Pubcorp week 5

Dual Personality
Lidasan vs Comelec
21SCRA 496
Principle:
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality
of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency
of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that
they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
(Lidasan vs Comelec)
Facts:
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and
petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes
be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that
the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional
for embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous

subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify
the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact
of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In
fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from
its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local
application, originated.
The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms
where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the
title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged
purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of
Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One,
it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

DELEGATED POWERS

Rubi vs Provincial Board

39 Phil 660
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
Facts:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes
of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and
one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The
action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor.
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by
the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
Issue:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial
official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?
Held:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature

to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive

departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board
and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law.
This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted
to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.
People vs Vera
65Phil56
Facts:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a
motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The
SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of
Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office, which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed
by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
Issue:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
Held:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided
for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has
to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for
probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without
such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided
into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and
this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no
probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the
probation system.
SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991)
Facts:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by
LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also
observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not
directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the
Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the
confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal
of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court
issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit
separate comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling.
The Metro Manila Authority (MMA) defended the ordinance on the ground that it was

adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies,

promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The
flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does
not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation
of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention,
however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a
formal challenge to its validity.
Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare

Clause embodied in the LGC

Held:
No.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are.
1) The completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of
the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to
the will of their principal.
To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and
6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing
law. The pertinent law is PD 1605.

PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.
There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan
Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to
"impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under
such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the
removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be
imposed by the Commission.
Notably,
Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license
shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila,
including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains
itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what
is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.
In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the
ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating
national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent
bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts,
to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of
speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end
be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the
requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in
fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect
partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605
applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority
conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish
violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed,
including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were
enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the
effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and
enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must
also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of
such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At
any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory

prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by
virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the
exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments
in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions
prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.
Discussion:
What is the role of the local government units?
Why is it important to distinguish what personalities this local government has
taken?
Difference between GOCC, Government Agency and Government Instrumentality?

GOCC may be performing functions proprietary and governmental functions

Agency performing the will of the government
Government Instrumentality an organization performing governmental function.