OWNERSHIP CASE DIGESTS

Isaguirre v. De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 803
Gonzaga Reyes, J.

FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro
de Lara was succeeded by his wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as claimant. On this lot stands
a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondents sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. When Felicitas encountered financial
difficulties, she approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre.

On February 10, 1960, a document denominated as Deed of Sale and Special Cession
of Rights and Interests was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre, whereby the former sold
a 250 square meter portion of the subject lot, together with the two-story commercial and
residential structure standing thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de
Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the
two-story building. However, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property
and was issued an OCT.

Due to overlapping of title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution,
petitioner opposed, and alleged that he had a right of retention over the property until
payment of the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he made on the property.

HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings from this case,
it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he
held respondents property as mere security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore,
petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to
reimbursement for any useful expenses which he may have incurred.

2
German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495
Fernan, J.

FACTS: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was originally registered on 5 August
1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948.

On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision.
Consequently, the German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the
property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza and 20 other persons, German
Management advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.

Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of the subject

property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al. Gernale,
et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC
Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have
occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD
27, and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law when German
Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing their
farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other
crops that they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The MTC dismissed
Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible entry.

On appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed
the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al.
were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German
Management, they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession. German Management moved to reconsider but the
same was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, here is the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when respondents refused to vacate
the premises.

HELD: No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of the
prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is

unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536
New Civil Code which provides that "in no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

3
Caisip v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17
Concepcion, C. J.

FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag cultivated a parcel of land known as
Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, the same land used to be tenanted
by Cabalags father when he was still alive. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia,
administered by Antonio Chuidian, and supervised by the overseer, Felix Caisip. Prior to the
incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful tenant of Royas y Cia from the Court
of Agrarian Relations but his action was dismissed. Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an action against
Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot 105-A.
The Justice of the Peace of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia and on June 6,
1959, a trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of sugarcane.

A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by
Caisip. Due to Cabalags tenacious attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of Police of
Nasugbu. The Deputy Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his request to eject Cabalag cannot
be acted upon without a proper court order. Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned Sergeant
Ignacio Rojales and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo Palico. On June 17, 1959,
Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Caisip approached her
and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so. So, Caisip went to Sgt. Rojales and Cpl.
Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told Cabalag to stop weeding but she insisted
on her right to stay in the said lot. While in squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales
who twisted her right arm and wrested the trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left hand
and together Rojales forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood nearby,
with a drawn gun. Cabalag shouted, Ina ko po! Ina ko po! and was heard by some neighbors.
Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with them on
their way to the municipal building. Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales and
Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who interrogated her. But upon representations made by
Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then filed a complaint charging
Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of grave coercion.

The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as charged. On appeal, The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the exercise of his right
granted by Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. This is totally
inapplicable to the case, for, having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to vacate the
lot, Cabalag did not, on June 17th and within said period, invades or usurps the said lot. She had
merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its
co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the Justice of Peace Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and
others did not repel or prevent an actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation. They
expelled Cabalag from a property which she and her husband were in possession, despite the
fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said property up to
June 26th, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial order. It is
clear, therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal
authority, had prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law (weeding
and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against her will (stopping the weeding
and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong, thereby taking the law into their hands, in
violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.

4
Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio vs. CA,
GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the
property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe
fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed
by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire passageway,
therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court and ordered the
custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the punlic street
and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use
and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum
absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner
in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can
complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life

5
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195
Fernan, C.J.

FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent
corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of respondent corporation,
for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action against respondent corporation for damages. The trial
court dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed the order of the trial
court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors
and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act
or omission constituting fault or negligence. However, responsibility for fault or negligence under
the said article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. The plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. The decision is reversed and set aside.

6
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125018, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 145
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. and private respondent Crispin Lat are adjoining
landowners in Lipa City. The land of Lat is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while
Remmans land is devoted to its piggery business. The latters land is 1 meters higher in
elevation than that of respondent Lat. Meanwhile, respondent noticed that petitioners waste
disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating of Lats plantation. He made several
representations with petitioner but they fell on deaf ears. Consequently, the trees growing on the
flooded portion where it was inundated with water containing pig manure, started to wither and
die. Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages alleging that the acidity of the soil in
his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from
petitioners piggery farm. Petitioner denied the allegations and claimed that the construction of
additional lagoons was already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to
prevent any damage to the adjoining estate. Petitioner also argued that the damages, if any, were
due to a fortuitous event.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages were due to a fortuitous event.

HELD: No. We cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opions expressed
by the lower courts: Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God; by reason of
their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable for the
ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649 (1993), the
Supreme Court held: Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damages sustained by private respondents since they,
the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an
act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The
effect tehn of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted
from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were,
and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appelle, resort to pertinent
provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code, it is provided that
lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither
can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.

A similar provision is found under Article 50 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067),
which provides that lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without
the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry
with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural
flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher
estate make works which will increase this natural flow.

As worded, the two aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower estate to
receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher
estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher estate are those which are artificially
collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower
or servient estate to compensation.

7
Republic vs CA and Jose Y. De La Rosa
GR No. L-43938
Surface Rights of Landowner (Article 437)

Facts: Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his own behalf
and on behalf of his children. This application was separately opposed by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge Corporation (Atok).
The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents and that they have
been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground that they
have mineral claims covering the property and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner.
The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok
respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights
of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA's ruling is correct.
Held: No, the CA is incorrect. Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land
ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did

not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with
a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.