Cabague v.

Auxillo
G.R. No. L-5028
November 26, 1952
Bengzon
FELIPE
CABAGUE
AND
GERONIMO
CABAGUE
petitioners
responden MATIAS AUXILIO AND SOCORRO AUXILIO

Fernandez

ts
summary Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued Matias Auxillio and his daughter

Socorro to recover damages from Matias and Socorros refusal to honour their
contract with Felipe and Geronimo. Matias and Socorro promised that Socorro
will marry Geronimo provided that Geronimo would make improvements on
their house and spend for the wedding. The complaint was dismissed for being
unenforceable under the rule of evidence. SC ruled that there were in fact two
agreements: the one for improvement and the one for the wedding. For breach
of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This
is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible. However
Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an
agreement in consideration of marriage

facts of the case

Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to
recover damages resulting from Matias and Socorros refusal to carry out the previously
agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo.
The complaint alleged that:
o Matias and Socorro promised such marriage to Geronimo, provided the latter would
improve the their house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the
bride;
o Feliper and Geronimo made the improvement and spent P700; and
o Matias and Socorro refused to honor their pledged word.
Matias and Socorro moved to dismiss, arguing that the contract was oral, unenforceable
under the rule of evidence and the court dismissed the case.
Court of First Instance affirmed the dismissal.

issue

(1)May the contract be proved in court? YES BUT ONLY GERONIMOS ACTION MAY BE
MAINTAINED.

ratio

The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really
involves two kinds of agreement:
o Agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the
marriage of Socorro and Geronimo.
o The second agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry".
For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is
such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible.
However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in
consideration of marriage.
Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the
theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against
Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such damages as may have resulted
from her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.Wherefore this expediente will
be returned to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

DOMALAGAN v. BOLIFER
G.R. No. 8166

8 Feb 1916

Johnson, J.

Gan

petitioners JORGE DOMALAGAN

responden CARLOS BOLIFER
ts
summary Domalagan and Bolifer verbally agreed that Domalagan shall pay P500 (plus

P16 as token for future marriage) upon the marriage of their children to each
other. Domalagan paid the agreed sum but later found out that Bolifers
daughter was joined in lawful wedlock with another man. Domalagan
demanded for the return of the amount he paid. But Bolifer contends that the
contract was not valid as it was not reduced into writing.
The Supreme Court held that since the contract was merely verbal, it falls
under the 3rd paragraph of Section 335. Said section requires some note or
memorandum in order to prove the existence of the contract, otherwise the
contract is unenforceable. HOWEVER, during the trial, Bolifer did not object to
any proof presented by Domalagan which showed or tended to show the
existence of the alleged contractwhich made such proof binding upon Bolifer.

facts of the case

- On Nov 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a verbal contract in which the parties agreed that
Domalagan was to pay to Bolifer the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with
Bolifers daughter, Bonifacia Bolifer.
- On Aug 1910, Domalagan paid the agreed sum of P500 plus a further sum of P16 as hansel or token of
future marriage.
- Notwithstanding the agreement, Bonifacia Bolifer was joined in lawful wedlock with Laureano Sisi.
- Upon learning of Bonificias marriage, Domalagan demanded from Bolifer the return of the sum he paid
(P516) together with interest and damages. He further alleged that in order to raise the sum of P500, he
was obliged a certain real property belonging to him at a great sacrifice.
- Bolifer presented a general denial and alleged that the facts stated in the compliant do not constitute a
cause of action.
- Lower court: ruled in favor of Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to pay P516 together with interest at 6% per
annum.
- Bolifer appealed to the Supreme Court.

issue

Whether the verbal contract entered into by Domalagan and Bolifer in regard to the delivery of
the money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective. YES.

Ratio
- Citing paragraph 3 of Section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, Bolifer argues that by virtue of
the provisions of said paragraph and by virtue of the fact that the agreement had not been reduced to
writing, Domalagan could therefore not recover.
Section 335. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed
by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
1. . . .
2. . . .
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry.

- Supreme Court found that during the trial, Bolifer never objected to any proof presented by Domalagan
which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract.
- Section 335 provides that evidence of the agreement referred to cannot be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents. Here, all of the evidence relating to the said agreement was
admitted without the slightest objection.
- Section 335 does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said
section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be
enforced by an action unless the same is evidence by some note or memorandum. Said section simply
provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that
said contract are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in
paragraph 5 of said section (335).
- A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is
not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a
failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the
statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
- If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral
evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
Held: Lower court decision affirmed.

HERMOSISIMA v. CA
G.R. No. L-14628
30 September 1960
J. Concepcion
petitioner Francisco Hermosisima
respondent Court of Appeals
summary Petitioner and his girlfriend, Soledadolder than him by around 10 years
had sex on a boat. When Sol became pregnant, Frank promised that he
would marry her, but a month after their daughter was born, he married
someone else. The lower courts awarded moral damages, on the basis
that seduction had occurred. The SC deleted the award for moral
damages, stating that seduction as contemplated in Art. 2219 is the
crime, as punished by Arts. 337 and 338 of the RPC. Besides the
age gap, court also considered the fact that Sol was supposedly more
enlightened than Frank, being a high school teacher and insurance agent.
Lastly, the court considered the fact that Sol admitted that she gave in to
Frank out of love for him.

facts of the case

Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in Sibonga Provincial High School, Cebu, who later became an
insurance underwriter. She and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, who was almost 10 years her
junior, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, though Frank had made no
prior promise of marriage to her.
One evening, after coming from the movies, they had sex in Franks cabin onboard the M/V
Escao, where he was then an apprentice pilot. Later, Sol told Frank that she was pregnant, so he
promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima 1 was born the next year. The month
after her birth, however, Frank married a certain Romanita Perez.
Sol thus instituted this complaint for acknowledgment and support of her child as Franks
natural child, as well as for moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Frank admitted
paternity and said he was willing to support the child, but denied ever having promised to marry
complainant Sol.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring that Chris was Franks natural daughter and
ordering payment of support, actual and compensatory damages, moral damages, and
attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, except as to the award of actual and compensatory and moral
damages, which were increased. The basis of the CA in affirming the trial court was Art. 2219(3),
which states that moral damages may be recovered from one who is liable for seduction.

issue
1. Main: Whether there was seduction in this case. NO.
2. Secondary: Whether moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry. NO.

ratio

1. Seduction under Arts. 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code does not exist in this
case.
The language used in Art. 2219(3), CC, strongly indicates that the seduction contemplated
therein is the crime, as punished by Arts. 337 and 338 of the RPC.
Petitioner Frank is not morally guilty of seduction in this case. He is approximately 10
years younger than complainant Sol. The Court also considered that Sol was supposed to be
highly enlightened, as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent, whereas Frank
was a mere apprentice pilot when the two became intimate.
Finally, the court of first instance had found that Sol surrendered herself to Frank
because she had been overwhelmed by her love for him and wanted to bind him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. Thus the Court could not
find that seduction, as contemplated in the RPC, had occurred in this case.
2. There is no cause of action to recover damages for breach of promise to marry in
Philippine civil law, apart from the recovery of money or property advanced on the
faith of such promise.2
The proposed Civil Code initially contained provisions that would have made the breach of
promise to marry an actionable right, but these articles were eliminated in Congress, on the
ground that, as in the United States and England, breach of promise suits tend to lend
themselves more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. Thus, Heart Balm
suits have been abolished in many American States.

1 Chris daw yung pangalan, pero daughter daw sabi ng case.IDK.

2 Consistent with the ruling in De Jesus v. Syquia.
6

Thus, based on the clear and manifest intent of lawmakers not to sanction actions for
the breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages was improper.
The Court therefore eliminated the award for moral damages in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, but affirmed in all other respects.

WASSMER v. VELEZ
G.R. No. 20089

December 26, 1964

Bengzon, J.

Gonzales

petitioners
Beatriz P. Wassmer

responden Francisco X. Velez

ts
summary Beatriz and Francisco were set to wed on Sept. 4, 1954. Two days before the

wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz that the wedding will have to be
postponed for his mother opposes it. A day before the wedding he sent a
telegram to the bride-to-be assuring her that nothing has changed and that
he will return soon. He never returned. Beatriz sued Francisco for damages.
RTC ruled in favor of Beatriz. Upon appeal, the SC likewise ruled in favor of
Beatriz. SC: Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

facts of the case

On August 23, 1954 Beatriz and Francisco applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed
and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party
dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received.
And then, with but two days before the wedding, Francisco Velez, who was then 28 years old,
simply left a note for Beatriz stating: "Will have to postpone wedding-My mother opposes it . . ."
Francisco enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding,
he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon". But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered Francisco to pay
Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as
there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

issue

Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is actionableNO.

Whether or not Velez is liable for damagesYES.

ratio

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the above-described preparation, and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 (NCC).
Note that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that "Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage".
Francisco is held to be liable not only for actual damages (for the costs of the wedding prep
already incurred) but also moral and exemplary damages. Per Article 2219 (10) of the new Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, considering the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant
clearly acted in a "wanton . . . reckless [and] oppressive manner."

Estremos v. Ephan
CV No. 68300
December 23, 1986
BARTOLOME
SPOUSES
FRANCISCO
ESTREMOS
AND
ESTRELLA
ESTREMOS, ET AL.
petitioners
responden SPOUSES GONZALO EPHAN AND RESURRECCION VALENZONA, ET AL

Leynes

ts
summary Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos were college sweethearts. Erlinda became

pregnant with Virgilios child. The parents of Virgilio arranged the wedding of
their son to Erlinda after Erlinda informed them of the pregnancy. Days before
the wedding, Virgilio ran away and the wedding did not push through. The
Estremos family sued the Ephan family for breach of promise to marry under
the exception stated in Wassmer v Velez. The Court stated that the Wassmer
case is not on point since in this case, Virgilio was only forced to enter into the
promise to marry and that Erlinda is also to blame.

10

facts of the case

Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos fell in love with each other sometime in September 1975,
which culminated in Virgilio Ephans having carnal knowledge of Erlinda Estremos several times
with her consent.
Erlinda became pregnant. The parents of both parties arranged the wedding of Erlinda and
Virgilio, despite Virgilios protest.
On July 22, 1976, Virgilio sent a letter to Mrs. Estremos stating that he was not going thru with
the wedding and disappeared.

issue

WON the Ephans are liable for the breach of promise to marry. NO. Erlinda is also to blame
and should shoulder some of the responsibility.

ratio

Marriage being a lifelong arrangement, the parties to it should be deliberate and mature. The
Supreme Court has recognized the fact that there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an
action for breach of promise to marry.
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The SC previously
emphasized that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the
provisions that would have it so.
The Supreme Court, however, laid down certain exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v.
Velez (Dec. 26, 1964). Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, the SC found that to formally set a
wedding and go through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the matrimony
is about to be solemnized, is quite different [from a breach of promise to marry]. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Art 21.
However, in Wassmer v Velez, it was the parties themselves who entered into the agreement
to marry. In this case, it was the parents that agreed connive Virgilio to her in a marriage
celebration. Erlinda was as much to blame for said breach.

11

Tanjanco v. CA
G.R. No. l-18630
December 17, 1966
Apolonio
Tanjanco
petitioners
responden CA and Araceli Santos

J. J.B.L. Reyes

Nuez

ts
summary Based on guy's promise to marry her, girl allowed him into her pants. She

became pregnant and the guy refused to marry her and support the child. Girl
filed for damages under Article 21. The Court held that since there was no
seduction on the guy's part (she consented, and she was of legal age), there
was no element of deceit and therefore there is no case for damages under
Article 21. Case dismissed, without prejudice to an action for recognition of the
child or for support.

12

facts of the case

Apolonio started courting Araceli in 1957. Because of his promise to marry her, Araceli
consented to having sexual intercourse with Apolonio regularly until 1959. She became pregnant,
which resulted to her resigning from her job due to humiliation.
Because of Apolonio's refusal to marry Araceli, she filed a complaint for moral and exemplary
damages and for recognition of their child and support.
CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action but the CA reversed, finding basis for
damages in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

issue

Whether Apolonio is liable for damages. NO.

ratio

CA relied on the example of an Article 21 situation given during the Code

Commission's deliberation, but it was not on point - the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction
Examining the complaint, there was no seduction employed on Araceli - Over and
above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had
she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.

13

Baksh v. CA
G.R. No. 97336
19 February 1993
J. Davide
GASHEM
SHOOKAT
BAKSH,
petitioner,
petitioners
responden HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Ortiz

ts
summary Baksh proposed to Gonzales that he would marry her after the academic

semester ends. Gonzales accepted. The petitioners attitude towards her

changed a week before the filing of the complaint. He maltreated her and even
threatened to kill her. During a confrontation a day before filing the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement. He said that he is already
married to someone living in Bacolod. The Court ruled in favor of the
respondent. The breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
The court held that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind
it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

14

facts of the case

A complaint for damages was filed by respondent Gonzales with the RTC, alleging the
following:
1. She is 22 years old, single, Filipino, and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community
2. Petitioner Baksh is an Iranian citizen residing in Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City
3. Before 20 August 1987, the Baksh courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year
4. On 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments;
she was a virgin before she began living with him
5. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries
6. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her
not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City
Defense of Petitioner: he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent. Baksh told Gonzales to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner shall pay damages amounting to PhP 20k for
moral damages, PhP 3k for attorneys fees, and PhP 2k for litigation expenses.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Argument of the Petitioner: Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or
proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her.

issue

WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines

ratio
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
The court held that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
The court said that the ruling in Hermosisima v. CA does not apply since in that case because the
complainant in that case wanted to bind the defendant by having a fruit of their engagement
15

even before they had the benefit of clergy. In the case at bar, the Gonzales surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of
moral seduction.
The respondents profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to
fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her
and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the
Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

16

Panganiban v. Borromeo
G.R. No. ######
September 9, 1933
JOSE
R.
PAGANIBAN
petitioners
responden ELIAS BORROMEO

Panganiban

Ramos

ts
summary Husband and wife executed and subscribed to a contract where they agreed

that husband is permitted to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live
in an adulterous relationship with another man WITHOUT OPPOSITION from the
other.
ISSUE: WON the agreement was valid.
Court said the contract contains provisions contrary to law, morals and public
order, and as a consequence is not valid. However, since they both agreed to
the stipulations in the void contract, it operates as a bar to prosecution for
adultery or concubinage if ever they want to prosecute the other in the future.

17

facts of the case

On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife, subscribed a
contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo. The contract was prepared by the municipal
secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document
and had, at lease, some knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been fully
informed because of a difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an
agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take
unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another
man, without opposition from either one of them.

issue

WON the contract between husband and wife was valid (NO)

ratio

The contract of the spouses was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code, as
modified by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding, however, that the more liberal provisions of
the Revised Penal Code should be given application, it is herein provided that the consent or
pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or concubinage.
In this instance, if the spouses should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either
one by the other could be expected.
(IMPORTANT PART)
Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize adultery and
concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be
instituted if the offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of
future contingency and is not matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We
hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and
as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

18

In Re Santiago
Adm. Case No. 923
June 21, 1940
-petitioners
responden Atty. Roque Santiago

Laurel

Recto

ts
summary Ernesto Baniquit and Soledaci Colares were separated for 9 years and executed
a document authorizing each other to marry again upon the legal advice of
Atty. Santiago. Ernesto contracted a second marriage. He tried to rectify the
situation by executing a deed of cancellation of the contract. An administrative
case was filed against Atty. Santiago and he was suspended for 1 year. Such
contract was void and without legal effect according to NCC 221.

19

facts of the case

This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor General against Roque
Santiago charging him with malpractice.
Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife Soledaci Colares for 9 years and
wanted to contract a second marriage, sought legal advice from Atty. Santiago. He was a
practicing attorney and notary public of Negros Occidental.
Santiago asked Ernesto to bring his wife that afternoon of the same day. He prepared a
document that the contracting parties authorized each other to marry again, at the same time
renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. He
assured them that they were again single.
Ernesto remarked, Would there be no trouble? and Santiago replied pointing to his diploma
on the wall, I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid.
Ernesto contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. Santiago asked to for P50.
Santiagos defense is that he had the idea that 7 years separation of husband and wife would
entitle either to contract a second marriage. Upon realizing his mistake, he asked for the parties
to execute a deed of cancellation.

issue

Whether or not Santiago is guilty of malpractice 3 YES

ratio

The document executed is contrary to law, moral and tends to subvert the vital foundation of
the family. The advice given and the preparation of the document all constitute malpractice
which justifies disbarment.
Santiago was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in
giving legal advice. Following the recommendation of the investigator, instead of disbarment he
is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.

3 Relevant provision of NCC: Art. 221. Article 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:(1) Any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

20

Selanova v. Mendoza
Adm. Matter No. 804-CJ
May 19, 1975
Aquino
Saturnino
Selanova
petitioners
responden Alejandro Mendoza, City Judge, Mandaue City

Reynes

ts
summary A judge prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the

conjugal partnership of a married couple. The court ruled that such an

agreement is void as it contravenes Art. 221 of the Civil Code (see note 1).

21

facts of the case

1. Judge MENDOZA prepared and ratified a document dated Nov. 21, 1972, extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the Saturnino SELANOVA and his wife Avelina
CENIZA.
a. A condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw their
respective complaints for adultery or concubinage against each other.
2. SELANOVA charged MENDOZA with gross ignorance of the law based on the above
facts.
3. MENDOZA commented that he was aware of the invalidity agreement but he
nevertheless ratified the same on the assurance that the spouses would ask the CFI
where they reside to approve the above agreement. He also alleged that he relied on
Art. 191, 4 of the (old) Civil Code, which provides that the husband and wife may
agree upon the dissolution of conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval.
a. MENDOZA also surmised that SELANOVAs complaint was instigated by a lawyer
whose case was adversely decided by MENDOZA. This was denied by SELANOVA.
4. MENDOZA retired in 1975, after which he asked the court for a compassionate view in
view of his 43 years of service in the government and his familys current financial
predicament. He admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the questioned
document, which he caused SELANOVA and his wife to sign.

issue

W/N the agreement in question is void YES, it is.

W/N MENDOZA should be drastically penalized NO, he deserves only a severe censure.

ratio

The agreement in question is void.

The agreement contravenes Art. 221 of the (new) Civil Code. 4
Even before the enactment of the (new) Civil Code, it has been held by the Supreme Court
that an extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was
void.
MENDOZA deserves only a severe censure.
Similar acts have been punished by severe censure, reprimand, or suspension from the
practice of law.
Mendoza, due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition against contracts for the
personal separation of husband and wife and for the extrajudicial dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, prepared the said void agreement.
o He was admitted to the bar in 1948. Because he did not study the new Civil Code in
law schoo, he might not have been cognizant of Art. 221 thereof.
o Taking into account his apparent good faith and a sincere desire to terminate the
marital conflict, only a severe censure should be meted against him. This should not
be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement benefits (assuming that there are no
other causes for depriving him of such benefits.

4 The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife; []

22

LICHAUCO-DE LEON v. CA
G.R. No. 80965
June 6, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.
Villarroya
Sylvia
Lichauco
De
Leon
petitioners
responden The Hon. Court Of Appeals, Macaria De Leon and Jose Vicente De Leon

ts
summary Sylvia and her husband Jose separated (de facto) due to irreconcilable

differences. Thereafter, Sylvia entered into a Letter-Agreement with Joses

mother, Macaria, concerning the termination of relations between Sylvia and
Jose. Macaria assailed the validity of this agreement on the ground that its
purpose was to terminate the MARITAL relationship of Sylvia and Jose. Sylvia,
on the other hand, insisted that the purpose was limited to their PROPERTY
relations. The SC declared the Letter-Agreement null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy.

23

facts of the case

Private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were married
in 1969. In 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable
marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home and flying to the US. Thereafter, Sylvia
entered into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, Macaria De Leon, with respect to the
termination of relations between her and Jose. Sylvia and Jose then filed a joint petition for
judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership
Macaria filed her complaint in intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of the LetterAgreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital relationship
between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the
Letter-Agreement was the termination of PROPERTY relations with her husband and not their
MARITAL relations.

issue

Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid. NO

ratio

It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous, perforce, it is subject
to interpretation.
On page two of the Letter-Agreement, the parties contemplated not only to agree to a judicial
separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings. If taken
with the apparently ambiguous provisions regarding termination of 'relations', the parties clearly
contemplated not only the termination of property relationship but likewise of marital
relationship in its entirety. Furthermore, it would be safe to assume that the parties not having
specified the particular relationship which they wanted to peacefully and amicably terminate had
intended to terminate all kinds of relations, both marital and property.
While there could be inherent benefits to a termination of conjugal property relationship
between the spouses, the court could not clearly perceive the underlying benefit for the
intervenor insofar as termination of property relationship between petitioners is concerned,
unless the underlying consideration for intervenor is the termination of marital relationship by
divorce proceedings between her son Jose Vicente and his wife petitioner Sylvia. (IN OTHER
WORDS, why would Macaria, mother of Jose, be a party to the Letter-Agreement if the said
document concerned only their conjugal property? Her interest would only be limited to the
marital relations between her son and Sylvia.)
The Letter-Agreement, premised on the termination of marital relationship, is not only
contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public policy. As such, any agreement or
obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be
deemed null and void.

24

PUGEDA v. TRIAS
G.R. No. L-16925
Mar 31, 1962
Labrador, J.
Casila
plaintiff Fabian Pugeda
defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Gabriel (all surnamed Trias), Romulo, Gloria, Fernando (all surnamed
Viniegra), Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda
summary Pugeda seeks partition of several lands, which he alleges to be part of his conjugal partnership with
Maria (mother of defendants). Defendants Trias and Viniegra allege that the properties were inherited
by them from their father (first husband of Maria) and deny the marriage between Pugeda and Maria
because there was no record of the marriage in the municipalitys record of marriages. SC held that
the evidence submitted conclusively showed that Pugeda and Maria were married. It cited the rule
that for marriages, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted,
unless the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of
any kind and that the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not of the requisites of a valid
marriage.

facts of the case

Plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the his marriage with the deceased Maria Ferrer, they acquired
with conjugal partnership funds certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration and that
upon the death of Maria, he became co-owners of the properties with defendants and defendants managed the
properties in trust as co-owners. He prays that the properties be partitioned and thereof be given as his
share.
The Trias and Viniegra defendants denied the claims of the plaintiff and alleged that the properties had
been inherited by them from their deceased father Mariano Trias and Maria Ferrer and had been in possession
and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years. Defendats Trias also denied that plaintiff was married to
Maria and introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite in the
month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein.
Defendants Pugeda joined plaintiff in his claim that the properties were joint properties of the plaintiff and
the defendants.

issue
W/N a valid marriage exists between Fabian Pugeda and Maria Ferrer - YES

ratio
Plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of Jan 5, 1916, on the eve of
Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and Maria went to the office of the Justice of the Peace (Ricafrente), to ask
the latter to marry them. Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses. After the
usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the witnesses
had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of the
Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. No celebration of
the marriage was held in spite of the prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy
campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and Maria was already on the family way.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage, plaintiff lived in the house of
Maria, which was the house of Mariano Trias and Maria. A baptismal certificate submitted states that the
baptized child was the issue of the spouses Fabian and Maria. The registry of said birth was also submitted
and it states that the father is Fabian and the mother is Maria.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with Maria until the death of the latter (18
years), publicly and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" was signed
by the defendants themselves, which states: x x x Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y ferrer, are the
children of her second marriage with Fabian Pugeda.
Art. 53, Civil Code provides: As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a
certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or
25

have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by
evidence of any kind.
In Madridejo v. De Leon, it was held that the non-forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate does
not invalidate a marriage since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity
were not present. The forwarding of a copy is not of the requisites.
The evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff was in fact married to Maria and the marriage
subsisted from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter.

26

Juanita Sison vs Te Lay Ti

CA No. 7037-R
May 7, 1952
Reyes J.B.L.
Chua
Petitioners Juanita Sison
Respondent Te Lay Ti
s
Summary A marriage was arranged by Juanitas father, as was customary among
Chinese, between her and Te. Juanita refused and ran away from home
however her father succeeded in bringing her back. She was kept locked in
their house until the day of her wedding where she was handed a knife and
told to choose between losing her life or his (father) if she did not marry Te.
Thus she was married to Te twice, before a Judge and the Chinese Consul. The
Court declared the marriage null and void on the ground that the brides
consent was obtained by force and intimidation. Although such vice in consent
may be ratified by cohabitation, such must be voluntary. In this case, even
though Juanita lived in the same roof with her husband, she was kept a virtual
prisoner thereat. She never acquiesced to her status as Tes wife.

27

Facts of the Case

Juanita wants her two marriages, celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 to Te be declared
null and void for having been obtained through force and intimidation employed by her father. They
were first married in the morning by Judge Hofilena and then in the afternoon by Chinese Consul
Mih in accordance with the rites of China.
Juanita testified that her father first brought up the topic of marriage two weeks before its
celebration. Prior to this, Te never wooed her. She refused but her father whipped her as often as
she opposed the proposed marriage.
Two days before the wedding she ran away from home. She went to the office of the Fiscal but her
father came to get her with the promise that he would no longer force her to marry against her will.
However, upon return, she was kept locked in the house. The morning of her wedding day, her
father handed her a knife telling her to choose between losing her life or his if she did not marry Te.
Because of fear that her father might kill her, Juanita consented.
Juanita related that although she married Te, she had always considered him a stranger. He kept her
a prisoner in their house. Even if they sleep in the same room, she never occupied the same bed
but slept in a chair.
They never had sexual intercourse except for one instance, one month after their wedding in the
early morning when Te forced her with a knife to submit to his wishes, for which she mustered
enough courage to escape from her husbands home.
Te claims that their marriage, in all respects, was regular and legal. He said that she was not kept a
prisoner but used to go out often; that one day she left carrying with her Php1,200; when asked, the
latter retorted that it was none of his business; that because of her scathing remarks and
aggressive attitude, he slapped her. She left his house in the morning and in the afternoon he was
summoned by the police for maltreatment of his wife.

Issue
Whether or not Juanitas consent to the marriage was procured by force and intimidation. YES.
Whether or not such was ratified by cohabitation. NO.
Ratio
Juanitas testimony was corroborated by her mother and is even supported by Tes
witnesses. Judge Hofilena who officiated the marriage admitted on cross that Juanita came
to him shortly before her marriage and confided to him that she was being compelled by
her father to marry a man she did not like. It was for this reason that the Judge requested
an additional witness in the person of Mr. Teng as a precautionary measure.
Mr. Teng testified that during the ceremony he noticed that the Judge was irked by the
hesitant attitude displayed by the bride. He also testified that Juanitas father solicited his
help in going to the Fiscal to take his daughter back home, during which the former
confessed that his daughter did not want to marry according to his wishes.
Nowhere in the record was it ever denied by Te that Juanita was induced to marry him only
through fear and compulsion. Her father, which would have been the most logical witness
to refute the allegations, was never presented.
As a general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of consent which was
clearly manifested to determine its reality. However, mere words without any
corresponding intention will not create the marriage relation. Notwithstanding that the
28

formalities indicating consent have been complied with, there is no valid marriage where
the parties do not intend to enter into the marriage.
On second point, while a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and
confirmed by cohabitation, such cohabitation must be voluntary. It is clear from Juanitas
testimony that there was no voluntary cohabitation on her part and she never acquiesced
to the status of wife.

29

Vilar v Paraiso
G.R. No. L-8014
Mar. 14, 1955
Pedro
V.
Vilar
petitioners
responden Gaudencio V. Paraiso

Bautista-Angelo, J.

Cristobal

ts
summary Paraisos election as Mayo was challenged on the ground that he is a minister of UCCP.
It is important to determine whether he has really resigned, because the authority of
the solemnizing officer who officiates marriages is a formal requisite for validity of
marriages.

30

facts of the case

Vilar and Paraiso were among the candidates for Mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Paraiso obtained
1,509 votes, 41 votes higher than Vilar in the Nov. 13, 1951 elections. Vilar instituted a quo
warranto case, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as Mayor since he was a
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and as such was disqualified to be a
candidate under the Revised Admin Code.
Paraiso claimed that he resigned as minsiter on Aug. 21, 1951 and that this resignation was
accepted by the cabinet of his church in a special meeting on Aug. 27, 1951.
TC: Paraiso ineligible. Vilar cannot be declared mayor for lack of sufficient legal basis.

issue

WON Paraiso really resigned as minister? NO

ratio

Part pertinent to us:

Since 1944 up to 1950 Paraiso acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages
as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries that on April 19, 1950,
respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to
work in the same place and chapel during the years 19441950 that on April 7, 1951, respondent
applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as
minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952 that said license has never been
cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor respondent has requested for its
cancellation and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United Church of
Christ. but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as
minister.
The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is
twofold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious
functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so with regard to the authority to
solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory.
Although Paraiso submitted certain documents purporting to show the alleged resignation
and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting, the Court branded them as selfserving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an
attempt to obviate his disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we
examine the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the
minutes of all the meetings of the church, because upon an examination thereof one would at
once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and net with such seriousness and
solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well-established religious order.
Declaring Vilar as Mayor, having obtained second place in the elections cannot be done in
the absence of an express provision authorizing such declaration.

31

ARAES v. OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
April 11, 2002
Mercedita
Mata
Araes
petitioners
responden Judge Salvador Occiano

ts
summary

Puno

Enad

Judge Occiano was charged with gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing
a marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction (judge of MTC Balatan but
solemnized in Nabua) and without a marriage license. Held: Judge liable for
solemnizing outside his jurisdiction, and acted in gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized the marriage without the license. Under BP 129, the
authority of RTC judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
SC. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art. 3 FC, which
though may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize the marriage. Judge
Occiano did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner.

32

facts of the case

-

Petitioner charges judge of MTC of Balatan, CamSur with gross ignorance of the law,
alleging that Judge Occiano solemnized her marriage to her late groom Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camsur, which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobias pensions (he was a retired
Commodore of the Phil Navy).
Judge: (1) Orobia suffered from a stroke and could not stand the rigors of travelling so he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in Nabua; (2) When he discovered that the couple did
not possess the marriage license, he initially refused to solemnize the marriage, but due to
the pleas of the couple, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the
occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion, only
reiterating after the ceremony the necessity for the marriage license. However, the license
was never delivered to his sala.
Petitioner then executed an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that it was her fault that their
marriage was void, and that she only filed the complaint out of rage.
OCA: Judge Occiano guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. Fine of 5k.

issue

WoN the judge can be held liable. YES.

ratio

Under BP 129, the authority of RTC judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the SC. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Art. 3 FC, which though may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Applied: Judge Occianos act of solemnizing the marriage in Nabua is contrary to law and
subjects him to admin liability. His act may not amt to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion, but he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Judge Occiano should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize the marriage. Judge Occiano did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner = he acted in gross ignorance of the
law.
Petitioners Affidavit of Desistance cannot exculpate Judge Occiano. The withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary
action. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matterscant
be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may condone a detestable act.

33

Martinez v. Tan
G.R. No. L-4904
5 February 1909
Rosalia
Martinez
plaintif
defendant Angel Tan

J. Willard

Espaola

summary Plaintiff Martinez denies having married defendant Tan, in spite of documentary

evidence and witnesses testimonies pointing to the conclusion that they had
married with the intention of keeping the union a secret from Martinezs
parents. The issue, therefore is whether Martinez and Tan had indeed married
each other on 25 September 1907 before the justice of the peace in Palompon,
Leyte: in this regard, both the lower court and the Supreme Court ruled that
the two had indeed been married.
Martinez further alleged that in spite of the documentary evidence and the
testimonies, what occurred on that date was not a valid marriage. The Court
emphasized, however, that no form of ceremony is required for marriage,
and it suffices that the persons to be wed appear personally before
the solemnizing officer to declare that they take each other as
husband and wife. Here, they had made those declarations in the documents
personally presented to the justice of the peace. The Court ruled that in
signing those documents, Tan and Martinez had taken each other as
husband and wife, and thus what took place on 25 September
amounted to a legal marriage.

34

facts of the case

Plaintiff Martinez commenced this action in order to demand damages and to cancel the
certificate of marriage showing that she wed defendant Tan on 25 September 1907 before the
justice of the peace in Palompon, Leyte
Martinezs version of events:
She was visiting Palompon for two weeks to visit her brother and stay at his house, and had only
ever gone to school every morning and to church once
She admits that she signed an expediente de matrimonio civil but was not aware of its
nature, because she signed it in her own home, at the request of defendant Tan, who
told her that it was a document authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents so
that they may marry
She rode the steamer Rosa to Ormoc, and though defendant Tan was on the same boat, they did
not communicate
She and the defendant never lived with each other as husband and wife
Upon arriving in Ormoc, she consulted with her family, and thereafter went to Cebu to file this
action

Tans version of events, based on the testimony of witnesses and on documentary evidence
presented:
He and plaintiff Martinez married each other on 25 September 1907
Martinez wrote 9 letters to defendant Tan before and even after the wedding, showing that
they had indeed planned to marry without the knowledge of the plaintiffs parents

Letter No. 6: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law
will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the
Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
Letter No. 7: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or
10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of
loading lumber. Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing
to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the
court-house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that
we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.
Letter No. 9: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be
informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.

Testimony of witness Pacita Ballori:

On 25 September, Martinez requested that Ballori go to the store of a Chinese named Veles
At the store, she met Martinez and Martinezs mother
On the pretext of looking at some dress patterns at Balloris house, Ballori and Martinez left
Martinezs mother
Instead of going to Balloris house, however, Ballori and Martinez secretly went to the justice of
the peace for the wedding ceremony
After the ceremony, they went to Balloris house for Martinezs mother to pick up the plaintiff

Some of the documentary evidence presented:

(1) The expediente de matrimonio civil, which contains a statement to the efect that Martinez
and Tan had mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage and a petition
directed to the justice of the peace that he solemnize their marriage
(2) The marriage certificate signed by the justice of the peace and two witnesses (Ballori and a
certain Zacarias Esmero), stating that Martinez and Tan were legally married by the
justice of the peace in the presence of witnesses on that day

The lower court had ruled for defendant Tan based on the testimonies and documentary
evidence

issue
Whether plaintiff Martinez and defendant Tan had indeed married on 25 September 1907.
YES. All the documentary and testimonial evidence lead to this conclusion. It suffices
35

that the parties signed before the justice of the peace documents in which they
declare that they take each other as husband and wife, since no particular form of
marriage ceremony is required under the law.

ratio

The evidence, as described above, is strongly preponderant in favor of the conclusion that the
plaintiff Martinez did in fact appear before the justice of the peace to wed the defendant Tan
The plaintif claims, however, that even admitting all the testimonies of witnesses,
what occurred was not a legal marriage. This is untenable.
General Orders, No. 68, 6: No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.
Testimony of Zacarias Esmero:
The justice of the peace had said nothing until the documents were signed, and then
only said, You are married
The documents contain the declaration that the parties took each other as husband
and wife
The parties thus agreed to unite in marriage when they personally appeared
before the justice of the peace and signed the document
Both Martinez and Tan were able to read and write Spanish, so they knew the contents of
the document that they signed
Thus, what took place on 25 September amounted to a legal marriage
The judgment of the lower court is thus affirmed

36

Madridejo v. De Leon
G.R. No. 32473
October 06, 1930
Villa-real
Fernandez
MELECIO
MADRIDEJO,
ASSISTED
BY
HIS
GUARDIAN
AD
LITEM,
PEDRO
MADRIDEJO
petitioners
responden GONZALO DE LEON ET AL

ts
summary After his first husband died, Flaviana lived with Pedro Madridejo. A child was

born unto them named Melecio based on the records of the registry of births.
Later, Flaviana Perez married Pedro in articulo mortis. Melecio sought to be
legitimated. The Court ruled that the marriage between Flaviana and Pedro
was valid notwithstanding the failure of the parish priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. This is not an essential requisite
of marriage. As to whether Melecio was legitimated, the Court ruled in the
negative as Melecio was neither voluntarily acknowledged nor compulsorily
acknowledged.

37

facts of the case

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez had one child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio died in 1915.
o During her widowhood, Flaviana lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor.
The registry of births of the on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro
Madridejo.
o On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child was christened Melecio Perez at the parish church
of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father.
On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan.
o She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by
Eulogio de Leon, and the Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband,
Pedro Madridejo.
o Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.

issue
(2)Was the marriage between Flaviana and Pedro valid? YES.
(3) Did the marriage between Flaviana and Pedro gave Melecio the status of a legitimated
child? NO.

ratio
The marriage in article mortis was valid.
The mere fact that the parish priest failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that
the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
Melecio was not acknowledged.
Under CC 121, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the
natural children born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either
before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment:
voluntary and compulsory.
As to Pedro, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily acknowledged
Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry certificate of birth.
o This is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks the requisites of article
48 of the Law of Civil Registry. While it is a public instrument, but it has neither been
executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he
acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son.
o While Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with
the necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said
official inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not sufficient to
bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the Flaviana, it does not appear that Flaviana supplied the data set forth in the civil
registry of births Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, and which constitutes final proof only
of the baptism, and not of the kinship or parentage of the person baptized. Furthermore,
church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents.
On the other hand, the compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in CC 135, and
by the mother according to CC 136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against
38

the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up as the heirs of both, for
the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of
the court.
o In this action, Melecio not only has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural
child, which is the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the
subsequent marriage but he has not even impleaded either his father, Pedro
Madridejo,' or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might
have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his being a natural
child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as such.
Lastly, Melecio alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to an
admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving
that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage.
o Such an admission would have been effective if the present action had been brought
for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee
as her son.

39

G.R. No. 173540

January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, VS. TECL A HOYBIA AVENIDO

Facts:

Tecla Hoybia Avenido instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido.

Allegations

In her complaint, Tecla alleged that

o marriage - 30 Sep 1942 in Talibon, Bohol (Parish Priest)
o She has a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR)
o However, due to World War II, records were destroyed.
o During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children.
o In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by
the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977.
o In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman (Peregrina).
Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim
o Ako legal wife!
o marriage - 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.

Evidence Presented:

Tecla:
o 1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno [sister of Eustaqio] , Climaco Avenido and Tecla herself
o 2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually
filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila;
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of
Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War
issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as
requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.

Peregrina
o Testified that Tecla was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.
o Documentary evidence
1) 1979 Marriage Contract
40

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted
marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom
he had 4 children
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of
Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
RTC dismissed the case for failure of Tecla to present the marriage certificate
CA ruled in favor of Tecla. Marriage to Ate P was bigamous.
o RTC erred when it disregarded
(1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla];

(2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction
of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.
Peregrina appealed. OSG raises the following legal issues:

1. WON the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage;
2. WON secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the
execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original
document;
3. WON a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence
of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.
Issue:
WON the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
Ratio:
In Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons
birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Vda de Jacob v. CA: Marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence. Truly, the execution of a
document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof.
Due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was
shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: rationale behind the presumption:
41

The
basis
of
human
society
throughout
the
civilized
world
is
that
of
marriage.1wphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
The establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla;
the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral
of Talibon, Bohol.
The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID.

42

Abbas v Abbas

43

BORJA-MANZANO v. SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-0001329
8 March 2001
Davide, C.J.
HERMINIA
BORJA-MANZANO
petitioners
responden JUDGE ROQUE SANCHEZ, MTC, INFANTA, PANGASINAN

Gan

ts
summary Herminia, the legal spouse of the late David Manzano, charges respondent

Judge with gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage contracted by
the late David with another woman, Luzviminda Payao, both of whom had prior
subsisting marriages. The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law because cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and
Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their
separated affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact
that David and Luzviminda had been cohabiting for seven years already prior
to their marriage could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.

facts of the case

- Complainant Herminia charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law.
She avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married to him on May
21, 1966.
However, on March 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent judge.
She contends that when respondent judge solemnized the said marriage, he know or ought to know
that the same was void and bigamous as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated.
- Respondent judge claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not
know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
That had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again, otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
That he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question based on two separate affidavits of the late
Manzano and of Payao which were sworn to before him.
Both Manzano and Payao expressly stated in their separate affidavits that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had
been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited and
communicated with their spouses anymore.
- Court Administrator: recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000

issue
Whether respondent Judge should be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. YES.

Ratio
- For Art. 34 FC (on legal ratification of marital cohabitation) to apply, the ff. requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
44

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years
[and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications
of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage
- Not all requirements are present in this case.
The parties had legal impediment to marry each other.
- In their separate affidavits, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, it was indicated in their marriage contract that both were separated.
- Respondent judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separated affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
- The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial.
Art. 63(1) FC allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This
holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
- Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.
It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated
by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
- Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence.
It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when
the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
Held: Recommendation of Court Administrator is adopted but the amount of fine is increased to P20,000.

45

NIAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

Ynares-Santiago, J.

Gonzales

petitioners
Engrace Nial for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors Babyline Nial, Ingrid
Nial, Archie Nial & Pepito Nial, Jr.

responden Norma Bayadog

ts
summary Nial and Bayadog were married in 1974. Nial shot his wife Bellones in 1985,

causing her death (why didnt they convict him of parricide???). After a year
and a half, Ninal contracted a second marriage with Bayadog without a
marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at
least five years. Ninal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a
declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage with Bayadog. It is assumed that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect the children's
successional rights.
SC: Nial and Bayadog's marriage is void for lack of marriage license. They are
not exempt from acquiring a marriage license because their five-year
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five
years that they had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal
impediment.
Other than for purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of the Family Code),
no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case.

46

facts of the case

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article
47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action
for annulment of marriage.

issue

Whether or not the second marriage (between Pepito and Norma) is validNO.
Whether or not the petitioners can file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his
deathYES.

ratio

On the validity of the marriage between Pepito and Norma

The two marriages involved were solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
An exception wherein a marriage license is dispensed with refers to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage (Article 76, NCC).
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it
wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
As to the nature of cohabitation contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, the five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union.
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
47

the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity

meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Since second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
On the personality of the petitioners to file a petition to declare their fathers
marriage void after his death
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in
any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it
will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of
the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of
action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
48

The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

49

Republic v Albios

50

PERIDO v. PERIDO
G.R. No. L-28248
March 12 1975
Makalintal
Hermosisima
Margarita
Perido
et
al.
(Children
and
grandchildren
of
Lucio
Perido
with
his 1 st wife)
petitioners
responden Maria Perido et al (Children and grandchildren with 2nd wife)

ts
summary Lucio married twice during his lifetime: he had 3 kids with his wife; after the

death of his 1st wife, he married a 2nd with whom he had 5 kids. After Lucio and
his 2nd wife died, his heirs from both marriages executed a Declaration
partitioning Lucios 8 lots. The heirs of the 1 st marriage suddenly filed an action
to annul said Declaration on 3 grounds. The ground most relevant to us is the
argument that the heirs of the 2nd marriage are not entitled to anything since
they were illegitimate children. Petitioners based it on the argument that the 1 st
wife was still alive when the 1st 3 of 5 were born (hence born out of wedlock).
They also argue that Lucio married his 2nd wife only on 1925, after all the 5
children were born; they base it on land titles issued in 1923 which say that
Lucio was still a widower. SC held that the 5 children were all illegitimate. 1 st,
evidence would show that Lucios 1st wife died before the birth of the 1st child.
Second, the court held that the land titles were insufficient to show that Lucio
and his 2nd wife were not married before that. Such title is insufficient to
rebut the presumption that a man and woman living together as
husband and wife are married to each other, a presumption that is
rooted based on the fact that marriage isnt only a contract but an
institution that the public has an interest it.

51

facts of the case

-

Lucio married twice.

o The 1st wife was Benita Taloring with whom he had 3 children. Benita died during the
Spanish regime (more of that later)
o The 2nd wife (after Benita died) was Marcelina Baliguat with whom he had 5 children.
Lucio died in 1942 while his 2nd wife died in 1943. After that the heirs of both marriages
executed a Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition on August 15
1960whereby they partitioned among themselves 8 lots in Himamaylan Occidental
Negros
On March 8 1962, the children belonging to the 1 st marriage filed a complaint in the CFI of
Negros Occidental against the children of the second marriage asking that the declaration
be annulled on the following grounds:
o Misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means in executing the document
o The lots which were partitioned belonged to the conjugal property of Lucio and
Benita (1st wife)
o The five children of Lucio and Marcelina were all illegitimate and therefore
had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio.
Grounds for the alleged illegitimacy The first 3 children were born out of
wedlock even before Lucios 1st wife died. They aver that the 1st wife died only
in 1905, when the 3 children of the alleged 2 nd marriage were already born.
The last 2 were born still out of wedlock and were never recognized. They
argue that Lucio married his 2nd wife only on 1925, since in 1923 the titles of
the land issued to Lucio bore the remark that he was still a widower.
The trial court annulled the Declaration but did not partition the lots solely to the
petitioners. It held that the children of the 2 nd marriage were all legitimate and that all the
lots, except for one, was Lucios exclusive property. The rtc ruled that 11/12 of the 8 th lot
was the conjugal property of the 2nd marriage, hence it cannot be shared with the
petitioners. CA affirmed

issue

Whether the children of the 2nd marriage were illegitimate. NO.

Were the 1st 7 lots the exclusive property of Lucio? YES
Was the 8th lot a property of the 2nd marriage? YES OR NO PARA KITA AGAD.

ratio

1) 1st issue
- Did Lucios 1st wife die after the birth of the 3 children of the 2 nd marriage? NO. Based on
the evidence, Lucios 1st wife died during the Spanish regime. Thus, Lucio had no legal
impediment to marry his 2nd wife before the birth of their first child in 1900
- Did Lucio only marry his 2nd wife on 1925, when all the children of the 2 nd marriage were
born? NO. The evidence used by the petitioners (the land titles in 1923) were held to be
inconclusive that Lucio married his 2nd wife only on 1925. Furthermore, it is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together as husband
and wife are married to each other. According to the court, the presumption,
specially when legitimacy is involved, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the
part of those who allege illegitimacy.
- The court explained that this is because marriage isnt just a contract but a relation, the
institution of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intemdment of the
law leans toward matrimony.
52

Here, the marriage allegedly done in 1925 was not even considered by the lower and
appellate courts since the person who testified said that she knew it not through her own
account, since she was getting flowers for the alter from the garden (not an eyewitness to
the ceremony)

2) 2nd Issue
- The titles indicated that the lands were all declared in the name of Lucio only. There was
also evidence that Lucio inherited the land from his grandmother. These were found by the
CA to be sufficient evidence to show that the lands were exclusive. Even if the petitioners
argue that their witnesses can attest to the contrary, the SC held that the issue is an issue
of appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of the CA.
3) 3rd Issue
- The certificate of title of the 8th lot indicated that Lucio was married to his 2 nd wife. If the
law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal,
the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose
name the land is registered is married to somebody else.
- Even if the petitioners would like the SC to consider evidence to show that the lot was
purchased using money from the 1st marriage, the SC held that such is a question of
appreciation of evidence, which is not in its jurisdiction.

53

Fiel v Banawa
No. 56284-R
March 26, 1979
DOMINGA
FIEL
petitioners
responden JULIO BANAWA, ET. AL.

GUTIERREZ, H. E.

Leynes

ts
summary Dominga and Natalio were in a common-law relationship. Natalio died.

Natalios brothers and nephews entered into a document of partition with

Dominga wherein Dominga received only one third. Dominga filed a case for
of the properties in question. The Court stated that common-law marriages are
not recognized in the Philippines. In such situations, the property acquired is
governed by Art. 144, provided (1) the couple are not incapacitated to marry
each other and (2) the properties were acquired through the work industry of
both or either of them. Though Dominga was legally married to another, the
Court still applied Art 144 on the consideration of both legal and equitable
grounds.
However, donations made by Natalio to Dominga during his lifetime were
declared void since it is prohibited by the civil code and public policy
considerations.

54

facts of the case

Dominga Fiel, who lived in a common law relationship with Natalio Banawa for twenty five
years, filed a complaint on March 3, 1971 for the annulment of a partition of the properties
allegedly owned in common by her and the latter.
Natalio Banawa was a widower, before living with Dominga.
Natalio Banawa died on June 29, 1970, after living with Dominga since 1945. On Oct. 22,
1970, one of the nephews of Natalio brought Atty. Catane to Dominga for the execution of a
document of partition of the properties.
Dominga received 1/3 while 2/3 were given to the brothers and nephews of Natalio. Upon
realization that she received less than what she was supposed to, she filed this complaint. The
lower court rendered a decision in favor of Dominga (awarding her half). Appeal was taken by the
defendants.

issue

WON Dominga should receive half of the properties. YES. Though Art. 144 was not fully
satisfied, on legal and equitable considerations, she should receive half.

ratio

Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
In the Philippines, the property of such common-law relationships are governed by Art. 144
of the Civil Code:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
For Art. 144 to apply, two requisites must be satisfied:
1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and
2) That the properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both or
either of them.
As to the second requisite, the records show that Natalio set up a sari-sari store with
Dominga, after disposing of his properties from his previous marriage and became a widower.
As to the first requisite, Dominga admits that she was legally married to Eusebio Potestas
and that Eusebio Potestas was still alive when she testified in the trial court.
However, despite such failure to satisfy a requisite, the Court finds that On the combined
strength of legal and equitable considerations, we rule that the co-ownership rules provided by
Article 144 of the Civil Code are applicable. Dominga should receive of the fruits and earnings
of her joint efforts with Natalio. The properties in part came from her own sweat, brains and
efforts.
As to the donations made by Natalio to Dominga during his lifetime, the same should be
declared void. Art. 739 of the Civil Code expressly provides that donations made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation are void. Adultery or
concubinage need not be proved in a criminal action, mere preponderance of evidence is
required. Furthermore, as stated in the ruling of Buenaventura v Bautista, the donations are
contrary to public policy as well since legally married spouses cannot donate to each other so
should those not married.
55

56

People v. Mendoza
95 Phil. 645
September 28, 1954
People
of
the
Philippines
petitioners
responden Arturo Mendoza

C.J. Paras

Nuez

ts
summary Second wife charged accused with bigamy for contracting a third marriage.

Turns out that the marriage to #2 was void as he already had a first wife.
Because the second marriage was void, there was no valid marriage to speak
of and therefore the third marriage was not bigamous. According to the
prevailing law at that time, there was no need for a court order to establish the
invalidity of marriages.

57

facts of the case

August 5, 1936 - Mendoza was married to Jovita de Asis in Marikina.

May 14, 1941 - while the first marriage was subsisting, Mendoza was married to Olga Lema in
Manila.
February 2, 1943 - de Asis died.
August 19, 1949 - Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio in Laguna. This gave rise to
prosecution for bigamy.
Mendoza - the marriage to Lema being void as the marriage to de Asis was subsisting, the
marriage with Panlilio could not have been bigamous, the first marriage being void.
SolGen - the voidness of the marriage to Lema given, there should have been a court order
declaring the nullity of the marriage before he can validly marry Panlilio.

issue

Whether Mendoza was guilty of bigamy. NO

Should there have been a previous court order declaring the nullity of the first marriage? NO
NEED, BUT THE DISSENT SAYS YES.

ratio

It is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the
existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in
force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is
here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.

58

People v. Aragon
G.R. No. L-10016
28 February 1957
J. Labrador
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
petitioners
responden PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Ortiz

ts
summary Accused married Gorrea on 28 September 1925. He contracted a subsequent

marriage on 27 August 1934 with Faicol. Gorrea then died on 05 August 1939.
The accused contracted a third marriage on 03 October 1953 with Maglasang.
Because of this, a case for bigamy was filed by Faicol against the accused. The
court ruled that the 1953 marriage with Maglasang was not bigamous since the
first marriage with Gorrea was already extinguished because of her death. The
1934 marriage with Faicol has not become valid upon the death of Gorrea.

59

facts of the case

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his
marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon,
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita
Church in Iloilo City.
The accused maintained Maria Faicol in Iloiolo and Maria Gorrea in Cebu. Gorrea then died on
August 5, 1939. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where
she worked as a teacher-nurse.
The accused and Faicol did not live a happy marital life. She was always being maltreated by
the accused. The accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing
treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a
certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.
A complaint was filed by Faicol with the CFI
CFI: The accused is guilty of the crime of bigamy. The defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either
by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage.

issue
WON the accused is guilty of bigamy. NO

ratio
The court reversed the ruling of the CFI. The action was instituted upon complaint of the
second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife
and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for
having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Dissent by J. Reyes: There should be a judicial declaration of nullity before one can marry
again. It is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is
reserved to the courts

60

Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905
May 30, 1983
MELENCIO-HERRERA
Ramos
SERAFIA
G.
TOLENTINO
petitioners
responden HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
ts PAOMBONG, BULACAN

summary Husband was charged with a bigamy case by his wife. He admitted to the
offense, served his prison sentence, but once out of jail, continued to live with
his second wife. Upon his death, the name of the second wife was indicated in
his death certificate as his wife. First wife now files a case for the rectification
in the entry of the Local Civil Registrar.
SC held that since Amado (the husband) himself admitted to the act, there is
no better proof that he had an existing marriage when he married his second
wife. As such, the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of
no force and effect. Further, no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage and rectification can be made in the records of the
LCR.

61

facts of the case

Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Bulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G.
Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting.
Petitioner charged Amado with bigamy, where the latter pleaded guilty. He served his prison
sentence, but continued to live with respondent until his death. In his death certificate, it noted
that respondent was his wife.
Petitioner filed a SpecPro for the Correction of Entry where she sought to correct the name of
the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her
name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law"
and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding. Conformably, she filed a case against
respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paomobong, Bulacan. The Court however dismissed
her petition.

issue

Who should be named as the wife of the deceased? (Serafia)

ratio

Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence
furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no
better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage.
The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime
of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and efect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. Rectification
of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

62

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy
G.R. No. L-53703
August 19, 1986
Paras
Recto
Lilia
Oliva
Wiegel
petitioners
responden Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy (presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
ts of Caloocan City) and Karl Heinz Wiegel

summary Lilia contracted a first marriage with Eduardo. She contracted a second

marriage with Karl. Karl asked for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on
the ground of the prior existing marriage. Lilia wanted to present evidence that
her first marriage was vitiated by force and that at the time of the first
marriage, her first husband was already married to someone else.
There is no need to present evidence because assuming Marriage#1 was
vitiated by force, it would be merely VOIDABLE (valid until annulled) thus when
she contracted Marriage #2, she was still validly married making Marriage #2
VOID.
Assuming Husband#1 already had a wife at the time of celebration of their
marriage, there was no judicial declaration of nullity and therefore at the time
of Marriage #2, Marriage #1 was still valid making Marriage #2 VOID.

63

facts of the case

Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva Wiegel.
They were married on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. He filed
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court with presiding judge Alicia Sempio-Dy on the
ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion (ceremony was performed on June
25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in QC).
Lilia admitted the existence of the prior marriage but claimed that it was null and void
because they were allegedly forced into marriage. At the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the
issue was the status of the first marriage: assuming the presence of force, was the first marriage
void or merely voidable?
Lilia asked the court to present evidence: (1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both parties; and (2) that the first husband was already married to someone else
at the time of their marriage.
Judge Sempio-Dy ruled against presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties were already agreed upon.

issue

Whether or not Lilia could present evidence on those facts NO

(Real issue: status of Lilias marriage to her first husband (VOIDABLE) and to her second husband
(VOID)

ratio

No need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because assuming it
was true, her first marriage is not void but merely VOIDABLE (CC 85), and therefore valid until
annulled.
Since no annulment has been made, she married her second husband while still validly
married to the first. Her second marriage is VOID (CC 80).
No need for Lilia to introduce evidence about the first husbands existing prior marriage at the
time they married each other because their marriage although void, still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact. At the time she contracted her second marriage she was still considered
as a married woman, therefore, the marriage with the second husband is still regarded as VOID.

64

Donato v. Luna
G.R. No. 53642
April 15, 1988
Gancayco
Reynes
Leonilo
C.
Donato
petitioners
responden Artemon Luna, Presiding Judge of the Manila CFI; Jose Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila;
ts Paz Abayan

summary An information for bigamy was filed against Donato, based on a complaint filed

by the wife in the alleged bigamous marriage. Afterwards, the same wife filed a
civil case for annulment based on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit. The court ruled that the issue raised in the civil case did not
constitute a prejudicial question sufficient to forestall the criminal proceedings.

65

facts of the case

5. [Jan. 23, 1979] An Information for the crime of bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal
of Manila against petitioner DONATO. It was based on the complaint of Paz ABAYAN (the
alleged second wife).
6. [Sept. 28, 1979] Before arraignment, ABAYAN filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila a civil action for annulment of her marriage with
DONATO contracted on Sept. 26, 1978, based on the ground that ABAYAN consented to
marrying DONATO since she had no previous knowledge that DONATO was already
married to a certain Rosalinda MALUPING (celebrated June 30, 1978).
a. DONATO interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license, and that force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence were employed by ABAYAN to obtain DONATOs consent.
b. [It was noted, however, that the marriage license was dispensed with due to a
joint affidavit executed by the spouses on Sept. 26, 1978 stating that they had
lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit
of wedlock for a period of at least five years.]
7. Prior to the date set for trial in the criminal case, DONATO filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings contending that the pending civil case raises a prejudicial question which
must first be determined and decided before the criminal case can proceed.
a. This motion was denied by the judge, relying on the case of Landico v. Relova.
b. DONATO filed a motion for reconsideration, relying on the later case of De la
Cruz v. Ejercito. This was also denied.

issue

W/N the pending civil case for annulment raises a prejudicial question to merit the suspension of
the criminal case for bigamy NO, it does not.

ratio

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved the said case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal.
o It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate form the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain here.
o The issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of DONATOs guilt or innocence in the criminal case for bigamy.
o It was DONATOs second wife, ABAYAN, who filed the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Landico v. Relova, and not De la Cruz v. Ejercito, applies in the case at bar.
o The Court in Landico ruled that the mere fact that there are action to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
prejudicial questions are automatically raised to warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. In order for the annulment case to forestall the criminal proceedings,
it must be shown that petitioners consent was obtained by means of duress, force,
and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage was involuntary and
cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
DONATO has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage had been obtained by the use of threats, force, and intimidation.
66

De la Cruz is markedly different. There, it was the accused who was charged with
bigamy and who was likewise the one who filed a civil case for annulment. Here, it
was the ABAYANthe second wifewho filed a complaint for annulment. Moreover,
in De la Cruz, there was already a judgment in the civil case declaring the second
marriage null and void; here, there is no such judgment.
DONATO only raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade prosecution of the criminal
case.
o DONATOs averments of vitiated consent is belied by the fact that DONATO and
ABAYAN executed a joint affidavit mentioned in facts.2.b. above.
o Also, it was only when the civil case was filed (or more than one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage) that DONATO came up with his vitiated
consent angle.
o

67

TERRE v. TERRE
A.M. No. 2349
July 3, 1992
Dorothy
B.
Terre
petitioners
responden Atty. Jordan Terre

PER CURIAM

Villarroya

ts
summary Respondent Jordan Terre married complainant Dorothy Terre after he convinced
her that her first marriage to Merlito Bercenilla was void ab initio and had no
need for judicial declaration. Thereafter, he abandoned her and married
another woman. The SC declared him guilty of grossly immoral conduct and
disbarred him.

68

facts of the case

Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine
Bar, with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman, while his prior marriage with complainant subsisted.
She and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates. She
was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single. Respondent was aware of
her marital status but still he persistently courted her. She decided nothing would come of it
since she was married but he respondent explained to her that their marriage was void ab
initio since she and her first husband were first cousins. Convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him. In their marriage license, respondent wrote "single" as her
status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to
declare it as such. They were married in 1977. However, respondent disappeared in 1981.
Complainant was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out that
respondent married a certain Helina Malicdem.
Respondent sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his
prior marriage with complainant was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial
declaration of nullity was necessary.

issue

Whether or not respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct. YES, respondent is

disbarred!

ratio

Respondents pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled

complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito Bercenilla, being incestuous and
void ab initio, she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent,
being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing
case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally
free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold him to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
The conduct of respondent inveigling complainant to contract a second marriage with him; in
abandoning complainant after she had cared for him and supported him through law school,
leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second
marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage was subsisting, constituted "grossly
immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.

69

Republic v Granada

70

Republic v Cantor

71

JONES v. HORTIGUELA
G.R. No. 43701
Mar 6, 1937
Concepcion, J.
Casila
petitioner Angelita Jones
oppositor Felix Hortiguela
summary Jones, the daughter of the decedent from her first husband, contends that the marriage of her mother
and Hortiguela was void because her father A. Jones had only been judicially declared absent for 6
years and 14 days (not 7 years) at the time of the second marriage. SC held that for the purposes of
the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. The date shall be reckoned from the date on which the
last news was received.

facts of the case

Marciana Escano had died intestate. In an order, Jones, her daughter by her first marriage and Hortiguela,
her widower by second marriage were declared her only heirs. Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator
of the entire estate. (June 1933) The project of partition and final account were approved in an order and the
properties were turned over to the grantees.
(May 1934) Jones filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother and there never was a
valid marriage between her mother and Hortiguela. CFI denied the motion.

issue
W/N Hortguelas alleged marriage to Escano was celebrated - YES

ratio

Important dates:
Dec 1914: Escano married Arthur W. Jones
Jan 10, 1918: A. Jones secured a passport to go abroad and nothing was ever heard of him
Oct 1919: Escano instituted proceedings to judicially declare A. Jones an absentee.
Oct 25, 1919: CFI declared him an absentee from the Philippines
Dec 1919-June 1920: The order was published in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper El Ideal
April 23, 1921: CFI issued an order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence
May 6, 1927: Hortiguela and Escano were married before the justice of peace of Malitbog, Leyte and they
signed the certificate of marriage
Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made when the CFI issed an order
for the taking effect of the declaration of absence not when CFI declared A. Jones an absentee. From the latter date to the
date of marriage of Hortiguela and Escano, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed and in accordance with General Order 68,
the marriage is null and void.

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The absence of A. Jones should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on
which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
72

As regards the failure to record the marriage in the register of the municipality:
General Order 68 does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the
marriage.
Madridejo v. De Leon: It does not appear that in the celebration of marriage forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is a requisite for the validity of the marriage.
US v. De Vera: Certificates of marriages recorded in registrars are not the only ones that can attest and prove
such facts to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial.
Further, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be
dead.

73

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw

G.R. No. L-1780
April 31, 1948
Padilla J
Chua
Petitioners Counselo Sors
Respondent N/A
s
Summary Consuelo married a Polish citizen named Nicolas. They had a son but almost 4
years into the marriage, Nicolas left and took with him their sons. She had
neither seen nor heard of them since then. After her husbands absence for
more than seven years, Consuelo filed a petition to declare her husband
presumptively dead. Court dismissed her petition on the ground that
independently of an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death
cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. A judicial pronouncement to this effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. Since it is merely
disputable, it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration,
if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass.

74

Facts of the Case

Counselo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was
married in Manila on November 1936 and whom she bore a child.

She lived with Nicolas from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her
husband, on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from their home with
their child and never returned,

She made inquiries and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai.
However, according to Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child
had not been seen and could not be found.

Because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which there was no
news from him, she believes that he is dead, thus, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband
be declared dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive
and later on appear, be preserved.

TC: Dismiss. (1) It is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, and (2) The rule
of evidence establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is
dead, does not create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be
predicated.

Issue
Whether or not Consuelos petition for her husband to be declared presumptively dead may be
granted. NO.
Ratio
Petition is not for the settlement of estate. Nicolas neither possessed property brought to
the marriage nor had he acquired any property during his married life. The rule invoked by
Consuelo is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is
dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established.

This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death
cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination
of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not
pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years.

The petition is for a declaration that Consuelo's husband is presumptively dead. But this
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve her situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
75

final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. Since it is merely
disputable, it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.

Once a Court decides a controversy by a final decree, the judgment upon the right or
status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact becomes res judicata, subject to
no collateral attack, with a few exceptions.

It is therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,

because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.

A declaration such as the one prayed for by Consuelo, if granted, might lead her to believe
that the marital bonds which bind her to her husband are torn asunder and that for that
reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers did not
intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be
made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in
collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot
be obtained under the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by means of a
judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.

76

Republic v CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763
Feb. 13, 1997
Republic
of
the
Philippines
petitioners
responden CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina (wife)

Panganiban, J.

Cristobal

ts
summary Annulment of Marriage case on the ground of psychological incapacity. The

Court handed down the Molina Doctrine:

1. Burden of proof on plaintiff, to be investigated for collusion by the OSG
2. Root cause must be medically/clinically identified, alleged in the complaint
and explained in the decision
3. Exists at the time of the marriage
4. Incurable relative to spouse (ie nurse not caring for own children)
5. Grave enough to bring about incapability to fulfill marital obligation
(disabling factor)
6. Essential marital obligations refer to: Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225
7. Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic Church
should be observed (respected, persuasive)
8. State participation to protect sanctity of marriage through the fiscal or
prosecuting attorney - serve OSG a copy of the petition

77

facts of the case

Roridel married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985 and they had a son. After a year, Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility, as he preferred to spend more time with friends
on whom he squandered his money, he depended on his parents for aid and was never honest
with Roridel regarding finances, resulting to frequent quarrels between them. Sometime in 1986,
he was relieved of his job and Roridel became the sole breadwinner. In October 1986 the couple
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. In March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City, and a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground that Reynaldo
was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations.
In his answer, Reynaldo alleged that their quarrels were due to Roridels refusal to perform
some of her marital duties such as cooking and running the household, and her failure to handle
their finances.
TC declared the marriage void. CA affirmed, concluding that psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment is a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct which, considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage. Thus, there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
Hence this appeal by the Republic represented by the SolGen, contending that opposing and
conflicting personalities is not equivalent to PI.

issue

WON the marriage should be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity? NO

ratio

There is no clear showing that the psychological defect is an incapacity. It appears to be

more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not
get along with each other. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity (she testified that the spouses are
not unfit for other partners or for their professions). There is no showing that Reynaldos alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration.
Through the help of amici curiae Oscar Cruz of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines and Justice Ricardo Puno, member of the Family Code
Revision Committee, the Court handed down the following guidelines: (Molina doctrine)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against every one of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
78

be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification.

79

CHOA v. CHOA
G.R. No. 143376
Nov. 26, 2002
Leni
Choa
petitioners
responden Alfonso Choa

Panganiban

Enad

ts
summary Respondent-husband filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage

with Petitioner-wife for the latters alleged psychological incapacity. The

relevant issue here is WoN respondent presented evidence to establish his
wifes psych incapacity such that the RTC was correct in denying the wifes
demurrer to evidence.
Held: The RTC was in GAD when it denied the demurrer. The evidence
presented by the husband (docs showing charges filed against him by his wife;
his oral testimony that his wife was immature, lacked attention to children, and
lacked the intention to procreate; the expert testimony of Dr. Gauzon stating
that they were incompatible) failed to show that the wifes incapacity was
characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

80

facts of the case

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. They have 2 children. In 1993,
respondent filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental a complaint for the annulment of their
marriage. He subsequently filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity. After respondent finished
presenting his evidence, petitioner filed a MTD (Demurrer to Evidence).
RTC: denied demurrer. Respondent established a quantum of evidence that petitioner must
controvert.
CA: denial of demurrer interlocutory = certiorari under Rule 65 not available. Remedy is for
petitioner to present evidence.

issue

WoN the RTC was in GAD in denying the demurrer. YES. The evidence failed to establish
petitioners psychological incapacity.
WoN certiorari is available to correct and order denying a demurrer to evidence. YES.

ratio

Evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological

incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Evidence presented by respondent:
(1) He claims that petitioner filed a series of charges against him (perjury, false testimony
concubinage, and deportation). The filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that
his wife wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country.
SC: Docs presented by respondent do not show the alleged psych incapacity of petitioner.
They merely establish the prosecution of cases against him, not that his wife is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations.
(2) Respondents testimony that his wife wanted to have an abortion before they were even
married, that she was immature, lacked attention to their children, and lacked the intention of
procreative sexuality (ano daw).
SC: None of these traits, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psych
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. (Santos v CA)
Psych incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 FC, include their
mutual obligs to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity, and render help and support. It
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal,
or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. There should be a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligs
essential to marriage.
Applied: Evidence merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the
problems besetting their marital union. It did not show that the psych incapacity was grave
enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligs of marriage. Also,
how could they have had 2 children if petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality?
Moreover, there was no proof that the defect already existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
81

(3) Expert testimony of Dr. Gauzon.

SC: The testimony utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psych
incapacity. It did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically/clinically
permanent or incurable. Nor did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about
disability of the party to assume the essential obligs of marriage. His testimony only
establishes that the sps were incompatible, a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated
through psychotherapy.
Furthermore, the assessment made by the doctor was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondentthere was no examination conducted on petitioner.
Thus, he had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, making his testimony
unscientific and unreliable.
Thus, the ct was in GAD when it denied petitioners demurrer to evidence.
Re: certiorari availability
GR: interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
EXC: certiorari allowed when lower ct acts with GAD in the issuance of an interlocutory order.

82

Barcelona v. CA & Bengzon

G.R. No. 130087
24 September 2003
Diana
M.
Barcelona
petitioners
responden Court of Appeals and Tadeo R. Bengzon

J. Carpio

Espaola

ts
summary Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for Annulment of Marriage against his wife,

Diana Barcelona, which he then moved to withdraw. He then filed a second

petition for the same cause of action based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
alleging psychological incapacity that rendered her unable to fulfill the
essential obligations of their marriage. Diana moved to dismiss the second
petition on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action, primarily
because the petition was unable to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. The Court disagreed, and held that under the 2,
paragraph 6 of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, expert opinion need
not be alleged. The root cause of psychological incapacity would be a matter
best determined by experts in the fields of neurological or behavioral science;
hence, it constitutes expert opinion that need not be alleged in the petition. It
suffices that the petition allege the physical manifestations of the
psychological incapacitya requisite that Tadeos petition complies with.

83

facts of the case

In March 1995, respondent Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner Diana Barcelona, but later filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition, which was granted
in June 1995.
In July 1995, Tadeo filed a new Petition for Annulment of Marriage against Diana based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. In the petition, Tadeo alleged that he and Diana were legally
married after a whirlwind courtship, established their home in Quezon City, and begot five
children. However, petitioner Diana was allegedly psychologically incapacitated at the time of
the celebration of their marriage, rendering her unable to comply with the essential obligations
of the marriage, to wit:
(a)
They frequently quarreled because of their varied upbringing; since Diana came from a
rich family, she was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house,
playing tennis all day;
(b)
Diana suffered several miscarriages, and one of their children fell ill, causing Diana to
withdraw into herself and refuse to speak to her husband;
(c)
During her pregnancy with their fifth child, Diana requested that Tadeo leave their conjugal
dwelling, and in spite of Tadeos attempts at compromise (i.e. occupying another room in
the house), he was forced to leave;
(d)
The separation resulted in complete estrangement;
(e)
Dianas psychological incapacity, which subsisted up to the present, was conclusively
found in a psychological examination conducted between her and Tadeo.
In response, Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was predicated on two grounds. The first is
that the petition fails to state a cause of action, because the petition does not allege
the following:
(1) The root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity;
(2) That the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage;
and
(3) That it is permanent and incurable.
Second, the petition violates the rule against forum shopping.
The trial court denied Dianas Motion to Dismiss on the ground that contrary to her claim, the
allegations in the second petition show a cause of action, and that the filing of the second
petition did not amount to forum shopping since the first petition had already been dismissed
without prejudice.
Diana assailed the trial courts ruling before the Court of Appeals, which sustained the finding
that the allegations in Tadeos second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid
judgment if proven to be true. Neither did Tadeo violate the rule against forum shopping: there is
no litis pendentia since the first petition had been dismissed, and neither was there res judicata
because the dismissal was not a final decision on the merits of the case. Hence, this petition.

issues

(1)Whether the allegations of the second Petition for Annulment of Marriage sufficiently state
a cause of action. YES. The rules of procedure on absolute nullity and annulment
of void and voidable marriages provide that expert opinion need not be alleged.
The root of the psychological incapacity would constitute expert opinion. It thus
need not be alleged in the petition.
(2)[Minor issue] Whether Tadeo violated the rule against forum shopping in filing the second
Petition. NO. The dismissal of the first petition precluded litis pendentia, and
that dismissal, not being one on the merits, does not constitute res judicata.

ratio
84

(1) The second petition complies with the new procedural rules governing absolute
nullity and annulment of void and voidable marriages.
The case of Santos v. CA defined psychological incapacity as
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support.
Further, Santos states that the law refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological condition must exist at the time of celebration of the
marriage.
Subsequent to Santos and the case of Republic v. Molina, the Court adopted the Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, where 2, paragraph (d) states: The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration
of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
These new Rules are applicable to the case at hand, given that procedural rules apply to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new rules
in providing that expert opinion need not be alleged is that there is no need to allege the
root cause of psychological incapacity, since only experts in the fields of neurological
and behavioral sciences are competent to determine such root cause.
All that the new Rules require is that the petition allege the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity; Tadeos second petition
complies with this requirement.
Moreover, the second petition definitely states a cause of action since it states the legal
right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative legal obligation of petitioner Diana, and the
act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of Tadeos legal right.
(2) There was neither litis pendentia nor res judicata.
The Court upheld the CAs findings that there was no litis pendentia, since the first petition
had already been dismissed. Neither does the dismissal of the first petition constitute res
judicata, since the dismissal was not a decision on the merits, but was in fact a dismissal without
prejudice.

85

RP v. QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC
petitioners
responden LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO

Corona

Fernandez

ts
summary Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship while

they were in Japan. They moved back to the Philippines and had a child. After
their marriage, Toshio went back to Japan and after some time, did no longer
responded to the letters of Lolita. Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The trial court ruled that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfil his marital obligations as shown by his irresponsibility
and lack of concern to the needs of his family. The CA affirmed this ruling. The
Court however ruled otherwise. Citing Molina, it ruled that the totality of
evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

86

facts of the case

In her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, Lolita Quintero-Hamano, alleged that in
October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. Later, they lived in
the Philippines for a month. In 1987, Toshio went back to Japan. In the same year, she gave
birth to their child. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio in MTC Cavite.
Lolita alleged that unknown to her, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.
o One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas. Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never responded. Sometime in 1991, Lolita learned from her friends that Toshio visited
the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his
given address.
o In 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication.
o Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, Lolita filed a to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation which was
granted by the court.
The prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties.
o He prayed that the OCP to be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated.
o The trial court allowed Lolita to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to
support her testimony.
Trial court rendered declaring the marriage between Lolita and Toshio null and void after
finding that Toshio failed to fulfil his obligations as a husband and as a father. According to the
court, Toshio remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and
lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
OSG appealed to the CA but the appellate court upheld the ruling of the trial court.

issue

(4) Did Lolita successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities ? NO.

ratio

In the ruling in Molina, the court provided guidance in the interpretation and application of FC
36:
o [] (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision []
o The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.
o The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or
clinically identified.
87

However, what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Lolita showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family.
He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. She sent him several letters
but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
o Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
o Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would
have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness.
This respondent did not do.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage.
o It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological, not physical, illness.
According to the CA, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the
present case involves a mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese national.
o In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien spouse and
a Filipino spouse.
o

88

Republic v. Encelan

89

YAPTINCHAY v. TORRES
G.R. No. L-26462
June 9 1969
Sanchez
Hermosisima
Teresita
Yaptinchay
(aka
kabit)
petitioners
responden Judge Guillermo Torres (CFI Rizal)Virginia Yaptinchay (special administratrix) etc

ts
summary Case of kabit versus the proper heirs. Teresita Yaptinchay filed an application

for appointment as special administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, which

included a house and lot in Forbes, Makati. Josephina, Isidros legitimate wife,
and his children objected to this, hence the probate court awarded the
administration of the property to Isidros daughter, Virginia. After losing the
administration of the estate, Teresita filed a civil case for replevin with prayer
for prelim injunction to prevent Virginia et al from forcing her out of the Forbes
property. She wanted to dissolve the alleged partnership she had with Isidro in
both contributing to build the Forbes house. The court in the civil case denied
said right and instead ordered Teresita to deliver the Forbes house to Virginia.
SC sided with the lower court. SC held that Teresita failed to show a clear right
to the said house to grant her prayer for injunction. First, she has not provided
enough proof to rebut the presumption that a house built on Isidros land,
and at his instance, during the existence of his marriage with
Josephina is conjugal property. The loans she argued were used in building
the house didnt show that they were actually used for building the house in
Forbes since some of them also showed that she used it for her own business
and personal expenses.
Even if Teresita argues that there is a presumption of co-ownership as to
property purchased by two people who are living together with the
impediments to get married (CC 144), court said Teresita failed to build the
presumption in the 1st place since she failed to show that she contributed in
building the house.

90

facts of the case

-

1st case (probate case)

On July 1965, Teresita Yaptinchay filed with the CFI an application to be appointed as
special administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, claiming that:
o She has lived with Isidro Yaptinchay continuously for 19 years 1946-65.
o That Isidro died without a will and left an estate with an estimate value of around
500k
o That in her knowledge, Isidro only had three daughters: Virgina, Mary and Asuncion
o That certain people have been stealing personalties from his estate, hence the need
of a special administatrix
Court issued an order appointing Teresita as special administatrix 4 days later. Such
appointment was shortlived since Josefina Yaptinchay and other children of Isidro filed an
opposition to her appointment on the ground that Teresita was not an heir of Isidro,
since Josefina was the legitimate wife. Add to this the fact that she has been
living with Isidro for a number of years as her kabit, Josefina et al argued that
Teresita cannot be appointed as special administratrix.
The CFI granted such prayer and instead appointed Virginia Yaptinchay (Isidros
daughter) as special administratrix. As special administratrix, Virginia conducted an
inventory of Isidros estate, which includes the subject property of this case, a house in
North Forbes.
2nd case (civil case)
Teresita, being defeated in the probate court, filed civil case 8873, a case for replevin and
liquidation of partnership supposedly formed during her cohabitation with Isidro. By filing
this separate civil case for replevin, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering
Virginia et al from interfering with Teresitas right of possession of the Forbes property
Virgina et al opposed this saying the probate court had jurisdiction over the whole estate
of Isidro and that Teresitas title to the property was in doubt. This is why the court in the
2nd case issued a preliminary injunction, ordering Teresita to give the Forbes property to
Virginia and ordered all of her representatives to leave the premises.
Since Teresitas MR was denied, she filed this case with the SC

issue

Is Teresita entitled to the injunction she is praying for? No

Ratio
-

It is a principle in law that injunction is not be granted for the purpose of taking property
out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title has
not been clearly established. Here, although Teresita was in possession of the lot, the
probate court already acquired jurisdiction not only over Isidros exclusive
property but also over his conjugal property with his legitimate wife (who is not
Teresita) (and since the special administratrix is an agent of the court, any
property under the jurisdiction of the probate court may be possessed and
administered by said special administratrix)
Teresita keeps on arguing that she also contributed in the purchase and construction of the
Forbes lot, showing loans that she obtained while the house was under construction. The
SC however found no direct correlation between the loans and the construction of the
house since the loans did not indicate its purpose. Some of the loans, on the other hand,
listed several purposes for the money borrowed.
With this lack of direct proof, Teresita was not able to override the presumption that the
house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro at his instance, and during
91

the existence of his marriage with Josephina, is part of the estate that should be
under the control of the special administratrix.
Lastly, Teresita cannot rely on Article 144 of the Civil Code which states that When a man
and woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership
o The creation of the civil relationship of co-ownership under Article 144
must 1st meet the conditions laid out in the law. One such condition is that
there must be a clear showing that the petitioner, during cohabitation,
really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved.
o Until such right to co-ownership is established, Teresitas right to the property
cannot be considered as a present right or title that would give her the privilege of
an injunction

92

Fujiki v Marinay

93

Garcia-Quiazon v Belen

94

Republic v Olaybar

95

MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226
6 Feb 2004
LUCIO
MORIGO
Y
CACHO
petitioners
responden PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Quisumbing, J.

Gan

ts
summary Lucio and Lucia were married. Lucia applied for and was granted a divorce

decree by the Ontario Court. Subsequently, Lucio remarried. He filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. Instead, the parties merely signed the marriage
contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Lucio was convicted by
the RTC for bigamy. While the bigamy case was pending before the CA, the RTC
declared his marriage to Lucia void ab initio.
The Supreme Court acquitted Lucio. Under the principle of retroactivity of
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. Petitioner was not married to Lucia when he married Maria Jececha.
Therefore, the first element of bigamy is lacking.

facts of the case

- LUCIO Morigo and LUCIA Barrete were boardmates at a house in Bohol for four years (from 1974 to 1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio and Lucia lost contact with each other.
- In 1984, they reconnected and became sweethearts. Lucia worked in Canada but they maintained constant
communication.
- In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and both agreed to get married. On Sep 1990, Lucia reported
back to work in Canada leaving Lucio behind.
- On Aug 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio.
This was granted on Jan 17, 1992 and took effect on Feb 17, 1992
- On Oct 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
- On Sep 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage (with Lucia) in the
RTC of Bohol on ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place (CIVIL CASE)
- On Oct 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy (CRIM CASE)
- (CRIM CASE) RTC: found Lucio guilty of bigamy.
It ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
remarry.
The Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia is not entitled to recognition.
- (CIVIL CASE) RTC: declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
This decision was rendered while the CRIM CASE was pending with the CA.
- (CRIM CASE) CA: affirmed Lucios conviction for bigamy.
It could not acquit Lucio because what is sought to be punished by Art. 349 RPC is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the fact that the
first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The MR was denied but denial was by a split vote. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was
validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
96

issue

Whether petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid. NO.
Lucio did not commit bigamy as his first marriage was declared void ab initio or
legally inexistent. Under the eyes of the law, Lucio was never married to Lucia. His
defense of good faith is now moot and academic.

Ratio

Petitioner: submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree
of the Ontario Court. His lack of criminal intent is material as the crime of bigamy is mala in se,
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense.
OSG: counters that petitioners contention that he was good faith because he relied on the
divorce decree of the Ontario Court is negated by his act of filing the CIVIL CASE seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
SC:
- The elements of bigamy:
1. the offender has been legally married;
2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
4. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
- The trial court found that no actual marriage ceremony was performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of the solemnizing officer. Thus, the RTC held that the marriage is void ab initio in
accordance with Art. 3 and 4 FC.
- This means that there was no marriage to begin with and such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage. Reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the
date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was under the eyes of the law never married.
- Under the principle of retroactivity of marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
from the beginning. Petitioner was not married to Lucia when he married Maria Jececha. Therefore, the
first element of bigamy is lacking.
As distinguished from the case of Mercado v. Tan
- Similarity: the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was obtained AFTER the second marriage
was celebrated.
- Difference:
In Mercado, the first marriage was solemnized not just once, but twice.
First, before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued. Second, six months later before
a priest in religious rites
Ostensibly, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio

In this case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Lucio and Lucia merely signed a marriage contract. This act bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

- The issue of the validity of Lucios defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent is now moot and
academic.
Held: Acquitted.
97

98

TENEBRO v. CA
G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

Ynares-Santiago, J.

Gonzales

petitioners
Veronico Tenebro

responden Court of Appeals

ts
summary Tenebro married Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro later left the conjugal

dwelling which he shared with Ancajas stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes, the woman he is previously married to (Villareyes marriage not
dissolved). On January 1993, Tenebro contracted another marriage with a
certain Villegas. Ancajas filed a criminal case for bigamy. RTC and CA convicted
Tenebro of the crime of bigamy. Tenebro appealed to the SC. One of his
defenses was that the marriage with Ancajas was declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity (thus no 2 nd marriage to speak of). SC affirmed
conviction.
SC: the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding
the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

99

facts of the case

Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. RTC found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In his appeal to the SC, Tenebro presented a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that
his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated.

issue

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the 2 nd marriage due to psychological incapacity
constitute a valid defense for bigamyNO.
WoN there was a first marriageYES. Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

ratio

[relevant] Effect of the declaration of absolute nullity of the 2nd marriage due to
psychological incapacity
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied
by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted
the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal
effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
100

consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As to the existence of the first marriage
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes,
dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, Tenebro presented (1) a certification issued by
the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
The documents presented by Tenebro merely attest that the respective issuing offices have
no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite
different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense
that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence
of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Separate Opinion, Vitug:

Except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both
parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of either the first
or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense
in a criminal action for bigamy.
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been
from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with
those of church laws. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital
obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined
to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or
disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the
like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties
thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining
101

to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to

assume, that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would
continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially
declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for
the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal
requisites of a valid marriages; and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e.,
relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which
are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental
state, may not so readily be as evident. It would have been logical for the Family Code to
consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt
to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Since psychological incapacity does not relate to an infirmity in the elements,
either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity
subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the efects of the
marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part
of the offender who had entered into it.
Dissent, Carpio:
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. The offender is legally married;
2. The marriage is not legally dissolved;
3. The offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. The second or subsequent marriage is valid except for the existence of the first marriage.
The first three elements reiterate the language of the law. The last element, the validity of the
second marriage except for the existence of the first marriage, necessarily follows from the
language of the law that the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
then legally there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the
marriages that are void from the beginning. The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a
marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated shall likewise be void. Article 1409 of
the Civil Code declares inexistent and void from the beginning contracts expressly x x x
declared void by law. Thus, a marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the marriage is legally inexistent and void from the beginning. Such void marriage
cannot constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.

102

Capili v People

103

People v Odtuhan

104

Go-Bangayan v Bangayan

105

Jocson v Robles
G.R. No. L-23433
February 10, 1968
GLORIA
G.
JOCSON
petitioners
responden RICARDO R. ROBLES

REYES

Leynes

ts
summary Plaintiff commenced an action for the annulment of marriage. Defendant also

assailed the marriage and filed a motion for summary judgment. Court denied
said motion stating that the evidentiary requirement to establish that the
defendant was previously married was not established. The SC agreed, stating
that the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.

106

facts of the case

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of marriage to
Ricardo R. Robles on the ground that it was bigamous. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was
previously married before their marriage.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs'
parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage
with her notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man.
Defendant then filed a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, on the ground that no genuine
issue of fact is involved.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court
ruling there is necessity for proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintif,
defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage.
The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in
the motion for summary judgment.
Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in
their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage.

issue

WON the appeal should prosper. NO. A decree of annulment of marriage cannot be
rendered upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

ratio

ON THE MERITS
The Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of
the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly
prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
SIDE NOTE: Procedural
There is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and
record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the reglementary period, as required by the
provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The record on appeal must contain "such data as will show that the appeal was
perfected on time."
This requirement was held to be jurisdictional, failure to comply with which shall cause the
dismissal of the appeal. There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within
the reglementary period, which datum should have appeared in the record on appeal.

107

Tolentino v. Villanueva
56 SCRA 1

Mar. 15, 1974

Romulo Tolentino
Helen Villanueva and Judge Corazon Agrava

J. Makasiar

Nuez

petitioners
responden
ts
summary Plaintiff wanted to annul his marriage. Wife failed to appear despite summons.
Judge directed fiscal to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties. Plaintiff refused to cooperate and thus the case was dismissed.

SC upheld the dismissal, saying that since a marriage is a special contract, the
law does not allow its annulment based on stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment. The institution of marriage is so sacred and the State has an interest
to protect it against desecration by collusion or fabricated evidence. Thus, in
these cases the fiscal is authorized by law to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties.

108

facts of the case

Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen Villanueva, alleging that
his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that wife was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior
to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after
the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained
unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco,
Cebu.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to
file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare
her in default. Judge set the date for presentation of evidence but directed the fiscal to
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's
counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in
connection with the annulment case.
Plaintiff's counsel informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the
subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by
the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
Because plaintiff continued to refuse, the case was dismissed.

issue

Whether the judge's order was correct. YES.

ratio

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties
exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication
of evidence for the plaintiff.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct
that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material
facts alleged in the complaint are proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the
institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of
the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage
based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the
defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and
for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the
marital bonds.
109

Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101
25 April 1941
J. Horrilleno
GODOFREDO
BUCCAT,
demandante-apelante,
petitioners
responden LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, demandada-apelada.

Ortiz

ts
summary Godofredo and Luida got married. After 89 days, Luida gave birth to a son.

Godofredo wanted to annul their marriage on the ground that he was led to
believe that she was a virgin. The court ruled that the marriage should not be
annulled. It was unlikely that Godofredo did not suspect anything about the
pregnancy given the advanced stage it was already in. Marriage is a sacred
institution: the foundation of the society. Clear and convincing evidence must
be shown in order to nullify a marriage. This was not shown in this case.

110

facts of the case

On 26 November 1938, Godofredo and Luida were married in Baguio City.

On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave
birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with
her.
Godofredo seeks the annulment of this marriage on the ground that, in consenting to the
marriage, he did it because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin.

issue

WON marriage should be annulled on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the
marriage. NO

ratio

The court did not find any evidence that the pregnancy was concealed at the time of the
marriage. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about
the pregnancy considering that it was already in an advanced stage when they got married.
Marriage is a sacred institution: the foundation of the society. Clear and convincing evidence
must be shown in order to nullify a marriage. This was not shown in this case.

111

Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853
July 27, 1960
FERNANDO
AQUINO
petitioners
responden CONCHITA DELIZO

Guttierez David

Ramos

ts
summary Husband filed an annulment case against wife based on the ground of fraud,

alleging that his wife was pregnant with another man during their marriage. He
said that FOUR months after their marriage, she already gave birth to a child.
Only evidence he presented was their marriage contract and his testimony.
TC dismissed his case saying concealment of pregnancy does not constitute
fraud as would annul a marriage.
CA denied his motion for new trial (coz he wanted to present further evidence)
and said that it was not impossible that he impregnated his wife before they
got married and it would be unbelievable that he would not have noticed that
his wife was pregnant during their marriage.
SC held CA should not have denied husbands motion for new trial since he
could have adduced sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by him. In
comparison to Buccat where the wife was 7 months pregnant, in this case the
wife was only FOUR months pregnant during their marriage. The Court said it
would be hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since
she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by petitioner. CASE REMANDED.

112

facts of the case

Petitioner (husband) filed an annulment case against respondent (wife) based on the ground
of fraud, it being alleged that respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner, concealed
from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or
about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed
that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
Only the plaintiff however, testified during trial and the only documentary evidence presented
was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any
evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later
date.
TC: dismissed the complaint holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff
does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
CA: it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during
their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim
that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, it
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
*Note: Petitioner filed a motion for new trial for the reception of new evidence

issue

WON petitioner is entitled for an annulment (Case remanded)

ratio

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs.
Buccat cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment
of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy
of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already
in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage.
That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife
was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to
plaintif. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintif
(what a douche). It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
more general and apparent.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together
with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud
alleged by plaintiff. The CA should not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply
because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent
the Government precisely to prevent such collusion.

113

Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930
November 26, 1970
Aurora
A.
Anaya
petitioners
responden Fernando O. Palaroan

JBL Reyes

Recto

ts
summary Fernando filed an action for annulment of his marriage to Aurora on the ground

that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. CFI dismissed
the complaint and while the counterclaim was negotiated, he revealed he had
a pre-marital relationship with a second relative. The non-disclosure of a premarital relationship is not a ground for fraud. The secret intention of her
husband not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the
wife soon after the marriage. Her action for annulment based on fraud should
have been brought within 4 years after the marriage, now already barred.

114

facts of the case

Aurora and Fernando were married on Dec. 4, 1953. Fernando filed an action for annulment of
marriage on Jan 7, 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. CFI Manila dismissed the complaint. While the counterclaim of Aurora was being
negotiated, Fernando revealed that several months prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital
relationship with a close relative. Aurora prayed for annulment of marriage and moral damages
on the ground of fraud in obtaining her consent.
Fernando denied having a pre-marital relationship with a close relative and denied any fraud.
He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel for praying for the validity of the
marriage. He counterclaimed for damages for filing a malicious suit. He did not pray for the
dismissal fo the complaint but for its dismissal wrt the alleged moral damages.
Aurora alleged that prior to their marriage, he pretended to shower her with love only
because he was trying to escape marriage to the close relative of his. He contracted the
marriage with the secret intent not to perform the marital duties and obligations. He left for a
third girl who he cohabited with and had several children.
CFI found that Auroras allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to validate her marriage.
CFI dismissed the case.

issue

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage NO

ratio

Under CC 85 (4)5, fraud as a vice of consent in marriage may be a cause for its annulment. CC
866 enumerated the species of fraud as a vice of consent.
The intent of Congress was to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as a ground
for annulment to those 3 instances in CC 86. This may be deduced from the fact that of all the
causes of nullity in CC 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in the subsequent article.
CC 86 was also enacted to deal with fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article and
proceeds with enumerating the specific frauds.
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship is not one of those enumerated that
constitutes a ground for annulment. It is further excluded by the last paragraph of CC 86 that no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity shall be a ground to annul a marriage.
Auroras contention in her reply that Fernando paid court to her without any intent to comply
with his marital duties is an entirely new and additional cause of action. Such allegations are
improper because a party is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action set forth in
the complaint. Such secret intention of her husband not to perform his marital duties must have
been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage. Hence, her action for annulment based on
fraud should have been brought within 4 years after the marriage. Since the wedding was

5Art.85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
of the marriage: xxx (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be
6 Article 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:(1)
Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty
imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage.

115

celebrated in December 1953, this ground being pleaded only in 1966, it must be declared
barred.

116

Ruiz v. Atienza
No. 5986 (Ct. App.)
March 18, 1941
Jose
Ruiz
petitioners
responden Pelagia Atienza

Bengzon

Reynes

ts
summary Jose Ruiz alleged that he was forced into marrying Pelagia Atienza, i.e. her

father threatened him with bodily harm; her cousin-in-law who was a lawyer
threatened to obstruct his admission to the bar. The CA ruled that Ruiz was not
forced into marrying Pelagia. The threat of bodily harm was not sufficiently
proven; the threat of obstructing Ruizs admission to the bar was a lawful
threat; and Ruiz had many opportunities to walk away.

117

facts of the case

(case in Spanish; digest based on Dawn Chuas digest available at Blessings)

1. Jose RUIZ and PELAGIA Atienza were both sweethearts prior to Feb. 1938, when they
had sex. PELAGIA became pregnant and gave birth on Nov. 14, 1936.
2. After the babys birth, Jose Atienza and Atty. Villavicencio (PELAGIAs father and cousinin-law, respectively), with three other persons, visited RUIZ in his boarding house.
There, they requested and convinced RUIZ to marry PELAGIA.
3. RUIZ went with his cousin, Jose Atienza, and companions to PELAGIA, who joined them
to go to the Aglipayan Church where they secured a marriage license. That evening,
they returned to the church and celebrated the marriage.
4. Four days later, RUIZ filed a suit to secure the avoidance of the marriage, alleging
that he had been forced into wedlock in the following manner:
a. PELAGIAs father threatened him with a balisong;
b. Villavicencio intimidated him by saying that he would have difficulty when he
would take the bar examinations as many have been rejected admission to the
bar on the ground of immorality;
c. Villavicencios promise that RUIZ would be physically safe if he would go with
them; and
d. He was practically kidnapped until after the ceremony.

issue

W/N the RUIZ was forced into wedlock by violence or duress NO, he was not.

ratio
RUIZ was not forced into wedlock by violence or duress.
PELAGIAs father did not threaten RUIZ.
o It appears that in the course of the visit, RUIZ stated that he could not marry
PELAGIA because he was already a married man. This prompted PELAGIAs father to
grab RUIZ by the necktie and say, So you mean to fool my daughter! This
altercation was quickly stopped as those present quickly intervened.
o It was not established that PELAGIAs father displayed any balisong or made any
threat against the life of RUIZ.
In fact, only a 1.5-inch knife was found in PELAGIAs fathers possession by
the policeman who arrived upon seeing signs of trouble.
Villavicencios threat to obstruct RUIZs admission to the bar does not constitute duress.
o Where a man marries under the threat of or constraint from a lawful prosecution for
seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of duress.
From Villavicencios promise of safety, it cannot be inferred that Ruiz would not be safe if
he did not follow him.
RUIZ had many occasions to escape. He had companions in the house from whom he
could have asked for help; and there was even a policeman.
Law presumes strongly the validity of marriage once the formal ceremonies have been
completed.
RUIZ was not able to successfully meet the issues upholding the judges conclusion of fact
that neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.

118

SARAO v. GUEVARA
(CA) 40 OG 1st supp.
263
petitioners B. Sarao
responden Pilar Guevara

Villarroya

ts
summary Plaintiff and respondent were unable to consummate their marriage because

the latter complained of pains in her vagina. Eventually, a tumor was found
and her uterus and ovaries had to be removed, rendering her barren. Plaintiff
filed a petition for annulment on the ground of impotency. The SC dismissed his
petition because impotency, to be a valid ground, must be an inability to
copulate and not a mere inability to reproduce. Barrenness does not invalidate
a marriage.

119

facts of the case

Plaintiff and respondent were married. On their wedding day, plaintiff tried to consummate
the marriage. However, respondent showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening.
Although he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of
pains in her vagina later that night. Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter
offensive to the smell coming from defendants vagina.
Upon the physicians advice, respondents uterus and ovaries were removed due to the
presence of a tumor. The removal of said organs rendered her incapable of procreation. Plaintiff
declared that from the time he witnessed the operation, he lost all desire to have sex with his
wife and thus filed this complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency.

issue

Whether or not their marriage can be annulled on the ground of impotency. NO

ratio

Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase physically incapable of entering into the married state
as incapacity to procreate. However, impotency is not the inability to procreate but the inability
to COPULATE. The defect must be one of copulation and not of reproduction.
Barrenness will not invalidate the marriage. The removal of the organs rendered
respondent sterile but it by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse.

120

JIMENEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-12790
Aug 31, 1960
plaintif Joel Jimenez
defendant Remedios Canizares
intervenor Republic of the Philippines

Padilla, J.

Casila

summary Jimenez seeks the annulment of his marriage to Canizares upon the ground that

the orifice of her vagina is too small to allow copulation. CFI ordered Canizares to
submit to a physical examination but she never did. CFI annulled the marriage.
SC set aside the decree and held that the wifes impotency has not been
satisfactorily established. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.

facts of the case

Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to Canizares upon the ground that the
orifice of her vagina is too small to allow the penetration of a penis for copulation. For that
reason, he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.
Canizares was summoned and served but she did not file an answer. CFI entered an order
requiring her to submit to a physical examination to determine her physical capacity for
copulation . She was granted additional five days to comply with warning that her failure to
undergo medical examination and submit the required doctors certificate would be deemed lack
of interest and judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
CFI entered a decree annulling the marriage. The city attorney filed MR but was denied.

issue
W/N the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband
who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent - NO

ratio
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established
because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.
The lone testimony of the husband is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.

121

In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of Lourdes G. Lukban

G.R. No. L-8492
February 29, 1956
Bautista Angelo J
Chua
Petitioners Lourdes G. Lukban
Respondent Republic of the Philippines
s
Summary Lourdes is married to Francisco. However, she has not heard of him since the
day he left after a violent quarrel, merely seventeen days after their weddings.
She now prays that she be declared a widow of her husband who is presumed
to be dead. The Court did not grant the petition. a judicial declaration that a

person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in

seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. It would have
been different had she sought for the declaration of the death of her
husband rather than the establishment of the presumption of death.

122

Facts of the Case

Petition for a declaration that Lourdes is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is
presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
Lourdes contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. Seventeen days later,
on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard
from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends
but no one knew of his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive. She believes that he
is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years. Because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any
liability under the law.

Issue
Whether or not Lourdes petition for a declaration she is a widow of her husband Francisco

Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a

subsequent marriage may be granted. NO.
Ratio

Following the ruling in Szatraw, such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding; much less
can the court determine the status of Lourdes as a widow since this matter must of necessity
depend upon the fact of death of the husband. The court can declare upon proper evidence, but not
to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead.
To reiterate the earlier case, A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot
be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.
Lourdes remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband,
and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily
proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a declaration to that effect as
has been intimated in the case of Szatraw.
Lourdes also claims that her petition can be entertained because the RPC, in defining bigamy,
provides that a person commits that crime if he contracts a second marriage before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings and, it is claimed, the present petition comes within the purview of this legal
provision.
The words proper proceedings can only refer to those authorized by law such as those which refer
to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
123

 Gue v Republic
G.R. No. L-14058

Mar. 24, 1960

Montemayor, J.

Cristobal

petitioners In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue, presumptively dead.
Angelina L. Gue

responden Republic of the Philippines

ts
summary Angelina petitioned for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband William.
TC dismissed for failure to establish the right. TC: the declaration might make the
present spouse think that s/he can remarry, which is not allowed because the
declaration is a mere disputable presumption.

124

facts of the case

Nov. 20, 1957 Angelina filed a petition to declare her husband William Gue presumptively
dead. She alleged that she was married to William, a Chinese citizen, and they have a child. She
also alleged that on Jan. 5, 1946, William left Manila where they were residing and went to
Shanghai, China.
She followed him to China in August 1946, and then she came back with their children to the
Philippines in 1949. Since then, she had not heard from William. Despite her efforts and diligence
(she went to the Bureau of Immigration in 1955 and 1958 to inquire) she failed to locate him, and
that they had not acquired any property during the marriage.
TC: dismissed because Angelina had not established any right upon which a judicial decree
may be based. Citing the case of Petition for Presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw, the TC
held:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to
presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from
in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made
in a case, whether in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
submitted for decision to, a special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor
is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final determination of his right or status or
of the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass.
A declaration such as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted, may make or
lead her to believe that the marital bonds which binds her to her husband are torn
asunder, and that for that reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage
contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of
evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that
presumption may be made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case
may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree
of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted [under the provisions of the Divorce
Law Act No. 2710] could easily be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a
person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.
At the CA, Angelina contended that under Art. 390 NCC, Courts are now authorized to declare
persons presumptively dead.
The OSG answered her, citing Lukban v Republic which was decided long after the NCC took
effect which also cited Nicolai Szatraw.

issue

WON the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted? NO

ratio

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order (of CFI
Manila) dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.

125

PEOPLE v. MASINSIN
No. 9157-R
June 4, 1953
People
of
the
Phils
petitioners
responden Constancia Masinsin

ts
summary

Pecson

Enad

Constancia was married to Irineo, who was impotent. 5 mos. after the
latters death, Constancia married Guillermo. She was thereafter found guilty of
premature marriage under Art. 351 RPC. Held: Since the purpose of Art. 351 is
to avoid cases of doubtful paternity, the woman will not be liable thereunder if:
(a) she has already delivered; and (b) she has conclusive proof that she was
not pregnant by her first spouse since he was permanently sterile. Thus,
Constancia is not liable since Irineo was impotent, and the birth of her son
occurred 2 yrs after the subsequent marriage.

facts of the case

(case in Spanish; digest based on Dawn Chuas digest available at Blessings)

Constancia was initially married to Irineo Bermudez. Their marriage lasted for 18 yrs. They
had no children. She claimed that 5 yrs. before they got married, a doctor confirmed that Irineo
was impotent.
Feb. 3, 1945: A group of guerillas kidnapped Irineo. His corpse was later found in a creek.
July 5, 1945 (5 mos. after Irineos death): Constancia married Guillermo Mascarias. 2 yrs
later, she gave birth to a baby boy.
She was found guilty of premature marriage by the CFI.

issue

WoN Constancia is guilty of premature marriage. NO.

ratio

The Atty General gave Art. 351 RPC7 a too strict interpretation, ignoring Sec. 68 (3) of the
New Civil Code: The ff are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(3) the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband who is not impotent is indisputably
presumed to be legitimate, if not born within the 180 days immediately succeeding the marriage,
or after the expiration of 300 days following its dissolution.
The civil code establishes rebuttable presumptions in order to prevent dubious paternity with
the assumption that the husband is not impotent.
Since the purpose of Art. 351 is to avoid cases of doubtful paternity, the woman will not be
liable thereunder if: (a) she has already delivered; and (b) she has conclusive
proof that she was not pregnant by her first spouse since he was permanently sterile.
Applied: After 18 yrs of not having children, along with the knowledge of the doctors
finding that Irineo was impotent, Constancia remarried after 5 mos. The birth of her son after 2
yrs shows that the conception of her son happened way beyond 301 days = absence of malice.

7 Art. 351. Premature MarriagesAny widow who shall marry within 301 days from
the date of the death of her husband or before having delivered if she shall
have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding P500.
126

The prohibition of 301 days applies only to those cases wherein there exists a
possibility of pregnancy by the deceased husband. In this case, since Irineo was impotent,
Constancia is free to remarry.

127