Vda. De Molo vs.

Molo
G.R. No. 182295 June 26, 2013
Facts:
Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality
of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir.
He was survived, however, by his wife, Juana Vda. de Molo
(petitioner), and by his nieces and nephew, Luz and
Cornelio Molo (oppositors), who were the children of the
deceased brother of the testator. Mariano left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June
20, 1939.
On February 7, 1941, Juana filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition seeking the probate of the will
executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no
opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition
filed by the oppositors, the order of the court admitting the
will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened.
After hearing, at which both parties presented their
evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of
said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove
that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20,
1939, petitioner on February 24, 1944, filed another petition
for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same
oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three
grounds: (1) petitioner is now estopped from seeking the
probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been
executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will
has been subsequently revoked. But before the second
petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came and
the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a
petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same was found
to be impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors
could produce the copies required for its reconstitution. As a
result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14,
1946, similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors
filed an opposition based on the same grounds as those
contained in their former opposition. The case was set for
trial, and on May 28, 1948, the court issued an order
admitting the will to probate.
Issue: Whether the will executed in 1918 be probated in
view of the disallowance of the 1939 will of the testator?
Held: Yes
As stated in the case of Samson vs. Naval, a subsequent
will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having

been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in

conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce
the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void.
While it is true that the law on the matter (sec. 623, Code of
Civil Procedure) provides that a will may be some will,
codicil, or other writing executed as proved in case of wills"
but the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within
the meaning of said word, but as "other writing executed as
provided in the case of wills", simply because it was denied
probate. And even if it be regarded as any other writing
within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for
holding that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it
cannot have the effect of revocation.
Oppositors contend that, regardless of said revocatory
clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because
of the presumption that it was deliberately revoked by the
testator himself. The oppositors contend that the testator,
after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of
the recovatory clause contained said will, himself
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for
that reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in
these proceedings is only a duplicate of said original.
But there is no evidence which may directly indicate that
the testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918
will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will he executed in 1939.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed
the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a
duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the
most logical step for the testator to take is to recall said
duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed.
But this was not done as shown by the fact that said
duplicate copy remained in the possession of petitioner. It is
possible that because of the long lapse of 21 years since the
first will was executed, the original of the will had been
misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the
testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing
exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may
be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of
circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct
evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first
will by the testator. This matter cannot be inference or
conjecture.
Assuming arguendo that the earlier will was voluntarily
destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second
will, which revoked the first, if such is the case, it is the
opinion of the Court that the earlier will can still be
admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent
relative revocation".

The rule is established that where the act of destruction is

connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of
the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional
and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and
if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original
will remains in full force. The failure of a new testamentary
disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions,
and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a
mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It
must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new will.
The Court thus concluded that even in the supposition that
the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating
the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded
on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
executed and would be given due effect. The theory on
which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest
when he executed two wills on two different occasion and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore
be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
Heirs of Late Jesu Fran vs. Salas
G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992
Facts
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on July 10,
1972 in Cebu City with neither descendants nor ascendants;
she left real and personal properties located in Cebu City,
Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte.
Earlier, on April 23, 1972, she executed a last will and
testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives
(brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties,
and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus
Fran, as executor to serve without bond. Instrumental
witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre
and Primo Miro.
On July 15, 1972, Fran filed a petition with the Court of
First instance of Cebu for the probate of Remedios' last will
and testament. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not
physically well and, therefore, will not be assuming the
position of administratrix. Hence, the court appointed
petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
On 10 August 1972, private respondents, who are sisters of
the deceased, filed a manifestation alleging that they needed
time to study the petition because some heirs who are
entitled to receive their respective shares have been

intentionally omitted therein, and praying that they be given

ample time to file their opposition, after which the hearing
be reset to another date.
Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead,
they filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of
Probate of the Will" wherein they expressly manifested,
with their "full knowledge and consent that they have no
objection to the allowance of the will of the late Remedios
Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo," and that they have "no objection to
the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of petitioner,
Dr. Jesus Fran." No other party filed an opposition. The
petition thus became uncontested.
The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate
the will of the testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo,
and appointing Fran as executor thereof. Fran thereafter
filed an Inventory of the Estate; copies thereof were
furnished each of the private respondents.
Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the
dispositions made in the will and signed by all the devisees
and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C.
Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was
submitted by the executor for the court's approval. Said
legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they
admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together
with the notice of hearing, and state that they had no
objection to its approval.
After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued
its Order approving the same, declaring the parties therein
as the only heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia
Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator to deliver to the
said parties their respective shares and decreeing the
proceedings closed.
Private respondents then filed with the new Branch VIII an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate
judgment and the Order of partition, in said motion, they
ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit
their opposition to the allowance of the will. They allege
that: (a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will; (b)
the will is a forgery; (c) they were not notified of any
resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time
within which to file their opposition, or of the order
authorizing the clerk of court to receive the evidence for the
petitioner, or of the order closing the proceedings; (d) the
reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void (e) the
project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they
were not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the
project of partition as administrator and not as executor,
thereby proving that the decedent died intestate; (g) the
petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law;
and (h) the petitioner never distributed the estate to the
devisees and legatees.
Respondent Judge then issued an Order setting for hearing
the said Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration

Consequently, the instant petition was filed challenging the

jurisdiction of the lower court in taking cognizance of the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration considering that the
probate judgment and the order approving the Project of
Partition and terminating the proceedings had long become
final and had in fact been executed. Private respondents had
long lost their right to appeal therefrom.
However, respondent Judge proceeded with the hearing of
the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent
Judge likewise issued an Order on stating that unless he
received a restraining order from this Court within twenty
(20) days therefrom, he will reopen Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R.
The Supreme Court issued a restraining order enjoining
respondent Judge from reopening Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R.
However, on the same date, before the restraining order was
served on him; respondent Judge issued the impugned order
declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void,
finding the signature of the late Remedios M. Vda. de
Tiosejo to be a forgery, decreeing the reopening of Sp. Proc.
No. 3309-R and converting the same into an intestate
proceeding.
Hence, petitioners filed their Second
Supplemental Petition asking this Court to declare as null
and void the Order of 2 June 1980 and, pending such
declaration, to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing the
same.
Issue: Whether Judge Salas committed grave abuse of
discretion when he reopened the probate of the will?
Held: Yes
The Court held that the respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November
1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of
the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary
dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the
testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and
undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably
passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set
the same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will
is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate is
conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and
it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding.
The Court wished also to advert to the related doctrine
which holds that final judgments are entitled to respect and
should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a
wavering of trust in the courts.
Furthermore, private respondents had lost their right to file a
petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that their

omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly 6

years, 10 months and 22 days after the rendition of the
decision, and 6 years, 1 month and 13 days after the court
issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which
they voluntarily expressed their conformity through their
respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
The Court also held that the annexing of the original will to
the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly
evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person
named therein regardless of whether or not he is in
possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed.
The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for
their examination renders completely baseless the private
respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part in
securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the probate of
the will. If indeed such withdrawal was conditioned upon
Fran's promise that the private respondents would be shown
the will during the trial, why weren't the appropriate steps
taken by the latter to confront Fran about this promise
before certifications of conformity to the project of partition
were filed?
Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment
of said promise constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of the
kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 37 and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or
even a separate action for annulment of judgment. It is
settled that for fraud to be invested with, sufficiency, it must
be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the
issues raised during the trial which resulted in such
judgment.
The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously
denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-opening
of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for
execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, the
Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has
possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court
would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding
to order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled
thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed
within the reglementary period, a separate action for the
recovery of the shares would be in order. As the Court saw
it, the attack of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a
clever ploy to give asemblance of strength and substance to
the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting
therein a probate court committing a series of fatal,
substantive and procedural blunders, which the Court find
to be imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated.