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TodayisTuesday,August09,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.145370March4,2004
MARIETTAB.ANCHETA,petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFOS.ANCHETA,respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 59550
whichdismissedthepetitionerspetitionunderRule47ofthe1997RulesofCivilProceduretoannultheOrder2of
theRegionalTrialCourtofNaic,Cavite,Branch15inSpecialProceedingsNo.NC662nullifyingthemarriageof
the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the
motionforreconsiderationofthesaidresolution.
Thiscasearosefromthefollowingfacts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Theyhadeightchildrenduringtheircoverture,whosenamesanddatesofbirthsareasfollows:
a.ANAMARIEB.ANCHETAbornOctober6,1959
b.RODOLFOB.ANCHETA,JR.bornMarch7,1961
c.VENANCIOMARIANOB.ANCHETAbornMay18,1962
d.GERARDOB.ANCHETAbornApril8,1963
e.KATHRINAB.ANCHETAbornOctober29,1965
f.ANTONIOB.ANCHETAbornMarch6,1967
g.NATASHAMARTINAB.ANCHETAbornAugust2,1968
h.FRITZIEYOLANDAB.ANCHETAbornNovember19,19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children.
OnJanuary25,1994,petitionerMariettaAnchetafiledapetitionwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,Branch
40,againsttherespondentforthedissolutionoftheirconjugalpartnershipandjudicialseparationofpropertywith
apleaforsupportandsupportpendentelite.ThecasewasdocketedasSp.Proc.No.M3735.Atthattime,the
petitionerwasrentingahouseatNo.72CRMAvenuecor.CRMCorazon,BFHomes,Almanza,LasPias,Metro
Manila.4
OnApril20,1994,thepartiesexecutedaCompromiseAgreement5wheresomeoftheconjugalpropertieswere
adjudicatedtothepetitionerandhereightchildren,includingthefollowing:
b.Aparcelofland(adjoiningthetwolotscoveredbyTCTNos.120082andTCTNo.120083Cavite)locatedat
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No.
310882,togetherwiththeresortMuntingParaiso,TrainingCenter,fourstoreybuilding,pavilion,swimmingpool
andallimprovements.AllofthesharesofstocksofAnchetaBiofoodsCorporationweredistributedonethird(1/3)
tothepetitionerandtheeightchildrenonetwelfth(1/12)each.6
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The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent
vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
petitioner,withtheknowledgeoftherespondent,thenceforthresidedinthesaidproperty.
Inthemeantime,therespondentintendedtomarryagain.OnJune5,1995,hefiledapetitionwiththeRegional
Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC662. Although the respondent
knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he,
nevertheless,allegedinhispetitionthatthepetitionerwasresidingatNo.72CRMAvenuecornerCRMCorazon,
BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court
issuedsummonstothepetitionerattheaddressstatedinthepetition.8Thesheriffservedthesummonsanda
copyofthepetitionbysubstitutedserviceonJune6,1995onthepetitionersson,VenancioMarianoB.Ancheta
III,athisresidenceinBancal,Carmona,Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the
summonsandacopyofthepetitionwereservedonthepetitionerthroughhersonVenancioMarianoB.Ancheta
IIIonJune6,1995:
RETURNOFSERVICE
Thisistocertifythatthesummonstogetherwiththecopyofthecomplaintanditsannexeswasreceivedbythe
herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the
summons.ServicewasmadeonJune6,1995.
June21,1995,Naic,Cavite.
(Sgd.)JOSER.SALVADORA,JR.
Sheriff10
Thepetitionerfailedtofileananswertothepetition.OnJune22,1995,therespondentfiledan"ExParteMotion
toDeclareDefendantasinDefault"settingitforhearingonJune27,1995at8:30a.m.Duringthehearingonthe
saiddate,therewasnoappearanceforthepetitioner.ThepublicprosecutorappearedfortheStateandoffered
noobjectiontothemotionoftherespondentwhoappearedwithcounsel.Thetrialcourtgrantedthemotionand
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence exparte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order
granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a
CertificateofFinalityoftheOrderofthecourtonJuly16,1996.12
OnFebruary14,1998,ValentinesDay,therespondentandTeresitaH.Rodilweremarriedincivilrightsbefore
themunicipalmayorofIndang,Cavite.13
OnJuly7,2000,thepetitionerfiledaverifiedpetitionagainsttherespondentwiththeCourtofAppealsunderRule
47oftheRulesofCourt,asamended,fortheannulmentoftheorderoftheRTCofCaviteinSpecialProceedings
No. NC662. The case was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondentcommittedgrossmisrepresentationsbymakingitappearinhispetitioninSp.Proc.No.NC662that
she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila,
when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal,
Carmona,Cavite.Accordingtothepetitioner,therespondentdidsotodepriveherofherrighttobeheardinthe
saidcase,andultimatelysecureafavorablejudgmentwithoutanyoppositionthereto.Thepetitioneralsoalleged
that the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her
marriedson,VenancioMarianoB.AnchetaIII,aresidentofBancal,Carmona,Cavite,wheretherespondentwas
aresident.Furthermore,VenancioM.B.AnchetaIIIfailedtodelivertoherthecopyofthepetitionandsummons.
Thus,accordingtothepetitioner,theorderofthetrialcourtinfavoroftherespondentwasnullandvoid(1)for
lackofjurisdictionoverherpersonand(2)duetotheextrinsicfraudperpetratedbytherespondent.Shefurther
contended that there was no factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological
incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000.
Appendedtothepetition,interalia,weretheaffidavitsofthepetitionerandofVenancioM.B.AnchetaIII.
Thepetitionerprayedthat,afterdueproceedings,judgmentberenderedinherfavor,thus:
WHEREFORE,petitionerrespectfullypraysthisHonorableCourttorenderJudgmentgrantingthePetition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic,
Cavite).
2.Orderingrespondenttopaypetitioner
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a.P1,000,000.00asmoraldamages
b.P500,000.00asexemplarydamages
c.P200,000.00asattorneysfeesplusP7,500.00perdiemforeveryhearing
d.P100,000.00aslitigationexpenses
e.Costsofsuit.14
OnJuly13,2000,theCAissuedaResolutiondismissingthepetitiononthefollowingground:
Wecannotgiveduecoursetothepresentpetitionindefaultorintheabsenceofanyclearandspecificaverment
bypetitionerthattheordinaryremediesofnewtrial,appeal,petitionforrelieforotherappropriateremediesare
no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present
petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption
thatextrinsicfraudcanbeavalidgroundtherefor,thatitwasnotavailedof,orcouldnothavebeenavailedof,in
amotionfornewtrial,orpetitionforrelief.15
Thepetitionerfiledamotionforthereconsiderationofthesaidresolution,appendingtheretoanamendedpetition
inwhichshealleged,interalia,that:
4.Thispetitionisbasedpurelyonthegroundsofextrinsicfraudandlackofjurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed it was filed within the fouryear period after discovery of the extrinsic
fraud.
6.Thegroundofextrinsicfraudhasnotbeenavailedof,orcouldnothavebeenavailedofinamotionfor
newtrialorpetitionforrelief.
7.Thegroundoflackofjurisdictionisnotbarredbylachesand/orestoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no
longer available through no fault of petitioner neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This
petitionistheonlyavailableremedytoher.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondents marriage
was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on
whethertherewascollusionbetweentheparties,andtoordertheSolicitorGeneraltoappearfortheState.
OnSeptember27,2000,theCAissuedaResolutiondenyingthesaidmotion.
ThepetitionerfiledapetitionforreviewoncertiorariwiththisCourtallegingthattheCAerredasfollows:
1.InfailingtotakeintoconsiderationthekindofOrderwhichwassoughttobeannulled.
2.InfindingthatthePetitionwasprocedurallyflawed.
3.InnotfindingthatthePetitionsubstantiallycompliedwiththerequirementsoftheRulesofCourt.
4.InfailingtocomplywithSection5,Rule47,RulesofCourt.
5.Innotevenconsidering/resolvingPetitionersMotiontoAdmittheAmendedPetitionandinnotadmitting
theAmendedPetition.
6.InfailingtoapplytheRulesofProcedurewithliberality.17
Thepetitionismeritorious.
AnoriginalactionintheCourtofAppealsunderRule47oftheRulesofCourt,asamended,toannulajudgment
orfinalorderorresolutionincivilactionsoftheRTCmaybebasedontwogrounds:(a)extrinsicfraudor(b)lack
of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary
remediesofnewtrial,appeal,petitionforrelieforotherappropriateremediesarenolongeravailablethroughno
faultofthepetitioner.18Thepetitionermustallegeinthepetitionthattheordinaryremediesofnewtrial,appeal,
petitionforrelieffromjudgment,underRule38oftheRulesofCourtarenolongeravailablethroughnofaultof
hersotherwise,thepetitionwillbedismissed.Ifthepetitionerfailstoavailoftheremediesofnewtrial,appealor
relieffromjudgmentthroughherownfaultornegligencebeforefilingherpetitionwiththeCourtofAppeals,she
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cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19
Itisnotenoughtoallegeinthepetitionthatthesaidremedieswerenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofher
own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was
incorporatedintherulepreciselytoavoidabuseoftheremedy.20Accesstothecourtsisguaranteed.Butthere
must be limits thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court,heshouldnotbegrantedanunbridledlicensetosueanew.Theprevailingpartyshouldnotbevexedby
subsequentsuits.21
Inthiscase,thepetitionerfailedtoallegeinherpetitionintheCAthattheordinaryremediesofnewtrial,appeal,
andpetitionforrelief,werenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofherown.Shemerelyallegedthereinthatshe
receivedtheassailedorderofthetrialcourtonJanuary11,2000.Thepetitionersamendedpetitiondidnotcure
the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the
remediesofnewtrial,appealorpetitionforrelieffromjudgment,shedidnotexplainwhyshefailedtodoso.
We,however,rulethattheCourtofAppealserredindismissingtheoriginalpetitionanddenyingadmissionofthe
amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material
allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction
overthepersonofthepetitioner,onherclaimthatthesummonsandthecopyofthecomplaintinSp.Proc.No.
NC662werenotservedonher.Whiletheoriginalpetitionandamendedpetitiondidnotstateacauseofaction
for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a
sufficientcauseofactionforthenullificationoftheassailedorderonthegroundoflackofjurisdictionoftheRTC
overthepersonofthepetitioner,notwithstandingtheabsenceofanyallegationthereinthattheordinaryremedy
ofnewtrialorreconsideration,orappealarenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofthepetitioner.
InacasewhereapetitionfortheannulmentofajudgmentorfinalorderoftheRTCfiledunderRule47ofthe
RulesofCourtisgroundedonlackofjurisdictionoverthepersonofthedefendant/respondentoroverthenature
or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsiderationofthefinalorderorjudgmentorappealtherefromarenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofher
own.ThisissobecauseajudgmentrenderedorfinalorderissuedbytheRTCwithoutjurisdictionisnullandvoid
andmaybeassailedanytimeeithercollaterallyorinadirectactionorbyresistingsuchjudgmentorfinalorderin
anyactionorproceedingwheneveritisinvoked,22unlessbarredbylaches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material
avermentstherein,werebasednotonlyonextrinsicfraud,butalsoonlackofjurisdictionofthetrialcourtoverthe
person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the
complaint.Sheclaimedthatthesummonsandcomplaintwereservedonherson,VenancioMarianoB.Ancheta
III,who,however,failedtogiveherthesaidsummonsandcomplaint.
Evenacursoryreadingofthematerialavermentsoftheoriginalpetitionanditsannexeswillshowthatitis,prima
faciemeritorioushence,itshouldhavebeengivenduecoursebytheCourtofAppeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the
person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case
hasbeenfiledagainsthimand,thus,enablehimtodefendhimself.Heis,thus,putonguardastothedemands
oftheplaintifforthepetitioner.Withoutsuchserviceintheabsenceofavalidwaiverrendersthejudgmentofthe
court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he
knowsofthecaseagainsthimunlessheisvalidlyservedwithsummons.26
Summonsandcomplaintmaybeservedonthedefendanteitherbyhandingacopythereoftohiminperson,or,if
herefusestoreceiveandsignforit,bytenderingittoher.27However,ifthereisimpossibilityofpromptserviceof
the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be
effectedbysubstitutedserviceasprovidedinSection7,Rule14ofthesaidRules:
SEC.7.Substitutedservice.If,forjustifiablecauses,thedefendantcannotbeservedwithinareasonabletime
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendantsresidencewithsomepersonofsuitableageanddiscretionthenresidingtherein,or(b)byleavingthe
copiesofdefendantsofficeorregularplaceofbusinesswithsomecompetentpersoninchargethereof.28
InMirandav.CourtofAppeals,29weheldthatthemodesofserviceshouldbestrictlyfollowedinorderthatthe
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be
servedpersonallywithinareasonabletimethatsubstitutedservicemaybemadebystatingtheeffortsmadeto
find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This
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statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is
necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that
substitutedserviceofsummonsisamethodextraordinaryincharacterhence,maybeusedonlyasprescribed
andinthecircumstancescategorizedbystatutes.31
AsgleanedfromthepetitionandtheamendedpetitionintheCAandtheannexesthereof,thesummonsinSp.
Proc.No.NC662wasissuedonJune6,1995.32Onthesameday,thesummonswasservedonandreceivedby
VenancioMarianoB.AnchetaIII,33thepetitionersson.Whenthereturnofsummonswassubmittedtothecourt
by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein
within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no
mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely
showedhimthesummonsandthecomplaintandwasmadetoaffixhissignatureonthefaceofthesummonshe
wasnotfurnishedwithacopyofthesaidsummonsandcomplaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been
residingontheadjoininglandconsistingoftwo(2)lotslaterapportionedtomyfatherashisshareofthe
conjugalpartnership.Sincethen,Ihavebeenresidingthereinuptothepresent.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my fathers lot), my father
cametoseemeandthenaskedmetosignandIdidsignpaperswhichhe(myfather)andtheSheriffdid
not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for
annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or
copyofthecomplaint/petition.34
We,thus,rulethattheCourtofAppealsactedarbitrarilyindismissingtheoriginalpetitionofthepetitionerandthe
amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court.
However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The
recordsshowthatforthepetitionersfailuretofileananswertothecomplaint,thetrialcourtgrantedthemotionof
therespondenthereintodeclareherindefault.Thepublicprosecutorcondonedtheactsofthetrialcourtwhen
heinterposednoobjectiontothemotionoftherespondent.Thetrialcourtforthwithreceivedtheevidenceofthe
respondent exparte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor.TheactuationsofthetrialcourtandthepublicprosecutorareindefianceofArticle48oftheFamily
Code,whichreads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
betweenthepartiesandtotakecarethatevidenceisnotfabricatedorsuppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confessionofjudgment.35
ThetrialcourtandthepublicprosecutoralsoignoredRule18,Section6ofthe1985RulesofCourt(nowRule9,
Section3[e]ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure)whichprovides:
Sec.6.Nodefaultsinactionsforannulmentofmarriageorforlegalseparation.Ifthedefendantinanactionfor
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigatewhetherornotacollusionbetweenthepartiesexits,andifthereisnocollusion,tointerveneforthe
Stateinordertoseetoitthattheevidencesubmittedisnotfabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
applicationofArt.48oftheFamilyCode,oneofwhichconcernstheroleoftheprosecutingattorneyorfiscaland
theSolicitorGeneraltoappearascounselfortheState:
(8)ThetrialcourtmustordertheprosecutingattorneyorfiscalandtheSolicitorGeneraltoappearascounselfor
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quotedinthedecision,brieflystatingthereinhisreasonsforhisagreementoropposition,asthecasemaybe,to
thepetition.TheSolicitorGeneral,alongwiththeprosecutingattorney,shallsubmittothecourtsuchcertification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
GeneralshalldischargetheequivalentfunctionofthedefensorvinculicontemplatedunderCanon1095.38

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ThisCourtinthecaseofMalcampoSinv.Sin39reiterateditspronouncementinRepublicv.CourtofAppeals,40
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the
RulesofCourtandtheFamilyCode,aswellastherulingsofthisCourt.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and
notmereproformacompliance.Theprotectionofmarriageasasacredinstitutionrequiresnotjustthedefenseof
atrueandgenuineunionbuttheexposureofaninvalidoneaswell.42
Agrantofannulmentofmarriageorlegalseparationbydefaultisfraughtwiththedangerofcollusion.Hence,in
allcasesforannulment,declarationofnullityofmarriageandlegalseparation,theprosecutingattorneyorfiscalis
orderedtoappearonbehalfoftheStateforthepurposeofpreventinganycollusionbetweenthepartiesandto
take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendantspouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determineifcollusionexistsbetweentheparties.Theprosecutingattorneyorfiscalmayopposetheapplication
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adducedisdubiousandfabricated.
Ourconstitutioniscommittedtothepolicyofstrengtheningthefamilyasabasicsocialinstitution.Ourfamilylawis
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The breakup of
familiesweakensoursocialandmoralfabrichence,theirpreservationisnottheconcernofthefamilymembers
alone.43Whetherornotamarriageshouldcontinuetoexistorafamilyshouldstaytogethermustnotdependon
the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,
incapacitatingsuchpartytofulfillhisorhermaritaldutiesandobligations.
INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheResolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsdated
July13,2000andSeptember27,2000inCAG.R.SPNo.59550areherebySETASIDEandREVERSED.Letthe
recordsofCAG.R.SPNo.59550beremandedtotheCourtofAppealsforfurtherproceedingsconformablywith
theDecisionofthisCourtandRule47oftheRulesofCourt,asamended.
SOORDERED.
Quisumbing,(ActingChairman),AustriaMartinez,andTinga,JJ.,concur.
Puno,J.,(Chairman),onleave.

Footnotes
1PennedbyAssociateJusticeRenatoC.Dacudao,withAssociateJusticesCancioC.Garcia(Chairman)

andB.A.AdefuindelaCruz,concurring.
2PennedbyJudgeEnriqueM.Almario.
3CARollo,pp.2627.
4Id.at26.
5Rollo,pp.95102.
6CARollo,pp.45.
7Id.at49.
8Id.at53.
9Id.
10Id.at54.
11Id.at5759.
12Id.at212.

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13Id.at213.
14Id.at21.
15Id.at101.
16Id.at109.
17Rollo,p.36.
18Rule47,Section1.
19Republicv.Sandiganbayan,352SCRA235(2001).
20Herrera,RemedialLaw,Vol.III,1997ed.,p.549.
21Pacquingv.CourtofAppeals,115SCRA117(1982).
22Ramosv.CourtofAppeals,180SCRA635(1989).
23SEC.3.Periodforfilingaction.Ifbasedonextrinsicfraud,theactionmustbefiledwithinfour(4)years

fromitsdiscoveryandifbasedonlackofjurisdiction,beforeitisbarredbylachesorestoppel.
24211SCRA879(1992).
25Umandapv.Sabio,Jr.,339SCRA243(2000).
26UnitedCoconutPlantersBankv.Ongpin,368SCRA464(2001).
27Rule14,Section6,RulesofCourt.
28Supra.
29326SCRA278(2000).
30Keisterv.Navarro,77SCRA209(1977).
31Ibid.
32CARollo,p.53.
33Ibid.
34Id.at5556.
35Supra.
36Supra.
37268SCRA198(1997).
38Id.at213.
39355SCRA285(2001).
40Supra.
41 The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 021110SC

whichtookeffectonMarch15,2003.
Sec. 8. Answer.(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by
publication.Theanswermustbeverifiedbytherespondenthimselfandnotbycounselorattorney
infact.
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(2)Iftherespondentfailstofileananswer,thecourtshallnotdeclarehimorherindefault.
(3)Wherenoanswerisfiledoriftheanswerdoesnottenderanissue,thecourtshallorderthe
publicprosecutortoinvestigatewhethercollusionexistsbetweentheparties.
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court
ordermentionedinparagraph(3)ofSection8above,thepublicprosecutorshallsubmitareportto
thecourtstatingwhetherthepartiesareincollusionandservecopiesthereofonthepartiesandtheir
respectivecounsels,ifany.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and, if
convincedthatthepartiesareincollusion,itshalldismissthepetition.
(3)Ifthepublicprosecutorreportsthatnocollusionexists,thecourtshallsetthecaseforpre
trial.ItshallbethedutyofthepublicprosecutortoappearfortheStateatthepretrial.
42Seenote39.
43Tuasonv.CourtofAppeals,256SCRA158(1996).
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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