CAO, LOVELY MAE

EMPERMACO B. ABANTE, JR., petitioner, vs. LAMADRID BEARING & PARTS

CORP. and JOSE LAMADRID, President, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159890 May 28, 2004]
FACTS: Petitioner was a salesman of respondent company earning a commission of
3% of the total paid up sales covering the whole area of Mindanao. Aside from selling,
he was also tasked with collection. Respondent corporation through its president, often
required Abante to report to a particular area and occasionally required him to go to
Manila to attend conferences.
Later on, bad blood ensued between the parties due to some bad accounts that
Lamadrid forced petitioner to cover. Later petitioner found out that respondent had
informed his customers not to deal with petitioner since it no longer recognized him as a
commission salesman. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money
claims against respondent company and its president, Jose Lamadrid.
By way of defense, respondents countered that petitioner was not its employee but a
freelance salesman on commission basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as a commission salesman, is an employee of
respondent corporation.
HELD: To determine the existence of an employee-employer relationship, we apply the
four fold test: 1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages;
(3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence
of the power of control.
Applying the aforementioned test, an employer-employee relationship is notably absent
in this case. It is true that he was paid in commission yet no quota was imposed
therefore a dismal performance would not warrant a ground for dismissal. There was no
specific office hours he was required to observe. He was not designated to conduct
services at a particular area or time. He pursued his selling without interference or
supervision from the company. The company did not prescribe the manner of selling
merchandise. While he was sometimes required to report to Manila, these were only
intended to guide him. Moreover, petitioner was free to offer his services to other
companies.
Art. 280 is not a crucial factor because it only determines two kinds of employees. It
doen;t apply where there is no employer-employee relationship. While the term
commission under Article 96 of the LC was construed as being included in the term
wage, there is no categorical pronouncement that the payment of commission is
conclusive proof of the existence of an employee-employer relationship.
The decision of the CA is affirmed.

BARNUEVO, AGNES P.
Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. OpleGR No. L-37790, March 25, 1976

FACTS: Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, a firm based at Malabon, Rizal, appointed
petitioner Mafinco as its sole distributor of Cosmos soft drinks in Manila. Rodrigo
Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling contract whereby Repomanta agreed to
buy and sell Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. Months
later, Mafinco terminated the peddling contract with Repomanta and Moralde.
Consequently, Repomanta and Moralde, through their union, filed a complaint with the
NLRC, charging the general manager of Mafinco for illegally dismissing them. Mafinco
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent
contractors. It stressed that there was termination of the contract not a dismissal of an
employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between

petitioner Mafinco and private respondents Repomanta and Moralde.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that under the peddling contracts, Repomanta and
Moralde were not employees of Mafinco but were independent contractors as found by
the NLC and its fact finder and by the committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to
look into the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. A contract whereby one engages
to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by the manufacturer but providing
that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers, shall post
a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages
caused to third persons, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the
expenses incurred in the sale of the soft drinks is not a contract of employment.

http://legallypinoy.blogspot.com/2012/09/mafinco-trading-corp-vs-ople.html

YU, MARY JANE JOY

Maraguinot vs. NLCR, Del Rosario & Viva Films [GR No. 120969]

Facts: Maraguinot and Enero were separately hired by Vic Del Rosario under Viva
Films as part of the filming crew. Sometime in May 1992, sought the assistance of their
supervisor to facilitate their request that their salary be adjusted in accordance with the
minimum wage law.
On June 1992, Mrs. Cesario, their supervisor, told them that Mr. Vic Del Rosario would
agree to their request only if they sign a blank employment contract. Petitioners refused
to sign such document. After which, the Mr. Enero was forced to go on leave on the
same month and refused to take him back when he reported for work. Mr. Maraguinot
on the other hand was dropped from the payroll but was returned days after. He was
again asked to sign a blank employment contract but when he refused, he was
terminated.
Consequently, the petitioners sued for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The
private respondents claim the following: (a) that VIVA FILMS is the trade name of VIVA
PRODUCTIONS, INC. and that it was primarily engaged in the distribution & exhibition
of movies- but not then making of movies; (b) That they hire contractors called
producers who act as independent contractors as that of Vic Del Rosario; and (c) As
such, there is no employee-employer relation between petitioners and private
respondents.
The Labor Arbiter held that the complainants are employees of the private respondents.
That the producers are not independent contractor but should be considered as laboronly contractors and as such act as mere agent of the real employer. Thus, the said
employees are illegally dismissed.
The private respondents appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter declaring that the complainants were project employees due to the ff.
reasons: (a) Complainants were hired for specific movie projects and their employment
was co-terminus with each movie project; (b)The work is dependent on the availability of
projects. As a result, the total working hours logged extremely varied; (c) The extremely
irregular working days and hours of complainants work explains the lump sum payment
for their service; and (d) The respondents alleged that the complainants are not
prohibited from working with other movie companies whenever they are not working for
the independent movie producers engaged by the respondents.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the complainants but was denied by NLRC. In
effect, they filed an instant petition claiming that NLRC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in: (a) Finding that petitioners were project employees; (b) Ruling that
petitioners were not illegally dismissed; and (c) Reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.

In the instant case, the petitioners allege that the NLRC acted in total disregard of
evidence material or decisive of the controversy.
Issues: (a) W/N there exist an employee- employer relationship between the petitioners
and the private respondents. (b) W/N the private respondents are engaged in the
business of making movies. (c) W/N the producer is a job contractor.
Held: There exist an employee- employer relationship between the petitioners and the
private respondents because of the ff. reasons that nowhere in the appointment slip
does it appear that it was the producer who hired the crew members. Moreover, it was
VIVAs corporate name appearing on heading of the slip. It can likewise be said that it
was VIVA who paid for the petitioners salaries.
Respondents also admit that the petitioners were part of a work pool wherein they
attained the status of regular employees because of the ff. requisites: (a) There is a
continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation of a project; (b) The tasks
performed by the alleged project employees are vital, necessary and indispensable to
the usual business or trade of the employer; and (c) However, the length of time which
the employees are continually re-hired is not controlling but merely serves as a badge of
regular employment.
Since the producer and the crew members are employees of VIVA and that these
employees works deal with the making of movies. It can be said that VIVA is engaged
of making movies and not on the mere distribution of such.
The producer is not a job contractor because of the ff. reasons: (Sec. Rule VII, Book III
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.)
a. A contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on
his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method,
free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected
with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. The said producer has
a fix time frame and budget to make the movies.
b. The contractor should have substantial capital and materials necessary to conduct
his business. The said producer, Del Rosario, does not have his own tools, equipment,
machinery, work premises and other materials to make motion pictures. Such materials
were provided by VIVA.
It can be said that the producers are labor-only contractors. Under Article 106 of the
Labor Code (reworded) where the contractor does not have the requisites as that of the
job contractors.

DUMLAO, SHEENA
JOSE SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION [G.R. No. 138051]
June 10, 2004

Facts: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an agreement with the Mel and Jay Management
and Development Corporation (MJMDC). ABS-CBN was represented by its corporate
officers while MJMDC was represented by Sonza, as President and general manager,
and Tiangco as its EVP and treasurer. Referred to in the agreement as agent, MJMDC
agreed to provide Sonzas services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and
television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay Sonza a monthly talent fee of P310, 000 for the first
year and P317, 000 for the second and third year.
On April 1996, Sonza wrote a letter to ABS-CBN where he irrevocably resigned in view
of the recent events concerning his program and career. After the said letter, Sonza filed
with the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint alleging that ABS-CBN did
not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive pay,13th month pay, signing
bonus, travel allowance and amounts under the Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP).
ABS-CBN contended that no employee-employer relationship existed between the
parties. However, ABS-CBN continued to remit Sonzas monthly talent fees but opened
another account for the same purpose.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that there is no employeeemployer relationship. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA also affirmed
the decision of NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties.
Ruling: Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employee-employer
relationship are selection and engagement of the employee, the payment of wages, the
power of dismissal and the employers power to control the employee on the means and
methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called "control
test", is the most important element.
Sonzas services to co-host its television and radio programs are because of his
peculiar talents, skills and celebrity status. Independent contractors often present
themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from
ordinary employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique
skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees, is a
circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship.
All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of negotiations that led to
the Agreement. For violation of any provision of the Agreement, either party may
terminate their relationship. Applying the control test to the present case, we find that
SONZA is not an employee but an independent contractor.
The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing an
employee from an independent contractor. This test is based on the extent of control the

hirer exercises over a worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer
exercises, the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. The converse holds true
as well the less control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an
independent contractor. To perform his work, SONZA only needed his skills and talent.
How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were
outside ABS-CBNs control. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job.
ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify the program format and airtime schedule
"for more effective programming." ABS-CBNs sole concern was the quality of the shows
and their standing in the ratings.
Clearly, ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance
of Sonzas work. A radio broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is
an independent contractor. Sonzas work as television and radio program host required
special skills and talent, which SONZA admittedly possesses.
ABS-CBN claims that there exists a prevailing practice in the broadcast and
entertainment industries to treat talents like Sonza as independent contractors. The
right of labor to security of tenure as guaranteed in the Constitution arises only if there is
an employer-employee relationship under labor laws. Individuals with special skills,
expertise or talent enjoy the freedom to offer their services as independent contractors.
The right to life and livelihood guarantees this freedom to contract as independent
contractors. The right of labor to security of tenure cannot operate to deprive an
individual, possessed with special skills, expertise and talent, of his right to contract as
an independent contractor.

PALMA, CAMILLE JOIE

Villamaria v CA (Labor Standards) Villamaria v CA & Bustamante [GR No. 165881]
April 19, 2006

FACTS: Oscar Villamaria, Jr. was the owner of Villamaria Motors, a sole proprietorship
engaged in assembling passenger jeepneys with a public utility franchise to operate
along the Baclaran-Sucat route. By 1995, Villamaria stopped assembling jeepneys and
retained only nine, four of which operated by employing drivers on a boundary basis.
One of those drivers was respondent Bustamante.
Bustamante remitted 450 a day to Villamaria as boundary and kept the residue of his
daily earnings as compensation for driving the vehicle. In August 1997, Villamaria
verbally agreed to sell the jeepney to Bustamante under a boundary-hulog scheme,
where Bustamante would remit to Villamaria P550 a day for a period of 4 years;
Bustamane would then become the owner of the vehicle and continue to drive the same
under Villamarias franchise, but with Php 10,000 downpayment.
August 7, 1997, Villamaria executed a contract entitled Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng
SasakyansaPamamagitan ng Boundary Hulog. The parties agreed that if Bustamante
failed to pay the boundary- hulog for 3 days, Villamaria Motors would hold on to the
vehicle until Bustamante paid his arrears, including a penalty of 50 a day; in case
Bustamante failed to remit the daily boundary-hulog for a period of one week, the
Kasunduan would cease to have the legal effect and Bustamante would have to return
the vehicle to Villamaria motors.
In 1999, Bustamante and other drivers who also had the same arrangement failed to
pay their respective boundary-hulog. The prompted Villamaria to serve a Paalala.On
July 24, 2000.Villamaria took back the jeepney driven by Bustamante and barred the
latter from driving the vehicle. Bustamante filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*Labor Arbiter: petition dismissed.
*NLRC: dismissed appeal.
*CA: reversed NLRC, awarded Bustamante separation pay and backwages.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: (1) WON the existence of a boundary-hulog agreement negates the

employer-employee relationship between the vendor and vendee
(2) WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal dismissal in such
a case.

HELD:
(1) NO. Under the boundary-hulog scheme, a dual juridical relationship is created; that
of employer- employee and vendor-vendee. The Kasanduan did not extinguish the
employer employee relationship of the parties existing before the execution of said
deed.
a. Under this system the owner/operator exercises control and supervision over the
driver. It is unlike in lease of chattels where the lessor loses complete control over the
chattel leased but the lessee is still ultimately responsible for the consequences of its
use. The management of the business is still in the hands of the owner/operator, who,
being the holder of the certificate of public convenience, must see to it that the driver
follows the route prescribed by the franchising and regulatory authority, and the rules
promulgated with regard to the business operations.
b. The driver performs activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the owner/operator. Under the Kasunduan, respondent was
required to remit Php 550 daily to petitioner, an amount which represented the boundary
of petitioner as well as respondents partial payment (hulog) of the purchase price of the
jeepney. Thus, the daily remittances also had a dual purpose: that of petitioners
boundary
and respondents partial payment (hulog) for the vehicle.
c. The obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old one,
changes only the terms of payment and adds other obligations not incompatible with the
old
provisions or where the contract merely supplements the previous one.
d. The existence of an employment relation is not dependent on how the worker is paid
but on the presence or absence of control over the means and method of the work. The
amount earned in excess of the boundary hulog is equivalent to wages and the fact
that the power of dismissal was not mentioned in the Kasunduan did not mean that
private respondent never exercised such power, or could not exercise such power.

(2) YES. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction under Article 217 of the Labor
Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can
only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statues of their collective
bargaining agreement.

ELLORICO, DENNIS
CITIZENS' LEAGUE OF FREEWORKERS AND/OR BALBINO EPIS, NICOLAS
ROJO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Davao and TEOFILO GERONIMO and EMERITA MENDEZ,
respondents.[G.R.No.L-21212] September 23, 1966
Facts:
On March 11, 1963 the respondents filed a complaint to restrain the Citizens' League of
Freeworkers, a legitimate labor organization (referred to as union) from interfering in
with the respondents auto-calesas business in Davao and to recover damages from
committing certain acts complained of in connection therewith. The union members who
were drivers of the said business, alleges that the defendants named therein used to
lease the auto-calesas of the spouses on a daily rental basis and that the same does
not recognize the union as their employees rather the petitioners were treated as
lessees and refuses to bargain with them. The union declared a strike on February 20,
1963, to which paralyzed plaintiffs' business operations through threats, intimidation and
violence. The writ was granted.
On March 18, 1963, petitioners filed a motion to declare the writ of preliminary injunction
void on the ground that the same had expired by virtue of Section 9 (d) of Republic Act
875. In his order of March 21, 1963, however, the respondent judge denied said motion
on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between respondentsspouses and the individual petitioners herein and that, consequently, the Rules of Court
and not Republic Act No. 875 applied to the matter of injunction. Thereupon the petition
under consideration was filed.
Issue:Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship existing from a daily
rental basis company?
Held: In the case of IsabeloDoce vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.
(G.R. No. L-9417, December 22, 1958), upon a similar if not an altogether identical set
of facts, We held:
"The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and lessee between the
respondent, owner of the jeeps, and the drivers, members of the petitioner union, are
the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their compensation is the excess
of the total amount of fares earned or collected by them over and above the amount of
P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent, and the fact that the gasoline burned
by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers.
These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship, between
them from that of employer-employee, because the estimated earnings for fares must
be over and above the amount they agreed to pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift
or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps. Not having any interest in the business
because they did not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not
participate in the management thereof, their service as drivers of the jeeps being their
only contribution to the business, the relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be

sustained."Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the writ of preliminary

injunction issued bythe respondent judge in Civil Case No. 3966 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, with costs.Source: http://dirkdigests.blogspot.com

PANGANIBAN, ALICE J.
G.R. Nos. 83380-81 November 15, 1989
Makati HaberdaShery Inc., Jorge Ledesma and CecilioInocencio, petitioners
vs NLRC, etc., respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition assailing the decision of NLRC affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter
finding Haberda guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering him to reinstate the dismissed
workers and in concluding that there is employer-employee relationship between
workers and Haberda. The complainants were working for Haberda as tailors,
seamstress, sewers, basters and plantsadoras. Paid on a piece-rate basis with
allowance when they report for work before 9:30am everyday.(MON-SAT) July 1984, the
labor organization where the complainants are members filed a complaint for
underpayment of basic wage, living allowance, non-payment of overtime work, nonpayment of holiday pay, non-payment of service incentive pay ad other benefits under
wage orders. During the pendency, Haberda dismiss the workers for the alleged job
acceptance from another, which was denied by the workers and countered by filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Which was granted by NLRC. Hence, this petition raising
the issues on:
Issues: (1) employer-employee relationship? (2) workers entitled to monetary claims?
(3) were respondents illegally dismissed?
Ruling:(1) There is employer-employee relationship. The facts at bar indubitably reveal
that the most important requisite of control is present. As gleaned from the operations of
petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the haberdashery or its
proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or
"plantsadora" to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt
as specified by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects
the manner and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing.
(2) Because the workers were proven to be regular employees, they shall be entitled to
minimum wages. Plus the respondents didn't appealed when the Labor Arbiter granted
the minimum wage award to the workers in the first place. But workers are not entitled
to incentive pay and other benefits because piece-rate workers are paid at fixed amount
for performing work irrespective of the time consumed.
(3) There was no illegal dismissal to the two workers accused of the copied Barong
Tagalog design, because when they were asked to explain to their employer, the
workers did not but instead go AWOL. Imposing disciplinary sanctions upon an
employee for just and valid cause is within the rights of the employer.

Reference: http://jeanneguian.blogspot.com/2013/08/gr-nos-83380-81.html

PIQUERO, JEMELY N.
AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY AGENCY VS. NLRC
FACTS: petitioner's service contracts with various corporations and government
agencies to which private respondents were previously assigned had been terminated
generally due to the sequestration of the said offices by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government. Accordingly, many of the private respondents were placed on
"floating status" on September 16, 1986. A number of them had been put on that status
even earlier. "Floating status" means an indefinite period of time when private
respondents do not receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law. A number of
them later obtained employment in other security agencies.
On account of the uncertainty of their employment with the petitioner, on July 25, 1986,
private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the
Department of Labor and Employment against petitioner. They sought the payment of
their respective separation pay, 13th month pay for 1986 and service incentive leave
pay. After due' proceedings where the parties were required to submit their position
papers and stipulation of facts, the respondent labor arbiter ruled in favor of the private
respondents whose decision as above-related was affirmed by the NLRC.
Hence, the herein petition alleging that the petitioner was denied due process of law by
the NLRC and it committed a grave abuse of discretion in considering private
respondents as employees of petitioner, in ruling that the "floating status" of private
respondents amounted to an illegal dismissal, and in causing the execution of the
judgment pending a complete and full adjudication of the issues.
ISSUE: Is there an employer-employee relationship between a security agency and its
security guards? Is the so-called "floating status" of a security guard lawful and could
such prolonged status amount to illegal dismissal?
RULING: As to the issue of employer-employee relationship, an examination of the
records shows that private respondents are regular employees of petitioner. Their
individual length of service ranges from four (4) to more than ten (10) years. In
accordance with the stipulation of facts, it appears that private respondents worked with
petitioner as security guards/janitors Their employment contracts provide, among
others.
It was petitioner who determined how much private respondents received as their
monthly salary, overtime/night differential pay, mid-year and Christmas bonus and 13th
month pay, uniforms and meal allowances and other benefits mandated by law. Private
respondents were reported by the petitioner as its employees for purposes of social
security coverage. Petitioner remitted their withholding taxes to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and made monthly contributions to the Pag-ibig fund for their benefit. It was
petitioner who determined and decided on the assignments, promotions and salary
increases of private respondents, their working hours, the firearms to be issued to them
and janitorial devices and tools to be used. Likewise, it was petitioner who imposed the
appropriate disciplinary measures on private respondents by way of reprimand,

suspension and dismissal. In determining the existence of an employee-employer

relationship, the following elements are generally considered:

1)

The selection and engagement of the employees;

2)

Payment of wages;

3)

The power of dismissal and

4)

The power to control the employees' conduct .

It is clear, therefore, that private respondents are petitioner's regular employees who
enjoy security of tenure and who cannot be dismissed except for cause .
As to the alleged illegal dismissal of private respondents, the records show that they
filed their complaint against petitioner on July 25, 1986. At the time they filed their
complaint, most of them were still on the job or on assignments and its only in
September 1986 when most of them were placed on "floating status."
Obviously, the filing of the complaint was premature. Apparently, this issue was not
raised at all and so it is deemed waived. Thus, when the labor arbiter rendered his
decision, he considered those who have been out of work or "floating status" for a
period exceeding six (6) months to have been terminated from the service without just
cause thus entitling them to the corresponding benefits for such separation.

BERNALES, RONNEH LIZA T.

Besa v. Trajano

FACTS: Respondent KAMPI filed a Petition for Certification Election.

Petitioner opposed alleging that there is no ER-EE relationship between Besa
and petitioners. These petitioners are shoe shiners paid on a commission basis. The
question of ER-EE relationship became a primordial consideration in resolving whether
or not the subject shoe shiners have the juridical personality and standing to present a
petition for certification as well as to vote therein.
ISSUE: W/N ER-EE relationship exists betweem shoe shiners and Besa.
Ruling: No.
Shoe shiner is different from a piece worjer:
Piece Woker
shiner
1. paid for work accomplished
the capital of the employer
2. the employer pays his wages
customer

Shoe
1. contributes anything to
2. paid directly by his

3. paid for work accomplished without concern to

the profit derived by employer.
from the trade are divided

3. the proceeds derived

share with respondent BESA

4. the employer supervises and controls
his work
not exercise control

4. respondent does

Thus, shoe shiners are not employees of the company, but are partners, because there
is no control by the owner and shoe shiners have their own customers whom they
charge a fee and divide the proceeds equally with the owner

CHING, CAVEN M.
Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. Pagalilauan G.R. No. L-62909 April
18, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its Legal Assistant
and received basic monthly salary of P 1,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P
50.00 which gradually increased to P 320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a
letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated
effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well. Aban
filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that
Aban was illegally dismissed.
This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the

petitioner Corporation and Aban.

RULING: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate
Aban to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three
(3) years back wages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorneys
fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private
respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years back pay
and P5,000.00 attorneys fees. A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be
an employee of a private corporation or even of the government.
This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an
employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection
and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the
presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a
power to control the putative employees conduct.
Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor. In this case,
Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner, dealt
only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also
assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is
not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner
has the power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised
control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four
standards in determining whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.

BAUTISTA, CEL MICAELA A.

MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and FERMIN LAMAR, respondents. G.R. No.
64948September 27, 1994

Facts:
A petition for certification was filed with the Labor Relations Division of the Ministry of
Labor by PTCCEA in behalf of the caddies of petitioners. The petition was resolved in
favor of caddies. The same union later filed for SSS coverage but the Social Security
Commission denied them for absence pf employee employer relationship.

Issue:
Whether or not persons rendering caddying services for members of golf clubs and their
guests in said clubs courses of premises are the employees of such clubs and
therefore within the compulsory coverage of the SSS.

Ruling:
The caddies are not employees for the following reasons:
-rules and regulations are permissible means to impose order where the caddies are
allowed to pursue their profession within the clubs premises.
-they do not observe a particular working hour and are not at the call of the club
-the club has no measure of control over the incidents of the caddies work and
compensation
-the group rotation system is only an assurance that the work is distributed fairly

Decision of the CA reversed and set aside

DIMACULANGAN, MIKA
Victoria Milling VS. NLRC
Facts: In September 1989, private respondent National Federation of Sugar WorkersFood and General Trades (NFSW-FGT), on behalf of "all workers of farm owners,"
1instituted a suit against petitioner Victorias Milling Co., Inc., a sugar central in Victorias,
Negros Oriental, planter Hacienda Estrella II/Ferraris and all other haciendas within
petitioners milling district before Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Department of Labor and Employment. 2 Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 809, 3 private respondent sought to recover the share of the workers
in the increased deliveries enjoyed by the planter of unrefined sugar and by-products
produced in petitioners refinery from 1952 to crop year 1983-1984. 4crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
there was no employer-employee relationship between it and private respondent. The
labor arbiter denied the motion on January 2, 1990 and January 31, 1990.
5crlwvirtualibrry
Respondent Commission, on July 6, 1993 and May 26, 1994, affirmed the orders of the
labor arbiter. Hence this petition.
Petitioner solely contends that:
"THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE
ACTION IN NLRC CASE NO. V-0027-90 BEFORE IT (AND/OR RAB VI CASE NO. 0606-10249-89 BEFORE ITS ARBITRATION BRANCH NO. VI) AND THEREBY
CONSEQUENTLY DIRECT/ORDER DESISTANCE FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
THEREON NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT NEITHER THE SAID
RESPONDENT NOR THE LABOR ARBITER OF ITS ARBITRATION BRANCH
POSSESSES JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SAID SUIT IN
LIGHT OF THE ADMITTED ABSENCE OF ANY EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP AS BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND/OR
THE "FARMWORKERS" IT SEEKS TO REPRESENT." 6crlwvirtualibrry
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and respondent Commission is defined in Article 217 of
the labor Code which reads:
"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. -- Except as otherwise
provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for employees compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement."
7crlwvirtualibrry
The labor arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all disputes involving workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, if
the dispute falls under paragraphs 1 to 6 of Article 217. Not all claims for money and
benefits are included in this jurisdiction. Article 217 assumes that the cases or disputes
arise out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship between the
parties. 8crlwvirtualibrry
The question now is whether an employer-employee relationship exist between
petitioner sugar central and private respondent farm workers.
The answer is in the negative.
As early as 1981 in the case of Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, 9this
Court had ruled that a sugar central does not have any privity of any kind with the sugar
farm workers, to wit:
"x xxFrom the very beginning of the sugar industry, the centrals have never had any
privity of any kind with the plantation laborers, since they had their own laborers to take
care of. In other words, both the centrals and the planters have always been the one
dealing with their respective laborers regarding the terms and conditions of their
employment, particularly as to wages. x xx." 10crlwvirtualibrry
Sugar farm workers/laborers were the direct responsibility of their respective planters
and the central did not deal with the planters workers but only with the planter.
R.A. 809 did not create any employer-employee relationship between the planters
workers and the sugar centrals. In fact, the law affirmed the old practice of the central
dealing only with the planter by directly issuing to it the planters share of the unrefined
sugar per their milling contracts. 11 Section 1 of R.A. 809 apportions the proceeds of
the sugar between the sugar central and the planters as follows:
"SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of
planters and the millers of sugar-cane in any milling district in the Philippines, the

unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the
sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-products
and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between them as follows:
Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum for the central in any milling
district the maximum actual production of which is not more than four hundred thousand
piculs: Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to sugar centrals with
an actual production of less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs;
Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per
centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which
exceeds four hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed six hundred thousand
piculs;
Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five per centum for the central in any
milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds six hundred thousand
piculs but does not exceed nine hundred thousand piculs;
Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per
centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which
exceeds nine hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed one million two hundred
thousand piculs;
Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per centum for the central in any milling
district the maximum actual production of which exceeds one million two hundred
thousand piculs.
By actual production is meant the total production of the mill for the crop year
immediately preceding."
The planters share included the workers share such that if any increase was made on
the planters participation in the proceeds, it became the planters obligation to pay his
workers their 60% share of such increase. To ensure that the workers received their
share, the law tasked the Department of Labor with the distribution thereof, thus:
"SECTION 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the
proceeds of any increase in the participation granted the planters under this Act and
above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborer in the
plantation in the following proportion:
Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the laborers and forty per centum for
the planters. The distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made
under the supervision of the Department of Labor.
The benefits granted to laborers in sugar plantations under this Act and in the Minimum
Wage Law shall not in any way be diminished by such labor contracts known as "by the
piece," "by the volume," "by the area," or by the other system of "pakyaw," the Secretary
of Labor being hereby authorized to issue the necessary orders for the enforcement of
this provision."

Clearly, there is no privity between the sugar centrals and the sugar farm workers. The
workers are not employees of the sugar central but of the planter. 12 And R.A. 809
expressly recognizes the planter, not the central, as the employer of the farm workers
by imposing on it the duty of paying its respective workers their share of the proceeds
from the milled sugar. As held by this Court:
"x xx. Accordingly, the only obligation of the centrals, like VICTORIAS, is to give to the
respective planters, like the PLANTERS herein, the planters share of the proceeds of
the milled sugar in the proportion stipulated in the milling contract which would
necessarily include the portion of 60% pertaining to the laborers. Once this has been
done, the central is already out of the picture, and thereafter, the matter of paying the
plantation laborers of the respective planters becomes exclusively the concern of the
planters, the laborers and the Department of Labor. Under no principle of law or equity
can We impose on the central -- here VICTORIAS -- any liability to the plantation
laborers, should any of their respective planters-employers fail to pay their legal share."
13crlwvirtualibrry
Private respondent admits that the sugar central may not be held solidarily liable with
the planter for the workers share. It argues, however, that the centrals non-liability does
not preclude it from being impleaded as an indispensable party without whose presence
the court cannot proceed and render judgment. 14 It claims that petitioner sugar central
and the planters "have conspired, confederated and confabulated" to deprive the
workers of their rightful share under the law. It opines that once impleaded, petitioner
may be compelled to reveal the names of the planters who milled therewith and submit
the milling contracts and other records necessary for the successful prosecution of
private respondents case. 15crlwvirtualibrry
An indispensable party is a "party in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action." 16 To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest,
i.e., one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. 17 Petitioner does not stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit. It has no privity with, much less any legal obligation to
private respondent. 18crlwvirtualibrry
Private respondent need not implead petitioner to obtain evidence to prove its claims
against the planters. It has sufficient remedies under the law and our rules of procedure.
It may obtain a subpoena from the labor arbiter to require the sugar central to produce
its records, 19 or it may resort to the various modes of discovery under the Revised
Rules of Court. 20 It may also find recourse with the Department of Labor and
Employment, the office called upon to supervise the distribution of the workers share.
21crlwvirtualibrry
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. The decision and Order of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case AC-No. V-0027-90 are reversed
and set aside and the labor arbiter is ordered to dismiss RAB VI Case No. 06-06-1024989 with respect to herein petitioner Victorias Milling Co., Inc. and to proceed with
dispatch in resolving the same.

SANCHEZ, JERLY ANN L.

ORLANDO FARM GROWERS ASSOCIATION/GLICERIO AOVER vs. NLRC
GR No. 129076 November 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Farm Growers Association (Anover
is the
p r e s i d e n t ) i s a n association of landowners engaged in the production of
export quality bananas located in Kinamayan, Sto. Tomas, Davao del
Norte, established for the sole purpose of dealing collectively with Stan
Phil co. on matters concerning technical services, canal maintenance, irrigation
and pest control, among others.
Respondents (about 20 complainants) were hired as farm workers
b y s e v e r a l member-landowners but, nonetheless, were made to perform functions
as packer sand harvesters in the plantation of petitioner association.
January 8, 1993 July 30, 1994 respondents were dismissed on various
dates. Thus, they filed against petitioner for illegal dismissal and monetary benefits.

Petitioners liabilities to complainants are joint and solidary, with its responsible officers.
September
6,
1995
LABOR ARBITER SANCHO: ordered
Reinstatement of respondents and payment of back wages and other benefits.
Note: 2 complainants eventually dropped their case (Loran Paquit and LovillaDorlones)
because they were able to amicably settle their claims.
1. December 26, 1996 - NLRC affirmed decision of LA and denied the
motion for reconsideration.
2. Petitioner contends that being an unregistered association and
having been formed solely to serve as an effective medium for dealing
collectively with Stan Phil co, and not existing in law, it cannot be considered
an employer.
Issue:
Whether
or not
an unregistered
association
may be
an employer
independent of the respective members it represents
Held:
YES. Petition is DISMISSED. NLRC judgment affirmed but remanded back to Labor
Arbiter Sancho to specify the amount each respondent is entitled to.

MENDOZA, AARON VINCE

Manila terminal company vs. court of industrial relation
Facts:
Manila Terminal Company, Inc. hereinafter to be referred as to the petitioner, undertook
the arrastre service in some of the piers in Manila's Port Area at the request and under
the control of the United States Army. The petitioner hired some thirty men as watchmen
on twelve-hour shifts at a compensation of P3 per day for the day shift and P6 per day
for the night shift.
The watchmen of the petitioner continued in the service with a number of substitutions
and additions, their salaries having been raised during the month of February to P4 per
day for the day shift and P6.25 per day for the nightshift. The private respondent sent a
letter to Department of Labor requesting that the matter of overtime pay be investigated.
But nothing was done by the Dept of Labor.
Later on, the petitioner instituted the system of strict eight-hour shifts.
The private respondent filed an amended petition with the Court of Industrial Relations
praying, among others, that the petitioner be ordered to pay its watchmen or police
force overtime pay from the commencement of their employment.
By virtue of Customs Administrative Order No. 81 and Executive Order No. 228 of the
President of the Philippines, the entire police force of the petitioner was consolidated
with the Manila Harvor Police of the Customs Patrol Service, a Government agency
under the exclusive control of the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of
Finance The Manila Terminal Relief and Mutual Aid Association will hereafter be referred
to as the Association.
Judge V. Jimenez Yanson of the Court of Industrial Relations in his decision ordered the
petitioner to pay to its police force but regards to overtime service after the watchmen
had been integrated into the Manila Harbor Police, the has no jurisdiction because it
affects the Bureau of Customs, an instrumentality of the Government having no
independent personality and which cannot be sued without the consent of the State.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Association also filed a motion for
reconsideration in so far its other demands were dismissed. Both resolutions were
denied.
The public respondent decision was to pay the private respondents their overtime on
regular days at the regular rate and additional amount of 25 percent, overtime on
Sundays and legal holidays at the regular rate only, and watchmen are not entitled to
night differential pay for past services. The petitioner has filed a present petition for
certiorari.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the CIR has no jurisdiction to render a money judgment involving
obligation in arrears. b. Whether or not the agreement under which its police force were
paid certain specific wages for twelve-hour shifts, included overtime compensation.
c. Whether or not the Association is barred from recovery by estoppel and laches.
d. Whether or not the nullity or invalidity of the employment contract precludes any
recovery by the
Association.

e. whether or not the Commonwealth Act No. 4444 does not authorize recovery of back
overtime pay.
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision that the petitioner's watchmen will
be entitled to extra compensation only from the dates they respectively entered the
service of the petitioner, hereafter to be duly determined by the Court of Industrial
Relations.
On the first issue, the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to award a money
judgment was already overruled by this Court on the case of Detective & protective
Bureau, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations and United Employees Welfare Association
that under Commonwealth Act No. 103 the Court is empowered to make the order for
the purpose of settling disputes between the employer and employee.
On the second issue, based on the case of Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations and United Employees Welfare Association, the law gives
them the right to extra compensation. And they could not be held to have impliedly
waived such extra compensation, for the obvious reason that could not have expressly
waived it.
On the third issue, the principle of estoppel and the laches cannot well be invoked
against the Association. it would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight Hour Labor Law,
under which as already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to extra
compensation. If the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied, the employee
may be compelled to accomplish the same thing by mere silence or lapse of time,
thereby frustrating the purpose of law by indirection.
On the fourth issue, the employee in rendering extra service at the request of his
employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirement of the
law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor.
This was based on the case of Gotamo Lumber Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
wherein both parties are in pari delicto. Moreover, the Eight-Hour Law, in providing that
"any agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee contrary
to the provisions of this Act shall be null avoid ab initio.
On the fifth issue, based on Fair Labor Standards Act of the United States which
provides that "any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 and section 207
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compensation as the case may be,"
a provision not incorporated in Commonwealth Act No. 444, our Eight-Hour Labor Law.
We cannot agree to the proposition, because sections 3 and 5 of Commonwealth Act
444 expressly provides for the payment of extra compensation in cases where overtime
services are required, with the result that the employees or laborers are entitled to
collect such extra compensation for past overtime work. To hold otherwise would be to
allow an employer to violate the law by simply, as in this case, failing to provide for and
pay overtime compensation.

EDA, RUBY
Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC [August 17, 1992]
Facts:

Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer
Christian Institute.
One day, Funtecha, who already had a students drivers license, requested
Masa, the school driver and son of the school president, to allow him to drive the
school vehicle. Assenting to the request, Masa stopped the vehicle he was
driving and allowed Funtecha to take over behind the wheel.
However, after neglecting a sharp dangerous curb, Funtecha came upon a fast
moving truck so that he had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon
swerving, they bumped a pedestrian walking in his lane. The pedestrian died due
to the accident.

Issue: Whether or not Filamer Christian Institute should be held liable

Ruling: YES

First, it should be noted that driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president were both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of
the interest of the petitioner-school. The school jeep had to be brought home so
that the school driver can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next
school days.
Thus, in learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allans home, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride or for enjoyment, but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. (School president had knowledge of Funtechas desire to learn how to
drive.)
Court is thus constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties.
The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver does not relieve the school from
the burden of rebutting the presumption of negligence on its part. It is sufficient
that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the school.
Petitioner school has failed to show that it exercised diligence of a good father of
a family.
Petitioner has not shown that it has set forth rules and guidelines as would
prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not
the official driver or prohibiting the authorized driver from letting anyone than him
to drive the vehicle. Furthermore, school had failed to show that it impose
sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons
other than the driver.

The liability of the employer, under Article 2180, is primary and solidary. However,
the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
DOROSAN, KENNETH B.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HONORATO JUDICO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents. [G.R. No. 73887 December 21, 1989]
G.A. Fortun and Associates for petitioner.
Facts:
Petitioner admits that on June 9, 1976, private respondent Judico entered into an
agreement of agency with petitioner Grepalife to become a debit agent attached to the
industrial life agency in Cebu City. Petitioner defines a debit agent as "an insurance
agent selling/servicing industrial life plans and policy holders. Industrial life plans are
those whose premiums are payable either daily, weekly or monthly and which are
collectible by the debit agents at the home or any place designated by the policy holder"
(p. 156, Rollo). Such admission is in line with the findings of public respondent that as
such debit agent, private respondent Judico had definite work assignments including but
not limited to collection of premiums from policy holders and selling insurance to
prospective clients. Public respondent NLRC also found out that complainant was
initially paid P 200. 00 as allowance for thirteen (13) weeks regardless of production and
later a certain percentage denominated as sales reserve of his total collections but not
lesser than P 200.00. Sometime in September 1981, complainant was promoted to the
position of Zone Supervisor and was given additional (supervisor's) allowance fixed at
P110.00 per week. During the third week of November 1981, he was reverted to his
former position as debit agent but, for unknown reasons, not paid so-called weekly
sales reserve of at least P 200.00. Finally on June 28, 1982, complainant was
dismissed by way of termination of his agency contract.
Issue: whether or not employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and
private respondent.
Ruling: Yes. Judico is employee of the company because an ordinary commission
insurance agent works at his own volition or at his own leisure without fear of dismissal
from the company and short of committing acts detrimental to the business interest of
the company or against the latter, whether he produces or not is of no moment as his
salary is based on his production, his anemic performance or even dead result does not
become a ground for dismissal. Whereas, in private respondent's case, the undisputed
facts show that he was controlled by petitioner insurance company not only as to the
kind of work; the amount of results, the kind of performance but also the power of
dismissal. Undoubtedly, private respondent, by nature of his position and work, had
been a regular employee of petitioner and is therefore entitled to the protection of the
law and could not just be terminated without valid and justifiable cause.

LAYUG, MARK
SALAZAR VS. NLRC APRIL 17, 1996 [G.R. No 109210]
FACTS: On 17 April 1990, private respondent Carlos Construction, at a monthly salary
of P4,500.00, employed Salazar as construction/project engineer for the construction of
a building in Cubao. Allegedly, by virtue of an oral contract, petitioner would also receive
a share in the profits after completion of the project and that petitioners services in
excess of 8 hours on regular days and services rendered on weekends and legal
holidays shall be compensable overtime.
On 16 April 1991, petitioner received a memorandum issued by private respondents
project manager informing him of the termination of his services effective on 30 April
1991.
On 13 September 1991, Salazar filed a complaint against private respondent for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, illegal deduction, non-payment of wages, overtime
rendered, service incentive leave pay, commission, allowances, profit-sharing and
separation pay with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch, Manila.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the instant case for lack of merit.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, where it affirmed in to the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. His MR was likewise dismissed.
ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner is entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for services rendered on rest
days and holidays and service incentive leave pay
2) WON petitioner is entitled to a share in the profits of the construction project;.
3) WON petitioner rendered services from 1 May to 15 May 1991 and is, therefore,
entitled to unpaid wages;
4) WON private respondent is liable to reimburse petitioners legal expenses and;
5) WON petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
HELD: The assailed decision is modified.
1. NO. Although petitioner cannot strictly be classified as a managerial employee,
nonetheless he is still not entitled to payment of the foretasted benefits because he falls
squarely under another exempt category officers or members of a managerial staff
as defined under sec. 2(c) of the abovementioned implementing rules:
Sec. 2. Exemption. The provisions of this Rule shall not apply to the following
persons if they qualify for exemption under the condition set forth
(c) Officers or members of a managerial staff
That petitioner was paid overtime benefits does not automatically and necessarily
denote that petitioner is entitled to such benefits

1. NO. Petitioner insists that private respondent promised him a share in the profits
after completion of the construction project. It is because of this oral agreement,
petitioner elucidates, that he agreed to a monthly salary of P4,500.00, an amount which
he claims is too low for a professional civil engineer like him with the rank of project
engineer.
We cannot accede to petitioners demand. Nowhere in the disbursement vouchers can
we find even the remotest hint of a profit-sharing agreement between petitioner and
private respondent. Petitioners rationalization stretches the imagination way too far.
3. YES. On April 30, he was advised by the Manager to continue supervising the
finishing touches to the building until May 15, the date appearing in the Certificate of
Service as the date of the termination of the contract between Salazar and the
Company. But the Manager insists that Salazars services terminated at April 30
according to the Memorandum given the petitioner.
The purpose for which they said certificate was issued becomes irrelevant. The fact
remains that private respondent knowingly and voluntarily issued the certificate. Mere
denials and self-serving statements to the effect that petitioner allegedly promised not to
use the certificate against private respondent are not sufficient to overturn the same.
Hence, private respondent is stopped from assailing the contents of its own certificate of
service.
4. YES. During the construction of the building, a criminal complaint for unjust vexation
was filed against the officers of the owner of the building. Petitioner avers that he was
implicated in the complaint for the sole reason that he was the construction engineer of
the project.
Although not directly implicated in the criminal complaint, Carlos Construction is
nonetheless obligated to defray petitioners legal expenses. Petitioner was included in
the complaint not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as project engineer of
private respondent and the case arose in connection with his work as such. At the
construction site, petitioner is the representative of private respondent being its
employee and he acts for and in behalf of private respondent. Hence, the inclusion of
petitioner in the complaint for unjust vexation, which was work-related, is equivalent to
inclusion of private respondent itself.
5. NO. On the last issue, we rule that petitioner is a project employee and, therefore, not
entitled to separation pay.

CONEL, LEAH
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (PACUP) and TOMAS N.
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-17620

August 31, 1962

Facts: Tomas N. Aguirre became a faculty member of the respondent in 1948.

He was first employed at the rate of P6.00 per hour and then was contracted to
teach in the Boys' High School Department in the same university at the rate of
P30.00 per class, earning an average of P500.00 to P600.00 a month. Aguirre
joined the PACUP, a legitimate labor organization in June 1953. In July or August,
1953, upon orders of the president of the PACUP, Jose M. Hernandez, Aguirre
began to campaign and recruit members for the PACUP. As a result of his efforts
in campaigning for membership, he was able to influence seven members from
the faculty of the university (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-6", inclusive). In his
campaign for membership, he approached practically all of the faculty members
of the respondent's Institute of Education and some from the Arts and Sciences,
Business Administration and Finance, but most of them were afraid to join the
union. They were afraid of any retaliation that the respondent may make because
of their joining the union.
During the months of December, 1953 up to May, 1954, for teaching in the Far
Eastern University, respondent herein, Aguirre was paid the following: December,
1953-P210.00; January, 1954 P302.40; February, 1954 P313.20; March,
1954 P249.00. In June, 1954, respondent stopped giving him teaching
assignments.
Aguirre claims that in June, 1954, he was no longer given an assignment
because of his union activities while respondent claims that Aguirre was not
given assignment because of decreased enrollment in the university. He further
avers that after recruiting some members, his classification as full time instructor
changed to reserved full time instructor and his teaching load was decreased to
two hours a day.
The dean of the Institute of Education, Luz A. Zafra, admitted also that in the
assignment of subjects to faculty members, length of service, experience,
preparation and professional growth as well as student-faculty relation were
taken into consideration. Hence if these above-mentioned factors, particularly
length of service and experience, were really taken into consideration, Aguirre a
full time professor should have been given the assignment in stead of Regalado
and Mendoza who were only part time professors and who started teaching after
him. The other Tagalo instructors (professors under the classification) who were
given assignments when Aguirre was not, are not members of the PACUP. It
should also be noted that since before the last war, Aguirre had been teaching in
the University of the Philippines.

Issue: W/N there was an Employer-Employee relationship. Feu must pay unfair
labor practices.
Ruling: On motion for reconsideration filed by the complainant, a majority of the
judges of said Court sitting en banc, affirmed the decision of Judge Martinez,
insofar as the commission of unfair labor practice charged and the payment of
the salary differential and back wages are concerned, but held that Aguirre's
employment in the Central Bank and the Philippine College of Commerce are not
the substantial equivalent of his aforementioned position as full time instructor in
the University, and, accordingly, modified said decision by, likewise, sentencing
the University to reinstate Tomas N. Aguirre, in addition to paying him the
aforementioned wages differential and back wages plus "other emoluments".
Hence this appeal by certiorari taken by the University. The Court of Industrial
Relation, as one of the appellees herein, has filed a motion, which we consider
as its answer, to dismiss the appeal for lack of merit upon the ground that
appellant raises no question of law.
Although Mr. Aguirre was, not a professor, but a full time instructor in the
University, we agree with the opinion of the lower court, sitting en banc. In
addition to the circumstances relied upon by the latter, one important factor, not
mentioned in the resolution appealed from, is decisively in favor of the conclusion
therein reached, and that is that Mr. Aguirre is an instructor in Tagalog, and that,
as such, his position as researcher in the Central Bank has no future for him. The
situation would perhaps have been different had his line been economics.
Inasmuch, however, as Mr. Aguirre has especialized in the Tagalog dialect, his
work as a researcher in the Central Bank is inferior to his job as full time
instructor in the University, not so much because his salary in the latter is
substantially bigger, even if we add thereto his emoluments in the Philippine
College of Commerce, but, specially, because of the future his position as
instructor in the University offers him as a career, which is non-existent in the
Central Bank.
WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner. It is so ordered..1wph1.t

BELAS, JONATHAN
Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union vs. Laguesma & Corfarm GrainsG.R No.
113542, February 24, 1998
Facts: Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union members (petitioners) worked as
cargadores forCorfarms Grains,Inc. (private respondent). They loaded unloaded and
piled sacks of palay from thewarehouses to the cargo trucks and from the cargo trucks
to the buyers. They were paid by privaterespondent on a piece rate basis. When
Corfarm denied some benefits to these cargadores, theyorganized a union. Upon
learning of its formation, Corfarm barred its members from working withthem and
replaced them with non-members of the union.Petitioner filed [a petition] for certification
election before the Department of Labor andEmployment and also filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.Corfarm denies that it had the power of control, rationalizing that
petitioner's members"were 'street-hired' workers engaged from time to time to do
loading and unloading work .Therewas no superintendent-in-charge to give orders and
there were no gate passes issued, nor tools,equipment and paraphernalia issued by
Corfarm for loading/unloading. Furthermore theycontended that employer-employee
relationship is negated by the fact that they offer and actuallyperform loading and
unloading work for various rice mills in Pangasinan .Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito
issued his decision finding the dismissal of petitioner'smembers illegal. Public
Respondent Laguesma premised the dismissal of the petition forcertification election on
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner'smembers and
private respondent
ISSUE: The present controversy hinges on whether or not an employer-employee
relationshipbetween the CPWU members and Respondent Corfarm exist.
HELD:
Yes there is employer-emploee relationship. To determine the existence of an employeremployee relation, this Court has consistently applied the "four-fold" test which has the
followingelements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to
dismiss, and (4) thepower to control - the last being the most important
element.Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union members (petitioners) performed work
which isdirectly related, necessary and vital to the operations of Corfarm. Moreover,
Corfarm did not evenallege, much less prove, that petitioner's members have
"substantial capital or investment in theform of tools, equipment, machineries, [and]
work premises, among others. To be considered asindependent contractors.
Furthermore, said respondent did not contradict petitioner's allegationthat it paid wages
directly to these workers without the intervention of any third-partyindependent
contractor. It also wielded the power of dismissal over petitioners; in fact, its exerciseof
this power was the progenitor of the illegal dismissal case. Clearly, the workers are not
independent contractors. Assuming arguendo that they did work with other rice mills,
this wasrequired by the imperative of meeting their basic needs.

BUSTOS, BENEDICT
MERCIDAR FISHING CORPORATION represented by its President DOMINGO B.
NAVAL, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FERMIN
AGAO, JR., respondents/1998
FACTS:
Fermin Agao, a bodegero (or para sosy, ships quartermaster) at Mercidar
Fishing Corp.,filed complaint for illegal dismissal, violation of PD 851 and non-payment
of 5-days serviceincentive leave; he started work there in 1988 and claims to have been
constructively dismissedin 1990 when his employer refused to give him assig
nments aboard the companys boats. LA ordered Agaos reinstatement with backwages
and payment of 13th month pay and serviceincentive leave pay; NLRC dismissed the
appeal of Mercidar Fishing which claimed that Agao, as a field personnel was not
entitled under the LC to such service incentive leave pay
Petitioner contends that Agao abandoned his work, while the latter alleges that after
havingbeen on one-month leave following a sickness, his employer refused to give him
furtherassignments after he reported for workISSUE:
ISSUE: WON fishing crew members are deemed field personnel, as defined under
Art. 82 of LC (NO) WON Agao had been constructively dismissed (YES)HELD/RATIO:
Art. 82 - "Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly
perform theirduties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whoseactual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty. (Theprovisions of the Title on Working Conditions & Rest Period

according to par.1 of Art. 82

donot apply, among others, to field personnel.)Citing Union of Pilipro Employees (UFE)
v. Vicar which sought to explain the meaning of "whoseactual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty", the Courtsaid that, in deciding whether
or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can bedetermined with
reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not suchemployee's time
and performance is constantly supervised by the employer.Here, the nature of the work
necessarily means that the fishing crew stays on board the vesselin the course of the
fishing voyage. Although they perform non-agricultural work away frompetitioner's
business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work theyare
under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel's patron
ormaster as the NLRC correctly held.The Court also ruled that there was constructive
dismissal of Agao. Medical certificate showshis fitness to work when he presented the
same to his employer. Beside, as alreadyestablished in jurisprudence, to constitute
BARLIZO, ROMEL

AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner vs. ANTONIO

BAUTISTA, respondent.
FACTS:
1. Antonio bautista has been an employed by Auto Bus Transit since 1995 as driver
conductor. He was paid on commission basis, % of the total gross income per travel,
twice a month. In 2000. While he was driving a bus along nueva viscaya, a bus of the
same company suddenly stopped at a sharp curve without giving any warning so the
bus Antonip was driving accidentally bumped the rear portion of that bus.
2. When questioned he said that the accident happened because he was compelled by
the management to go back to isabela although he had not slept for almost 24 hours. A
month after the incident, he was given a letter of termination.
3. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims.
LABOR ARBITER RULED: Illegal dismissal complaint is dismissed but ordered Auto
Bus to pay him the following: his 13th month pay- about P78K and his service incentive
leave pay about 13.7K. Not satisfied, he appealed the decision to NLRC.
NLRC HELD: same decision but modified, deleted the 13th month pay. Displeased, he
sought the review of said decision with CA
CA HELD: affirmed decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: WON BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS ARE ENTITLED TO INCENTIVE
LEAVE PAY
HELD:
YES.
1. Auto Bus maintained that a driver-conductor plying Manila-Tuguegarao-Baguio route
is not entitled to the grant of service incentive leave just because he was paid on purely
commission basis is misplaced. What must be ascertained in order to resolve the issue
of propriety of the grant of service incentive leave to Bautista is won he is a field
personnel or not.
2. The definition of a field personnel is not merely concerned with the location where the
employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that his performance is
unsupervised by the employer. Their actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty but there must be an inquiry as to whether or not
the employees time and performance are constantly supervised by the employee.
3. As observed:

a. along the routes that are plied by the bus companies, there are inspectors assigned
in strategic places who board the bus and inspect the pax, punch the tickets and the
conductors report.
b. There is also the mandatory once a week car barn or shop day where the bus is
regularly checked as to is mechanical, electrical and hydraulic aspects and if there are
any problems.
c. Since the bus leaves promptly, they must be at a place specified on a specific time
and the same with their arrival. A dispatcher is around to supervise this.
4. Given the above observations, the driver is therefore under the constant
supervision while in the performance of their work. They cannot be considered as
field personnel.