of a stable balance of power over the long term, involving a serious consideration of the more

Such an examination and acceptance must initially occur domestically, then

among allies and protectorates, and finally via a bilateral U.S.-China strategic dialogue
fundamental actions.

aimed at developing understandings about the process and actions required. Such understandings must provide for ample opportunities and means for both sides to assess and

If such understandings can be reached regarding the overall need for

then the specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities and
arrangements for meaningful cooperation, involving Korea, Taiwan, and maritime issues within the first island chain,
will become much more possible. In particular, a strategic understanding designed to achieve a peaceful and stable transition to a genuine
evaluate the credibility and veracity of the actions of the other side.
strategic adjustment,

balance of power in the Western Pacific could make Beijing more likely to pressure or entice North Korea to abandon or place strong limits on its nuclear weapons program and
undertake the kind of opening up and reforms that would almost certainly result eventually in a unified peninsula. While difficult to envision at present, such a shift in Chinese
policy is certainly possible, given the obvious incentives to do so. While South Korea might also resist movement toward a nonaligned status in a post-unification environment,

Regarding Taiwan, if
both U.S. and Chinese leaders can convince Taipei of the benefits of the kind of mutual
assurances and restraints necessary to neutralize the cross-strait issue, none of which
the obvious benefits that would result from a stable balance of power, if presented properly, could very likely overcome such resistance.

require the U.S. abandonment of the island , these possible adverse outcomes of the
proposed or ongoing shift, including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost
certainly be avoided .

Solvency: Taiwan Says Yes/Bargain Solves

And, Swaines QPQ solves and is necessary to resolve relations and
collapse of deterrence Taiwan will say yes
Bush 13
(Richard, Ph.D. (1978), M.Phil. (1975), M.A. (1973), Columbia University, Dir
for Center for East Asian Studies @ Brookings, Uncharted Strait: The
Future of China-Taiwan Relations, pg 237-9//um-ef)
Third is

the possibility of a cross-Strait peace accord . Washington and Taipei should

understand that even if an accord would be difficult to negotiate and seems unlikely now, it is not out
of the question . Taiwan may decide that an accord is in its interest . If that is the case, the
two capitals should assume that at some point Beijing would raise the issue of U.S. arms
sales to and security cooperation with Taipei. That PRC scholar Sun Zhe suggested that even the discussion
of confidence-building measures would require a credible declaration from Taiwan
concerning this issue indicates that it would certainly be on the agenda for a peace
accord. 63 To be sure, a PRC effort to limit Taiwans acquisition of capabilities without
restraining its own would likely make a draft agreement politically unacceptable on the
island .Yet, given the possibility of cross-Strait security negotiations, Taipei and Washington should be prepared to discuss privately the many implications for their
there have been some proposals that the United States should rethink its
arms sales policy altogether, either to promote positive relations with China or to
demilitarize what is deemed to be a political dispute. The most extensive recommendation
comes from Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Essentially, he believes that the United
States is losing a race over China concerning Taiwans security.As the PLA has built
capabilities relevant to a Taiwan conflict,Washington has responded so far by providing
Taipei with some advanced systems, urged restraint on the PRC, and intensified
surveillance activities and naval and air deployments against China. The race could be suspended if there
were sufficient domestic consensus in Taiwan to reach a political understanding with Beijing, but Swaine believes that is unlikely. Rather, he argues, the
defense relationship. Finally,

relative shift in the balance of resources and power between the United States and the
PRC will place Washington at a growing disadvantage , and it will be less able to resist
opposition to future arms sales . Deterrence as it has existed will weaken, and Taiwan
will become an even more toxic issue in U.S.- China relations . 64 In order to stabilize cross-Strait security relations,
Swaine proposes a U.S.-China understanding: Washington policymakers should consider negotiating directly
with Beijing, in consultation with Taipei, a set of mutual assurances regarding PLA force levels and
deployments on the one hand, and major U.S. arms sales and defense assistance to
Taiwan on the other hand, that are linked to the opening of a cross-Strait political
dialogue . 65

Solvency: Now Key/CBMs Key

A series of CBMs between US, China, and Taiwan are key to maintain
stability DPP victory makes effective trilateral relations essential to
prevent conflict escalation
Harner 15, worked in Japan for more than 12 years in the eighties and nineties, in Osaka,
Nagoya and Tokyo with the U. S. State Department, Citibank and Merrill Lynch. After many more
years in China in banking (Deutsche Bank and Ping An Bank) and consulting, (Stephen,
6/17/15, How To Solve The 'Taiwan Problem' In U.S.-China Relations, Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/06/17/how-to-solve-the-worsening-taiwanproblem-in-u-s-china-relations/#7c494dd8fb5e)//kap
Successful

management of the Taiwan problem is the key to a sound U.S.-China

relationship. And the door that key can open is one that leads to a better century than the last one for all concerned. This
quotation, written by Chas Freemanalong with Henry Kissinger, perhaps Americas most successful and respected diplomatscholar on the U.S.-China relationshipintroduces a chapter entitled ImagineThe Taiwan Question and U.S. China-Relations in
U.S. Naval War College Assistant Professor Lyle J. Goldsteins scintillating and titillating new book, Meeting China HalfwayHow to
Defuse the Emerging U.S.-China Rivalry. Anyone following current affairs in Taiwan will be aware that successful

management of the Taiwan problemfrom the perspectives of the United States, China, and Taiwan itselfis
about to become more difficult and fraught with danger than at any time since 1995-96, and possibly
since 1949. The 1995-96 crisis erupted with Chinese protests at a visit to the U.S. by Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui, followed by
Chinese missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, followed by President Bill Clintons deployment to the Western Pacific of, as described by
James Mann and quoted by Goldstein, the largest armada since the end of the Vietnam War.

The source of the danger

today is the utter failure of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) government of President Ma Ying-jeou,
in power since 2008, to earn the confidence and loyalty of Taiwans voters . Public disillusionment with Ma,
with approval ratings in the single digits, has been particularly acute on the issue of Taiwans relations with China. To put it simply,

the majority of people of Taiwan have concluded that Ma and his colleagues in the KMT,
whose initial mandate from Taiwans voters was to reduce tensions and improve cross-strait relations, have on a variety of issues
and in a number of cross-strait political and commercial projects sold

out Taiwans interests to curry favor

with and to exact corrupt rewards from both Beijing and Washington. Now, based on the KMTs
dismal performance, the goal of improving cross-strait relations as a policy has itself been
discredited, or at least is distrusted by most Taiwan voters. The severity of the verdict against Mas government was delivered
in local elections last November 29 when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (minjindang, DPP) swept virtually the entire
country. The KMT, seeking to regroup, elected Eric Chu, Taipei county leader (pictured with Xi Jinping), to replace Ma as chairman.
No one is more alarmed at this than China. Beijing must be observingand hearing from its sourcesthat Taiwans great political
divide is no longer simply, or perhaps even mostly, between benshengren (locally born Taiwanese, majority supporters of the DPP)
and waishengren (descendants of mainlanders who accompanied Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1947-49, almost all supporters of
the KMT). Rather, it is between proponents of eventual unification with the mainland (the KMT position, though often fudged and
obfuscated) and unifications opponentsadvocates a permanent status quo of de facto independencethe position (ditto) of the

DPPs leader, Dr.

Tsai Ing-wen (pictured above), will be elected president, and DPP candidates couldprobably will
capture majority control of the hitherto KMT controlled law-making Legislative Yuan. DPP control
of both executive and legislative government branches would present for Beijingand for
Washingtona potentially explosive situation. Goldsteins book is a tour dhorizon of the many severely
DPP. Every indication now is that, in the presidential election that will take place January of next year, the

troubled and portentous aspects of U.S.-China relations, including the Taiwan question, trade frictions, developing world rivalry,
Korean denuclearization, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the South China Sea, and the U.S. rebalance to Asia. Goldstein sets out specific
sequential, reciprocal actions or movesa cooperation spiralthat would build confidence, enhance communications and trust,
and lead to a positive common goal or mutually acceptable modus vivendi. Goldstein addresses directly what the Taiwan question
means and portends for the United States and China (treating Taiwan itself, perhaps inevitably, as something less than an

Washingtons move #1: The

United States should significantly reduce the planned redeployment of 8,000 Marines from
autonomous actor). His cooperative spiral to resolve the Taiwan question the following:

Okinawa to Guam. Beijings move #1: China should agree to initiate military confidencebuilding measures without political conditions. Washingtons move #2: The United States
should reveal the full extent of its defense ties with Taiwan and should close the office of
its military representative at the American Institute in Taiwan. Beijings move #2: China
should remove its short-range ballistic and cruise missiles from within a radius of 1,000
kilometers from Taiwan. Washingtons move #3: The United States should endorse and
actively push for final status negotiations. Beijings move #3: China should institutionalize
a system for developing an expanded international presence for Taiwan. Washingtons
move #4: The United States should halt the sale of new types of weapons systems.
Beijings move #4: China should restrict the building of its amphibious fleet. Washingtons
move #5: The United States should cease all arms transfers for Taiwan. Washingtons move
#5: China should renounce the use of force as part of the peace treaty process that joins
Taiwan and the Mainland in a confederation. Impossible? No. Improbable? Maybe. But here we observe
thinking that rejects deadlock and demands progress, despite the seeming intractability of the issues.
Goldsteins book is a treasure trove of bold and brilliant ideas, offering a uniquely promising ways forward for currently deeply
worrying U.S.-China relations.

Solvency: QPQ Key

A QPQ on arms sales reduces the probability of conflict- the ineffective
policies of the status quo are what makes conflict likely
Lowther 11- William, staff writer, Asia specialist warns US on arms sales,
(http://taiwantt.org.tw/taipeitimes/2011/10/20111010-02.htm) JB
Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan is a recipe for problems for Washington, according to
Michael Swaine, an Asia specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In a filmed interview released by Carnegie,
Swaine said: It

is unclear to me whether China will continue to accept continued significant US

arms sales to Taiwan in response to Chinas military buildup without seeking to place
greater coercive pressure on the US and possibly Taiwan. This could indeed produce
crises between the US and China over time, he said. The statement comes as Swaine and others are
upsetting some of Taiwans supporters in the US with a planned high-profile roundtable discussion titled, Should the United States
Abandon Taiwan? Organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, the discussion will take
place on Oct. 18. Some of Taiwans supporters say no serious consideration is being given to the idea of abandoning Taiwan and
that, by providing a platform, the CSIS might be unintentionally promoting it. It is not at all a feasible policy option and it is promoted
and supported by a very small circle of people, so why discuss it so much? one academic said. What are they trying to gain? My
cynical side says its just another way for these folks to present a provocatively titled panel and get out in front of an audience to
promote their latest writings. The beast feeding itself. Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow of China Studies at the CSIS, and Nancy
Bernkopf Tucker, professor of history at Georgetown University, will make an opening presentation at the roundtable based on their
recent article printed by the Washington Quarterly analyzing the question Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? In that
article, Glaser and Tucker say that prominent people in the US were insisting in influential publications that it was time for the US to
rethink its Taiwan policy and walk away from Taiwan. However, after examining the variables, Glaser and Tucker concluded that
the US should neither abandon nor reduce its commitments to Taiwan, but rather it should strengthen them. Washington

has not decided to jettison Taiwan, and it should not. However frightening or seductive
China is, appeasing it by sacrificing Taiwan would not be good policy, they wrote. Nevertheless,
the idea will be discussed at the CSIS roundtable by Charles Glaser, professor of political science at George Washington University
and no relation to Bonnie Glaser, and Swaine. Charles Glaser caused waves earlier this year with an article in Foreign Affairs
magazine in which he said the US could avoid conflict with China by backing away from its commitments to Taiwan. The sensitive
nature of the subject was almost immediately made clear when former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Nat Bellocchi attacked
Charles Glaser in the Taipei Times, saying never in my long diplomatic life have I run into a more shortsighted, uninformed and
fallacious set of arguments. Foreign Affairs does itself and its readers a disservice by publishing such a flawed article, Bellocchi

Chinas strategic mindset was

quintessentially defensive, largely reactive and focused first and foremost on deterring
Taiwans independence and defending the Chinese mainland, not on establishing itself
as Asias next hegemon. In his latest statements, Swaine said: Im not as certain as many people
seem to be that the situation regarding Taiwan will remain as generally benign and stable
as it appears to be today. He called on the US and China to engage in dialogue to
understand, assess or establish some sort of quid pro quo involving military
added. Last month, Swaine published an article in The National Interest saying

deployments and arms sales in consultation with the Taiwan government on the US
side. But it would also require very different thinking on the part of US officials from what
exists today. Because the current US position basically is, Its not broken, dont fix it. We just keep selling arms to Taiwan if
the Chinese keep developing, and to me, that is a recipe for problems, he added. June Teufel Dreyer, an expert on Taiwan at the
University of Miami, told the Taipei Times: When articles on this topic appear in Foreign Affairs written by someone who is not an
expert on Taiwan and the Washington Quarterly, and is given a platform by CSIS, it would appear that the sponsoring groups are
trying to promote an agenda to move what could be a minority view into the mainstream. Foreign Affairs, for example, could have
run [Charles] Glasers article side by side with an article entitled Why the US Must Not Abandon Taiwan. But did not. And further,
ran another article a year before advocating the Finlandization of Taiwan. This bespeaks an agenda, she added.

Solvency: Say Yes (Taiwan/PRC)

China, Taiwan, and the US will say yes to CBMs regarding arms saleseveryone has a lot to gain from it
Hickey 13- Dennis, James F. Distinguished Professor and Director of the Graduate Program
in Global Studies with a focus on the International Relations of East Asia, National Security and
American Foreign Policy., Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait,
(http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/autumn_2013/4_hickey.pd
f) JB
Option 4: Negotiation, Compromise, and Arms Control If a US administration opted to
pursue this option, it could use arms sales as bargaining chips.49 The administration might explore
the possibility of reaching an agreement similar to that proposed by then President Jiang Zemin when visiting with President Bush in
Crawford, Texas, in 2002. Namely, Washington

would agree not to sell new fighters, submarines,

and other advanced arms to Taiwan in exchange for the removal of the missiles (and their
infrastructure) that China has deployed directly opposite Taiwan. According to media reports, Chang
Wanquan, PRC Defense Minister, raised a similar proposal when meeting with Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defense, on 19
August 2013.50 This

initiative may yield numerous dividends. First, it is likely Beijing would

consider this proposal because removal of the missiles would generate goodwill among
the Taiwanese, and the weapons could no longer be cited by local politicians as evidence of
Beijings hostility. Public opinion polls reveal that a large percentage of Taiwanese believe Beijing is
hostile to both the ROC government and the islands popula- tion.51 President Ma has stated the
mainland should remove or actually dismantle all the missiles that are targeted against Taiwan, otherwise we wont be interested in

Second, it is clear the PRC will consider

removing the missiles as part of a deal with the United States. As noted, President Jiang first raised the idea
with President Bush. According to Chinese media accounts, the PLA has been debating the question of
whether to withdraw the missiles opposite Taiwan for years. On 22 September 2010, Premier Wen
Jiabao conceded that the missiles would eventually be removed. Prominent PRC political
analysts with links to Beijing have responded favorably to such a proposal.53 Third,
Washington has telegraphed its willingness to reduce arms sales if Beijing removes its
missiles. For example, in 2004, one highranking US official said that if the PLAs military posture opposite Taiwan appears
making further steps to negotiate a peace agreement with them.52

more peaceful, it follows logically that Taiwans defense 48 requirements will change.54 Indeed, Mark Stokes, a former Pentagon
official has observed that, it

just makes sense: if the military threat was reduced, of course it

would have an effect on arms sales.55 Fourth, Taiwan has indicated that it might not have
an interest in purchasing so many US arms if the PRC missiles are removed. After all,
they claim that arms purchases are linked directly to the threat posed by the mainland.
Removing the missiles could be considered a confidence building measure because it
promotes stability and would increase warning time and thus build confidence. 56

Every country has something to gain from CBMs

Sigur Center for Asian Studies 13- Sigur center for Asian Studies, Building Cross-Strait
Military CBMs- A Goal Between Far and Near,
(https://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/publications/asiareports/asiareport22.pdf) JB
Alan Romberg, Director of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC gave a brief overview of the current political and security

Beijing has come to understand the

limits to actual reunification, especially considering the political situation of Ma Ying-jeou. Ultimately, Beijing desires
political dialogue. However, as much as tensions may have abated between the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., the potential for
the use of force still remains. Beijing believes it is important to maintain a credible
landscape of the Taiwan Strait. Reflecting a trend of pragmatism on the part of the P.R.C.,

deterrent, including the possible use of force. While Mr. Romberg believes that the chance of any future R.O.C. administration moving toward de
jure independence is close to zero, Beijing fears the consequence of saying that it would not use force under any circumstances. This is important

from Beijings
point of view, until reunification is actually achieved, the use of force must be an option.
This position has major implications for Taiwans defense preparedness as well as U.S. force posture in the region, including
considering that the use of force is one thing the U.S. has stated cannot occur as part of any eventual reunification. Yet

ASIA REPORT ISSUE NO. 22 OCTOBER 2013 Building Cross-Strait Military CBMs - A Goal Between Far and Near the continued sale of arms to
Taiwan by the U.S. Mr. Romberg went on to state that even if there is no chance of military confrontation occurring as a result of Taiwan declaring
independence, there is still the danger that Beijing will lose patience at some point. However, Taiwan is far
from the only regional security issue Beijing currently has to deal with. While Washington analysts are understandably focused on how Beijings military
modernization will affect Taiwan, these other security issues that Beijing has involved itself in during recent years (conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands, territorial disputes in the South China Sea) all vie for its attention and affect how it prioritizes Taiwan. Romberg stated that Beijing is not looking
for a fight and would prefer to achieve its goals in a diplomatic manner. Regarding the U.S. role in cross-Strait security, Mr. Romberg claimed that
Taiwan is not really a factor in the U.S. rebalance towards Asia and that the evolving military relationship between the U.S. and Beijing reflects the
importance that leaders from both sides place on cooperation over potential instability wherever possible. In fact, since the end of the Chen Shui-bian
era, the U.S. has gradually convinced Beijing that it does not favor Taiwanese independence. This pragmatic U.S. position has served to ease tensions
in the region and has further enhanced Taiwans security. In sum, Mr. Romberg stressed that

the trilateral relationship has

evolved to a point where all three sides are striving to avoid any sort of crisis. On the contrary,
they are seeking to consolidate a situation of peace and stability. Under this setting, certain types
of CBMs could certainly be considered.

Solvency: U.S. Key/Arms Sales Key

The US plays an important role in finding common ground between China
and Taiwanarms sales are one of the biggest aggravators
Brunnstrom 2016 (David, Reuters U.S. Asia Policy Correspondent, based in Washington
DC, Taiwan poll looms as unwanted headache for Obama in final year, January 13, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-usa-headache-idUSKCN0UR31G20160113,
Reuters, silbs)
With all the other issues on his plate, probably the

last thing U.S. President Barack Obama will want to deal

with in his final year in office is a possible return to crisis in Taiwan-China relations. But
after years of warming Taipei-Beijing ties that have been welcomed by Washington, this
is a real prospect with the leader of Taiwan's independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) - an
organization loathed by Beijing - looking set for victory in elections on Saturday. While Tsai Ing-wen has said she will not
provoke China if elected president, the risk of worsening China-Taiwan ties is viewed
with concern in Washington at a time when it is trying to tamp down tension over growing Chinese military power and assertive
pursuit of territorial claims elsewhere in Asia. On Wednesday, Obama's deputy national security adviser Ben
Rhodes called on Taiwan and China to avoid an escalation of tension. He said the United States did not
take sides in the poll and wanted Taiwan-China issues dealt with peacefully, whoever won. "What we want to see is calm and
dialogue," he said adding that Washington would want to be supportive of this as it had been in the past. " We will think through
what are the best ways to support that effort when we have greater clarify about both the
election results and how that's playing out," he said. On Tuesday, the chief of the U.S. Navy, Admiral John Richardson,
whose force is on the front line in the U.S. effort to maintain stability in Asia, agreed that a DPP win could bring heightened tension with China. "Well

Tsai's party has

historically favored Taiwan's formal independence, and says it believes only Taiwan's
people can decide its future, she has trodden carefully recently in discussing how she
will engage China. That was not the case when she visited the United States before Taiwan's 2012 election and the Obama administration
just have to see how it plays out, Richardson told Reuters. "Its going to be a factor in that theater for sure." While

was sufficiently alarmed for a senior U.S. official to air doubts about whether she was willing and able to maintain a stable relationship with China.
'RELIABLE PARTNER' Tsai

visited the United States for 12 days in June and was at pains to ease
those concerns, stressing support for a "status quo," and saying she would be a "reliable
partner" for the United States with a "proactive diplomatic agenda for peace." Beijing still
considers Taiwan a renegade province to be retaken by force if necessary after nationalist forces fled there in 1949 at the
end of China's civil war with the Communists that has never formally ended. The United States backs a "one-China
policy" and has no diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but is committed under its Taiwan
Relations Act to ensuring the island can defend itself in the event of conflict. Obama reiterated this in a meeting
with Chinese President Xi Jinping in September. With strong backing for the commitment in the U.S. Congress, last
month Obama angered Beijing when he authorized a $1.83-billion arms sale package for Taiwan. Last
Friday, Tsai said the DPP advocated "active diplomacy" and would seek greater cooperation with other countries. But she
said Taiwan's diplomacy could not rely on China's goodwill as it would then lose its
"autonomy." Patrick Cronin of Washington's Center for a New American Security think-tank said the prospect of a DPP win had brought
Taiwan back "as a serious foreign policy issue" for the United States at a time when Obama is already wrestling with multiple crises ranging from the
Middle East to Ukraine and North Korea. Tsai understood the stakes, but if her electorate perceived coercive pressure from China "then change and
instability may be accelerated," something that would necessitate a stepped up U.S. diplomatic effort. Cronin said this could be expected in the fourmonth interregnum after the elections, beginning with a scheduled visit of the DPP's prospective national security adviser, Joseph Wu, to Washington

China was also likely, at least initially, to adopt

a wait-and-see attitude towards a DPP government. Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies said Washington could play an important role in trying to find common ground
between the two sides, as it did when the DPP was last in power in the 2000s. But she said the U.S. administration
next week. Cronin said he expected a cautious stance from Wu, while

would find itself under enormous pressure from opponents in what is a U.S. election year
to take a tough line with China should it take a hardline approach with Tsai. Glaser said she did not
think a DPP victory would lead to a "hot war" over Taiwan, "but I don't think it will be a simple handover with all things continuing as they have been for
the past eight years."

The US has an important role to play in the CBM processkey to

strengthen security guarantees on the Taiwan Strait
Kan 2014 (Shirley, specialist in Asian Security Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Shes been there since 1990 and she specializes in national security interests of the United
States with particular interest in China and Taiwan. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since
1990, Congressional Research Service, August 29, 2014, silbs)
Changes in PLA Missile Deployments and Other CBMs There has been interest among U.S. academic circles and think tanks
for Washington to pursue talks with Beijing on its military buildup and U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan (instead of simply enhancing security assistance to Taiwan).152 One catalyst for this debate
arose out of the U.S.- PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwans legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and
reported in Taiwans media, then-PRC ruler Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in
Chinas deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraint in U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan.153 President Bush reportedly did not respond directly to Jiangs linkage. Editorials in Taiwan were divided on
whether to pursue Jiangs offer. Some argued that confidence building measures (CBMs),
such as a reduction in actual deployments of the PLAs missile and other units, would
improve the chances for cross-strait political dialogue on Taiwans status and lead to
sustained stability. They said that the United States could explore or even negotiate with the PRC how it might reduce the threat against Taiwan, such as dismantling missile brigades in a
verifiable manner, since sales of U.S. systems are based on Taiwans defense needs. They argued that Jiangs offer represented the first time that
the PRC offered meaningfully to discuss its forces opposite Taiwan. Others said that a
freeze or redeployment of missiles would not eliminate the PRCs continuing and broader
military threat against Taiwan (including mobile missiles that can be re-deployed) and that the PRC should hold direct
talks with leaders in Taipei instead. They argued that Jiang did not seek to reduce the
PLAs coercive threat but to undermine the relationship between Washington and Taipei, including arms
sales which take years to complete. They noted that the PLAs missile buildup has continued. One issue for congressional oversight has concerned
whether and how the President might deal with Beijing on the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in the context of increasing cross-strait dialogue. Policy considerations
include the TRA, the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan premised on the PRCs peaceful unification policy), and the 1982 Six
Assurances to Taiwan (including one of not holding prior consultations with the PRC on
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). At a hearing in March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured Senator Helms that the Six Assurances would
remain U.S. policy and that the Administration would not favor consulting the PRC on
arms sales to Taiwan.154 The Bush Administration reportedly did not counter Jiangs verbal offer, noting the accelerated missile buildup, continued military threats against Taiwan, the
need for the PRC to talk directly to Taiwan, the TRA, and the Six Assurances to Taiwan. Nonetheless, in April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
testified at a hearing that if the PRC meets its stated obligations to pursue a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its rhetoric with a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, it follows logically that Taiwans
defense requirements will change.155 In May 2005, an official PRC newspaper reported that the PLA continued to debate the question of whether to withdraw
missiles opposite Taiwan.156 China has continued its buildup of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), whose adequate precision guidance could destroy key leadership facilities, military bases, and
communication and transportation nodes with minimal advanced warning, warned the Pentagons 2004 annual report to Congress on PRC military power. Later, the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress
that by late 2008, the PLA deployed opposite Taiwan an arsenal of 1,050-1,150 mobile M-9 and M-11 SRBMs. That build-up increased by 60-80 SRBMs from 2007, less than the previously reported increase of
about 100 missiles a year. The Defense Secretary reported to Congress in 2014 that at the end of 2013, the PLA had more than 1,000 SRBMs. While the expansion in the number of SRBMs seemed to have
slowed, the newer, more advanced missiles (that replaced older missiles) have precision strike capability with longer ranges, better accuracy, and various conventional warheads.157 Moreover, the PLA has
deployed cruise as well as ballistic missiles. At a hearing of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense on June 16, 2010, Senator Feinstein asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates about any changes

there continued to be an extraordinary deployment by the PLA

of cruise as well as ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. The PLA reportedly has the worlds largest force of ground-launched land attack
cruise missiles (LACMs), with about 100 LACMs entering the operational force each year and up to 500 CJ-10 LACMs by 2014.158 Potential CBMs between the PLA and
in the PLAs posture against Taiwan, and he testified that

Taiwans Ministry of National Defense (MND) gained more attention after the KMTs Ma Ying-jeou became President in Taipei
in May 2008 and Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Hu Jintao in Beijing issued a speech in December 2008 with six points that included a proposal similar to Mas, namely, to end the
state of hostility and reach a peace agreement, including exploring the establishment of a mechanism of mutual trust for military security. There are many possible
steps that could constitute CBMs, including changes in the PLAs deployment of some
ballistic and cruise missiles . One issue for U.S. policy concerns how the increasing
cross-strait dialogue concerning and potential conduct of such CBMs positively and negatively might affect U.S.
interests, with or without Taipeis consultation with Washington. Another issue asks
whether the United States should encourage or play another role in the increasing
cross-strait dialogues that potentially include such CBMs . In September 2009, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg stated
that the

Obama Administration encouraged the PRC and Taiwan to explore CBMs that would lead to

closer ties and greater stability across the strait. His encouragement of CBMs raised
expectations of an active U.S. role and injected new U.S. pressure in a sensitive
domestic debate in Taiwan over whether such CBMs are premature at this time and
would serve Taiwans security interests . In contrast, later in the month, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson said that we are encouraged by the PRCs reciprocity in encouraging renewed interactions in cultural and
economic affairs, but we have not yet seen similar progress or dialogue in military affairs. We encourage both sides to consider such steps at the appropriate time and in a mutually agreed manner. Gregson also

urged Taiwan to stress asymmetrical advantages in its defense. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs David Shear echoed those measured words, saying that his department did not want to push Taiwan to hold CBMs and that they should occur at a pace acceptable to Taiwans people. At a summit

the United States

welcomes the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks
forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic,
political, and other fields, and develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations .159
in Beijing in November, Presidents Obama and Hu issued a Joint Statement in which the United States did not use encouragement of cross-strait CBMs. As worded,

Presidents Ma and Hus proposals for CBMs and a peace accord have been considered in a controversial debate in Taiwan (including between civilian and military officials) concerning whether CBMs with the
PLA serve Taiwans security interests and whether those interests are better served in securing U.S. arms and other defense-related support that Taiwans officials believe are necessary for the confidence to deal

Some in Taiwan worry that CBMs with the PLA could lead to the PLAs stronger
leverage at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan defense related ties. There is also the question of whether Taiwans expectations of a
with Beijing.

greater U.S. role could be met. In October 2009, Shuai Hua-ming, a key KMT Member of the Legislative Yuan in Taipei who is a retired Lieutenant General of the Army, questioned the U.S. commitment to help
Taiwans self-defense under the TRA (with delays and cost increases in arms programs), the push by some in Taiwan to build trust through triangular talks among Taiwan, China, and the United States (rather than
traditional trust between Taiwan and the United States), and the will of Taiwans military leadership to reform with new concepts of training, jointness, warfighting, and strategy (not simply using defensive weapons
with no combat experience for decades).160 On November 2, 2009, the international Sun Tzu conference took place in Beijing with the attendance of Jia Qinglin, a Member of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo of the CPC and with discussion of cross-strait CBMs. The PLAs Major General Luo Yuan of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and a few of Taiwans retired generals attended the conference.161
On November 13-14, organizations with ties to officials of the two sides of the strait held the first conference in Taiwan to discuss economic, political, and security engagement, including CBMs and a peace
accord. The PRC delegation attending the conference called 60 Years Across the Taiwan Strait included Zheng Bijian, former vice president of the CPCs Central Party School, Yu Keli of the Institute of Taiwan
Studies, retired Major General Pan Zhenqiang of the PLAs National Defense University, and retired PLA Lieutenant General Li Jijun of the Association for the Study of Sun Tzus Art of War (and formerly at AMS
and the CMCs General Office). Li Jijun said that the two sides could discuss the PLAs missiles only based on the 1992 Consensus (rephrasing of one China, different interpretations) and opposition to

2010, the PLA responded

publicly for the first time to Taiwans demand that the PLA withdraw missiles . However,
the PLA said that the two sides of the strait would discuss both of their military
deployments in discussions of setting up CBMs. Moreover, the PLA could retain the threat of force or coercion as a political tool to influence
Taiwan. Taiwans expectation for cross-strait military CBMs has not been consistent and has
remained politically sensitive, especially concerning controversial visits by retired
generals and admirals to the PRC. Nonetheless, in March 2010, Taiwans MND set up a new Office of Defense Studies (linked to the Integrated Assessment Office)
Taiwans independence, and he also acknowledged that withdrawal of missiles would be meaningless since they are mobile. At the end of July

also acting as the preparatory office for a think tank. It has studied military contacts with the PLA. In Beijing in November 2012, the CPC General Secretarys report at the 18th Communist Party Congress stressed

Taiwans Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of March 2013 cautioned that

the conditions for CBMs have not matured, while MND would carefully study the
feasibility of future steps.
CBMs with Taiwan. However,

US involvement is key- necessary to assure Taiwan and get them to say

yes
Sigur Center for Asian Studies 13- Sigur center for Asian Studies, Building Cross-Strait
Military CBMs- A Goal Between Far and Near,
(https://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/publications/asiareports/asiareport22.pdf) JB

Lastly,

there is the U.S. factor. Taiwan does not want to produce any concern on the U.S.
side that it is moving too far into Beijings orbit, especially in light of the U.S. rebalance
towards Asia. It is also important not to cause any unease in Washington for fear of jeopardizing
continued arms sales. While Beijing is continually pressing for the termination of such sales and
is trying to link CBMs to this issue, claiming that the improved crossStrait environment makes the sales
unnecessary, Taiwan will not readily give up this aspect of its security relationship with the
U.S.

The US must be involved- bilateral CBMs dont solve they just cause more
concerns
Kan 10- Francis, former Senior Advisor to the National Security Council, SessionVI: Regional
Formats of Military and Security Cooperation, (https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Kan_BCAS2010_web_ks.pdf) JB
In addition, all players around need

to consider the feasibility of construction of a multilateral

security mechanism where the major actors will be involved and conflicts can be solved through
dialogues. Bilateral CBMs like the possible one across the Taiwan Strait may reduce their mutual distrust,
but a closer military relationship based on bilateral CBMs may also cause others concern. On the
other hand, a multilateral security CBMs could address and solve major security
concerns in a peaceful way and therefore enhance mutual trust among all. While the two sides of
the Taiwan Strait are contemplating future CBMs and the US is strengthening its bilateral alliances with countries around, it would
be constructive and meaningful for the US and others to seriously consider a multilateral
security mechanism where the US supremacy will remain and where the transformation of Chinas rise will be peaceful.
Both Americas prevailing power and Chinas peaceful rise will be crucial for regions security and peace as a whole.

Arms Sales Key

Relations are improving but the biggest problem is continued arms sales
prevents military CBMs between China and Taiwan to resolve structural
mistrust
Jianwei 2009 (Wang, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at EAI, THE UNITED STATES AND
NEW DYNAMICS IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, National University of Singapore, 2009,
silbs)
After Ma Yin-jeou was elected president of Taiwan in March 2008, crossstrait relations have experienced sea
changes. Tension has been significantly reduced and economic, cultural and human exchanges between the two sides have reached an unprecedented level. 2.
The new dynamics in cross-strait relations provide the United States with both new
opportunities and challenges. With the rapid thawing of Beijing-Taipei relations, Washingtons influence to define the status quo and direction of
cross-strait relations is likely to decline. 3. Nevertheless the United States is still a crucial factor in the development
of cross-strait relations. It could either hinder or facilitate the rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei when cross-strait relations move from low
1.

politics to high politics to deal with more difficult political and military/security issues. 4. Officially Washington supports and encourages cross-strait dialogues. Unofficially, the
American attitude is more ambivalent. Some feel uncomfortable about the fast improving Beijing-Taipei relations and worry about the increasing political, economic, and military

Some political forces in Washington advocate upgrading U.S.Taiwan political relations. So far White House has handled this issue with caution as reflected in Washingtons restraints in handling Ma Yings jeous
transit visit to the U.S. Yet Taiwan may ask for more and Washington may find it hard to refuse in the future. 6. The formation of cross-strait
military confidence-building measures (CBMs) could also be constrained by the
American factor. Taipei is more reluctant to move forward largely because it involves
Taiwans military relations with the i United States. While Beijing attempts to use the
military CBMs to minimize U.S-Taiwan military ties, Taipei is not ready to pay such a high
price. 7. Washington is not enthusiastic about cross-strait military CBMs either. It shies
away from hosting the direct talk between the two militaries across the Taiwan Strait. Some in the
U.S. military also worry about the possible leaking of American military technology and information to China through military CBMs. 8. The biggest
obstacle that the United States could create for the cross-strait thaw from Beijings
perspective is its arms sales to Taiwan. Bushs decision of arms sales in October 2009 crippled SinoAmerican military relations, which has not fully recovered even today. A new arms sale by the Obama
administration could once again disrupt and destabilize China-U.S.-Taiwan trilateral relations. 9. Therefore with the new dynamics in cross-strait relations unfolding it is
time for all three parties to take a more creative approach to find a way to manage, if not
completely resolve, this issue and take parallel actions to defuse this time bomb in
their relationships. New dynamics in cross-strait relations 1.1 Since Ma Yin-jeou was elected president of Taiwan in March 2008, crossstrait relations have
imbalance between China and Taiwan. 5.

experienced sea changes. Based on the 1992 consensus, Beijing and Taipei resumed semi-official dialogues, which were suspended for the prior nine years, less than a
month after Ma was sworn in. The two sides have reached nine agreements and one consensus in the short time span of one year. As a result, economic, cultural and human
exchanges between the two sides have now reached an unprecedented level. 1.2 The dazzling and swift improvement in cross-strait relations has significantly reduced the
probability of military conflict in the region, turning a once highly dangerous water into fairly tranquil water. It also subtly began to change the dynamics of China-U.S.-Taiwan
trilateral relations, which for a long time was characterized by zero-sum calculation and mentality. 1.3 The more benign new reality across the Taiwan Strait provides the United

For a long time, the United States played the role of a selfinvited arbitrator and balancer in crossstrait disputes between Beijing and Taipei.
Washington made it clear that it opposed either side unilaterally changing the status quo,
as defined by the United States.
States with new opportunities as well as new challenges.

Reducing arms sales are keysolves US-Sino relations, China-Taiwan

relations, and strengthens the overall trilateral relationship
Jianwei 2009 (Wang, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at EAI, THE UNITED STATES AND
NEW DYNAMICS IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, National University of Singapore, 2009,
silbs)

Arms sale: the biggest obstacle 6.1 Ever since Sino-American relations were established in the 1970s, American arms sales to
Taiwan have proved to be the thorniest issue in the relationship, disrupting normal
interactions between the two countries from time to time. This issue has not disappeared
with the new developments in cross-strait relations. Rather it has become even more
delicate under new circumstances and still has the potential of derailing the trilateral relationship. 6.2 In his first term in office President
George W. Bush was considered the most pro-Taiwan president in recent American administrations. In April 2001 he approved a package of arms sale to Taiwan valued at

billion, the largest in a decade including some offensive weapons that Washington
had refrained from selling before such as submarines. However, because of domestic
partisan infighting in Taiwans legislature, the package was largely undelivered as the
pan-blue camp in the legislative body blocked funding for the purchase. 6.3 This situation began to
nearly $5

change after Ma Ying-jeou was elected. From the very beginning, he made it very clear that although improving relations with the mainland is one of his top priorities,

Taiwan will continue to purchase arms from the United States, particularly more
advanced weapons such as F-16 C-D to meet Taiwans security needs. 6.4 Initially the Bush administration also pushed
the new government in Taiwan to spend more on defense. However, with the significant
reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait and the Bush administrations strong desire to maintain stable and cooperative
U.S.-China relations, it became more delicate business for Washington to justify arms
sales to Taiwan. The timing for such a sale also became sensitive as Beijing and Taipei quickly jump started their direct dialogues and China was busy preparing
its historical Olympics, which President Bush was committed to attend. 6.5 It was reported that the White House had decided to suspend
the arms sales at least until after Beijing Olympics. Admiral Keating publicly confirmed his administrations intention on July 16,
2008. He articulated that it was based on the understanding that there is no pressing, compelling reasons for, at this moment, arms sales to Taiwan. 6.6 Although the
State Department spokesman quickly reiterated that the U.S. policy on arms sales to
Taiwan had not changed and denied there was a freeze, there was evidence that the new situation in the Taiwan Strait
made some senior American leaders including President Bush to pause on this critical issue in cross-strait relations. 6.7 After a long delay the Bush
administration finally notified the Congress of the arms sales before it recessed in
October 2008. The package of $6.5 billion included some of the weaponry that Taiwan
wanted, but omitted some items on Taiwans wish list such as Black Hawk helicopters and the designs for submarines. For the item Taiwan wanted the most, the F-16 CD fighter jets, Washington asked Taipei to keep it off the list. 6.8 Beijing reacted quickly (see Appendix III). It strongly condemned the American
action and summoned the U.S. embassy official to protest. It immediately suspended
most military exchanges with the U.S. The dialogues on non-proliferation between the Foreign Ministry and the Department
of State were postponed as well. 6.9 The bad feeling caused by the arms sale was still lingering even after President
Obama took office. Although mil-to-mil talks have been resumed at the urge of the United Sates,
the Chinese military was still reluctant to restore full-scale mil-to-mil exchanges insisting
that the Taiwan issue remained Chinas core interest and concern and urged the U.S. to
stop upgrading substantive military relations with Taiwan, stop selling arms and take
concrete actions in support of the peaceful development of cross-Strait ties. 6.10 The
arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 were in reality incomplete. Among the request of $11 billion from Taiwan, Washington only
approved $6.5 billion. It did not turn down the rest of the request, but only said it was under consideration including Black Hawk helicopters, diesel-electric submarine designs,

In recent months, Taipei has intensified its push for F16 and other arms. Funds necessary to purchase these weapons have been approved by the Legislative Yuan. 6.11 Therefore it is just a
matter of time before the U.S. government has to make decision on this issue again. At his
and some PAC-III missiles. F-16 C-D still tops Taiwans shopping list.

confirmation hearing for the position of assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, Kurt Campbell for the first time acknowledged that the Obama administration was

Dennis
Blair suggested that Chinas massive military spending will spur continued U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan to maintain a military balance. 6.12 One speculation about the timetable of a new arms sale is that a
working on the outstanding request for arms sales to Taiwan. In his testimony to the Congress in February 2009, U.S National Intelligence Director Admiral

recommendation to sell F-16s and other weapons will go to the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House in early September. President Obama will announce the

Beijing of course is
trying to do everything it can to stall further arms sales to Taiwan by the Obama administration. During the 10th
Sino-American Defense Consultative Talks in June, Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian described the U.S. arms sale as the greatest
new arms sale after his visit to China in November. It will then go to the Congress for approval in late November and early December. 6.13

obstacle in Sino-American relations and urged the U.S. side to scrap the $6.5 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. The issue has

been raised in every mil-to-mil talk between the two countries since December 2008.

6.14
During his first visit to the United States as the director of State Councils Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi also focused on the possible U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and argued that

the American side responded that

Chinas own military buildup and its failure to reduce the large missile force aimed at
Taiwan did not give Washington much confidence in Wangs argument. 6.15 In sum, the U.S.
arms sales could be a time bomb in the otherwise uneventful Washington-Beijing-Taiwan
trilateral relations. Ma Ying-jeous calculation is that Taipei can pursue the parallel courses of improving
cross-strait relations and purchasing arms from the United States to strengthen its
defense. However, the extent of Beijings tolerance level towards Taipeis military relations and arms deals with Washington remains to be seen. 6.16 By the same token
the arms sale to Taiwan could significantly hinder SinoAmerican relations, particularly in
the military and security areas. As a matter of fact, the mil-to-mil relations between the two countries have become
a hostage to the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, making it the weakest link in the extensive
system of U.S-China dialogues and consultations. In this respect, the Taiwan issue remains the main source of mutual strategic
mistrust and suspicions between the two countries. 6.17 Therefore to maintain the momentum of peaceful development in the Taiwan Strait, all three parties
need to take a fresh and more creative approach and to find a way to manage, if not
resolve, the problem. In 2002 then Chinese President Jiang Zemin proposed to then President George W. Bush that if the United States
improved cross-strait relations made it unnecessary for Taiwan to buy more arms from the U.S. However,

could restrain arms sales to Taiwan, China would consider reducing its missile
deployment along the Taiwan Strait . Reportedly the U.S. response at that time was that China needed to talk to Taiwan about this issue,
Maybe the time has come now for all three parties to revisit this
proposal to minimize the potentially negative impact of arms sales on trilateral relations .
which was impossible for Beijing to do at that time.

Yi-hua Kan 13
(Francis, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations,
National Chengchi University, New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait
Relations: How Far Can the Rapprochement Go?, pg 84-92 //um-ef)
The relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, generally characterized as
constant antagonism both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, has long been a
decisive factor in shaping the region's security and stability. Following the initial rapprochement between them,
talcing place since 2008 when Taiwan's new administration was sworn in. this relationship is now at a critical juncture as the
important political transitions are taking shape both in Taiwan and the mainland . Their
newly obtained amelioration has offered some observers optimistic outlooks for further
institutionalized ties and leaves open the possibility of future discussions on more
sensitive issues, including cross-Strait confidence-building measures ( CBMs ).1 Nevertheless, their relations are
still facing tremendous impediments, whether domestic, bilateral, or international, which
may complicate the peace process or even reverse the trend of positive development at some point in the future. The reconciliatory policy
initiated by President Ma Ying-jcou on the Taiwan side, with the practical response taken by President Hu Jintao on the mainland side, has dramatically improved the security
environment in the Taiwan Strait. Such pragmatism exercised by both in developing cross-Strait relations has led them to resume intensive dialogues that have achieved a

ECFA) is a milestone epitomizing a

crucial step toward institutionalization of their bilateral relations. The step-by-step approach, starling from easy
issues and leaving the difficult ones to be solved in the future, carefully observed by both has made further cooperation conceivable
and accumulated a certain degree of mutual trust, required for future talks on more
scries of landmark agreements, among which the Fconomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (

difficult and sensitive issues . While Taiwan and China have been able to increase their socio-economic interactions, discussions of
political and security issues have generally been seen as premature because of their
sensitivity. The future negotiations on these issues would inevitably touch upon military
deployments, the one-China principle, international status, sovereignty, and the US

factor, at least from the mainland's perspective. Beijing is understandably keen on an early negotiation of political and security issues with an aim at expeditiously
institutionalizing the bilateral relations between Beijing and Taipei, framing their ties within a structure in which future interactions have to be conducted accordingly, no matter

Taipei
distinctly prefers to stick to the current pace of talks unless and until its polarized public
opinion can be convinced of the necessity of touching upon sensitive issues. The possibility of
what political party governs Taiwan, and therefore largely reducing the uncertainties that would easily reverse its planned course of action. On the other hand.

constant changes of government in Taiwan renders further difficult any attempted to reach a consensus between rival parties and among people. In response. China has so far
demonstrated its flexibility as it realizes thai any rushed move to push the political dialogue forward will be counterproductive. Yet how long its patience will last remains to be
seen. The core question this chapter intends to explore is whether it is desirable, feasible, and valuable for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to pursue CBMs." First, the

cross-Strait CBMs may be desirable only wrhen both parties recognize that political and
security mechanisms are essential to reach sensible solutions to the political and
military impasses, resulting from their ancient animosity. The stability and security in the
Taiwan Strait would be built upon with incremental institutionalization of bilateral
relations and therefore mechanisms may be needed for preserving agreements,
reducing misunderstandings, and safeguarding peace . If mutual trust continues to accumulate. CBMs could
pave the way for the eventual termination of hostility between the two and for the
realization of a lasting peace . Second. CBMs across the strait can be feasible, but only when
both sides have the courage and determination to solve the thorny issues ahead . The
divergence of agendas designed by them would create serious obstacles toward their future discussions. Domestic discords and
international reservations would further deteriorate the already fragile mutual trust and
delay the talks over CBMs. If both Taiwan and the mainland sincerely feel the need to
explore the possibility of constructing CBMs, they have to take a cautious approach
toward such a sensitive issue and build firmer foundation of mutual confidence by first focusing on economic, cultural, and social cooperation.
Third, to make CBMs attainable both Taiwan and the mainland have to convince domestic and international audiences that such CBMs are valuable for all. They have
to demonstrate that CBMs between Taiwan and the mainland would guarantee, not
undermine, peace in the Taiwan Strait. After all. future cross-Strait CBMs. if properly achieved and implemented, would not only shape the
outlook of the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and the mainland, but also have real impacts on the region's security environment.

Swaine 15
(Michael, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The
Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, pg online @
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominancein-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi //um-ef)
In general,

true balance-of-power environments can at least potentially increase both risk

taking and miscalculation , especially if one or both sides conclude that they must
confirm or consolidate a perceived increaseor compensate for a perceived declinein
leverage by acting more aggressively to test the resolve of the other side, advance specific interests, or
manage a serious political-military crisis. Avoiding or effectively controlling such situations will require not
only a variety of crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) beyond
what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also high levels of mutual strategic
reassurance and restraint, involving substantive and verifiable limits on each sides freedom of action or ability to prevail militarily along Chinas
sensitive maritime periphery, as well as the maintenance of deterrent and shaping capabilities in those areas that count most. Many knowledgeable

observers have offered a variety of recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and

enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense
spending to mutual, limited concessions or understandings regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, and clearer, more calibrated bottom-line statements on alliance

many of these initiatives make eminent sense, they generally fail to address both
the underlying problem of clashing assumptions and beliefs about the requirements for
continued order and prosperity in Asia and the basic threat perceptions generated by
inaccurate historical analogies about Chinas past and domestic nationalist views and
pressures. Moreover, almost no observers offer recommendations designed to significantly
alter the power structure in volatile areas along Chinas maritime periphery, such as on the
Korean Peninsula and in and around Taiwan , in ways that could significantly defuse those areas as
sources of conflict over the long term. In order to minimize the potential instabilities inherent in a roughly equal balance-of-power
environment, specific actions must be taken to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources
commitments and core interests.3 While

of future U.S.-China crises and the propensity to test each sides resolve, and to
enhance the opportunities for meaningful cooperation over the long term . In particular,
Washington and Beijing will need to reach reliable understandings regarding the future
long-term status of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the management of maritime territorial disputes, and the scope and function of U.S. (and other
foreign) military activities within the first island chainor at the very least within both Chinas and Japans exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Such understandings should
almost certainly involve some credible form of neutralization of these areas as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, or the creation of a stable U.S.-China
balance of power within them, thereby creating a de facto buffer zone along Chinas maritime periphery. In the case of Korea, this implies the emergence of a unified, nonaligned
(or loosely aligned) peninsula free from foreign military forces. This would require prior credible security assurances by both the United States and China that a unified Korea
would remain free from coercion and always open to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve a continuation in some form of a
greatly reduced security relationship with Washington, at least in the short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified
Korea, at least to the extent of agreeing to not acquire nuclear weapons or some types of conventional weapons that Korea might find threatening, such as precision ballistic
and cruise missile strike capabilities. Of course, none of this could happen as long as the Korean Peninsula remains divided, with South Korea under threat of attack from North
Korea. Thus, ideally, the development of a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific will require Korean unification sooner rather than later. Failing that, a clear, credible

In the case of
Taiwan, any credible neutralization of the cross-strait issue as a threat to either sides
interests would require, as a first step, a U.S.-China understanding regarding restrictions
understanding must be reached as soon as possible among the powers concerned regarding the eventual disposition of the Korea problem.

on U.S. arms sales in return for certain types of verifiable limits on Chinese military
production and deployments relevant to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike
aircraft . Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not
use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese
declaration of de jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island . In the
past, Beijing has resisted providing assurances regarding any non-use of force toward
the island, viewing such an assurance as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
However, as in the case of Korea, Beijing would likely view such a conditional limitation
on its right to employ force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of
an overall stable balance of power in the Western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also
regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland. In
addition, Beijing would also likely need to accept: a) explicitly that such unification could
only occur on the basis of a peaceful process involving the willing consent of the people
of Taiwan, and b) tacitly that eventual unification would likely not occur, if at all, for many
decades. For its part, the United States would likely need to provide assurances to China that it
would neither place forces on the island nor provide any new level of defense assistance
to Taipei, as long as Beijing abides by its own assurances . And both countries would need to consult closely with
Taiwan and Japan at each step of this process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them. Regarding territorial disputes in
the East China Sea and South China Sea, the United States needs to make clear that it has little if any direct interest in the interactions occurring between the disputants,
beyond clear security threats leveled against the two U.S. allies involved: Japan and the Philippines. While supporting, in an even-handed manner, a binding code of conduct
and established legal procedures for resolving clashes and arbitrating claims, Washington should avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a noncoercive process is followed
in every instance. That said, it should also make clear that it will oppose, forcefully if necessary, any attempt to establish an exclusion zone or de facto territorial waters beyond
accepted 12-nautical-mile limits. For its part, Beijing must clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and that it will never
seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied areas. It must also credibly and convincingly state, privately if not publicly, that those waters in the South China Sea located

within its so-called nine-dashed line and outside the territorial waters and EEZs of specified land features constitute open ocean. Although doubtless difficult to achieve, such
understandings will likely become more possible in the larger context of a neutralized first island chain as U.S.-China suspicions abate. In the larger conventional military realm,
U.S. military primacy within at least the first island chain will need to be replaced by a genuinely balanced force posture and accompanying military doctrine. This should likely
be centered on what is termed a mutual denial operational concept in which both China and the United States along with its allies possess sufficient levels of anti-access and
area denial (A2/AD)type air, naval, missile, and space capabilities to make the risks and dangers of attempting to achieve a sustained advantage through military means over
potentially volatile areas or zones clearly prohibitive. In such an environment, neither side would have the clear capacity to prevail in a conflict, but both sides would possess
adequate defensive capacities to deter or severely complicate an attack, for example, on Taiwan, on the Chinese mainland, and against U.S./allied territory, or any effort to close
or control key strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific. This will likely require agreed-upon restraints on the production and/or deployment of certain types of
weapon systems operating in the Western Pacific, such as deep-strike stealth aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and deployed surface and subsurface warships. On the
nuclear level, a stable balance-of-power environment in the Western Pacific requires a clear set of mutual assurances designed to strengthen the deterrence capacity of each
sides nuclear arsenal and thereby reduce significantly the dangers of escalation from a conventional crisis or conflict into a nuclear confrontation. To attain this goal, American
and allied defense analysts need to discard the dangerous notion that U.S. primacy must extend to the nuclear realm, via the establishment of a clear ability to neutralize
Chinas nuclear arsenal. Instead, Washington should authoritatively indicate that it accepts and will not threaten Chinas retaliatory nuclear strike capability. In other words, it
must unambiguously affirm the validity of a U.S.-China nuclear balance based on a concept of mutual deterrence, something it has never done. Moreover, to make this credible,
Washington must abandon consideration of a long-range, precision global strike system, or any other new type of system capable of destroying Chinas nuclear arsenal through
both nuclear and conventional means, and provide greater assurances that its ballistic missile defense capabilities cannot eliminate a Chinese second strike. For its part, Beijing
must be willing to accept such U.S. assurances and eschew any attempt to transition beyond its existing modest minimal deterrent, second-strike nuclear capability to a much

these sorts of changes will present major implications for U.S. allies and
friends in the region. Japan in particular would play a major role in any effort to create a stable U.S.-China
balance of power in the Western Pacific. In order for Tokyo to provide Seoul with the kind of assurances identified above, and to accept the above
adjustments in the U.S. force posture and stance toward Taiwan, certain clear understandings with
Washington and Beijing would be necessary. In general, the creation of a de facto buffer zone or a neutral/balanced area within the
larger force. Obviously,

first island chain would almost certainly require that Japan significantly strengthen its defense capabilities, either autonomously or, more preferably from the U.S. perspective,
within the context of a more robust yet still limited U.S.-Japan security alliance. In the latter case, Tokyo would become a critical partner in the creation of the sort of defensive,
mutual denial operational concept. This would entail the creation of a more fully integrated U.S.-Japan C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance) infrastructure, stronger passive defenses against possible Chinese ballistic and cruise missile threats to U.S. and Japanese military assets,
and enhanced Japanese logistics and support facilities, alongside improvements in specific defensive-oriented Japanese military capabilities, such as ASW (antisubmarine
warfare) and interceptor aircraft. However, this would not require Japan to become a fully normalized security partner alongside the United States, undertaking alliance-based
security activities across the Western Pacific and beyond. For China, acceptance of a strengthened but still limited U.S.-Japan alliance, a unified, largely nonaligned Korean
Peninsula, verifiable limits on Chinese capabilities vis--vis Taiwan, and the other elements of the stable balance-of-power structure mentioned above would require a clear
willingness to forgo those more ambitious security objectives toward which some Chinese might aspire, either now or in the future. These include, most notably, the clear ability
to establish control over the waters and airspace along Chinas maritime periphery and a Sino-centric Asian economic and political order that largely excludes the United States.
This will likely require, in turn, that Beijing make concerted, public efforts to reject and invalidate among the Chinese citizenry those more extreme interpretations of Chinese
nationalism that call for China to dominate Asia and to employ aggressive or violent means to resolve various sovereignty and other disputes with its neighbors. Although not
mainstream at present, such notions nonetheless could become more popular and influential as Chinas power grows (and if Washington responds to such growth by seeking to

The benefits for China of these

accommodations would be an enhanced level of security via a reduced U.S. threat to vital
Chinese interests and the avoidance of a costly and likely increasingly dangerous
security competition. These new circumstances would also allow China to concentrate even more than at present on establishing a stable and prosperous
domestic environment. OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHING A STABLE BALANCE IN ASIA Several obstacles stand in the way of
Washington and Beijing undertaking such a substantial change in perceptions and practices, force deployments,
sustain its past predominance), and would in turn represent a clear threat to regional stability.

and power relations in the Western Pacific. On the U.S. side, first and foremost is the general refusal of most if not all U.S. decisionmakers and officials to contemplate an
alternative to U.S. military predominance in this vital region. Such maritime predominance has arguably served Washington and most of the region well for many decades, and it
accords with the deep-seated notion of American exceptionalism, which prescribes a dominant U.S. leadership role throughout the world. In addition, the short-term perspective,
natural inertia, and risk avoidance of bureaucrats and policy communities in Washington (and elsewhere) militate against major shifts in policy and approach, especially in the
absence of an urgent and palpable need for change. Indeed, it is extremely difficult for any major power, much less a superpower, to begin a fundamental strategic shift in
anticipation of diminished relative capabilities before that diminishment fully reveals itself. In the Western Pacific in particular, with regard to both U.S. ISR activities along the
Chinese coast and the larger U.S. military presence within the first island chain, the United States Navy and many U.S. decisionmakers are wedded to the notion that American
power (and in particular naval power) must brook no limitation in areas beyond a nations 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace. This derives in part from the belief that
any constraints on U.S. naval operations will lead to a cascade of coastal states challenging the principle of U.S. maritime freedom of action and to possible reductions in the
level of resources and the scope of operations available to support U.S. naval power. Moreover, the specific U.S. desire to maintain a strong naval presence along Chinas
maritime periphery reflects a perceived need to acquire more accurate intelligence regarding Beijings growing offshore air and naval capabilities. Such a presence is also
viewed as essential to sustaining U.S. credibility with Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and to the maintenance of deterrent capabilities against a possible Chinese
attack on Taiwan. This combination of service interests, intelligence needs, and perceived security requirements reinforces the general U.S. bias in favor of continued maritime
predominance. However, an inevitable Chinese refusal to accept that predominance over the long term will be expressed first and foremost in opposition to the past level of U.S.
naval activities along the Chinese coastline, that is, within Chinas EEZ at the very least, and possibly within the entire first island chain. Second, and closely related to the prior

U.S. decisionmakers are extremely loath to contemplate significant adjustments in the

current status of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. From the U.S. perspective, any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of
point,

the U.S. security commitment to these two actors (a U.S military ally and a de facto U.S. protectorate, respectively) could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms, and/or

, Japan might react to such movement by questioning

Washingtons basic security commitment to Tokyo, which could result in a break in the
U.S.-Japan alliance and/or Japanese acquisition of nuclear arms. These concerns are real, if
no doubt exaggerated by some in Tokyo or Taipei in order to justify maintenance of the
threats or attacks from North Korea or China. In addition

existing U.S. relationship , and in some cases to avoid undertaking costly defense improvements
of their own. On the Chinese side, perhaps the most significant obstacle to undertaking a transition toward a stable balance of power in Asia derives from the
insecurities and weaknesses of the Chinese government, both domestically and abroad. Chinas leaders rely, for their legitimacy and support, not only on continued economic
success and rising living standards, but also on a form of nationalism that prizes the ability of the regime to correct past injustices meted out by imperialist powers during
Chinas so-called century of humiliation and to stand up to current slights, both real and imagined. Thus, their policies often capitalize on the resentments felt by many Chinese
citizens toward the supposedly arrogant West and Japan. This viewpoint makes the Chinese leadership hesitant to quell the more extreme forms of nationalism described above
and deeply suspicious of the United States and its allies. It also makes it more receptive to the notion that a rising yet still underdeveloped and relatively weak China must

continue to conceal its military capabilities while developing its overall capacities to the maximum extent possible. In other words, the Chinese regime is both excessively
vulnerable to ultranationalist pressures and disinclined to contemplate self-imposed limitations on its sovereign rights (for example, with regard to Taiwan) and its political,
economic, and military abilities, especially in Asia. While this does not translate into a drive for predominance, it does make Beijing less willing to accept the kind of mutual

NO GRAND BARGAIN, BUT A CLEAR

UNDERSTANDING AND A STAGED PROCESS ARE REQUIRED These obstacles clearly indicate that
restraints necessary to achieve a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much less reach, a formal grandbargain-type of agreement to establish a new regional security environment anytime
soon .4 Such a fundamental shift in policies and approaches can only occur gradually, in
stages, and over an extended period of time. But it can only begin if elites in Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals seriously
examine the enduring trends under way in Asia and accept the reality of the changing power distribution and the need for more than just marginal adjustments and assurances.
Only then will they undertake a systematic examination of the requirements of a stable balance of power over the long term, involving a serious consideration of the more

Such an examination and acceptance must initially occur domestically, then

among allies and protectorates, and finally via a bilateral U.S.-China strategic dialogue
fundamental actions.

aimed at developing understandings about the process and actions required. Such understandings must provide for ample opportunities and means for both sides to assess and

If such understandings can be reached regarding the overall need for

then the specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities and
arrangements for meaningful cooperation, involving Korea, Taiwan, and maritime issues within the first island chain,
will become much more possible. In particular, a strategic understanding designed to achieve a peaceful and stable transition to a genuine
evaluate the credibility and veracity of the actions of the other side.
strategic adjustment,

balance of power in the Western Pacific could make Beijing more likely to pressure or entice North Korea to abandon or place strong limits on its nuclear weapons program and
undertake the kind of opening up and reforms that would almost certainly result eventually in a unified peninsula. While difficult to envision at present, such a shift in Chinese
policy is certainly possible, given the obvious incentives to do so. While South Korea might also resist movement toward a nonaligned status in a post-unification environment,

Regarding Taiwan, if
both U.S. and Chinese leaders can convince Taipei of the benefits of the kind of mutual
assurances and restraints necessary to neutralize the cross-strait issue, none of which
the obvious benefits that would result from a stable balance of power, if presented properly, could very likely overcome such resistance.

require the U.S. abandonment of the island , these possible adverse outcomes of the
proposed or ongoing shift, including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost
certainly be avoided .

CBMs Key
Trilateral confidence building measures are key to restoring trust and
preventing Chinese fears of Taiwanese independence push
Glaser and Glosserman 8, Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director
of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and
security policy. She is concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a
senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East
Asia. From 2008 mid-2015 Ms. Glaser was a Senior Adviser with the Freeman Chair in China
Studies, and from 2003 to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS International Security
Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices,
including the Departments of Defense and State, Brad Glosserman is executive director of the
Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, an independent program of the Washington-based Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Pacific Forum has provided policy-oriented
analysis and promoted dialogue on regional security, political, economic, and environmental
issues in the Asia-Pacific region since 1975. Mr. Glosserman oversees all aspects of Pacific
Forum activities, including conferences, fellowships, publications, and administration. He is
coeditor of Comparative Connections, the Pacific Forums triannual journal and writes, along
with Pacific Forum president Ralph Cossa, the regional review., (Bonnie and Brad, September
2008, Promoting Confidence Building Across the Taiwan Strait)//kap
Cross-strait CBMs will need to reflect the unique nature of mainland ChinaTaiwan
relations and respond to the security concerns of both sides. One key conclusion is that there is a
critical role to be played by top-level decisionmakers, particularly on the mainland, to accommodate the political needs of the other
side and promote improved cross-strait relations. Without

directives from the leadership, lower-level

policymakers will not take politically risky initiatives to advance the relationship. In China, the
default approach to con dence building is one of extreme caution. e Chinese fear that negotiated CBMs could
be used by the KMT government to strengthen its de facto independent status or by a future
Democratic Progressive Partyled Taiwan government to promote de jure independence.
China is also concerned that dialogue and trust-building exer- cises not be designed to
undermine deterrence and perpetuate the status quo but instead promote eventual
reunification. These concerns will have to be addressed for continued progress to be
made. There are differences in the way mainland China and Taiwan think about CBMs, but there is also substantial
common ground. e biggest obstacle to CBMs is the deep-seated suspicion on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Americans,
Taiwanese, and Chinese all agreed that a strategic op- portunity exists to improve relations across the strait that should not be
missed. But realizing this opportunity is not inevitable, and there is no substitute for a gradual, evolutionary approach to im- proving

All three sides should take

steps to promote mutual trust and seek win-win-win solutions. China could make a nearterm political gesture by reducing some of the missiles currently aimed at Taiwan and in
the longer term take meaningful steps to reverse its military buildup opposite Taiwan.
Through bilateral negotiations, Beijing could declare its intent not to use force against
Taiwan as long as Taiwan refrains from declaring independence. Beijing can and should
allow Taiwan to play a greater role in international society, including in multilateral
organizationsboth those that dont require sovereignty for membership and those that do. Taiwan should persist
in expanding its engagement and contacts with the mainland, be flexible in its approach
to seeking participation in international organizations, and consult with the United States
on managing the evolving cross-strait relationship. Both Taiwan and the mainland should
cross-strait relations. Con dence-building measures can play a critical role in this process.

avoid setting precondi- tions for engaging in dialogue on any speci c issues. e United
States should make clear that it supports improvements in cross-strait relations reached
through the free choices of the people in mainland China and Taiwan and o er to assist
them, when requested by both sides, in overcoming obstacles to implementing any future agreements that they may reach.

US posture in the next few weeks is critical

AI 6/4, The American Interest, (6/4/16, Tsai Ing-wen Reforms Taiwans China Policy,
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/06/04/tsai-ing-wen-reforms-taiwans-chinapolicy/)//kap
After just two weeks on the job, Taiwans

new president Tsai Ing-wen is already breaking with the

foreign policy of her pro-Beijing predecessor. Bloomberg reports: On her first full day in office on May 23,
Tsai created a mechanism with Japan to settle maritime disputes, signaling possible
warmer ties with Japan, which also has territorial disputes with China. Her cabinet said it would
work directly with Japan to resolve differences over fishing rights in waters near the Japanese reef of Okinotori, rather than taking a
legal approach. Also on May 23, Premier Lin Chuan issued an order dropping criminal charges against 126 protesters who broke
into the cabinet headquarters in 2014 to demonstrate against a trade pact with Beijing. The same day, when confirming the
appointment of the islands new representative to the U.S., Tsai used the title ambassador rather than representative
terminology that will rankle China because ambassador connotes that Taiwan is a country, not a Chinese province as Beijing
insists. Although shed often spoken about taking a new attitude toward China on the campaign trail, it wasnt certain that Ing-wen
would turn her Beijing-at-arms-length politics into policy. Taiwans

economic dependence on the mainland

and Tsais vow to honor public support for the status quo were expected to temper Tsais
ambitions and the ambitions of some of her ardent supporters. Yet Tsai doesnt seem
particularly risk-averse so far. Her decision to strengthen ties with Japan built on relations
she had been developing even before she became president, when she angered Beijing by visiting
Tokyo and meeting with Japanese officials. Tsai no doubt has her eye on Japans improving military
capabilities, which could be a lifeline for Taiwan as the capabilities of its own military fall
behind. But shes also interested in finding new destinations for Taiwans exports. That focus on economics has led her to
announce a New Go South policy aimed at strengthening ties with Southeast Asian nations, in part by addressing their concerns
about the South China Sea. The United States will

have to figure out how to manage an emboldened

Taiwan and an angry China. The U.S. has been the final guarantor against PLA invasion
since the fifties, and recent years have seen repeated affirmations of this relationship, from cyber security cooperation to arms
deals. With

Taiwans new ambassador coming to town, Washington is under pressure to

signal where it stands as the decades-long conflict between Taipei and Beijing escalates.

Econ/Diplo Engage Key

And, the U.S. should engage the PRC over Arms Sales ECONOMICALLY
through diplomatic channels
Miller Center Roundtable 11
(The roundtable formulated a practical set of recommendations to improve and strengthen the relationship of
the worlds two leading powers. Admiral Joseph W. Prueherthe Miller Centers Schlesinger Professor and
the former U.S. Ambassador to China from 1999 to 2001convened the participants and led the discussion.
Admiral Pruehers experience at the highest levels, in diplomacy and the military, provide crucial insight into
China, David L. Cunningham, Jr., President of the Asia Pacific Region of FedEx Express Michael Ducker,
Chief Operating Officer for FedEx Express and President of its International Division Charles Freeman, III,
Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies David M. Finkelstein, Vice
President, CNA & Director, CNA China Studies Harry Harding, Dean, Frank Batten Sr. School of Leadership
and Public Policy, University of Virginia Admiral Timothy J. Keating (USN, ret.) former Commander, United
States Pacific Command David Michael Lampton, Dean of Faculty, School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University James Shinn, Lecturer, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Princeton
University Brantly Womack, Professor of Politics, University of Virginia pg online @
http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf //um-ef)

A peaceful resolution of the long standing Taiwan issue, acceptable on

both sides of the strait would indeed be a boon to stability in East Asia, as well as to
U.S./China relations. It is also an issue where progress can be made. Taiwan has over time and with our
encouragement become an economically successful democratic polity. Unfortunately, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are part of a vicious
We Should Take a Fresh Look at Taiwan.

circle, leading to the Taiwan issue that is clearly political, and increasingly economic,
being always discussed in military terms . The solution to the Taiwan issue is not a
military one, so we should discuss it in the layers of economy, politics, and culture. Paraphrasing Einstein, Simplify all things
but not too much. Let us thus try to describe the vicious circle of Taiwan arms sales. Politically, the
President of the Taiwan people, now the extremely capable Ma Ying-jeou, in order to get elected, must satisfy a large
segment of his Taiwanese constituency by asking the U.S. to approve annual arm sales to
Taiwan. The U.S. Administration, for domestic political reasons, must offer arms to
Taiwan (The large difference between what is approved and what is actually transferred is another subject). Mainland Chinese ( PRC) leaders, to reconcile
increasingly pluralistic domestic pressures, are obliged to protest the interferences of
these arms sales in internal Chinese affairs. Further, the PLA feels obliged, and has
been tasked, to show it can deal militarily with Taiwan. A manifestation of this is
demonstrated in the large military build-up in Fukian province. A manisfestation is that
this is happening despite an environment of increasing cross-Strait economic activities,
contact, and tourism. The goal enunciated in the Taiwan Relations Actto preserve and
promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between
the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the
China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific areaneeds to be rethought by all sides in a context broader than military Of course, something as sensitive as Taiwan policy should be changed only with
great deliberation. There are some in Washington and Beijing who talk quietly of a new Taiwan Relations Act or 4th Joint Communiqu, but our recommendation is that
(1) dialogue on the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle be elevated from a mostly military to a
politicoeconomic dialogue and (2) that serious, official (perhaps stemming from a Track Two, or non-government effort) steps be taken

to break the vicious circle described above. In our view the easiest, most statesmanlike, step could be made by the PRC but this paper is about what the
U.S. can do. There is no better time to act than while relations are working well and both the U.S. and China need to expend energies on other topics.

Off Case Answers

Case Turns

2AC Dialogue/Eng Key & Deter Fails

Cbms are necessary to ensure deterrence is credible and de-escalate
conflicts breakdowns and conflict are inevitable without them
Peng 13
MAJ (NS) Lim Chin Peng, Deterrence Through Various Confidence and Security Building
Measures, POINTER, Journal of the singapore armed forces Vol.39 No.4,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/dam/imindef_media_library/graphics/pointer/PDF/2013/Vol.39
%20No.4/5)%20V39N4_Deterrence%20Through%20Various%20Confidence%20Building
%20and%20Security%20Measures.pdf, msm
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES While the concept

of deterrence has been

employed by the various Southeast Asian states with varying degrees of success, more can be done to
prevent deterrence from fraying and undermining the relative peace and tranquility the region
has enjoyed for the past few decades. As such, CSBM , in the form of increased international engagements, should
be employed

to provide a comprehensive approach to defense.

International Engagement Increased interaction between states through multilateral forums,
dialogues and meetings provide avenues for leaders of states to come together to
resolve differences and exploit opportunities for mutual benefit. Such processes allow
in tandem with deterrence

for greater trust

and

understanding to be built between these states and also give leaders

greater awareness of the concerns and limitations of its neighbors. As identified earlier,
deterrence tends to break down in circumstances when perceived vulnerability
overwhelms rationality or when miscommunication occurs . As such, these engagement
platforms help to increase the transparency and communications between the various
stakeholders and in turn reduce the chances of conflict between states. As the world undergoes
a period of unprecedented growth and development, issues such as unequal progress between states and competition for limited
resources can give rise to disagreements, jealousy or even fracture lines across societies. These require mediation and
increased cooperation , and dialogue can reconcile these differences.

Arms Sales key to Negotiations

And, U.S. arms sales are a PRE-REQUISITE for effective negotiations
provide bargaining chip for Taiwan
Glaser and Glosserman 8, Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director
of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and
security policy. She is concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a
senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East
Asia. From 2008 mid-2015 Ms. Glaser was a Senior Adviser with the Freeman Chair in China
Studies, and from 2003 to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS International Security
Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices,
including the Departments of Defense and State, Brad Glosserman is executive director of the
Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, an independent program of the Washington-based Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Pacific Forum has provided policy-oriented
analysis and promoted dialogue on regional security, political, economic, and environmental
issues in the Asia-Pacific region since 1975. Mr. Glosserman oversees all aspects of Pacific
Forum activities, including conferences, fellowships, publications, and administration. He is
coeditor of Comparative Connections, the Pacific Forums triannual journal and writes, along
with Pacific Forum president Ralph Cossa, the regional review., (Bonnie and Brad, September
2008, Promoting Confidence Building Across the Taiwan Strait)//kap
Although the United

States has no direct role in the evolving cross-strait relationship, its actions shape the

context in which that engagement occurs . Given its legal obligations under the Taiwan
Relations Act to provide defensive goods and services to Taiwan and maintain a robust
force pres- ence in the west Paci c to forestall Chinese military intimidation or coercion,
the United States is intimately involved in the cross-strait relationship. Both Taiwan and
China should recognize that Washington supports active and positive cross-strait
relations and dialogue that is aimed at peacefully resolving differences. Close long- standing U.S.
objectives will not change, no matter who wins the 2008 presidential election. e United States does not seek, nor does it bene t
from, tensions between Taiwan and mainland China. Americans urged Chinese at our meetings not to see U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Taiwan,
or cross-strait relations in zero-sum terms. Each relationship should not depend on the state of the other rela- tionshipsand, in
particular, improvement in one relationship should not come at the expense of another. Most Americans anticipate considerable
improvement in U.S.-Taiwan relations with the advent of the Ma government. In a zero-sum framework, improvement would come at
the expense of the cross-strait or the U.S.-China relationship, which does notand should nothave to be the case. Our

Chinese interlocutors acknowledged that the United States has a role to play in the cross- strait
relationship, but they di ered sharply from U.S. analysts on what the appropriate role is.
There was almost complete unanimity when it came to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, with the Chinese insisting that arms
sales damage the atmosphere of cross-strait relations and undercut a rap- prochement
between Beijing and Taipei. During our visit, there were warnings that agreement to provide Taiwan with 66 F-16 C/D
ghters as requested would severely damage Sino-American ties. (A few Chinese participants viewed the sales as inevitable,
however, and appreciated a sug- gestion from a U.S. participant that the administration of George W. Bush make the sale a er the

Americans countered that

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue, not only because of legal commitments, but also because
Americans believe that such sales bolster Taiwanese confidencea necessary
precondition for Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the mainland. e common U.S. view
is that China, meanwhile, can in uence the nature of the U.S.- Taiwan security relationship by reducing the military threat to
Olympic Games to clear the deck for the next U.S. president.) At our meetings in Beijing,

Taiwan, which could

persuade Taiwan to spend less on guns to defend itself against a

Chinese threat and more on butter to provide for the needs of its citizens. Americans
also urged Chinese not to be overly concerned about arms sales, arguing that China would
continue to strengthen its advantage in the cross-strait military balance and, for the foreseeable
future, maintain a credible deterrent against a Taiwanese break for independence . In candid
moments, Chinese acknowledged that arms sales are worrisome primarily because of their
political significance , not their military impactthey send a signal to both Taipei and
Beijing about U.S. commitments to Taiwan but it was clear that this does not make
them any offensive to mainland sensibilities. Our discussions revealed a deep-rooted suspicion among
Chinese that concessions in this area could open the door to Taiwans inclusion in a U.S.-led collective security system in East Asia,
an unacceptable proposition to Beijing. Perhaps to forestall such a possibility, one Chinese interlocu- tor suggested that the United
States and China build on their cooperation during Chen Shui-bians rule and jointly manage Taiwans security. In practice,
according to this formulation, this would entail a gradual reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taipei, while Beijing increases its
responsibility for Taiwans defense. is idea was roundly rejected by U.S. participants as both not feasible and unac- ceptable.
Chinese experts at our meetings urged that the United States take a strategic view of cross- strait relations, by which they meant
that the United States should appreciate the centrality of Taiwan to PRC interests and recognize that U.S. relations with China are a
higher priority than its ties to Taiwan. ese comments re ected the broader Chinese hope that the United States will eventually come
to see Taiwan as only peripheral to its interestsalthough there is little expecta- tion that this will happen anytime soon.

Top-Down CBMs Key

Top down CBM negotiation and implementation is key to successful ChinaTaiwan bilateral trust
Glaser and Glosserman 8, Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director
of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and
security policy. She is concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a
senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East
Asia. From 2008 mid-2015 Ms. Glaser was a Senior Adviser with the Freeman Chair in China
Studies, and from 2003 to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS International Security
Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices,
including the Departments of Defense and State, Brad Glosserman is executive director of the
Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, an independent program of the Washington-based Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Pacific Forum has provided policy-oriented
analysis and promoted dialogue on regional security, political, economic, and environmental
issues in the Asia-Pacific region since 1975. Mr. Glosserman oversees all aspects of Pacific
Forum activities, including conferences, fellowships, publications, and administration. He is
coeditor of Comparative Connections, the Pacific Forums triannual journal and writes, along
with Pacific Forum president Ralph Cossa, the regional review., (Bonnie and Brad, September
2008, Promoting Confidence Building Across the Taiwan Strait)//kap
Bilateral CBMs have been very limited, as tension in the cross-strait relationship has
circum- scribed virtually all social contact. Beijing apparently concluded that the danger of
Taiwan inde- pendence created risks in taking steps that would increase Taiwans con
dence and instead obliged the mainland to make Taiwan feel insecure. ere are some informal
CBMs between police and coast guard o cers, but they tend to be low-level arrangements to deal with practical problems, such as
rescuing shermen in distress and dealing with law enforcement problems in the strait. e two sides have not developed broader
habits of cooperation, and the relationship continues to be dominated by deep-seated mistrust and suspicion. ere are both di
erences and commonalities in the way that mainland China and Taiwan think about CBMs. For the majority of our mainland
interlocutors, the

core of the process is political trust , because trust allows the two sides to develop common
interests that permit them to make compromises during the negotiation process to pursue those shared concerns. Once the
political framework is set, according to this Chinese view, then the two sides can push from the top
and the bottomamong ranking o cials and at the working level simultaneouslyto expand the structure of interaction and
trust.2 Taiwanese agree on the centrality of trust to the process of building a foundation for
stable cross-strait ties. In its 2008 defense white paper, Taiwans Ministry of National Defense (MND) argues that crossstrait relations are built on a foundation of both sides being equal and trustworthy. e MND approach to cross-strait CBMs matches
the thinking of mainland Chinese as expressed by those we met with. Both concur that CBMs should be pursued in three stages
short-term, mid-term, and long-term (each of which can be further divided into speci c steps and goals). But, argued one Chinese
analyst, a confidence-building

mechanism can only be established following the

mechanisms of dialogue and negotiation and should be developed in a coordinated way
with other mechanisms. In other words, Chinese see CBMs as part of a broader political process rather than precursors
to it. For Chinese, it was elaborated during our discussions, this approach means that the CBM pro- cess must be top
down: political leaders set the pace for discussion, and reconciliation and CBMs follow .
Recent developments attest to both the accuracy of this characterization and the rationale behind it. A top-down model re ects the

preference for
using mutual trust rather than the phrase confidence-building measures re ects a linguistic
realities of an authoritarian political system, particularly 2. Several Chinese participants argued that their

twist: when speaking with Taiwanese in Chinese, the former phrase is used; when speaking in English, the preferred phrase is
CBMs. It is worth noting that the same languagecross-strait mutual military trustis used in the Taiwan Ministry of National

Only senior decisionmakers are in a

position to stretch the envelope of the possible; initiative by lower-level actors could be
career threatening. Chinese thinking diverged sharply from the Western approach. U.S.
Defense 2008 white paper. when dealing with such sensitive issues.

participants character- ized CBMs as facilitating the dialogue process and noted that although all CBMs require political approval,

rarely do policymakers have the requisite skills or knowledge to make informed decisions about technical issues. As such, implementation of speci c measures that facilitate contact or reduce the
possibility of a mishapfor example, between naviesare best le to working-level o cials who better understand the context in
which the two sides interact. Di erences are also evident in thinking about the objective of CBMs. As one U.S. participant explained,

CBMs are transformational measures, designed to move a relationship from the exist- ing
state to something better. Some Chinese experts shared this perspective but emphasized that this dialogue and trustbuilding exercise must not be designed to perpetuate the cross-strait status quo; CBMs should at least be conducive to the eventual
peaceful uni cation of China.

U.S. par- ticipants cautioned the Chinese to avoid evaluating the

desirability of a CBM based on whether it advances Beijings cause of reuni cation.
Moreover, they advised that China should respect Mas insistence that reuni cation not be discussed. Doing otherwise would
counterproductively chafe the Taiwan publics wait-and-see attitude toward the future political relationship and preference for the
status quo for the time being. U.S.

participants also stressed the utility of CBMs in avoiding an

accident between armed forces that could escalate to a broader military conflict. Chinese
participants, as previously men- tioned, insist that the primary purpose of CBMs is to build mutual trust. Avoiding inadvertent con ict
is of secondary importance for Taiwanese and Chinese alike. is is likely because both sides claimed to be familiar with the others
military rules of engagement (ROE). Taiwanese of- cials assured us that their ROE are clear, and although they are not written, they

Taiwan policy is to avoid

conflict by all means. Taiwanese warships do not cross the midline in the Taiwan Strait; do not lock on PLA vessels with
believe that the Chinese know and understand them. As one Taiwanese o cer explained, the

their radar or target Chinese weapon systems; do not use anything other than sonar to identity underwater vessels; and do not
come within four to six km of PLA vessels or territory. Taiwan is prepared to take the rst strike, but, cautioned one senior o cial, We

Mainland
experts reiterated the common Chinese refrain that there will only be war if Beijing
determines that the use of force is unavoidable. at might explain why a Chinese interlocutor atly denied the
wont surrender either. One Taiwanese o cial suggested that the PLA takes advantage of those rules of engagement.

possibility of formally establishing a centerline in the Taiwan Strait to prevent inadvertent contact between the two militaries, arguing
that it would promote the separation of China and Taiwan rather than eventual uni cation. is is problematic for the proposal in Tai-

Taiwanese
thinking may be changing, however. In his meeting with our delegation, then president-elect Ma explained that We
need to pay more attention to the accidental outbreak of hostilities. Minister of Defense Chen
Chao-min expressed hope to a Legislative Yuan committee on June 4 that CBMs can be established to avoid an
accidental con ict in the Taiwan Strait. Both statements were a marked contrast with the majority of views we
wans 2006 National Security Strategy to establish a bu er zone along the centerline of the Taiwan Strait.

heard from both Taiwanese and Chinese.

Tsai Key Solves CBMs

CBMs are key and necessary supplements to deterrence posturing
Turner 1-13-16
Jennifer M. Turner is a graduate student in the China Studies department at Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies. She previously served as a Navy civilian electrical
engineer and as a U.S. Army officer in Korea. THE COST OF CREDIBLE DETERRENCE IN
TAIWAN, http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-cost-of-credible-deterrence-in-taiwan/, msm
Defense issues were relatively neglected during the Ma era. Tsai has an opportunity to push
through reforms to reverse this trend, and secure U.S. commitment and regional prestige by
continuing Mas soft power initiatives and HADR efforts. The key unanswered question is how China will respond to the next DPP
government. Tsai

would do well to sustain Mas economic successes and strengthen Taiwans defense
posture. There are a number of ways to succeed. Suggestions that Taiwan should develop its own A2AD
capability could fall under several of the above strategies that can be pursued in combination to achieve a credible defense posture
under political and economic constraints. If things go well,

Tsai may

even

have opportunities to pursue

military confidence-building measures with China , something the KMT could not do in the current political
context without being criticized for selling out. An important element of national power is the ability to
mobilize resources to translate policy into action. Ultimately, the implementation of
Taiwans defense policy will depend on the governments ability to build consensus
about the importance of defense policy in Taiwans diverse, opinionated electorate.

Arms Sales Collapse Rels

Turn: Relations
Prefer experts close to the situation arms sales collapse relations and
need to be ramped-down
Wang 13
(Jainwei, New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: How Far Can the
Rapprochement Go?, pg 214//um-ef)
with regard to the American policy objective in cross-Strait relations, an
interesting debate took place among US specialists on Taiwan. On the one hand, Robert Sutter argued that the
For example,

longstanding US policy goal is to maintain "a balance of power and influence in the Taiwan area favorable to Taiwan and U.S. interests and influenced by the United States."23

Richard Bush and Alan Romberg, on the

insisted that the goal of the United States regarding the Taiwan Strait over the last
50 years "has been the maintenance of peace and stability in the Strait." Maintaining a
balance of power and influence is a means rather than an end.24 Such debates and different opinions emerging
from them indicate that under new circumstances in cross-Strait relations, the United States began
to wonder if the original or traditional American policy objective is still valid and
attainable. On the issue of arms sales and United States-Taiwan security and military
However, this balance has been eroded since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan in May 2008.
other hand,

relations, some scholars and practitioners also advocate rethinking . Charles Gla-ser's
article in Foreign Affairs'5 on abandoning US military commitments to protect Taiwan triggered a
lot of discussion among American Taiwan specialists. Although people realize he still
represents the minority view in the Washington policy community , the mere fact that the
most authoritative foreign policy journal repeatedly published articles to argue for a new
Taiwan policy may indicate something very telling: under changing balance of power in the world, some traditional
American policies on the Taiwan issue may no longer be untouchable. Mainstream
American Taiwan experts arc often too quick to dismiss such new thinking on Taiwan as
meaningless and out of touch with policy reality in Washington . Nevertheless, it is
difficult to easily dismiss a report on reexamining the arms sale to Taiwan jointly
authored by former commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Command admiral Joseph
Pruchcr, admiral Timothy Keating, national intelligence officer James Shinn, and wellknown Chinese scholars such as Charles Freeman and David Lampton . The report
argues that arms sales to Taiwan creates a vicious circle in Sino-American relations .26
Even former secretary of defense Robert Gates acknowledges that a time might come when the issue of arms
sales may go away.27

AT: Arms Sales Deter

Arms sales dont solve theyre ineffective and dont deter chinese
aggression causes china lashout
Hua 12-20-15
Zhang, assistant research fellow at the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, Arms sales to Taiwan do not help the US, Global Times,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/959549.shtml, msm
Washington has to accept it is becoming far less capable of containing China's rise. It may upset the
government of the Chinese mainland by making a fuss with Taiwan, but it won't have a real effect. Washington's primary intent in
forging a military relationship with Taiwan is to maintain military balance across the
Taiwan Strait. However, the strategy is stretched too thin . Given the mainland's swift and prominent ramp-up in
military spending, a

military balance can no longer be stricken between the mainland and Taiwan,

no matter how many advanced weapons the US sells to Taiwan. The possibility of using
Taiwan to suppress the mainland's growing leverage in its periphery is vanishing. The
mainland's economic aggregate is more than 20 times larger than Taiwan's, so the latter
has no chance to engage in a military race with the former. Selling arms to Taiwan
doesn't mean Washington would hold on to its promise to "come and rescue" Taiwan
when the island is in trouble with the mainland. It is not even a commitment to include
Taiwan in its umbrella of protection . Even some Taiwanese strategists have pointed out that Taiwan is too obsessed with the
delusion that Washington will come all the way to defend Taiwan. Washington also cunningly argues that the weaponry deal
will bolster Taiwan's confidence when it needs to negotiate with the mainland in other respects. In fact, in such talks, it is
always the mainland that makes more room for Taiwan's wellbeing, not because Taiwan
has a strong military capability that is feared by the mainland , but because the mainland
regards Taiwan as family.

Although the US, especially its arms enterprises and political brokers, could reap fat profits from such

practices, these companies and individuals might risk losing the second biggest market. The pros and cons are not hard to weigh. In fact, some

Washington seems to have gone on the offensive in the arms

deal, but Beijing can find opportunities to strike back. From the Diaoyu Islands to the South China Sea disputes,
companies have started to reflect on the deal.

the US keeps stirring troubles against China in recent years during the implementation of its "rebalancing to Asia" strategy. China could have resorted
to countermeasures but is too prudent to take real action. On the occasion of this arms deal, for which the US has neither moral nor legal ground,
Beijing should take the chance to carry out down-to-earth countermeasures, such as halting bilateral communications over military matters and
sanctioning relevant US enterprises. It becomes increasingly obvious that playing the

Taiwan card is no longer an effective

approach to countering China's rise . On the contrary, it makes Washington take bigger risks to jeopardize a relationship with
the Chinese mainland, which is clearly more important. The

US government must have realized that it is

necessary to reduce the harm caused by arms sales . During President Barack Obama's administration, the US
government slowed down the frequency of arms sales to Taiwan. The last four years has seen just two arms sales. Besides, Washington knows the
mainland's red line, and decided not to fulfill Taiwan's request for sensitive weaponry such as submarines and F-16 C/D fighters. Given that Taiwan's
strategic significance is diminishing, to abandon it or not has raised years of debates in the US. High-level military and government officials and wellknown academic experts have also expressed their concerns that arms sales to Taiwan are not helping the US gain a competitive edge. In the short
term, the US won't stop selling arms to Taiwan, let alone abandon it. But the mainland's rise will eventually make the US realize that

sales to Taiwan are not helping Washington.

arms

2AC Arms Sales = Arms Racing

Arms sales cause arms races extinction turns the net benefit
Zhongqi 2k3
Pan Zhongqi is currently a research fellow of the Department of American Studies at Shanghai
Institute for International Studies (SIIS). He received his Ph.D. in international relations from
Fudan University, Shanghai, China, in 1999. Special thanks go to the Henry L. Stimson Center
based in Washington, DC for the opportunity to conduct this research program in early 2001. US
Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: a dilemma of deterrence, Journal of Contemporary China
(2003), 12(35), 387407, http://www.cewp.fudan.edu.cn/attachments/article/68/Pan
%20Zhongqi,%20US%20Taiwan%20Policy%20of%20Strategic%20Ambiguity%20A
%20Dilemma%20of%20Deterrence.PDF, msm
Security dilemma and dangerous miscalculation However, contrary to expectations,

US arms sales have brought not

military balance but a security dilemma and an arms race to the Taiwan Strait . The US dual
deterrence strategy simply cannot avoid the security dilemma and makes perilous any
miscalculations by either side of the Strait. The Taiwan Strait is experiencing a vicious
circle in the security dilemma. Taiwan never feels secure about its independence goal versus
Chinas unification determination. US arms sales give Taiwan more confidence . At the same time, however,
they devalue the leverage of Chinas claim for reunification . To make sure Taiwan will not
go away, i.e. choose independence, under the protection of Americas security umbrella, China seeks to build up its
military capability and threaten to use force against Taiwans independence , which in
return becomes the excuse for Taiwans request for more defensive weaponry and a
positive response to that request by the US . China blames US arms sales for creating this problem. The US defends
those sales by noting that China refuses to renounce the use of force and that Beijing is continuing to develop its military capabilities vis-a`-vis Taiwan
to a degree that threatens the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan charges that Chinas military buildup and its missile deployment are
targeted against Taiwan. Taiwan feels insecure and then presses the US Congress to sell it more arms.

US arms sales only

reinforce Chinas suspicion and make it reluctant to make any concessions . US arms
sales to Taiwan will definitely arouse Chinas reaction, and vice versa . The repeated
actions and reactions are a classic security dilemma.27 Even though both sides have acquired a lot of
sophisticated weaponry, military hardware, and high-level technology, neither of them gains more safety and the
security situation not only does not get better but becomes worse step by step.
inevitability of the security dilemma across the Taiwan Strait,

Given the

it is infeasible for the US to keep a military balance

across the Taiwan Strait by means of arms sales . Moreover, military balance

per se

across the

Strait is a destabilizing factor rather than a security guarantee. Miscalculation and

misjudgment of Americas intentions by either side of the Strait will be very dangerous
and will raise the possibility of cross-Strait military conflict or even war . The perception in
Beijing that the US and Taiwan are trying to use arms transfers, including TMD, to
resume their military alliance, which was severed as a permanent condition of
normalization of SinoUS relations in 1979, would encourage China to adopt a now-ornever28 approach, and to take a risk to wage war . At the same time China can also increase the price of the US

interference to intolerable levels by means of its own military modernization. By contrast,

Taiwan may further push its

independence envelope if US arms sales give Taipei the perception that Washington
would certainly come to its aid in a military conflict, no matter what the circumstances . It
does not matter whether these kinds of perceptions are correct and reasonable or not. Beliefs guide actions. And in fact, the ambiguous character of
Americas strategy always makes more likely this kind of miscalculation and misjudgment, which are undoubtedly very risky. Singapore Senior Minister
Lee Kuan Yew warned that the US policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan could lead to a disaster if China or Taiwan misread the US position.29
Cross-Strait arms race An arms

race across the Taiwan Strait is the second unavoidable consequence of

the US dual deterrence strategy and arms sales policy. In the last decade, especially since the 19951996 Taiwan Strait crisis, both
China and Taiwan have increased their defense budgets and military expenditures in a
major way . The cross-Strait relationship has been becoming inflammatory and explosive. Economic growth has been the top priority for Chinas
leaders since the 1980s, and military modernization was even proclaimed as the poor fourth of the Four Modernizations (of industry, agriculture,
science and technology, and the military) as Chinas national goal.30 However, the order of priority is undergoing transition. Since the mid-1990s,
deterring Taiwans independence and securing Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity have become Chinas pressing security problems. Beijing
had to promote the rank of military modernization as the second component of building Chinas comprehensive national power. The countrys official
defense budget accordingly increased from RMB64 billion (US$7.7 billion) in 1995 to RMB121 billion (US$14.6 billion) in 2000,31 and China has
announced its new military budget for 2001 with a shocking 17.7% increase, jumping to RMB140 billion (US$17.2 billion).32 Since Chinese defense
spending remains non-transparent, most analysts believe the actual military expenditures to be much higher. For example, the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated the real level of Chinese military spending to be about two times higher than official figures.33 By contrast,

Taiwan also began to see its military modernization as a key step to deter Chinas military
threats. Chinas missile tests in 19951996 exposed the serious weakness of Taiwans defense posture and changed Taiwans strategic thinking.
Former Taiwan Minister of Defense, Tang Fei, even declared that it is necessary for Taiwan to get some offensive weapons.34 Accompanying the
strong request for military modernization, Taiwan raised its defense budget from NT$251 billion (US$9.6 billion) in 1995 to NT$403 billion (US$12.8
billion) in 2000.35 Although the reliability of official Taiwan figures was seldom questioned, they were substantially understated, too. According to the
estimation of IISS, the actual spending in 1998, for example, was not NT$275 billion (US$8.3 billion) but NT$425 billion (US$14.2 billion). The dramatic
increase in Taiwans military spending reinforced the developing worry that Taiwan was remilitarizing. The remilitarization of Taiwan would put an end to
the placid circumstance of the past 40 years brought about by a demilitarized Taiwan Strait.36 Some people may argue that the increase in military
expenditures across the Taiwan Strait is not so dramatic from the standpoint of the percentage of GDP accounted for by military spending.37 However,
we should take the factor of force size into account. In the past decade, both China and Taiwan have reduced their armed forces in terms of man-power
by a big number. The reduction potentially enlarged the relative values of their expenditures on weapons while their absolute values also got increased.
Although the true amount of their annual military expenditures remains controversial, even the official amounts are indicative, and more important, both
sides spent a big share of their military budget buying expensive high-tech weapons. Since military technologies on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are
comparatively backward, arms purchases, chiefly Taiwan from the US and China from Russia, other than self-reliant research and development have
been the primary means to modernize their militaries. Depending on weaponry purchases from the outside is a very distinguishing feature of the arms
race across the Taiwan Strait. Considering

that both sides of the Taiwan Strait have become more

offensive and hostile to each other, stating that the correlation of the military
development of China and Taiwan has led to an arms race is an accurate rather than an
exaggerated description of the reality. Many American scholars admit that the arms race across
the Taiwan Strait has been a reality, and that it does have something to do with Americas
policy toward cross-Strait relations.38 Martin L. Lasater believed that, A major arms race is underway in the Taiwan Strait,
with both sides trying desperately to leverage their respective military advantages into a decisive checkmate.39 The arms race is not only a
fact, but it is potentially getting worse.

Arms sales are unsustainable and outdated causes conflict

Zurong 4-2-13
Wu Zurong is a research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies in Beijing. Is it
Time to Stop Arms Sales to Taiwan?, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/is-it-time-tostop-arms-sales-to-taiwan/, msm
Since ancient times, Taiwan has been the territory of China. Oddly enough,

stable development of Sino-US relations

Taiwan has always been an obstacle to the

since the birth of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in October of 1949. The

It is high time now for the

stop interfering in Chinas internal affairs ,

peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Straits since 2008 is helping remove this obstacle.

US to seize the opportunity and make up its mind to

stop arms sales to Taiwan and stop

overt and covert official

contact with Taiwan.

For the last 34 years, US

arms sales to Taiwan have caused considerable troubles between China and the US, making relations stagnate and suffer setbacks.

China nor the US strategically benefits from this unstable relationship.

Neither

The Taiwan issue is a

remnant of history. For the last 60 years or more, it has been the single most important and most sensitive issue at the heart of Sino-US relations. In a
certain sense, the failure

to seriously discuss and resolve this issue has contributed to the 22

years of estrangement and hostility experienced between China and the US. When President Nixon
made his historic visit to China in 1972, Taiwan had been a central issue in the negotiations for normalization of relations between China and the United
States. On January 1, 1979, China and the US established full diplomatic relations when the Carter Administration decided to sever diplomatic relations
with Taiwan, withdraw American troops and military installations from Taiwan, and to abrogate the treaties it had signed with Taiwan. In a word,
resolution of the Taiwan issue was key to normalization. On April 10, 1979, President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act into law. The law directs
the Executive Branch to promptly inform Congress of any threat to Taiwans security or to the social or economic system of the Taiwanese people,
including any danger to the interests of the US. The act states that the US will make available defense articles and services in such a quantity as may
be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Chinese Government resolutely opposed the law, stating that the
law contravenes the principles agreed upon by the two sides and constitutes gross interference in Chinas internal affairs. Thus, the Taiwan issue
remains a key issue obstructing the healthy development of Sino-US relations after normalization. Given the weight the Taiwan issue carries for Sino-

with
threats to Taiwan are

US relations, China and the US should urgently act to resolve the Taiwan issue and ensure long-term stability of bilateral relations. Now,

peaceful development established in cross-Straits relations, assumed

diminishing

and

there is no apparent danger to US interests . Therefore, the Taiwan

Relations Act is now completely out of date . The US has expressed support for the continued expansion of exchanges
and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits as it is not only in the interests of the people of both sides of the Straits, but also helps
maintain peace and stability in the region. With the establishment of peace prevailing across the Taiwan Straits,

Taiwan have

not only

become

unreasonable but also

US arms sales to

unnecessary . Taiwans needs for weapons are

on the decline . The arms sold to Taiwan are used to protect Taiwans fishing boats in the Diaoyu Islands territorial waters. It would
be ridiculous if the US insists on arms sales to Taiwan when the US officially insists on
the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Under the current situation, the US decision to completely
terminate arms sales to Taiwan would be a wise choice. As China and the US work together to build a new type
of major power relationship, based on equality and mutual benefit, continued interference in Chinas internal affairs
is not helpful at all . Since sustainable peace across the Taiwan Straits has overturned the very foundation of the Taiwan Relations Act,
the US is losing its standing to continue arms sales to Taiwan. For the past 34 years, the US has violated the basic principles enshrined in the three
joint communiqus between China and the US by selling arms to Taiwan, which has already inflicted severe damage upon Sino-US relations. It is high
time for such violations to come to an end, benefitting both China and the United States.

Cross-strait military CBMs are inevitablecontinued arms sales risks

China getting a hold on our military technology
Jianwei 2009 (Wang, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at EAI, THE UNITED STATES AND
NEW DYNAMICS IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, National University of Singapore, 2009,
silbs)
Complexity of cross-strait military CBMs 5.1 With cross-strait economic and trade relations booming, both sides began to
talk about establishing cross-strait military confidence-building measures (CBMs). CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao formally endorsed this idea in his
six-point remarks delivered in December 2008 in which he suggested that both sides could start contacts and exchanges to explore the mechanism of

Taipei initially was also very much interested in

cross-strait military CBMs. In recent months, however, Taipei is showing its reluctance to
move forward on this front emphasizing that the time for cross-strait military CBMs has
not come yet and Taiwan is not in a hurry to discuss it with Beijing. Among other things,
the concern with the possible repercussion from the United States and impact on TaiwanU.S. military relations are behind Taipeis dampened enthusiasm on this issue. 5.3 In this
regard Beijing and Taipei have displayed divergent thinking. For Beijing, the military
CBMs are strictly matters between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and should not
involve a third party. Logically cross-strait military CBMs imply Taiwan should cut or at least
minimize its military ties with Washington. But Ma Ying-jeou made it very clear that the mechanism of
mutual trust on cross-strait military security at a proper time. 5.2

military mutual trust is sensitive because it involves Taiwans relations with the United
States. Taiwanese scholars also point out that Taiwan will be unwilling to sacrifice its military relations
with Washington for the sake of establishing military CBMs with Beijing. It is simply too high a price.
5.4 The official attitude of the American government toward cross-strait military CBMs is
also supportive. Senior Obama administration officials told visiting Wang Yi that the United States is glad to see the two sides across the
Taiwan Strait establish the mechanism of military mutual trust. Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, once offered to
host direct talks between military officers from the mainland and Taiwan at his headquarters in Hawaii. 5.5 After his remarks, there were reports that at
the invitation of the U.S. Pacific Command (PaCom), military officers from both Taiwan and China will attend in August the Transnational Security
Cooperation Course sponsored by AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), a Pentagon-funded think tank, in Hawaii. That will lead to the first

American attitudes toward cross-strait

military CBMs are more complicated and ambivalent. Very soon sources in Washington
clarify that the media reports about such a sponsorship are false. Similarly, the
spokesman of Chinas Taiwan Affairs Office confirmed the reports as inaccurate. 5.7
direct contact between the two militaries in sixty years. 5.6 However, in reality

Washington is not enthusiastic about Keatings idea of providing good office for the two militaries either. American officials and scholars argue that if
Keatings proposal is carried out, this will mean a significant departure from the long-time American policy of not playing a mediator role between China

cross-strait military CBMs may increase the chance

of sensitive weapon technology and military information provided by the U.S. to Taiwan
ending up in the hands of the Chinese military as some military CBMs require increasing
transparency towards each other. Therefore cross-strait military CBMs may lead
Washington to reconsider its arms sale to Taiwan in the future.
and Taiwan. 5.8 Another concern by some in Pentagon is that

Arms sales offer greater risk than rewardPRC espionage on Taiwans

forces
Kan 2014 (Shirley, specialist in Asian Security Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Shes been there since 1990 and she specializes in national security interests of the United
States with particular interest in China and Taiwan. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since
1990, Congressional Research Service, August 29, 2014, silbs)
Greater cross-strait integration has raised concerns about the leakage of military
technology, intelligence, and other secrets from Taiwan to mainland China. As supporters of Taiwan
wrote in October 2006, there is little sense in Americas continued support of Taiwans defenses if Taiwan has no intention of using them to deter attack
by the Chinese. Washington

is increasingly alarmed that Taiwans politicianswittingly or

unwittinglyare shifting responsibility for their islands defense from Taipei to Beijing,
thus jeopardizing the integrity of U.S. defense technology that has already been
transferred to Taiwan.228 Others have pointed out that Taiwan has its own concern about the control of military information and
technology that could leak to the PRC and that the United States has transferred weapons to countries like Pakistan with close ties to the PLA. A
critical case of compromising Taiwans intelligence and military, including the U.S.-origin Po Sheng C4
program, came to light on February 8, 2011, when Taiwans military announced the detention on January 25
of Army Major General Lo Hsien-che for allegedly passing secrets to the PRC after PRC
intelligence recruited him (while assigned in Thailand in 2002-2005). He could have continued to pass sensitive
information after subsequent assignment at Army headquarters as director of the
Communications and Electronic Information Department and promotion in 2008 to major
general with even broader access to information on command and control. Lo was reported as
Taiwans highest-ranking alleged military spy for the PRC in decades and was not uncovered until 2010, with U.S. counter-intelligence involvement in
investigations. In an interview with the Washington Post, Taiwans President Ma acknowledged that this very serious case started in 2002 and, after
its discovery in 2010, Taiwans military started stricter safeguards and damage control. On July 25, 2011, a military court sentenced Lo to life in prison

Cases in the United States that concerned PRC

espionage against Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan weapons programs (including Po Sheng) involved Gregg
Bergersen and James Fondren, Jr. Bergersen was a weapon systems policy analyst at the Defense Security
for spying for the enemy. Taiwan was not the only compromise.

Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the agency involved in arms sales, and was arrested in February 2008 and
sentenced in July 2008 to 57 months in prison. Fondren was a civilian official in PACOMs Washington office and was sentenced
in January 2010 to 36 months in prison.229 Still, there have been concerns about structural weaknesses in Taiwan that could allow for broad (beyond a
need to know) and unquestioned access to secrets (particularly by general and flag officers or senior civilian officials), as compared to U.S.
compartmentalized information, background security investigations, and routine procedures for safeguarding classified data and discussions. While it
was possible that there was a coincidence that these cases involved the Po Sheng C4 program or that the PRC targeted Po Sheng, it was probable
that PRC

espionage has been aggressive and comprehensive in targeting the militaries of

Taiwan, the United States, and other countries, which included Taiwans C4 system. Moreover, in August 2011,
Taiwan failed to detain a citizen who worked on arms programs in Taiwan (including Po Sheng),
Ko-Suen Moo, who was arrested in 2005 and then jailed in the United States for trying to
sell military parts (including an F-16 fighter engine) to the PRC. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) stated that it
deported Moo to Taipei on August 17, 2011, and handed him over to local authorities. Despite the U.S. expectation of legal action, Taiwans government

Taiwan reported that an Air Force Captain Chiang was

detained in mid-January for allegedly leaking secrets to the PRC that involved a Regional Operations
Control Center (ROCC). Taiwans MND issued a statement on February 29 to confirm that he was
turned over to prosecutors and to contend that it minimized any damage by tightening
security after Lo Hsien-ches case. The military reportedly watched Chiang for four years. Nonetheless, this case raised
lost Moo.230 In late February 2012, a news magazine in

questions as to why Taiwan did not announce the arrest until the media reported on it, whether the arrest was delayed until after the presidential
election on January 14, and whether Taiwan briefed the U.S. side (with U.S. programs potentially harmed). A number of other cases in Taiwans military
of alleged spying for Beijing also have come to light. In addition, after the KMTs Ma Ying-jeou became president in May 2008, there has been a
question of whether Taiwans pursuit of closer integration with the PRCbeyond dtentehas an implication of Taiwans strategic reorientation closer
toward the PRC and away from the United States and U.S. democratic allies (like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines).231

Increasing arms sales increases the risk of war and wont defend Taiwan
because they cant afford more arms
Hickey 13- Dennis, James F. Distinguished Professor and Director of the Graduate Program
in Global Studies with a focus on the International Relations of East Asia, National Security and
American Foreign Policy., Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait,
(http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/autumn_2013/4_hickey.pd
f) JB
Option 3: Increase

Military Support This option is attractive to those who believe the Obama
administrations provisions for Taiwans security cannot meet the islands defense needs.
Representative Ros-Lehtinen and others are pushing the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 (TPA) in an effort to strengthen American
military support for Taiwan. If the TPA (or similar legislation) is passed and signed into law, it would almost provide Taiwan with carte
blanche for procurement of US arms. The TPAs provisions include the sale of F-16 C/D warplanes (in addition to the upgrade of the
F-16 A/B fighters), modern surface-to air-missiles, vertical and short take-off and landing 37 (V/STOL) combat aircraft, cost
effective submarines, three guided missile frigates, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, global positioning system (GPS)-guided shortrange rockets, unmanned air vehicles, radar, and jamming equipment. If

the United States opted to provide

Taiwan with all the weapons the ROC desires, one of Americas oldest friends might be
assured of a sufficient self-defense capability. This could enable Taipei to negotiate with Beijing from a
position of strength, not weakness. The additional military muscle would also give any potential adversary, including the PRC, cause
to calculate whether an attack on Taiwan is worth the risksdeterrence would be enhanced. Should deterrence fail, the new arms
would provide Taiwan with a boost during any military campaign. Moreover, American lawmakers and defense contractors have
speculated that substantial economic benefits would accrue to the United States in the event of a massive arms sale. Finally,
proponents of massive arms transfers assert that, while Beijing might complain or tem- porarily suspend military-to-military contacts
with Washington, past behavior indicates that China is unlikely to challenge any fundamental US interests in response to any future
releases of significant military articles or services to Taiwan.44 The Perryman Group estimates that the Lockheed Martin Taiwan F16 program would generate some $8.7 billion in output (gross product) and more than 87,651 person-years of employment in the
US.45 To be sure, a sharp escalation in arms sales could advance US interests in some ways. However, any

US
administration must be prepared for a negative reaction from the PRC. This response
could range from a suspension in US-PRC military-to-military contacts to a break in
diplomatic relations. Beijing might even sell arms to states unfriendly to American
interests. After the US sold 150 F-16 A/B fighters to Taiwan in 1992, for instance, China
transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan and reached a formal agreement with Iran to

cooperate on nuclear energy, thus breaking its February 1, 1992 promise to abide by the terms of the MCTR.46 In
addition, Taiwan may not have the resources to buy the weapons. Taipei apparently finds it
difficult to purchase the arms sales offered in 2010 and 2011. Adding 66 new F-16 C/D fighters to the
tab would not make it any easier to pay the bill.47 Moreover, where will the submarines and U/STOL aircraft come from? The United
States stopped manufacturing diesel submarines decades ago, and it could be a decade before F-35-B Joint Strike Fighters are
available for export. Finally, officials

must consider domestic politics in China. As Gary Locke, US

Ambassador to China, observed, the political situation in the PRC is very, very delicate.48 Decisionmakers must
consider whether a spike in arms sales might create tremors in Chinese politics, perhaps
weakening the position of the present leaders in Beijing.

US arms sales do nothing- the squo is more likely to cause war than
prevent it
Swaine 11- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China, Taiwan, U.S.:
Status Quo Challenged, (http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/us-provoking-china-overtaiwan-5996) JB
In the existing dynamic, Washington sees itself as a stabilizer, encouraging cross-strait
dialogue, cautioning both sides that it will oppose any unilateral actions that might
threaten the peace and deterring Beijing by maintaining its military predominance in the Western Pacific while boosting Taipei's defense
capabilities. All of this is basically done at arm's length. Washington leaves it to Beijing and
Taipei to resolve their political differences through direct contact while itself avoiding any dialogue with Beijing over the cross-strait
military buildup, other than to indicate a willingness to reduce U.S. military assistance to Taiwan if Taipei sees a reduced requirement as a result of a unilateral Chinese
drawdown. This "hands-off" U.S. approach has worked reasonably well for more than thirty years, despite the occasional mini-crisis, thus creating the widespread expectation

U.S.-China relationship, the argument goes, is too important for

Beijing to risk serious damage to it by retaliating in any major way against U.S. arms
sales, especially if Washington avoids providing Taiwan with certain advanced weapons
that it will continue to work indefinitely into the future. The

(this time, it did not act on Taiwan's request to purchase new and more sophisticated F-16san apparent red line for Beijing) and does not endorse Taiwanese independence.

proponents of the status quo assume that as long as Taiwan's political leadership
welcomes greater cross-strait contact and does not seek permanent separation from the
mainland, Beijing will always favor negotiation over coercion. Indeed, currently improving cross-strait contacts
supposedly suggest movement toward some sort of stable long-term modus vivendi. Finally, according to this optimistic view,
Washington will retain the military wherewithal to deter any Chinese resort to force, as
long as Taipei is able to keep Beijing at bay long enough to let U.S. forces intervene in a
conflict. The problem with this argument is that several emerging trends cast significant doubt
on its continued validity. First, China's steady military buildup is rapidly making it
impossible for Washington to resist selling far more sophisticated weapons to Taiwan of the
Moreover,

sort that Beijing would view as unacceptable. These would likely include more advanced aircraft, warships, and possibly missiles with both defensive and offensive capabilities.

Absent a major breakthrough in cross-strait relations or a highly unlikely unilateral

Chinese drawdown of its direct military threat to Taiwan, such U.S. sales are virtually
inevitable under current conditions. Second, China's ability to inflict significant pain on the United
States in retaliation for such arms sales to Taiwan is increasing. If China's rapid growth continues and America's
severe economic problems persist over many years, it is quite possible that Beijing will reach the point where its calculation of the benefits resulting from a variety of possible
severe retaliations will outweigh their presumed costs. This is especially true given the highly emotional nature of the Taiwan issue in China and its association with an
increasingly assertive strand of nationalism. Such forces could compel future Chinese leaders to undertake highly dangerous actions to deter or punish future arms sales.

Third, a tension-reducing breakthrough in cross-strait relations seems highly unlikely for

a very long time, if ever. Despite all the improvements of recent years in those relations, Taipei and Beijing have yet to
reach any understanding that would permit a reduction in their military buildups, much
less a stabilizing dialogue over the island's political status. The fault for this lies on both
sides and is rooted in deep-seated mutual distrust as well as strong domestic political
opposition to any unilateral conciliatory initiatives. Moreover, this impasse will become even more likely if the pro-independence political opposition wins the Taiwan

For many U.S. observers, the only "solution" to the intensifying

problem created by these factors is to keep selling arms to Taiwan, plow ever-more scarce U.S. resources into
presidency next yeara definite possibility.

maintaining military predominance in the Western Pacific, keep providing verbal assurances to Beijing that it does not support unilateral moves by Taiwan toward independence,

But China's military buildup, its increasing

economic and political leverage, and its growing nationalism suggest that a serious
future crisis over arms sales will likely occur before any significant movement toward a stable modus vivendi between Beijing and
Taipei emerges. Only the United States can alter China's calculus toward Taiwan in ways that
would facilitate a military drawdown and genuine movement toward a more stable crossstrait military and political relationship. It is time for Washington to consider negotiating
directly with Beijing, in consultation with Taipei, a set of mutual assurances regarding
Chinese force levels and deployments, on the one hand, and major U.S. arms sales and defense
assistance to Taiwan, on the other handlinked to the eventual opening of a cross-strait
political dialogue on the status of Taiwan. Success in such an effort would be difficult but not impossible. It would require political
and continue urging Taipei and Beijing to work out their differences peacefully.

courage, diplomatic acumen, and a recognition that the current U.S. approach to Taiwan is probably unsustainable and could prove disastrous.

Arms Sales only increase the likelihood of war

Swaine 03- Michael, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate
in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China, Reverse
Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.China Relations,
(http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief22.pdf) JB
Beijings intensifying effort to strengthen its coercive capabilities against Taiwan necessitates a vigilant response from the Pentagon,
the organization charged with worst casing the complex United StatesChinaTaiwan security situation. However, absent

either the resumption of a stabilizing cross-Strait dialogue or the negotiation of a new

understanding between Washington and Beijing on U.S.Taiwan interactions, the
seemingly open-ended deepening of the United StatesTaiwan defense relationship
could eventually derail United StatesChina rapprochement. Specifically, U.S. policy could
exacerbate the expanding arms race across the Strait and thereby create a sense that
conflict between the two sides is inevitable. It could also reduce even further Taiwans
willingness to negotiate with the Mainland. Contrary to the belief of some officials in Washington and Taipei , a
stronger Taiwan might destabilize cross-Strait relations rather than facilitate a dialogue ,
especially given existing political dynamics on the island. Moreover, close inter-operability between U.S. and Taiwan forcesviewed
by some as a logical outcome of current trendscould cause Beijing to believe that Washington favors the resumption of the former
could eventually prompt
Beijing to undertake military action to preempt such a development.
United StatesTaiwan security alliance advocated by the independence movement. This

Taiwan Cant Defend/CBMs Key

Lack of cbms make conflict inevitable
Cabestan 12
Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Professor and Head, Department of Government and International
Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University and Director General of the European Union Academic
Programme in Hong Kong. He is also associate researcher at the Asia Centre at Sciences Po,
Paris and at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Hong Kong. His main
themes of research are Chinese politics and law, Chinas foreign and security policies, ChinaTaiwan relations and Taiwanese politics. Taiwans Changing Security Environment,
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/JeanPierreCabestan_Shanghai2012_web.pdf, msm
On the one hand, Taiwan (or the Republic of China, ROC)'s capability
aggression has

deteriorated.] In addition,

to] defend itself and keep the island secure from outside
since no military confidence-building measures (CBMs)

have been initiated with mainland China

(or the People's Republic of China, PRC)

military incidents

cannot be excluded nor managed properly . But more importantly, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) growing power
projection capability land pressure on the island as well as the Ma Administration's lack of investment in defense have made Taiwan more and more
dependent upon the US de facto] security guarantee the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) at a time the United] States' relative decline is becoming more
perceptible, Beijing is intensifying its pressure on Washington to stop providing weapons to the island and a debate is] looming in the US about its longterm capability to and interest in guaranteeing] Taiwan's security.

Topicality

T-military
And, we meet arms sales are ECONOMIC prefer our evidence its the
way policymakers define arms sales in practice
Baldwin 92
(David, Economic Statecraft, pg google books//um-ef)
This evidence has been gender modified
Definition of the "economic" aspect of social life in terms of the production and
consumption of wealth that is measurable in terms of money corresponds with longstanding usage by the classic textbooks15 of economics and is descriptive of the
interests of most contemporary economists. In addition, such usage captures the basic intuitive
notion of economic activities used by
cases that are hard to classify. For example,

lay[persons] and

policy makers . There are, as always, borderline

should the sale or gift of military hardware be considered

as economic or military statecraft?

In general,

the relevant distinction is between firing (or

threatening to fire) weapons and selling (or promising to sell) them . Insofar as a market
price for such items exists, these transactions could reasonably be labeled economic
statecraft . A plausible case could also be made for classifying them as military since some items, e.g. nuclear bombs, may
providing weapons is so closely related to military
statecraft, some might want to treat it as such. Depending on the particular research interest at hand, one
might decide to classify them either way. The existence of such borderline cases, however, does not
do serious harm to the value of this concept of economic statecraft for most purposes .
have no "going market price.'* Also, since

Arms Sales = T
WM the president and Dept. of State have to designate and approve arms
sales
DSCA, no date
(Defense Security Cooperation Agency, no date, FAQ, Department of Defense, http://www.dsca.mil/resources/faq, accessed
7/9/16, JH)

The President designates countries and international organizations eligible to

participate in FMS . The Department of State approves individual programs on a case-bycase basis . Currently, some 223 countries and international organizationsparticipate in FMS.

CBMs = T
WM the means of CBMs are diplomatic, even if the ends are military
Sheffield 9
(Joseph L. Sheffield, Air Force Major, April 2009, MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND
COOPERATION WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 7-8, JH)
Military Confidence Building Measures Confidence building measures (CBM) are a set of actions or procedures that reduce military
tensions between two (or more) states. In practice, CBMs function to assist the calculability and predictability of a countrys conduct,
so that states will have certain expectations regarding the behavior of other states.30 Although

there are many forms of

effective confidence building, such as economic, diplomatic, or military, each method

aims at reducing military tensions.
specificity of agreed parameters. Consequently,

The effectiveness of confidence building measures begins with the quality and

any CBM will entail at least some degree of political

diplomacy . In fact, the most comprehensive CBM model in history is the East-West negotiations which culminated in the 1975
Helsinki Final Act. At the height of the Cold War, this CBM solidified the status quo in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) and engendered military-to-military cooperation between the East and the West. This military CBM initiated mutual
observation of military readiness activities on both sides.31 During the Helsinki Conference, the Swiss Prime Minister, Olof Palme,
argued: The Military balance, which is generally considered a guarantee of peace, could be maintained at a lower level if states
knew more about one anothers preparations and intentions. Confidence would deepen. Over-reaction and arguments based on
worst case assumptions could be avoided.32

WM diplomatic engagement in the plan text fiats that diplomacy be the

means for confidence building measures its contextual to policy with
China
DoD, no date
(Department of Defense, no date, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ON
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MECHANISM,
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingOnNotification.pdf, p. 1-2 accessed 7/9/16, JH)

The United States Department of Defense and the People's Republic of China Ministry of
National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the "sides"): Reaffirm the commitment to the development of a new model of U.S.-China
military-to-military relations, which is an integral part of the bilateral relationship; Affirm that both sides are committed to improve relations, deepen

Recognize that both sides

seek to advance the bilateral relationship through military confidence-building measures, undertaken in a spirit of equality and
mutual understanding, reduce risk, and reduce the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation;

openness; Realize the consensus between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping, and to establish a notification of major military activities
confidencebuilding measures initiative; Determine that this mechanism for notification of major military activities forms the basis from which both sides
exchange notifications of military activities and strengthen confidence and mutual trust through reciprocal notifications and information sharing; Affirm
that notifications should aim to reduce misunderstanding, prevent miscalculation, and manage risk and crisis effectively; and Establish a mechanism to
inform when both sides would exchange notifications of major military activities on the basis of the principles of constnrctive cooperation, mutual

This MOU
describes the purpose, principles, and processes for bilateral exchanges, with annexes covering the details for
interest, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and reciprocity, consistent with accepted international norms of behavior. SECTIONI

specific notification activities. Both sides affirm their aspiration to establish a voluntary foundation for notifications of major military activities, and
endeavor to improve the scale and frequency of notifications gradually through consultations in a reciprocal, incremental manner through the addition

The United States Department of

Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the People's Republic of China, Ministry
of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, are the authorized agencies for executing this
mechanism and accomplishing notifications, which are to be effected through
of annexes. New annexes should not conflict with previously developed ones. SECTION II

diplomatic and military channels .

FW Agreements = T
WM framework agreements necessitate diplomatic contacts the India
FW agreement was the only one in history that has involved the DoD, and it
was set in motion by President Obama
Garamone 15
(Jim Garamone, DoD Reporter, 6-3-2015, "U.S., India Sign 10-Year Defense Framework Agreement," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604775, accessed 7/8/16, JH)
WASHINGTON, June 04, 2015 In

India, Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Indian Defense

Minister Manohar Parrikar signed a 10-year defense framework agreement yesterday,

highlighting the growth of defense cooperation between the two countries. Carter is on a
10-day trip focused on the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. The agreement signed in
India yesterday

is an outgrowth of a meeting that was held between President Barack Obama

and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in January. Working Together Out of that meeting
grew the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. The idea is for India and the United States to work closely
together to develop military capabilities both can use. Yesterdays agreement included plans to cooperate in developing a mobile
solar energy power source that could be used in remote areas and in developing a lightweight protective suit effective in chemical
and biological hazard environments. In India, Carter also met with Prime Minister Modi and External Affairs
Minister Sushma Swaraj and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. Carter also became the first U.S. defense secretary to visit an
Indian operational military command -- the Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam.

CPs

Econ Add-on
The aff is k2 econ
Kane 11-10-11
Paul V. Kane, a former international security fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, is a Marine
who served in Iraq. To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.html, msm
Obama could correct the countrys course, help assure his re-election, and preserve our childrens future. He
needs to redefine Americas mindset about national security away from the old defense mentality that American power
WITH a single bold act, President

derives predominantly from our military might, rather than from the strength, agility and competitiveness of our economy. He should make it clear that today American jobs and wealth matter more than military

most significant threat to our national security is our

debt. There are dozens of initiatives President Obama could undertake to strengthen our economic security. Here is one: He should enter into closed-door negotiations with Chinese leaders to write off the
prowess. As Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared last year, The

$1.14 trillion of American debt currently held by China in exchange for a deal to end American military assistance and arms sales to Taiwan and terminate the current United States-Taiwan defense arrangement
by 2015. This would be a most precious prize to the cautious men in Beijing, one they would give dearly to achieve. After all, our relationship with Taiwan, as revised in 1979, is a vestige of the cold war. Today,

America has little strategic interest in Taiwan , which is gradually integrating with China economically by investing in and forming joint ventures with
mainland Chinese firms. The

islands absorption into mainland China is inevitable. But the status quo is dangerous; if

Taiwanese nationalist politicians decided to declare independence or if Beijings hawks

tired of waiting for integration and moved to take Taiwan by force, America could
suddenly be drawn into a multitrillion-dollar war. There will be China hawks who denounce any deal on Taiwan as American capitulation, but
their fear of a Red China menacing Asia is anachronistic. Portraying the United States as a democratic Athens threatened
by Chinas autocratic Sparta makes for sensational imagery, but nothing could be further
from reality . The battle today is between competing balance sheets, and it is fought in board rooms; it is not a geopolitical struggle to militarily or ideologically dominate the Pacific. In fact,
China and the United States have interlocking economic interests . Chinas greatest military asset is actually the United
States Navy, which keeps the sea lanes safe for Chinas resources and products to flow freely. China would want a deal on Taiwan for several
reasons. First, Taiwan is Beijings unspoken but hard-to-hide top priority for symbolic and
strategic reasons; only access to water and energy mean more to Chinese leaders. Second, a deal would open a clearer path for
the gradual, orderly integration of Taiwan into China. Third, it would undermine hard-line
militarists who use the Taiwan issue to stoke nationalist flames, sideline pro-Western
technocrats and extract larger military budgets. And finally, it would save China the considerable sums it has been spending on a vast
military buildup. Jeffrey Lewis, an East Asia expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, estimated that one-fourth to one-third of Chinas defense spending goes to forces in the vicinity of Taiwan at
a cost of $30 billion to $50 billion a year. A deal for the resolution of Taiwans status could save China $500 billion in defense spending by 2020 and allow Beijing to break even by 2030, while reducing Americas
debt and serving our broader economic interests. The Chinese leadership would be startled for a change if the United States were to adopt such a savvy negotiating posture. Beyond reducing our debt, a

Taiwan deal could pressure Beijing to end its political and economic support for pariah
states like Iran, North Korea and Syria and to exert a moderating influence over an
unstable Pakistan. It would be a game changer. The deal would eliminate almost 10
percent of our national debt without raising taxes or cutting spending ; it would redirect American foreign policy
away from dated cold-war-era entanglements and toward our contemporary economic and strategic interests; and it would eliminate the risk of involvement in a costly war with China. Critics will call this proposal
impractical, even absurd. They will say it doesnt have a prayer of passing Congress, and doesnt acknowledge political realities. They might be right today. But by pursuing this agenda, Mr. Obama would
change the calculus and political reality. And Congress should see a deal with China as an opportunity to make itself credible again. Debt is not in itself bad, when managed, but todays

unsustainable debt will suffocate our economy , our democracy and our childrens futures.

AT Military CP
And, diplomatic and economic engagement key to balance Chinese fears of
U.S. aggression and containment military engagement fails and spreads
Chinese fears of containment
Jennings 13
(Peter, China and the US: hopeful times, pg online @
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-and-the-us-hopeful-times/ //um-ef)
ASPI has just completed its tenth annual 1.5 track dialogue with the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (CIISS), and we also met with a number of Chinese international security scholars. A decade

the views of
Chinas elite think-tanks arent casual or to be dismissed. On US relations, China watched
the first term of the Obama administration with concern. There was a worry that the US was overlong investment has generated a frank and friendly exchange. A couple of meetings can never convey the surprising diversity of Chinese opinion on security matters, but

emphasising the military aspects of its presence in the Asia-Pacific through the defence diplomacy of

As the Chinese explain it, this

worry has been assuaged somewhat by Washingtons
recasting of the rebalance to include economic and
diplomatic engagement There are still reservations that the US might be

the rebalance and the tough-minded planning of the Air Sea Battle concept.

trying to contain China, but the Obama-Xi meeting is seen to be a rapprochement after
the stilted engagement of the last few years. Critically, the Chinese are focused on Obamas acceptance of the principle set out by Xi that theirs is a
great power relationship. Conferring that status matters to China , which anxiously balances its internal strengths and weaknesses. An Australian reading of the
last few years tells the story a little differently. The US rebalance has, quite simply, worked: in Southeast Asia, by building closer security ties with countries from Singapore to the Philippines, and even more

It comes as a relief in Beijing to realise that the US is

every bit as serious in wanting to engage them. That said, the US still needs to do a
better job of explaining its strategic purpose in Asia. Phase two of the rebalance will
emphasise engaging with China as much as the rest of the region. So what does a new kind of great power relationship
look like? The Chinese identify three principles. First, there should be a policy of avoiding confrontation and seeking to
resolve differences through cooperation. Second, the two should have a mutual respect for
each others choices of social and political systems. Third, there needs to be an emphasis on
cooperation for mutual benefit. China and the US must get rid of the zero sum mentality .
broadly from New Delhi to Wellington. This could only cause Chinese anxiety.

All of this is easier said than done but, at base,

those three aims make sense and have underpinned periods in US-

China relations in which cooperation has been good . The real test will be to see if both
sides are prepared to invest any effort to shift from their well-entrenched current
behaviours. On this last point there seemed to be a genuine willingness on the part of Chinese
interlocutors to consider new forms of cooperation. A dialogue on cyber security with the US has been initiated; a dialogue on space might

Theres evident priority to push the US military and

the PLA together, even though both sides are frankly
not that enthusiastic. he test of new great power relations will come when

follow.

one of the entrenched relationship breakers heats up. Will the US quietly reduce surveillance missions along Chinese territorial waters?

(Quite possibly.)

Will both sides work to prevent US weapons sales to Taiwan cutting the PLAs

contacts with America? (Theyre trying.) Will they at least try to come to some understandings on cyber security? (Early days, but both understand the need.)

A2 Hotline CP
Hotlines fail only reducing arms sales solve
Reuters 15
(Reuters, 12-30-2015, "China, Taiwan open first hotline in tension reducing measure," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-taiwan-hotline-idUSKBN0UD07020151230, accessed 7/2/16, JH)

China and Taiwan began operating the first telephone hotline between the two nations on
Wednesday, set up as a confidence building and tension reducing measure, with senior officials exchanging New Year's greetings.

The step was agreed during a historic meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore last month. Ma Xiaoguang, spokesman for China's Taiwan Affairs Office, said
the first call was between Zhang Zhijun, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, and Andrew Hsia, head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs
Council, who wished each other happy New Year. Zhang and Hsia also talked about the important achievements both sides had
made in the past year in promoting the peaceful development of relations, spokesman Ma said. Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council
confirmed the call took place, but did not immediately provide any other details. Defeated Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan after
losing a civil war with the Communists in 1949. Beijing has never renounced the use of force to bring what it deems a renegade
province under its control. Relations have improved rapidly since Ma Ying-jeou became Taiwan president in 2008, and the two have
signed a series of landmark trade and tourism deals. Still,

deep suspicions remain. China reacted angrily

earlier this month at the latest U.S. plans to sell Taiwan weapons. China is also looking warily at
January's presidential elections in Taiwan, which are likely to return the independence-leaning opposition Democratic Progressive
Party to power. China says it will never countenance an independent Taiwan.

AT: Abandon Taiwan CP

Abandoning Taiwan fails to change perception of US regional posture

weakens US international power projection and destabilizes the region
Roy 12, senior research fellow in Asian security issues with the East-West Center in Honolulu,
(Denny, 12/6/12, Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandontaiwan/)//kap
China is the next superpower, the United States is in decline, and America needs to get on
Chinas good side. So say many analysts who have recently argued that in order to gain favor with
Beijing, Washington should stop supporting Taiwan. The U.S. support at stake here includes
two explicit policies and one implied policy. Since Taiwan cannot keep up with Chinas
massive military expansion, the United States sells arms to Taiwan. Washington also insists that
any settlement of the Taiwan sovereignty issue must be agreeable to Taiwans people,
not forced on them by Beijing. Finally, China understands that U.S. forces might intervene if
Taiwan came under military attack. The argument for abandoning Taiwan may be superficially
appealing in its cold-blooded logic. But it is terribly wrong. U.S. foreign policy has always been a reflection of American
principles along with strategic and economic interests. Taiwan is a legitimate democracy, one with a long
history of close friendship with the United States, threatened by a large authoritarian state
demanding a political annexation that Taiwans people clearly do not want. If Americans
will not stand by Taiwan, the principled component of U.S. foreign policy is dead. But
abandoning Taiwan would not be merely immoral. Washington has economic, political and strategic
interests in promoting democracy worldwide. In general, democratic governments make
better international citizens than authoritarian states and are more likely to be partners
than adversaries in Americas pursuit of its global agenda. Abandoning Taiwan would not only
reduce the democratic world in concrete terms by throwing a community of 23 million people back over the barbed-wire fence. It

would also signal that America is no longer serious about promoting democratization
elsewhere. Some countries in the region are willing to stand up for their own interests
against Chinese encroachment only if they have confidence in a long-term U.S.
commitment to be a security partner. Other Asia-Pacific governments friendly to the United States would certainly
take note if Washington sacrificed Taiwan to improve relations with China. Not only would the U.S. reputation for reliability suffer, but

regional governments would perceive a shift in regional leadership from America to

China. Absorption of Taiwan by China would make Taiwan an unsinkable aircraft carrier
for the Chinese military. Taiwan anchors the first island chain, limiting the Chinese Navys access to the Pacific Ocean.
Conversely, occupation of Taiwan would allow Chinese forces to straddle important sea
lanes that are the economic lifelines of Japan and South Korea. Chinese control of
Taiwan would greatly increase the pressure on Tokyo and Seoul, critically important U.S.
allies, to accommodate Beijings strategic wishes. These alliances, and along with them the U.S.
leadership role in the western Pacific, might become untenable. Although too small to act as a political Trojan Horse to
massive China, as a vibrant Chinese democracy Taiwan is an influential model for China. It is easy for Chinese to dismiss the
American or Western European democracies as unsuitable or unimaginable in a Chinese context, but Taiwan is a different matter. If
the persistence of Taiwan as a political showcase (now viewed in person by almost two million mainland Chinese visitors annually)
could constructively affect Chinas political evolution toward democracy, this Taiwan contribution would be invaluable. But

Taiwan

requires help to safeguard its democratic system against Chinese pressure. Advocates of
abandoning Taiwan may erroneously believe that halting U.S. military and diplomatic
support for Taipei would reduce tensions in East Asia. This is certainly what Beijing would have us believe.
According to Chinese officials and commentators, U.S. assistance to Taipei is all that stands in
the way of peaceful unification, and without it the people of Taiwan would stop resisting and accept Beijings terms for
unification. This premise, however, ignores an important reality: the main obstacle to unification
is not U.S. arms sales, but rather Taiwanese nationalism and the wish of nearly all
Taiwans people not to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, withdrawal of U.S. support
would not necessarily lead to a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait imbroglio. The opposite outcome is at least as likely.

Deterrence against an attack by the Peoples Liberation Army would be weakened, while
Taiwans people may well choose to fight rather than capitulate. Another dubious assumption is that
removing the Taiwan issue from U.S.-China relations would clear the way for a vastly improved bilateral relationship. It is true that
Taiwan is the greatest single irritant in U.S.-China relations, that U.S. support for Taiwan reinforces Chinese suspicions of an
American containment strategy, and that the cross-Strait war scenario is a major rationale for Chinas military modernization and
buildup. But neither

U.S.-China relations nor Chinese regional behavior would improve much,

if at all, as a result of a U.S. sellout of Taiwan. The Chinese would still have many other
reasons to believe the United States is trying to keep China from rising, such as the U.S. alliances,
increased American security cooperation with other governments in the region, and the alleged American meddling in the South
China Sea dispute. There is no reason to expect that China would do more to further the American agenda on issues such as the
North Korean and Iran nuclear weapons crises, since Chinese policy follows Chinese self-interests. Most importantly, Taiwan is not
the source of China-U.S. friction. The two main Asia-Pacific powers are engaged in a rivalry for regional leadership and, even more
fundamentally, in a struggle between two competing models for conducting international relations: one based on modern
international laws and norms, and the other based on a return to the Sinocentric sphere of influence that prevailed for much of

a U.S. concession regarding Taiwan might embolden

Chinese demands for more concessions aimed at further weakening Americas strategic
position in the Asia-Pacific region. Many observers see America in permanent decline
and China as the anointed regional hegemon, but both of these outcomes are highly
uncertain. Although now in the trough of an unemployment and fiscal crisis, the United States will probably recover.
Conversely, China faces serious limits to its bid for regional leadership. These include internal
history. Rather than satisfying and pacifying Beijing,

vulnerabilities such as an aging population, the potential for large-scale political turmoil caused by groups angry at the Chinese
government, and the necessity of making huge and painful adjustments to the Chinese economy. Externally, few

states in
Asia prefer Chinese to U.S. leadership. Unless China becomes overwhelmingly strong
and American capabilities greatly diminish, security cooperation among the Asia-Pacific
countries in defense of widely-accepted norms of international behavior will be sufficient
to check those Chinese aspirations that are illegitimate in that they forcibly intrude on
other peoples vital interests. One of these illegitimate aspirations is the notion that China cannot be a
prosperous, secure great power without politically absorbing Taiwan, the last big piece of unfinished
business from Chinas century of humiliation. Abandoning Taiwan would, tragically, acquiesce to this
notion. The threat of Taiwan independence is an unfortunate invention of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a fake threat. An
autonomous Taiwan is not preventing massive increases in Chinas prosperity and security. On the other hand, Beijings threat to

Abandoning Taiwan is
completely at odds with the broad U.S. agenda for international affairs as well as with the
specific policy of re-balancing toward Asia. Washington should consider cutting off its support to Taiwan only
militarily destroy the political system and political identity chosen by Taiwans people is real.

if the United States has decided to abdicate its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region and pull its influence back to the Western
Hemisphere.

AT: Hard-line CPs

US diplomacy and moderation is key to maintain peace harder
approaches risk escalation
Paal 2016 (Douglas, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES, vice chairman of JPMorgan Chase
International and as unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute
in Taiwan, PhD, History and East Asian Languages, Harvard University, Maintaining Peace
Across Taiwan Strait Can Benefit All, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/21/maintainingpeace-across-taiwan-strait-can-benefit-all-pub-62558, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 21, 2016, silbs)
The elections in Taiwan have the
potential to lead to strains between the United States, Chinese mainland, and Taiwan for
the first time in over seven years. Parallel interests in all three leaderships do not fundamentally clash, leaving space for careful and creative
management of the Taiwan political transition. But there is enough suspicion and mistrust across the Taiwan Strait
that a vicious circle of action and reaction cannot be ruled out and probably should be subject to active policy
prevention. It is important at the outset to note that the policy objectives of all three sides in some way call for the
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait . For the U.S. government,
Tsai Ing-wen, candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, won Taiwan's leadership election on Saturday.

this should form the core of its private and public messaging as events unfold . Steadiness will be
required as both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan will persuade Washington to help each to restrain or mollify the other. If the U.S. does not grasp
and establish its own principled position from the outset, it risks entrapment by events .
That position starts with the formal and almost ritual adherence to the three Sino-U.S. communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), but it may have to adapt quickly to

The Chinese mainland will look for public indications that Tsai has taken
seriously the mainland's repeated warnings that the basis for continued cross-Strait
cooperation lies in an acknowledgement of the concept of One China, however formulated. It is at
changing circumstances.

this juncture that U.S .policymakers will need to kick in . It is in the U.S. interest that Tsai
continue the moderate, even conservative and reassuring approach to cross-Strait affairs
that she adopted before the election. Her posture this time toward cross-Strait relations is markedly more constructive in terms
of maintaining the status quo than her ambiguous stance in 2012, and this deserves to be recognized. Tsai's revised posture won her American
acquiescence to her candidacy after a visit to Washington in 2015. That was something she failed to achieve in her 2012 unsuccessful bid for the leadership.

Washington seemed persuaded, temporarily at least, that she had developed safe hands
to manage cross-Strait policy. Some in the U.S. and other circles, including in Japan and Taiwan, argue that
Washington should seize the change in Taiwan to raise the level of official dealings in
U.S.-Taiwan relations, embed Taiwan in the "rebalance" to Asia, and promote closer
security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. That is an option, but in light of
the increasingly interdependent agendas of the United States and Chinese mainland, and
the extreme sensitivity of issues involving sovereignty for the Chinese, pursuing such
an option would be fraught with costs difficult to predict or control. For the Barack Obama administration, on
its way out and in search of a positive legacy, this seems an unlikely choice. The Chinese mainland will naturally have its own levers to try to influence Tsai's government. The

Tsai's
team is preparing to manage any such setbacks. They may seek U.S. criticism of the
moves. The best public U.S. response is probably to revert to a desire to see peace and
stability maintained in the region and to repeat the mantra of the communiqus and the
TRA. The Taiwan election has already caught the attention of some of those running to succeed Obama. But on the whole, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are relatively
mainland will have four months to signal publicly or communicate privately warnings or inducements to shape Tsai's cross-Strait policy choices. There are hints that

The Chinese
mainland would be smart to remind itself of that fact and contain its instincts
appropriately with respect to managing the transition with Taiwan.
subordinate to the Middle East, the Iran nuclear agreement, Russia-Eastern Europe relations, and other hot button issues in this U.S. election.

AT: Aggression CP
And, INCREASED U.S. commitment to Taiwan inflames relations and
undercuts possibility for negotiations
Kastner 16
Scott, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of
Maryland, College Park, Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point?, International Security > Volume
40, Number 3, Winter 2015/2016, http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/610049, msm
For similar reasons, U.S.

policymakers should be skeptical of calls to dramatically increase the

U.S. commitment to Taiwans security or to more visibly incorporate Taiwan into
rebalancing initiatives.104 Such moves would be viewed as inflammatory in Beijing and
could generate renewed pessimism about long-term trends in the strait. Perhaps more
fundamentally, a much stronger

U.S. commitment to Taiwan would stoke increased tensions in the

U.S.-China relationship. As alluded to earlier, a key component of Chinas expected costs of a Taiwan Strait conflictregardless of
whether the United States intervenedis the damage such a conflict would likely inflict on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the U.S.China relationship is in tatters to begin with , then Beijing has less to lose in a cross-strait
war . In essence, policies that increase U.S. support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship
risk being self-defeating , as the increased stability generated by slowing the cross-strait power shift is canceled out by decreasing
expected costs of war for China.
Finally, although I have downplayed in my analysis the risk of inadvertent war, it is something that cannot be discounted entirely. As such,

the

United States should continue to advocate for U.S.-China and China-Taiwan confidencebuilding measures
to-military dialogues)

(e.g., hotlines, limits in risky military exercises [End Page 91] undertaken in close proximity to the other party, military-

that could help further mitigate this risk.

AT: Increase Arms Sales CP

CP causes Taiwan to declare independence goes nuclear
Aitken 13
Aaron Aitken is a 2013 graduate of the Master of Arts program at Carleton Universitys Norman
Paterson School of International Affairs. The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales, The Agora:
Political Science Undergraduate Journal Vol.3 No. (2013), msm
Despite good intentions, the policy of ramping up arms sales to Taiwan in an attempt to maintain a
balance of force across the Taiwan Strait is both misguided and dangerous. The goal of achieving a balance
of power across the Taiwan Strait should not be overemphasized.42 Achieving a balance of forces across
the Strait is not an end in itself. Instead, it should be viewed as means to the peaceful resolution of the current stalemate. As a result, Taiwan
does not actually need to be able to defend itself without outside support. The very idea
is unsustainable . The rate of Chinas economic and military growth makes any unilateral attempt by Taiwan to maintain a military balance
across the Strait impossible in the long term. Instead, a sense of balance across the Strait relies on the implicit possibility that the United States would
become involved in a Sino-Taiwanese dispute. One way that the U.S. signals this commitment is through periodic arms sales.43 Given the symbolic
nature of such sales, they do not need to include a considerable quantity of advanced weaponry, as their purpose is not to alter the balance of power
across the Strait.
Even if ramping up arms sales to Taiwan cannot forestall the development of an asymmetrical balance between Taiwanese and Chinese forces, is

There are actually a

number of risks entailed in ramping up arms sales to Taiwan. As Wei-Chin Lee observes in Issues and
Studies, the unrestrained and unconditional supply of advanced weapons to Taiwan could have the effect
of upsetting the status quo in the region 44 It is possible, for example, that an expansion of arms
there any harm in selling increased quantities of advanced arms to Taiwan to help alleviate pressure on the U.S. military?

packages would embolden Taipei by creating the impression of unconditional American

support . This might then lead Taiwanese leaders to take a risk and declare independence on
would support them against China. This would almost undoubtedly
provoke a military reaction from China , as declaring independence steps over the red lines
set out by Chinas Anti-Succession Law. The United States, as Taiwans guarantor, would then be under
considerable pressure to meet Chinas aggression . This is clearly a position that the
the assumption that the U.S.

United States has a vested interest in avoiding, due to the potential for a nuclear conflict .
What is the likelihood that increased arms sales would actually embolden Taiwan enough to rashly declare independence? It is hard to say, but recent
improvements in Sino-Taiwanese relations makes it somewhat unlikely. However, given the catastrophic consequences of such an event, even the
slightest possibility of U.S. entrapment in a Sino-Taiwanese conflict ought to be avoided.

DAs

AT: Elections
An overwhelming majority of Americans support engagement with China
and would not want to defend Taiwan in a crisis- proves the plan does not
lead to vote-switching
Thrall and Gomez 6/9- Trevor, senior fellow for the Cato Institutes Defense and Foreign
Policy Department, Eric, research associate for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato
Institute, The American Public Is Not Very Hawkish on China,
(http://www.cato.org/blog/american-public-not-very-hawkish-china) JB
Chinas economic rise over the past decades has been meteoric, during which time the
volume of rhetoric about the China threat has also grown at historic rates. In the early 1990s
the Pentagon needed a new superpower rival to justify Cold War-sized defense budgets. But displays of American military power in
the first Gulf War and the 1995-96 crisis in the Taiwan Strait also prompted China to develop a military strategy designed to keep
American forces out of its neighborhood. Now, with counterterrorism missions in Iraq and Afghanistan down from their peak and

U.S. military has been devoting more time and

resources to figuring out ways to counter Chinas new strategy. Beyond the military,
political hawks have been quick to draw attention to the China threat. During last weekends
Chinas military posture maturing significantly, the

Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) said that China has a choice between peaceful cooperation and
engaging in a zero-sum game for regional power and influence. Even

academics have gotten in on the game,

with many arguing that Chinas rise will not be peaceful. Though Chinas saber rattling in
East Asia and the South China Sea hasnt made a big splash in the 2016 presidential
campaign so far, the question of how the United States should respond to Chinas rising
military and economic power is one of the most important foreign policy challenges the
next president will face. Both candidates have staked out aggressive positions on China.
Trump has promised to impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports, suggested that South Korea and Japan should acquire nuclear
weapons, and has called for a strong military presence in Asia to discourage Chinese adventurism. Clinton, for her part, was a lead
architect of the pivot to Asia as Secretary of State, redirecting U.S. military and diplomatic efforts from the Middle East to Asia to
confront Chinas rise. A

close look at public opinion, however, reveals that although complex, the
American publics attitudes towards China are more sanguine than those of its fearful
leaders. To be sure, most Americans have always harbored concerns about the Communist
nation and its intentions, and during difficult times Americans worry about the challenge China poses to their economic
fortunes. But despite Chinas aggressive campaign to modernize its military, and despite
two decades of one-sided debate about the China threat, most Americans correctly
continue to identify the United States as the stronger military power, and fewer than half
view Chinas military power as a serious threat

(even fewer rate it a critical threat.) Moreover, the prolonged

Gallup polls show a

slight increase in Chinas favorability rating among Americans between 1990 and 2016.
And in 2014 the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that just 48% of the public views
China as primarily a rival and 49% see it primarily as a partner. Most importantly, though,
Americans overwhelming support a cooperative approach to dealing with China rather
than a confrontational one. Sixty-seven percent responded to the 2014 CCGA poll that the best
way to handle the rise of Chinese power is to undertake friendly cooperation and
engagement, compared to 29% who said the United States should actively work to limit the growth of Chinas power. And
when it comes to the prospect of military conflict with China the public is truly not interested. Just 26% believe the
fear mongering has failed to move the needle when it comes to how Americans feel about China.

United States should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan.

These figures provide fair

warning to the next president to think twice about how to deal with China. An aggressive military posture like the one in place today
(and promoted by both candidates) not only runs contrary to public preferences, it also increases the prospects for direct conflict
between the United States and China.

And, No Link Taiwan not relevant to U.S. voters

Paal 2016 (Douglas, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES, vice chairman of JPMorgan Chase
International and as unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute
in Taiwan, PhD, History and East Asian Languages, Harvard University, Maintaining Peace
Across Taiwan Strait Can Benefit All, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/21/maintainingpeace-across-taiwan-strait-can-benefit-all-pub-62558, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 21, 2016, silbs)
The Taiwan election has already caught the attention of some of those running to succeed
Obama. But on the whole, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are relatively subordinate to the
Middle East, the Iran nuclear agreement, Russia-Eastern Europe relations, and other hot button
issues in this U.S. election. The Chinese mainland would be smart to remind itself of that fact
and contain its instincts appropriately with respect to managing the transition with Taiwan.

AT: Agenda Ptix

No Link Obama fights the plan he has supported past increases in arms
sales
Reuters, 15 - (David Brunnstrom and Patricia Zengerle, "Obama administration authorizes
$1.38 bn arms sale to Taiwan," http://www.livemint, 12/18/15,
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/tnSMR4jNoAf198a2nMqSwJ/Obama-authorizes-138-bn-armssale-to-Taiwan.html,//BR/)
Washington/Taipei/Beijing: The Obama administration formally notified

Congress on Wednesday of a $1.83-billion

arms sale package for Taiwan, including two frigates, anti-tank missiles, amphibious assault vehicles and other
equipment, drawing an angry response from China. The authorization, which Reuters on Monday reported was imminent, came a
year after Congress passed legislation approving the sale. It is the first such major arms sale to Taiwan in more than four years. The
White House said there was no change in the longstanding US one China policy. Past US weapons sales to Taiwan have attracted
strong condemnation in China, which considers Taiwan a renegade province. The

White House said the

authorization followed previous sales notifications by the administration totaling more
than $12 billion under the Taiwan Relations Act. Our longstanding policy on arms sales to
Taiwan has been consistent across six different US administrations, a National Security Council
spokesman, Myles Caggins, said. We remain committed to our one-China policy, he added. Although Washington
does not recognize Taiwan as a separate state from China, it is committed under the
Taiwan Relations Act to ensuring Taipei can maintain a credible defence.

Link Non-Unique Debates over Taiwan in the Senate now

Lowther, 6-3-16 - (William, staff reporter, "US Senate to debate bill on Taiwan," Taipei Times,
6-3-2016, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/06/03/2003647781,//BR/)
The US Senate is next week to debate a US$574.5 billion defense spending bill that calls for
improved military relations with Taiwan. US Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain is in Taipei
this week and is expected to support the provisions on Taiwan. If the provisions pass and the bill
is ratified, it would constitute the most significant congressional upgrade to US-Taiwan
relations since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center
Rick Fisher told the Taipei Times. The bill calls on the Pentagon to improve military relations with Taiwan by starting a program that
would exchange senior military officers and officials on a regular basis. According to the bill if passed by the committee the
exchange officers and officials would focus on threat analysis, military doctrine, force planning, logistical support and intelligence
collection and analysis. The exchanges would be conducted in Taiwan and the US, and would involve active duty flag officers and
assistant secretaries of defense. In addition, the

bill contains a sense of the Senate provision that

said Taiwan should be invited to participate in advanced aerial combat training and other
bilateral military training in the US to increase credible deterrent capabilities. The provision also calls on Taiwan to
strive to invest at least 3 percent of its annual GDP on defense. Another provision in the bill said: It is the sense of the Senate that
the US should strengthen and enhance its long-standing partnership and strategic cooperation with Taiwan.

The provision

said the US should reinforce its commitment to the TRA and the six assurances, as both countries
work toward mutual security objectives by conducting regular transfers of defense articles and defense services necessary to enable
Taiwan to secure common interests and objectives with the US. The US Senate supports Taiwans efforts to integrate innovative
and asymmetric capabilities to balance the growing military capabilities of the Peoples Republic of China, including fast-attack craft,
coastal defense cruise missiles, rapid runway repair training and undersea warfare capabilities optimized for the defense of the
Taiwan Strait, it said. The provision said that it is also the sense of the US Senate that Taiwan should be assisted in building an
effective air defense capability consisting of a balance of fighters and mobile air defense systems and permitting Taiwan to

participate in bilateral training activities. These are very necessary enhancements to our military relationship with Taiwan that
should have happened many years ago, Fisher said. He said that by the early 2020s China could have an initial capability to
actually invade Taiwan. As Taiwanese are every year less inclined to vote to unify with China, there is a real danger that a systemic
crisis for the Chinese Communist Party could prompt its leadership to risk a costly war over Taiwan to justify its continued
dictatorship, Fisher said. Strengthening the military-to-military relationship with Taiwan and increasing Taiwans exposure to

The US House
version of the bill does not contain the same provisions on Taiwan and thus even if
the US Senate votes in favor of the bill, it must still be negotiated with the US House in the Conference
Committee before going to the White House for US President Barack Obamas signature.
advanced military tactics and training will go far to increase Taipeis ability to deter a Chinese attack, he added.
of Representatives

AT: Taiwan Politics

The Taiwanese public hates US arms sales- they are expensive and illsuited for defense
Yang and Jensen 13- Charles, writer, Aaron, writer, More Harm Than Good,
(http://www.academia.edu/8429575/_The_use_of_confidence_building_measures_as_negotiati
on_tools_in_Asian_region) JB
The Taiwanese

public, as well as growing numbers of politicians, could also become less

supportive of purchasing US arms. Despite the fact that Chinas defense budget continues to grow, and the PLA
becomes stronger every year, many Taiwanese are not particularly concerned about Chinas
military development and they consider the possibility of conict to be low . A recent survey
by Taiwans United Daily News found that the percentage of Taiwanese who viewed
cross-strait relations as tense had decreased from 31 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2013.
Successful cross-strait CBMs could further strengthen this perception and continue to erode public support for US arms sales and or
military funding in general. Many Taiwanese

are already critical of purchasing US weapons since

they consider these weapons to be expensive and ill-suited for Taiwans defense needs. In
2004, Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan claimed that Taiwan does not need military strength to
negotiate with the PRC. In 2005, Peoples First Party Chairman James Song suggested that money meant for
US weapons would be better spent on domestic projects. At a time of slow economic growth in Taiwan,
the perception of a stable security environment could encourage politicians to divert more resources away from the military.

AT: Deterrence/Cred D.A.

US arms sales have no deterrent effect Taiwan too far behind
Bush III 14- Richard, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, holds the Chen-Fu and Cecilia
Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and is director of its Center for East Asia Policy Studies,
Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan,
(http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/01/14-us-arms-sales-taiwan-bush) JB
My fifth and final point has to do with the political

character of arms sales versus their military value. Of

U.S. transfer of advance weapons systems to Taiwan has a political character
for both Beijing and Taipei. That is particularly true of civilian leaders in both places, who happen to be the folks that
most of us talk to. But U.S. weaponry is not trivial in a military sense. From the U.S. perspective, its arms sales,
whatever their political value for Taiwan, should also contribute to Taiwans ability to
deter a Mainland attack or threat of attack. If we were to decide to come to Taiwans
defense in the event of such an attack, we would need Taiwan to hold on for several
weeks while we do all that would be needed to mount that defense. So Taiwan needs the capability to hold on. Optimally, if it
possesses that capability then Beijing is less likely to consider an attack in the first
place. In this regard, there is growing concern that Taiwans past defense strategy, on
which its arms requests to the United States are based, is no longer appropriate to its
course, the

threat environment , thus reducing the deterrent effect of the capabilities it has or might
have.

US arms sales dont protect Taiwan- we dont give them the advanced
technology they need to hold off an attack and Taiwan would lose to a
Chinese quick strike even with arms sales
Wu and Blanchard 15- J.R., staff writer, Ben, staff writer, Taiwan arms deal enough to give
China bloody nose, but no more, (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-armsidUSKBN0U10ZY20151218) JB
But Taiwan,

which is expected to vote in a new government next month less friendly to

China, needs advanced weapons such as the latest fighter jets or submarine-making
technology if it stands a chance of holding off a concerted Chinese assault before U.S.
forces come to the rescue.

"The idea is to complicate China's scenarios, to make them pause, to get them to think

China quickly
criticized this week's $1.83 billion deal, the first arms sales to Taiwan that the Obama
administration has approved in four years, saying it interferes with its sovereignty over Taiwan. The deal
twice before they attack," said Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council.

includes two Navy frigates, combat systems for mine-sweepers, missiles, amphibious attack vehicles and communications systems.

Compared to China's ambitious build-up of its military, the world's largest, Taiwan's arms
deals are aimed at survivability. Giving its latest assessment on China's forces in
September, Taiwan's defense ministry indicated Beijing could devote 400,000 of its 1.24 millionstrong ground force in combat against the island. That would give it a two-to-one advantage
against Taiwan's 215,000 full time troops. Taiwan is highly vulnerable to a quick strike, experts say.

Chinese fighter jets could scream across the narrow Taiwan Strait in minutes and take
out Taiwan's air fields, while China rains down some of the hundreds of missiles it is
believed to have targeted at the island.

And, nationalism and political decision-making outweighs military strength

and interdependence our internal link to U.S.-China is comparatively
LARGER than the negs
Sterling-Folker 9
(Jennifer, is the Alan R. Bennett Honors Professor of Political Science at
the University of Connecticut; Rosemary E., has PhD in international
relations theory and political theory from the University of Connecticut,
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 136-8 //um-ef)
Peril despite profit: whither the interdependent peace dividend?
The process that is occurring in Taiwan is one that underscores precisely why a neoclassical
realist analysis of the interdependence-promotes-peace proposition is necessary. It is a process
in which the Nationalist-DPP electoral competition over the levers of internal power (i.e. the
state and decision-making institutions) has been intimately related to and just as important as
Taiwan's external
competitions with other states. Those internal competitions have involved a process of national
identity reconstruction which pushes the very envelope that China, due to its own identity
politics, has consistently warned should not be opened. As Thomas Christcnsen notes, "What
will determine whether China takes actions that will lead to Sino-American conflict will likely be
politics, perceptions, and coercive diplomacy involving specific military capabilities in specific
geographic and political contexts, not the overall balance of military power across the Pacific or
across the Taiwan Strait."79 The more Taiwan has pushed, the more it has promoted a hardline, nationalist response in China that encourages increasing nationalism in Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the more aggressively China acts toward Taiwan, the more likely it has been that
the US will intercede on Taiwan's behalf, since both American political parties are committed to
doing so and Chinese aggression strengthens the hand of the containment crowd in the ongoing
conceptual debates within US policy-making communities.
The phenomenon of economic interdependence is caught up in this matrix of internal
competition and identity politics, and it should only be understood within this context. The
Boeing camp in each country-has acted rationally to protect its own economic interests within
the interdependent relationship, and on this score it is functionally efficient for particular types of
corporations, industrial sectors, and their elected or bureaucratic representatives to argue for
moderation. But the liberal interdependence literature has taken this argument and turned it into
an explanation for the international phenomenon of interdependence itself, as well as a
normative justification that it can deliver more peaceful international relations. The US-ChinaTaiwan case underscores why the phenomenon should not be treated with such sanguinity.
Interdependence among nation-states docs not arise from a commonly shared recognition of

joint profit and a cognitive shift among state decision-makers that cooperation and peace are
the best means to obtain these profits for themselves or particular interest groups or
corporations or society as a whole.
Instead, economic interdependence occurs within the context of political competition between
nation-states as well as inside them.
Such internal competitions involve the fundamental issue of who controls the decision-making
structures that allocate resources within the nation-state. Those structures are the subject of
intense competition, and controlling them involves more than demonstrating that profit can be
maximized, whether it is for everyone or just for particular constituents. It involves identity
politics - that is, the ongoing process of national identity reconstruction both internally and in
juxtaposition to other national groupings - and this process of identity politics works to reinforce
nationalism, not displace it. It is this linkage between intra-group competition and national
identity politics that drives interdependence. The ongoing relevance of nationalism and
collective identity-difference to world affairs means that the purported interdependence peace
dividend will not be cashed in any time soon.

Arms sales dont matter- the Taiwanese military is terrible

Hickey 13- Dennis, James F. Distinguished Professor and Director of the Graduate Program
in Global Studies with a focus on the International Relations of East Asia, National Security and
American Foreign Policy., Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait,
(http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/autumn_2013/4_hickey.pd
f) JB
Relations between Taipei and Beijing have improved enormously since Ma Ying-jeou was elected
ROC president in 2008; and US military authorities are encouraged by recent developments. Admiral Robert F. Willard,
Commander of the US Pacific Command, said that, as they (PRC and ROC) improve their relationship economically and diplomatically, we think it should

lower the likelihood of coercion or conflict taking place.16 He cautioned,

however, that there is very impressive combat power across the Strait on mainland China .
. . they continue to improve their capabilities, so in terms of a balance of power, its generally one-sided.17 The US Department of Defenses 2013 report on Chinas military confirms that dealing with a
potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait remains the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA) primary
mission despite decreasing tensions there.18 It warns that preparation for a Taiwan conflict
with the possibility of US intervention has largely dominated Chinas military
modernization program.19 Indeed, the PLA budget has been trending upward for
decades. In 2012, the US Department of Defense estimated that Chinas military budget could have been as high as $180 billion
in 2011double the stated budget (the declared budget is $116.2 billion for 2013).20 In 2010, Robert Gates, then US Secretary of
Defense, characterized

the military build-up directly opposite Taiwan as an extraordinary

deployment.21 It represents the highest concentration of missiles anywhere on earth, and
holds the potential to destroy key leadership facilities, military bases and
communication and transportation nodes with minimal advance warning [emphasis added].22
The PLA is also boosting its military prowess by developing new anti-ship ballistic missiles, torpedo and mine

systems, and combat aircraft. Such considerations led one study to warn that the PLAs air and conventional missile capabilities
could now endanger US military forces and bases in the region should Washington decide to intercede on Taiwans behalf.23

Taiwans defense budgets have remained flat . The shift to an all-volunteer force
will mean that a large share of military resources must be allocated to cover personnel
costs. Military equipment is growing old and obsolete. Particularly worrisome is the state of the ROC Air
Nonetheless,

Force. Its inventory includes 56 Mirage 2000, 145 F-16 A/B, 126 IDFs, and 60 F-5E/F fighters. According to a Defense Intelligence
Agency study, many of these warplanes are incapable of operating effectively.24 Another report estimates that by

2020,
Taiwans fighters would drop in number by 70% without new F-16s, and by 50% with 66 new F-16s.25 It is
clear that Taiwans defense capability relative to that of the PRC has not been
maintained.

China is substantially stronger than Taiwan and no amount of arms sales is

going to change that
Jianing 15- Yao, writer, America's arms sale to Taiwan won't change cross-strait strength
landscape, (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2015-12/18/content_4633208.htm) JB
The U.S.

will sell 10 types of military equipment worth 1.83-billion U.S. dollar in total to
Taiwan, including the Perry-class frigates, announced the U.S. on the early morning of December 17, 2015. Chinese
defense ministry and foreign ministry voiced strong opposition immediately, and vowed to
sanction American enterprises that sell weaponry to Taiwan. The new arms deal came four years after the U.S.
sold weapon to Taiwan last time in 2011. The arms sale this time isn't on a large scale compared with previous
deals, but its nature is as bad as ever. The mainland's military strength has long surpassed that of the
Taiwan military by a landslide. No matter how much American weaponry Taiwan buys, it
won't change the disproportional strength landscape across the strait. Already out of service in
the U.S., the Perry-class frigate is "out-dated" maritime equipment, so the new arms deal is more a tribute paid by
Taiwan to the U.S. in exchange for the latter's commitment to "protecting Taiwan" than an
arms contract in the real sense. On the one hand, the U.S. makes money by selling arms to Taiwan. On the other hand, it uses the
arms sale to encourage Taiwan to uphold the idea of consolidating its security with armed forces, which will cement the military
stalemate across the strait and suppress those in Taiwan who believe in ensuring Taiwan's long-term security through peaceful

Given Taiwan's limited

finance, it's impossible for it to independently launch a military confrontation against the
mainland. The possibility of the U.S. waging an all-round war against the mainland in
order to "protect Taiwan" is an ever shakier trump card for Taiwan's "national defense". As the
mainland's military strength has developed steadily, the price of the U.S. engaging in the
cross-trait conflict is rising every year. The American military is losing its "sure win"
against the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in case a conflict broke out across the Taiwan Strait, and the most
communication with the mainland. The U.S. is paving the way for "Chinese fighting Chinese".

symbolic aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy cannot approach the strait during a war as analysts said they have to stay 2,000 km away
from the Chinese coastline to keep themselves safe. In

the past, Taiwan's military strength was only

slightly weaker than the mainland's and the U.S. was able to deploy much stronger
forces in the West Pacific than China, but this "balance" has been disrupted.

Arms sales dont help Taiwan- they are not focused on the areas where
Taiwan is lacking and only serve to antagonize China
Cheng 15- Dean, research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs at The Heritage
Foundation, Obamas Arms Sale Leaves Taiwan Vulnerable, (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/obamas-arms-sale-leaves-taiwan-vulnerable-14726) JB

Fast on the heels of the COP21 climate change conference, the Obama

administration announced its first, and

likely last, arms sale to Taiwan in this term. Totaling some $1.83 billion, the sale will include two
decommissioned frigates, Javelin and TOW-2B anti-tank missiles, Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, amphibious vehicles

raises the question of

what the administration actually intends to do. While these systems are helpful in
sustaining Taiwan, they do not address two of the most fundamental imbalances in the
cross-strait security situation: the air and undersea situations . In 2010, the American Defense
Intelligence Agency submitted a report that indicated the balance of airpower over the Taiwan Strait was
steadily sliding in favor of the Peoples Republic of China. The situation has not
improved, half a decade later. As China continues to add Generation 4.5 and fifth-generation fighters (including the J-20 and J31 fighters) to its air force, Taiwan has had to make do with older versions of the F-16. Efforts to obtain
and various support equipment. While the decision to sell arms to an American friend is welcome, it

additional F-16s to replace their 1960s-vintage F-5s have come to naught. Instead, since 2010, the only fighter program the Obama
Administration has approved was a modernization package for the islands F-16A/Bs. Meanwhile, despite the welcome addition of
two more frigates, the balance

of sea power in the Taiwan Strait is also steadily shifting against

Taiwan. China has been adding an array of new surface combatants, as well as serial
production of several modern classes of submarines. Chinese long-range Naval Aviation aircraft have now
begun to fly missions into the central Pacific, signaling that the waters east of Taiwan are no longer a sanctuary. By contrast,
Taiwans submarine force is largely centered on two World War II era submarines, whose
continued operation is a tribute to Taiwans shipwrights and engineers, but whose age imposes daunting demands upon its sailors to
challenge growing Chinese sea power. The announced sale apparently does not address the need to permit American companies to
aid Taiwan in its bid to build its own submarines. As important,

such a sale does little to demonstrate

American credibility. While some might posit that this sale was intended to curtail bad feelings in Beijing, the reality is
that the approach taken seems almost calculated to antagonize the Chinese. Coming in the
wake of the climate change conference, it would appear that the United States delayed any announcement so as to not jeopardize
Chinese cooperation in those talks. But the Chinese have a long memory. Does the administration really believe that the Chinese
were unaware of an impending sale? Or that China would not extract some kind of price for the sale, especially if the U.S. is so
desperate to gain Chinese support for a climate change agreement? Indeed, the lack of substantial sales in systems that might
make a difference in the actual cross-strait balance raises the question of whether, in fact, a quid pro quo was in place. If the
administration had wanted to signal its resolve or simply exploit the opportunity post-COP21, it could have pushed for a larger sale,
given that the Chinese would protest an arms sales in any case, whatever was actually sold. Instead, the

administration is

fumbling away its credibility in Asia as evidenced not only by the arms sale, but also by yet another apparently
bungled freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). The administration hastened to explain a recent flight near disputed Cuarteron
Reef, saying that the flight near the Chinese artificial island was unintentional. Coming after the USS Lassens not-quite-FONOP,
Beijing should be forgiven for thinking that it is being given a free-hand in the western Pacific.

US arms sales to Taiwan hurt the US and Taiwan is too far behind the
Chinese military to use arms sales to catch up
Hua 15- Zhang, professor and former research associate at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Arms sales to Taiwan do not help the US, (http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/959549.shtml) JB
Washington formally announced a $1.83 billion arms sale package to Taiwan on Wednesday. China
slammed the sale for interfering in its internal affairs and vowed to impose sanctions on relevant American companies.
Chinese pundits see this as new proof of Washington's desire to contain China by roiling
cross-Straits relations. In fact, arms sales to Taiwan have already had a negative impact on
the US. Washington has to accept it is becoming far less capable of containing China's
rise. It may upset the government of the Chinese mainland by making a fuss with Taiwan, but it won't have a real effect.
Washington's primary intent in forging a military relationship with Taiwan is to maintain military balance across the Taiwan Strait.
However, the strategy

is stretched too thin. Given the mainland's swift and prominent rampup in military spending, a military balance can no longer be stricken between the

mainland and Taiwan, no matter how many advanced weapons the US sells to Taiwan.
The possibility of using Taiwan to suppress the mainland's growing leverage in its
periphery is vanishing.

The mainland's economic aggregate is more than 20 times larger than Taiwan's, so the latter has

no chance to engage in a military race with the former. Selling arms to Taiwan doesn't mean Washington would hold on to its
promise to "come and rescue" Taiwan when the island is in trouble with the mainland. It is not even a commitment to include Taiwan
in its umbrella of protection. Even some Taiwanese strategists have pointed out that Taiwan is too obsessed with the delusion that
Washington will come all the way to defend Taiwan. Washington also cunningly argues that the weaponry deal will bolster Taiwan's
confidence when it needs to negotiate with the mainland in other respects. In fact, in such talks, it is always the mainland that makes
more room for Taiwan's wellbeing, not because Taiwan has a strong military capability that is feared by the mainland, but because
the mainland regards Taiwan as family. Although the US, especially its arms enterprises and political brokers, could reap fat profits

pros and cons are

not hard to weigh. In fact, some companies have started to reflect on the deal. Washington seems to have
gone on the offensive in the arms deal, but Beijing can find opportunities to strike back.
from such practices, these companies and individuals might risk losing the second biggest market. The

From the Diaoyu Islands to the South China Sea disputes, the US keeps stirring troubles against China in recent years during the
implementation of its "rebalancing to Asia" strategy. China could have resorted to countermeasures but is too prudent to take real
action. On

the occasion of this arms deal, for which the US has neither moral nor legal
ground, Beijing should take the chance to carry out down-to-earth countermeasures, such as
halting bilateral communications over military matters and sanctioning relevant US enterprises. It becomes increasingly
obvious that playing the Taiwan card is no longer an effective approach to countering
China's rise. On the contrary, it makes Washington take bigger risks to jeopardize a relationship with the Chinese mainland,
which is clearly more important. The US government must have realized that it is necessary to reduce the harm caused by arms
sales. During President Barack Obama's administration, the US government slowed down the frequency of arms sales to Taiwan.
The last four years has seen just two arms sales. Besides, Washington knows the mainland's red line, and decided not to fulfill
Taiwan's request for sensitive weaponry such as submarines and F-16 C/D fighters.

at: lasers
Theyre inev Lockheed isnt key
Atherton 2-29-16
Kelsey, ARMY PLANS TO HAVE LASER WEAPON BY 2023, http://www.popsci.com/armyplans-laser-weapons-for-2023, msm
The Pentagon kills language. Housing the brain and

central coordinating organs of the most advanced

military the world has ever known , the Depart of Defense headquarters can take an announcement as
exciting as the U.S. Army is

working on laser guns and distill it to, in the words of Mary J. Miller, deputy assistant secretary of the

Army for Research and Technology, aligned to transition into a program of record in the fiscal 2023 timeframe. Make no mistake: bland phrasing
aside, the Army

is going to fund laser weapon development

in the next decade.

Already have em
FITS 6-27-16
FITS NEWS, The U.S. Military Has A Laser , http://www.fitsnews.com/2016/06/27/the-u-smilitary-has-a-laser/, msm
And we love lasers So the news

that the U.S. military is perfecting a 150-kilowatt laser weapon system is

well, pretty cool. Especially since our multi-billion dollar military is running out of bombs. You never know when were going to have to hit reset on
our enemies, right? Lasers are a powerful, efficient, cost-effective and lethal option. To borrow the soldiers lingo, they have a low cost per
engagement ratio. Were spending pennies on the dollar every time we use that capability, one admiral recently told National Defense Magazine.
Imagine that the military doing something on the cheap!

The Navy already has an operational 30-kilowatt laser

weapon mounted on the deck of the USS Ponce

system was installed

in August 2014.

(LPD 15) an Austin-class amphibious transport dock. This

at: defense industry

Growth is inev Taiwan isnt key at worst, no uq growth up now
CLOUGH 9-25-14
Richard, contributor to Portland Press Herald, U.S. defense industrys profits soaring along with
global tensions, http://www.pressherald.com/2014/09/25/u-s-defense-industrys-profits-soaringalong-with-global-tensions/, msm
Led by Lockheed Martin , the biggest U.S. defense companies are trading at record prices as
shareholders reap rewards from escalating military conflicts around the world. Investors
see rising sales for makers of missiles , drones and other weapons as the U.S. hits Islamic State
fighters in Syria and Iraq, said Jack Ablin, chief investment officer at Chicago-based BMO Private Bank. President Barack Obama approved open-ended
airstrikes this month while ruling out ground combat. As we ramp up our military muscle in the Mideast, theres a sense that demand for military
equipment and weaponry will likely rise , said Ablin, who oversees $66 billion including Northrop Grumman and Boeing shares. To
the extent we can shift away from relying on troops and rely more heavily on equipment
that could present an opportunity. Bombardments of Islamic State strongholds added to tensions this year that include U.S.-led sanctions on Russia for backing Ukrainian
rebels and Chinas feuds with neighbors over disputed South China Sea islands. The U.S. also is the biggest foreign military supplier to Israel, which waged a 50-day offensive
against the Hamas Islamic movement in the Gaza Strip. A Bloomberg gauge of the four largest Pentagon contractors excluding Boeing, whose civilian airplanes business is
larger than its military unit rose 19 percent this year through yesterday, outstripping the 2.2 percent gain for the Standard & Poors 500 Industrials Index.
the worlds biggest defense company,

Lockheed ,

reached an all-time high of $180.74 on Sept. 19, when Northrop and Raytheon also set records.

General Dynamics, the parent company of Maine shipbuilder Bath Iron Works, traded at $129.45 on that day, up from $87.74 a year ago. That quartet of companies and
Chicago-based Boeing accounted for about $105 billion in federal contract orders last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Even if industry declines no collapse its resilient

Clevenger 7-29-15
Andrew, Top 100: Defense Revenues Down, but Industry Prevailing,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/07/26/defense-newstop-100-main-story-revenues-down/30639503/, msm
Lagging defense spending and the large-scale drawdown of US troops in the Middle East
spelled another year of decreased revenues for defense contractors . But industry has largely
avoided the dramatic upheavals of previous industrial downturns , with mergers and
acquisitions being driven more by opportunistic business decisions than panic over a
dwindling pot of money . Lockheed Martin maintained its chokehold on the top position in
this year's Defense News Top 100 our annual ranking of the world's largest defense companies with 2014 defense revenues of $40.128 billion out of $45.6 billion total
revenues. That was

down $366 million, or - 0.1 percent , from last year's defense revenues of $40.494 billion.

at: Russia war impact

No war
Peck 14 [Michael Peck (Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); 7 Reasons
Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine; 3/05/2014;
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-towar-over-ukraine/]
America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely
nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the
Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting
war with Russia .
This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face
the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never
smack Russia with a big stick:
Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of
American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldnt inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally
devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they
even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike.
For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never
fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and
Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor
Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that.
Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory
days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in
storage), according to the Military Balance 2014 from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its
navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraines coast.

U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War.
American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets,

However, better is not good enough. The Russian military

is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With
such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots).

advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler antiaircraft missiles, Russian

forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses.

Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The
distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. Its much easier for Russia to send
troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air.
The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, Americas armed forces need a
breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from
repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan.
The U.S. doesnt have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to
Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred
aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there

is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off
Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian
defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland
through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S.
would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize.
The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American
public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe
nation. Neville Chamberlains words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be
digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.

Americas allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in
Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and
has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European
public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering
the regions sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military
capabilities, the Europeans couldnt evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without
American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Lets not even go there.

K Answers

aff taiwan realism

D.A. to the alt alternatives that dont start at the state level CANT account
for Taiwanese Identity and FAIL to provide a functional strategy for Taiwan
survival ONLY a strategy that places THE STATE at the center of analysis
can be Ethical in the context of Taiwanese lives
Sterling-Folker and Shinko, 05 [Jennifer, is the Alan R. Bennett Honors Professor of Political
Science at the University of Connecticut; Rosemary E., has PhD in international relations theory
and political theory from the University of Connecticut, Millennium - Journal of International
Studies, Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide, vol. 33 no. 3 pages
637-664, June 2005, http://mil.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/33/3/637.full.pdf+html,
7/10/16]JRO
The
postmodern notion of self-making in a register of freedom suggests that individuals
It is precisely the equation between the state and order that leads realism, in turn, to question the possibility of such a de-territorialised postmodern ethics.

can and want to be free to remake their identity but that they are prevented from doing
so by the state. The problem with such a formulation from a realist perspective is that
individuals do not want freedom from settled identity; and in any case it is the nation, not
the state, that is the chief oppressor in this regard. Human beings are social creatures
whose humanity is only realisable within the context of a group, and, as a result, human
beings do not embrace identity ambiguity.39 They will form groups even when there is no
rational reason to do so, and group formation means the demarcation of identity difference from
other human beings. What binds a collective of individuals is always the opposition to
something normatively different, external, and less desirable, because without this juxtaposition the members of a
collective cannot know who they are and they cannot function as a collective. The need for order and stability
is not a function of the state, then, it is a function of human sociability that derives, in
turn, from the anarchic conditions of species evolution. Postmodernism is correct to argue that the act of identity-settling
is never complete and the content of identity contestable. This is what allows for identity manipulation, imposition, and subjugation in the name of a greater collective good. But

realism counter-proposes that the human need for a settled identity is stronger than the
desire for contestability, and the voices offering ambiguity and contingency cannot prevail
against those offering clarity of identity difference instead. In contemporary world
politics the most pertinent group identity is the nation, which subsumes other forms of
group identity and is married to the state as a type of social institution and process for
determining intragroup resource decisions.40 Individual identity is intimately linked to
the state as the primary decision-making structure for the national collective. A refusal to
engage in this link analytically means an analytical failure to recognise how important
the state remains for intra-national quarrels over identity and resource allocation. And to
encourage the identity ambiguity while refusing engagement with the state is to play into the hands of the forces that post-modernists wish to counter-act: the builders of
territorially-defined nation-states

. It is no accident, then, that the ROCs development into a full fledged

democracy gave pro-independence forces access to the Taiwanese state and the
opportunity to enact policies that encourage nationalist identity difference . Early proindependence movements were as much about secession from China as they were
opposition to the KMTs authoritarian rule over Taiwan between 1949 and 1989, and there was an ethnic link between China and the
KMT that was in opposition to the islands Taiwanese majority. For many Taiwanese, they belong to a separate nation

that has no more enduring connections to China than it does to Japan or even the Netherlands, its former
colonial rulers.41 This has proven to be electorally significant, and the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bien, won the Presidency in 2000
and 2004 on a party platform that aligns pro-independence with Taiwanese ethnicity. Taiwanese ethnic identity began enjoying a
tailwind of popular support during Chens first term, and the 2004 Presidential election was cast as a choice between subjugation to Communist
China and Taiwanese nationalism.42 Conversely, the political identity of the Taiwanese Nationalists is rife with ambiguity, which works to the political advantage of the DPP.

suggest to electoral strategists

that the Nationalists will need to embrace native Taiwanese nationalism, and downplay
their Mandarin Chinese ethnic identities, if they wish to prevail electorally.43 Meanwhile, Chen and the
Voting margins from the last two Presidential elections, in which Chen won by thirty-nine percent and fifty percent,

DPP show every sign of pursuing the nation-state building agenda of their campaign, which includes revising the Taiwanese constitution, restructuring its government, redefining
Taiwans territory, and changing the ROCs name to the Republic of Taiwan. According to Yan Xuetong, a foreign policy expert at Beijings Quingha University, Chen is
determined to be the founding father of a new nation by 2008;44 something which China has vowed to prevent with force if necessary. Competitive elections over control of the
state are a driving force in the upsurge in Taiwanese nationalism, because the state remains the primary resource allocating institution of contemporary global politics.

Hence access to and control over it ensures the ability to pursue and obtain specified
preferences and agendas, and so it is a site where struggles over resource control and
identity differentiation come together. Failure to examine the political and national
struggles over state control that occur on a daily basis around the globe, and a
preference for the study of the marginalised and ambiguous instead, will get us no closer
to understanding or realising individual identity or security; either globally, or in the
Chinese-Taiwanese relationship specifically. And to suggest to individuals and subgroups within
China and Taiwan that their cause will be furthered by embracing identity ambiguity while
simultaneously refusing participation in the state, is not simply unrealistic; it is an ethical
abdication in its own right, as there is no surer way to marginalise oneself from the sites
of and exercise of power.

***Realism politics are why Taiwan exists refusing statehood and

focusing on individual subjectivity fails to function in practice
Sterling-Folker and Shinko, 05 [Jennifer, is the Alan R. Bennett Honors Professor of Political
Science at the University of Connecticut; Rosemary E., has PhD in international relations theory
and political theory from the University of Connecticut, Millennium - Journal of International
Studies, Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide, vol. 33 no. 3 pages
637-664, June 2005, http://mil.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/33/3/637.full.pdf+html,
7/10/16]JRO
It was the Taiwanese desire to embrace statehood and the parameters of the
Westphalian system that, along with US strategic deterrence, prevented a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan. To argue that the individuals of Taiwan would be safer if they refused
statehood is to ignore the Chinese commitment since 1949 to subjugate Taiwan
according to its own identity parameters . It is also to ignore the desire of the vast majority
of Taiwanese not to be subjugated according to those parameters. The ROC would not
even exist if it had not been for classic balance-of-power politics between two nation-states,
the US and China, in the context of the early Cold War. Its evolution into a democracy is just as
indebted to its relationship with the US, since it was the US decision to improve its relations with China in the
1970s that forced the KMT to pursue democratisation as means of national consciousness. Simultaneously, the goal of
Taiwanese nation-state building was to confirm for other nation-states that the ROC had a
legitimate claim to sovereignty (in opposition to Chinas claim that it is only a province), because the ROC
government has the legitimate support of its population. Hence the increasing identity
tolerance between Taiwan and China has only been realised through the avenues and

mechanisms of national identity politics and the governing institutions of China and
Taiwan, not outside or beyond them . Certainly nations have the option of refusing to become nation-states, but it
would make little sense for nations and the individuals who comprise them to do so, when those parameters promise control over a
specified territory via intra-national decision-making institutions.

This is why civil wars are endemic to the Westphalian system

nations will pursue statehood even when they are, in relative terms, politically
and economically comfortable. If we dont examine particular, historical contexts,
identities, and institutions that is, if we insist upon, in Morgenthaus words, the neglect of the
contingencies of history and of the concreteness of historical situations56 then we will
miss the way in which radical ideas work through and shape existing institutions and
practices, and are in turn shaped by them. Thus we will miss the most essential link between that which
and why

changes (namely, history), and what remains the same (namely, structure).

Realism proves the US and China are mutually using Taiwan to

counterbalance the other the squo is comprised of deterrent strategic
calculations
Sterling-Folker and Shinko, 05 [Jennifer, is the Alan R. Bennett Honors Professor of Political
Science at the University of Connecticut; Rosemary E., has PhD in international relations theory
and political theory from the University of Connecticut, Millennium - Journal of International
Studies, Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide, vol. 33 no. 3 pages
637-664, June 2005, http://mil.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/33/3/637.full.pdf+html,
7/10/16]JRO
For a structural realist there is an obvious reality with
respect to Taiwan, but it begins with the US and the PRC, which are both concerned with
the potential damage that the other could do to their national security and economies.14
These concerns result from each nation-states desire to dominate the politics and economics
of the region, and both possess substantial resources in this regard, including large
numbers and types of military weapons, large portions of their citizenry engaged in their
militaries, sizeable economies, vast networks of trading partners and linkages, and
considerable financial resources and influence. Given the military resources each possesses, combined with
the trade linkages they have developed with one another, both nation-states seek to avoid direct
military confrontations with one another. Yet they also simultaneously seek to balance
one anothers military and economic power in order to avoid any advantage the other
might accrue in their competition for regional domination. From a structural realist perspective, Taiwan
represents a third and relatively weaker entity in the mix. For the PRC, Taiwan represents
What does it mean to say the China-Taiwan relationship?

unfinished business .15 Originally a province of China, Taiwan is an island 100 miles off the coast of Chinas
Fukien province, and the body of water that separates them, the Taiwan Strait, is a major commercial shipping
avenue. Taiwan had been annexed to and occupied by the Japanese from 1895 until 1945 when it was returned to China. When the decadeslong Chinese civil war culminated in a communist victory over the mainland in 1949, remnants of the US-supported Nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT)
escaped to the island and established their own government, the Republic of China (ROC ).

From its inception, the ROC was

intended to be a temporary solution. The Nationalists argued that they were the sole legitimate government of China and
insisted that they would some day re-conquer the mainland. Meanwhile the PRC made plans to reclaim Taiwan after it
had consolidated power on the mainland. What prevented this invasion was the US
interest in balancing Chinese aggression in light of the Korean War. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s
Taiwan became the cornerstone in the US Cold War containment strategy in Asia. The US sent naval forces into the Taiwan Strait several times in
response to Chinese provocations, it supplied the ROC with economic aid, and it signed a mutual

defense treaty with it in 1954. This Cold War context changed by the early 1970s, however, as
China had by then developed a mutual interest with the US in counter-balancing the Soviet
Union, and the US and China explored the possibility of improved relations . In 1979 the US
established full diplomatic relations with the PRC, terminated its 1954 mutual security pact with Taiwan, and
reaffirmed the one-China principle that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Simultaneously, however,
the US adopted the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which declared that the US has a
commitment to Taiwans security and is obligated to sell sophisticated defensive arms to
it. The US has also consistently argued it has a right to protect Taiwan from the PRC, and in
1996 it dispatched two aircraft carrier groups to the region in response to Chinese military activities in the strait . The triangular
relationship between the US, the PRC, and the ROC is replete with strategic deterrent calculations. The
US attempts to pacify China with regards to Taiwan while also containing China and
protecting Taiwan from it. The PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan while preventing direct
US involvement in their bilateral conflict. And the ROC seeks to maintain and increase its
independence from China while being careful not to alienate American support. This trilateral
structural relationship can also be examined from a neoclassical realist perspective, which focuses on the domestic politics of these states .
Competing subgroups within the US, the PRC, and the ROC emphasise either cooperative economic
linkages or militaristic policies in their relationships with one another. The extent to which any of these
particular subgroups are in ascendance results from electoral competition in the US and the ROC, and internal bureaucratic struggles in the PRC. 16
Taiwans development into a full-fledged democracy in the 1990s has increased hostilities between
the ROC and the PRC, because democratisation allowed the main pro-independence political party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to gain control over and utilise state power in the pursuit of its
nationalist policies. Given neoclassical realisms concern with non-systemic variables, the impact of identity
formation on intra-state politics in Taiwan is particularly important. The DPP and other proindependence groups are intimately linked to a Taiwanese identity that sees itself as distinct from
that of mainland China. These Taiwanese, who emigrated from Mainland China before World War II and may be divided into two groups
(Hoklos and Hakkas) based on linguistic differences, constitute eighty five percent of the population17 Mainlanders are the Mandarin speaking KMT

As long as the Nationalists

prevailed electorally, Taiwan pursued a foreign policy with China that subtly mixed
accommodation (including the public acceptance of the one China principle) and resistance (such as pursuing sovereign member
ship in IGOs). Under the DPP, on the other hand, Taiwan has declared its intention to become a fullfledged sovereign nation-state within the next ten years; something the PRC has consistently
who retreated to Taiwan after WWII; they constitute only fourteen percent of the population.

indicated it will use force to prevent . These internal developments make conflict between
the PRC and the ROC even more likely than international structural considerations alone
would have done. Given US strategic interests in the region, the Taiwan Strait is, as David Lampton, Director of China Studies
at John Hopkins observes, the only probable place . . . where two big nuclear powers could come
into conflict.18

Realism is how states interact governmental officials are the ones who
designate each other as malicious studying those structures is critical to
resolving tensions
Sterling-Folker and Shinko, 05 [Jennifer, is the Alan R. Bennett Honors Professor of Political
Science at the University of Connecticut; Rosemary E., has PhD in international relations theory
and political theory from the University of Connecticut, Millennium - Journal of International
Studies, Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide, vol. 33 no. 3 pages

637-664, June 2005, http://mil.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/33/3/637.full.pdf+html,

7/10/16]JRO
Realism is What States Do It is not that change is not possible in realism, or that alternative sites of struggle are not important, but
the parameters of and sites of struggle for change highlighted by postmodernism seem
analytically misplaced. If realism is not simply explanation by ivory-tower academics but
is what states and policy-makers do (it is, after all, Chinese and US officials who
designate one another as menaces, and it is Taiwanese state officials who equate
national security and welfare in their own documents), then why study the marginalised
instead of the states and policy-makers involved? Why not talk about change within the
context of state-society politics and among state policy-makers? The state is one of the
ultimate sites of political, economic, and social struggle and power in contemporary
world politics, and it seems counter-productive to look for and promote change in
representative practices while simultaneously ignoring the state and its relationship to
these alternative sites of representation. If change is both possible and afoot in our
representations of the world, shouldnt it be recognisable in the politics of and struggle
over the state and its functions in society? The fact that many states, such as the US and the ROC,
are democracies underscores this point, since they have been institutionally designed to
respond to majorities and minorities within their societies. Even Chinas totalitarian regime responds to
multiple interests emanating from its society. Hence it is not clear to realists why a discussion of the
marginalised does not also involve understanding the structural mechanisms whereby
doubt and uncertainty are translated into political practice. Conversely, while there is a great deal of radical
doubt in the world, but not all of it matters to individual security or territorial violence and
competition among nation-states. If the radical doubt engendered by the marginalised (in
this case, two percent of Taiwans population) is not realised through state structures,
then studying them wont get us any closer to understanding change and stasis in the
China Taiwan relationship. Wouldnt our understanding of change in this triangular relationship be better
served by examining how the majority and the minority interact within the political
structures, parties, and interest groups of the US, the PRC, and the ROC and, in so
doing, effect the politics and behavior of the other states involved?

2AC Your Alt Fails/Reality Exists

Reality isnt constructed it exists and your alternative cant account for
the power relationship that exists between China, Taiwan, and the U.S.
Your model has zero application in this instance
Legato 10
(Paul, a Clojure generalist programmer and systems architect, Philosopher,
Constructivist Errors in Taiwan-China Analysis: a Case Study, pg online
@ http://www.paullegato.com/blog/constructivist-errors-taiwan-china/ //umef)
Constructivist Errors In short, he says that China-Taiwan relations have improved
because, in a show of empowerment, people in both countries are constructing a new
reality and a new concept of China through their social interactions, as embodied in the One China, different
interpretations policy. This requires thinking that reality is something socially constructed , first of all, which I
obviously dont. And it requires believing that these social contacts are the driving force behind
policy set by the elites, rather than policy being the driving force behind the social
contacts. Despite cromulent wishing, ordinary people are not quite yet embiggened The emphasis on social interactions that shape
common identities as the putative basis for the present improved Chinese-Taiwanese
relations is derived from an ongoing and well-meaning but misguided effort to deinstitutionalize the concept of power, which crops up across the postmodernist
spectrum. Present postmodernists are engaged in a self-delusional attempt to
democratize the conception of power into something done by ordinary people (those who are
empowered, anyway, a killer pomo buzzword), rather than as the acts of distant institutions of the elite which are beyond the individuals purview. (This is, incidentally, an idea that postmodernist thought

They cannot stomach the idea that our fate, both as

individuals and as a society, is largely determined by forces beyond our control, so they imagine (or
appropriates from liberalism, as part of its general klepto-philosophic program.)

construct, if you prefer) a reality in which that is not the case. Granted, its not exactly a happy thought, that some faraway leader who Ive never even met could push me into a war tomorrow, but because it is

The most cursory reading of history shows this to be the case. If not, are
we to believe instead that the ordinary people of, say, Germany in 1938 just really, really
hated Poles, on a personal level? that ordinary Japanese of 1941 really despised the
United States? and a hundred thousand other similar examples? Of course not . Ordinary
unpleasant does not make it untrue.

people dont care for war until they are whipped into a fervor by a very small group of
leaders , who can, in many cases, guide them to whatever path they choose. Unpleasant? Sure, but we must confront that,
rather than bury our heads in the sands of Pollyanna optimism and pretend as though we as individuals have some kind of
power that we only wish for. and the real power-brokers just dont care much about cultural identity
The idea that mainland Chinese and Taiwanese relations are built, somehow, upon the
mutual construction of an intersubjective identity is absurd, not to mention incredibly
naive. (It is absurd philosophically, derived from the inherent nonsense of
phenomenology, for reasons that must wait until another day to be elaborated. The short version, omitting many details, is that an objective reality exists
apart from our perceptions of it, at least until a repeatable experiment demonstrates otherwise, and failure to notice that is a serious illness called schizophrenia. cf.
Karl Popper.) Sure, Taiwan and China share an ethnic heritage and a language and a culture, but

these are relatively minor factors. International relations are generally determined mainly
by power and money, at times by pragmatic cooperation for mutual benefit, and yes, even by altruism
occasionally. Identity is not nearly as important a factor as the constructivists would have it . When
PRC and ROC diplomats meet, are they talking about trade and guns and money, or are they exchanging sweet and sour chicken recipes and reciting Tao Qian? All else the same,
two groups from the same cultural background will prefer one another, but all else is
certainly not the same in the case of China and Taiwan. Just look at US-UK economic relations over the entire postwar period: despite
close security ties which are undoubtedly culturally rooted (i.e. the US and UK may not like each other all that much, but they like each other much better than either likes anyone else), economic cooperation has
been far less apparent the UK needed a humiliating IMF bailout in 1976. where was the USA? and the Special Relationship has looked rather frayed on more than one occasion, not the least of which is

weve deconstructed the deconstruction.

Now we are left with the more positive task of providing an alternate, and better,
explanation for the present state of Taiwanese-Chinese relations. As a point of fact, both the PRC
and ROC governments have endorsed the One China, different interpretations policy.
As another point of fact, there has been a notable dtente in cross-strait relations, with increased
trade and tourism and decreased (though remaining) military provocation. Realists and liberals Realists would argue that the PRC, being fully
aware of the United States vast investment in and concominant commitment to the
defense of Taiwan, agreed to this policy as a face-saving way to avoid a costly and
possibly unwinnable war with the United States at least for now. In the meantime, the PRC is happy
to trade with Taiwan and make some cash with which to patiently build up its military
might. Taiwan, for its part, is obviously aware that it would be largely destroyed in any US-China conflict, so it has agreed to One China as a general self-preservation measure. Unsure of the United
the currently waning public support in Britain for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. English School Explanation So,

States long-term commitment to it, it trades to accumulate its own power, so as to hopefully become enough of a potential military problem that China will judge itself better off trading than fighting at some point in

Liberals characterize the situation more simply, as one of mutual benefit; they have
both realized that they are better off trading than fighting. Nonetheless, they must save
face. The One China charade is simply a face-saving measure to preserve a semblance of national pride. (Marxists might
add, while the elites of both countries rake in profits behind the scenes.) Liberal Realism, or, the English School I think theyre both right. The best
the future.

explanation is a fusion of the liberal and realist positions . The realists go too far in assuming that international relations is a zerosum game, while the liberals fail to appreciate the anarchic and power-hungry aspect of things. Liberals are too optimistic and realists are too pessimistic.

China, or at least a

large faction of its leadership, definitely still wants Taiwan . They would probably take it
today if they thought they could get away with it, but they know they cant. So they will
settle for making lots of money from Taiwanese trade in the meantime , while they figure out what to do (or, who will
be in charge.) In time, this conciliatory but transient harmony could congeal into a more permanent arrangement, maybe, as more and more of the power elites in both countries realize that the benefits of
cooperation outweigh fighting (but, though likely, it will not necessarily do so.) Note that

the ordinary people are largely irrelevant in this

analysis, not because I am just a very mean person and dont like democracy, but as a
de facto statement of reality rather than choosing candy-coated empowering wishful
thinking . The ordinary people can usually be brought around to whatever the elites
decide . This is, in my opinion, a far more compelling and realistic analysis than positing the
metaphysical mutual co-construction of some entirely new aspect of Chinese reality
through social interaction and discourse. Mainland Chinese like making money.
Taiwanese like making money. The mainland would love to take over Taiwan and use
their resources to make even more money, but they are externally constrained (by the
US) from doing so for the forseeable future, so they arent. Being self-interested as well as not intrinsically warlike, and indeed sharing a common cultural bond (though it not be the major
factor), they gradually soften their position, bit by bit, and engage in trade as part of a general normalization of relations. No magical thinking required.

FoPo Debate Good: Agency/Skills

Debate over international policy is necessary to solve global crises and
provides an essential counterweight to government propaganda that
enables a reckless foreign policy
Walt 11, Profess of IR at Harvard (Stephen, International Affairs and the Public Sphere,
publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/)
There is today no shortage of global problems that social scientists should study in
depth: ethnic and religious conflict within and between states, the challenge of economic
development, terrorism, the management of a fragile world economy, climate change and
other forms of environmental degradation, the origins and impact of great power
rivalries, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, just to mention a few. In this complex and contentious world, one might
think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly valued commodity. Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would flock to courses that
helped them understand the world in which they will live and work, and policymakers and the broader public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say. One
might also expect scholars of international relations to play a prominent role in public debates about foreign policy, along with government officials, business interests,
representatives of special interest groups, and other concerned citizens. Social scientists are far from omniscient, but the rigor of the scientific process and the core values of
academia should give university-based scholars an especially valuable role within the broader public discourse on world affairs. At its best, academic scholarship privileges
creativity, validity, accuracy, and rigor and places little explicit value on political expediency. The norms and procedures of the academic profession make it less likely that
scholarly work will be tailored to fit pre-conceived political agendas. When this does occur, the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more likely that politically
motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed. Although we know that scholarly communities do not always live up to this ideal picture, the existence of these basic
norms gives the academic world some important advantages over think tanks, media pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. Yet the precise role that academic
scholars of international affairs should play is not easy to specify. Indeed, there appear to be two conflicting ways of thinking about this matter. On the one hand, there is a
widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public discourse about world
affairs. Former policymakers complain that academic writing is either irrelevant or inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion. This
tendency helps explain Alexander Georges recollection that policymakers eyes would glaze as soon as I used the word theory.[1] As Lawrence Mead noted in 2010: Todays
political scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with method and past literature. Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the
real world. . . . Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting. Inquiry is becoming obscurantist and ingrown.[2] Within the field of international affairs,
this trend has led to repeated calls to bridge the gap between the ivory tower and the policy community.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of prominent scholars have
recently organized workshops or research projects seeking to challenge this cult of irrelevance and deprogram its adherents, although it is not clear whether these efforts will
succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium reflects a similar concern: how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our
collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy disasters? On the other hand, closer
engagement with the policy world and more explicit efforts at public outreach are not without their own pitfalls. Scholars who enter government service or participate in policy
debates may believe that they are speaking truth to power, but they run the risk of being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways by the same individuals and
institutions that they initially hoped to sway. Powerful interests are all-too-willing to use the prestige associated with academic scholars to advance particular policy goals, and
scholars are hardly immune to temptations that may cloud their judgment or compromise their objectivity. Furthermore, scholars who embrace the role of a public intellectual
may be tempted to sensationalize their findings to attract a larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on which they have no particular expertise. Instead of improving
the quality of public discourse, such behavior may actually degrade it. The remainder of this essay explores these themes in greater detail. I begin by discussing the unique
contributions that academic scholars could make to public discourse on world affairsat least in theoryhighlighting their capacity to serve as an authoritative source of
knowledge about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issues (Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?). I then consider why there is a
growing gap between university-based scholars and both the policy world and the public sphere, and suggest that this trend is due largely to the professionalization of academic
disciplines and the concomitant rise of a quasi-academic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas (Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public
Sphere?). Next, I identify some of the pitfalls that scholars face when they become more active participants in the public sphere (The Pitfalls of Engagement). I conclude by
proposing several reforms that could help the social sciences make a more vital contribution to public understanding and policy formation in the broad domain of global affairs
(What Is To Be Done?). Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable? Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although
the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in
far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our towns school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering,
we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in
Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or
conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or
make sense of what it means. When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge
and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part
on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual
procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). Second, and more importantly,

an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to

shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous
information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are
especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs. Much of what we know about the outside world is
ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that
information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public
access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success

Given these information asymmetries and their obvious

interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that
both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for
depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6]

specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens .[7] This situation creates few problems
when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they dont. In such cases, alternative
voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to
suggest different solutions

to the problem(s) at hand. Because

scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic

freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they

are uniquely positioned to

challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and
training to bear on vital policy issues . If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and
correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies , then a sophisticated,
diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. Third, the scholarly world also
offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly
personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within
academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms
of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of

it is
highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about
key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research
can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make
sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose
among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help
policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to
success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of
benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from
daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop
new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.
academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. For all of these reasons,

Policy training is critical to producing effective foreign policy scholars

the affirmatives focus on theory and generalization ensures it will be
dismissed
Walt 11, Profess of IR at Harvard (Stephen, International Affairs and the Public Sphere,
publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/)
the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have
Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures
as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases
(i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymakers in-tray ). Thus, scholars are delighted
whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more
interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case
at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait
To some degree,

different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints.

until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 Arab Spring long before anyone fully understood what was driving these

Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often

find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might
wish. Yet the growing gap between theory and practice and the declining role of scholars in the public sphere also reflects the professionalization of academic disciplines and the norms and incentives that
events or where they might lead.

prevail in the scholarly world. In particular, the academic disciplines that are most concerned with global affairs (political science/international relations, history, economics, sociology, anthropology/area studies,
etc.) are largely governed by university-based scholars who have little if any experience in the policy world. With rare exceptions, policymakers, policy analysts, or public intellectuals do not play significant roles in
the governance of academic disciplines, leaving the latter free to set their own norms and criteria of merit. Not surprisingly, scholarly disciplines have come to privilege highly specialized research (as opposed to
teaching, public service, or public engagement) because that is what most members of these fields prefer to do. Yet this was not always the case. In the distant past, thinkers such as Machiavelli, Locke, Hobbes,
Madison, Marx or Burke were engaged in and inspired by the political events of their day and their writings were explicitly intended to shape public attitudes and inform elite conduct. During the Progressive Era,

the founders of modern political science in the United States consciously intended the knowledge they generated to improve the world, and the creation of organizations like the American Political Science
Association was intended in part to enhance the public role of political science knowledge. Not so long ago, it was not uncommon for leading scholars of global affairs to work in policy-making circles before

the norms and incentives of

contemporary academic life discourage scholars from active participation in the public
sphere or from doing work that is directly relevant to pressing global issues and
accessible to influential decision-makers.[12] In the vast majority of cases, promotion to tenure and eligibility for lucrative outside offers from competitor
universities depends on a scholars reputation among his or her professional peers, and not on their public profile or their contributions to real-world debates. As a result, most scholars of
global affairs do not try to write books or articles that would be directly relevant to policy
problems or accessible to a wider public audience. Although a few in-and-outers still exist, they are for the most part not drawn from the very top of the disciplinary hierarchy.[13] Younger scholars
returning to active intellectual careers or to write for both academic audiences and the broader public.[11] By contrast,

are cautioned not to waste their time publishing op-eds, weblogs, or articles in general readership journals. Scholars who write for Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, or even rigorously peer-reviewed journals such

Professionalization
also encourages scholars to employ specialized jargon and arcane methodological
techniques, because these devices reinforce the idea that members of the discipline are privy to specialized knowledge that non-members lack. At worst, a trivial result that
relies on the latest methodological fad will be judged superior to a bolder, more
counterintuitive, or potentially more fruitful argument that is presented in clear and easyto-understand prose. More advanced methods or techniques are preferable when they yield superior results, of course, but methodological
sophistication alone tells us relatively little about the value or the insights embodied in a
particular work. In fact, there is no great mystery as to what makes a piece of scholarship valuable. First, does it address an important question? Second, does it offer a creative or original
as International Security are sometimes dismissed as insufficiently rigorous, based on arbitrary and dubious notions of what constitutes genuine scholarship.[14]

answer, one that substantially alters our prior understanding of the phenomenon under study? Third, are its empirical claims valid and convincing? Finally, is it presented as clearly and accessibly as possible, so

privileging methodological
sophistication over the others is a hallmark of a professionalized discipline that, as a consequence, maximizes its autonomy, insulates itself from public scrutiny, and reinforces the belief that
that it can reach the largest possible audience (including the largest number of potential critics)?[15] Each of these qualities is important, and

its members possess specialized knowledge that is available only to them. At the most extreme, hyper-professionalized disciplines are like a guild of silversmiths whose members are judged solely on the purity of

inevitably widens the

gap between the ivory tower, the policy world, and the public sphere. Professionalization also discourages academic
the metal in their objects, and not on whether the items they made were useful, durable, or attractive. A similarly one-dimensional approach to scholarship

scholars from addressing controversial topics or challenging well-established taboos. Although university scholars are quick to defend the institution of tenure and the principle of academic freedom, in most cases
this commitment has more to do with a desire for lifetime sinecures than a commitment to using these protections to take on politically controversial topics. Smart young scholars know that being too controversial
can annoy potential donors, alarm deans and department chairs, and alienate senior colleagues, thereby undermining prospects for promotion or later advancement. Focusing ones efforts on narrow and
uncontroversial topics that are of interest only to ones fellow academicians is by far the safer route to the Holy Grail of lifetime employment. Given this incentive structure, it is hardly surprising that academic
engagement in the public sphere and the policy world is declining. Last but not least, the cult of irrelevance in academe is probably related to the concomitant emergence of independent think tanks. Although
such organizations increasingly mimic the academic world (e.g., by appointing fellows to endowed chairs to convey a quasi-academic image and aid fund-raising efforts), the two realms are quite different. Not
only do most think tanks exist in order to advance an explicit political agenda, but researchers at these organizations are often dependent on soft money and do not enjoy the full protections of tenure. They have
become increasingly influential in recent years in part because of their proximity to centers of power like Washington, New York, and London, but also because they work much harder than universities do at
wielding influence in the policy world. And although think tanks like the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution once performed research that was as rigorous and influential as most academic
scholarship, this is no longer the case. To the extent that think tanks also provide sinecures for once-and-future policymakers when their party is out of power, then these organizations will be even less likely to
produce research or commentary that challenges the prevailing Establishment consensus. The Pitfalls of Engagement Yet a more intimate connection between scholars, policymakers, and the broader public
carries its own pitfalls as well. For starters, academics aspiring to hold government positions may be even less likely to tackle controversial topics or take unpopular positions, because doing so might jeopardize
their chances for a future appointment. Indeed, because political appointees are chosen primarily for their loyalty and ideological compatibility and not for scholarly accomplishment, academics who seek direct
policy jobs are bound to tailor their work to suit those who might appoint them (or in the United States, to appease the Senators who will vote to confirm their appointments). This tendency does not mean that
scholars will say things they dont believe merely to get a job in government, but it would be nave to think that this concern never influences what an ambitious scholar would be willing to say in public. Greater
engagement can lead to other conflicts of interest as well. In particular, academics working on important aspects of global affairs may enjoy lucrative opportunities to do outside consulting, often at the behest of
wealthy or well-funded interests. National security experts are sometimes hired to consult for the Department of Defense or a major defense contractor, for example, or an economist might consult for banks,
hedge funds or private corporations. Different government agencies also hire consultants and sponsor academic research projects, which may tempt recipients to tailor their work to fit the agencys preferences or
to refrain from publishing results that might be embarrassing to the funder.[16] If relationships like these are not publicly disclosed, it is hard to know whether a scholars views on a given issue reflects a genuine
scholarly conclusion or whether it is at least partly influenced by financial or other professional incentives. At the very least, consumers of a scholars work should be informed about these arrangements so that
they can take obvious conflicts of interest into account. Even when money is not at issue, closer engagement with the real world creates other sources of potential bias. Scholars are only human, after all, and they
are hardly immune from seduction by powerful interests or individuals. Being asked to advise the Secretary of State, to participate in a Defense Department junket to Afghanistan or Iraq, or to serve on a
government task force can be a heady experience, and scholars may also regard such service as a patriotic duty. But academics that enjoy hobnobbing with public officials or powerful private interests may
become reluctant to do or say anything that might jeopardize their insider status. Instead of speaking truth to power, in short, academics can easily slide into telling the powerful what they want to hear, or at least
confining their comments to what they think is the acceptable range of opinion. There is even a potential downside when academics become public intellectuals. On the one hand, scholarly engagement in the
public sphere increases public awareness of key issues and foster a more informed and responsible citizenry. There may also be a link between public engagement and more effective teaching: the same skills
that help academics explain complex ideas to untrained students can make them more effective at informing the public (and vice versa). Writing op-eds, blogs, popular books, and articles is also a way to fulfill
academias broader responsibility to help society address important public problems, instead of engaging mostly in a self-serving internal dialogue among specialists. The danger, however, is that a craving for
public attention (not to mention book sales, speakers fees, and other rewards) will encourage some scholars to cast off academic rigor entirely and court notoriety for notorietys sake. It can also encourage
scholars to opine on topics that are far from our established areas of expertise and where we have no special insight or wisdom to impart. While there is an obvious problem with the cult of irrelevance, in short,
there is also a danger that academic scholars can become little more than hired guns; handmaidens to powerful interests instead of pursuers and proclaimers of truth. And if that happens, then academias unique
ability to serve as an independent and critical source of authoritative knowledge will be impaired. In short, no matter how much we may want academics to be more fully engaged in the public sphere, we should
also acknowledge that it is hard to have the best of both worlds.[17] What Is To Be Done? As scholars, therefore, our challenge is to chart a course between the Scylla of hyper-professionalized irrelevance and

the norms and incentives that guide the scholarly

enterprise are neither divinely ordained nor fixed in stone; like all norms, they are
socially constructed by the academic community itself and by the outside stakeholders who have an interest in what the academy
the Charybdis of corrupt opportunism. We should begin by recognizing that

produces. Members of academic disciplines are free to debate and determine which norms and incentives should guide our enterprise and to modify them as experience suggests. There is no objective reason
why greater engagement in the public sphere cannot be elevated in our collective estimation, along with the other criteria (rigor, originality, empirical validity, etc.) that scholars have traditionally (and correctly)
prized. If consensus on these norms proves elusive, then different universities or departments could adopt different criteria of merit and evolve in different directions. To some extent this may already be occurring,
as schools of public policy begin to occupy the policy-relevant space abandoned by hyper-professionalized arts and sciences departments. Indeed, greater disagreement about the norms used to judge academic
work might even be desirable, because a heterogeneous intellectual community working on these issues is probably preferable to a monoculture where a single method, theoretical perspective or political
orientation predominates.[18]Even the best social science theories are highly imperfect, and once-popular ideas and approaches are often exposed as hollow with the passage of time. When dealing with vital yet
contentious issues (i.e., the sorts of topics that routinely arise in world affairs), we will be better off nurturing a diverse intellectual ecosystem instead of placing all our bets on a single way of trying to grasp
something as complex and contingent as international affairs. The bottom line is clear: the academic study of international affairs will be impoverished if the relevant academic disciplines continue to turn inward, to
focus on narrow issues that are primarily of interest only to other scholars, and to become even less interested in communicating to policymakers, the broader public, or the bulk of our students (the vast majority
of whom do not want to be social scientists themselves). Accordingly, our goal should be to encourage a diverse, engaged community of scholars that is still committed to a free exchange of ideas and to high

What can be done to advance this goal?

standards of both rigor and relevance.

Here are six steps that would encourage greater academic engagement in
the public sphere without sacrificing a commitment to high scholarly standards. 1. Give Greater Weight to Real World Impact when Evaluating Individual Scholars and Academic Departments First, and most
obviously, academic departments could

give greater weight to policy relevance and public impact in hiring and promotion decisions. Instead of focusing

almost entirely on peer-reviewed professional journals and/or monographs by university presses, for example, promotion review committees could also do a systematic evaluation of a candidates other
contributions to knowledge and public discourse, including weblogs, popular journals, trade books, or other professional studies (such as National Academy of Science proceedings). As Bruce Jentleson noted a

decade ago, Should it really be the case that a book with a major university press and an article or two in a [refereed] journal . . . can almost seal the deal for tenure, but books with even major commercial
houses count so much less and articles in journals such as Foreign Affairs count little if at all? . . . The argument is not about padding publication counts with op-eds and other such commentaries, but it is to
broaden evaluative criteria to better reflect the type and range of writing of intellectual import.[19] Jentleson is surely right; it is the substance of a scholars work that should count, not where it happens to have
been published. This shift might be facilitated by another innovation, which was recently discussed among participants in the Perestroika movement in political science. What if junior faculty were told at the time
they were hired that they would be permitted to submit no more than five scholarly works when being considered for promotion to tenure? Instead of encouraging younger scholars to churn out as many
publications as possible (most of which will not even be read by most of the colleagues who will eventually vote on their case), this procedure would encourage scholars to publish fewer works of higher quality
and to aim for greater overall impact. As Lenin put it in another context, better fewer, but better. This norm would also make it easier for outside referees and senior colleagues to read these works in depth and
to judge them on their merits, instead of using the alleged prestige of the the journal or press as a proxy for a publications intellectual merit. Similarly, instead of focusing primarily on sheer quantity of academic
publications or imperfect measures like citation counts, review committees could be asked to perform a more systematic evaluation of a scholars impact on public discourse or policy debate.[20] In addition to
academic citation counts, for example, a review committee could also track the number of news reports or blog hits that discussed a candidates work, or examine citations in both academic and non-academic
journals. Similarly, in addition to obtaining the usual outside letters from senior scholars, review committees could also solicit evaluations from policymakers working in the same domain as the candidates primary
work. Non-academic appraisals must be used with caution, of course, as outsiders may be unfamiliar with academic standards or inclined to favor only those works that agreed with their political views. And they
are certainly no substitute for the confidential appraisals offered by senior scholars. But if an academic department cared about having a faculty that made positive contributions to the broader public sphere, then
surely it would want to know if a junior scholar working on a topic like ethnic conflict or nuclear proliferation was being read by important members of the relevant policy community or if their work was helping
shape how people outside academia thought and talked about these issues. A similar principle could also be applied to the evaluation of entire departments. External review committees should contain obviously
scholars from the relevant discipline, but they could include people drawn from outside academia as well. Instead of focusing on the deeply-flawed rankings provided by U.S. News and World Report or the
National Research Council, new efforts could be made to devise evaluative methodologies that were not stacked in favor of certain types of work.[21] Ranking indexes could also measure and incorporate on a
departments contributions outside the academy. University presidents, provosts, and deans could start holding departments accountable to a broader conception of merit as well, by stressing not just narrow
technical excellence but also the substantive importance of the facultys work and the contributions it had made to public understanding of them. 2. Encourage Professional Associations to Honor Public Impact
Professional associations could encourage greater involvement in the public sphere by doing more to acknowledge and valorize it. Consider that the American Political Science Association gives literally dozens of
annual awards for books, papers or articles in the various sub and sub-sub-fields of the discipline, judged almost entirely on a prize jurys assessment of scholarly merit. It gives one award (the Hubert H.
Humphrey Award) in recognition of notable public service by a political scientist, and one other award (the Charles Merriam Award) for a person whose published work and career represent a significant
contribution to the art of government. In short, real-world relevance is germane to only two of the dozens of APSA prizes awarded each year. If we want scholars to devote more time to engaging in the public
sphere, reducing this imbalance by making real-world impact or relevance an explicit criterion for the existing awards would almost certainly help, as would the creation of more prizes intended to honor scholars
whose work or careers are judged to have had a positive impact on the public sphere itself. 3. Encourage Younger Scholars to Participate in Policy-Related Activities Academic departments could encourage
greater involvement in the public sphere by making it easier for younger scholars to engage in it, either on their own or through programs like the International Affairs Fellowships sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations.[22] At present, few academic departments encourage junior scholars to take time off for public service, and few universities will stop the tenure clock if a junior faculty member wants to spend a
year serving in government or at a non-governmental organization such as Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, or the World Bank. If they enabled younger faculty to stop the clock in this way, however,
academic departments would have more members who understood how governments and key global organizations actually worked, and they would become more adept at translating scholarly research into
useful knowledge for their students and practical guidance for policymakers and the public at large. Such individuals would probably be better teachers as well, because students, unlike many professional
academics, really do care about the real world and have little tolerance for empty scholasticism. 4. Engage Policymakers and Knowledgeable Citizens in the Research Process As Craig Calhoun suggests in his
own contribution to this symposium, the scholarly world should do more to engage policymakers and other non-academic experts in the research process itself, instead of seeing them solely as objects of study.
We expect todays graduate students to master an elaborate methodological toolkit and to be familiar with an ever-expanding academic literature, but we rarely encourage them to interact with the policy
communities whose decisions and actions they are studying and rarely give them explicit training on how to soak and poke among policy elites. Not surprisingly, therefore, younger scholars are often content to
manipulate data sets or to write detailed case studies, but without engaging in any depth with the policymakers working in the relevant domain. Furthermore, if academic scholars made a practice of asking
practitioners what topics or questions might be most interesting or useful, the benefits for both communities might be considerable. For instance, what if people with real-world experience were regarded not just
as potential consumers of scholarship or as data points in a survey, but as a source of guidance about scholarly research agendas, methods, and modes of presentation? Instead of deriving dissertation topics or
research ideas primarily from lacunae in the academic literature, we could also ask policymakers what sorts of knowledge they would most like to have, or what recurring puzzles merit extended scholarly
attention. Among other things, outside experts are more likely to ask so what? when confronted by an elegant and well-crafted study addressing a question that is of interest to hardly anyone. In the same spirit,

we could also encourage students to plumb real-world policy debates in order to identify
underlying theoretical or empirical disputes that drive policy disagreements . Obviously, scholars should
still develop their own research agendas and not take their marching orders from non-academics blindly, but more extensive dialogue between the worlds of theory and of practice at the initial stages of a research
project could improve the overall quality of the research itself and make it more likely that policymakers would pay attention to the results.

Accidents/Miscalc Reps Good

And, accidental war is real and a risk its a separate risk that their
criticism doesnt account for
Sagan 00
(Scott D., Department of Political Science Stanford University,
ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE , pg online //um-ef)
war is conceived by these historians in pure Clausewitzian terms. It is a rational tool
controlled and used by statesmen to achieve important political objectives. Wars do not
begin by accident. Has there ever been an accidental war? One purpose of this essay is to answer "yes" to that specific
question: this is an effort, an "existence proof" if you will, to provide the logic and evidence
that cuts against the historian's consensus. A broader purpose of the piece, however, is to
In short,

provide a better analytic framework for understanding the phenomenon of accidental

war in general . What does it mean to say that a war was accidental or inadvertent? How should one assess such claims? The essay has three basic parts. First, I will define
the concept of accidental war and provide, through use of an analogy between accidental war and
automobile accidents, a typology of scenarios that could be realistically produce an
accidental war. Second, I will present in some detail an historical example of each of these types of an
accidental war. Finally, I will discuss the significance of this concept for our theories about the causes of war in the past and, unfortunately, in the future as well. Definitions and Analogies The
terms "accidental war" and "inadvertent war" could have many different meanings. Sometimes the terms have been used rather promiscuously to refer to any war in which such common factors as misperceptions
of an adversary's intent, overconfidence in crises, imperfect decision-making processes, or miscalculation of the consequences of war played some role in the conflict. This is not helpful: by this loose definition,

the terms are used in the literature to refer to the idea

that war could break out, at least in theory, not because it served the basic political
interests of states or statesmen, but rather because of some unintended consequence of the
structure or operations of military organizations. The theory of accidental war is
most wars in history could be seen as accidental. More commonly, however,

therefore based on the insight that military organizations are, like other complex
organizations and machines, inherently imperfect and therefore subject to break-downs
and accidents.

In this light,

professional military organizations are seen as tools of national

security, but tools that take on a life of their own and are very difficult to statesmen to control
when implementing the state's security policy in an international crisis . Could these
difficulties in organizational control be so intense that they could produce a war even when
statesmen on both sides believe that there is "no fundamental basis for an attack" (to use Thomas Schelling's term ) ? Decisions, Counterfactuals, and Accidents It is this more
narrow conception of accidental war which has produced the large conceptual gap
between political scientists and modern historians. As Marc Trachtenberg nicely
summarizes the historian's central perspective: The professional diplomatic historians
as a rule never paid much attention to the military side of the story. While military power as such was always seen as
very important, the coming of war was never viewed as the product of a dynamic that was largely military
in nature. We all took if for granted that war was essentially the outcome of political
conflict. But what does it mean to say that a war was "essentially the outcome of political conflict" and not an accident caused by a "dynamic that was largely military" in character? Certainly the
"test" used by the historians cited above to asses the "political conflict theory" and
criticize the "accidental war theory" is inadequate. In each of their works, the historians have an exceedingly narrow definition of accident in
mind. For them, the simple fact that a choice or a decision to use military force was made implies that some degree of intent existed and that the war was therefore not accidental. One should note the language of
soft rational choice at play here. Blainey, for example, argues that "there can be no war unless at least two nations prefer war to peace." Howard refers to "a deliberate and carefully considered act;" Brodie finds

statesmen seeing where the diplomatic "moves" are taking them; and Luard states that war has always been "the deliberate intention" of one party "at the time when war broke out" in the discussions quoted

both accidental acts and

deliberate actions usually involved some sort of decision. The point can perhaps best be made through the use of an analogy.
We all recognize that there are such things as automobile accidents. Yet, very few car
crashes would be automobile "accidents" by the historians' logic since individuals
"decide" or "choose" to steer their cars into other objects. Drivers "prefer" to veer to the
left, instead of the right. They make a "deliberate" decision to switch lanes when a car is
next to them. They "see" that they have "moved" into incoming traffic. They "intend" to enter the expressway, not
knowing that it is a one-way ramp going in the opposite direction. Individuals may still make decisions, and may still have their
hands on the steering wheel, but they are involved in automobile accidents nonetheless . To
continue the analogy, three pathways to an accidental war can be usefully compared to a kind of an
automobile accidents: accidents can be caused by false warnings or information, by
unauthorized activities, or by loss of control. In the body of this essay, each of these accident "scenarios" will be examined in some detail.
What does it mean, from a social science perspective, to call a war accidental? For a conflict to be
considered an accidental war, there would have to be some activity or incident inside the military machine,
without which war would not have occurred. It is not enough therefore to show that some
above. This definition of a "non-accidental" war -- that someone "decided" to initiate the use of force -- is highly misleading. Indeed,

military accident occurred and that it was the proximate cause of the outbreak of war ;
one must also argue that the war would not have occurred anyway. This obviously places
the scholar squarely into the problematic world of counterfactuals, but there is little
alternative to such thought experiments if we seek to understand whether a particular factor played "a very marginal role" or an essential role in causing any
specific historical event. To make reasonable judgements in such matters it is essential, in my view, to
avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination." Looking backwards at historical
events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of
a war and argue that the likelihood of conflict was so high that the war would have
broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. If taken too
far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes
our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors . The
point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. During the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, a bizarre false warning incident in the U.S. radar systems facing
Cuba led officers at the North American Air Defense Command to believe that the U.S.
was under attack and that a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida. Now imagine
the counterfactual event that this false warning was reported and believed by U.S.
leaders and resulted in a U.S. nuclear "retaliation" against the Russians. How would
future historians have seen the causes of World War III? One can easily imagine
arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War
was overdetermined: given the deep political hostility of the two superpowers, the conflicting ideology, the escalating arms race, nuclear war would have occurred eventually. If not
during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin, or the Middle East, or Korea. From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as

Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor
overdetermined during the Cold War.
misleading.

Neg Work

No nuclear escalation
US attack on China could avoid China nuclear retaliation if a commandcontrol strategy is executed without hitches
Talmadge 16, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George
Washington University, (Caitlin, February 2016, Conventional Counterforce as a Pathway to
Nuclear Escalation,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf)//kap
Policy Alternatives That Reduce Escalatory Risk The United States and its allies could examine alternative conventional approaches
that would not appear to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce and therefore would reduce the risk of Chinese nuclear

United States could signal restraint even in an

expansive conventional campaign that involved attacks on the Chinese mainland. For
example, the United States might be able to geographically constrain its incursions into China as
a somewhat arbitrary but clear way of communicating limited aims. It also could attack targets on the Chinese
escalation. Several studies have highlighted means by which the

mainland using standoff weapons only, so that a major air defense suppression campaign would not be necessary. In addition, the

United States could make a serious peacetime effort to develop target sets inside China that do
not have nuclear functions. Alternatively, the United States could adopt highly defensive approaches in which it would
refrain from all attacks on mainland China. For example, the United States could work with allies to cut off
Chinas access to vital waterways. Though such an approach might still entail very aggressive conventional military
operations within the first island chain, it could be less escalatory in the nuclear realm. In addition, the United
States and its regional allies and partners, such as Japan and Taiwan, could consider investing much
more heavily in passive defenses: these might include hardening, dispersal, redundancy, and resistance efforts
that would significantly raise the cost of Chinese attack and lower the probability that
suck an attack would deliver benefits to China. This so-called porcupine strategy could be
combined with additional asymmetric defenses that would use anti-access tactics and
operations to impose disproportionate costs on attacking Chinese forces, rather than
confronting them head-on. This alternative approach could be conventionally effective, but China would
be unlikely to mistake it for an attempt at counterforce. As such, it could sharply reduce the possibility of nuclear
escalation in the event of a U.S.China conventional war. In addition, it could help deter China
from engaging in conventional aggression in the first place.