KennedyandHisRoleinCuba

JasonYe

FWIS180
SamAbramson

2
November5,2015
TheKennedyAdministrationsforeignpolicyinCubainthesixtiesamidsttheColdWar
reflectedanunhealthyoutlooktowardsCubanthreats.ThoughtheKennedyAdministrationwas
victoriousattheendoftheCubanMissileCrisisdueultimatelytoluck,combinedwithitsrefusal
toopenclearchannelsofnegotiationandfailuretorecognizethepotentiallynegative
consequencesofitsactions,theadministrationcontinueditshardlineantiCubastancethat
significantlycontributedtotheexacerbationofColdWartensionsandthepotentialformutually
destructivenuclearconflict.
TheKennedyAdministrationsnarrowfocusonCubaultimatelyledtotheescalationof
theCubanMissileCrisisandtheColdWar.TheadministrationsCubanproblemscanbetraced
toPresidentJohnF.KennedysinheritanceofformerPresidentDwightD.Eisenhowersanti
CubanagendawhichlaidthefoundationfortheBayofPigsInvasion.UnlikeEisenhower
however,KennedygreatlyexaggeratedFidelCastroandCubaasthreatstotheUnitedStates.
AlthoughCastrowasasymbolofAmericanfailureintheLatinAmericaaswellasasymbolof
WesternHemispherecommunism,theKennedyAdministrationpaintedhimtobeamuchgreater
threatthanheactuallywas,attributingtoCastroacapabilitytoexportrevolutionthattheCuban
leaderneverhad(Paterson,SpinningOutofControl:KennedysWarAgainstCubaandthe
MissileCrisis,427).CastroneverhadtheabilitytospurrevolutioninotherLatinAmerican
countrieswithmostofhisencouragedrevolutionsendinginfailuresuchasPresidentSalvador
AllendesfailedChileancommunistrevolution.Regardless,theKennedyAdministrationsought
totakesignificantactionagainstCastro,fearinginflatedchallengestoUnitedStateshegemonyin
theWesternHemisphereandCubannationalizationofU.S.assetssuchasoilrefineriesinCuba.

3
ThoughtheUnitedStateswasjustifiedinrespondingtoacrediblecommunistthreatduetothe
DominoTheory,itsresponsetosuchminorthreatsweremorethansuperfluous.Backingand
organizinganinvasionofathousandandfourhundredCubanexilestoincitearevoltagainstthe
CastroregimeintheBayofPigsaffair,theKennedyAdministrationdemonstratedthelengthsto
whichitwouldgotodisplaceCastro.EvenafterthefailureoftheBayofPigsoperation,U.S.led
operationstooverthrow,assassinate,orsabotageCastroonlyescalatedthroughOperation
Mongoose,launchingamultitrackprogramofcovert,economic,diplomatic,andpropagandistic
elementscalculatedtooverthrowtheCastrogovernmentthatincludedbizarreattemptstomake
Castrosbeardfalloutorassassinatehimwithpoisonedcigars(Paterson,SpinningOutof
Control:KennedysWarAgainstCubaandtheMissileCrisis,428).ThoughCubawasnot
initiallytheKennedyAdministrationsmostpressingagendaissue,itquicklybecamemajor
focuswiththeadministrationspendingasmuchormoretimeonCubaasanyotherforeign
policyproblemevenamongsttheVietnamWarandotherpressingforeignissues(Paterson,
SpinningOutofControl:KennedysWarAgainstCubaandtheMissileCrisis,425).Although
Castrowasinrealityaminorthreat,theKennedysAdministrationconstantpressuringand
harassmentofCubalargelycontributedtothefomentationofthemissilecrisis.UnderAmerican
siegethroughharsheconomicembargosandcovertintelligenceoperationssuchasOperation
Mongoose,CastrobegantoincreasinglycallupontheSovietUniontoprotectCubaninterests,
pullingtheSovietUnionintotheWesternHemisphere.Whatwasonceaminorforeignproblem
quicklyescalatedintotheKennedysAdministrationmostpressingandimminentproblem.
InadditiontoitshyperinflationofCastroasathreat,theKennedyAdministrations
diplomaticfailuresandmisinformationledtostallednegotiationsthatultimatelyhelpedpushthe

4
worldtowardsthebrinkofmutuallyassureddestruction.Notonlydiditfailrecognizethepre
imminentconsequencesoffailingtoopenclearchannelsofdiscussionwiththeSovietUnion
duringthecrisisandthroughouttheColdWar,theKennedyAdministrationalsofailedin
extendingdiplomatictalkswithCubawhichultimatelyledtonegativefarreaching
consequencesforCubanAmericanrelationsandtheCubanMissileCrisis.Distrust,fear,and
misinformationultimatelyledtotheKennedyAdministrationsinabilitytopushfordiplomatic
talks.AsshowninAmbassadorCharlesE.Bohlenscallsfordiplomacy,theadministration
rejectedpoliticaltalkstonegotiateandalleviatethemissilecrisisinfavorofmilitaryactiondue
tofearthatthemissileswouldbeoperationalbythetimetalksstarted.Actionwaslargely
favoredovernegotiationsduetotheimportanceoftimeiftheactionwasoverquickly,the
repercussionswouldnotbetooserious(PrimarySource,AmbassadorCharlesBohlensCall
forDiplomacyisRejected).AlthoughjustifiableinitscallfortheremovaloftheSovietmissiles,
theKennedyAdministrationcouldhavebettermanagedthemissilecrisisthroughclearerforms
ofnegotiationsratherthanthroughopenandbackchannelletters.IncontrasttotheKennedy
Administrationseagernesstorelyonmilitaryretaliation,Khrushchevwasmorereceptiveto
avoidingalloutwarincomparisonasevidencedinhisseriesofletterstoPresidentKennedy.As
astarkcontrasttotheKennedyAdministrationsstubbornnessandeagernesstoturntomilitary
action,Khrushchevslettersdisplayaclearrecognitionoftheescalatingdangersofthemissile
crisisandconsequencesofpotentialnuclearwar.WhileCastroandKhrushchevcertainlyshare
blameforofthemissilecrisis,theKennedyAdministrationislargelytoblameduetoitshardline
stanceanddedicationtooustCastro.AlthoughtheSovietUnioneventuallybackeddownonthe

5
brinkofnuclearwar,PresidentKennedyandtheKennedyAdministrationcouldhaveeasily
avoidedunnecessaryescalationthroughmoretransparenttalks.
ContrarytoKennedyandhisadministrationsportrayalaftertheCubanMissileCrisis,
theKennedyAdministrationwasessentiallyluckyratherthandecisiveinitsvictoryintheCuban
MissileCrisis.ManyU.S.responsiblefactorscontributedtotheworseningoftheconflictsuchas
theoverflyingofaU2spyplaneintheSovietUnionandprovocativeU.S.warfareactions
againsttheSovietUnionincludingtheutilizationofdropchargesagainstSovietsubmarineB59
whichcouldhaveignitedalloutnuclearwar.U2planeactivityinSovietUnionterritoryalso
exacerbatedColdWartensionsbetweenthetwonationsduetopotentialdogfightsbetween
SovietandU.S.nucleararmedfighters.OthernavalactivitysuchastheCubanblockadeand
minorstandoffsbetweenSovietandU.S.submarinesalsocarriedthepotentialtoescalatewar.
AlthoughtheKennedyadministrationwaswiseinitsdecisiontonotretaliateafterthedowning
oftheU2planeinCuba,incontextofthetheadministrationsfailuresandownactionsthatat
timesonlyworsenedColdWarconditions,Kennedysvictorycanonlybeattributedtoluckdue
tohighrisksofnuclearwarandfurtherexacerbationoftensions.Kennedysvictoryinthecrisis
canalsobeattributedtoluckinSovietmiscalculations.KhrushchevdidnotexpectthatU.S.
intelligencewoulddiscovertheconstructionofthemissilesitesandhadalsocuthimselfoff
fromcriticaladvicecounselthatwouldhavealertedhimtothecertainvigorousU.S.response
totheemplacement(Paterson,SpinningOutofControl:KennedysWarAgainstCubaandthe
MissileCrisis,436).U.S.discoveryofthemissilesitesinCubawouldeventuallyforce
KhrushchevtoagreetoKennedysnonnegotiableterms.Sovietdecisionmakingwasalsoat
oddswithCubandecisionmaking.WhileCastrowantedaclearSovietresponsetoU.S.

6
aggression,KhrushchevrecognizedtheinherentdangersofdisplayingaclearSovietresponse
whichwouldprovokealloutwar.StrainsbetweenCastroandKhrushchevalsohelpedtogive
theU.S.anedgeinnegotiationsbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates.While
PresidentKennedyandtheKennedyAdministrationshouldcertainlybegivensomecreditin
managingthecrisis,itshouldberecognizedthatthevictorywonowedlargelytoluckinlightof
theadministrationsblundersandaccidents.Inspiteofthesignificantmiscalculationsandclose
callsmadeonbehalfoftheKennedyAdministration,luckultimatelyhelpedtoturnthetablesin
favoroftheKennedyAdministration.AlthoughmanyhistoriansapplaudPresidentKennedyand
theKennedyadministrationforitshandlingoftheCubanmissilecrisis,applaudingastunning
success,noblestatesmanship,andmodelofcrisismanagement,PresidentKennedyandthe
KennedyAdministrationsvictoryintheCubanMissileCrisisultimatelywasaresultofthe
combinationofnearmisses,closecalls,narrowsqueaks,physicalexhaustion,accidents,and
guessesratherthanaresultoftheirmanagementofthecrisis:theywerelucky(Paterson,
SpinningOutofControl:KennedysWarAgainstCubaandtheMissileCrisis,435).
Inconclusion,theKennedyadministrationsforeignpolicyagendainCubawaslargely
radicalandsharessignificantresponsibilityininstigatingandescalatingtheCubanMissile
Crisis.AlthoughjustifiedinitsresponsetoacommunistthreatagainstAmericaninterestsinthe
contextoftheColdWar,thepresidentandhisadministrationcertainlycouldhavebetter
managedandhandleditscovertactivitiesagainstCubaaswellascrisismanagementofthe
CubanMissileCrisis.

Bibliography
AmbassadorCharlesBohlensCallforDiplomacyisRejected,1962PrimarySourceMajor
ProblemsinAmericanForeignRelations.VolumeII:Since1914.5thEd.Editedby
DennisMerrillandThomasPaterson.NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,2000.
Spinning Out of Control, Thomas PatersonMajor Problems in American Foreign Relations.
Volume II: Since 1914. 5th Ed. Edited by Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson. New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.