1 PEOPLE VS.

PANIS
GR No. L5867477, July 11, 1990
FACTS:
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo
City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor
as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising
employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be
charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24,
1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute
recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as
an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons
is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons
and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the
crime of illegal recruitment
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on
the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers,
the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.

2 PEOPLE VS GOCE
GR No 113161August 29, 1995
Facts:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicateand in large scale, punishable
under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code as amended bySection 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed
against spouses Dan and Loma Goceand herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 5.
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but notone of them was arrested.
Hence, on February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the case archivedbut it issued a standing warrant of arrest
against the accused.Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, at around midday of February 26,
1993, Nelly Agustin wasapprehended by the Paraaque police.On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered
judgment finding herein appellant guilty as aprincipal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing
her to serve thepenalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00.In her appeal, appellant Agustin
raises the following arguments:(1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within
themeaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34of the Labor Code;(2)
there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and theGoce spouses; and(3) there is
no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to the complainants. Appellant counsel agreed to
stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized torecruit applicants for overseas employment. Appellant,
however, denies that she was in any wayguilty of illegal recruitment.It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did
was to introduce complainants to theGoce spouses. Being a neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her

son's overseas job application was processed and facilitated by them, the complainants asked her to introducethem
to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she complied with their request.
Issues:
Whether or not appellant Agustin actions in relation with the Goce couple constitute illegalrecruitment.
Held:
Appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity including the prohibited practices enumerated in
Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39thereof. The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an
offenseinvolving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely,(a) when illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate,i.e., if it is carried out by a groupof three or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another; or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed
againstthree or more persons individually or as a group.Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting,utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that anyperson or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or morepersons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, referral isthe act of passing along or forwarding of an
applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer or bureau.There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a
worker abroad." It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she hadthe power or
ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to giveher the money she demanded in
order to be so employed.
Decision:WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, withcosts against
accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin

3 MILLARES VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

305 SCRA 500 (1999)
Posted by Pius Morados on November 15, 2011
(Labor Standards wages, customary facilities)
Facts:
Article 97, par. (f), of the Labor Code defined wage as the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable
of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or
other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily
furnished by the employer to the employee.
116 employees of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) in Bislig, Surigao del Sur were terminated
under a retrenchment program as a solution to a major financial setback. Aside from their one month basic pay,
petitioners believe that the allowances they allegedly regularly received on a monthly basis should have also been
included in the computation of their separation.
PICOP grants the following allowances:
Staff allowance/managers allowance to those who live in rented houses near the mill site which ceases whenever a
vacancy occurs in the companys free housing facilities.
Transportation allowance in the form of advances for actual transportation expenses subject to liquidation is given to
key officers and managers who use their own vehicles in the performance of their duties. This privilege is
discontinued when the conditions no longer obtain.
Bislig allowance is given to managers and officers on account of the hostile environment prevailing therein. Once the
recipient is transferred elsewhere, the allowance ceases.

Applying Art. 97, par (f) of the Labor Code which defines wage, the Executive Labor Arbiter opined that the subject
allowances, being customarily furnished by respondent PICOP and regularly received by petitioners, formed part of
the latters wage.
However, the NLRC decreed that the allowances did not form part of the salary base used in computing separation
pay since the same were contingency-based.
Issue:
Whether or not the allowances in question are considered facilities customarily furnished.
Held:
No. Customary is founded on long established and constant practice connoting regularity. The receipt of allowance
on a monthly basis does not ipso facto characterize it as regular and forming part of salary because the nature of the
grant is a factor worth considering.

(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term whichever is less.
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas
contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months'
salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more.
To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is
the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to
some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be
taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of
the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly.
The questioned Decision and Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED.

The subject allowances were temporarily, not regularly received by petitioners because once the conditions for the
availment ceased to exist, the allowance reached the cutoff point. The petitioners continuous enjoyment of the
disputed allowances was based on contingencies the occurrence of which wrote finis to such enjoyment.

4 MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY VS. NLRC

G.R. No. 127195, August 25, 1999
R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act)
Facts:
Private respondent Wilfredo T. Cajeras was hired by petitioner MARSAMAN, the local manning agent of petitioner
DIAMANTIDES, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV Prigipos, owned and operated by DIAMANTIDES, for a contract
period of ten (10) months. Cajeras started work on 8 August 1995, but less than two (2) months later, he was
repatriated to the Philippines allegedly by "mutual consent."
Private respondent Cajeras filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners with the NLRC alleging that he
was dismissed illegally, denying that his repatriation was by mutual consent, and asking for his unpaid wages,
overtime pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
On 29 January 1996 Labor Arbiter resolved the dispute in favor of private respondent Cajeras ruling that the latter's
discharge from the MV Prigipos allegedly by "mutual consent" was not proved by convincing evidence.
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. On 16 September 1996 the NLRC affirmed the appealed findings and conclusions
of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 12
November 1996.
Hence, the petition contending that, among other things, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering a
monetary award beyond the maximum of three (3) months' salary for every year of service set by RA 8042.
Issue:

5 ANTONIO M. SERRANO V GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary
of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months
and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of
contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for
the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity
and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:
On the amount of salaries due private respondent, the rule has always been that an illegally dismissed worker whose
employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
employment. On 15 July 1995, RA 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995" took effect, Sec. 10 of which provides:
Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security
and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on,
OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year
or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

6 EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION
37 SCRA 409 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of Foreign Law
FACTS
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi
Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It was
agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a
termination letter and right there and then was removed from his post. The termination letter states that he was
incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which is required in his line of work; that he failed to
enrich his knowledge during his 5 month stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because he failed to
submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB
from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that
the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi
labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of Grans employment; that under Saudi labor laws,
Grans termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Grans insubordination and incompetence
is outlined in the termination letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof as to the existence and
the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and Philippine labor laws shall be
used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated upon just cause. The allegations against him,
at worst, shall only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven because prior to being sent
to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required trade test to prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he
is competent and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever adduced in
court. His alleged insubordination is likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track records
is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to
the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should receive two notices. In the case at bar, he only received
one and he was immediately terminated on the same day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws is again applied here sans proof of
Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly examined. In this case,
based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void
because his separation pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).

7 SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. V. NLRC

G.R. No. 161757; January 25, 2006
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo
(Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1, 1997. The deployment was with the
assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for her Taiwanese employer,
Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal
alleging that she was jailed for three months and that she was underpaid
Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . ANSWER TO COMPLAINANT'S
POSITION PAPER" alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract was without its knowledge and consent,
hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and
Release of Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was annexed to said
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two more years was without its
knowledge and consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina be attributable to Sunace
HELD:
No, the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina is not attributable to Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment
contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for
any of Divina's claims arising from the 2-year employment extension.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its
foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan.

8 SANTIAGO VS.CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 162419July 10, 2007TINGA,
FACTS:
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five(5) years. He
signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10
days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the respondent received a
phone call from petitioners wife and some unknown callers asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he
will jump ship in Canada. Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for
Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the
latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and respondent, hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRCs finding that since petitioner
had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any
claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.
ISSUE:
When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers commence?
RULING:
A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the
employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of
execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest
of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier
discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before
the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract
was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the
erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon,
he would be liable for damages. Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and
boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent
unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual
damages he suffered.

9 BERNARDO ET AL. VS. NLRC

July 12, 1999
FACTS:
The 43 petitioners are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far
EastBank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment

Contractor Handicapped Workers". The said agreement provides for the manner of how they are hired and be
rehired, the amount of their wages (P118.00 per day), period of employment (5 days a week, 8 hours a day, training
for 1 month, 6 months period) and the manner and methods of how their works are to be done (Sort out bills
according to color; Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;
Wrap and label bills per hundred; Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for
verification.) Many of their employments were renewed every six months. Claiming that they should be considered as
regular employees they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and recovery of various benefits.
Labor arbiters decision: complaint is dismissed for lack of merit (the terms of the contract shall be the law between
the
parties.). Affirmed by the NLRC (Art. 280 is not controlling herein but Art. 80) (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons
wasnot applicable, "considering the prevailing circumstances of the case.") and denied motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Does petitioners considered as regular employees?
LAW:
Art.78 & 80 of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons.
RULING: Yes.
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts
were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal. The stipulations in the
employment contracts indubitably conform with Article 80, however, the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code
is justified because of the advent of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons) which mandates that a
qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualifiedablebodied person (compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances) 27 of the petitioners are
considered regular employees by provision of law regardless of any agreement between the parties as embodied in
article280 in relation to article 281 of the Labor Code. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with
respect to such activity, and while such activity exist. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is
necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of
the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to
determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. Those who have worked for only 6 months and employments were
not renewed are not considered regular employees.
OPINION:
The Court correctly finds that 27 of the handicapped workers are regular employees. The test is whether the activity
is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The employment is considered
regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exist. Without a doubt, the task of counting and
sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. As regular employees, the twenty-seven
petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized
cause