INTRODUCTION TO LAW

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to
reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19,
1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil
Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19,
1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of
6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440)

located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the

name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in
the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale
to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf
of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and
5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell
was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by
Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who
were then occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr.
Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to
private respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5)
thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers
fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr.
Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the
lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction
or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent
counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the
purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00
per square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of
P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt
of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8) private respondent

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on
March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent,
sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one
over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers'
transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and
registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the
PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private
respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to
Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private
respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell
and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but
in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.

On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the

Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the
outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and
that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the
Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign
immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87).

Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale
between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the
other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance
of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4)
damages.

A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be
availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The
general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by
the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to
proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of
exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the
trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National
Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service
Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer
waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.

On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss

the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo,
pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On
August 30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose
of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional
Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign
immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to
establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private
respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on
the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing
petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes
the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its
official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign

Affairs. In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the
Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II

The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality

or legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case
in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said
defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion,"
where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American
court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether
it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a
similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to
that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law
130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities
and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its
claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. InWorld Health Organization v.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial
court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S.
Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval
Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The
Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and
Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of
Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of
petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in
support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to
the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v.
Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80
Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]
and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign
Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination
as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction
over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the
other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not
anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak
when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale
of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its
status as a sovereign state is in order.

Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the
monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International
Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under
the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in
International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public
International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See
over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive
foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter
into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems
In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the
purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and
of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international
relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine
whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some
writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons
the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in
which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948];
Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the
Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object,
the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope,
who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of
State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are
such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125;
Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has
significant implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects
essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with
international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International
Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can
conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the
international person.

its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the
restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a
sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure
imperii.

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio,
has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since
1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international
relations.

The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states
into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the
Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and
international trading.

B. Sovereign Immunity

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with
private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of
apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil.
312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a
United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and
(3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v.
Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have

adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without
this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated
as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our
admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and
Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or
judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The
United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which
defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law
declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament
enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts.
The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or
conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a
"commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of
problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of

On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a
foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook
in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery,
a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States
of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the
operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants
and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment
contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United
States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to
come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private
party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the
inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.

still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises,
has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).

As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):

The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court

without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of
private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case
was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of
the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title
I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this
case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from
local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The
determination of the executive arm of government that a state or
instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political
question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts
to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic
Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the
certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

There is no question that the United States of America, like

any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute
said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use
of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal,
in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity
from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any
real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of
the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for
the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic
envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards
the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for
the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are

Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its
motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would however be
pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso
Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his
own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade
the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government
and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to
espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of
the International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302
[1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic
due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental
writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may
have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention
of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the
need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged
in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States
Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on
each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another;
thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents
in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of,
or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy
of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter
dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999),
denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the
extradition request and supporting documents from the United
States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition
law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and
the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4
of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is
not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the
person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time
to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains
grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury
process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law.
The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District
Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury
information to Philippine government and law enforcement
personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any
further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the
United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request
the United States Government requested the Philippine

Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject

information. This Departments denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that
the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a
party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus(to compel herein petitioner to
furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and
to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set
aside herein petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a
memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,
disposing:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely:
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents
and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States
Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to
the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the
preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the
parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the
morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM
COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO
DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS
TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT
ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN
PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION
FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS,
IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN

ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS

ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT
NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL
NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO)
providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C.
Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons
acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and
DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999
issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August
1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as
directed, filed their respective memoranda.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues
are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of
both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to
the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of
which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August
24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the
extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that
private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the
legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there
any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly
into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters
which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety
of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17,
1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into
force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal
of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves
a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars
as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if
known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the
commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the
designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the
request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the
request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant
treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the
related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to
take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the
task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty,
the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity
and probable location of the person sought;

The Extradition Request

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the
offense for which extradition is requested;

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest
issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or
some other instruments having equivalent legal force;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the

offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the
prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide
probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been
committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent
authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not
be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition
proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1],
Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the
summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the
Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by
the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of
a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately
executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal
in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal,
except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political
one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following
query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request
and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he
shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition
with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court
take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the
Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the
supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their
sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice
has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1],
Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that
there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For
while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of
Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the
Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department
of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post
office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of
Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in
taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon
itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to
find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition
Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that
although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition
documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this
stage where private respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be furnished
the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in
having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in
support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the
request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,
one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of
Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation
that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message
that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and
supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,
eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA
Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a
class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage,
the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29;
Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast

to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial

power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De
Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs.
United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of
documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rulemaking or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to
rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts
and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the
facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a
final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the
rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its
only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the
law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation
procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period
of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only
mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged
if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court
(Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets
off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal
law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes
of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions.
Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are
rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against selfincrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the
right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could
result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court,

citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that
the revocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence,
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can
be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it
may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the
proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged,
the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones
property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys
precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced,
the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or
penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest
and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the
filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to
the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority
for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with
the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both
States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their
interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to
the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The
requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained
by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as
they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights
of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon
notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute
the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits

and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the
respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such
as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for
criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent
is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described
situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are
quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S.
Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition
which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2),
and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding
state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as
swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged
with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of
the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding
state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is
charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition
documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain
such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of
the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or
an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said
charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order
to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition
(35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the
indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other
instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered
to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic
one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte
Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d
853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the
presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or
demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d
815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter
dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In
urgent cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice,
and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to
the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a
declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full
force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been
authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any
subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to

hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request
(Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is
extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the
defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person
sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability
after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found
within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is
noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition
proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a
committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged
fugitive (31AAm Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it
incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and
certifies the persons extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of
extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State.
The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of
State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the
motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person
facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins
and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the
points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department
of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly,
however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned
over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of
evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government
should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the
Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is
the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance
in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly
say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the
Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not
only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of
the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents
Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where
the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify
the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individuals
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that
right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of

criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,
accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are,
however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles
inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that
point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or
may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in
the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and
statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31
Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of
the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice
for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid
requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable
efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it
even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and
those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his
Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature
of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time
due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed
with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of
administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no
extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination
which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the
threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during
the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and
manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and
(2) the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred.
These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and
rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated
July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the
matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with
public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material
when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes
the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the
people and any citizen has "standing".

When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said
action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of
deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section
1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public
concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within
the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records,
and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U. S. Government. No official action from our country
has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for
the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition
hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government
by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.
The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process
clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass
upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992
ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local
courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs
of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga &
Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as
the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal
or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not
pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.
From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice
and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto,
the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also
manifests this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he

describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition
Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may
even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum
state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right
(35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly
confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against
the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar
situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite
Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition
has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide
therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides
that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable byreclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended " Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are
by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees
in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC,
270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC,
276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas
School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632
[1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which
the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283
SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting
State may have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of its
commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to
the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police
Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings
under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil
Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing
its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971
(Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may
be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System
in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other
purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary
dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the
minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of
Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is
saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even

without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear

to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred
against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so
informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against
him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that
the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must
have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that
is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and
to present evidence in support of his defenses.
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld
the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to
his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable
action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is
easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268
SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the
stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The
incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
(ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity
as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
DECISION

d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in

the School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines?[2]
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty
member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a
foreign-hire.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of
private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree.
That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of
course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal
pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this
jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice.
That is the principle we uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant
to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents.[1] To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or
other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted
for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of
its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member
should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.

These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely:
(a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from
his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the
risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the
purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this
time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with
economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's
family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the
education of one's children, adequate insurance against
illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a
basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted
again with the same economic reality after his term: that he
will eventually and inevitably return to his home country
where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining
suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive
measure to remain competitive on an international level in
terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of
international education.[3]
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on
June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate
labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members"[4] of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreignhires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo
A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in
an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School
is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreignhires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty
members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have
been hired locally and classified as local hires.[5]The Acting Secretary of
Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as
the Filipino local-hires:
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to
all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired
locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.[6]
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction
in salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find
application in the present case. The international character
of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal
with different nationalities and different cultures, among the
student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of
salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel
which system is universally recognized. We agree that
certain amenities have to be provided to these people in
order to entice them to render their services in the
Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the
international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have
limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who
enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages
and other benefits would also require parity in other terms

and conditions of employment which include the employment

contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the
conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be
compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the
Superintendent of the School has the
discretion to recruit and hire expatriate
teachers from abroad, under terms and
conditions that are consistent with accepted
international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at
equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff
(OSRS) salary schedule. The 25%
differential is reflective of the agreed value of
system displacement and contracted status
of the OSRS as differentiated from the
tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff
(LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties'
recognition of the difference in the status of two types of
employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to
justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants
based on reasonable classification. A classification is
reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply
to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a
substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires,
the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no
amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be
given a good compensation package in order to attract them
to join the teaching faculty of the School.[7]

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention.
Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution[8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise
proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test
of what is reasonable.[11] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, [13] the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,[14] the Convention against Discrimination in Education, [15] the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle against discrimination,
the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often
skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are
all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane
conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner
by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code[19]provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would
be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.[20]
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes[21]the payment of
lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for

work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a
minimum, with:
i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for
work of equal value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
x x x.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the
long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work
with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22] This rule applies to the
School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that localhires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. [23] The Court finds this
argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal
work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that
employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities,
which they perform under similar working conditions.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their
domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or
recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular
intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[24] we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a
person for his pains or industry in another man's business.
Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from
"sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the
fundamental idea of compensation for services
rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries
should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The
local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be
paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases
for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure
affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare,"[25] "to afford labor full protection."[26] The State,
therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good.[28] Should such contracts contain
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike
down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local
hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice
of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public
policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining

unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law."[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status.[30] The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
[31]

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be

grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were
always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the
same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of
the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with
local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby
GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
EN BANC
November 29, 1920
In re Application of MAX SHOOP for admission to practice law

MALCOLM, J.:
Application has been made to this court by Max Shoop for admission to
practice law in the Philippines Islands under paragraph four of the Rules for
the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law, effective
July 1, 1920. The supporting papers show that the applicant has been
admitted to practice, and has practiced for more than five years in the highest
court of the State of New York.
THE RULES
That portion of the rules of this court, in point, is as follows:
Applicants for admission who have been admitted to practice in the
Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeal
or district court, therein, or in the highest court of any State or
territory of the United States, which State or territory by comity
confers the same privilege on attorneys admitted to practice in the
Philippine Islands, and who can show by satisfactory affidavits that
they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, may, in
the discretion of the court, be admitted without examination.
The above rule requires that New York State by comity confer the privilege of
admission without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys
admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. The rule of the New York court
permits admission without examination, in the discretion of the Appellate
Division in several cases, among which are the following:
1. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years
as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or
territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia.
2. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years
in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of
the English Common Law.

This court is advised informally that under this rule one member of the bar of
the Philippine Islands has been admitted to practice, without examination, in
the State of New York, and one member of the same bar has been refused
such admission, the latter being the more recent case. The rulings of the
New York court have not been bought to the attention of this court
authoritatively, but assuming that reports of such rulings by the New York
court are true, in view of the apparent conflict, it seems proper to enter upon
the consideration of whether or not under the New York rule as it exits the
principle of comity is established. It must be observed that under the rules of
both jurisdictions, admission in any particular case is in the discretion of the
court. Refusal to admit in any particular case is not necessarily conclusive as
to the general principles established by the rules.
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS A TERRITORY.
Under paragraph 1 of the New York rule, practice for five years in the highest
court in any "State or territory of the American Union" is the basic
qualification. If the Philippine Islands is a territory of the United States within
the meaning of the word as used in that rule, comity would seem to exist.
The word "territory" has a general and a technical meaning. It is clear that the
Philippine Islands is not an "organized territory" incorporated into the United
States under the constitution. (Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 138.) It is likewise
clear that the Philippine Islands is not a "foreign country." (The Diamond
Rings, 183 U.S., 176.) In the language of that case it is a "territory of the
United States over which civil government could be established." So also is
Porto Rico (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 1.) It has been held that Porto
Rico is not a foreign territory and that the United States laws covering
"territories." such as the Federal Employer's Liability Act, includes Porto Rico.
(American Railroad Co. of Porto Rico vs. Didricksen, 227 U.S., 145.) Porto
Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska are now incorporated, organized territories of the
United States. (Muratti vs. Foote, 25 Porto Rico, 527; Hawaii vs. Mankichi,
190 U.S., 197; Rasmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 516.)
An opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States holds that
While, like Porto Rico, the Philippine Islands are not incorporated in
the United States, they clearly are territory of the United States and
to the extent that Congress has assumed to legislate for them, they
have been granted a form of territorial government, and to this extent
are a territory. (30 Op. Atty.-Gen., U.S., 462, reversing 24 Op. Atty.Gen. U.S., 549.)

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Further, the Philippine Islands have been held not to be "another country"
within the meaning of the Cuban Commercial Treaty. (Faber vs. U.S., 221
U.S., 649.) Chief Justice Marshall, in construing the phrase "United States"
once observed:
Does this term designate the whole or any particular portion of the
American Empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one
answer. It is the name given to our great Republic, which is
composed of states and territories. The District of Columbia or the
territory west of Missouri is not less within the United States than
Maryland or Pennsylvania. (Loughborough vs. Blake, 5 Wheat [U.S.],
317, at p. 319.)
This is the broad general view which would seem to have been the point of
view of the New York courts in using the phrase "Any state or territory of the
American Union." The New York rule contemplates "state," "territory," and
"another country." It seems clear that the Philippine Islands is not "another
country." It is not believed that the New York court intended the word territory
to be limited to the technical meaning of organized territory, or it would have
used the more accurate expression. the full phraseology, "any state or
territory of the American Union," indicates a sweeping intention to include all
of the territory of the United States, whatever the political subdivision might
be, as distinguished from foreign country. Otherwise, the Philippine Islands
would be in an anomalous position like unto Edward Everett Hale's "A Man
Without a Country" a land neither "another country," nor a "state," nor a
"territory" a land without status.
Of course the construction of what is intended by the use of that phrase is for
the New York courts finally to determine, but in the absence of any
authoritative decision from the New York courts on the point, we feel justified
in concluding that under paragraph 1 of the New York rule there exists
between that jurisdiction and this, with reference to admission of attorneys
without examination, a basis of comity sufficient to satisfy the requirement in
the rule of this court in that regard.
A COMMON LAW JURISDICTION.
But assuming that comity is not permitted under paragraph 1 of the New York
rule, we turn to a consideration of whether or not it exits by virtue of
paragraph 2. This rule applies to "another country whose jurisprudence is
based on the principles of the English Common Law." We have then further
to assume that if the Philippine Islands is not a "state or territory," that it must
be "another country." The question then presented is upon what principles is
the present jurisprudence of these Islands based? this is a question which

can property be answered by this court. It is a problem, however, upon which

books could be and have been written. We will endeavor to make a brief
analysis of the situation.
What is "jurisprudence based on the principles of the English Common Law?"
Jurisprudence is the groundwork of the written law, or, as Bouvier defines it,
"The science of law. The particular science of giving a wise interpretation to
the laws and making a just application of them to call cases as they arise." In
an untechnical sense, it sometimes means Case Law.
COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.
We must assume that the New York court, in using this phrase, considered
that the jurisprudence of New York State was based upon the principles of
the English common Law. We should, therefore, consider to what extent the
English Common Law principles apply to New York. In a case in 1881 we find
the following:
And the Common Law of England was the law of the colony at that
date (April 19, 1775), so far as it was applicable to the circumstances
of the Colonists. And it has since continued so to be, when
conformable to our institutions, unless it was established by an
English statute which has since been abrogated or was rejected in
colonial jurisprudence, or has been abolished by our legislation.
(cutting vs. Cutting, 86 N.Y., 522, p. 529.)
And again:
This court has interpreted this provision of the constitution to man not
that all of the Common Law of England was the law of the Colonists
at the time of the making of the Constitution, but only so much of it as
was applicable to the circumstances of the Colonists and
conformable to our institutions. Cutting vs. Cutting, 86 N.Y., 522, p.
529; Williams vs. Williams, 8 N.Y., 525, p. 541. (Shayne vs. Evening
Post Publishing Co., 168 N.Y., 70, at p. 76.)
In Morgan vs. King (30 Barber [N.Y.], 9), the New York court said that in
adopting the English Common Law, New York adopted:
The written law of England as a constantly improving science rather
than as an art; as a system of legal logic, rather than as a code of
rules, that is, that the fundamental principles and modes of
reasoning and the substance of the rules of the Common Law are

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
adopted as illustrated by the reasons on which they are based, rather
than the mere words in which they are expressed.
Once more, in 1903, the New York court said in connection with a question of
the right of the public to use the foreshore:lawph!l.net
In adopting the Common Law of the Mother country we did not
incorporate into our system of jurisprudence any principles which are
essentially inconsonant with our circumstances or repugnant to the
spirit of our institutions. (Barnes vs. Midland Railroad Terminal Co.,
193 N.Y., 378, at p. 384.)
The above statements of the New York court clearly indicate the scope of the
English Common Law in that state. In most of the States, including New York,
codification and statute law have come to be a very large proportion of the
law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case law
which has its roots, to a large but not an exclusive degree, in the old English
cases. In fact, present day commentators refer to American jurisprudence or
Anglo-American jurisprudence as distinguished from the English Common
Law.
Accordingly, in speaking of a jurisprudence which is "based on the English
Common Law," for present purpose at least, it would seem property to say
that the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction is based upon the principles
of that Common Law, if, as a matter of fact, its statute law and its case law to
a very large extent includes the science and application of law as laid Down
by the old English cases, as perpetuated and modified by the American
cases.
COMMON LAW ADOPTED BY DECISION.
The concept of a common law is the concept of a growing and ever-changing
system of legal principles and theories. and it must be recognized that due to
the modern tendency toward codification (which was the principle of the
Roman and Civil Law), there are no jurisdictions to-day with a pure English
Common Law, with the exception of England itself. In the United States the
English Common Law is blended with American codification and remnants of
the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has
occurred similar to that which is transpiring in this jurisdiction to-day. Some of
the western states, which were carved out of the original Louisiana territory,
have adopted the Common Law by decision. (State vs. Twogood, 7 Iowa,
252; Barlow vs. Lambert, 28 Alabama, 704; Parsons vs. Lindsay, 41 Kansas,
336; McKennen vs. Winn, 1 Okla., 327.)

Louisiana has long been recognized as the one State of the Union which
retained a portion of the Civil Law. In a case in 1842 in Louisiana, the court
considered the question of whether a protest on a promissory note had been
made within the required time. The court rejected the straight Civil code rule,
and adopted the custom of New Orleans, which was the law of the sister
States, saying:
The superior court of the late territory of Orleans very early held that although
the laws of Spain were not abrogated by the taking possession of the country
by the United States, yet from that event the commercial law of the Union
became the commercial law of New Orleans; and this court has frequently
recognized the correctness of these early decisions, principally in bills of
exchange, promissory notes and insurance. (Wagner vs. Kenner, 2 Rob.
[La.], 120.)
In Xiques vs. Bujac (7 La. Ann., 498, p. 504), the court after deciding a
question involving the dedication of real property according to the Civil code
rules, said:
I must add that the general doctrine laid down in Common Law
courts has been admitted by our courts with some modification
resulting from our different systems of law.lawph!l.net
Louisiana, by statute, adopted certain common law rules, and with reference
to these the court said, in State vs.McCoy (8 Rob. [La.], 545):
We concur with the counsel in believing that the legislature in
adopting the Common Law rules of proceeding, method of trial, etc.,
adopted the system as it existed in 1805, modified, explained and
perfected by statutory enactment, so far as those enactments are not
found to be inconsistent with the peculiar character and genius of our
government and institution.
From this brief survey of the extent of the English Common Law basis in the
States, we may conclude (1) that the New York court in referring to a
jurisdiction whose jurisprudence is based on the English Common Law, uses
the phrase in a general sense; and (2) that such Common Law may become
the basis of the jurisprudence by decision of the courts where practical
considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives ground for such a decision.
If, in the Philippines Islands, a comparatively young jurisdiction, English
Common Law principles as embodied in Anglo-American Jurisprudence are
used and applied by the courts to the extent that such Common Law
principles are not in conflict with the local written laws, customs, and
institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and subsequent

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
legislation, and there is no other foreign case law system used to any
substantial extent, then it is proper to say in the sense of the New York rule
that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippine Islands is based on the English
Common Law.
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
The extent of the English or the Anglo-American Common Law here has not
been definitely decided by this court. But when the subject has been referred
to by this court there has been a striking similarity to the quotations from the
American decisions above cited with reference to the English Common Law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson (21 Phil., 308), this court, in passing upon
an objection of counsel, that while a certain rule was universally recognized
and applied in the courts of England and the United States, it was not the law
in the Philippine Islands, said:
To this we answer that while it is true that the body of the Common
Law as known to Anglo-American jurisprudence is not in force in
these Islands, "nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon
our courts, save only in so far as they are founded on sound
principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with
existing law" (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241); nevertheless many of the
rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law have, to all
intents and purposes, been imported into this jurisdiction, as a result
of the enactment of new laws and the organization and
establishment of new institutions by the Congress of the United
States or under its authority; for it will be found that many of these
laws can only be construed and applied with the aid of the Common
Law from which they are derived, and that to breathe the breath of
life into many of the institutions introduced in these Islands under
American sovereignty recourse must be had to the rules, principles,
and doctrines of the Common Law under whose protecting aegis and
prototypes of these institutions had their birth.
xxx

xxx

xxx

And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports

numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had to
the rules, principles and doctrines of the Common Law in
ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in
and for the Philippine Islands since they passed under American
sovereignty. (Pp. 331, 333.)

And later in speaking of the judicial system of the Philippines Islands (page
333):
The spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and
terminology would be unintelligible without some knowledge of the
judicial system of England and the United States. Its manifest
purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its
incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new
system modelled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial
system of the United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any
incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests must
be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system.
In U.S. vs. De Guzman (30 Phil., 416), the court spoke as follows:
We have frequently held that, for the proper construction and
application of the terms and provisions of legislative enactments
which have been borrowed from or modelled upon Anglo-American
precedents, it is proper and of times essential to review the
legislative history of such enactments and to find an authoritative
guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of
American and English courts of last resort construing and applying
similar legislation in those countries. (Kepner vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 100;
11 Phil., 669; Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U.S., 470; 11 Phil., 762; Alzua
and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil., 308.) Indeed it is a general rule of
statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of the origin
and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe
and administer, and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity
and operation. (2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec.
309.)
In U.S. vs. Abiog and Abiog (37 Phil., 137), this court made this further
statement on the subjects:
To elucidate the principles of the Anglo-American Common Law
are for the Philippines, just as they were for the State of Louisiana
and just as the English Common Law was for the United States, of
far-reaching influence. The Common Law is entitled to our deepest
respect and reverence. The courts are constantly guided by its
doctrines. Yet it is true as heretofore expressly decided by this Court
that "neither English nor American Common Law is in force in
these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon
our courts, save only in so far as they are founded on sound

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with
existing law." (U.S. vs. Cuna [1908], 12 Phil., 241.)
What we really have, if we were not too modes to claim it, is a
Philippine Common Law influenced by the English and American
Common Law, the derecho comun of Spain, and the customary law
of the Islands and builded on a case law of precedents. Into this
Philippine Common Law, we can properly refuse to take a rule which
would estop other courses of reasoning and which, because of a lack
of legal ingenuity would permit men guilty of homicide to escape on a
technicality.
At this juncture, three years after the last quoted comment, the influence of
English and American jurisprudence can be emphasized even more strongly.
A survey of recent cases in the Philippine Reports, and particularly those of
the last few years, shows an increasing reliance upon English and American
authorities in the formation of what may be termed a Philippine Common
Law, as supplemental to the statute law of this jurisdiction. An analysis will
show that a great preponderance of the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is
based upon Anglo-American case law precedents, exclusively in applying
those statutory laws which have been enacted since the change of
sovereignty and which conform more or less to American statutes, and to
a large extent in applying and expanding the remnants of the Spanish codes
and written laws.
PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW.
Introductory to analyzing what Spanish written laws remain in force to-day,
we will consider in a general way those Spanish laws which were in force at
the time of the change of severeignty. In addition to these there were certain
special laws having limited application: Las Siete Partidas; Las Leyes de
Toro; Leyes de las Indias; La Novisima Recopilacion; Mining Law; Notarial
Law; Spanish Military Code, and the Corpyright Law.
The foregoing were written laws which, by change of sovereignty, acquired
the force of statute law in the Philippine Islands. There was no properly called
Common Law or Case Law of Spain to accompany and amplify these
statues, although there were, of course, the customs of the people of the
Islands, which continued, in a sense, unwritten law. Spanish jurisprudence
does not recognize the principle of stare decisis; consequently, there could
be no Common Law in any sense analogous to the English or American
Common Law. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:

When there is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy,

the customs of the place shall be observed and in the absence
thereof, the general principles of law.
In order to determined the general principles of law "judicial decision cannot
be resorted to" . . . . (2 Derecho Civil of Sanchez roman, pp. 79-81; 1
Manresa, p. 80.) A lower court of Spain is at liberty to disregard the decisions
of a higher court. This is the general continental rule. (Holland's
Jurisprudence, 11th Ed., pp. 68-70.) "The Partidas is still the basis of Spanish
Common Law, for the more recent compilations are chiefly founded on it and
cases which cannot be decided either by these compilations or by the
local fueros must be decided by the provisions of thePartidas." (IV Dunham,
History of Spain, p. 109.)
The Partidas is a code law and cannot in any proper sense be considered as
Common Law. It specifically provided, however, for recourse to customs
when the written law was silent. The customs to which resort is to be had are
the customs of the particular place where the case arise; the customs of one
locality in Spain having no effect on the application of law in another place. (1
Manresa, pp. 77-79; Civil Code, art. 6; Code of Commerce, art. 2.)
Accordingly, the Spanish customary law could not have any force here. The
law or custom cannot be migratory. Manresa does not defined what is meant
by "general principles of law." but from his discussion under article 6 of the
Civil Code it appears how far from a case law system is Spanish
jurisprudence. He formulates the rule that courts are governed: first, by
written law; second, by the customs of the place; third, by judicial decision;
and fourth, by general principles of law. In fact, un urging that resort to
judicial decisions should come before resort to general principles of law,
Manresa rather implies that the practice of the courts is the contrary.
English Common Law is quite a different conception. While it grew out of the
early Anglo-Saxon customs, it came in time to be a case law of binding force
which controlled custom. In fact, it became so binding that it was found
necessary, in order to effect justice in particular cases, to establish the Court
of Chancery, which became the court of equity. The English Common Law
recognizes custom only in so far as it does not conflict with the well settled
principles of that law. Under the Spanish system, on the other hand, when
the written law is silent, before considering precedents in the cases the court
is governed by the customs of the locality at the time.
Consequently, by the change of sovereignty there was no body of case law
or common law of Spain which could be considered as existing in connection
with the written law retained in force in these Islands. The only amplification
of that written law was the local customs of the people of the Islands. This is

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
particularly true of Spanish decision rendered since the change of
sovereignty, which do not preclude the local courts from exercising an
independent judgment. (Cordova vs. Rijos, 227 U.S., 375.)

SPANISH STATUTE LAW.

The Spanish statute law, as amplified by Spanish commentaries but without a
background of Spanish precedent or case law, was by the change of
sovereignty, severed from Spanish jurisprudence and made effective in this
jurisdiction to the same extent as if Congress had enacted new laws for the
Philippines modelled upon those same Spanish statutes. This retention of the
local private law was merely in accordance with the principles of International
Law in that regard. However, by the mere fact of the change of sovereignty,
all portions of that statute law which might be termed political law were
abrogated immediately by the change of sovereignty. Also, all Spanish laws,
customs, and rights of property inconsistent with the Constitution and
American principles and institutions were thereupon superseded.
(Sanchez vs. U.S., 216 U.S., 167.)
We will give a brief analysis of the further extent to which the Spanish statute
law has been repealed and cut down since the change of sovereignty. The
table is the note 1 below illustrates the situation in a general way.
Even the Spanish Civil Code has been largely modified as will appear from
the table in the note 2 below.
CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES.
It thus appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative from
Anglo-American sources; derivative within the sense of having been copied,
and in the sense of having been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its
authority. This court has repeatedly held that in dealing with the cases which
arise under such statute law the court will be governed by the AngloAmerican cases in construction and application. (U.S. vs. De Guzman, 30
Phil., 416, at p. 419; U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241; Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., 33 Phil., 245, 428, 429.)
To illustrate more clearly the scope of the use of Anglo-American cases in
this connection, a bried analysis of some of the more recent decisions of this
court is advisable. For convenience the cases will be taken up in the note 3 by
subjects. In all of them, Anglo-American decisions and authorities are used
and relied upon to a greater or less degree. Although in many cases the use

is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the building up of a very

substantial elaboration of Anglo-American case law.
From the foregoing selection of the more recent and typical cases, it appears
how broad is the scope of the use of Anglo-American authorities and
precedents in the field of law subjects affected by American derived
legislation. In the application of those statutes in the many cases which come
before the court, there is bound to be developed a substantial common law.
There is no question that this exists. We are merely concerned with its extent
and source.
CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES.
In addition to the subjects covered above, there is a wide field of use of
Anglo-American cases in the interpretation and application of the remnants of
the Spanish statutes. Such is of even greater importance in showing the real
permanency of the hold which Anglo-American Common Law has fastened
upon the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction. An analysis of the cases,
particularly those of the later years, justifies completely the well-expressed
opinion of former Attorney-General Araneta quoted below:
We cannot say with certainty that the courts of the Philippine Islands
will, in the absence of a statute, be guided by the common law. It has
been said that the common law is expanded slowly and carefully by
judicial decisions based on a standard of justice derived from the
habits, customs, and thoughts of a people, and by this standard
doubtful cases are determined; that the office of the judge is not to
make the common law but to find it, and when it is found to affix to it
his official mark by which it becomes more certainly known and
authenticated. The announcement of the law comes from the courts
after they have had the benefit of the learning of counsel, which to be
comprehensive and useful must embrace a knowledge of the people
and their customs, as well as a knowledge of the principles
established by prior decisions. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume
that the courts of the Philippine Islands in cases not controlled by
statute will lay down principles in keeping with the common law,
unless the habits, customs, and thoughts of the people of these
Islands are deemed to be so different from the habits, customs, and
thoughts of the people of England and the United States that said
principles may not be applied here. (4 Op. Atty.-Gen. P.I., 510, 511.)
To illustrate the scope of the use of Anglo-American cases in connection with
the remaining Spanish statutes, a brief analysis 4 of the more recent cases
under a few of the principal subjects, will be appropriate. Frequently in these

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
cases reference to Anglo-American precedents is for the purpose of showing
that Spanish law and the Anglo-American law s the same, and frequently it is
for the purpose of amplifying or extending the Spanish statutes. In most
cases it is for the purpose of applying those statutes to the particular case
before the court; but whatever the use, the fact remains that through the
influence of these cases a broad exposition of American case law is made.
The last group of recent cases, which are but typical of many others in the
Reports, illustrates clearly the fact that Anglo-American case law plays a very
great part in amplifying and applying the law on those subjects which are still
governed by the remaining portions of the Spanish statutes.
The foregoing two groups of cases in combination, those under the subjects
covered by Spanish statutes and those under the subjects covered by
American-Philippine legislation and effected by the change of sovereignty,
show conclusively that Anglo-American case law has entered practically
every one of the leading subjects in the field of law, and in the large majority
of such subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance of this court in
developing the local jurisprudence. The practical result is that the part twenty,
years have developed a Philippine Common Law or case law based almost
exclusively, except where conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon
Anglo-American Common Law. The Philippine Common Law supplements
and amplifies our statute law.

It is a fact of considerable practical importance that there are no digests of

Spanish decisions to aid the study of Bench and Bar. On the other hand, the
local libraries contain both digests and reports of the Federal Courts and
Supreme Court of the United States, and of most of the State courts, and
also many reports of the English courts. Added to his is a liberal supply of
English and American text books. The foregoing not only has a natural
influence on the results of the work of the Bench, but it has a very decided
influence on the development of the present Bar of the Philippine Islands;
each year adds to the preponderance of lawyers trained chiefly from a study
of Anglo-American case law.
The fact that prolific use of Anglo-American authorities is made in the
decisions of this court, combined with the fact that the available sources for
study and reference on legal theories are mostly Anglo-American, present a
practical situation at this moment from which this court can draw but one
conclusion, namely, that there has been developed, and will continue, a
common law in the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction (which for purposes of
distinction may properly be termed a Philippine Common Law), based upon
the English Common Law in its present day form of an Anglo-American
Common Law, which common law is effective in all of the subjects of law in
this jurisdiction in so far as it does not conflict with the express language of
the written law or with the local customs and institutions.
CONCLUSIONS.

COLLATERAL INFLUENCES.
We may summarize our conclusions as follows:
This conclusion is further justified by the practical situation which has
surrounded the Bench and Bar of the Philippine Islands for many years and
which there is very reason to believe will continue unabated in the future.
This court his, in any increasing degree during the past twenty years, cited
and quoted from Anglo-American cases and authorities in its decisions. The
following analysis of the citations of the last twenty volumes of the Philippine
Reports show this graphically.
Cases cited.
The American citations are over ten times as numerous as the Spanish
citations. (In Vol. 1 there were 63 Spanish to 53 United States.) Add to this
the cumulative effect of perpetuating this ratio through the citations of
Philippine cases in which American cases have been cited, and it is obvious
that Spanish decisions have had comparatively slight effect in the
development of our case law.

(1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the United

States, under a civil government established by the Congress.
(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this
jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in cases not covered by the
letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and
precedents of Anglo- American cases, subject to the limited
exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish
written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few
cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs
and institutions.
(3) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English
Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-American Common
Law to an almost exclusive extent.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(4) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, given a reasonable
interpretation, permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to
practice in the Philippine Islands similar to those privileges accorded
by the rule of this court.
Accordingly, the supporting papers filed by the applicant in this case showing
to the satisfaction of the court his qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his
petition is hereby granted and he is admitted to the practice of law in the
Philippine Islands. Our decision is based upon our interpretation of the New
York rule, and it does not establish a precedent which may be controlling on
this court with respect to future applications if our interpretation is not borned
out by the future enforcement of that rule by the New York court. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton
for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar
Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the
bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained
an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to
75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered
and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill
No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested
the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law,
which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR

EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any
bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up
to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations;
seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred
and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a
candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall
be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the
purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per
cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may
obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose
motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972
which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the
history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I
and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following
statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of
Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1953

TOTAL

2,555

968

284

12,230

5,421

1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination,

and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by
section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to
five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is
therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions
for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972,
although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons
to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738

1,033

426

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the

practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because
some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of
whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant
assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in
writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and
of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A.
Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman
Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners,
Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile
Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter.
The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by
the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority
opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the
Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials
and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236
passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation
for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement
that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years
and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books
and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since

1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have
been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports
began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by
the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of
applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been
easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long AngloSaxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system
established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States,
and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the
citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the
validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from
the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill
and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries
had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force
or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case
that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law that of
Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the
decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7,
1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust.
All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the
Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be
void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public
office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning
and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts
of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is
as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was
the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges
had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of
attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently
arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause.
There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject,
unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that
the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to
grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the
power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to
admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of
the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate
that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of
Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of
the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the
law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the
country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution
of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia
College being an institution of established reputation, and having a
law department under the charge of able professors, the students in

which department were not only subjected to a formal examination

by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period
of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the
Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act,
as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to
which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and
ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court.
It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the
Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit
requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college
should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of preexisting statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these
statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with
that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia
College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not
taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney
at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are
entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up

and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial
function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the
most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and
proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress,
is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the
rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in

its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude,
is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived,
the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative
enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts
was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following
paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we
have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to
the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the
courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an
attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and
Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of
qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are

distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government.
Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That
was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane
upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of
the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or interference by any other
department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir
the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice
dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity
of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to
the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution
of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the
most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded
as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult
to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part
of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the
judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging
to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney
at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which
indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control.
Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was
to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant
purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature
may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect
the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only
a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must
make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute
the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing
additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by
them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise
the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the
power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function.
In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82,
90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the
bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19

How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;

Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan,
48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D.
43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held
that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation
of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability,
adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the
need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners,
whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz,
C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162
N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something
more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and
,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of
justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at
law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys
under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission
to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission
to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision
of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary
to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief
Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe,
19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure
license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day,
54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained
the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has
always been the general practice in this country to obtain this
evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which
they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application,
is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite
legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair.
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its
entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to
it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their
exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the
exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases.
It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of
the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of
the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may,
with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing
his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of
their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded

everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion
need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function,
and is an inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State
Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of
the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to
establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the
judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the
exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not
subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by
judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by
either of the other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts
by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own
views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the
discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be
taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of
1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation
of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission
to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules
of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter,
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this
Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of
law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not
promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to
exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement
the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law
and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or
a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it.
But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and
enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised
with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to

the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These

powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part;
the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and
should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to
the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may
find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good
and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of
the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional
limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining
the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took
examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A
recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guaria and he discharged the
duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license
without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of
provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of
the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States
and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided,
That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for
the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of
Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant
attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points
short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face
of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,
without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the
Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held
and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of
Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides
for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the
United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of
Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the

commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be
limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration
wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above
citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon
the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the
positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria,
the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar
under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore,
we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made
as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in
all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had
been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears
that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in
this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last
applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of
the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he
fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in
the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive,
with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought
to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the
office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination
which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to
do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed
by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that
if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the
Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4,
1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced
their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that
this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The
Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this
state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants.
The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act
entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The
amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in
the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for
a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in
regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the

laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in
each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is
that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the
proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges
upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a
special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such.
If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the
court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for
litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates
certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges
must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing
an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation
to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147
Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired
by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs.
People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician
has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon
it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the
legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for
the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began
the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided
into two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second,
those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or
part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be
admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present
rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be
no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both
classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No
course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may
prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to
the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon
the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any
prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is
for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where
the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law,
the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those
applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through
general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S.

Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every
citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are
imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of
our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every
one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood,
some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution
is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can
be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that
all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy
equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations
of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law
rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E.
517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the
right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a
mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had
once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle
him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual
upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded
the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the
United States during the World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby
within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924,
known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is
rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of
this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it
clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in
12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between
the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must
be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one
class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between
the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and
the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in
relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a
just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and
burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the
bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955,
will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum
general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given,
then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with
the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has
no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years,
from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those
who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that

no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account
of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to
1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar
of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946
those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per
cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to
1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or
criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the
license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per
cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What
Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained
by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them
to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court
that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that
said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not
the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of
simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other
words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And
this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds
to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at
indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take
into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws
and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the
text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and
annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is
obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are
not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because
their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No.
972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect
for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the
bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in
the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present
already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to
perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on
the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their
respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal
may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this
Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such
additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate
acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate
the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may
be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing
rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which

the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does
not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared.
The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring
to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it
concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the
magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief
Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the
Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to
take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under
the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which
refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who
failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all
candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions
for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members
of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the
passing general average in the bar examination of august and November of
1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent
those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in
1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the
profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed
amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below
50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing
subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20
per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile
Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per
cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per
cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any subject in which they
have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall
be taken into account in determining their general average in any
subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate
fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination,
he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and
shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any
applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to

be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and

subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter
before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar
examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects
which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any
subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent
or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the
President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the
same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to
refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this
amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or
higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he
need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is
a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or
two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed
system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for
the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on
only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time
that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several
years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs
subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories
contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the one or
two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly
possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a
candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this
plan, must pass the examination in no more that three installments;
but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the
object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting
persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to
be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects
required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice
the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required
by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates
who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight
years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two
subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no
grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all
required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127.

This amendment provides that any application who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50
per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less
than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission
to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to
the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its
effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding
amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in
the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we
have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that
after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting
and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating,
reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of
70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average fixed
for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications,
and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked
during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate
a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain

law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal

of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or
resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering
it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that
members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme
Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme
Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified
to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to
the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have
obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required
for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and
impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready,
competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment
giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average
runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court
and practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and
even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite
of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its
officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to
elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high
level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice
precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious
fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding
oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting
as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the
unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar
examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final
resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general
average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for
reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have
failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision
also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally
obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it
was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20,
article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the
Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127
of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up
to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent
in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however,
That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all
succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose
of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade
or grades shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and
to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves
discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those
who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the
passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing
mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general
averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to
1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71
per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent.
Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per
cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as
the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the
available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not
improved from those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme
Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the
study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of
1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his
objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a special
class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a
class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing
what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by
making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the
Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill
should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar
examination on the strength of the established precedent of our
Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We
believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered,
constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not
yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being
inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple
curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to
enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class
legislation, is very expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the
class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it
leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as
"natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules established
for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465
(1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings
new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the
new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a
few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief.
The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always.
It permits them when there are special evils with which the general
laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by
the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286
U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always
retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as in this case
from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75
per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly

recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above
transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court, which
endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive
Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate
Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views
they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May,
1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated
June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to
pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953
(Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited
as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both
the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive
privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only
this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of
the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It
is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in
the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or
not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative
power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not
made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function,
and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the
rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in
1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as
having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and
discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass
candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial
authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory.
Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be
allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking
earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not
embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue
interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and
because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate
"may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list
of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general

average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however,

12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names
of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average
of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates
with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of
successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more
but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful
bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by
resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all
those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions
for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949.
Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing
average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without
being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose
general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for
reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948,
but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and
professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law
graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average
from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after
July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,
Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the
previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the
later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of
Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the
bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law,
Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the
required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of
the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first
vetoed by him.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August
1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar
examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in
the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing
the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the
approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing
average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the
allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein.
In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that
some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a
new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because
the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section
13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the
Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little

intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the
Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it
covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional,
because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to
admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is
erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do
not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by
this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were
filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that
bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a
judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word,
because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the
function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are
not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post
facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny
due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is
not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract
or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended
to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court
of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being
discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who
might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per
cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be
that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited
by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the
reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that
the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived
from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of
this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is
any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is
essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three
branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case
involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the
other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by
section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if,
for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar
after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar
admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution
amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per
cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a
general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether
they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule
127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and
August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was
supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive
rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted
as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per
cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of
the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of
legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying
them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act
972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act
is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court,
to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before

passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the
Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972
as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the
exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of
Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are
thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should
only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should
therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive
privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only
this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of
the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It
is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in
the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or
not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative
power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not
made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function,
and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the
rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in
1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as
having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and
discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass
candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory.
Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be
allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking
earlier or later are not?

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose

general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for
reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948,
but said motions were uniformly denied.

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not

embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue
interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and
because it is discriminatory.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and
professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law
graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average
from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after
July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,
Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the
previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the
later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of
Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the
bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law,
Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the
required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of
the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first
vetoed by him.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate
"may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list
of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general
average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however,
12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names
of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average
of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates
with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of
successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more
but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful
bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by
resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all
those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions
for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949.
Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing
average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without
being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August
1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar
examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in
the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing
the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the
approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing
average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the
allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein.
In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a
new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because
the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section
13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the
Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the
Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it
covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional,
because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to
admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is
erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do
not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by
this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were
filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that
bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a
judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word,
because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the

function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are
not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post
facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny
due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is
not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract
or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended
to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court
of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being
discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who
might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per
cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be
that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited
by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the
reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that
the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived
from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of
this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is
any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution.
Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is
essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three
branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case
involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the
other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by
section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if,
for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar
after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar
admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution
amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per
cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a
general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether
they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule
127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and
August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was
supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive
rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted
as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per
cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of
the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of
legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying
them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act
972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act
is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court,
to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the
Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972
as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the
exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of
Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are
thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should
only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should
therefore be given effect in its entirety.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 37717-R entitled Leoncia D. Aguirre Et. Al. v. Vicenta
Aguirre Et. Al., in favor of petitioners, but claimed by them to be
short of what they should be entitled to under the law, having in
view the findings of fact of the appellate court itself.
This litigation started in the Court of First Instance of Batangas as
an action for partition and damages among the surviving
descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin of
the properties left by said spouses. The trial court rendered
judgment for petitioners who were plaintiffs there but made no
award of damages. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, mainly
because of the failure of the trial court to award them damages,
the appellate court made the following pertinent findings and
conclusions of fact:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"With respect to plaintiffs-appellants claim for damages, the same
was denied by the trial court on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. This is an error. Sufficient proofs had been introduced by
them at the trial as shown by the following testimony

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33080. August 15, 1974.]
LEONCIA D. AGUIRRE, LUIS D. AGUIRRE, JR., and AURELIA
LUNINGNING AGUIRRE,Petitioners, v. VICENTA AGUIRRE,
FELIPE AGUIRRE, ANDREA AGUIRRE, CARIDAD AGUIRRE,
SOCORRO AGUIRRE, SEVERINO AGUIRRE as substitute for
his deceased father DOMINADOR AGUIRRE, CRISTETA
LAMAHANG, LUIS L. AGUIRRE, JR., and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Q. The properties having originated from the spouses, Gregorio

Aguirre and Regina Antolin, how much share did your children
receive annually as their share?
A. More or less P200.00.
Q. In the properties left by the spouses, Melencio Aguirre and
Fructuosa Perez, how much is the amount corresponding to your
two children?
A. More or less P800.00 annually.

Felix M. Sulit, for Petitioners.

Magno T. Bueser for Private Respondents.

Q. And the sums of P200.00 and P800.00 respectively were not

given to you for your two children since 1955 up to the present?
A. Yes, sir. it was not given to me.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.:

Q. By refusal of the defendants to accede to the demands for

partition of the properties mentioned in the complaint, what
damages f any did you incur?
A. Actual damages P1,000.00 yearly for 1955 up to the present

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(Plaintiffs testimony t.s.n. p. 36 June 22, 1961).
The damages of P1,000.00 annually above-mentioned represents
the value of the rice, corn, mangoes, copras, salt and others, to
which the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled but were unable to
receive by reason of the unjustified acts of the defendantsappellees as shown by the following testimony
Q. How were you able to get the corresponding share in the
produce of the lands mentioned in the complaint corresponding to
your two children?
A. The share regarding palay was given to me by Socorro Aguirre
the money coming from San Juan was given to me by Caridad
Aguirre and the copra coming from Lobo was given to me by
Dominador Aguirre. The salt, mangos, palay and corn in Batangas
were given to me by Maura Aguirre.
Q. How about the share of Your two children in the properties in
Bilogo, Taysan, Batangas, where did you get the same?
A. From Maura Aguirre also.
Q. How about the properties located in Rosario, Batangas where did
you get the share corresponding to your two children?

Q. Did you agree to such division of the share corresponding to

your two children?
A. I did not agree.
Q. When you did not agree, what happened?
A. The 1/6 share corresponding to my two children was not given
to me.
Q. Is that up to the present?
A. Yes, sir. (t.s.n. pp. 33-35 June 22, 1961).
"In connection with the above-mentioned claims of P1,000.00
yearly, it is to be noted that the lands subject of this suit are
unsurveyed lands, which according to the pertinent tax declarations
contained an area of 500 hectares. Portions of these lands in the
names of Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez are coconut lands.
The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Loho, Batangas, consists of
around 3,000 fruit bearing coconut trees and the ricelands are
cultivated by around 50 families, residing at the place as
permanent tenants. This is shown by the following
Q. More or less will you tell this Honorable Court how many coconut
trees there are?

A. From Tules, Rosario the share was given to me by Socorro

Aguirre, in Matamis, Rosario, Batangas the share was given to me
by Dominador Aguirre.

A. There are around three thousand (3,000) coconut trees, sir.

Q. Until when were you receiving the corresponding share of the

produce of the lands mentioned in the complaint for your two
children?

A. All fruit bearing, sir. (t.s.n. p. 38, April 2, 1964).

A. Up to 1954.
Q. What happened in the year 1955 to the produce corresponding
to your two children in the properties mentioned in the complaint?
A. In 1955, Felipe Aguirre, Dominador Aguirre, Caridad Aguirre and
Socorro Aguirre divided the 1/6 share of my children, saying the
same will be given to Cristeta Lamahang.

Q. Fruit bearing or not?

Q. All of them are situated at barrio Jaybanga, Lobo, Batangas?

A. Yes, sir. (t.s.n. p. 49, April 2, 1964).
Q. And the lands in Jaybanga, Pinagbayanan, Tulos and Matamis,
Rosario, Batangas what can you say as to that?
A. There are around fifty (50) tenants, sir.
Q. In their testimony these tenants are only transients or

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
temporary, what can you say as to that?
A. That is not true, sir. They have established homes there and
many tenants are qualified voters of that place (t.s.n. p, 39 April 2,
1964).
Due to the wrongful acts of the defendants and intervenors, the
plaintiffs were forced to litigate to protect their rights, incurring
additional actual damages in the form of attorneys fees, expert
witness fees and miscellaneous expenses. These are established by
the following testimony
Q. When the share in the produce of the lands mentioned to the
complaint, corresponding to your two children was not given to
you, what did you do?
A. I consulted a lawyer.
Q. What happened after the consultations?

With respect to the fee for the expert witness which plaintiffsappellants has incurred, the following testimony is a good guideline

Q. In case where the client has the capacity to pay, especially in

civil case, how much do you usually charge for examination of
documents, testimonies given in the Court of First Instance
regarding that examination?
A. I would depend in the nature of the case.
Q. In this case how much did you charge the plaintiff herein?
A. Well, I asked expenses for photostatic materials and for my
appearance here.
Q. Usually how much?

A. This present complaint was filed.

A. I charged P500.00 (t.s.n. p. 5, Oct. 28, 1964)."cralaw virtua1aw

library

Q. When you engaged the services of your counsel was there any
condition regarding attorneys fees?

Upon these facts and considerations, the court rendered judgment

as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

A. Yes, sir.

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified in

the sense that Parcel No. 7 otherwise known as the property
located in Matamis, Rosario, Batangas, as part and parcel of the
mass of property left by the late Gregorio Aguirre, is to be divided
between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendants on the
others, awarding the plaintiffs damages, thus: attorneys fees
P5,000.00; actual damages P1,000.00; moral damages
P2,000.00; exemplary damages P1,000.00; and fees for expert
witness P500.00. As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects, without pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Q. What?
A. Our contract was P5,500.00 (t.s.n. p. 35 June 22, 1961).
Q. In your previous direct examination, you stated that you
suffered actual damages in the amount of P1,000.00 yearly, the
sums corresponds to the share which you ought to received from
1955 to 1956, is that the only damage you suffered?
A. I sustained other damages in the form of attorneys fees and
miscellaneous expenses and also moral damages.
Q. In the amount of how much?
A. The attorneys fees P5,000.00 miscellaneous expenses P500.00
and moral damages P2,000.00 (t.s.n. p. 6, Oct. 12, 1961).

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by petitioners it is evident that

whereas the appellate court found as a fact that the damages
suffered by petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since 1955, the
dispositive portion of its decision simply says P1,000, without any
qualification, which, of course, is a manifest ambiguity, if not
inconsistency, that leaves the parties at a loss as to what exactly

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
should be the amount of actual damages recoverable by
petitioners. Considering, however, the tenor of the opinion and the
ratiocination in the decision in question, there can hardly be any
doubt that it was the intention of the appellate court to allow the
recovery of the yearly damages it found to have been suffered by
petitioners. If it went as far as to award attorneys fees of P5,000,
moral damages of P2,000, exemplary damages of P1,000 and even
fees for experts of P500, it stands to reason that it could not have
meant to award petitioners actual damages of only P1,000. The
absurdity of such a meager judgment of actual damages in the face
of the other special items of damages awarded is too plain to be
ignored. In fact, had the judgment of the Court of Appeals been
allowed to become final and the problem now besetting petitioners
were to be raised as an incident in the execution thereof, the
chances are that a construction of said judgment in the manner
above-stated might be sanctionable notwithstanding jurisprudence
to the effect that it is the dispositive part of a decision that controls
irrespective of what might appear in the opinion part thereof, for
the simple reason that in this particular subject judgment, the
inevitable conclusion from the findings of fact in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals is so indubitable that any argument to the
contrary would appear flimsy and purely technical, apart from
being totally illogical. 1 We have no doubt that any other view
would precisely be the kind of reasoning that might convince the
people that our courts sometimes sacrifice substantial justice in the
altar of technicalities. What is cause for wonder to Us in this case,
however, is why such a simple matter had to reach the Supreme
Court. It is almost certain that a brief motion for reconsideration
calling the appellate courts attention could have made the instant
proceeding unnecessary. Or respondent could have readily yielded
to petitioners pose, considering the manifest correctness thereof.
Be that as it may, We must admit that delays in the administration
of justice could be considerably avoided if greater care were taken
in the drafting of the dispositive portions of decisions which in truth
constitute the very essence thereof.
Petitioners also assign as error the failure of the Court of Appeals
to sentence defendants to pay them interests and costs. Again, We
find merit in this contention. They are entitled to interest at the
legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial court. (Section
8, Rule 51; Article 2213, Civil Code of the Philippines.) And to
costs. (Section 1, Rule 142.)

Anent the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to

corresponding adjustment of the amounts granted to them as a
result of the rise in the rate of dollar exchange of the peso, We are
of the considered opinion that the facts extant in the record do not
provide sufficient legal basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
the modification that the amount of actual damages awarded
petitioners should be P1,000 annually from 1955 and the
respondents shall pay interest on all the amounts adjudged against
them at the legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial
court. Costs in all instances against respondents.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and
Aquino, JJ., concur.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ESGUERRA, J.:
On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses
Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio
Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an
area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of
defendants (now petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee (p. 3, Rollo).
Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due time their answer with affirmative
defenses. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on
January 6, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of
reconveyance of the homestead land in question, free of all
liens and encumbrances, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon the
payment by the latter to them of the repurchase price of
P16,000.00;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975

VITA UY LEE and HENRY LEE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTA VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON,
in her own behalf, as substituting heir of former deceased co-plaintiff
Emiliano Simeon, and as guardian ad litem of the other substituting
heir, minor Emiliano V. Simeon, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioners.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap and Associates for private respondents.

(2) Directing the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the

possession of said land;
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon
presentation to him of the deed of reconveyance and
payment of his legal fees, to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 57279 issued to defendant Vita Uy Lee and to issue
a new one in lieu thereof in the name of the plaintiff Emiliano
Simeon, married to plaintiff Alberta Vicencio; and
(4) For defendants to pay the costs of the action.
The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record on Appeal)
Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial (pp. 60-96, Ibid) and
later an urgent motion for reconsideration (pp. 114-116, Ibid), which were
both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 (pp. 113114, Ibid) and June 25, 1964 (pp. 119-124, Ibid).

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal was affirmed in toto. (Annex A to Petition, pp. 27-45, Rollo). A timely
motion for reconsideration (Annex B to Petition, pp. 66-85, Ibid) was filed by
defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. (Annex C to Petition, p.
87, Ibid)
The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy
Lee and Henry Lee.
The land in question, together with another parcel denominated as Lot No.
732 in the name of Ignacio Simeon, deceased father of Emiliano Simeon,
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of Free Patent No. 187771
which Ignacio had obtained from the government way back in 1935. (p.
28, Ibid)
After the death of Ignacio Simeon and his wife, plaintiff (now substituted by
his spouse, Alberta Vicencia Vda. de Simeon as private respondent) Emiliano
Simeon and his brother Deogracias Simeon, as the only surviving heirs,
executed on March 27, 1947 a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties
left by their parents (Exh. 2) whereby Lot No. 1 was adjudicated to
Deogracias and Lot No. 2 to Emiliano. Because the certificate of title covering
the said lots could not be found, they were simply described as "Homestead
No. 82945." (Ibid)
On January 30, 1957, following some negotiation, plaintiffs (now private
respondents) agreed to sell the land in question to Vita Uy Lee (Exh. 1).
Upon request of Henry Lee, Vita's husband, plaintiffs (now private
respondents) furnished him with a copy of the deed of extrajudicial partition
(Exh. 2) and a certification (Exh. 1) issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal
that "there is no certificate of title issued for Lots Nos. 1 and 2 located at
Antipolo covered by Plan F-54569". Defendants (now petitioners) likewise
verified the status of the property from the Land Registration Commission
and the Bureau of Lands (pp. 48-49, Ibid).
On February 14, 1957, plaintiffs (now private respondents) executed a deed
of sale of Lot No. 2 in favor of defendants (now Petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and
Henry Lee. The document prepared by defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer,
Atty. Leonardo M. Guzman, described the property as "Lot 2 of Plan F954569," instead of a homestead as stated in the deed of extrajudicial
partition (Exh. 2). (p. 29, Ibid)
The day following the sale, defendant (now petitioner) Vita Uy Lee filed her
own application for free patent over Lot No. 2 with the Bureau of Lands (Exh.
G.), in which application she expressly acknowledged that said property is a

public land previously occupied by Ignacio Simeon and his heirs. The
application was denied (p. 50, Ibid).
Defendants (now petitioners) then sought registration of the lot in question in
their names under the provisions of Act No. 496. The Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch VI, acting as a land court, favorably acted upon their
application in a decision dated December 7, 1957 (Exh. 5). However, before
the final decree and the corresponding certificate of title could be issued, it
was discovered that the land in which defendants (now petitioners) sought to
register in their names, "has already been patented and is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)." Acting upon this information, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal set aside on February 11, 1958, its decision of
December 7, 1957 (Exh. 7). (pp. 30-31, Ibid)
Meanwhile, on February 5, 1958, Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon filed a
motion praying for the issuance of a substitute owner's duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.) which was "irretrievably lost during
the early period of the American liberation ..." (Exh. 8). The motion was
granted. (p. 31, Ibid)
On March 4, 1958, defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer prepared a
document entitled "Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition With
Partial Sale" (Exh. B), wherein the adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to
Deogracias Simeon and Emiliano Simeon, respectively, and the sale by the
latter of his share to Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were
affirmed. On that day, Original Certificate of Title No. 732 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57272 (Exh. 11) covering Lot No. 2 issued in
the name of Emiliano Simeon. Later that day, the new Transfer Certificate
was cancelled and replaced by the present Transfer Certificate of Title No.
57279 (Exh. 14) in the name of Vita Uy Lee, married to Henry Lee, "subject
to the provisions of ... the Public Land
Act ... " (Exh. H). (Ibid)
What transpired next is the crux of this controversy as plaintiff (now
substituted by surviving spouse Alberta Vicencio as private respondent)
Emiliano Simeon tried to repurchase the property sold to the spouses Lee.
The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:
"On June 14, 1960, Emiliano Simeon, through plaintiffs' former counsel Atty.
Valeriano Santos, sent a letter of demand (Exh. C) to Vita Uy Lee, advising
her that he desires to repurchase the parcel of land situated at Antipolo,
Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 in your name' and
requesting that he be informed of her "conformity on the matter within five
days from receipt hereof." Notwithstanding receipt of this letter, defendants

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
did not bother to make any reply thereto. Hence, on November 3, 1960, Atty.
Santos wrote another letter (Exh. J) reiterating the demand of Emiliano
Simeon to repurchase the land. This letter was received by defendant Vita Uy
Lee on November 5, 1960 (Exh. J-1), but as in the case of the first letter, the
defendants did not reply to the second letter. Consequently, for the third time,
on June 24, 1961, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. D) to Vita Uy Lee
repeating the same demand, with a warning that if nothing is heard from her
within five days from receipt, the matter would be brought to court. Still the
defendants did not answer. However, despite this failure of the defendants,
Atty. Santos did not take any court action and apparently because of this
indifference of their former counsel, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
services of a new lawyer, Atty. Narciso Pea (p. 32, Ibid).
"On March 2, 1962, Atty. Pea addressed a letter (Exh. E) to Vita Uy Lee
reiterating that Emiliano Simeon "is ready to repurchase from you the land" in
question. After receipt of this letter, Vita Uy Lee broke her silence and
through her counsel Atty. Guzman, she wrote Atty. Pea on March 12, 1962,
that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because even
assuming that your client had the right to repurchase the land, the period of
five (5) years within which to do so, had already expired". (Exh. 12) In view of
this flat refusal of the defendants to resell the lot in controversy to the
plaintiffs, the latter filed this action in the court below." (p. 33, Ibid)
Plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought the redemption of Lot No. 2 from
defendants (now petitioners) pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
141 which provides as follows:
Section 119. Every reconveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance.
There is no dispute that the land under litigation was acquired under a free
patent (p. 36, Ibid), and that its sale is subject to redemption within five (5)
years from the execution of the deed of sale (Galasiano, et al. vs. Austria and
Cardenas, 97 Phil. 82; Abogado vs. Aquino, et al., 53 O.G. 5187; Bayaua vs.
Suguitan, et al., 53 O.G. 8832; Reyes vs. Manas, L-27755, Oct. 4, 1969, 29
SCRA 736; Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan.
30, 1970, 31 SCRA 329) on February 14, 1957. (p. 29, Ibid) Likewise, there is
no question that private respondents instituted the action to compel
petitioners to resell the land to them only on June 25, 1965 when the
redemption period had already elapsed. (p. 27, Ibid) The main issue to be
resolved is whether the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by

surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse
of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the
right of private respondents to repurchase the property.
Before passing, however, upon said issue, We find it logical, considering their
nature, to first examine the other questions raised herein.
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient
and complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve
petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law." (p. 32,
Brief for Petitioners) Petitioners based this assignment of error on the
requirement embodied in Section 4, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states:
Sec. 4. Findings of the court. Every decision of the Court
of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all
issues properly raised before it."
More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to
include in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by
respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to
petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the expiration of the period within which
redemption could be made (p. 35, Brief for Petitioners), petitioners intimating
that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as another question
is raised by them on the basis of the "terminology of those three letters".
(Ibid).
We find no merit in this contention.
At the outset, it should be stressed that provisions of the Rules of Court like
the one invoked by petitioner are to be given liberal construction. (Rule 1,
Sec. 2, Rules of Court) As this Court had the occasion to rule, the findings of
facts which as found by the court and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon. (Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438,
Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 157, citing Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465)
It is not necessary that the appellate court reproduce in their entirety the
exhibits presented by the parties during the trial. To require the Court to do so
would be to clutter the pages of the decision with wordy texts of documents
when reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better,
serve the purpose of the rule. The respondent Court did not disregard the
three letters in question. Neither did it dismiss their evidentiary value. Each
letter was properly referred to in the decision and its message clearly
reflected thereon. Indeed, it is not alleged that respondent Court
misunderstood the communication.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Another point raised concerns questions of fact, relating particularly to the
testimonies of Henry Lee, his witness Valeriano Santos and respondent
Alberta Simeon (pp. 39-45, Brief for Petitioners). Suffice it to state here that
these matters cannot be inquired into a review on certiorari. (Sec. 2, Rule 45,
Rules of Court; De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. Court of
Appeals, 90 Phil. 688; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20
SCRA 54; Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687;
Ramirez Telephone Corporation vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33
SCRA 737; People vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 97)
Going now to the main issue to be resolved, petitioner, assign as error the
Court of Appeals' finding that the right of private respondents to repurchase
the land in question still subsists. It was respondent court's thinking that the
first three letters sent by private respondent (now substituted by surviving
spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the
five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of
private respondents to redeem the property (pp. 58-59, rollo).
The first letter dated June 14, 1960 (Exh. C) advised petitioner Vita Uy Lee of
Emiliano Simeon's "desire to repurchase" the land and requested that the
latter be informed of Lee's conformity on the matter within five days from
receipt (t)hereof". (p. 32, Ibid) The second letter sent on November 3, 1960
(Exh. J) reiterated Simeon's demand to repurchase the land (Ibid). The third
letter dated June 24, 1961, expressed the same demand, this time with a
warning that if nothing is heard from petitioner Vita Uy Lee within five days
from receipt, respondent Simeon would seek judicial intervention (Ibid). In no
instance was it shown that private respondent offered or tendered the
repurchase price.
Petitioners maintain that the sending of letters advising of private
respondents' desire to repurchase the property and demanding its resale did
not constitute a proper exercise of the right of legal redemption, absent an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment (p. 17, Brief for Petitioners).
Petitioners argue that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee
that the former intends to redeem the property sold, but he must at the same
time offer to repay the price. (p. 21, Ibid).
This view deserves consideration.
The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to
exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot

avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the
price of the sale ...".
Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is
not sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the vendee that the
former desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately thereupon
offer to repay the price ...". Likewise, in several other cases decided by the
Supreme Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil.
394; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil.
840; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., .98 Phil. 975; and other cases)
where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised,
there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been made by the
vendor.
Private respondent points out, however, that the statement in Angao cited
above is an obiter dictum because in that case, the period of redemption had
prescribed thereby rendering immaterial the question of whether or not a
tender of payment was made. This might be so; nevertheless, a dictum which
generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule
(21 C.J.S. 309) may be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Ibid, citing
Karameros vs. Luther, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 508).
Accordingly, the Angao ruling was cited with approval in the case of Laserna
vs. Javier and Cruz, 110 Phil. 172, where the appellant failed to tender
payment of the repurchase price within 30 days after the court below had
decided by final judgment that the contract sue upon was a pacto de
retro and not a mortgage. (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
gives a vendor a retro "the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time
final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract
was a true sale with right to repurchase". It was invoked in the subsequent
case of Torrijos vs. Crisologo, L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 184. In that
case, Crisologo offered the return to Torrijos of P2,000.00, representing a
part of the repurchase price of P19,313.95. Holding that the vendor who
desires to redeem the property should offer to repay the price, the Court went
further and declared that the full amount of the repurchase price should be
tendered.
It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his
desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of
redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to
properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year period,
the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an
action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Private respondents also argue, on the assumption that tender of payment
was ordinarily required, that the same was not necessary in the instant case
because petitioner Vita Uy Lee refused their demands for reconveyance.
It may indeed be recalled that before the period for redemption expired,
respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon sent
petitioner Vita Uy Lee three letters one in June 1960, the other in
November of the same year, and the third in June 1961 demanding the
resale to him of the homestead. (p. 52, Rollo) Despite Lee's receipt of the
letters, she did not send any reply. It was only when Simeon wrote her a
fourth letter, this time after the redemption period had elapsed, that petitioner
Lee expressly signified her refusal to resell the land in question on the
ground that the 5-year period had already expired (pp. 52-53, Ibid).
The appellate court considered appellants' (now petitioners) failure to reply to
Simeon's first letters as refusal on petitioners' part to resell the property in
question and held that such refusal rendered tender of payment unnecessary
(pp. 61-63, Ibid).
This position is untenable.
Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by
respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of
respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of
payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that
tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has
refused to permit the repurchase, as enunciated in at least two cases
(Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 678 and Laserna vs. Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is
premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will also
refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have
shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat
refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's
subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the
same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment
and, instead, merely filed an action to compel reconveyance after the
expiration of the period.
WHEREFORE, finding private respondents' right of redemption to have
lapsed, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
entered dismissing the complaint.
No costs.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
PrivaterespondentStateInvestmentHouse,Inc.(hereinafter,SIHI)broughtanaction
forasumofmoneyagainstDELTAintheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofManila,
BranchVI.ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.8423019.DELTAwas
declaredindefault,andon5December1984,theRTC,perJudgeErnestoTengco,
renderedadecision[4]thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingconsiderations,judgmentisherebyrendered
orderingthedefendanttopayuntoplaintifftheamountofP20,061,898.97asitstotal
outstandingobligationandtopay25%ofthetotalobligationasandforattorney's
fees,pluscostofsuit.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121075. July 24, 1997]

DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. ROBERTO M. LAGMAN, and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 29147 dated 5 January 1995 [2] and 14 July 1995.[3] The former
denied the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motors Corporation
(hereinafter DELTA), while the latter amended the earlier Resolution.
The pleadings and annexes in the record of CA-G.R. SP No. 29147
disclose the following material operative facts:

The decision could not be served on DELTA, either personally or by

registered mail, due to its earlier dissolution. However, Delta had been taken
over by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. This
notwithstanding, SIHI moved, on 4 November 1986, for service of the
decision by way of publication, which the trial court allowed in its order of 6
December 1986. The decision was published in the Thunderer, a weekly
newspaper published in Manila. After publication, SIHI moved for execution
of the judgment, which the trial court granted in its order of 11 March 1987 on
the ground that no appeal had been taken by DELTA despite publication of
the decision. The writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto certain
properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and
sold. The sheriff likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA.
DELTA then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, wherein
DELTA insisted that: (a) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant (DELTA) since there was no valid/proper service of
summons, thus rendering the decision null and void; and (b) the void decision
never became final and executory.
In its decision of 22 January 1991 [5] the Court of Appeals ruled against
DELTA on the first ground, but found that the record before it "is bereft of any
showing that a copy of the assailed judgment had been properly served on
P.N.B. which assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's
dissolution." Accordingly the Court of Appeals ruled that:
[T]he[decision]didnotbecomeexecutory(Vda.deEspirituv.CFI,L
30486,Oct.31,1972;Tuazonv.Molina,L55697,Feb.26,1981).
It further opined that service by publication did not cure the fatal defect and
thus decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE,whiletheassaileddecisionwasvalidlyrenderedbythe
respondentcourt,nonethelessithasnotattainedfinalitypendingserviceof

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
acopythereofonpetitionerDELTA,whichmayappealthereforewithin
thereglementaryperiod.[6]

therein as its answer and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

In a motion for reconsideration, DELTA insisted that there was no valid

service of summons and the decision of the RTC was not in accordance with
the Rules, hence, void.[7] SIHI also filed a motion for reconsideration claiming
that DELTA was not dissolved, and even if it were, its corporate personality to
receive service of processes subsisted; moreover, its right to appeal had
been lost.[8] These motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 27 May 1991.[9] Unsatisfied, DELTA filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 100366) which was denied in the
resolution of 16 September 1991 for non-compliance with Circular No. 188. A motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution of 9 October
1991, a copy of which was received by DELTA on 31 October 1991. [10]

On 17 June 1993 the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision [21] in

CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the dispositive portion providing:

On 12 November 1991, DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal [11] with the RTC
in Civil Case No. 84-23019, indicating therein that it was appealing from the 5
December 1984 decision, and prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE,itismostrespectfullyprayedofthisHonorableCourtthat
thisNoticeofAppealbenotedandtherecordsofthiscasebeelevatedto
theCourtofAppeals.
SIHI filed on 2 December 1991 a motion to dismiss DELTA's
appeal[12] on the ground that it was filed out of time, since DELTA obtained a
certified true copy of the decision from the RTC on 21 September 1990,
hence it had only fifteen days therefrom within which to appeal from the
decision. Despite DELTA's opposition,[13] the trial court dismissed the Notice
of Appeal.[14] DELTA moved to reconsider,[15] which SIHI opposed.[16] In its
order[17] of 14 September 1992 the trial court denied Deltas motion.
DELTA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO.
29147.[18] In its petition, Delta prayed for the: (a) annulment of the order of the
trial court dated 3 June 1992 dismissing the Notice of Appeal dated 6
November 1991; (b) annulment of the order of the trial court dated 14
September 1992 denying the motion for reconsideration of the former; and
(c) elevation of the original records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court of
Appeals.
On 30 October 1992 the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
29147 a restraining order enjoining respondents and any and all other
persons acting on their behalf "from enforcing or directing the enforcement of
the Decision, subject of the petition." [19]Thereafter, in its resolution
promulgated on 22 December 1992,[20] the Court of Appeals gave due course
to the petition in said case, considered the comments of private respondents

WHEREFORE,thequestionedorderoftherespondentcourtdatedJune3,1992,
dismissingthenoticeofappealdatedNovember6,1991;andtheorderdated
September14,1992ofthesamecourtdenyingthemotionforreconsiderationfiled
bythepetitioner,throughcounsel,areherebySETASIDE;andrespondentcourt
herebyorderedtoELEVATEtherecordsofthecasetotheCourtofAppeals,on
appeal.
On 18 January 1993, the RTC elevated the record of Civil Case No. 8423019 to the Court of Appeals.
SIHI appealed to this Court from the decision by way of a petition for
review.[22] It contended that DELTA had lost the right to appeal in view of the
lapse of more than 15 days from DELTAs receipt of a certified true copy of
the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019. This petition for review was
docketed as G.R. No. 110677.[23]
While SIHI's petition in G.R. No. 110677 was pending before this Court,
DELTA filed on 14 February 1994, in CA G.R. SP No. 29147 of the Court of
Appeals, an Omnibus Motion[24] to:
1) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY
FORCE AND EFFECT THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT
COURT DATED MARCH 11, 1987 ORDERING THE ISSUANCE
OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION;
2) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY
FORCE AND EFFECT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED
PURSUANT TO THE ORDER DATED MARCH 11, 1987;
3) ALL OTHER PROCEEDINGS HELD, CONDUCTED AND
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT SHERIFF IMPLEMENTING
THE AFORESAID WRIT OF EXECUTION.
SIHI opposed the motion[25] on grounds that: a) there was a pending
appeal by certiorari with this Court, thus the Court of Appeals was without
jurisdiction to entertain the Omnibus Motion; b) the Omnibus Motion was
barred by res judicata; and c) the filing of the Omnibus Motion was a clear
act of forum-shopping and should then be denied outright.
In its resolution of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals merely noted the
Omnibus Motion and stated:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ItappearingthatthereisapendingpetitionforreviewwiththeSupreme
CourtofthisCourt'sDecisiondatedJune17,1993,itwouldbeimproper
forthisCourttoactontheOmnibusMotionfiledbypetitionerDelta
MotorCorporationxxx.[26]
On 18 July 1994 this Courts Second Division issued a resolution [27] in
G.R. No. 110677 denying the petition therein for failure to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in the questioned
judgment. SIHI's motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution of
this Court of 21 September 1994.[28]
On 26 October 1994 DELTA filed a manifestation and motion [29] to
resolve its Omnibus Motion of February 10, 1994.
In its resolution of 5 January 1995,[30] the Court of Appeals denied
DELTA's Omnibus Motion, holding:
[T]hemattersprayedforintheOmnibusMotionofpetitionerDeltaMotor
CorporationdatedFebruary10,1994andabovequotedarematterswhich
werenotraisedasissuesbypetitionerintheinstantpetitionand,therefore,
notwithinthejurisdictionandpowerofthisCourtintheinstantpetitionto
decide.[31]
On 27 January 1995 DELTA filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
clarification[32] wherein it alleged that: (a) while it was true that the matters
prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner were not raised in the instant
petition, they were, nevertheless, included in the general prayer in the
petition for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the
premises; (b) it could not file the Omnibus Motion with the RTC since the
records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 had already been elevated to the Court of
Appeals and upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the case; and (c) the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were
incidental to and included in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, on 2 February 1995, SIHI filed a motion for
clarification[33] wherein it asked for the deletion, for being mereobiter dictum,
the following paragraph in the Resolution of 5 January 1995, to wit:
WhileitistruethatasanecessaryconsequencethedecisionoftheCourt
ofAppealsdatedJanuary22,1991rulingthatthedecisioninCivilCase
No.8423019"hasnotattainedfinalitypendingserviceofacopythereof
onpetitionerDelta,whichmayappealtherefromwithinthereglementary
period",allproceedingsand/orordersarisingfromthetrialcourt'sdecision
inCivilCaseNo.8423019arenullandvoidxxx.
SIHI argued that this paragraph was not necessary to the decision of the
case before it[34] and cannot be considered binding for the purpose of
establishing precedent; [35] likewise, the Resolution itself did not decide the

incident on its merits or consider and dispose of the issues, nor determine
the respective rights of the parties concerned.
In its resolution of 14 July 1995, [36] the Court of Appeals granted SIHI's
motion for clarification and denied DELTA's motion for reconsideration. As to
the latter, it ruled that:
[P]etitionerDELTAisnotwithoutremedy,especiallyconsideringthe
rulingoftheCourtofAppealsinthefirstpetitionforcertiorari(CAG.R.
SPNo.23068)whichruledthus:
"WHEREFORE,whiletheassaileddecisionwasvalidly
renderedbytherespondentcourt,nonethelessithasnotattained
finalitypendingserviceofacopythereofonpetitionerDELTA,
whichmayappealtherefromwithinthereglementaryperiod."
Clearly,theonlyissueinthispetition(CAG.R.SPNo.29147)isastothe
validityofthequestionedordersofrespondentcourtdatedJune3,1992
(dismissingthenoticeofappealdatedNovember6,1991)andtheOrder
datedSeptember14,1992ofthesamecourt(denyingthemotionfor
reconsiderationfiledbythepetitionerthroughcounsel).[37]
It then decreed to amend its Resolution of 5 January 1995 by deleting the
assailed paragraph.
DELTA then filed the instant petition, insisting that the matters raised in
the Omnibus Motion were incidental to and included in the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; hence, it had jurisdiction to rule on said
motion. As regards the grant of SIHI's motion to strike out a paragraph in the
resolution of 5 January 1995 for being obiter dictum, DELTA submitted that
the latter contained a finding or affirmation of fact, thus could not have
constituted obiter dictum.
After SIHI filed its comment, we gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.DELTA and SIHI
did so on 16 April 1996 and on 13 May 1996, respectively.
After a painstaking review of the record in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we
are more than convinced that respondent Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in denying DELTAs Omnibus Motion. The decision of the
Court of Appeals of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 had long
become final insofar as DELTA was concerned, and it very well knew that the
only issues raised therein concerned the trial courts orders of 3 June 1992
and 14 September 1992. As a matter of fact, at the time Delta filed the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null and
void in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having been so
issued at the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. In short, if DELTA
intended such orders to be challenged in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, it could

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
have explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and
prayed for the corresponding affirmative relief therefrom, and if this course of
action initially proved unavailing then DELTA could and should have moved
for reconsideration on that aspect. After the finality of the decision in said
case, any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had become procedurally
impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have
been allowed during the pendency of said case by way of amendments to the
petition.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's Omnibus
Motion in keeping with jurisprudence [38] concerning Section 7 of Rule 51 of
the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the Court of Appeals, which mandates
that:
Sec.7.Questionsthatmaybedecided.Noerrorwhichdoesnotaffect
thejurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterwillbeconsideredunlessstatedin
theassignmentoferrorsandproperlyarguedinthebrief,saveasthecourt,
atitsoption,maynoticeplainerrorsnotspecified,andalsoclericalerrors.
Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by
petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, which were limited to the trial court's
orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. These were the only errors
Delta argued extensively in its brief. To allow DELTA's Omnibus Motion which
it filed more than eight months from promulgation of the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 29147, or long after finality of said case, would result in abandonment
of sound judicial process.
In light of the dispositive portions of the Court of Appeals decisions of 22
January 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, and of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29147, we cannot agree with SIHI that DELTA is barred by res
judicata. This conclusion is further fortified by the unequivocal statements of
the Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 14 July 1995 that:
[P]etitionerDELTAisnotwithoutremedy,especiallyconsideringthe
rulingoftheCourtofAppealsinthefirstpetitionforcertiorari(CAG.R.
SPNo.23068)...
xxx
Clearly,theonlyissueinthispetition(CAG.R.SPNo.29147)isastothe
validityofthequestionedordersofrespondentcourtdatedJune3,1992
(dismissingthenoticeofappealdatedNovember6,1991)andtheOrder
datedSeptember14,1992ofthesamecourt(denyingthemotionfor
reconsiderationfiledbythepetitionerthroughcounsel).
The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting
the phrase SIHI protested as obiter dictum.

An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court

upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it.[39] It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and
not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[40]
The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a
matter not raised by petitioner expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal
of its notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of the
aforementioned issue. The body of the resolution did not contain any
discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of law to support such
statement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged
resolutions of 5 January 1995 and 14 July 1995 in C.A. G.R.-SP. NO. 29147
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman,) Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., no part.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Court of December 16, we issued the corresponding writ of preliminary
injunction restraining respondents from excluding or banning petitionersappellants, their children and all other of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this
action has been brought, from admission to public schools, particularly the
Buenavista Community School, solely on account of their refusal to salute the
flag or preventing their return to school should they have already been
banned, until further orders from this Court.
The facts involved are not disputed. On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No.
1265 was approved and went into effect. Acting upon section 2 of said Act
authorizing and directing the Secretary of Education to issue or cause to be
issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, said
Secretary issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21, 1955
which Department Order quoting Republic Act No. 1265 in its entirety, we
reproduce below for purpose of reference:
"Republic of the Philippines
Department of Education
Office of the Secretary
Manila
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Department Order
No. 8, s. 1955

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13954

August 12, 1959

GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondentsappellees.
K.V. Felon and Hayed C. Cavington for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioners are Appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Masbate dismissing their complaint. Acting upon the "Urgent Motion for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction" filed on behalf of petitioners of December 12, 1958,
and without objection on the part of the Solicitor General, by resolution of this

July 21, 1955

COMPULSORY DAILY FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE SCHOOLS
To the Director of Public Schools and the Director of Private Schools:
1. Quoted below is Republic Act No. 1265 entitled "An Act making
Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions," which is
self-explanatory.
SECTION 1. All educational institutions henceforth observe
daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and
shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National
Anthem.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby
authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules
and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony
herein provided.
SECTION 3. Failure of refusal to observe the flag ceremony
provided by this Act and in accordance with rules and
regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after
proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational
institution concerned and its head to public censure as an
administrative punishment which shall be published at least
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony
provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice
and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit
of the private educational institution responsible for such failure.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions,

public and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be
raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag staff must be
straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as
would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or
within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flagraising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which
event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way
possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day.
The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the
following manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in
school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag.
At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and
everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No
one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.

Approved, June 11, 1955.

2. As provided in Section 2 of the Act, the rules and regulations
governing the proper conduct of the required flag ceremony, given in
the in closure to this Order, are hereby promulgated. These rules and
regulations should be made known to all teachers and school
officials, public and private. The patriotic objective or significance of
the Act should be explained to all pupils and students in the schools
and to all communities through the purok organizations and
community assemblies.
(Sgd.) G. HERNANDEZ, JR.
Secretary of Education
Incl.:
As stated
(Inclosure of Department order No. 8, s. 1955)
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY
IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem

accompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if it
has none; or the anthem may be played by the school band alone. At
the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the
flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and
execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing that
hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand with their arms and
hands downed and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy
Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations.
The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon
last note of the anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly
shall recite in unison of following patriotic pledge (English or
vernacular version 0, which may bring the ceremony to a close. This
is required of all public schools and of private schools which are
intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly
Filipino.
ENGLISH VERSION
I Love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
3. The retreat shall be observed as follows:
a. Teachers and pupils or faculty members and students whose
classes and after the last school period in the afternoon before sun
down shall assemble facing the flag. At command, the Philippine
National Anthem shall be sung with accompaniment of the school
band. If the school has no band, the assembly will only sing the
Anthem. Boys who have been taking part in preparatory military
training or Boy Scout activities shall attend the retreat in formation
and execute the salute prescribed for them. Others shall execute the
same salute and observe the same deportment as required of them
in the flag-raising ceremony. The flag should be lowered slowly so
that it will be in the hands of the color detail at the sound of the last
note of the Anthem.
b. If the school so prefers, it may have its bugle corp play "To the
Colors", instead of the singing of the National Anthem, for the retreat.
At the sound of the first note, the assembly shall stand at attention
facing the flag and observe the same deportment as required in the
flag-raising ceremony. Or, it may have its bugle corp play "To the
Colors" and at the sound of the first note everybody within hearing
distance shall stand at attention, face the flag, and observe the same
deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony.
4. The flag should be handled reverently in raising or lowering it and
not allowed to touch the ground. This can be insured by having one
pupil hold the flag while another pupil fastening it to or unfasten it
from the halyard.
5. To display the National Flag at half-mast when necessary, it must
be hoisted to full-mast, allowing it to fly there for a moment, and then
brought down to half-mast. To lower the flag, it must again be hoisted
to full-mast before bringing it down."
In his turn the Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22, series of
1955, on July 30, 1955 addressed to Division Superintendents of Schools,

enclosing a copy of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 and enjoining

strict compliance therewith.
It would appear that pursuant to the Department Order in question, the flag
ceremony contemplated therein was held daily in every school, public and
private. Petitioners' children attending the Buenavista Community School,
Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order
No. 8; as a result they were expelled from school sometime in September,
1955. It is said that other children similarly situated who refused or failed to
comply with the requirement about saluting the flag are under threats of
being also expelled from all public schools in the Philippines.
Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education petitioning that in
the implementation of this flag ceremony, they and their children attending
school be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and
hands down and straight at the sides and that they be exempted from
executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting
of the patriotic pledge, giving their reason for the same. On December 16,
1955 the Secretary of Education wrote to counsel for petitioner denying the
petition, making it clear that the denial was the final and absolute stand of the
Department of Education on the matter and that counsel may thereafter feel
free to seek a judicial determination of the constitutionality or interpretation of
Republic Act No. 1265 as construed and applied to Jehovah's Witnesses.
The letter also informed petitioners' counsel that with reference to his letter of
December 1, 1955 relative to the request for reinstatement of petitioners'
children who had been expelled from school for non-compliance with
Department Order No. 8, no favorable action could be taken thereon. So, on
March 27, 1957 petitioners commenced the present action asking that a writ
of preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Secretary of Education and the
Director of Public Schools from enforcing Department Order No. 8 "as
applied to petitioners and all others of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this
action is brought and to restrain them from excluding from the public schools
the children of the petitioners on account of their refusal to execute a formal
salute to the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
and that after hearing, the trial court declare Department Order No. 8 invalid
and contrary to the Bill of Rights and that the preliminary injunction prayed for
be made permanent.
Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, an
unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is
superior to that of laws enacted by the State. Their religious beliefs include a
literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which say: "Thou shalt
not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They
consider that the flag is an "image within this command. For this reason they
refuse to salute it.
To further make clear the stand of petitioners as to the relative position and
priority of religious teaching on the one hand and laws promulgated by the
State on the other, we quote from appellant's brief on page 50 thereof:
In Halter vs. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41, 27 S. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696
(1907), the United States Supreme Court held that the flag `is an
emblem of National sovereignty,
To many persons the saluting of a national flag means nothing. To a
sincere person who believed in God and the Bible as his Word, and
who is in a covenant with Almighty God to do his will exclusively, it
means much. To such person "sovereignty" means the supreme
authority or power. Many believe that "the higher powers," mentioned
in the Bible at Romans 13:1, means the "sovereign state"; but to the
Christian this means Jehovah God and his son, Christ Jesus,
Jehovah's anointed King. They, Father and Son are the higher
powers, to whom all must be subject and joyfully obey. (Emphasis
supplied)
The question involved in this appeal is a highly important one. We are called
upon to determine the right of a citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution
about freedom of religious belief and the right to practice it as against the
power and authority of the State to limit or restrain the same. Our task is
lessened by the fact that petitioners do not challenge the legality or
constitutionality of Republic Act 1265. All that they question is the legality or
constitutionality of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 of the Department
of Education implementing said Republic Act.
The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and though. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however
strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with
the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must
yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains
said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the
moment he translates said religious belief into an overt act, such as engaging
or practising plural marriages, he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may
not plead or involve his religious belief as a defense or as matter of
exemption from the operation of the law.
In the case of Reynolds vs. U.S. (98 U.S. 145) the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a law prohibiting and punishing polygamy even as
against the claim of religious belief of the Mormons. Said the Court:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages
shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstance.
(emphasis supplied)
Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim
that according to his religious belief, the payment of taxes means service to
one other than God. As long as he confines himself to mere belief, well and
good. But when he puts said belief into practice and he actually refuses to
pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the States steps in,
compels payment, and enforces it either by court action or levy and distraint.
One of the important questions to determine here is the true meaning and
significance of the Filipino flag. Petitioners believe and maintain that it is an
image and therefore to salute the same is to go against their religious belief.
"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven . . . thou shalt not bow down
thyself to them or serve them." They also claim that the flag salute is a
religious ceremony, participation in which is forbidden by their religious belief.
We disagree. Appellants themselves (page 51 of their brief) concede that the
flag is a symbol of the State. They give the meaning of the word "image" on
page 51 of their brief as follows:
Under the word "image" this comment is given by Webster: "Image,
in modern usage, commonly suggestsreligious veneration."
(Emphasis supplied)
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag
salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious
ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a
candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right hand is
raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promise to
defend the Constitution and even invokes the help of God; and it is to be
doubted whether a member of Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for
admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking the oath on the ground
that is religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a a religious group or
sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers, all depending upon the meaning which they,
though in all sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or
ceremony.
We understand that petitioners, during the flag ceremony, are willing to
remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down straight
at the sides, and they agree that boys, members of Jehovah's Witness who
have been taking part in military training or Boy Scout activities, and are in
uniform, may execute the salute to the flag prescribed by the Circular for
them. So, the requirement contained in Department Order No. 8 that during
the flag ceremony those without hats may stand with their arms and hands
down and straight at the sides, including the formal salute by boys in military
and boy Scout uniform, meets with the conformity of petitioners. Of course,
there is the other requirement that boys and men with hats shall salute the
flag by placing their hats over the heart, but petitioners and other members of
the Jehovah's Witness could well solve this requirements or avoid it by
putting away their hats just as pupils books, may put them away, at command
(Rules and Regulations, Sec. 2, par. [a]). Consequently, the opposition of
petitioners to the flag salute may be reduced to their objection to singing the
National Anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge.
After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as
reproduced at the beginning of this decision, frankly we find nothing,
absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from the point of view of religious
belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves the
Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that
because it protects him, in return he will heed the counsel of his parents,
obey the rules and regulations of his school, perform the duties of a patriotic
and law-abiding citizen; and serve his country unselfishly and faithly, and that

he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He is not even

made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands.
So that even if we assume for a moment that the flag were an image,
connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of the State and
of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants against bowing to and
venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized.
And as to the singing of the National Anthem, which we reproduce below:
Land of the morning,
Child of the sun returning.
With fervor burning,
Thee do our souls adore.
Land dear and holy,
Cradle of noble heroes,
Ne'er shall invaders,
Trample thy sacred shores.
Ever within thy skies and thy clouds,
and o'er thy hills and sea,
Do we behold the radiance, feel the throb
of glorious liberty.
Thy banner, dear to all our hearts,
Its sun and stars alight.
Onever shall its shining field
Be dimmed by tyrant's might.
Beautiful land of love,
Olandoflight,
In thine embrace `tis rapture to lie.
But is glory ever, when thou art wronged,
For us, they sons to suffer and die.
the same thing may be said; that it speaks only of love of country, of
patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it. It does not even
speak of resorting to force and engaging in military service or duty to defend
the country, which service might meet with objection on the part of
conscientious objectors. Surely, petitioners do not disclaim or disavow these
noble and sacred feelings of patriotism, respect, even veneration for the flag
and love of coutnry for which the flag stands.
Men may differ and do differ on religous beliefs and creeds, government
policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the correctness of judicial
decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of country, reverence for the
flag, national unity and patriotism, they can hardly afford to differ, for these

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
are matters in which they are mutually and viatlly interested, for to them, they
mean national existence and survival as a nation or national extinction.
In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no
compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations
about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they
being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not
to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing
more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having
elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited
their right to attend public schools.
In the case of Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed.
343, quite similar to the present case, appellants therein were taxpayers and
citizens of the United States and of California. The University of California
received endowment and support from the State legislature under certain
conditions such as that any resident of California of the age of 14 years or
upward of approved moral character shall have the right to enter the
University as a student and receive instructions therein. The University as
part of its cirriculum and instruction required military science and tactics in
the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Appellants conformed to all
requirements of the University except taking the course in military science
and tactics and for this the regents of the University suspended them.
Appellants were members of the Methodist Espiscopal Church and of the
Epworth League. For many years their fathers have been ordained ministers
of that church. They believed that war and preparation for war is a violation of
their religious belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to
war. They believed that war, training for war, and military training were
immoral, wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of the teaching of God
and precepts of the Christian religion. They petitioned for exemption from the
military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make military
training optional or to exempt them and they were suspended. So they
initiated court action with a California Supreme Court to compel the regents
of the University to admit them. In that action they assailed the validity of the
State law providing for military training in the University. The petition was
denied by the State Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of the State
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States held that:
. . . California has not drafted or called them to attend the University.
They are seeking education offered by the State and at the same
time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely
upon grounds of their religious beliefs and consicientious objections
to war, preparation for war and military education. Taken on the basis
of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants' contentions amount to

no more than an assertion that the due process clause of the

Fourtheenth Amendment as a safeguard of liberty' confers the right
to be students in the state university free from obligation to take
military training as one of the conditions of attendance.
Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be
put aside as untenable . . .
In United States vs. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. ed. 1302, 51 S.
Ct. 570, a later naturalization case, the applicant was unwilling,
because of conscientious objections, to take unqualifiedly the
statutory oath of allegiance which contains this statement: "That he
will support and defend the constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and
allegiance to the same." U.S.C. title 8, Sec. 381. His petition stated
that he was willing if necessary to take up arms in defense of this
country, "but I should want to be free to judge of the necessity." In
amplification he said: "I do not undertake to support "my country,
right or wrong" in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to
poromise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my
country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not "take up arms
in defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem
to be to the government of the day." The opinion of this court quotes
from petitioner's brief a statement to the effect that it is a fixed
principle of our Constitution, zealously guarded by our laws, that a
citizen cannot be forced and need not bear arms in a war if he has
conscientious religious scruples against doing so." And, referring to
that part of the argument in behalf of the applicant this court said (p.
623): "This, if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing
statement. Of course, there is no such principle of the Constitution,
fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the
obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision,
express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded
with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him . . . The previlege of
the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes
not from the Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body
may grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and
if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot
successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible
with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war power as above
illustrated, which include by necessary implication, the power, inthe
last extremity, to compel armed serviced of any citizen in the land,
without regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice
or morality of the particular war or of war in general. In Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Ann. Cas, 765, this Court (upholding a state compulsory vaccination
law) speaking of the liberties guaranteed to the individual by the
Fourteenth Amendment, said: "... and yet he may be compelled, by
force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal
wishes or his pecuniary intersts, or even his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
And see University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, a
case, similar to that now before us, decided against the contention of
a student in the University of Maryland who on conscientious
grounds objected to military training there required. His appeal to this
Court was dismissed for the want of a substantial federal questions.
290 U.S. 597, 78 L. ed. 525, 54 S. Ct. 131.
Plainly there is no ground for the contention that the regents' order,
requiring able-bodied male students under the age of twenty-four as
a condition of their enrollment to take the prescribed instruction in
military science and tactics, transgresses any constitutional right
asserted by these appellants.
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion said:
I assume for present purposes that religious liberty protected by the
First Amendment against invasion by the nation is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states.
Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance
an obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of religion as the
phrase was understood by the foundrs of hte nation, and by the
generations that have followed. Davis vs. Beasin, 133 U.S. 333, 342,
33 L. ed. 637, 10 s.Ct. 299.
There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of governmental
power in the exaction of military service when the nation is at peace.
The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile
purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. They
have not even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to
join courses of instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect
to resort to an institution for higher education maintained with the
state's moneys, then they are comanded to follow courses of
instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This may be
condemned by some unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is
violence to conscientious scruples, either religious or merely ethical.

More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. In controversies

of this order courts do not concern themselves with matters of
legislative policy, unrelated to privileges or liberties secured by the
organic law. The first Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth,
makes invalid any state law `respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Instruction in military science
is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly
nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it
insists upon such training. Instruction in military science,
unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an
interference by the state with the free exercise of religion when the
liberties of the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half
of history during days of peace and war . . .
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have
never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in
furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in
furtherance of any other end, condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet
been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principlewhich
may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an errordoes not prove
by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law."
We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States Federal Supreme
Court on similar set of facts. In the case of Minersville School
District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed. 1375, two Jehovah Witnesses
children were expelled from the public school of Minersville for refusing to
salute the national flag in accordance with the regulations poromulgated by
the school board for the daily flag ceremony. Their father Gobitsi on behalf of
his two children and in his own behalf brought suit to enjoin the school
authorities from continuing to exact the execution of the flag ceremony as a
condition of his children's admittance in school. After trial, the District Court
gave him relief and this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, the decrees of both the District
Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals were reversed with the lone dissent of
Chief Justice Stone, on the ground that the requirement of participation of all
pupils in the public schools in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due
process law and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one
referring to religious freedom and belief. Three years later, that is, on June
14, 1943, the ruling laid down in the Minersville School Districtvs. Gobitis
case, was in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Bernette,
319 U.S. 624-671 reversed by a sharply divided court, the majority opinion
being penned by Mr. Justice Jackson in which Justice Black, Douglas and

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Murphy concurred; while Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in the
Gobitis case, filed a long dissenting opinion, and Justices Roberts and Reed
adhered to the views expressed in the Gobitis case.
Neither attempting to justify the ruling laid down in the Minersville vs. Gobitis
case nor desiring to criticize the doctrine of the West Virginia vs. Barnette
case, frankly, we are more inclined to favor the former as more in keeping
with the spirit of our Constitution and the government policy as laid down in
Republic Act No. 1265 entitles "An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory In
All Educational Institutions".
We cannot help thinking that one reason that may have possibly influenced
the decision in the West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette case,
was that the children involved in said case and their parents found
themselves in a serious dilemma for refusing to salute the flag as required by
the regulations of the School Board. They were expelled by the School Board
and their absence was considered unlawful and because of the law of
compulsory school atendance of all children of school age, they were
considered as truants and the school officials threatened to send them to
reformatories maintained for criminially inclinded juveniles. Parents of such
children have been prosecuted or were threatened with prosecution for cause
such as alleged delinquency and if convicted, were subject to fine not
exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not exceeding 30 days. That is why in the
majority opinion it was stated:
. . . The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual.
The state asserts power to conditions access to public education on
making a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to
coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child . . .
Such a grave and embarrassing situation, however, does not obtain in the
Philippines. True, we have a law (Republic Act 896) requiring compulsory
enrollment of children of shcool age, but said law contains so many
exceptions and exemptions that it can be said that a child of school age is
very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost
invariably, there is school crisis every year wherein the pupils applying for
admission in public schools could not be accommodated, and what is equally
important is that there is no punishment or penal sanction either for the pupil
who fail to attend school or is expelled for failure to comply with school
regulations such as the compulsory flag salute ceremony, or his parents.
In the case of re Summers, 325 U.S. 561-578, decided on June 11, 1945,
that is, two years after the decision in the case of West Virginia, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court

refusing admission of petitioner Clyde Wilson Summers to the Illinois Bar.

Summers had complied with tall the prerequisites to admission to the Bar of
that state, but he was a conscientious objector who did not believe in the use
of force or war because of his religious belief. He described this attitude of
his as follows:
The so-called "misconduct" for which petitioner could be reproached
for is his taking the New Testament too seriously. Instead of merely
reading or preaching the Sermon on the Mount, he tries to practice it.
The only fault of the petitioner consists in his attempt to act as a
good Christian in accordance with his interpreation of the Bible, and
according to the dictates of his conscience. We respectfully submit
that the profession of law does nt shut its gates to persons who have
qualified in all other respects even when they follow in the footsteps
of that Great Teacher of mankind who delivered the Sermon on the
Mount. We respectfully submit that under our Constitutional
guarantees even good Christians who have met all the requirements
for the admission to the bar may be admitted to practice law
The Constitution of Illinois required service in the militia in time of war of men
of petitioner's age group. The Federal Supreme Court defined the position of
Summers as a conscientious objector in the following words:
. . . without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or
his subsequent statments in the record, his position may be
compendiously stated as one of non-violence. Petitioner will not
serve in the armed forces. While he recognizes a difference between
the military and police forces, he would not act in the latter to coerce
threatened violations. Petitioner would not use force to meet
aggression against himself or his family, no matter how aggravated
or whether or not carrying a danger of bodily harm to himself or
others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider
only his attitude toward service in the armed forces.
It was not denied that Summers was unwilling to serve in the militia of Illinois
because of his religious belief. In affirming the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court excluding Summers from the practice of law in that state, the
Federal Supreme Court held that the action of the State Supreme Court did
not violate the principle of religious freedom contained in the Constitution.
If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors,
he would normally have complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives,
his religion, incuding the manners he practices his religious beliefs. There
would be no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow. He would be

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and
instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the
benefits of society and of social and political organization. The moment he
does this and he becomes a member of a community or nation, he has to
give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general welfare,
just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their
rights in his favor. So, with his religion. He may retain retain his freedom or
religious belief, but as to practising the same, he would have to give up some
of those practices repugnant to the general welfare and subordinate them to
the laws and sovereignty of the State. In order words, the practice of religion
or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and
regulations by the state.
In the case of Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 88 L. ed. 645,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision convicting Sarah Prince
of a violation of the Child Labor Law of Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Rutledge
who wrote the opinion tersely described the case thus:
The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between
Jehovah's Witneses and state authority. This time Sarah Prince
appeals from convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor
laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her religious
convictions.
When the offenses where committed she was the aunt and custodian
of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The defendant in this case allowed Betty, under here legal cutody who was at
the same time niece, to distribute religious pamphlets intended to propagate
the religion of Johovah Wiitness. The question involved was whether or not
the law in question contravened the Fourtheenth Amendment by denying
appellant freedom of religion and denying to her the equal protection of the
law. Defendant claimed that the child was exercising her God given right and
her constitutional right to preach the gospel and that no preacher of God's
commands shold be interfered with. She rested her case squarely on
freedom of religion. In affirming the judgment of conviction and upholding the
law as agains the claiim of relgion and the exercise of religious belief, the
court said:
. . . And neither rights of religion nor lights of parenthood are beyond
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by
requiring shcool attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's

labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of
conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
relgious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death. . . . It is too late now to
doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is
withinthe state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to
control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary
action.
Incidentally, it must be noted that this case was decided after that of West
Virginia vs. Barnette, supra.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a
religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory
school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem,
Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty
imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over
and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all
schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the
duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution). It does nothing
more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school population during the
formative period of their life, love of country and love of the flag, all of which
make for united and patriotic citizenry, so that later in after years they may be
ready and willing to serve, fight, even die for it. It is well known that whatever
is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of God, of parents,
respect for elders, love of the truth, loyalty, honoring one's word and
respecting the rights of other, becomes a habit or second nature that will
remain with them always. School children of kingdoms and empires are
taught early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers and
sovereigns symbolize the nation, and the children as future citizens or
subjects will come to love their country.
Petitioners do not question the right of public schools to conduct the flag
salute ceremony regularly but they do "question the attempt to compel
conscientious objectors guided by the word of God to salute the flag or
participate in the ceremony to specific commandment of Jehovah God. It is
perfectly proper and lawful for one nt bound by a covenant with Jehovah to
salute the flag when that person desires to salute it. It is entirely wrong to
interfere with that right or prevent such one from saluting the flag.
Conversely, it is also true that it is wrong and illegal to compel one who, for

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
concience' sake, cannot participate in the ceremony." (p. 85, Appellant's
Brief)
The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag ceremony
aside from the fact that they have no valid right to such exemption is that the
latter would disrupt shcool discipline and demoralize the rest of the school
population which by far constitutes the great majority. If the children of
Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils, especially the
young ones seeing no reason for such exemption, would naturlly ask for the
same privilege because they might want to do something else such as play
or study, instead of standing at attention saluting the flag and singing the
national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, all of which consume
considerable time; and if to avoid odions discrimination this exemption is
extended to others, then the flag ceremony would soon be a thing of the past
or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when
we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with
reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and
patriotism a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion
of the shcool population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an
exemption. In a way that might be regarded as tyranny of the minority, and a
small minority at that.
In a few cases, such exemptions in a limited way have been afforded
members of a religious group. Conscientious objectors in the United States
who because of their religion were unwilling to serve in the war particularly as
regards actual fighting or field duty, were allowed to do some work in relation
to the war, but not involving combat duty or the use of force. But that was by
special legislation. If that is possible here as regards exemption from
participation in the flag ceremony, then petitioners would have to look to the
Legislature, not the courts for relief.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in h is dissent in West
Virginia vs. Barnette, supra:
The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious
equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised without
hindrance from the State, not the State may not exercise that which
except by leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal
power. Otherwise, each individual could set up his own censor

against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public

good by those whose business it is to make laws. (West Virginia
State Board vs. Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied)
In conclusion we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that
requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity;
that the flag salute is nt a religious ceremony but an act and profession of
love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag
stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that
the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in
said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision
about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the
non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school
disicipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to
attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from
the public shcool they were attending.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is ordered dissolved. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions
BARRERA, J., concurring:
I am in substantial accord with teh well-thought and well-expressed opinion of
Mr. Justice Montemayor.
As much reliacne has been place by appellants on the Barnette case decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States (West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L. ed. 1628), two fundamental
features distinguishing that case from the one before us, bear some
stressing.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The underlying and, I belive, compelling consideration that impelled the
majority in the Barnette case to overrule the Gobitis decision (Minersville
School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed 1375) was the compulsory
nature of the order of the State Board of Education making non-compliance
therewith virtually unlawful in the sense that under the West Virginia Code,
upon expulsion of the disobeying pupil, his parents or guardian become liable
to criminal prosecution1 for such absence due to expulsion and if convicted
are subjected to fine not exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty
days.2 The delinquent pupil may be proceeded against and sent to
reformatories maintained for ciminally inclined juveniles.3 Hence, the Court
treated the case as one where "the sole conflict is between authority and
rights of the individual. The State asserts power to condition access to public
education on making a prescribed sign and profession, and at the same time
to coerce attendance (in school) by punishing both parent and child". As thus
presented, really the conflict there between authority and liberty become
deeply sharpened and has attained the proportion of repugnance to a degree
that left no choice to the Court except to apply the rationale of the grave-andimminent-danger rule and to enjoin, under the circumstances, the
enforcement of the West Virginia School Regulation.
Fortunately the problem the instant case presents to us is unaccompanied by
such dire consequences. Non-compliance with our prescribed flag ceremony
does not result in criminal prosecution either of the pupil or of the parent. All
that the unwilling pupil suffers is inability to continue his studies in a public
school. If this and nothing else is the consequence, as it presently appears to
be the complaint of appellants in this case, then I perceive no clear offense is
done to the Constitution.
One other significant distinction between the Barnette case and the one
before us is the substnatial difference in the manner the flag salute is to be
executed under the two laws, and of course, the varying reaction and attitude
taken by the Jehovah's Witnesses in relation thereto. In West Virginia, the
law requires the "Stiff-arm" salute, the saluter to keep the right hand raised
with palm turned up while the following is repeated: "I pledge allegiance to
the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it
stands; one Nations, indivisible with liberty and justice for all." The Jehovah's
Witnesses considered this posture of raising the hand at the same time
reciting the pledge as an act of obeisance contrary to their religious beliefs.
Here, what is required of all persons present during the flag ceremony is to
stand at attention while the flag is being raised and the National Anthem is
being played or sung. Boys and men with hats shall place the hat over the
heart. Those without hats may stand with their arms and hands down and
straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the
salute prescribed by their regulations.

Appellants here have manifested through counsel, both in their brief and, I
understand, in the course of the oral argument, that they do not object to this
requirement of standing at attention with their arms and hands down and
straight at the sides. Consequently, there seems to be no irreconciliable
fundamental conflict, except perhaps as regards the singing of the National
Anthem and the recital (unaccompanied by any particular physical position)
of the patriotic pledge near the close of the ceremony. As to the import of the
National Anthem and the Patriotic Pledge, I can add nothing to the very sober
and well-considered opinion of Justice Montemayor.
As I see the issuance, disentangled as it should and could be from the stress
and strain of counsels' doctrinal discussion and argumentation on the
fundamentals of the freedom of religion about which there could be no
serious disagreement, and if viewed and interpreted rationally in a spirit of
harmony, goodwill and in keeping with an appropriate sense of nationalism
I find no reasonable consideration making the flag ceremony executed in the
manner prescribed by the questioned Department order and regulation,
clearly repugnant to the Constitution.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 95770 December 29, 1995

ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents,
MR. & MRS. LEONARDO EBRALINAG, JUSTINIANA TANTOG,
represented by her father, AMOS TANTOG, JEMIL OYAO & JOEL OYAO,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO, JANETH
DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS.
GODOFREDO DIAMOS, SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented
by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUSTO OSTIA, IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN
SEQUINO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO,
NAPTHALE TUNACAO represented by his parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL
TUNACAO PRECILA PINO represented by her parents MR. & MRS.
FELIPE PINO, MARICRIS ALFAR, RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their

parents MR. & MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR, FREDESMINDA ALFAR &

GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR
ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented by their parents MR.
& MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR, MARTINO VILLAR, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR, PERGEBRIEL GUINITA &
CHAREN GUINITA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR
GUINITA, ALVIN DOOP represented by his parents MR. & MRS.
LEONIDES DOOP, RHILYN LAUDE represented by her parents MR. &
MRS. RENE LAUDE, LEOREMINDA MONARES represented by her
parents MR. & MRS. FLORENCIO MONARES, MERCY MONTECILLO,
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL MONTECILLO,
ROBERTO TANGAHA, represented by his parent ILUMINADA
TANGAHA, EVELYN MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO TANGAHA, MAXIMO EBRALINAG
represented by his parents MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG, JUTA
CUMON, GIDEON CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their
father RAFAEL CUMON, EVIE LUMAKANG and JUAN LUMAKANG,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG, EMILIO
SARSOZO & PAZ AMOR SARSOZO, & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO,
MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH, represented by parent ANNIE
JOSEPH, EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU TABLASON,
represented by their parents EMERLITO TABLASON,petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and MR.
MANUEL F. BIONGCOG, Cebu District Supervisor, respondents.
G.R. No. 95887 December 29, 1995
MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO,
REDFORD ALSADO, JOEBERT ALSADO, & RUDYARD ALSADO
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ABELARDO ALSADO, NESIA
ALSADO, REU ALSADO and LILIBETH ALSADO, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO, SUZETTE NAPOLES,
represented by her parents ISMAILITO NAPOLES and OPHELIA
NAPOLES, JESICA CARMELOTES, represented by her parents MR. &
MRS. SERGIO CARMELOTES, BABY JEAN MACAPAS, represented by
her parents MR. & MRS. TORIBIO MACAPAS, GERALDINE ALSADO,
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. JOEL ALSADO, RAQUEL
DEMOTOR, and LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their parents MR. &
MRS. LEONARDO DEMOTOR, JURELL VILLA and MELONY VILLA,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. JOVENIANO VILLA, JONELL
HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE MAHINAY, and MAGDALENE MAHINAY,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FELIX MAHINAY, JONALYN
ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their parents FELIPE

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA, MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO,
represented by her parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA
CABUYAO, NOEMI TURNO represented by her parents MANUEL TURNO
and VEVENCIA TURNO, SOLOMON PALATULON, SALMERO
PALATULON and ROSALINA PALATULON, represented by their parents
MARTILLANO PALATULON and CARMILA PALATULON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and
ANTONIO A. SANGUTAN, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:
The State moves for a reconsideration of our decision dated March 1, 1993
granting private respondents' petition forcertiorari and prohibition and
annulling the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents therein on
the ground that the said decision created an exemption in favor of the
members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in violation of the
"Establishment Clause" of the Constitution. The Solicitor General, on behalf
of the public respondent, furthermore contends that:
The accommodation by this Honorable Court to a demand
for special treatment in favor of a minority sect even on the
basis of a claim of religious freedom may be criticized as
granting preference to the religious beliefs of said sect in
violation of the "non-establishment guarantee" provision of
the Constitution. Surely, the decision of the Court constitutes
a special favor which immunizes religious believers such as
Jehovah's Witnesses to the law and the DECS rules and
regulations by interposing the claim that the conduct required
by law and the rules and regulation (sic) are violative of their
religious beliefs. The decision therefore is susceptible to the
very criticism that the grant of exemption is a violation of the
"non-establishment" provision of the Constitution.
Furthermore, to grant an exemption to a specific religious
minority poses a risk of collision course with the "equal
protection of the laws" clause in respect of the non-exempt,
and, in public schools, a collision course with the "nonestablishment guarantee."

Additionally the public respondent insists that this Court adopt a "neutral
stance" by reverting to its holding in Gerona declaring the flag as being
devoid of any religious significance. He stresses that the issue here is not
curtailment of religious belief but regulation of the exercise of religious belief.
Finally, he maintains that the State's interests in the case at bench are
constitutional and legal obligations to implement the law and the
constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism
and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs, referring to the
test devised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. vs. O'Brien. 1
II
All the petitioners in the original case 2 were minor school children, and
members of the sect, Jehovah's Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who
were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities in Cebu
for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by
Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of
Education. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did not
observe the flag ceremony exercises, Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all
educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony with
public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit
on second offense.
The implementing regulations issued by the Department of Education
thereafter detailed the manner of observance of the same. Immediately
pursuant to these orders, school officials in Masbate expelled children
belonging to the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses from school for failing or
refusing to comply with the flag ceremony requirement. Sustaining these
expulsion orders, this Court in the 1959 case of Gerona vs. Secretary of
Education 3 held that:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national
unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve
any religious ceremony. . . .
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is
not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot
be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as
there are religious groups or sects or followers.
Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest
priority and amplest protection among human rights," this Court, in Ebralinag
vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 4 re-examined our over two
decades-old decision in Gerona and reversed expulsion orders made by the
public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion
clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution. 5
From our decision of March 1, 1993, the public respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration on grounds hereinabove stated. After a careful study of the
grounds adduced in the government's Motion For Reconsideration of our
original decision, however, we find no cogent reason to disturb our earlier
ruling.
The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect, the
Jehovah's Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely disseminated
in numerous books, magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by their
members in their house to house distribution efforts and in many public
places. Their refusal to render obeisance to any form or symbol which
smacks of idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the biblical injunction
found in Exodus 20:4,5, against worshipping forms or idols other than God
himself. The basic assumption in their universal refusal to salute the flags of
the countries in which they are found is that such a salute constitutes an act
of religious devotion forbidden by God's law. This assumption, while "bizarre"
to others is firmly anchored in several biblical passages. 6
And yet, while members of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the basis of religious
convictions, refuse to perform an act (or acts) which they consider proscribed
by the Bible, they contend that such refusal should not be taken to indicate
disrespect for the symbols of the country or evidence that they are wanting in
patriotism and nationalism. They point out that as citizens, they have an
excellent record as law abiding members of society even if they do not
demonstrate their refusal to conform to the assailed orders by overt acts of
conformity. On the contrary, they aver that they show their respect through
less demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance, by their simple
obedience to the country's laws, 7 by not engaging in antigovernment
activities of any kind, 8 and by paying their taxes and dues to society as selfsufficient members of the community. 9 While they refuse to salute the flag,
they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at attention, hands on their

side, in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who believe
differently. 10
The religious beliefs, practices and convictions of the members of the sect as
a minority are bound to be seen by others as odd and different and at
divergence with the complex requirements of contemporary societies,
particularly those societies which require certain practices as manifestations
of loyalty and patriotic behavior. Against those who believe that coerced
loyalty and unity are mere shadows of patriotism, the tendency to exact "a
hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards," 11 is seductive
to the bureaucratic mindset as a shortcut to patriotism.
No doubt, the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the
responsibility "to inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism
and nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs." The teaching of these values ranks at the very apex of education's
"high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of the youth in those principles
which would mold them into responsible and productive members of our
society. However, the government's interest in molding the young into
patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally free from a balancing
process" 12 when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to
education and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious
upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates of their
conscience and their sincere religious beliefs. 13Recognizing these values,
Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, the writer of the original opinion, underscored
that a generation of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the Bill of Rights would
find abhorrent the idea that one may be compelled, on pain of expulsion, to
salute the flag sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge during
a flag ceremony. 14 "This coercion of conscience has no place in a free
society". 15
The State's contentions are therefore, unacceptable, for no less fundamental
than the right to take part is the right to stand apart. 16 In the context of the
instant case, the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be
seen as the rule, not the exception. To view the constitutional guarantee in
the manner suggested by the petitioners would be to denigrate the status of a
preferred freedom and to relegate it to the level of an abstract principle
devoid of any substance and meaning in the lives of those for whom the
protection is addressed. As to the contention that the exemption accorded by
our decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to re-emphasize that "the
constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity." 17 The
essence of the free exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
dogma. 18Moreover, the suggestion implicit in the State's pleadings to the
effect that the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and evenly
applied to all citizens regardless of sect or religion and does not thereby
discriminate against any particular sect or denomination escapes the fact that
"[a] regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion." 19
III
The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the
symbol of the nation appears to be integrally related to petitioner's
disagreement with the message conveyed by the refusal of members of the
Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or participate actively in flag
ceremonies on religious grounds. 20 Where the governmental interest clearly
appears to be unrelated to the suppression of an idea, a religious doctrine or
practice or an expression or form of expression, this Court will not find it
difficult to sustain a regulation. However, regulations involving this area are
generally held against the most exacting standards, and the zone of
protection accorded by the Constitution cannot be violated, except upon a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state
has a right to protect.21 Stated differently, in the case of a regulation which
appears to abridge a right to which the fundamental law accords high
significance it is the regulation, not the act (or refusal to act), which is the
exception and which requires the court's strictest scrutiny. In the case at
bench, the government has not shown that refusal to do the acts of
conformity exacted by the assailed orders, which respondents point out
attained legislative cachet in the Administrative Code of 1987, would pose a
clear and present danger of a danger so serious and imminent, that it would
prompt legitimate State intervention.
In a case involving the Flag Protection Act of 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the "State's asserted interest in preserving the fag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity was an interest related to the suppression of
free expression . . . because the State's concern with protecting the flag's
symbolic meaning is implicated only when a person's treatment of the flag
communicates some message. 22 While the very concept of ordered liberty
precludes this Court from allowing every individual to subjectively define his
own standards on matters of conformity in which society, as a whole has
important interests, the records of the case and the long history of flag salute
cases abundantly supports the religious quality of the claims adduced by the
members of the sect Jehovah's Witnesses. Their treatment of flag as a
religious symbol is well-founded and well-documented and is based on
grounds religious principle. The message conveyed by their refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony is religious, shared by the entire community

of Jehovah's Witnesses and is intimately related to their theocratic beliefs

and convictions. The subsequent expulsion of members of the sect on the
basis of the regulations assailed in the original petitions was therefore clearly
directed against religious practice. It is obvious that the assailed orders and
memoranda would gravely endanger the free exercise of the religious beliefs
of the members of the sect and their minor children.
Furthermore, the view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral, secular
symbol expresses a majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of
the belief that an act of saluting the flag might sometimes be to some
individuals so offensive as to be worth their giving up another
constitutional right the right to education. Individuals or groups of
individuals get from a symbol the meaning they put to it. 23 Compelling
members of a religious sect to believe otherwise on the pain of denying minor
children the right to an education is a futile and unconscionable detour
towards instilling virtues of loyalty and patriotism which are best instilled and
communicated by painstaking and non-coercive methods. Coerced loyalties,
after all, only serve to inspire the opposite. The methods utilized to impose
them breed resentment and dissent. Those who attempt to coerce uniformity
of sentiment soon find out that the only path towards achieving unity is by
way of suppressing dissent. 24 In the end, such attempts only find the
"unanimity of the graveyard." 25
To the extent to which members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect assiduously
pursue their belief in the flag's religious symbolic meaning, the State cannot,
without thereby transgressing constitutionally protected boundaries, impose
the contrary view on the pretext of sustaining a policy designed to foster the
supposedly far-reaching goal of instilling patriotism among the youth. While
conceding to the idea adverted to by the Solicitor General that certain
methods of religious expression may be prohibited 26 to serve legitimate
societal purposes, refusal to participate in the flag ceremony hardly
constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to
prompt legitimate State intervention. It is worth repeating that the absence of
a demonstrable danger of a kind which the State is empowered to protect
militates against the extreme disciplinary methods undertaken by school
authorities in trying to enforce regulations designed to compel attendance in
flag ceremonies. Refusal of the children to participate in the flag salute
ceremony would not interfere with or deny the rights of other school children
to do so. It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly
constitutes a danger so grave and imminent as to warrant the state's
intervention.
Finally, the respondents' insistence on the validity of the actions taken by the
government on the basis of their averment that "a government regulation of
expressive conduct is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
power of the government (and) furthers an important and substantial
government interest" 27 misses the whole point of the test devised by the
United States Supreme Court in O'Brien, cited by respondent, because the
Court therein was emphatic in stating that "the government interest (should
be) unrelated to the suppression of free expression." We have already stated
that the interest in regulation in the case at bench was clearly related to the
suppression of an expression directly connected with the freedom of religion
and that respondents have not shown to our satisfaction that the restriction
was prompted by a compelling interest in public order which the state has a
right to protect. Moreover, if we were to refer (as respondents did by referring
to the test in O'Brien) to the standards devised by the US Supreme Court in
determining the validity or extent of restrictive regulations impinging on the
freedoms of the mind, then the O'Brien standard is hardly appropriate
because the standard devised in O'Brien only applies if the State's regulation
is not related to communicative conduct. If a relationship exists, a more
demanding standard is applied. 28
The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism, nationalism, good
citizenship, and moral uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with
parents and other societal institutions such as religious sects and
denominations. The manner in which such values are demonstrated in a
plural society occurs in ways so variable that government cannot make
claims to the exclusivity of its methods of inculcating patriotism so allencompassing in scope as to leave no room for appropriate parental or
religious influences. Provided that those influences do not pose a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to society and its institutions,
expressions of diverse beliefs, no matter how upsetting they may seem to the
majority, are the price we pay for the freedoms we enjoy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., took no part.
Padilla, J., I reiterate my Separate Opinion in G.R. No. 95770 (Ebralinag vs.
The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu), 1 March 1993, 219 SCRA
276.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

The value of the national flag as a symbol of national unity is not in question
in this case. The issue rather is whether it is permissible to compel children in
the Nation's schools to salute the flag as a means of promoting nationhood
considering that their refusal to do so is grounded on a religious belief.
Compulsory flag salute lies in a continuum, at one end of which is the
obligation to pay taxes and, at the other, a compulsion to bow down before a
graven image. Members of a religious sect cannot refuse to pay
taxes, 1 render military service, 2 submit to vaccination 3 or give their children
elementary school education 4 on the ground of conscience. But public school
children may not be compelled to attend religious instruction 5 or recite
prayers or join in bible reading before the opening of classes in such
schools. 6
In determining the validity of compulsory flag salute, we must determine
which of these polar principles exerts a greater pull. The imposition of taxes
is justified because, unless support for the government can be exacted, the
existence of the State itself may well be endangered. The compulsory
vaccination of children is justified because unless the State can compel
compliance with vaccination program there is danger that a disease will
spread. But unlike the refusal to pay taxes or to submit to compulsory
vaccination, the refusal to salute the flag threatens no such dire
consequences to the life or health of the State. Consequently, there is no
compelling reason for resorting to compulsion or coercion to achieve the
purpose for which flag salute is instituted.
Indeed schools are not like army camps where the value of discipline justifies
requiring a salute to the flag. Schools are places where diversity and
spontaneity are valued as much as personal discipline is. They are places for
the nurturing of ideals and values, not through compulsion or coercion but
through persuasion, because thought control is a negation of the very values
which the educational system seeks to promote. Persuasion and not
persecution is the means for winning the allegiance of free men. That is why
the Constitution provides that the development of moral character and the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
cultivation of civic spirit are to be pursued through education that includes a
study of the Constitution, an appreciation of the role of national heroes in
historical development, teaching the rights and duties of citizenship and, at
the option of parents and guardians, religious instruction to be taught by
instructors designated by religious authorities of the religion to which they
belong. It is noteworthy that while the Constitution provides for the national
flag, 7 it does not give the State the power to compel a salute to the flag.
On the other hand, compelling flag salute cannot be likened to compelling
members of a religious sect to bow down before a graven image. The flag is
not an image but a secular symbol. To regard it otherwise because a religious
minority regards it so would be to put in question many regulations that the
State may constitutionally enact or measures which it may adopt to promote
civic virtues which the Constitution itself enjoins the State to promote. 8
It trivializes great principles to assimilate compulsory flag salute to a form of
command to worship strange idols not only because the flag is not a religious
symbol but also because the salute required involves nothing more than
standing at attention or placing one's right hand over the right breast as the
National Anthem is played and of raising the right hand as the following
pledge is recited:
Ako'y nanunumpang magtatapat sa watawat ng Pilipinas at
sa Republikang kanyang kinakatawan isang bansang
nasa kalinga ng Dios buo at hindi mahahati, na may
kalayaan at katarungan para sa lahat.
(I pledge allegiance to the flag and to the nation for which it
stands one nation under God indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all.)
In sum compulsory flag salute violates the Constitution not because the aim
of the exercise is doubtful but because the means employed for
accomplishing it is not permitted. Legitimate ends cannot be pursued by
methods which violate fundamental freedoms when the ends may be
achieved by rational ones.
For this reason I join in holding that compulsory flag salute is
unconstitutional.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

The value of the national flag as a symbol of national unity is not in question
in this case. The issue rather is whether it is permissible to compel children in
the Nation's schools to salute the flag as a means of promoting nationhood
considering that their refusal to do so is grounded on a religious belief.
Compulsory flag salute lies in a continuum, at one end of which is the
obligation to pay taxes and, at the other, a compulsion to bow down before a
graven image. Members of a religious sect cannot refuse to pay
taxes, 1 render military service, 2 submit to vaccination 3 or give their children
elementary school education 4 on the ground of conscience. But public school
children may not be compelled to attend religious instruction 5 or recite
prayers or join in bible reading before the opening of classes in such
schools. 6
In determining the validity of compulsory flag salute, we must determine
which of these polar principles exerts a greater pull. The imposition of taxes
is justified because, unless support for the government can be exacted, the
existence of the State itself may well be endangered. The compulsory
vaccination of children is justified because unless the State can compel
compliance with vaccination program there is danger that a disease will
spread. But unlike the refusal to pay taxes or to submit to compulsory
vaccination, the refusal to salute the flag threatens no such dire
consequences to the life or health of the State. Consequently, there is no
compelling reason for resorting to compulsion or coercion to achieve the
purpose for which flag salute is instituted.
Indeed schools are not like army camps where the value of discipline justifies
requiring a salute to the flag. Schools are places where diversity and
spontaneity are valued as much as personal discipline is. They are places for
the nurturing of ideals and values, not through compulsion or coercion but
through persuasion, because thought control is a negation of the very values
which the educational system seeks to promote. Persuasion and not
persecution is the means for winning the allegiance of free men. That is why
the Constitution provides that the development of moral character and the
cultivation of civic spirit are to be pursued through education that includes a
study of the Constitution, an appreciation of the role of national heroes in
historical development, teaching the rights and duties of citizenship and, at
the option of parents and guardians, religious instruction to be taught by
instructors designated by religious authorities of the religion to which they
belong. It is noteworthy that while the Constitution provides for the national
flag, 7 it does not give the State the power to compel a salute to the flag.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
On the other hand, compelling flag salute cannot be likened to compelling
members of a religious sect to bow down before a graven image. The flag is
not an image but a secular symbol. To regard it otherwise because a religious
minority regards it so would be to put in question many regulations that the
State may constitutionally enact or measures which it may adopt to promote
civic virtues which the Constitution itself enjoins the State to promote. 8
It trivializes great principles to assimilate compulsory flag salute to a form of
command to worship strange idols not only because the flag is not a religious
symbol but also because the salute required involves nothing more than
standing at attention or placing one's right hand over the right breast as the
National Anthem is played and of raising the right hand as the following
pledge is recited:
Ako'y nanunumpang magtatapat sa watawat ng Pilipinas at
sa Republikang kanyang kinakatawan isang bansang
nasa kalinga ng Dios buo at hindi mahahati, na may
kalayaan at katarungan para sa lahat.
(I pledge allegiance to the flag and to the nation for which it
stands one nation under God indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all.)

governmental interest is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. (United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367)"
2 G.R. No. 95770, and G.R. No. 95887 March 1,
1993. 219 SCRA 256 (1993).
3 106 Phil. 2 (1959).
4 Supra, note 2.
5 Id., at 272-273 (1993).
6 See, for e.g. Daniel 3: 1-30.
7 Rollo, p. 8.
8 Id.
9 Id.

In sum compulsory flag salute violates the Constitution not because the aim
of the exercise is doubtful but because the means employed for
accomplishing it is not permitted. Legitimate ends cannot be pursued by
methods which violate fundamental freedoms when the ends may be
achieved by rational ones.
For this reason I join in holding that compulsory flag salute is
unconstitutional.
Footnotes
1 "To this end," the motion states, "a government
regulation of expressive religious conduct which
debases the constitutional mandate for citizenship
training is justifiable. As succinctly outlined in one
U.S. case:
A government regulation of expressive conduct is
sufficiently justified if it is within the Constitutional
power of this government; it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the

10 Rollo, p. 10.
11 State of Wisconsin v. Yoder 40 LW 4476 (1972).
12 Id.
13 Id., See also, Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
14 Ebralinag, supra, at 270.
15 Id., at 275, Cruz J. (Concurring).
16 L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE
COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY, 31
(1985).
17 See supra note 15, citing Justice Frankfurter.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
18 Id.
19 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
20 For instance, the Motion for Reconsideration
characterizes the practices and observations of the
sect as "bizarre," Rollo, p. 229, "seditious" Id., p. 240
and "anti-social" Id. (emphasis supplied). In making
these points, the Motion makes this tongue-in-cheek
observation. "Because of their religious conviction
that they" are not part of this world, and being
allegedly concerned "about the adverse effect that
the world's influence can have on our children", the
Jehovah's Witnesses ask that their children . . . be
exempted from participating in almost all school
activities and social function (sic) which, as they
pointed out below are contrary to Bible (sic)
principles. Id. The statement, "not part of this world"
was deliberately taken out of context. Here is what
the paragraph from the sect's manual says:
As one might expect, this view of the future
also had a significant effect on the first
Christians. It caused them to be a distinctive
people, separate from the world. As the
historian E.G. Hardy noted in his book
Christianity and the Roman Government:
"The Christians were strangers and pilgrims
in the world around them; their citizenship
was in heaven; the kingdom to which they
looked was not part of this world. The
consequent want of interest in public affairs
came thus from the outset to be a noticeable
feature in Christianity. Annex "B", p. 7.
21 West Virginia v. Barnette 319 US 624, at 339
(1942).
22 U.S. v. Eichman 496 US 310, 313; 110 L ed 2d
287 (1990).
23 Supra, note 4.
24 Id., at 640.

25 Id., at 641. "Recognizing that the right to differ is

the centerpiece of our First Amendment . . . a
government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity
in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government
cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a
set of approved messages to be associated with that
symbol when it cannot mandate the status or feeling
the symbol purports to represent." See, Texas v.
Johnson, 491 US 397 at 400 (1989).
26 Raising the "Children of God" caper, the Solicitor
General's brief states:
How about the Children of God, also known as
Future Visions of Family which engages in free love
and sex sharing among its members by way of
obedience to the biblical injunction "to love your
neighbor and love yourself" as interpreted by its
founder, Moses David Berg, through his writings
entitled "The Law of Love" and "Growing in Faith."
Despite the crusades of Cardinal Sin and the Aquino
government, this self-styled sex cult has gain (sic)
foothold and spread in numbers in this country,
offering free sex, cutely termed as "flirty fishing to
win people for the Lord." Will this Honorable Court
also recognize and allow their communal free love
and sex orgies to continue unabated as part of their
religious belief and protected by their constitutional
right of freedom of religion, thereby sideswiping the
present Government's program to prevent the
spread of venereal diseases and the dreaded AIDS
through the use of condoms?" Rollo, p. 245.
27 Supra, note 1.
28 Referring to the test devised in O'Brien the U.S.
Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson, supra, held: We
must first determine whether Johnson's burning of
the flag constituted expressive conduct permitting
him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his
conviction. If his conduct was expressive, we next
decide whether the State's regulation is related to
the suppression of free expression. If the state's
regulation is not related to expression, then the less

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
stringent standard we announced in United States
vs. O'Brien for regulations of noncommunicative
conduct controls. If it is then we are outside
O'Brien's test, and we must ask whether this interest
justifies Johnson's conviction under a more
demanding standard. Id., at 403.

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A"
and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A

DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila
nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced
are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further
argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.

it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the

effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues

raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA),
(4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association
of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded
and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its

opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic"
and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we
deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or nongovernment agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative

supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the
field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question
can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar
and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as
to the nature of the service or services being offered.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether
it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support
services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the
minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code,
there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and
woman entered into accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the

property relation during the marriage within

the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated
in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the
sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the
words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a
"secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of
permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be
seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts
does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services
as commonly understood, the advertisements in question

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
give the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that,
in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance
of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and
the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the
integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements
in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is
also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized
legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business
by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of
law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar
can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such
as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted
time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny
the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will
be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both
are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not
to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not
only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be

encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring

prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services
are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and
Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical
assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult
task of carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings
because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's
services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which
tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages
which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is
not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice
law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself
as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may
be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
2. Philippine Bar Association:

respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law

practice. 6

xxx xxx xxx.

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of
law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers
and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's
acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certainAtty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law
is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to
an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons
who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec.
1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to

the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical,
but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress
and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading
and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of
law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services"
to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in
the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and
convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice,
albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application
of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and
are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,

paramount consideration should be given to the protection of
the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.

regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of

marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in
essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic,
Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again
that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed
purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a

rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to
practice law.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very

admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many

jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards
which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general
public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines.
In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited
by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In the same manner, the general public should also be

protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers
are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should
be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services without being qualified to
offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly

advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which,
as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not
only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised
that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages
in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized
to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law
has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how
they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it
cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not
be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court
held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this
character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of
law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing
law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of
the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service
unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law

forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the

consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law accurate or inaccurate moulds
our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge
of the laws touching their particular business
or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning,
building and fire prevention codes, factory
and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in harmony
with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his
client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of
the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of
custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to
the building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the
lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few
of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack
of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is
growing into a recognized profession for
which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing
law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I
can imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in
the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides
the frame within which he must work, just as

the zoning code limits the kind of building

the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members
of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This
is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may
use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value
of the land depends on a disputed right-ofway and the principal role of the negotiator
is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to
the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his
men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since
the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies of
the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an authority

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or
to forbid representation before the agency
by one whom the agency admits. The rules
of the National Labor Relations Board give
to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules
and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant
may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974],
at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged
in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law)
is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the
Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule
of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession
or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render

wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage
license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems"
on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of
law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on
the subject and determines on the subject and determines by
himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply
the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a
legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact
that the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is
no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems,
and does not purport to give personal advice
on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does
not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular
situation in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . .
There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the
purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition
in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his
having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought
to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving
of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed.

(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],

cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted,
however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can
give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that
there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to
the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not
legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"
becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages
in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions
to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement
of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer,
he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it,
is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in
several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their right under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,

body, committee, or commission constituted by law or

authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105
Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with
the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;

designing and installing computer systems, programs, or

software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is nonadvisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and
so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract
drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in
the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at
The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as
the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they
come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a
simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care
of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are
dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died
and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need
a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is
not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent
would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that
the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of
the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason
of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice
of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar
from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As
the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American
Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of
what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to
be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law
in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall
he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to
the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of

his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities
as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of
brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose;
it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he
is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the
fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions
stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an
exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for
such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association
after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding
will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of
the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters
of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of
course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the
concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light
of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is
referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628).
And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p.
736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of
respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section
25 of Rule 127.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney

and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
EN BANC

EN BANC
A.C. No. 350

August 7, 1959

[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996]

In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva
for the Government.
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted
bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was
sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro,
and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency
(CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court,
he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the
practice of his profession.
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this
Court considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16
years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if
disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that
if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of
judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores.
Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his
office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the
reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in
the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION,

PARAMOUNT
PICTURES
CORPORATION,
TWENTIETH
CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS
CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT
DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and
DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its resolution [2] of May 10,
1993 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, both of which sustained
the order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila,
dated November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053
earlier issued per its own order[4] on September 5, 1988 for violation of
Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, otherwise known as
the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property.
The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows:
Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought
its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private
researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in
Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity),

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair
Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a
search warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure,
among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were
enumerated in a list attached to the application; and, television sets, video
cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other machines and
paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition,
showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms tapes in the
premises above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo, reiterated in
substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was corroborated by
another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingos deposition
was also taken. On the basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search
Warrant No 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as amended,
was issued by the court a quo.
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14,
1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In the course of the search of
the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and
seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or
exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines, equipment,
television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were
included in the receipt for properties accomplished by the raiding team. Copy
of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario,
registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home Video.
On December 16, 1987, a Return of Search Warrant was filed with the
Court.
A Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant was filed but was later
denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records).
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The
court a quo granted the said motion for reconsideration and justified it in this
manner:
Itisundisputedthatthemastertapesofthecopyrightedfilmsfromwhichthepirated
filmswereallegedlycopies(sic),wereneverpresentedintheproceedingsforthe
issuanceofthesearchwarrantsinquestion.TheordersoftheCourtgrantingthe
searchwarrantsanddenyingtheurgentmotiontoliftorderofsearchwarrantswere,
therefore,issuedinerror.Consequently,theymustbesetaside.(p.13,Appellants
Brief)[5]

Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting

private respondents motion for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant
which it had therefore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset,
said appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied. Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging
the validity of respondent courts retroactive application of the ruling in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[6] in dismissing
petitioners appeal and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the
trial court.
I
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter
of and the challenge to petitioners legal standing in our courts, they being
foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners
should have such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine
courts. In so challenging petitioners personality to sue, private respondents
point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of
exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion
pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as
their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of doing business in the
Philippines under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of
Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines,
Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the
absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask
for the issuance of a search warrant.[7]
In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the
Philippines,[8] and contend that private respondents have not adduced
evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would
require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
other than averments in the quoted portions of petitioners Opposition to
Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant dated April 28, 1988 and Atty.
Rico V. Domingos affidavit of December 14, 1987. Moreover, an exclusive
right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not
conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of
doing business.[9]
The Corporation Code provides:
Sec.133.Doingbusinesswithoutalicense.Noforeigncorporationtransacting
businessinthePhilippineswithoutalicense,oritssuccessorsorassigns,shallbe
permittedtomaintainorinterveneinanyaction,suitorproceedinginanycourtor
administrativeagencyofthePhilippines;butsuchcorporationmaybesuedor

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
proceededagainstbeforePhilippinecourtsoradministrativetribunalsonanyvalid
causeofactionrecognizedunderPhilippinelaws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the
Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of any
kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However, under
the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the
Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it
complies with the law in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to
maintain any suit in local courts. [10] As thus interpreted, any foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in
our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the
defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
prescribed license but doing business in the Philippines without such license
which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other
words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business
in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an
action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the
Philippines.[11]
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what
constitutes doing business or transacting business within that forum, in which
case said provisions are controlling there. In others where no such definition
or qualification is laid down regarding acts or transactions falling within its
purview, the question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held that all
the combined acts of a foreign corporation in the State must be considered,
and every circumstance is material which indicates a purpose on the part of
the corporation to engage in some part of its regular business in the State. [12]
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what
constitutes doing or engaging in or transacting business. Each case must be
judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances. [13] The
true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing
the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to
another.[14]
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle,
subject to such modifications as may be necessary in view of the particular
issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign
corporation is doing, transacting, engaging in, or carrying on business in the
State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents
and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some
substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in

the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or

occasional transactions and isolated acts.[15]
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts
constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines.Jurisprudence has,
however, held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or
works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in
progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization. [16]
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition,
having been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation
in our jurisdiction.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455[17] provides:
SECTION1.DefinitionsandscopeofthisAct.(1)xxx;andthephrasedoing
businessshallincludesolicitingorders,purchases,servicecontracts,openingoffices,
whethercalledliaisonofficesorbranches;appointingrepresentativesordistributors
whoaredomiciledinthePhilippinesorwhoinanycalendaryearstayinthe
Philippinesforaperiodorperiodstotallingonehundredeightydaysormore;
participatinginthemanagement,supervisionorcontrolofanydomesticbusiness
firm,entityorcorporationinthePhilippines;andanyotheractoractsthatimplya
continuityofcommercialdealingsorarrangements,andcontemplatetothatextent
theperformanceofactsorworks,ortheexerciseofsomeofthefunctionsnormally
incidentto,andinprogressiveprosecutionof,commercialgainorofthepurposeand
objectofthebusinessorganization.
Presidential Decree No. 1789, [18] in Article 65 thereof, defines doing
business to include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening
offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives
or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar
year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred
eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control
of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines, and
any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or
works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of
the business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree
conclude the enumeration of acts constituting doing business with a catch-all
definition, thus:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Sec.1(g).DoingBusinessshallbeanyactorcombinationofactsenumeratedin
Article65oftheCode.Inparticulardoingbusinessincludes:
xxx xxx xxx
(10)Anyotheractoractswhichimplyacontinuityofcommercialdealingsor
arrangements,andcontemplatetothatextenttheperformanceofactsorworks,orthe
exerciseofsomeofthefunctionsnormallyincidentto,orintheprogressive
prosecutionof,commercialgainorofthepurposeandobjectofthebusiness
organization.
Finally, Republic Act No. 7042[19] embodies such concept in this wise:
SEC.3.Definitions.AsusedinthisAct:
xxx xxx xxx
(d)thephrasedoingbusinessshallincludesolicitingorders,servicecontracts,
openingoffices,whethercalledliaisonofficesorbranches;appointing
representativesordistributorsdomiciledinthePhilippinesorwhoinanycalendar
yearstayinthecountryforaperiodorperiodstotallingonehundredeight(y)(180)
daysormore;participatinginthemanagement,supervisionorcontrolofany
domesticbusiness,firm,entityorcorporationinthePhilippines;andanyotheractor
actsthatimplyacontinuityofcommercialdealingsorarrangements,and
contemplatetothatextenttheperformanceofactsorworks,ortheexerciseofsome
ofthefunctionsnormallyincidentto,andinprogressiveprosecutionof,commercial
gainorofthepurposeandobjectofthebusinessorganization:Provided,however,
Thatthephrasedoingbusinessshallnotbedeemedtoincludemereinvestmentasa
shareholderbyaforeignentityindomesticcorporationsdulyregisteredtodo
business,and/ortheexerciseofrightsassuchinvestors;norhavinganominee
directororofficertorepresentitsinterestsinsuchcorporation;norappointinga
representativeordistributordomiciledinthePhilippineswhichtransactsbusinessin
itsownnameandforitsownaccount.
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such
statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present
action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners
are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines
as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our
courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have
performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of
an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.

Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange

Commission[20] stating that its records do not show the registration of
petitioner film companies either as corporations or partnerships or that they
have been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably
true, is of no consequence to petitioners right to bring action in the
Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be
expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign film corporations do not
transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be
licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Omnibus Investments Code lists, among others
(1)Solicitingorders,purchases(sales)orservicecontracts.Concreteandspecific
solicitationsbyaforeignfirm,orbyanagentofsuchforeignfirm,notacting
independentlyoftheforeignfirmamountingtonegotiationsorfixingoftheterms
andconditionsofsalesorservicecontracts,regardlessofwherethecontractsare
actuallyreducedtowriting,shallconstitutedoingbusinesseveniftheenterprisehas
noofficeorfixedplaceofbusinessinthePhilippines.Thearrangementsagreedupon
astomanner,timeandtermsofdeliveryofthegoodsorthetransferoftitletheretois
immaterial.Aforeignfirmwhichdoesbusinessthroughthemiddlemenactingin
theirownnames,suchasindentors,commercialbrokersorcommissionmerchants,
shallnotbedeemeddoingbusinessinthePhilippines.Butsuchindentors,
commercialbrokersorcommissionmerchantsshallbetheonesdeemedtobedoing
businessinthePhilippines.
(2)AppointingarepresentativeordistributorwhoisdomiciledinthePhilippines,
unlesssaidrepresentativeordistributorhasanindependentstatus,i.e.,ittransacts
businessinitsnameandforitsownaccount,andnotinthenameorfortheaccount
ofaprincipal.Thus,whereaforeignfirmisrepresentedinthePhilippinesbya
personorlocalcompanywhichdoesnotactinitsnamebutinthenameofthe
foreignfirm,thelatterisdoingbusinessinthePhilippines.
as acts constitutive of doing business, the fact that petitioners are admittedly
copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines
of motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium
of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before they
can sue upon a cause of action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of
petitioners, with express authority pursuant to a special power of
attorney, inter alia

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Tolaycriminalcomplaintswiththeappropriateauthoritiesandtoprovideevidence
insupportofbothcivilandcriminalproceedingsagainstanypersonorpersons
involvedinthecriminalinfringementofcopyright,orconcerningtheunauthorized
importation,duplication,exhibitionordistributionofanycinematographicwork(s)
filmsorvideocassettesofwhichxxxistheownerofcopyrightortheownerof
exclusiverightsofdistributioninthePhilippinespursuanttoanyagreement(s)
betweenxxxandtherespectiveownersofcopyrightinsuchcinematographic
work(s),toinitiateandprosecuteonbehalfofxxxcriminalorcivilactionsinthe
Philippinesagainstanypersonorpersonsunlawfullydistributing,exhibiting,selling
orofferingforsaleanyfilmsorvideocassettesofwhichxxxistheownerof
copyrightortheownerofexclusiverightsofdistributioninthePhilippinespursuant
toanyagreement(s)betweenxxxandtherespectiveownersofcopyrightinsuch
works.[21]
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how
exercising ones legal and property rights and taking steps for the vigilant
protection of said rights, particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact,
can be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business here.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing
business in the State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of
the State, where such contracts are consummated outside the State. [22] In
fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the
state merely because sales of its product are made there or other business
furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a
corporation or a natural person, where such activities are not under the
direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the
alleged agent as an independent business.[23]
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an
independent dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the
corporation to the products sold are not a doing of business by the
corporation.[24] Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its products to
persons styled distributing agents in the State, for distribution by them, is not
doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process
therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they shall buy
exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and
shall sell them at trade prices established by it.[25]
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in
engaging an attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular
State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum contact test.
[26]
With much more reason should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of
Atty. Domingo for legal protection against contingent acts of intellectual
piracy.

In accordance with the rule that doing business imports only acts in
furtherance of the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it
is held that the mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit,
particularly if the transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of
the State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The institution
of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the making of a contract nor the
doing of business within a constitutional provision placing foreign
corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations,
limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic
corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a
sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation.[27]
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private
respondents basis for arguing that petitioners are barred from maintaining
suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations doing
business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly
maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal
personality to bring an action before Philippine courts.[28]
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are
lack of legal capacity to sue[29] and that the complaint states no cause of
action.[30] Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to
appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he
claims.[31] On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to
sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence
grounded on failure to state a cause of action. [32] The term lack of capacity to
sue should not be confused with the term lack of personality to sue.While the
former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff
is not the real party- in-interest.Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for
a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;
[33]
whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss
based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no
cause of action.[34]
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground
available for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign
corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly
be lack of capacity to sue, not lack of personality to sue. Certainly, a
corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not
the only, real party-in-interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to
comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any
suit before our courts.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Courts rejection of the common
procedural tactics of erring local companies which, when sued by unlicensed
foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the
latters supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to
sue based on failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations
of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit
unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid
obligations or violations of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or
entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the country.[35]
II
We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the
present controversy of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988, [36] that for the
determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant
in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the
master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary.
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to
the discretion of the court subject to the determination of probable cause in
accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor under Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 126. As of the time of the application for the search warrant in question,
the controlling criterion for the finding of probable cause was that enunciated
in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff[37] stating that:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then
required, the lower court determined that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, and which determination in fact led to the
issuance and service on December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87053. It is further argued that any search warrant so issued in accordance with
all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not
possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases
involving videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the time of
such determination, on December 14, 1987, that is, the doctrine in the 20th
Century Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over
eight months later.
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the
Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower
court on the strength of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes
into the very essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the

search warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had not
yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule
126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and
governing law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an
application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that there was no
law that was retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all
along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Foxruling, which had
supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of the resolution of private
respondents motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search
warrant for failure of the trial court to require presentation of the master tapes
prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted grave
abuse of discretion.[38]
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century
Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration
in favor of the quashal of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis:
Andwhetherthisdoctrineshouldapplyretroactively,itmustbenotedthatinthe
20thCenturyFoxcase,thelowercourtquashedtheearliersearchwarrantit
issued.Oncertiorari,theSupremeCourtaffirmedthequashalonthegroundamong
othersthatthemastertapesorcopyrightedfilmswerenotpresentedforcomparison
withthepurchasedevidenceofthevideotapestodeterminewhetherthelatterisan
unauthorizedreproductionoftheformer.
IfthelowercourtintheCenturyFoxcasedidnotquashthewarrant,itisOurview
thattheSupremeCourtwouldhaveinvalidatedthewarrantjustthesameconsidering
theverystrictrequirementsetbytheSupremeCourtforthedeterminationof
probablecauseincopyrightinfringementcasesasenunciatedinthis20thCentury
Foxcase.Thisissobecause,aswasstatedbytheSupremeCourtinthesaidcase,the
mastertapesandthepiratedtapesmustbepresentedforcomparisontosatisfythe
requirementofprobablecause.Soitgoesbacktotheveryexistenceofprobable
cause.xxx[39]
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and
the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century
Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the
quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053.Herein petitioners consistent position
that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein
defendants motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued,
there having been satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards
under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The
lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners
in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to
the finding of probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that (l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same
Code declares that (j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as
an independent source of law; it cannot create law. [40] While it is true that
judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part
of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial
decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean,
and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the
Philippines.[41] Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same
authority as the statute itself.[42]
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and
in light of the above disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.[43] that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to
original amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but
also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier case
of People vs. Jubinal[44] echoes the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.:
DecisionsofthisCourt,althoughinthemselvesnotlaws,areneverthelessevidence
ofwhatthelawsmean,andthisisthereasonwhyunderArticle8oftheNewCivil
Code,JudicialdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingthelawsortheConstitutionshall
formpartofthelegalsystem.TheinterpretationuponalawbythisCourtconstitutes,
inaway,apartofthelawasofthedatethatthelawwasoriginallypassed,sincethis
Courtsconstructionmerelyestablishesthecontemporaneouslegislativeintentthat
thelawthusconstruedintendstoeffectuate.Thesettledrulesupportedbynumerous
authoritiesisarestatementofthelegalmaximlegisinterpretationlegisvim
obtinettheinterpretationplaceduponthewrittenlawbyacompetentcourthasthe
forceoflaw.xxx,butwhenadoctrineofthisCourtisoverruledandadifferent
viewisadopted,thenewdoctrineshouldbeappliedprospectively,andshouldnot
applytopartieswhohadreliedontheolddoctrineandactedonthefaiththereof.xx
x.(Stresssupplied).
This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[45] where the Court expounded:
xxx.Butwhileourdecisionsformpartofthelawoftheland,theyarealsosubject
toArticle4oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthatlawsshallhavenoretroactive
effectunlessthecontraryisprovided.Thisisexpressedinthefamiliarlegal
maximumlexprospicit,nonrespicit,thelawlooksforwardnotbackward.The

rationaleagainstretroactivityiseasytoperceive.Theretroactiveapplicationofalaw
usuallydivestsrightsthathavealreadybecomevestedorimpairstheobligationsof
contractandhence,isunconstitutional(Franciscov.Certeza,3SCRA565
[1961]).Thesameconsiderationunderliesourrulingsgivingonlyprospectiveeffect
todecisionsenunciatingnewdoctrines.xxx.
The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima[46] that judicial
interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect,
is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a
new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a preexisting one, and that is precisely the situation obtaining in this case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of
the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the
qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. [47] To hold otherwise would
be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. [48]
There is
argumentation:

merit

in

petitioners

impassioned

and

well-founded

Thecaseof20thCenturyFoxFilmCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals,etal.,164
SCRA655(August19,1988)(hereinafter20thCenturyFox)wasinexistentin
Decemberof1987whenSearchWarrant87053wasissuedbythelower
court.Hence,itbogglestheimaginationhowthelowercourtcouldbeexpectedto
applytheformulationof20thCenturyFoxinfindingprobablecausewhenthe
formulationwasyetnonexistent.
xxx xxx xxx
Inshort,thelowercourtwasconvincedatthattimeafterconductingsearching
examinationquestionsoftheapplicantandhiswitnessesthatanoffensehadbeen
committedandthattheobjectssoughtinconnectionwiththeoffense(were)inthe
placesoughttobesearched(Burgosv.ChiefofStaff,etal.,133SCRA800).Itis
indisputable,therefore,thatatthetimeoftheapplication,oronDecember14,1987,
thelowercourtdidnotcommitanyerrornordiditfailtocomplywithanylegal
requirementforthevalidissuanceofsearchwarrant.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
xxx.(W)ebelievethatthelowercourtshouldbeconsideredashavingfollowedthe
requirementsofthelawinissuingSearchWarrantNo.87053.Thesearchwarrantis
thereforevalidandbinding.Itmustbenotedthatnowhereisitfoundinthe
allegationsoftheRespondentsthatthelowercourtfailedtoapplythelawasthen
interpretedin1987.Hence,wefinditabsurdthatitis(sic)shouldbeseenotherwise,
becauseitissimplyimpossibletohaverequiredthelowercourttoapplya
formulationwhichwillonlybedefinedsixmonthslater.
Furthermore,itisunjustandunfairtorequirecompliancewithlegaland/ordoctrinal
requirementswhichareinexistentatthetimetheyweresupposedtohavebeen
compliedwith.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx.Ifthelowercourtsreversalwillbesustained,whatencouragementcanbe
giventocourtsandlitigantstorespectthelawandrulesiftheycanexpectwith
reasonablecertaintythatuponthepassageofanewrule,theirconductcanstillbe
opentoquestion?Thiscertainlybreedsinstabilityinoursystemofdispensing
justice.ForPetitionerswhotookspecialefforttoredresstheirgrievancesandto
protecttheirpropertyrightsbyresortingtotheremediesprovidedbythelaw,itis
mostunfairthatfealtytotherulesandproceduresthenobtainingwouldbearbut
fruitsofinjustice.[49]
Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions
imports application thereof not only to future cases but also to cases still
ongoing or not yet final when the decision was promulgated, should not be
countenanced in the jural sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling
repercussions. More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the
added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the
master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in
copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search
warrant proceedings in anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized
sale or renting out of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable
cause within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal
searches and seizures, as applied to copyright infringement cases involving
videotapes.
Therein it was ruled that
Thepresentationofmastertapesofthecopyrightedfilmsfromwhichthepirated
filmswereallegedlycopied,wasnecessaryforthevalidityofsearchwarrantsagainst

thosewhohaveintheirpossessionthepiratedfilms.Thepetitionersargumenttothe
effectthatthepresentationofthemastertapesatthetimeofapplicationmaynotbe
necessaryasthesewouldbemerelyevidentiaryinnatureandnotdeterminativeof
whetherornotaprobablecauseexiststojustifytheissuanceofthesearchwarrantsis
notmeritorious.Thecourtcannotpresumethatduplicateorcopiedtapeswere
necessarilyreproducedfrommastertapesthatitowns.
Theapplicationforsearchwarrantswasdirectedagainstvideotapeoutletswhich
allegedlywereengagedintheunauthorizedsaleandrentingoutofcopyrightedfilms
belongingtothepetitionerpursuanttoP.D.49.
Theessenceofacopyrightinfringementisthesimilarityoratleastsubstantial
similarityofthepurportedpiratedworkstothecopyrightedwork.Hence,the
applicantmustpresenttothecourtthecopyrightedfilmstocomparethemwiththe
purchasedevidenceofthevideotapesallegedlypiratedtodeterminewhetherthe
latterisanunauthorizedreproductionoftheformer.Thislinkageofthecopyrighted
filmstothepiratedfilmsmustbeestablishedtosatisfytherequirementsofprobable
cause.Mereallegationsastotheexistenceofthecopyrightedfilmscannotserveas
basisfortheissuanceofasearchwarrant.
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual
antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent portions of the decision
therein are quoted hereunder, to wit:
Intheinstantcase,thelowercourtliftedthethreequestionedsearchwarrantsagainst
theprivaterespondentsonthegroundthatitactedontheapplicationfortheissuance
ofthesaidsearchwarrantsandgranteditonthemisrepresentationsofapplicantNBI
anditswitnessesthatinfringementofcopyrightorapiracyofaparticularfilmhave
beencommitted.ThusthelowercourtstatedinitsquestionedorderdatedJanuary2,
1986:
Accordingtothemovant,allthreewitnessesduringtheproceedingsinthe
applicationforthethreesearchwarrantstestifiedoftheirownpersonal
knowledge.Yet,Atty.AlbinoReyesoftheNBIstatedthatthecounselor
representativeoftheTwentiethCenturyFoxCorporationwilltestifyonthevideo
cassettesthatwerepirated,sothathedidnothavepersonalknowledgeofthe
allegedpiracy.ThewitnessBacanialsosaidthatthevideocassetteswerepirated
withoutstatingthemanneritwaspiratedandthatitwasAtty.Domingothathas
knowledgeofthatfact.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
OnthepartofAtty.Domingo,hesaidthattheretapingoftheallegedlypiratedtapes
wasfrommastertapesallegedlybelongingtotheTwentiethCenturyFox,because,
accordingtohimitisofhispersonalknowledge.
AtthehearingoftheMotionforReconsideration,SeniorNBIAgentAtty.Albino
ReyestestifiedthatwhenthecomplaintforinfringementwasbroughttotheNBI,the
mastertapesoftheallegedlypiratedtapeswereshowntohimandhemade
comparisonsofthetapeswiththosepurchasedbytheirmanBacani.Whythemaster
tapesoratleastthefilmreelsoftheallegedlypiratedtapeswerenotshowntothe
Courtduringtheapplicationgivessomemisgivingsastothetruthofthatbare
statementoftheNBIagentonthewitnessstand.
Againastheapplicationandsearchproceedingsisapreludetothefilingofcriminal
casesunderP.D.49,thecopyrightinfringementlaw,andalthoughwhatisrequired
fortheissuancethereofismerelythepresenceofprobablecause,thatprobablecause
mustbesatisfactorytotheCourt,foritisatimehonoredpreceptthatproceedingsto
putamantotaskasanoffenderunderourlawsshouldbeinterpretedinstrictissimi
jurisagainstthegovernmentandliberallyinfavoroftheallegedoffender.
xxx xxx xxx
Thisdoctrinehasneverbeenoverturned,andasamatteroffactithadbeenenshrined
intheBillofRightsinour1973Constitution.
Sothatlackinginpersuasiveeffect,theallegationthatmastertapes
wereviewedbytheNBIandwerecomparedtothepurchasedandseizedvideotapes
fromtherespondentsestablishments,itshouldbedismissedasnotsupportedby
competentevidenceandforthatmattertheprobablecausehoversinthatgrey
debatabletwilightzonebetweenblackandwhiteresolvableinfavorofrespondents
herein.
ButtheglaringfactisthatCocoon,thefirstvideotapementionedinthesearch
warrant,wasnotevendulyregisteredorcopyrightedinthePhilippines.(AnnexCof
Opposition,p.152,record.)SothatlackingintherequisitepresentationtotheCourt
ofanallegedmastertapeforpurposesofcomparisonwiththepurchasedevidenceof
thevideotapesallegedlypiratedandthoseseizedfromrespondents,therewasno
waytodeterminewhethertherereallywaspiracy,orcopyingofthefilmofthe
complainantTwentiethCenturyFox.
xxx xxx xxx

Thelowercourt,therefore,liftedthethree(3)questionedsearchwarrantsinthe
absenceofprobablecausethattheprivaterespondentsviolatedP.D.49.Asfoundby
thecourt,theNBIagentswhoactedaswitnessesdidnothavepersonalknowledgeof
thesubjectmatteroftheirtestimonywhichwastheallegedcommissionoftheoffense
bytheprivaterespondents.Onlythepetitionerscounselwhowasalsoawitness
duringtheapplicationfortheissuanceofthesearchwarrantsstatedthathehad
personalknowledgethattheconfiscatedtapesownedbytheprivaterespondents
werepiratedtapestakenfrommastertapesbelongingtothepetitioner.However,the
lowercourtdidnotgivemuchcredencetohistestimonyinviewofthefactthatthe
mastertapesoftheallegedlypiratedtapeswerenotshowntothecourtduringthe
application(Italicsours).
The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court
therein required the presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
films in order to convince itself of the existence of probable cause under the
factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate
court itself observed:
Wefeelthattherationalebehindtheaforequoteddoctrineisthatthepiratedcopiesas
wellasthemastertapes,unliketheothertypesofpersonalpropertieswhichmaybe
seized,wereavailableforpresentationtothecourtatthetimeoftheapplicationfor
asearchwarranttodeterminetheexistenceofthelinkageofthecopyrightedfilms
withthepiratedones.Thus,thereisnoreasonnottopresentthem(Italicssupplied
foremphasis).[50]
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the
necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for
the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve
as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the
master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the
decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said
directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in
all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dictashould always be
construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless
interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of
overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the
application for search warrant with the lower court following a formal
complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his affidavit [51] and his
deposition,[52] did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on
said complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance
of the private respondents video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated in his affidavit [53] and further
expounded in his deposition[54] that he personally knew of the fact that private
respondents had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease
and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated
by Rene C. Baltazar, a private researcher retained by Motion Pictures
Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a
witness during the search warrant proceedings. [55] The records clearly reflect
that the testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses were straightforward and
stemmed from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed none
of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century
Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements,
among others, was what initially and correctly convinced the trial court to
make a finding of the existence of probable cause.
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the
validity of the search warrant, obviously borrowed from20th Century Fox, that
petitioners witnesses NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and
Rene C. Baltazar did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of
their respective testimonies and that said witnesses claim that the video
tapes were pirated, without stating the manner by which these were pirated,
is a conclusion of fact without basis. [56] The difference, it must be pointed out,
is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no allegation of
misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the part
of petitioners witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private
respondents that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted
ones nor have they shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to
copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to offer for sale, lease,
distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but
extensive surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by petitioners
witnesses sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and
depositions regarding matters discovered in the course thereof and of which
they have personal knowledge.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may
appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master
tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of
probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such
master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence
the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations
involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. [57] Such
auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or
documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence
tending to prove the factum probandum,[58] especially where the production in

court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out

of proportion to its evidentiary value.[59]
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions
relating to search warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. These provisions prevent
the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and
emphasize the purpose to protect against all general searches. [60] Indeed,
Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that
any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following
provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:
Sec.3.Requisitesforissuingsearchwarrant.Asearchwarrantshallnotissuebut
uponprobablecauseinconnectionwithonespecificoffensetobedetermined
personallybythejudgeafterexaminationunderoathoraffirmationofthe
complainantandthewitnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplace
tobesearchedandthethingstobeseized.
Sec.4.Examinationofcomplainant;record.Thejudgemust,beforeissuingthe
warrant,personallyexamineintheformofsearchingquestionsandanswers,in
writingandunderoaththecomplainantandanywitnesseshemayproduceonfacts
personallyknowntothemandattachtotherecordtheirswornstatementstogether
withanyaffidavitssubmitted.
Sec.5.Issuanceandformofsearchwarrant.Ifthejudgeisthereuponsatisfiedofthe
existenceoffactsuponwhichtheapplicationisbased,orthatthereisprobablecause
tobelievethattheyexist,hemustissuethewarrant,whichmustbesubstantiallyin
theformprescribedbytheseRules.
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions
requiring a showing of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued
are mandatory and must be complied with, and such a showing has been
held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A
search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the
issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.[61] It behooves us, then,
to review the concept of probable cause, firstly, from representative holdings

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
in the American jurisdiction from which we patterned our doctrines on the
matter.
Although the term probable cause has been said to have a well-defined
meaning in the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case,
with any degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it which would justify the
issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every
state of facts which might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast
rule, may be laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation.
[62]
As to what acts constitute probable cause seem incapable of definition.
[63]
There is, of necessity, no exact test.[64]
At best, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; [65] or the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a
reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made by the applicant for the
warrant is true.[66]
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it
import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable
cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has
been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief.
[67]
The requirement is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or
possibility.[68]
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.[69] It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue,
the warrant as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed, [70] the
facts warranting the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the
time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then
set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted
thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated
in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et al., supra, vis-a-vis the provisions of
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing and controlling legal
standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding of probable cause is
tested. Since the proprietary of the issuance of a search warrant is to be
determined at the time of the application therefor, which in turn must not be
too remote in time from the occurrence of the offense alleged to have been

committed, the issuing judge, in determining the existence of probable cause,

can and should logically look to the touchstones in the laws therefore
enacted and the decisions already promulgated at the time, and not to those
which had not yet even been conceived or formulated.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court
attempt to define probable cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such
matter to the courts discretion within the particular facts of each
case. Although the Constitution prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in
the absence of probable cause, such constitutional inhibition does not
command the legislature to establish a definition or formula for determining
what shall constitute probable cause. [71] Thus, Congress, despite its broad
authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures,
[72]
does not venture to make such a definition or standard formulation of
probable cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up the
same, much less limit the determination thereof to and within the
circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all in deference to judicial
discretion and probity.[73]
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a
particular requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated
by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of
probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or
statemanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious
exercise of a court's prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of
determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or
mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that
the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a
specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by
the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended
the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for
all seasons and reasons in infringement cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that
the lower court followed the prescribed procedure for the issuances of a
search warrant: (1) the examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination personally
conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts personally
known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to
the issuance of the search warrant now subject to this controversy:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Intheinstantcase,thefollowingfactshavebeenestablished:(1)copyrightedvideo
tapesbearingtitlesenumeratedinSearchWarrantNo.87053werebeingsold,
leased,distributedorcirculated,orofferedforsale,lease,distribution,ortransferred
orcausedtobetransferredbydefendantsattheirvideooutlets,withoutthewritten
consentoftheprivatecomplainantsortheirassignee;(2)recoveredorconfiscated
fromdefendants'possessionwerevideotapescontainingcopyrightedmotionpicture
filmswithouttheauthorityofthecomplainant;(3)thevideotapesoriginatedfrom
spuriousorunauthorizedpersons;and(4)saidvideotapeswereexactreproductions
ofthefilmslistedinthesearchwarrantwhosecopyrightsordistributionrightswere
ownedbycomplainants.
ThebasisofthesefactsaretheaffidavitsanddepositionsofNBISeniorAgentLauro
C.Reyes,Atty.RicoV.Domingo,andReneC.Baltazar.MotionPicturesAssociation
ofAmerica,Inc.(MPAA)thrutheircounsel,Atty.RicoV.Domingo,fileda
complaintwiththeNationalBureauofInvestigationagainstcertainvideo
establishmentsoneofwhichisdefendant,forviolationofPDNo.49asamendedby
PDNo,1988.Atty.LauroC.Reyesledateamtoconductdiscreetsurveillance
operationsonsaidvideoestablishments.PerinformationearliergatheredbyAtty.
Domingo,defendantswereengagedintheillegalsale,rental,distribution,circulation
orpublicexhibitionofcopyrightedfilmsofMPAAwithoutitswrittenauthorityor
itsmembers.KnowingthatdefendantSunshineHomeVideoanditsproprietor,Mr.
DaniloPelindario,werenotauthorizedbyMPAAtoreproduce,lease,andpossess
forthepurposeofsellinganyofitscopyrightedmotionpictures,heinstructedhis
researcher,Mr.ReneBaltazartorenttwovideocassettesfromsaiddefendantson
October21,1987.ReneC.BaltazarproceededtoSunshineHomeVideoandrented
tapescontainingLittleShopofHorror.HewasissuedrentalslipNo.26362dated
October21,1987forP10.00withadepositofP100.00.Again,onDecember11,
1987,hereturnedtoSunshineHomeVideoandrentedRobocopwitharentalslip
No.25271alsoforP10.00.OnthebasisofthecomplaintofMPAAthrucounsel,
Atty.LauroC.ReyespersonallywenttoSunshineHomeVideoatNo.6Mayfair
Center,MagallanesCommercialCenter,Makati.HislastvisitwasonDecember7,
1987.There,hefoundthevideooutletrenting,leasing,distributingvideocassette
tapeswhosetitleswerecopyrightedandwithouttheauthorityofMPAA.
Giventhesefacts,aprobablecauseexists.xxx.[74]

controlofthedefendants.Hence,thenecessityofthepresentationofthemastertapes
fromwhichthepiratedfilmswereallegedlycopiedisnecessaryintheinstantcase,to
establishtheexistenceofprobablecause.[75]
Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive
application of the master tape requirement generated by 20th Century
Fox upon a factual situation completely different from that in the case at bar,
and without anything more, this later order clearly defies elemental fair play
and is a gross reversible error. In fact, this observation of the Court in La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, et al., supra, may just as easily apply
to the present case:
Areviewofthegroundsinvokedxxxinhismotiontoquashthesearchwarrants
revealsthefactthattheyarenotappropriateforquashingawarrant.Theyarematters
ofdefensewhichshouldbeventilatedduringthetrialonthemeritsofthecase.xxx
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite
of presentation of the master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the
prime determinant of probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a
requirement to be complied with in a search warrant application which, it
must not be overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic
considerations, a strict application of said requirement militates against the
elements of secrecy and speed which underlie covert investigative and
surveillance operations in police enforcement campaigns against all forms of
criminality, considering that the master tapes of a motion picture required to
be presented before the court consists of several reels contained in circular
steel casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention,
unlike diminutive objects like video tapes which can be easily concealed.
[76]
With hundreds of titles being pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition
would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat, discouraging and
preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in
large scale of intellectual property rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it
bears calling to mind the Courts admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste,
supra, that

The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior

detailed and substantiated findings, by stating in its order of November 22,
1988 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and quashing the search
warrant that

xxx.Judgesalloverthecountryarewelladvisedtorememberthatcourtprocesses
shouldnotbeusedasinstrumentsto,unwittinglyorotherwise,aidcounterfeitersand
intellectualpirates,tiethehandsofthelawasitseekstoprotecttheFilipino
consumingpublicandfrustrateexecutiveandadministrativeimplementationof
solemncommitmentspursuanttointernationalconventionsandtreaties.

xxx.Thetwo(2)caseshaveacommonfactualmilieu;bothinvolveallegedpirated
copyrightedfilmsofprivatecomplainantswhichwerefoundinthepossessionor

III

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The amendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by
Presidential Decree No. 1987,[77] which should here be publicized judicially,
brought about the revision of its penalty structure and enumerated additional
acts considered violative of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1)
directly or indirectly transferring or causing to be transferred any sound
recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so recorded with
intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or publicly
exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for profit such articles on which
sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works are so transferred
without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling, leasing,
distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease,
distribution, or possessing for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition any of the abovementioned articles, without the
written consent of the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly
offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of
compensation any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with
the knowledge that such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material will
be used by another to reproduce, without the consent of the owner, any
phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds,
motion pictures or other audio-visual recordings may be transferred, and
which provide distinct bases for criminal prosecution, being crimes
independently punishable under Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended,
aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such infringement under
Section 29.
The trial courts finding that private respondents committed acts in
blatant transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its
findings of probable cause, which determination can be reached even in the
absence of master tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound
discretion. The executive concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing
amendments to the decree for the protection of intellectual property rights
should be matched by corresponding judicial vigilance and activism, instead
of the apathy of submitting to technicalities in the face of ample evidence of
guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual
terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding
thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned
and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law,
and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by
statute on the owner of the copyright.[78]
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense
that the pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was indirectly

copying, or did not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at
least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his
peril. In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter
copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute
infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the
work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original
is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially
and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of
law to constitute a piracy.[79] The question of whether there has been an
actionable infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion
pictures, radio or television being one of fact, [80] it should properly be
determined during the trial. That is the stage calling for conclusive or
preponderating evidence, and not the summary proceeding for the issuance
of a search warrant wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master
tapes.
In disregarding private respondents argument that Search Warrant No.
87-053 is a general warrant, the lower court observed that it was worded in a
manner that the enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense
of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the seizur(e)
of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other
unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as amended. x x x.[81]
[82]

On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al.,
instructs and enlightens:

Asearchwarrantmaybesaidtoparticularlydescribethethingstobeseizedwhen
thedescriptionthereinisasspecificasthecircumstanceswillordinarilyallow
(Peoplevs.Rubio,57Phil.384);orwhenthedescriptionexpressesaconclusionof
factnotoflawbywhichthewarrantofficermaybeguidedinmakingthesearchand
seizure(idem.,dissentofAbadSantos,J.,);orwhenthethingsdescribedarelimited
tothosewhichbeardirectrelationtotheoffenseforwhichthewarrantisbeing
issued(Sec.2,Rule126,RevisedRulesofCourt).xxx.Ifthearticlesdesiredtobe
seizedhaveanydirectrelationtoanoffensecommitted,theapplicantmust
necessarilyhavesomeevidence,otherthanthosearticles,toprovethesaidoffense;
andthearticlessubjectofsearchandseizureshouldcomeinhandy
merelytostrengthensuchevidence.xxx.
On private respondents averment that the search warrant was made
applicable to more than one specific offense on the ground that there are as
many offenses of infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to
issue one search warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the
rule that a search warrant must be issued only in connection with one specific
offense, the lower court said:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
xxx.Asthefaceofthesearchwarrantitselfindicates,itwasissuedforviolationof
Section56,PD49asamendedonly.Thespecificationstherein(inAnnexA)merely
refertothetitlesofthecopyrightedmotionpictures/filmsbelongingtoprivate
complainantswhichdefendantswereincontrol/possessionforsale,lease,
distributionorpublicexhibitionincontraventionofSec.56,PD49asamended. [83]
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and
the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated
video tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The
search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the
registration and deposit requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as
prerequisites for invoking the courts protective mantle in copyright
infringement cases. As explained by the court below:
DefendantsmovantscontendthatPD49asamendedcoversonlyproducerswho
havecompliedwiththerequirementsofdepositandnotice(inotherwords
registration)underSections49and50thereof.Absentsuchregistration,asinthis
case,therewasnorightcreated,hence,noinfringementunderPD49as
amended.Thisisnotwelltaken.
Ascorrectlypointedoutbyprivatecomplainantsoppositors,theDepartmentof
JusticehasresolvedthislegalquestionasfarbackasDecember12,1978inits
OpinionNo.191ofthethenSecretaryofJusticeVicenteAbadSantoswhichstated
thatSections26and50donotapplytocinematographicworksandPDNo.49had
doneawaywiththeregistrationanddepositofcinematographicworksandthateven
withoutpriorregistrationanddepositofaworkwhichmaybeentitledtoprotection
undertheDecree,thecreatorcanfileactionforinfringementofitsrights.Hecannot
demand,however,paymentofdamagesarisingfrominfringement.Thesameopinion
stressedthattherequirementsofregistrationanddepositarethusretainedunderthe
Decree,notasconditionsfortheacquisitionofcopyrightandotherrights,butas
prerequisitestoasuitfordamages.ThestatutoryinterpretationoftheExecutive
Branchbeingcorrect,isentitled(to)weightandrespect.
xxx xxx xxx
DefendantsmovantsmaintainthatcomplainantandhiswitnessesledtheCourtto
believethatacrimeexistedwheninfacttherewasnone.Thisiswrong.Asearlier
discussed,PD49asamended,doesnotrequireregistrationanddepositforacreator
tobeabletofileanactionforinfringementofhisrights.Theseconditionsaremerely
prerequisitestoanactionfordamages.So,aslongastheproscribedactsareshown
toexist,anactionforinfringementmaybeinitiated.[84]

Accordingly, the certifications[85] from the Copyright Section of the National

Library, presented as evidence by private respondents to show nonregistration of some of the films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight
or significance, whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that
even with respect to works which are required under Section 26 thereof to be
registered and with copies to be deposited with the National Library, such as
books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories
and gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and
letters, the failure to comply with said requirements does not deprive the
copyright owner of the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance
merely limits the remedies available to him and subjects him to the
corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which
prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement
that the rights granted under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works. This means that
under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an
intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of
registration and deposit. As has been authoritatively clarified:
Theregistrationanddepositoftwocompletecopiesorreproductionsofthework
withtheNationalLibrarywithinthreeweeksafterthefirstpublicdisseminationor
performanceofthework,asprovidedforinSection26(P.D.No.49,asamended),is
notforthepurposeofsecuringacopyrightofthework,butrathertoavoidthe
penaltyfornoncomplianceofthedepositofsaidtwocopiesandinordertorecover
damagesinaninfringementsuit.[86]
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of,
and its resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually
abusive extent by private respondents, without so much as an attempt to
adduce any credible evidence showing that they conduct their business
legitimately and fairly. The fact that private respondents could not show proof
of their authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners for
them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners copyrighted films
immeasurably bolsters the lower courts initial finding of probable cause. That
private respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does
not insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business
practices. What is more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some
unscrupulous characters have stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory
reputation as a hub for intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in
the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, now, of the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
World Trade Organization. Such acts must not be glossed over but should be
denounced and repressed lest the Philippines become an international
pariah in the global intellectual community.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court
dated November 22, 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of
Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is
DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate
proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are further
assessed against private respondents.

TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M.
CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of
the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares,
respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint
in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X,
wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land
located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the
north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the
east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land,
which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly
acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10,
1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON,
TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A.

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently
or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and
that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan,
Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on
July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No.
735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the
Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa)
which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior
judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The
grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that
a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C.
Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the
plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT
No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic
title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land
covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether
the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the
instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial
court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in
the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in
lieu of oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be
questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The
supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the
issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same
issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court.
The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating
OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them
to support their support their action and it might have encouraged them to
ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT
No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs.
Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs.
Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a
reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de
la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil.
106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117
Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs.
Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA
1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it
becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their
action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be
relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the
expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills,
Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial
court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without
costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, took no part.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CA
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

versus -

COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,

Promulgated:

Respondent.
February 22, 2010
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RE SOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the
movants-intervenors motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Courts
December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).[1]

EN BANC
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and
GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 189698

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,

The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as
unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369,[2] Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code [3] and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,[4] mainly on the ground that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed
Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging
the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into
the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent
COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the
constitutional proscription against the participation of public appointive
officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when
they accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials,
because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial
distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth;
and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public
safety and interest demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.
I.
Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the
COMELECs motion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as
well as the propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were
filed after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.
i.

Timeliness of COMELECs Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, [5] in relation to Section
1, Rule 52 of the same rules, [6]COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt
of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its
reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2,
2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was
filed on December 14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution
of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on
December 17, 2009 still within the reglementary period.
ii.

Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for
intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the
would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and
(2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding.[7]
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the
time within which a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even
beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of
justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who
have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court, [8] when the petition for review of the judgment has
already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, [9] and even where the
assailed order has already become final and executory.[10] In Lim v. Pacquing,[11] the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this
Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive
issues raised by the parties.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on
the sound discretion of the court [12] after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances.[13] We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice.[14] Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice.[15]

Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu
City Chapter has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to
clothe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in
character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.

We rule that, with the exception of the IBP Cebu City Chapter, all the
movants-intervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar.

II.
Substantive Issues

First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a

substantial right or interest in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to
challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as
a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and
as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence
of the public in its system of government.

The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:

On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible
are candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in
view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and
are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the
assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be
adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be
foreclosed if this Courts Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the
land.
With regard to the IBP Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the
assertion that this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming
2010 National Elections, and that there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx
so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before
this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental importance.[16]

We now turn to the substantive issues.

(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of
the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and
those holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil
servants holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether
or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b)
they limit these civil servants activity regardless of whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national,
municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right of these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and
accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
III.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the
present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:

Constitution. However, we in the government service have actually

experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or
indirect partisan political activities of many government officials.

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which

reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would

make this provision more strict, and which would deter its
violation?

Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14

of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act,[17]which repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code[18] and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436
insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of
the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running,[19] an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another
position without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in
any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers
and employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange
between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MS. QUESADA.

MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and
the implementing rules on the matter are more than exhaustive
enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public
service from engaging in any form of partisan political activity.
But the problem really lies in implementation because, if the head
of a ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies
of government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction
against partisan political activity, then no string of words that we
may add to what is now here in this draft will really implement the
constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x[20]
(italics supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers
and employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes.
Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
xxxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political
activities by one holding a non-political office.
xxxx

xxxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in
Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee in the
civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan
political activity." This is almost the same provision as in the 1973

Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil

Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage
directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any
officer or employee from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates
for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers
and employees holding political offices may take part in political
and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the
acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further
makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political
activities an election offense, viz.:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices;
any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense
forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units
that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly
or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public
order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is
too plain to be mistaken.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
implementing statutes apply only to civil servantsholding apolitical offices. Stated
differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding
the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. [21] This is because elected public officials, by the
very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year

round, even outside of the campaign period.[22]Political partisanship is the inevitable

essence of a political office, elective positions included. [23]
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are
allowed to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the
names of certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is
on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13,
between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase
ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the
word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word
CAMPAIGN.
May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino
may proceed.
MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted
the phrase "except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not
intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qualification of
the general prohibition against taking part in elections.
Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly
provided for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount to
disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is
not an unconditional right. In other words, the Legislature can
always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the right
to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only
like to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts
so that those who may want to vote but who are likewise
prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or
electioneering may vote.
MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please
understand that there was no intention on the part of the
Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee.
The elimination of the last clause of this provision was precisely
intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense
that they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
political contest. The last phrase or clause might have given the
impression that a government employee or worker has no right
whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not
the case. They are still free to express their views although the
intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a
political campaign.[24]
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
i.

Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemedresigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution in Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.[25]
In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in
relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the
ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As
Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of
elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer
considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of
certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the
limitation on appointive officials continues to be operative they are deemed resigned
when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against
Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions apply
equally to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal
dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are

material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.

Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives
undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution
is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who
do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of
officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A.
Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers
and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective
officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat
these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect
on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of
candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.
Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look
into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same classification are similarly
treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.[26]
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is
that our assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really adherence to
precedents, mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case
involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.
[27]
This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his
treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set
of litigants and the opposite way between another. If a group of
cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision.
It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite

principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was

a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am
plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment
and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and
moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded administration of justice in the courts.[28]

Our Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemedresigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mereobiter dictum. It is trite to state
that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered asobiter dictum.[29] This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are
presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead
up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision
is predicated.[30] For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a
precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some
other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached
might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than
it did.[31] As we held inVillanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[32]
A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as
obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can
an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case
has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also,
where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually
decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to
every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied
authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and
more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one
proposition make statements of the court regarding other
propositions dicta.[33] (italics supplied)
ii.

Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law

The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground
even if reexamined.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. [34] What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
[35]
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,
[36]
which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[37]
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned
provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however,
proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials
vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because whether
one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain, viz.:
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the VicePresident who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take
charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior
and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they
both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat
them differently when both file their [Certificates of Candidacy]
for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the VicePresident, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period and
can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. [38]

Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that
to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the
evil at once; it may proceed one step at a time. [39] In addressing a societal concern, it
must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to
those included or excluded.[40]Nevertheless, as long as the bounds of reasonable

choice are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment. [41] We may
not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully
achieved by expanding the class.[42] Stated differently, the fact that a legislative
classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally
arbitrary or invidious.[43] There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must
reach each and every class to which it might be applied; [44] that the Legislature must
be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must
convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is palpably arbitrary or
capricious.[45] He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment,
whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, [46] such
that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of
the classification is fairly debatable. [47] In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in
fact did not even attempt to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was
likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following
thesis:
... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we
may find that the statutes distinction is unfair, underinclusive,
unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint;
rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason for
the differing treatment.[48]
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for
excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will,
perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people.
[49]
It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote.[50] Considering that elected officials are put in
office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably
be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to
the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until
the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there
is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective
officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature,
whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally
compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
[51]
(emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would have us equalize the playing field by
invalidating provisions of law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under
the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are
unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected
officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The
absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his
dissent, that elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have greater political clout
over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring but not by this Court. Suffice
it to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given
the authority, under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and
thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is
certainly within the Legislatures power to make the deemed-resigned provisions
applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be
prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of
expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power
to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a public policy
standpoint.
iii.

Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled

Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling,

our assailed Decision adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.[52] This
was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated
in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision.
Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:

(1) The right to run for public office is inextricably linked with two
fundamental freedoms freedom of expression and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental
right must be subjected to strict equal protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and
impartiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned provisions
pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render
them unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the exhortation that since the Americans, from whom we
copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for
being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit.
Our assailed Decisions reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot
blink away the fact that the United States Supreme Court effectively
overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States Court
of Appeals. InUnited States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National
Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.[53] andBroadrick, et al. v. State of
Oklahoma, et al.,[54] the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal[55] and state[56] employees
from taking an active part in political management or in political
campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these
provisions results in dismissal from employment and possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection
clause. It held that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer
has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech
of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate
interest of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in
promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees expression interferes
with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on
speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility
or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any statutory
restrictions.[57] Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny
that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the
prohibitions in question.[58]
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and
the country appears to have been that partisan political activities by
federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate
effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in
representative government, and employees themselves are to be
sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far
imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties,
groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities
of the type described. They discriminate against no racial, ethnic,
or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political
opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote
at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education,
the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and
the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
(government), as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees. Although
Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so
chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by
the obviously important interests sought to be served by the
limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the
Hatch Act.
[59]

It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in

the Executive Branch of the Government, or those working for any
of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the
will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the
will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and
execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism
for or against any political party or group or the members thereof.
A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of
Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that

federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in

political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan
political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political
tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to
fair and effective government.
There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not
only important that the Government and its employees in fact
avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they
appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system
of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.
Another major concern of the restriction against partisan
activities by federal employees was perhaps the immediate
occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the
conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force
should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and
perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the 1936 and
1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were
sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against
the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using
the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid
for at public expense, to man its political structure and political
campaigns.
A related concern, and this remains as important as any
other, was to further serve the goal that employment and
advancement in the Government service not depend on political
performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government
employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit
invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in
order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out
their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions against
coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint
judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect
the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their
political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one
employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. For example,
at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the
prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission stated that the prohibitions against active
participation in partisan political management and partisan political
campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against
coercion . . .. Perhaps Congress at some time will come to a

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
different view of the realities of political life and Government
service; but that is its current view of the matter, and we are not
now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the
Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in
political activities is absolute in any event.[60] x x x
xxxx

campaign. Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as

with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of
such terms in s 818 as partisan, or take part in, or affairs of
political parties. But what was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable
here: there are limitations in the English language with respect to
being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that
although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding
fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and
comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' x x x

As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can,

but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to
comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)

xxxx

Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is

constitutionally permissible, viz.:

[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and

purports to reach protected, as well as unprotected conduct, and
must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable
of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the
overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner
here.

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed

restrictions on the partisan political conduct of state
employees.Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve
valid and important state interests, particularly with respect to
attracting greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their
job security, free from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and
by protecting them from political extortion. Rather, appellants
maintain that however permissible, even commendable, the goals
of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its
prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish
between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be
permitted. For these and other reasons, appellants assert that the
sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot
be enforced against them or anyone else.
We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.
[61]
We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
[62]
Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but
frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning
of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out explicit standards'
for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits
any state classified employee from being an officer or member of a
partisan political club or a candidate for any paid public office. It
forbids solicitation of contributions for any political organization,
candidacy or other political purpose and taking part in the
management or affairs of any political party or in any political

xxxx
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules
of standing in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement of
a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a
limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to
remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally
protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in
this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed
by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. x x x
x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that
facial over-breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the
State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that
conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded,
may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a
point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with
confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so
prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that
is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is
involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not
substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist
should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations
to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other
broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at political
expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the
same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular
groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate
political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As
indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less
exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s
818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as
manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or
criminal trespass. This much was established in United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today
in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is
no question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it
forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for
partisan candidates, political parties, or other partisan political
purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local
committees of political parties, or officers or committee members
in partisan political clubs, or candidates for any paid public office;
taking part in the management or affairs of any political party's
partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to
caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking
an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting
votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort
to get voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of
partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan
nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party
or partisan political candidate.
x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible
and that s 818 may be susceptible of some other improper
applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s
818 must be discarded in toto because some persons arguably
protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the
statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not,
therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)

It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not
deny the principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold,
nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal
of Mancuso,since they pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on
a different set of facts, viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil
Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the
Hatch Acts prohibition against active participation in political
management or political campaigns. The plaintiffs desired to
campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get
federal employees to run for state and local offices, to participate
as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political
club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for
being vague and overbroad a provision in the (sic) Oklahomas
Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the
political activities of the States classified civil servants, in much
the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political
activities of federal employees. Prior to the commencement of the
action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection
campaign of their superior, and were administratively charged for
asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign
work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the
campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving
and distributing campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an
automatic resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time
police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of
Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to
the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then
began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the
City Home Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different
types of laws and were decided based on a different set of
facts,Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a
reversal of Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these
cases.
Contrary
to
his
claim, Letter
Carriers,
Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run
laws, viz.:

The Hatch Act defines active participation in political management or

political campaigns by cross-referring to the rules made by the Civil
Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:
30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a
nomination or for election to any National,
State, county, or municipal office is not
permissible. The prohibition against political
activity extends not merely to formal
announcement of candidacy but also to the
preliminaries leading to such announcement and
to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or
permitting to be done any act in furtherance of
candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely
passive is immaterial; if an employee acquiesces
in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such
candidacy such acquiescence constitutes an
infraction of the prohibitions against political
activity. (italics supplied)

(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for
nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He
assailed the constitutionality of 14.09(c) of the City Home Rule
Charter, which prohibits continuing in the classified service of the city
after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any public
office.
(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service
Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Acts
prohibition against active participation in political management or
political campaigns[63]with respect to certain defined activities in which
they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this discussion are:
(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which
alleged that its members were desirous of, among
others, running in local elections for offices such as
school board member, city council member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did
not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough
Councilman in his local community for fear that his
participation in a partisan election would endanger
his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as
a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan election
for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he
would do so except for fear of losing his job by
reason of violation of the Hatch Act.

Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids

the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay compensation to these
persons.[64]
(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state
employees seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of two subparagraphs of Section 818 of Oklahomas Merit System of Personnel
Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this
discussion, states that [n]o employee in the classified service shall be a
candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office Violation
of Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible criminal
sanctions and limited state employment ineligibility.
Consequently,

it

cannot

be

denied

that Letter

Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the

imagination
could Mancuso still
be
held
operative,
as Letter
Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii)
were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It was thus not

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals the same court that
decided Mancuso to
hold categorically
and
emphatically in Magill
v.
[65]
Lynch that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who
ran for city office in 1975. Pawtuckets Little Hatch Act prohibits
city employees from engaging in a broad range of political
activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically
proscribed,[66] the violation being punished by removal from office
or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the
city officials on the ground that that the provision of the city
charter was unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant
of Letter
Carriers and Broadrick, took
the
position
that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It observed
that the view that political candidacy was a fundamental
interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive
alternatives were not available, was a position which was no
longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the
governments interest in regulating both the conduct and speech
of its employees differed significantly from its interest in
regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little
weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion
of government employees were a less drastic means to the same
end, deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a
balancing test to determine whether limits on political activity
by public employees substantially served government interests
which were important enough to outweigh the employees First
Amendment rights.[67]
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this
manner even though the election in Magill was characterized
asnonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the
circumstances of that case, that politically active bureaucrats might
use their official power to help political friends and hurt political
foes. Ruled the court:
The
question
before
us
is
whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which
bars a city employee's candidacy in even a
nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The
issue compels us to extrapolate two recent
Supreme Court decisions, Civil Service Comm'n
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and Broadrick v.
Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws barring civil

servants from partisan political activity. Letter

Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick
sustained Oklahoma's Little Hatch Act against
constitutional attack, limiting its holding
to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred
only activity in partisan politics. In Mancuso v.
Taft, we assumed that proscriptions of candidacy
in nonpartisan elections would not be
constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick
compel new analysis.
xxxx
What we are obligated to do in this
case, as the district court recognized, is to apply
the Courts interest balancing approach to the
kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this
record. We believe that the district court found
more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v.
Taft than remains after Letter Carriers. We have
particular reference to our view that political
candidacy was a fundamental interest which
could be trenched upon only if less restrictive
alternatives were not available. While this
approach may still be viable for citizens who are
not government employees, the Court in Letter
Carriers recognized that the government's
interest in regulating both the conduct and
speech of its employees differs significantly from
its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in
general. Not only was United Public Workers v.
Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the
Court gave little weight to the argument that
prohibitions against the coercion of government
employees were a less drastic means to the same
end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress.
We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit
in characterizing the Court's approach as "some
sort of 'balancing' process".[68] It appears that the
government may place limits on campaigning by
public employees if the limits substantially serve
government interests that are "important" enough
to outweigh the employees' First Amendment
rights. x x x (italics supplied)

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in
question, the Magill court detailed the major governmental
interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to
the Pawtucket provision as follows:
In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest
identified by the Court was that of an efficient
government, faithful to the Congress rather than
to party. The district court discounted this
interest, reasoning that candidates in a local
election would not likely be committed to a state
or national platform. This observation
undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance
to broad policy positions is concerned. But a
different kind of possible political intrusion into
efficient administration could be thought to
threaten municipal government: not into broad
policy decisions, but into the particulars of
administration favoritism in minute decisions
affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal
contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning,
licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court
in Letter
Carriers identified
a
second
governmental interest in the avoidance of the
appearance of "political justice" as to policy, so
there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the
appearance of political preferment in privileges,
concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or
reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors
evidently feared is not exorcised by the
nonpartisan character of the formal election
process. Where, as here, party support is a key to
successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the
norm, the city might reasonably fear that
politically active bureaucrats would use their
official power to help political friends and hurt
political foes. This is not to say that the city's
interest in visibly fair and effective
administration necessarily justifies a blanket
prohibition of all employee campaigning; if
parties are not heavily involved in a campaign,
the danger of favoritism is less, for neither friend
nor foe is as easily identified.

A second major governmental interest

identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the
danger of a powerful political machine. The
Court had in mind the large and growing federal
bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The
district court felt this was only a minor threat
since parties had no control over nominations.
But in fact candidates sought party
endorsements, and party endorsements proved to
be highly effective both in determining who
would emerge from the primary election and
who would be elected in the final election. Under
the prevailing customs, known party affiliation
and support were highly significant factors
in Pawtucket elections. The charter's authors
might reasonably have feared that a politically
active public work force would give the
incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an
unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In
municipal elections especially, the small size of
the electorate and the limited powers of local
government may inhibit the growth of interest
groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight
of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan
issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated
government employees may seek to influence
voters or their co-workers improperly; but a
more real danger is that a central party structure
will mass the scattered powers of government
workers behind a single party platform or slate.
Occasional misuse of the public trust to pursue
private political ends is tolerable, especially
because the political views of individual
employees may balance each other out. But party
discipline eliminates this diversity and tends to
make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of
employees pressured into advancing their
immediate superior's political ambitions, the
entire government work force may be expected
to turn out for many candidates in every election.
InPawtucket, where parties are a continuing
presence in political campaigns, a carefully
orchestrated use of city employees in support of
the incumbent party's candidates is possible. The
danger is scarcely lessened by the openness

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack
of party labels on its ballots.
The third area of proper governmental
interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that
employees achieve advancement on their merits
and that they be free from both coercion and the
prospect of favor from political activity. The
district court did not address this factor, but
looked only to the possibility of a civil servant
using his position to influence voters, and held
this to be no more of a threat than in the most
nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the
possibility of coercion of employees by superiors
remains as strong a factor in municipal elections
as it was in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the
systematic and coordinated exploitation of public
servants for political ends that a legislature is
most likely to see as the primary threat of
employees' rights. Political oppression of public
employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan
system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride
herd on the politics of their employees even in a
nonpartisan context, but without party officials
looking over their shoulders most supervisors
will prefer to let employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may
constitutionally
restrict
its
employees'
participation in nominally nonpartisan elections
if political parties play a large role in the
campaigns. In the absence of substantial party
involvement, on the other hand, the interests
identified by the Letter Carriers Court lose much
of their force. While the employees' First
Amendment rights would normally outbalance
these diminished interests, we do not suggest that
they would always do so. Even when parties are
absent, many employee campaigns might be
thought to endanger at least one strong public
interest, an interest that looms larger in the
context of municipal elections than it does in the
national elections considered in Letter Carriers.
The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a
subordinate running directly against his superior

or running for a position that confers great power

over his superior. An employee of a federal
agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses
less of a direct challenge to the command and
discipline of his agency than a fireman or
policeman who runs for mayor or city council.
The possibilities of internal discussion, cliques,
and political bargaining, should an employee
gather substantial political support, are
considerable. (citations omitted)
The court, however, remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings in respect of the petitioners
overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being
overbroad is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the
dark, the court held:
The governing case is Broadrick, which
introduced the doctrine of "substantial"
overbreadth in a closely analogous case.
Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a
law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected
conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and
when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected
conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
Two major uncertainties attend the doctrine: how
to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to
define "substantial" overbreadth. We are spared
the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The
plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a
candidate, and they were subject to discipline
under a law proscribing a wide range of
activities, including soliciting contributions for
political candidates and becoming a candidate.
The Court found that this combination required a
substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of
this case are so similar that we may reach the
same result without worrying unduly about the
sometimes opaque distinction between speech
and conduct.
disposed

The second difficulty is not so easily

of. Broadrick found no substantial

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
overbreadth in a statute restricting partisan
campaigning. Pawtucket has
gone
further,
banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns
as well.Measuring the substantiality of a
statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter
alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid
applications compared to the number of
potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity
to reality is needed; an invalid application that is
far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as
one that is probable. The question is a matter of
degree; it will never be possible to say that a
ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications
makes a law substantially overbroad. Still, an
overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the
court with some idea of the number of potentially
invalid applications the statute permits. Often,
simply reading the statute in the light of common
experience or litigated cases will suggest a
number of probable invalid applications. But this
case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad
depends in large part on the number of elections
that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed
to Pawtucket employees. For all the record
shows, every one of the city, state, or federal
elections inPawtucket is actively contested by
political parties. Certainly the record suggests
that parties play a major role even in campaigns
that often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities.
School committee candidates, for example, are
endorsed by the local Democratic committee.
The state of the record does not permit
us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not
to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the
dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below,
in the short period before the election was held,
was on the constitutionality of the statute as
applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further
efforts are not justified, but they should be
afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the
charter forecloses access to a significant number
of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal
employees would not pose the possible threats to
government efficiency and integrity which Letter

Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems

significant. Accordingly, we remand for
consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim.
(italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter
Carriers,
Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate
beyond
doubt
that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has
effectively been overruled.[69] As it is no longer good law,
the ponencias exhortation that [since] the Americans, from whom
we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a
similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that
we, too, should follow suit is misplaced and unwarranted.[70]
Accordingly, our assailed Decisions submission that the right to run for public office
is inextricably linked with two fundamental freedoms those of expression and
association lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a
fundamental right to express ones political views through candidacy,[71] as to
invoke a rigorous standard of review.[72] Bart v. Telford[73] pointedly stated that
[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and
this court has held that it does not do so by implication either. Thus, ones interest in
seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.[74] Moreover, one
cannot bring ones action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any
allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the political
ideas of a particular set of voters.[75]
Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in
the case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned
provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service
faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the
appearance of political justice as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a
powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement
on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor
from political activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the
non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective office.
En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v.
Fashing[76] and Morial, et al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
of Louisiana, et al.[77] to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run
provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:
U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of
resign-to-run provisions when applied to specified or particular
officials, as distinguished from all others,[78] under a
classification that is germane to the purposes of the law. These
resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and
sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test of being
germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite for a
valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials,
they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis
in the original)
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial.
The resign-to-run provisions in these cases were upheld not because they referred to
specified or particular officials (vis--vis a general class); the questioned provisions
were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and
found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge
in Clementsrevolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain
why some public officials are subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are
not. Ruled the United States Supreme Court:
Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that
the holders of certain offices automatically resign their positions if
they become candidates for any other elected office, unless the
unexpired portion of the current term is one year or less. The
burdens that 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial
than those imposed by 19. The two provisions, of course, serve
essentially the same state interests. The District Court found 65
deficient, however, not because of the nature or extent of the
provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the manner in
which the offices are classified. According to the District Court,
the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny,
because Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected
public officials are subject to 65 and why others are not. As with
the case of 19, we conclude that 65 survives a challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no
rational predicate to the classification scheme.
The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld
consistent with the "one step at a time" approach that this Court

has undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more

vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional
principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional
provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended
the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to
four years. The provision also staggered the terms of other offices
so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at
each election. The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not
added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic resignation
provision was added in Art. XI, 11, which applies to officeholders
in home rule cities who serve terms longer than two years. Section
11 allows home rule cities the option of extending the terms of
municipal offices from two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a
creature of the State's electoral reforms of 1958. That the State did
not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to
those officeholders whose terms were not extended by 11 or 65,
absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of
the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply
because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause
does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected officeholder's
candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places
similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language
and its history belie any notion that 65 serves the invidious purpose
of denying access to the political process to identifiable classes of
potential candidates. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that
there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to
become candidates for public office out of context. A correct reading of that line
readily shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that case,
as each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve weighing
governmental interests vis--vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:
The interests of public employees in free expression and political
association are unquestionably entitled to the protection of the first
and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should be
taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from
expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner
that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public
duties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates
for public office. Nor do we approve any general restrictions on the
political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is
necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it. A
requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a
candidate for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary
relation to the achievement of the state's interest in preventing the
actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a requirement
offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression
and association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. (italics supplied)
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining
which of its employment positions require restrictions on partisan
political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State
can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon
which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)

V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA
9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our
assailed Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts without due regard for the type of position being held
by the employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence
that may be attendant thereto;[79] and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants
holding appointive positions without due regard for the type of office
being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in
the national, municipal or barangay level.

Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.

i.

Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of

Incumbent Appointive Officials Position, Valid

According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are

overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding
appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the
employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented
are extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office
holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally
plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and
growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful
political machine that has amassed the scattered powers of government workers so as
to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.
[80]
As elucidated in our prior exposition:[81]
Attempts by government employees to wield influence
over others or to make use of their respective positions
(apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable
even innocuous particularly when viewed in isolation from other
similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be
decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more) realistic
and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts,
when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of an
emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda through
a carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials
coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.
[T]he avoidance of such a politically active public work
force which could give an emerging political machine an
unbreakable grasp on the reins of power is reason enough to
impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public
officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto. (citations omitted)
ii.
Limitation on Candidacy
Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are
overly broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants
holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being
sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national,
municipal or barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that the concerns of a
truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those
involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant
distinctive treatment,[82] so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by
the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the elective
office sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions
are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged
restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the
matter will show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our
exposition on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose
that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of
certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of
registered political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections.[83] Obviously, these rules and
guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution
8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are
decidedlypartisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction
in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of
appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth
challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369

and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with
other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions
are likewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan
public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the
elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in
this country which involve nonpartisan public offices.[84]
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the
enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has
intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by
special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations
which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said
provision states:
Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. No person
shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad
ng sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day
from the commencement of the election period
but not later than the day before the beginning of
the campaign period in a form to be prescribed
by the Commission. The candidate shall state the
barangay office for which he is a candidate.
xxxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city,
provincial or national official or employee, or
those in the civil or military service, including
those in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered automatically
resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate
deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there
would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found
in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in
the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than
a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised
against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent
proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. [85]

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section
13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public
offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:
In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to
controlling only partisan behavior has not received judicial
imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US
cases on the matter is simply that the government has an interest in
regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation
of the speech of the citizenry in general.[86]
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as
unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad,
particularly where, as in this case, conduct and not pure speech is
involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statutes plainly legitimate sweep.[87]
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a
statutes overbreadth would entail, among other things, a rough
balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the
number of potentially invalid applications.[88] In this regard, some
sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is farfetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable.
[89]
The question is a matter of degree. [90] Thus, assuming for the
sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid
and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this
distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth
challenge presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this
Court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid elections
(i.e. the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry
but were nevertheless closed to appointive employees) that may in
all probability result from the enforcement of the statute.[91]
The state of the record, however, does not permit us to
find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words of Magill v. Lynch,
indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken
in the dark,[92] especially since an overbreadth finding in this case
would effectively prohibit the State from enforcing an otherwise
valid measure against conduct that is admittedly within its power
to proscribe.[93]

This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when
it comes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that
purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly,
and only as a last resort.[94]
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only
where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others
may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing
some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. [95] Facial overbreadth has
likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the
challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would
cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.[96]
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent
appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts,
far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked
by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged
statutes which are, at best, bold predictions cannot justify invalidating these statutes
in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has
for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to
proscribe.[97] Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these
conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather
than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. [98]
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of highranking Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without
relinquishing their posts.[99] Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed
their Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces. [100] Even the Secretary
of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for representative of the first district
of Quezon province last December 14, 2009 [101] even as her position as Justice

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors, [102] who, in
turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. [103] The Judiciary
has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat
into the political arena. We cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing field in
their favor.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for petitioner.

B.C. Salazar & Associates for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678
and Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents
and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this
Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against

illegal searches and seizures to raids conducted in connection with the
government's anti-film piracy campaign. The main issue hinges on whether
or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the
application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the
complaint filed by the petitioner.
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's
(NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with
the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form
which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise
known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed
three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and
FORTUNE LEDESMA, respondents.

Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's
agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An
inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents.
Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed
by the private respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8,
1985, lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search
Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024; issued against Eduardo M.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro
Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued against Raul M. Sagullo of
South Video Bug Center, Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres.
Avenue BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila; and SW No.
85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix Video
Services of San Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro
Manila, be lifted.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three
search warrants which could not be a basis of any criminal
prosecution, now in the possession of the National Bureau of
Investigation which under the law must be delivered to this
Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to
be returned to their owners through their lawyer, Atty. Benito
Salazar or his agents or representatives, against proper
receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as
proof that said properties have been returned to the
possession of the rightful owners." (p. 34, Rollo)
The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in
its order dated January 2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul
the October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The
petition was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context
of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section
3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search
warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their
issuance. According to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses
which were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower
court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially
reproduces Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches
and seizures provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We
have explained in the case of People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385
US 293 119661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence.
In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not
only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in
the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and
to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v.
United States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski
in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional
right as the embodiment of a "spiritual concept: the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that
his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards."(ibid, p. 74).
The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers
and effects is circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches
and seizures provision of the Constitution.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800), we defined
probable cause for a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision
also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified" in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a probable
cause. (Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, supra).

Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude

to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright
infringement law, and although what is required for the
issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause,
that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is
a time- honored precept that proceedings to put a man to
task as an offender under our laws should be interpreted
in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in
favor of the alleged offender.

In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search
warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the
application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the
misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
court stated in its questioned order dated January 2,1986:

This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of

fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973
Constitution.

According to the movant, all three witnesses during the

proceedings in the application for the three search warrants
testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino
Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of
the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the
video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have
personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness
Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated
without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty.
Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the
allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly
belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according
to him, it is of his personal knowledge.
At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI
Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for
infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man
Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during
the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that
bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. "

xxx xxx xxx

So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that

master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to
the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents'
establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by
competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause
hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black
and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape
mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly
registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of
Opposition p. 152 record). So, that lacking in the requisite
presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for
purposes of comparison with the purchased evidence of the
video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from
respondents, there was no way to determine whether there
really was piracy, or copying of the film of the complainant
Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in
the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49.
As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was
the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the
issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes
taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court
did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application.
All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it
lifted the three questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to
the petitioner's allegation that the lower court based its January 2, 1986 order
only "on the fact that the original or master copies of the copyrighted films
were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading it
to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p.
17, Rollo)
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at
the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious.
The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets
which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the
former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations
as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought
to be seized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

c) Television sets, Video Cassettes

Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipments and other
machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease
distribution of the above-mentioned video
tapes which she is keeping and concealing
in the premises above-described." (p. 26,
Rollo)
In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
l] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing
of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all
document/communications, letters and facsimile of prints
related to "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and
other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of
the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the
'WE FORUM and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate
No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate
No. NKV 969;

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with
Plate No. PBP 665;and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate
No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476,13 L ed 2nd 431),
the search warrant which authorized the search for 'books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared
void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise' have been held
too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be
used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]"'
was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid (68
Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-737). The description of the articles
sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently. (at pp. 814-815)
Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the
articles sought to be confiscated under the questioned search warrants.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are
articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate
business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and
appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business
not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law
makes The search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation
of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually happened in the
instant case. Thus, the lower court, in its questioned order dated October 8,
1985 said:
Although the applications and warrants themselves covered
certain articles of property usually found in a video store, the
Court believes that the search party should have confined

themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence

constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of
intellectual property, but not to other articles that are usually
connected with, or related to, a legitimate business, not
involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a
whiteboard listing Betamax tapes, video cassette cleaners
video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of
Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged
in the video tape industry, and which could not be the subject
of seizure, The applicant and his agents therefore exceeded
their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal
property usually found in a video cassette store or business
establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court
when it lifted the search warrants it earlier issued against the private
respondents. We agree with the appellate court's findings to the effect that:
An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that
the main ground upon which the respondent Court anchored
said orders was its subsequent findings that it was misled by
the applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed
when it issued the questioned warrants.' Stated differently,
the respondent Court merely corrected its erroneous findings
as to the existence of probable cause and declared the
search and seizure to be unreasonable. Certainly, such
action is within the power and authority of the respondent
Court to perform, provided that it is not exercised in an
oppressive or arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the
respondent Court declaring the existence of probable cause
is not final and does not constitute res judicata.
A careful review of the record of the case shows that the
respondent Court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of
discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.' But far
from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
motivated by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so
when the erroneous findings collided with the constitutional
rights of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did
not even contest the righteousness and legality of the
questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged
denial of due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of
much needed revenues but is also an indication of the widespread
breakdown of national order and discipline. Courts should not impose any
unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy campaign.
However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To
say that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of
unconstitutional shortcuts is to denigrate the long history and experience
behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights. The trial court
did not commit reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 117897 May 14, 1997

ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANUEL F. PEREA and
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The subject of this petition for review is the Decision of the public respondent
Court of Appeals, 1 dated October 28, 1994, setting aside the portion of the
Decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for short) in
SEC Case No. 4012 which declared null and void the sale of two (2) parcels
of land in Quezon City covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale entered into by
and between private respondent Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC, for short) and the
Islamic Directorate of the Philippines, Inc., Carpizo Group, (IDP, for short).
The following facts appear of record.
Petitioner IDP-Tamano Group alleges that sometime in 1971, Islamic leaders
of all Muslim major tribal groups in the Philippines headed by Dean Cesar
Adib Majul organized and incorporated the ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IDP), the primary purpose of which is to establish an
Islamic Center in Quezon City for the construction of a "Mosque (prayer
place), Madrasah (Arabic School), and other religious infrastructures" so as
to facilitate the effective practice of Islamic faith in the area. 2
Towards this end, that is, in the same year, the Libyan government donated
money to the IDP to purchase land at Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, to
be used as a Center for the Islamic populace. The land, with an area of
49,652 square meters, was covered by two titles: Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. RT-26520 (176616) 3 and RT-26521 (170567), 4 both registered in the
name of IDP.
It appears that in 1971, the Board of Trustees of the IDP was composed of
the following per Article 6 of its Articles of Incorporation:
Senator Mamintal Tamano 5
Congressman Ali Dimaporo
Congressman Salipada Pendatun
Dean Cesar Adib Majul
Sultan Harun Al-Rashid Lucman
Delegate Ahmad Alonto
Commissioner Datu Mama Sinsuat
Mayor Aminkadra Abubakar 6
According to the petitioner, in 1972, after the purchase of the land by the
Libyan government in the name of IDP, Martial Law was declared by the late
President Ferdinand Marcos. Most of the members of the 1971 Board of
Trustees like Senators Mamintal Tamano, Salipada Pendatun, Ahmad Alonto,
and Congressman Al-Rashid Lucman flew to the Middle East to escape
political persecution.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Thereafter, two Muslim groups sprung, the Carpizo Group, headed by
Engineer Farouk Carpizo, and the Abbas Group, led by Mrs. Zorayda
Tamano and Atty. Firdaussi Abbas. Both groups claimed to be the legitimate
IDP. Significantly, on October 3, 1986, the SEC, in a suit between these two
contending groups, came out with a Decision in SEC Case No. 2687
declaring the election of both the Carpizo Group and the Abbas Group as IDP
board members to be null and void. The dispositive portion of the SEC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
elections of both the petitioners 7 and respondents 8 as null
and void for being violative of the Articles of Incorporation of
petitioner corporation. With the nullification of the election of
the respondents, the approved by-laws which they certified
to this Commission as members of the Board of Trustees
must necessarily be likewise declared null and void.
However, before any election of the members of the Board of
Trustees could be conducted, there must be an approved bylaws to govern the internal government of the association
including the conduct of election. And since the election of
both petitioners and respondents have been declared null
and void, a vacuum is created as to who should adopt the
by-laws and certify its adoption. To remedy this unfortunate
situation that the association has found itself in, the
members of the petitioning corporation are hereby
authorized to prepare and adopt their by-laws for submission
to the Commission. Once approved, an election of the
members of the Board of Trustees shall immediately be
called pursuant to the approved by-laws.
SO ORDERED. 9
Neither group, however, took the necessary steps prescribed by the SEC in
its October 3, 1986 Decision, and, thus, no valid election of the members of
the Board of Trustees of IDP was ever called. Although the Carpizo
Group 10attempted to submit a set of by-laws, the SEC found that, aside from
Engineer Farouk Carpizo and Atty. Musib Buat, those who prepared and
adopted the by-laws were not bona fide members of the IDP, thus rendering
the adoption of the by-laws likewise null and void.

On April 20, 1989, without having been properly elected as new members of
the Board of Trustee of IDP, the Carpizo Group caused to be signed an
alleged Board Resolution 11 of the IDP, authorizing the sale of the subject two
parcels of land to the private respondent INC for a consideration of
P22,343,400.00, which sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale 12 dated April 20, 1989.
On May 30, 1991, the petitioner 1971 IDP Board of Trustees headed by
former Senator Mamintal Tamano, or the Tamano Group, filed a petition
before the SEC, docketed as SEC Case No. 4012, seeking to declare null
and void the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by the Carpizo Group and the INC
since the group of Engineer Carpizo was not the legitimate Board of Trustees
of the IDP.
Meanwhile, private respondent INC, pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in its favor, filed an action for Specific Performance with Damages
against the vendor, Carpizo Group, before Branch 81 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6937, to compel said
group to clear the property of squatters and deliver complete and full physical
possession thereof to INC. Likewise, INC filed a motion in the same case to
compel one Mrs. Leticia P. Ligon to produce and surrender to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City the owner's duplicate copy of TCT Nos. RT-26521 and
RT-26520 covering the aforementioned two parcels of land, so that the sale
in INC's favor may be registered and new titles issued in the name of INC.
Mrs. Ligon was alleged to be the mortgagee of the two parcels of land
executed in her favor by certain Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag and Rowaida
Busran-Sampaco claimed to be in behalf of the Carpizo Group.
The IDP-Tamano Group, on June 11, 1991, sought to intervene in Civil Case
No. Q-90-6937 averring, inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That the Intervenor has filed a case before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Mr. Farouk
Carpizo, et. al., who, through false schemes and
machinations, succeeded in executing the Deed of Sale
between the IDP and the Iglesia Ni Kristo (plaintiff in the
instant case) and which Deed of Sale is the subject of the
case at bar;
3. That the said case before the SEC is docketed as Case
No. 04012, the main issue of which is whether or not the
aforesaid Deed of Sale between IDP and the Iglesia ni Kristo

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
is null and void, hence, Intervenor's legal interest in the
instant case. A copy of the said case is hereto attached as
Annex "A";
4. That, furthermore, Intervenor herein is the duly constituted
body which can lawfully and legally represent the Islamic
Directorate of the Philippines;

On April 6, 1992, the above Order was amended by Judge Reyes directing
Ligon "to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. RT-26521
(170567) and RT-26520 (176616) to the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City for the purposes stated in the Order of March 2, 1992." 19
Mortgagee Ligon went to the Court of Appeals, thru a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R No. SP-27973, assailing the foregoing Orders of Judge
Reyes. The appellate court dismissed her petition on October 28, 1992. 20

xxx xxx xxx 13

Private respondent INC opposed the motion arguing, inter alia, that the issue
sought to be litigated by way of intervention is an intra-corporate dispute
which falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC. 14
Judge Celia Lipana-Reyes of Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
denied petitioner's motion to intervene on the ground of lack of juridical
personality of the IDP-Tamano Group and that the issues being raised by
way of intervention are intra-corporate in nature, jurisdiction thereto properly
pertaining to the SEC. 15
Apprised of the pendency of SEC Case No. 4012 involving the controverted
status of the IDP-Carpizo Group but without waiting for the outcome of said
case, Judge Reyes, on September 12, 1991, rendered Partial Judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 ordering the IDP-Carpizo Group to comply with its
obligation under the Deed of Sale of clearing the subject lots of squatters and
of delivering the actual possession thereof to INC. 16
Thereupon, Judge Reyes in another Order, dated March 2, 1992, pertaining
also to Civil Case No. Q-90-6937, treated INC as the rightful owner of the
real properties and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, Leticia P. Ligon is hereby ordered to produce
and/or surrender to plaintiff 17 the owner's copy of RT-26521
(170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the
registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the latter's name
and the annotation of the mortgage executed in her favor by
herein defendant Islamic Directorate of the Philippines on the
new transfer certificate of title to be issued to plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 18

Undaunted, Ligon filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court which
was docketed as G.R. No. 107751.
In the meantime, the SEC, on July 5, 1993, finally came out with a Decision
in SEC Case No. 4012 in this wise:
1. Declaring the by-laws submitted by the respondents
unauthorized, and hence, null and void.

21

as

2. Declaring the sale of the two (2) parcels of land in Quezon

City covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale entered into by
Iglesia ni Kristo and the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines, Inc. 22 null and void;
3. Declaring the election of the Board of Directors,
corporation from 1986 to 1991 as null and void;

23

of the

4. Declaring the acceptance of the respondents, except

Farouk Carpizo and Musnib Buat, as members of the IDP
null and void.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. 24
Private respondent INC filed a Motion for Intervention, dated September 7,
1993, in SEC Case No. 4012, but the same was denied on account of the
fact that the decision of the case had become final and executory, no appeal
having been taken therefrom. 25
INC elevated SEC Case No. 4012 to the public respondent Court of Appeals
by way of a special civil action forcertiorari, docketed as CA-G.R SP No.
33295. On October 28, 1994, the court a quo promulgated a Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 33295 granting INC's petition. The portion of the SEC Decision

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
in SEC Case No. 4012 which declared the sale of the two (2) lots in question
to INC as void was ordered set aside by the Court of Appeals.

proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity;

Thus, the IDP-Tamano Group brought the instant petition for review, dated
December 21, 1994, submitting that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in:

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their

successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

1) Not upholding the jurisdiction of the SEC to declare the nullity of the sale;
2) Encouraging multiplicity of suits; and
3) Not applying the principles of estoppel and laches.

26

While the above petition was pending, however, the Supreme Court rendered
judgment in G.R. No. 107751 on the petition filed by Mrs. Leticia P. Ligon.
The Decision, dated June 1, 1995, denied the Ligon petition and affirmed the
October 28, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-27973
which sustained the Order of Judge Reyes compelling mortgagee Ligon to
surrender the owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. RT-26521 (170567) and
RT-26520 (176616) to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City so that the Deed
of Absolute Sale in INC's favor may be properly registered.
Before we rule upon the main issue posited in this petition, we would like to
point out that our disposition in G.R. No. 107751 entitled, "Ligon v. Court of
Appeals," promulgated on June 1, 1995, in no wise constitutes res
judicata such that the petition under consideration would be barred if it were
the ease. Quite the contrary, the requisites or res judicata do not obtain in the
case at bench.
Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual
aspects of res judicata in actions in personam, to wit:
Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to
the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by
prior judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of
judgment."
There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the
judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is
invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. When
the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the
first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. But where between
the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein
such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no
identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case,
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined,
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
"conclusiveness of judgment." 27
Neither of these concepts of res judicata find relevant application in the case
at bench. While there may be identity of subject matter (IDP property) in both
cases, there is no identity of parties. The principal parties in G.R. No. 107751
were mortgagee Leticia P. Ligon, as petitioner, and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as
private respondent. The IDP, as represented by the 1971 Board of Trustees
or the Tamano Group, was only made an ancillary party in G.R. No. 107751
as intervenor. 28 It was never originally a principal party thereto. It must be
noted that intervention is not an independent action, but is merely collateral,
accessory, or ancillary to the principal action. It is just an interlocutory
proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original
parties. 29 Indeed, the IDP-Tamano Group cannot be considered a principal
party in G.R. No. 107751 for purposes of applying the principle of res
judicata since the contrary goes against the true import of the action of
intervention as a mere subsidiary proceeding without an independent life
apart from the principal action as well as the intrinsic character of the
intervenor as a mere subordinate party in the main case whose right may be
said to be only in aid of the right of the original party. 30 It is only in the
present case, actually, where the IDP-Tamano Group became a principal

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
party, as petitioner, with the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as private respondent. Clearly,
there is no identity of parties in both cases.
In this connection, although it is true that Civil Case No. Q-90-6937, which
gave rise to G.R. No. 107751, was entitled, "Iglesia Ni Kristo, Plaintiff
v. Islamic Directorate of the Philippines, Defendant," 31 the IDP can not be
considered essentially a formal party thereto for the simple reason that it was
not duly represented by a legitimate Board of Trustees in that case. As a
necessary consequence, Civil Case No. Q-90-6937, a case for Specific
Performance with Damages, a mere action in personam, did not become
final and executory insofar as the true IDP is concerned since petitioner
corporation, for want of legitimate representation, was effectively deprived of
its day in court in said case. Res interalios judicatae nullum allis praejudicium
faciunt. Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who were not
parties to it. 32 Elsewise put, no person (natural or juridical) shall be affected
by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. 33
Granting arguendo, that IDP may be considered a principal party in Ligon,
res judicata as a "bar by former judgment" will still not set in on the ground
that the cause of action in the two cases are different. The cause of action in
G.R. No. 107751 is the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of the
transfer certificates of title to the rightful possessor thereof, whereas the
cause of action in the present case is the validity of the Carpizo Group-INC
Deed of Absolute Sale.
Res Judicata in the form of "conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise
apply for the reason that any mention at all in Ligon as to the validity of the
disputed Carpizo Board-INC sale may only be deemed incidental to the
resolution of the primary issue posed in said case which is: Who between
Ligon and INC has the better right of possession over the owner's duplicate
copy of the TCTs covering the IDP property? G.R. No. 107751 cannot be
considered determinative and conclusive on the matter of the validity of the
sale for this particular issue was not the principal thrust of Ligon. To rule
otherwise would be to cause grave and irreparable injustice to IDP which
never gave its consent to the sale, thru a legitimate Board of Trustees.
In any case, while it is true that the principle of res judicata is a fundamental
component of our judicial system, it should be disregarded if its rigid
application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. 34

The main question though in this petition is: Did the Court of Appeals commit
reversible error in setting aside that portion of the SEC's Decision in SEC
Case No. 4012 which declared the sale of two (2) parcels of land in Quezon
City between the IDP-Carpizo Group and private respondent INC null and
void?
We rule in the affirmative.
There can be no question as to the authority of the SEC to pass upon the
issue as to who among the different contending groups is the legitimate
Board of Trustees of the IDP since this is a matter properly falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC by virtue of Sections 3 and 5(c)
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have absolute jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all corporations, partnership or
associations, who are the grantees of primary franchises
and/or a license or permit issued by the government to
operate in the Philippines . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over
corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws
and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Controversies in the selection or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations,
partnerships or associations. . . . .
If the SEC can declare who is the legitimate IDP Board, then by
parity of reasoning, it can also declare who is not the legitimate IDP
Board. This is precisely what the SEC did in SEC Case No. 4012
when it adjudged the election of the Carpizo Group to the IDP Board
of Trustees to be null and
void. 35 By this ruling, the SEC in effect made the unequivocal finding
that the IDP-Carpizo Group is a bogus Board of Trustees.
Consequently, the Carpizo Group is bereft of any authority

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
whatsoever to bind IDP in any kind of transaction including the sale
or disposition of ID property.
It must be noted that SEC Case No. 4012 is not the first case wherein the
SEC had the opportunity to pass upon the status of the Carpizo Group. As far
back as October 3, 1986, the SEC, in Case No. 2687, 36 in a suit between the
Carpizo Group and the Abbas Group, already declared the election of the
Carpizo Group (as well as the Abbas Group) to the IDP Board as null and
void for being violative of the Articles of Incorporation. 37 Nothing thus
becomes more settled than that the IDP-Carpizo Group with whom private
respondent INC contracted is a fake Board.
Premises considered, all acts carried out by the Carpizo Board, particularly
the sale of the Tandang Sora property, allegedly in the name of the IDP, have
to be struck down for having been done without the consent of the IDP thru a
legitimate Board of Trustees. Article 1318 of the New Civil Code lays down
the essential requisites of contracts:
There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
All these elements must be present to constitute a valid contract. For,
where even one is absent, the contract is void. As succinctly put by
Tolentino, consent is essential for the existence of a contract, and
where it is wanting, the contract is non-existent. 38 In this case, the
IDP, owner of the subject parcels of land, never gave its consent,
thru a legitimate Board of Trustees, to the disputed Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in favor of INC. This is, therefore, a case not only of
vitiated consent, but one where consent on the part of one of the
supposed contracting parties is totally wanting. Ineluctably, the
subject sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever.
The Carpizo Group-INC sale is further deemed null and void ab
initio because of the Carpizo Group's failure to comply with Section 40 of the
Corporation Code pertaining to the disposition of all or substantially all assets
of the corporation:

Sec. 40. Sale or other disposition of assets. Subject to the

provisions of existing laws on illegal combinations and
monopolies, a corporation may, by a majority vote of its
board of directors or trustees, sell, lease, exchange,
mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of all or substantially
all of its property and assets, including its goodwill, upon
terms and conditions and for such consideration, which may
be money, stocks, bonds or other instruments for the
payment of money or other property or consideration, as its
board of directors or trustees may deem expedient, when
authorized by the vote of the stockholders representing at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock; or in
case of non-stock corporation, by the vote of at least twothirds (2/3) of the members, in a stockholders' or members'
meeting duly called for the purpose. Written notice of the
proposed action and of the time and place of the meeting
shall be addressed to each stockholder or member at his
place of residence as shown on the books of the corporation
and deposited to the addressee in the post office with
postage prepaid, or served personally: Provided, That any
dissenting stockholder may exercise his appraisal right under
the conditions provided in this Code.
A sale or other disposition shall be deemed to cover
substantially all the corporate property and assets if thereby
the corporation would be rendered incapable of continuing
the business or accomplishing the purpose for which it was
incorporated.
xxx xxx xxx
The Tandang Sora property, it appears from the records, constitutes the only
property of the IDP. Hence, its sale to a third-party is a sale or disposition of
all the corporate property and assets of IDP falling squarely within the
contemplation of the foregoing section. For the sale to be valid, the majority
vote of the legitimate Board of Trustees, concurred in by the vote of at least
2/3 of the bona fide members of the corporation should have been obtained.
These twin requirements were not met as the Carpizo Group which voted to
sell the Tandang Sora property was a fake Board of Trustees, and those
whose names and signatures were affixed by the Carpizo Group together
with the sham Board Resolution authorizing the negotiation for the sale were,
from all indications, not bona fide members of the IDP as they were made to
appear to be. Apparently, there are only fifteen (15) official members of the
petitioner corporation including the eight (8) members of the Board of
Trustees. 39

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
All told, the disputed Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the fake Carpizo
Board and private respondent INC was intrinsically void ab initio.
Private respondent INC nevertheless questions the authority of the SEC to
nullify the sale for being made outside of its jurisdiction, the same not being
an intra-corporate dispute.
The resolution of the question as to whether or not the SEC had jurisdiction
to declare the subject sale null and void is rendered moot and academic by
the inherent nullity of the highly dubious sale due to lack of consent of the
IDP, owner of the subject property. No end of substantial justice will be
served if we reverse the SEC's conclusion on the matter, and remand the
case to the regular courts for further litigation over an issue which is already
determinable based on what we have in the records.
It is unfortunate that private respondent INC opposed the motion for
intervention filed by the 1971 Board of Trustees in Civil Case. No. Q-90-6937,
a case for Specific Performance with Damages between INC and the Carpizo
Group on the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. The legitimate IDP Board could
have been granted ample opportunity before the regional trial court to shed
light on the true status of the Carpizo Board and settled the matter as to the
validity of the sale then and there. But INC, wanting to acquire the property at
all costs and threatened by the participation of the legitimate IDP Board in the
civil suit, argued for the denial of the motion averring, inter alia, that the issue
sought to be litigated by the movant is intra-corporate in nature and outside
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. 40 As a result, the motion for
intervention was denied. When the Decision in SEC Case No. 4012 came out
nullifying the sale, INC came forward, this time, quibbling over the issue that
it is the regional trial court, and not the SEC, which has jurisdiction to rule on
the validity of the sale. INC is here trifling with the courts. We cannot put a
premium on this clever legal maneuverings of private respondent which, if
countenanced, would result in a failure of justice.

Furthermore, the Court observes that the INC bought the questioned property
from the Carpizo Group without even seeing the owner's duplicate copy of
the titles covering the property. This is very strange considering that the
subject lot is a large piece of real property in Quezon City worth millions, and
that under the Torrens System of Registration, the minimum requirement for
one to be a good faith buyer for value is that the vendee at least sees the
owner's duplicate copy of the title and relies upon the same. 41 The private
respondent, presumably knowledgeable on the aforesaid workings of the
Torrens System, did not take heed of this and nevertheless went through with
the sale with undue haste. The unexplained eagerness of INC to buy this
valuable piece of land in Quezon City without even being presented with the
owner's copy of the titles casts very serious doubt on the rightfulness of its
position as vendee in the transaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the public
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33295 is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Securities and Exchange
Commission dated July 5, 1993 in SEC Case No. 4012 is REINSTATED. The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel the registration
of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the name of respondent Iglesia Ni Cristo, if
one has already been made. If new titles have been issued in the name of
Iglesia Ni Cristo, the Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to cancel the same,
and issue new ones in the name of petitioner Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines. Petitioner corporation is ordered to return to private respondent
whatever amount has been initially paid by INC as consideration for the
property with legal interest, if the same was actually received by IDP.
Otherwise, INC may run after Engineer Farouk Carpizo and his group for the
amount of money paid.
SO ORDERED.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107624. January 28, 1997]

GAMALIEL C. VILLANUEVA and IRENE C. VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE and LEONILA DELA
CRUZ, and SPOUSES GUIDO and FELICITAS PILE, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue here is whether a contract of sale has been perfected
under the attendant facts and circumstances.
The petition filed on December 18, 1992 assails the Decision [1] of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on October 23, 1992 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 30741 rendered by the Eleventh Division [2] dismissing the appeal of
petitioners and affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Q-50844 dated
December 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City,
presided by Judge Estrella T. Estrada. The dispositive portion of the affirmed
decision of the RTC reads: [3]
"WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendereddismissingplaintiff'sinstantactionfor
specificperformance.However,defendantJosedelaCruzisherebyorderedto
refundorreimbursetheamountofTenThousandPesos(P10,000.00)toplaintiff
IreneVillanueva.
Theparties'otherclaimsfordamagesandattorney'sfeesarealsoherebydismissed
forbeingnecessaryconsequencesoflitigation.
Nopronouncementastocosts."

The Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the trial court were
reproduced in the assailed Decision, [4] as follows: [5]

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
"xxxplaintiff(andnowpetitioner)GamalielVillanuevahasbeenatenantoccupant
ofaunitinthe3doorapartmentbuildingerectedonaparceloflandownedby
defendantsspouses(nowprivaterespondents)JoseDelaCruzandLeoniladelaCruz,
withanareaof403squaremeters,moreorless,locatedatShortHorn,Project8,
QuezonCity(Exhibit'L'),havingsucceededintheoccupancyofsaidunitfromthe
previoustenantLolitaSantossometimein1985.AboutFebruaryof1986,defendant
JosedelaCruzofferedsaidparceloflandwiththe3doorapartmentbuildingforsale
andplaintiffs,sonandmother,showedinterestintheproperty.Asaninitialstep,
defendantJosedelaCruzgaveplaintiffIreneVillanuevaaletterofauthoritydated
February12,1986(Exhibit'A')forhertoinspectthesubjectproperty.Becausesaid
propertywasinarrearsinthepaymentoftherealtytaxes,defendantJosedelaCruz
approachedplaintiffIreneVillanuevaandaskedforacertainamounttopayforthe
taxessothatthepropertywouldbeclearedofanyincumbrance(sic).PlaintiffIrene
VillanuevagaveP10,000.00ontwooccasionsP5,000.00onJuly15,1986(Exhibit
'F')andanotherP5,000.00onOctober17,1986(Exhibit'D').Itwasagreedbythem
thatsaidP10,000.00wouldformpartofthesalepriceofP550,000.00.Sometime
thereafter,defendantJosedelaCruzwenttoplaintiffIreneVillanuevabringingwith
himMr.BenSabio,atenantofoneoftheunitsinthe3doorapartmentbuilding
locatedonthesubjectproperty,andrequestedherandhersontoallowsaidBen
Sabiotopurchaseonehalf(1/2)ofthepropertywheretheunitoccupiedbyhim
pertainedtowhichtheplaintiffsconsented,sothattheywouldjustpurchasetheother
halfportionandwouldbepayingonlyP265,000.00,theyhavingalreadygivenan
amountofP10,000.00usedforpayingtherealtytaxesinarrears.Accordinglythe
propertywassubdividedandtwo(2)separatetitlesweresecuredbydefendantsDela
Cruz.Mr.BenSabioimmediatelymadepaymentsbyinstallments.
SometimeinMarch,1987ormorespecificallyonMarch6,1987,defendantsDela
Cruzexecutedinfavoroftheircodefendants,thespousesGuidoPili(sic)and
FelicitasPili(sic),aDeedofAssignmentoftheotheronehalfportionoftheparcel
oflandwhereinplaintiffGamalielVillanueva'sapartmentunitissituated,designated
asLot3AoftheSubdivisionPlan(LRC)Psd337290,Block24,Pcs4865,withan
areaof201.50squaremeters,moreorless,andcoveredbyTransferCertificateof
Title332445,purportedlyasfullpaymentandsatisfactionofanindebtedness(sic)
obtainedfromdefendantsPili(sic)(Exhibit'G';Exhibit'3').Consequently,Transfer
CertificateofTitleNo.356040wasissuedinthenameofdefendantsPili(sic)also
onMarch6,1987.Immediatelythereafter,theplaintiffscametoknowofsuch
assignmentandtransferandissuanceofanewcertificateoftitleinfavorof
defendantsPili(sic)sothatplaintiffGamalielVillanuevacomplainedtothe
barangaycaptainofBahayTuro,QuezonCity,onthegroundthattherewasalready
anagreementbetweendefendantsDelaCruzandthemselvesthatsaidportionofthe
parceloflandownedbydefendantsDelaCruzwouldbesoldtohim.Astherewasno
settlementarrivedat,theplaintiffselevatedtheircomplainttothisCourtthroughthe
instantaction."

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents. An

appeal was duly brought to public respondent which as earlier stated affirmed
the said decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

The Issues
The following errors are alleged to have been committed by public
respondent: [6]
"I
TheCourtofAppealserredinfailingtofindthatthereisaperfectedcontractofsale
ofsubjectpropertybetweenpetitionersandrespondentsspousesDelaCruz
II
TheCourtofAppealserredinapplyingtheStatuteofFraudsinthiscasewhenitisa
contractofsalethatwaspartlyexecuted
III
TheCourtofAppealserredinnotfindingthatthisbeingacaseofdoublesaleof
immovableproperty,althoughrespondentsspousesPili(sic)recordedthedeedof
assignmenttothemintheRegistryofDeedstheywerenotingoodfaithwhile(sic)
petitionersaspurchasersthereofwereinpriorpossessioningoodfaithofthe
property.
IV
TheCourtofAppealserredinfailingtoreverseandsetasidetheappealedjudgment
ofthetrialcourtandrenderingajudgmentforpetitioners"
In the opinion of this Court, these four issues may be summed up in a
single question: Under the factual circumstances of this case, was there a
perfected contract of sale?
Petitioners contend that the adopted findings of facts of public
respondent are contradicted by its ruling that there is no agreement as to the
price of the apartments. They argue that on the basis of the facts found by
public respondent, "the conclusion is ineluctable that there was a perfected

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
contract of sale of the subject property." [7] According to petitioners, private
respondents had to secure their consent to enable "Sabio to buy the one-half
portion of the property where the unit Sabio was renting pertains so that
petitioners will pay only the balance of P265,000.00 for the purchase of the
other half after deducting the P10,000.00 petitioners advanced." [8] Public
respondent's conclusion that the P10,000.00 paid to petitioners was not
intended as part of the purchase price allegedly "collides" with its quoted
findings, as follows: [9]

Q Why did you not sign the Deed of Sale you

mentioned?

"ItwasagreedbythemthatsaidP
10,000.00wouldformpartofthesaleprice
ofP
550,000.00.xxxdefendantJosedelaCruz.xxxrequestedherandhersonto
allowsaidBenSabiotopurchaseonehalf(1/2)ofthepropertywheretheunit
occupiedbyhimpertainedtowhichplaintiffsconsented,sotheywouldpurchasethe
otherhalfportionandwouldbepayingonlyP
265,000.00theyhavingalreadygiven
anamountofP
10,000,00usedforpayingtherealtytaxesinarrears.xxx"
(Underscoringinthepetition).

Q What are your other reasons?

A The Villanuevas told me to prepare the documents

involved in this transaction because according to
her (sic) she (sic) was only waiting for the money to
come but because I was then being pressed by
Felicitas Pile for the payment of my loan. I was
constrained to assign the property to her.

A Aside from that we were still huggling (sic) for the

purchase price then and since I was being pressed
by my creditor, I was forced to make the
assignment.'"
The most that public respondent can be faulted with is its failure to
expressly state that although its conclusion of law was correct, the trial court
erred in its statement of the facts.

The Court's Ruling

The arguments of petitioners do not persuade us. While it is true that
respondent Court adopted the recitation of facts of the trial court, it
nonetheless later corrected the relevant portions thereof as it found that no
perfected contract of sale was agreed upon. Thus, public respondent
explained: [10]
"Appellants'theoryofearnestmoneycannotbesustainedinviewofthecatenaof
circumstanceshowingthattheP10,000.00giventoappelleeswasnotintendedto
formpartofthepurchaseprice.AsthegreatcommentatorManresaobservesthatthe
deliveryofpartofthepurchasepriceshouldnotbeunderstoodasconstituting
earnestmoneyunlessitbeshownthatsuchwastheintentionoftheparties(Manresa
CommentariesontheCivilCode,2ded.,Vol.10,p.85).Moreover,ascanbe
gleanedfromtherecordstherewasnoconcreteagreementtothepriceandmannerof
payment:
'Q Will you tell us why your transaction with plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) did not materialize?
A Because I have been returning to Mrs. Villanueva and
in fact we have executed a Deed of Sale which was
in fact not signed.

Was There a Perfected Contract of Sale?

Petitioners contend that private respondents' counsel admitted that
"P10,000 is partial or advance payment of the property (TSN, June 14
[should be 15], 4 (sic) 1990, pages 6 to 7)." Necessarily then, there must
have been an agreement as to price. They cite Article 1482 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(w)henever earnest money is given in a contract of sale,
it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the
contract." [11]
Private respondents contradict this claim with the argument that "(w)hat
was clearly agreed (upon) between petitioners and respondents Dela Cruz
was that the P10,000.00 primarily intended as payment for realty tax was
going to form part of the consideration of the sale if and when the transaction
would finally be consummated." [12] Private respondents insist that there "was
no clear agreement as to the true amount of consideration." [13]
Generally, the findings of fact of the lower courts are entitled to great
weight and not disturbed except for cogent reasons. [14]Indeed, they should
not be changed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing that the trial
court overlooked, disregarded, or misinterpreted some facts of weight and
significance, which if considered would have altered the result of the
case. [15] In this case, and subject to the above clarification made by the
appellate court, petitioners have failed to convince us to alter such findings.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In fact, a review of the evidence merely strengthens the conclusions of
public respondent. We scoured the transcripts but we found that respondent
dela Cruz never testified that he (or his spouse Leonila) had agreed to a
definite price for the subject property. In fact, his testimony during the crossexamination firmly negated any price agreement with petitioners because he
and his wife quoted the price of P575,000.00 and did not agree to reduce it
to P550,000.00 as claimed by petitioner: [16]
"Q And despite the fact that the property was mortgaged with
Development Bank of Rizal you still contrated (sic) Sandiego
(sic) for the purpose of selling the property?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did Sandiego (sic) agree as agent in selling the property
despite the fact that it was mortgaged with the Development
Bank of Rizal?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you recall the condition you offered to Sandiego (sic) to act
as your agent in selling the same?
A He will get certain commission for the same.
Q Will you state the price and conditions set forth in selling the
property?
A P575 thousand, sir.
Q That is the same offer that was given to you by plaintiff Mrs.
Villanueva?
A I can not recall, I think so.
Q And you will agree with me that 1/2 of P575 thousand is how
much (sic)?
ATTY. MANZO:
There (is) nothing to agree with you counsel.
ATTY. GUPIT:
And the offer to you, the agreed price between you and Mrs.
Villanueva is P275 thousand as stated in the agreement that
was prepared?
ATTY. MANZO:
Counsel is again assuming that there was an agreement made
already.

(ATTY. GUPIT:)
He answered there is a document between Villanueva and Dela
Cruz.
ATTY. (MANZO):
Let the witness be confronted by the document."
We are not unmindful of petitioner Irene Villanueva's claim that the
parties agreed on the sum of P550,000.00, as follows: [17]
"ATTY. GUPIT
What was the result of the negotiations?
WITNESS (Irene Villanueva):
We agreed that he would sell the land to us for the sum of, the
amount of P550,000.00
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS
After the Deed of Sale relative to the purchase of the property was
prepared, Mr. dela Cruz (private respondent Jose) came to me
and told me that he talked with one of the tenants and he
offered to buy the portion he was occupying if I will agree and I
will cause the partition of the property between us.
ATTY. GUPIT
Did you agree with the proposal of Mr. dela Cruz that the portion of
the property will be sold to one of the tenants?
WITNESS
Yes(,) sir. I agreed because we are (sic) both tenants.
ATTY. GUPIT
How about the price? How much are (sic) you supposed to pay in
order to complete your payments?
WITNESS
We are (sic) supposed to divide the amount of P550,000.00."
To settle the above conflicting claims of the parties, petitioners could
have presented the contract of sale allegedly prepared by private respondent
Jose dela Cruz. Unfortunately, the contract was not presented in evidence.
However, petitioners aver that even if the unsigned deed of sale was not

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
produced, private respondent Jose dela Cruz "admitted preparing (said) deed
in accordance with their agreement." [18] This judicial admission" is allegedly
the "best proof of its existence." [19] Further it was "impossible" for petitioners
to produce the same "since it was and remained in the possession" of private
respondent Jose dela Cruz. [20]
We do not agree with petitioners. Assuming arguendo that such draft
deed existed, it does not necessarily follow that there was already a definite
agreement as to the price. If there was, why then did private respondent Jose
de la Cruz not sign it? If indeed the draft deed of sale was that important to
petitioners' cause, they should have shown some effort to procure it. They
could have secured it through a subpoena duces tecum or thru the use of
one of the modes of discovery. But petitioners made no such effort. And even
if produced, it would not have commanded any probative value as it was not
signed.
As has been said in an old case, the price of the leased land not having
been fixed, the essential elements which give life to the contract were
lacking. It follows that the lessee cannot compel the lessor to sell the leased
land to him. [21] The price must be certain, it must be real, not fictitious. [22] It is
not necessary that the certainty of the price be actual or determined at the
time of executing the contract. The fact that the exact amount to be paid
therefor is not precisely fixed, is no bar to an action to recover such
compensation, provided the contract, by its terms, furnishes a basis or
measure for ascertaining the amount agreed upon. [23] The price could be
made certain by the application of known factors; where, in a sale of coal, a
basic price was fixed, but subject to modification "in proportion to variations
in calories and ash content, and not otherwise," the price was held
certain. [24] A contract of sale is not void for uncertainty when the price,
though not directly stated in terms of pesos and centavos, can be made
certain by reference to existing invoices identified in the agreement. In this
respect, the contract of sale is perfected. [25] The price must be certain,
otherwise there is no true consent between the parties. [26] There can be no
sale without a price. [27] In the instant case, however, what is dramatically
clear from the evidence is that there was no meeting of mind as to the price,
expressly or impliedly, directly or indirectly.
Sale is a consensual contract. He who alleges it must show its existence
by competent proof. Here, the very essential element of price has not been
proven.
Lastly, petitioners' claim that they are ready to pay private
respondents [28] is immaterial and irrelevant as the latter cannot be forced to
accept such payment, there being no perfected contract of sale in the first
place.

Applicability of Statute of Frauds and the Law on Double Sale

Petitioners contend that the statute of frauds does not apply because
such statute applies only to executory contracts whereas in this case the
contract of sale had already been partly executed. [29] Further, petitioners,
citing Article 1544 of the Civil Code asseverate that being in possession of
the property in good faith therefore they should be deemed the lawful owners
thereof. [30] On the other hand, private respondents counter that the contract
in this case is a "mere executory contract and not a completed or executed
contract." [31]
Both contentions are inaccurate. True, the statute of frauds applies only
to executory contracts and not to partially or completely executed
ones. [32] However, there is no perfected contract in this case, therefore there
is no basis for the application of the statute of frauds. The application of such
statute presupposes the existence of a perfected contract and requires only
that a note or memorandum be executed in order to compel judicial
enforcement thereof. Also, the civil law rule on double sale finds no
application because there was no sale at all to begin with.
At bottom, what took place was only a prolonged negotiation to buy and
to sell, and at most, an offer and a counter-offer but no definite agreement
was reached by the parties. Hence, the rules on perfected contract of sale,
statute of frauds and double sale find no relevance nor application.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-11374. May 30, 1958.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DIOSCORO PINUILA, ET AL.,Defendants, ABSALON
BIGNAY, Defendant-Appellant.
Attorney de oficio Julio T. de la Cruz for Appellants.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Hector C.
Fulefor appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. LAW OF THE CASE; JUDGMENT WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND

CONCLUSIVE BECOMES LAW OF THE CASE; EFFECT OF NEW
INTERPRETATION OF LAW ON THE FINAL JUDGMENT; CASE AT
BAR. Appellant was charged with murder in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. In the course of the trial, after the
defense had raised the point of jurisdiction, the court dismissed the
case. Upon appeal by the Government, this Court resolved to
remand the case for further proceedings, following the doctrine in
People v. Salico, 47 Off. Gaz., 1765, which held that an appeal by
the Government from an order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
when such jurisdiction really existed, which order of dismissal was
based on or prompted by a motion to dismiss filed by the court
thereafter convicted the appellant who has now appealed to this
Court. In the meantime, the doctrine laid down in the Salico case,
not being in accordance with the law on double jeopardy, was
abandoned by this Tribunal. Query: Whether the new doctrine
overruling that of the Salico case should and could be applied to
the present case. Held: The decision of this Court on that appeal by
the Government from the order of dismissal, holding that said
appeal did not place the appellants, including appellant herein, in
double jeopardy promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long
become final and conclusive and has become the law of the case. It
may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
recently interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so, it may not be
disturbed and modified. The recent interpretation of the law may
be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and
conclusively determined.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WAIVER OF
DEFENSE. One aspect of the case of double jeopardy is that said
defense may be waived, and that failure to urge it in the appeal
may be regarded as a waiver of said defense.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Defendant Absalon Bignay is appealing the decision of the Court of

First Instance of Negros Occidental, finding him guilty of murder for
the death of Buenaventura Dideroy, and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-third
of the costs.
The following facts are not disputed. Early in the morning of
October 20, 1948, the Barge No. 560 of the Visayan Stevedoring
Company, loaded with molasses, was anchored some distance from
the mouth of the Victorias River, Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Bonifacio del Cano and Buenaventura Dideroy as members of the
crew of said barge, were sleeping inside its cabin, with a lighted
petroleum lamp hanging from the ceiling. Dideroy was suddenly
and violently attacked by men provided with stout wooden clubs,
which were being used as the capstan handle bars, resulting in a
fracture of his skull and other injuries to his body, which caused his
death hours later. Del Cano went ashore and reported the tragic
incident to the person in charge of the barge, who in turn notified
the authorities, and the police and the president of the sanitary
division lost no time in going to the vessel and making the
corresponding investigation. On the basis of said investigation,
appellant was arrested together with Dioscoro Pinuila and Conrado
Daiz, who were later charged with murder.

At the trial, the Government presented its evidence and after it had
rested its case, counsel for the accused filed a motion for dismissal
on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental had not been duly established. Although the
information charged that the crime was committed inside the barge
and within the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the
evidence for the Government tended to show that at the time, the
barge was not exactly docked at the bank of the Victorias River, but
was some distance from the mouth of said river, a precaution taken
by the master of the barge, so that at low tide, the barge would
not be stranded. On the basis of this finding, the trial court
sustained the motion for dismissal and claiming that its jurisdiction
had not been duly established, it dismissed the case, but provided
in its order that the three accused should not be released until the
order shall have become final.
The order of dismissal was appealed by the Government to this
Tribunal, over the objection of the defense which invoked the
principle of double jeopardy. But this Court in a decision
promulgated on March 28, 1952, found that the jurisdiction of the
trial court had been proven, and that the appeal did not involve
double jeopardy, and so remanded the case for further
proceedings.
As already stated, the three accused continued to be under arrest.
However, while the order of dismissal was pending appeal in this
Court, by virtue of an order of the trial court in a petition
for habeas corpus, the three defendants were released. When
criminal proceedings were resumed by the lower court, the arrest
of the three accused was sought, but only appellant Bignay could
be apprehended. His co-accused, Pinuila and Daiz, evaded arrest
and until now are still at large. For this reason, the trial was
continued only against Bignay.
The evidence shows that about three months before October 20,
1948, when Dideroy was killed, the latter and Dioscoro Pinuila were
in the aforementioned Barge 560, anchored along the Pasig River in
Manila, Dideroy as a plain sailor and Pinuila as master or patron. It
seems that Pinuila had misused or embezzled the mess funds in his
care, and the crew resented it, resulting in a violent quarrel and
fight between Pinuila and Dideroy. In the course of the fight, the
two men fell into the Pasig River and they continued the fight in the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
water. Being a bigger and stronger man, Dideroy was winning the
fight, and had it not been for the intervention of his companions,
Pinuila would have drowned. Pinuila not only lost the fight, but also
lost his job as master of the barge, presumably because of his
embezzlement of the mess funds. Because of all this, he nursed a
grudge against Dideroy and he found the opportunity of getting
even when he learned of the presence of Barge 560 with his enemy
in it, anchored near the mouth of the Victorias River.

wanted an amicable settlement. The news spread in the community

and the three accused fell into the trap set for them. They
appeared before Sergeant Ligada, Pinuila readily admitting that
they made the attack in order for him to get even with Dideroy for
what he had done to him in Manila three months before. Bignay
impliedly admitted participating in the attack because he told the
sergeant that he had to help Pinuila in the assault because Dideroy
was a big man.

Pinuila enlisted the aid of appellant Bignay and one Conrado Daiz,
ostensibly to help him get his equipment, including a table, from
the said barge, and for this he paid each of them two pesos. There
is no proof that Bignay and Daiz were informed by him or came to
know before hand that they were going to attack Dideroy inside the
barge. The truth is that at about 2:30 in the morning of October
20, 1948, the three took a small sailboat and boarded the barge,
and the three of them, each provided with a capstan wooden
handle bar, attacked Dideroy while he was sleeping. Del Cano, his
companion, was rudely awakened by the noise, and seeing the
assault and realizing the danger to himself, he jumped out of the
cabin through its window, hid under it, but through a large hole he
looked inside the cabin and witnessed the progress of the attack.
By the light of the petroleum lamp, he could easily identify Pinuila
and saw the faces of his two companions, noting that one of them
was limping, as though he were lame. After the attack, and
possibly believing that Dideroy was dead, Daiz said, "Where is the
other man, companion of this man Dideroy? Let us finish him also."
But Pinuila interceded, saying that Del Cano had no fault at all and
deserved no punishment, and he (Pinuila) proceeded to call out to
Del Cano, telling him not to be afraid because he would not be
harmed. Relying on this assurance, Del Cano came out of his hiding
place and approached the group. Pinuila said that they were
leaving, and that he (Del Cano) should take care of everything, at
the same time, giving the hint or warning that they had a rifle in
their boat, presumably meaning that if he informed the authorities
of the identity of appellants, his life would be in danger.

During the trial, Del Cano readily identified not only Pinuila but also
Bignay and Daiz as the assailants of Dideroy. There is, therefore,
no room for doubt that said three men were responsible for the
death of Dideroy, with Pinuila as the mastermind.

In the course of the investigation by the police, Manuel Ligada,

police desk sergeant of Victorias, went to the barrio within which
the crime was committed, and informed the residents that he was
looking for Pinuila, Daiz, and Bignay, not to arrest them for any
killing, because according to him, Dideroy was alive, but rather for
them to enter into negotiations with the victim of their attack who

The trial court found the crime committed to be murder, qualified

by evident premeditation, with the concurrence of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and treachery, compensated by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and imposed the
penalty in its medium degree. Of course, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery absorbs that of nighttime.
We are inclined to be lenient with appellant Bignay. Of the three
accused, he is clearly the least guilty. Moreover, he has been in jail
since 1952 when re-arrested, because by order of this Court, the
criminal proceedings were resumed. This, aside from the fact that
he had also been under arrest since 1948, up to the time he and
his co- accused were released after instituting habeas
corpus proceedings in 1949. In other words, he has been in jail for
about seven years. We are ready to believe and to find that the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation found by the
lower court to qualify the murder, does not apply to him. For two
pesos, it is hard to believe that appellant would agree to kill
Dideroy. It is more likely, even more probable, that he only agreed
to accompany Pinuila to get the latters equipment from Barge 560,
and only learned and realized that their trip to the barge was for a
sinister purpose, when they were already aboard the barge and
shortly before the actual attack. In the absence of evident
premeditation, the aggravating circumstance of alevosia should be
used as the qualifying circumstance of the crime of murder, thereby
leaving no aggravating circumstance. With the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, Bignay is entitled
to the penalty for the crime being imposed in its minimum degree,
namely, reclusion temporal in its maximum degree. Applying the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
law on indeterminate sentence, appellant Absalon Bignay should be
sentenced to not less than twelve years of prision mayor and not
more than seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal.

and modified. Our recent interpretation of the law maybe applied to

new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined. As already stated, the majority opinion in that appeal
is now the law of the case.

In the course of the discussion of this case and before it was

actually submitted to a vote, Chief Justice Paras raised the question
of double jeopardy, and without questioning the guilt of the
appellant on the basis of the evidence of record, claimed that said
appellant has once been placed in jeopardy and, therefore, he
should now be acquitted. It is argued that the decision of this Court
on the appeal prosecuted by the Government from the order of
dismissal of the trial court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, (G.
R. No. L-3217) was based on the case of People v. Salico, * 47 Off.
Gaz., 1765, which held that an appeal by the Government from an
order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, when such jurisdiction
really existed, which order of dismissal was based on and prompted
by a motion to dismiss filed by the accused himself, did not place
him in jeopardy, and that the doctrine laid down in said case of
Salico has recently been overruled by this same Tribunal in more
than one case. The argument is valid and correct. As a matter of
fact, the writer of the present opinion, together with Mr. Justice
Bengzon, concurred in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice,
holding that the doctrine laid down in the case of Salico was
incorrect, not being in accordance with the law on double jeopardy,
and therefore, it should not be applied in the determination of the
former appeal by the Government (G. R. No. L-3217) from the
order of dismissal, consequently, said appeal should be dismissed.
And it is really a fact that the principle enunciated in the Salico
case has already been abandoned by this Tribunal.

"Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a

former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the .same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principle or not, so long
as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court." (21 C. J. S. 330) (Emphasis
supplied.)

However, the writer of the present opinion cannot in conscience

and under the law agree to, much less recommend that the new
doctrine overruling that enunciated in the Salico case should and
could be applied to the present case. The decision of this Court on
that appeal by the Government from the order of dismissal, holding
that said appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalon
Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six Justices
as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice,
promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long become final and
conclusive and has become the law of the case. It may be
erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently
interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed

"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is

held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or
wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being
to seek a rehearing." (5 C. J. S. 1276-77). (Emphasis supplied.)

"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the

evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the
same as that on the first or preceding appeal. all matters,
questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the
law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein." (5 C. J. S. 1267) (Emphasis
supplied.)
"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821. where,
after a definite determination, the court has remanded the cause
for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other
than those arising subsequently to such determination and remand,
or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and
if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
directions of the appellate court, its action will ,not be questioned
on a second appeal. . . . .

"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal

will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal,
although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of
the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case
bearing on the point decided have received due consideration
whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion." 5 C. J.
S. 1237-87). (Emphasis supplied.)

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The reason behind this well settled principle of law of the case is
wholesome and salutary.

did that it had already been formally and conclusively determined

and adversely decided by this Tribunal in a decision long final and
conclusive.

"The reason for the finality of the appellate decision is sometimes

alleged, without direct reference to either stare decisis or res
judicata, to be found in the want of power in an appellate court to
modify its own judgment otherwise than on a rehearing, and in
that the issuance of a mandate for a retrial takes the case out of its
jurisdiction. Again the rule has been said to be founded on the
policy of ending litigation, and to be necessary to enable an
appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently,
which would be impossible if a question. once considered and
decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any
and every subsequent appeal. If a different rule were admitted, it
is said. every change in the personnel of the bench would produce
confusion." (5 C. J. S. 1274).

In view of the foregoing, and with the modifications above-stated,

the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed. With costs.

Furthermore, in his appeal brief, appellants counsel does not raise

this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to
the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the
guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that
said defense may be waived, and that failure to urge it in the
appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double
jeopardy.

I concur in the result.

"While the rule is not inflexible, and its application lies within the
discretion of the court, except in cases where the error assigned is
fundamental, or is so plain that it reveals itself by a casual
inspection of the record, or unless the point is expressly reserved
by the report of the lower court for the appellate courts
consideration, questions assigned as error are generally considered
to be waived by implication where they are not urged or brought
forward on appeal. . . .
"Subject to the exceptions stated in the preceding section,
questions assigned as error by an appellant are generally deemed
to have been abandoned or waived where they are not urged or
discussed on appeal." (5 C. J. 1218-19).
In truth, counsel for the appellant may not be blamed for failing or
declining to raise said question of double jeopardy, knowing as he

Appellant will be credited with any preventive imprisonment

already served.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, A., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is beyond doubt that the appellant in this case is guilty. The only
question is whether he can still be convicted despite the dismissal
of the case when it was first tried in the lower court. That question
was already answered by this Court when, as a result of the
Governments appeal from the order of dismissal, the said order
was revoked and the case remanded below for further proceedings.
This Court then ruled that the appeal did not violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy. That ruling having long become final, it
should be the law of the case, specially because, as the majority
opinion points out, counsel for appellant does not now raise the
question of double jeopardy and failure to urge it in this instance
may be regarded as a waiver of that defense.
The Chief Justice observes that the application of "the law of the
case" rule is subject to judicial discretion. But even then, that
discretion should be exercised wisely and its objective should be to
help justice and not to thwart it, that is to say, to punish a proven
guilt and not to let the wrongdoer go scotfree.
PARAS, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The appellant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental with the crime of murder. In the course of the trial, after

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the defense had raised the point of jurisdiction, the court dismissed
the case. Upon appeal by the Government, this Court, following the
doctrine in People v. Salico, * 47 Off. Gaz., 1765, resolved to
remand the case for further proceedings. The Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental thereafter convicted the appellant
who has now appealed to this Court.
In the meantime, in at least three instances (People v. Bangalao,
94 Phil., 354; 50 Off. Gaz., [10], 4760; People v. Ferrer, 100 Phil.,
124, 55 Off. Gaz., [4], 620, and People v. Cabarles, 102 Phil., 926,
54 Off. Gaz., [20], 7051) by implication if not expressly, we already
revoked the doctrine enunciated in People v. Salico by unanimous
vote. The decision of the majority upholding appellants conviction
is premised on the proposition that, although the rule in People v.
Salico has been abandoned, the resolution of this Court remanding
the case at bar for further proceedings was issued while the rule in
People v. Salico was in force or, in other words, the law of the
case.
Without discussing the judgment of conviction on the merits, I am
of the firm opinion that the position of the majority is patently
untenable, and that the appellant should be acquitted on the
ground of double jeopardy. In the first place, the "law of the case"
rule is subject to exceptions we need not enumerate. It would
suffice to refer to the following authorities:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The rule is qualified, however, in a number of jurisdiction which
held that, although the court will not review or reconsider
questions decided on a formal appeal except in most unusual
circumstances or in a very clear case of error, the court is not
precluded from doing so, and the formal decision may be
reconsidered and reversed under exceptional circumstances and
when cogent reasons therefore exist." (5 C. J. S., pp. 127778; Emphasis supplied.)
"Whether the appellate court will again consider questions decided
as former appeal is within its discretion, controlled by the
circumstances of the case." (Community Natural Gas Co. v.
Northern Utilities Co. 13 S. W. [2d]; Houston Oil Co. v. Davis, 181
S. W. 851.)
"The appellate court should not hesitate to correct its erroneous
ruling on a former appeal in the same case construing a statute

involving public policy." (McGovern v. Kraus, 227 N. W. 300.)

"The courts are not in accord as to the conclusiveness of a decision
on a prior appeal in the same case where the principle enunciated
therein conflicts with rulings in other cases. In some jurisdictions it
is held that the decision continues to be law of that case as
between the parties and those claiming under them although
subsequently it is overruled in another case or there is a change in
the rule of law in that jurisdiction. but there is other authority that
the decision will not followed on a subsequent appeal if it has been
overruled by another case in the meantime, at least if no property
or contract rights have been acquired under the former decision."
(5 C.J.S., pp. 1277-78)
In the second place, although our resolution remanding this case
for further proceedings had become final, the appellant has not as
yet been finally convicted and, as a matter of fact, this Court is still
called upon to decide his present appeal from all angles. We still
have the judicial discretion, nay duty, to rehear and resolve any
question decided under an erroneous prior doctrine; and to the
credit of this Court, it has abandoned erroneous earlier decisions.
In the third place, this being a criminal case, the subsequent ruling
in the cases of People v. Bangalao, People v. Ferrer and People v.
Cabarles, should be applied retroactively in favor of the Appellant.
It is immaterial whether the appellant has not raised the issue of
double jeopardy in his brief, because in criminal cases, regardless
of the assignment of error, we have ample power to consider and
correct palpable errors.
FELIX, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice and make
mine his reasons in support of his contention. I wish, however, to
add another reason which, I know, may be more realistic than
juridical.
There is no dispute among the members of the Court that the
decision We rendered in this case when it was first brought up to
Us, was erroneous because by that time, the defendant had
already been placed in double jeopardy. Nonetheless, this Tribunal
ruled that the lower Court had jurisdiction over the case and

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
remanded the same to the lower Court for further proceedings.
Needless to say that when this case was elevated to Us for the
second time and despite our previous ruling aforementioned, the
defendant had not ceased to be in double jeopardy, and it is my
considered opinion that We cannot sanction or approve our said
ruling under the theory that it was then, the law of the case. Once
Aristotle said that he was "amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas",
and in paraphrasing this statement that history passed on to Us
and sanctioned with its approval, I may say that although I am
prone to follow the principle of stare decisis and maintain the law of
the case, as already stated, yet I am always more determined to
uphold the truth and recognize an error that this Court may have
previously committed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter
referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that
they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of
the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4,
1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang
(2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino
Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company

personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another
meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S.
de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not
to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV:
NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather
too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO
sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded
with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration
and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company
prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No.
875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A",
pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur
L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a
corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex
"C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not
violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech
against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969,
found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo
Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice
and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the
aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969,
because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it
is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within
which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules
of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63,
rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on
September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September
15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22,

1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two
(2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the fiveday period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before
the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written
arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for
reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was
filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp.
74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 &
76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was
released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties
(pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision
or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the
C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a
petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that
their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the
petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the
affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order
dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the
Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of
Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and
toestablish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights
to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion
by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the
limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that
we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated,
not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it,
the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe
unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms
are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the
fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed
by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of
Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of
the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and
Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or
"when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by
whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable
danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
"concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein
petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic
society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held
petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition
for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it
was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to
the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take
up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with
the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its
workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the
local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged
oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby
subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of
the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life
and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted
as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above
intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-avis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to

his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is
like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression,
of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over
property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet
as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of
the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization
becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all
for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and
a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The
strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration
against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over
the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could
not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be
trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute
although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that
only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in
order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a
labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the
part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the
issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by
that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of
the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any
rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their
telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969,
the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry
out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is
gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it
is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because
the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and
the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1)
in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the
workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid
and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such

common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police

indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers
for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent
means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at
least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity
to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism,
favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra,
that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as
long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order
of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while
expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave
of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure
is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to
coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more
important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen
to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on
the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their
one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired
relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to
recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly
and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to
demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on
them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a
view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found
that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not
make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss
or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits
for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by
reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment
or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on
March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the
form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the
absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent
Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at
all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would
be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of
the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social
and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency
designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with
its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.

V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right
divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null
and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas
corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted
by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to
present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for
twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched
upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord
preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the
aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as
private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must
not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law
enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these
human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right
to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to
be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are
errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be
vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle
then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot
employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with
which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice
thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec.
16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the
Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven
(7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September
15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on
September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days
late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and
concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a
legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should
be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or
subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason
and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the
aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be
affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case
does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights
affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial
Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by
the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers,
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses
therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised
Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could
have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be
reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days
within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.);
although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on

October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period
required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of
the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October
28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the
reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is
filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed
beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial
Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes
final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so
that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed
waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the
first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional
issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case
without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the
dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or
of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case,
the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of
Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein
petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no
less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle
and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties
that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread
in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly
heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of
judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this
doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of
this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of
discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly
categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any
doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors
this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals
are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court
would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to
reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can
be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as
faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the
unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the
sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule
in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural
niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human
freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over
the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing
on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material
damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the
Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It
should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the
Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it
subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light
of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial

Relations rules with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20
of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of
Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by
Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan,
etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion
is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under
Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court
of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under
this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity
of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court
is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17,
1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil.
124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is
ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to
consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners
constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to
the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ...
(Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46
Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic
rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can illafford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their
counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on
September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late
considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they
ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules
have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v.
Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was
cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank,
84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA
675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in
Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar
mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are
no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they
were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance
with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and
of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly
opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice
Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the
situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point
promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.)
Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of
Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to
help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to
be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the
petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from
work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction
when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are
members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration
against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not
dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and
"C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the
400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only
the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair
labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if
not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969
and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did
not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have
been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick
leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most
cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages
for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside
from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from
those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
Government, but from men of goodwill good men who
allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what
they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What
we must remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties
does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has
the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an
outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of
liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never
ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties
of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own
liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a
group that is important and respected, we must recognize
that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less
fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be
observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who
claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was
more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its
employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company
assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.

such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial

Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved
or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6
A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the
respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline
for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue
publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of selforganization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation
Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the
employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is
undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his
employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against
the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing
right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313
U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.

C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having
written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the
respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of
some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small
group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity

that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted
an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment
of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor
unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed
the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all
the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full
back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated,
minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from
other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., dissenting:

I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me
to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of
facts upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company,
Inc., is a corporation existing and operating under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at
666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the
respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO
or members thereof;

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of

the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4,
1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente,
(5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another
meeting was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not
to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV
"NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather
too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO
sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact
occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations
filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners
charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)
particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing
collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)
subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)

After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which
read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are
directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice
act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as
employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex
F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this
decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that
they were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact,
petitioners admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for
Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the
following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7)
days after they were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed
that they filed their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse
of the five (5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5)
days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same
rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by
respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file
not only their motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in support
thereof within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of
Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law in rendering and
issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the
facts hereof is the decision of this Court inElizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations 1 wherein it was ruled that:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of
the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in support
thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file
its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of
its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the
motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at
the same time lodged the present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before
us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment
not merely an interlocutory order there is no doubt. The
fact that there is need for computation of respondent
Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision
incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan
American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next
contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining
Division or his representative to compute the compensation
due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial
functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We
do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves
a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still
have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval,
by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no
specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision
did not make it incomplete, since this matter should
necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of
the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et

al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the
sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence
of this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to
reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16
which says that the motion must be submitted with
arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could
not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same
section commands the 'the movant shall file the same within
ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a
movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has
since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs.
Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in
order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the
arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed
on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants
Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960)
pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes
final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the
motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period, the pre forma motion for
reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless
be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press &
Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching
in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is
denied upon the ground that the arguments in support

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision subject of
the motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and
pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to
reconsider without arguments in support thereof of
August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the
five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to
the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August
27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said
arguments were filed out of time five (5) days late. And
the judgment had become final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963
seeking extension of time within which to present its
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were
only filed on August 27 five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is
to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed
only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date
which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that
the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to
the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It
merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up
the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against
the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms,
sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.

Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September

16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.
That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
unappealable. We may not review the same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not
been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the
main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners' pose
that the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad
faith but also to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on
constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an
exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and
peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that
it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the
eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully
state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the light of its
attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any
constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional
guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms enshrined
in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto,
however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional rights may be
protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent
with substantive and procedural due process are observed. No doubt no
constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities,
very often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle
is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is
a possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance, and
none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a
final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon the
ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a
constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any
judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and
unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted as an
absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers
no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned
almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment".
And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres 2 which, in
principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of
those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused
was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in
Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to present evidence
to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was
denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases
are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they
were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion
for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private
firm trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the
statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition
herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect
assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court
as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be
resolved is whether or not the respondent Courten
banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en
banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure
without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:

III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a
fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining
in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration
and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent
court refused to act one way or another on the petition for
relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing
the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the
dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom
to assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for
redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad
faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even
alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of
the provisions of the "no-lockout no strike" clause of the
collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation
and proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the same
decision stated categorically:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
'The company alleges that the walkout
because of the demonstration is tantamount
to a declaration of a strike. We do not think
so, as the same is not rooted in
any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis
supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the
petitioner union bargained in bad faith is not
tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent
company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and
the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to
thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested
that the employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request or even
settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be
disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass
dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request
of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the
demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and
lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead
and join the demonstration because most of them belonged
to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
before it went through. We can even say that it was the
company who bargained in bad faith, when upon

representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the

employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the
same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the
company filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed
those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of
the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the
respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should have
taken into account that the company's action in allowing the
return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation
and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958).
Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the
court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the
union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it
will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed
in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the
constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it
will appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent
upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected
in proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that
"the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission
vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected
in their rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang
Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is
no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the
respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits
of the case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in
the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the
hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of the
case is whether under the facts and circumstances alleged in
respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by
the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike no lock out" clause of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully
reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had
altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does
not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners
should have been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its
own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners
as having "bargained in faith." The stand of the respondent
court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "nonsiquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the
freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the
duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution
is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision would be null
and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were
not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by
the respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising
any issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of the industrial
court is null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the
respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement herein involved over and above their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the
abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend
that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the
proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the

alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of judgment rather than that
of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and
indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the
fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to
join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been duly
presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the
simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it
the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error
of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the
charge against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a
mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question
has no constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of
argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance to
the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management
and proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm still, We
cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties
divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of
this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period
fixed by law; litigations would be endless, no questions would be finally
settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the losing party
were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future". 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation,
construction or application of a constitutional precept not constituting a denial
of due process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be
less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an
ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting
his individual, freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be
intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that inform the
principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason
why, as I have already noted, the main opinion does not cite any
constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle
supporting its basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees,
other than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid
judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of
Education, 4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting, 5 is that "it is
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners have
not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately
argued the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the
main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that
the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to
a denial of due process renders its judgment or decision null and void, and,
therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become
final and executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with
the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only
to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along
with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate
jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines 6 (reenacted
practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to
realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to us to review
decisions of lower courts involving questions of law(and these include
constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive
agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner
provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can
exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how
important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the
applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals
from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law
or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is already final and executory, this
Court would be devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter or
modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is
not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not
specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be
enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same;
rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to
entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice
Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by
the main opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs.
Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case,
We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but
even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the
judgment (against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and
enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the correctness

thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not
they are correct is something that is always dependent upon combined
opinion of the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as
changeable as the members themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of
anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice
than the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want
of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such court may
still be set aside or reopened in instances other than those expressly allowed
by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the Civil
Code. 7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments
once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions
are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors, 8 it is only when the
fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be
set aside, 9 and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive
period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82
Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v.
Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to
spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were
allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to
determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy
his judgments about from one party to the other, and to
change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a
chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might become
more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.'

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil.,
257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and
invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the
contents of the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I
said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not
escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of
the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical
implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision,
amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I
want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not
detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding
force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications.
The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial
decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the
highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them.
Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I
believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am
doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the
decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as
I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to
guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true
and correct meaning and implications of decision of this
Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving cases in
the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be constrained by technical
rules of procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to the
parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I
am certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a
judgment already final and executory. It too obvious to require extended
elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that the principle of
immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may
considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on
public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give
priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold
on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing and
constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in

the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement
on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead
constricts the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the
petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated
as it was pursuant to mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too
short, especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed
for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the
filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as
circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that there
can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in
question. Said rule provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies,
within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice
of the order or decision, object of the motion for
reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with
respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and
serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on
the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6)
copies, duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted
with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can
not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days
from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.
The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments
submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after
ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case
the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to
that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone
acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well knows, precisely
permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma
motion for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and
with barely a brief statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor,
without prejudice to supplementing the same by making the necessary
exposition, with citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be
filed (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree with
the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and general terms.
Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone concerned
within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to sought, and
thereby enable the parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It
must borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the
operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems might
require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and
concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the
case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier settlement may, if
possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is
short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no more than the
following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this

Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file
their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to
Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for
Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even
taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to
comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late
five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who
took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court,
as I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court".
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to
overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing
periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more substantive than
procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they have the effect of
either creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular
judgment concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final
judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same
enhances such substantive character. Moreover, because they have the
effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that
said rules partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or
abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the other

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of
abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained.
The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and be has no
reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be
asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles
to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion
that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of
the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether
we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not under our
supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative agency under the Executive
Department Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of substance
justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its
rules, I am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case
in which the judo has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their petition, in a
belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the industrial court on
October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to file
"Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration within the
reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of the
respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for respondents as
shown attested in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2)
which in brief, consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said
office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work
instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy with clerical
jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations, for, under
probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar
explanation previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered
respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due
time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance
of this kind of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither
credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan
vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge
Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such

whimsical exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of

discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to
be reviewed in the present case has already become final and executory,
nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous
from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote
to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4,
1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, upon
two days' prior notice to respondent employer company, as against the
latter's insistence that the first shift 1should not participate but instead report
for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal
from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union officers and
organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's
complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so
carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly
was not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent
employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union office manifestly
constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice
since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the union up to the
day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse
the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their
previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal,
since as found by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the
protagonists, but merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to
enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression,
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged
police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration of the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of
petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside
as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief
from the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their motion for
reconsideration due to such negligence which was not acted upon by
respondent court should have been granted, considering the monstrous
injustice that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their
summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in good
faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It
should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day
stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the
main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders
for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against
its wishes was but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and
the constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor be given true
substance and meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights
without due process which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness." 2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the
respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the
main opinion.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me
to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of
facts upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:

1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company,

Inc., is a corporation existing and operating under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at
666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the
respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO
or members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of
the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4,
1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente,
(5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another
meeting was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S.
de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not
to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV
"NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather
too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO
sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact
occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations
filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners
charging that: .

3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)

particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing
collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)
subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which
read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are
directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice
act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as
employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex
F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this
decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that
they were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact,
petitioners admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for
Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the
following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7)
days after they were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed
that they filed their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse
of the five (5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5)
days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same
rules.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by
respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file
not only their motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in support
thereof within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of
Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law in rendering and
issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the
facts hereof is the decision of this Court inElizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations 1 wherein it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of
the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in support
thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file
its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of
its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the
motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at
the same time lodged the present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before
us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment
not merely an interlocutory order there is no doubt. The
fact that there is need for computation of respondent
Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision
incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan
American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan

American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next

contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining
Division or his representative to compute the compensation
due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial
functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We
do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves
a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still
have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval,
by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no
specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision
did not make it incomplete, since this matter should
necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of
the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et
al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the
sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence
of this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to
reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16
which says that the motion must be submitted with
arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could
not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same
section commands the 'the movant shall file the same within
ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a
movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has
since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs.
Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in
order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the
arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed
on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960)
pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes
final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the
motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period, the pre forma motion for
reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless
be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press &
Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching
in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is
denied upon the ground that the arguments in support
thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision subject of
the motion becomes "final and unappealable".

To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up

the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against
the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms,
sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.

We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and

pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to
reconsider without arguments in support thereof of
August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the
five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to
the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August
27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said
arguments were filed out of time five (5) days late. And
the judgment had become final.

We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and

unappealable. We may not review the same.

3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963

seeking extension of time within which to present its
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were
only filed on August 27 five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is
to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed
only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date
which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that
the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to
the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It
merely filed its arguments on the 27th.

Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September

16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.
That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.

Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not

been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the
main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners' pose
that the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad
faith but also to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on
constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an
exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and
peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that
it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the
eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully
state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the light of its
attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any
constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional
guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms enshrined
in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto,
however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional rights may be
protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent
with substantive and procedural due process are observed. No doubt no
constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities,
very often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle
is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
a possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance, and
none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a
final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon the
ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a
constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any
judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and
unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted as an
absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers
no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned
almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment".
And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres 2 which, in
principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of
those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused
was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in
Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to present evidence
to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was
denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases
are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they
were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion
for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private
firm trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the
statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition
herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect
assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court
as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be
resolved is whether or not the respondent Courten
banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.

xxx xxx xxx

The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en
banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure
without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a
fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining
in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration
and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent
court refused to act one way or another on the petition for
relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing
the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the
dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom
to assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for
redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad
faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even
alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of
the provisions of the "no-lockout no strike" clause of the
collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation
and proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the same
decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout
because of the demonstration is tantamount
to a declaration of a strike. We do not think
so, as the same is not rooted in
any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis
supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the
petitioner union bargained in bad faith is not
tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent
company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and
the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to
thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested
that the employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request or even
settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be
disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass
dismissal;

Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request

of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the
demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and
lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead
and join the demonstration because most of them belonged
to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
before it went through. We can even say that it was the
company who bargained in bad faith, when upon
representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the
employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the
same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the
company filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed
those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of
the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the
respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should have
taken into account that the company's action in allowing the
return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation
and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958).
Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the
court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the
union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it
will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed
in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the
constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
will appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent
upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected
in proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that
"the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission
vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected
in their rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang
Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is
no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the
respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits
of the case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in
the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the
hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of the
case is whether under the facts and circumstances alleged in
respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by
the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike no lock out" clause of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully
reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had
altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does
not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners
should have been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its
own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners
as having "bargained in faith." The stand of the respondent
court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "nonsiquitor";

2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the

freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the
duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution
is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision would be null
and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were
not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by
the respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising
any issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of the industrial
court is null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the
respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement herein involved over and above their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the
abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend
that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the
proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the
alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of judgment rather than that
of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and
indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the
fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to
join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been duly
presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the
simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it
the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error
of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the
charge against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a
mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question
has no constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of
argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance to
the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management
and proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm still, We
cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties
divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of
this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period
fixed by law; litigations would be endless, no questions would be finally

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the losing party
were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future". 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation,
construction or application of a constitutional precept not constituting a denial
of due process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be
less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an
ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting
his individual, freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be
intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that inform the
principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason
why, as I have already noted, the main opinion does not cite any
constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle
supporting its basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees,
other than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid
judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of
Education, 4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting, 5 is that "it is
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners have
not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately
argued the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the
main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that
the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to
a denial of due process renders its judgment or decision null and void, and,
therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become
final and executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with
the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only
to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along
with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate
jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines 6 (reenacted
practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to
realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to us to review
decisions of lower courts involving questions of law(and these include
constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive
agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner

provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can
exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how
important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the
applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals
from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law
or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is already final and executory, this
Court would be devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter or
modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is
not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not
specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be
enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same;
rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to
entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice
Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by
the main opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs.
Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case,
We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but
even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the
judgment (against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and
enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the correctness
thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not
they are correct is something that is always dependent upon combined
opinion of the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as
changeable as the members themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of
anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice
than the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want
of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such court may
still be set aside or reopened in instances other than those expressly allowed
by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the Civil
Code. 7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments
once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions
are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors, 8 it is only when the
fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be
set aside, 9 and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive
period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82
Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v.
Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to
spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were
allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to
determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy
his judgments about from one party to the other, and to
change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a
chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might become
more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.'
(See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil.,
257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and
invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the
contents of the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I
said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not
escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of
the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical
implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision,
amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I
want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not
detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding
force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications.
The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial
decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the
highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them.
Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I
believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am

doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the

decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as
I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to
guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true
and correct meaning and implications of decision of this
Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving cases in
the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be constrained by technical
rules of procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to the
parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I
am certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a
judgment already final and executory. It too obvious to require extended
elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that the principle of
immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may
considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on
public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give
priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold
on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing and
constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in
the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement
on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead
constricts the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the
petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated
as it was pursuant to mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too
short, especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed
for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the
filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as
circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that there
can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in
question. Said rule provides:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies,
within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice
of the order or decision, object of the motion for
reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with
respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and
serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on
the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6)
copies, duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted
with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can
not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days
from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.
The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments
submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after
ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of
said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case
the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to
that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone
acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well knows, precisely
permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma
motion for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and
with barely a brief statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor,
without prejudice to supplementing the same by making the necessary
exposition, with citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be
filed (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree with
the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and general terms.

Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone concerned

within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to sought, and
thereby enable the parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It
must borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the
operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems might
require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and
concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the
case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier settlement may, if
possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is
short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no more than the
following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this
Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file
their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to
Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for
Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even
taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to
comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late
five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who
took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court,
as I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court".
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to
overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing
periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more substantive than
procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they have the effect of
either creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular
judgment concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final
judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same
enhances such substantive character. Moreover, because they have the
effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that
said rules partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or
abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the other
hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of
abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained.
The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and be has no
reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be
asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles
to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion
that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of
the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether
we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not under our
supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative agency under the Executive
Department Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of substance
justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its
rules, I am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case
in which the judo has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their petition, in a
belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the industrial court on
October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to file
"Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration within the
reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of the
respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for respondents as
shown attested in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2)
which in brief, consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said
office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work

instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy with clerical
jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations, for, under
probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar
explanation previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered
respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due
time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance
of this kind of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither
credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan
vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge
Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such
whimsical exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of
discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to
be reviewed in the present case has already become final and executory,
nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous
from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote
to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4,
1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, upon
two days' prior notice to respondent employer company, as against the
latter's insistence that the first shift 1should not participate but instead report
for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal
from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union officers and
organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's
complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so
carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly
was not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent
employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union office manifestly
constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice
since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the union up to the
day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse
the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their
previous requests.

Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the
respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the
main opinion.

Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal,
since as found by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the
protagonists, but merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to
enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression,
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged
police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration of the
reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of
petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside
as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief
from the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their motion for
reconsideration due to such negligence which was not acted upon by
respondent court should have been granted, considering the monstrous
injustice that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their
summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in good
faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It
should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day
stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the
main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders
for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against
its wishes was but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and
the constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor be given true
substance and meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights
without due process which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness." 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 90596

April 8, 1991

SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of
Appeals1 erred in reversing the trial court which had rendered summary
judgment; and (2) whether or not it erred in holding that an easement had
been extinguished by merger.
We rule for the petitioner on both counts.
It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in
Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel,
registered in the name of the private respondent corporation under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of
sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way:
. . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private
alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated
at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations
of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three
meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area
of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more
or less, had actually been expropriated by the City Government, and
developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro Manila
Governor. (p. 3, Record).2
As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's
title, as follows:
Entry No. 7712/T-5000 CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY
It is hereby made of record that a construction of private alley has
been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion
Street to the interior of the aforesaid property with the plan and
specification duly approved by the City Engineer subject to the

following conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least
three (3) meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be closed so
long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall
be open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private
alley has been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide
same with concrete canals as per specification of the City Engineer;
(5) That the maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at the
expense of the registered owner; (6) That the alley shall remain open
at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon;
(7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed
shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes
for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any
indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the
vendee or new owner of the property the conditions
abovementioned; other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page
No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa, Not. Pub. of Manila. 3
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of
neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered
use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against
the private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to
the easement.
The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private
respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the
order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient
estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the
petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any
indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way
lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a
"temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination
of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the
plaintiff.4 (the petitioner herein).
Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above
defenses.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the
court a quo ruled on the same as follows:
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the
merit (sic) and hereby resolve (sic) to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. (pp. 15-107, Record).5
On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the
temporary mandatory injunction, that had been issued against the
defendant, and for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this
suit.
The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby
dismissed, for lack of merit. (Summary Judgment, p. 6). 6
The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a
petition for the cancellation of the annotation in question. The court granted
cancellation, for which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the
respondent Court of Appeals which ordered the restoration of the annotation
"without prejudice [to] the final outcome of 7 the private respondent's own
appeal (subject of this petition).
In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered
summary judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary
judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the
defense set up by the private respondent that the easement in question had
been extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere
limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's
title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property,
"merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because
the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the
previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in
any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.
As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition.

There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale

executed between the private respondent and the seller, had been
constituted on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically,
the same charged the private respondent as follows: "(6) That the alley shall
remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed
thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been
constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay
pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity
for the use thereof. . ."8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across the
alley was in defiance of these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale,
and, of course, the servitude of way.
The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in
denying injunctive relief on appeal, the respondent Appellate Court
committed an error of judgment and law.
It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent
is the owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established
and that an easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not
claiming the easement or any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is
seeking to have the private respondent respect the easement already
existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that the private
respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it has failed to observe the
limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same
There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or
not an easement exists on the property, and as we indicated, we are
convinced that an easement exists.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects
the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a
mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an
independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they
actively or passively belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form
part.10 Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as
mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated 11 from the tenement,
or mortgaged separately.12

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable
from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of
the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a
portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for
the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ."13 and precisely, the former owner,
in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account of
the easement, thus:
WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto
agreed to adjust the purchase price from THREE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS
(P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THREE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,503,240.00)14
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire
ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a result of
the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put
up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as
a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of
Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in
favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a
merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person.15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a
personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong.16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement"
to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant
estate,17 in this case, the public at large.

Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant

owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement
of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public if
that is possible no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a
personal easement.
For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary
judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of Appeals held that it (the
trial court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error.
Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where
there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts
appear undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits of record.18 In one case, this Court upheld a decision of the trial
court rendered by summary judgment on a claim for money to which the
defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed to produce
receipts.19We held that under the circumstances, the defense was not
genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In
another case, we rejected the claim of acquisitive prescription over registered
property and found it likewise to be sham, and sustained consequently, a
summary judgment rendered because the title challenged was covered by a
Torrens Certificate and under the law, Torrens titles are imprescriptible. 20
We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary
judgment rendered thereon, on the ground that from the records, the plaintiffs
were clearly guilty of laches having failed to act until after twenty-seven
years.21 We likewise allowed summary judgment and rejected contentions of
economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding payment under a contract for
the reason that the contract imposed liability under any and all conditions. 22
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense,
indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and
secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other
words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material
fact and can not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.
As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of
the ritual of a trial where, from existing records,23 the facts have been
established, and trial would be futile.
What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent and
consequently, the challenged holding of the respondent Court of Appeals as
well is the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in
its CA-G.R. No. 13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at the back of the private
respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case No.
273. As the petitioner now in fact insists, the Court of Appeals' judgment,
which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated December 14, 1988,
in G.R. No. 83540, is at least, the law of the case between the parties, as
"law of the case" is known in law, e.g.:
xxx

xxx

none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87).

(Emphasis supplied.)24
CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to
determine the rights of the parties regarding the easement, subject of the
controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of
annotation" it may have, at a glance, suggested a different cause of action.

xxx

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a

former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330) (Emphasis
supplied).
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the
evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the
same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions,
points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the
case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or
readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.)

And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CAG.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case, after all, it was the one that initiated
the cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273
that precipitated that appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for
cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to preempt the injunction
decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private
respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, as we have described the term:
xxx

xxx

xxx

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion

in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to
suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations
commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is
pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. 25

In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where,

after a definite determination, the court has remanded the cause for
further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than
those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or
other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the
court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions
of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second
appeal.

to which contempt is a penalty.26

As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is

held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong,
the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a
rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77). (Emphasis supplied.)

As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the

will of the owner.

Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal

will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal,
although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the
court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on
the point decided have received due consideration whether all or

As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private

respondent found an unfriendly court and it can not be made to profit from its
act of malpractice by permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its
applicability as the law of the case.

In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo,27 this
Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto, declared that a personal
servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere
"act"28 of the landowner, and is not "contractual in the nature," 29 and a third
party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality to claim its
benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
that a personal or voluntary servitude does require a contract and that "[t]he
act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute
an offer . . . "30 and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance;
hence no contract."31
The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal
titans (they would contend even more spiritedly in the "larger" world of
politics) to whom present scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who,
because of the paths they have taken, have shaped history itself; after all,
and coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed that an easement has
been constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case. Rather, the
question is whether it is still existing or whether it has been extinguished. As
we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the
private respondent can not bar the public, by erecting an obstruction on the
alley, from its use.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW
CAUSE why they should not be punished for contempt of court, and also
administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum shopping.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999]

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
LEO

ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
AL., respondents.

vs. SECRETARY

OF

JUSTICE,

ET

RE SOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution
of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is
the submission of public respondents that:
"(1)TheDecisioninthiscasehavingbecomefinalandexecutory,itsexecution
enterstheexclusiveambitofauthorityoftheexecutiveauthority.Theissuanceofthe
TROmaybeconstruedastrenchingonthatsphereofexecutiveauthority;
(2)Theissuanceofthetemporaryrestrainingorderxxxcreatesdangerousprecedent
astherewillneverbeanendtolitigationbecausethereisalwaysapossibilitythat
Congressmayrepealalaw.
(3)Congresshadearlierdeliberatedextensivelyonthedeathpenaltybill.Tobe
certain,whateverquestionmaynowberaisedontheDeathPenaltyLawbeforethe
presentCongresswithinthe6monthperiodgivenbythisHonorableCourthadinall
probabilitybeenfullydebateduponxxx.
(4)Underthetimehonoredmaximlexfuturo,judexpraeterito,thelawlooksforward
whilethejudgelooksatthepast,xxxtheHonorableCourtinissuingtheTROhas
transcendeditspowerofjudicialreview.
(5)Atthismoment,certaincircumstances/superveningeventstranspiredtotheeffect
thattherepealormodificationofthelawimposingdeathpenaltyhasbecomenil,to
wit:
a.ThepublicpronouncementofPresidentEstradathathewillvetoany
lawimposingthedeathpenaltyinvolvingheinouscrimes.
b.TheresolutionofCongressmanGolez,etal.,thattheyareagainsttherepealofthe
law;
c.ThefactthatSenatorRoco'sresolutiontorepealthelawonlybearshis
signatureandthatofSenatorPimentel."

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public

respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided
for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the
Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter,
and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred
thirteen (113) congressmen.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order x x x is
within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers
nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay
execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to
address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is
no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until
Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern
matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was
imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations
was assailed by petitioner.For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4,
1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated
January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999.
Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that
the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents
that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer
restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking
the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that
"it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to
begin litigation."[1] Tostart with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final
Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the
Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled
out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
"ENTRYOFJUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ThisistocertifythatonOctober12,1998adecisionrenderedintheaboveentitled
casewasfiledinthisOffice,thedispositivepartofwhichreadsasfollows:
`WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIEDinsofaraspetitionerseekstodeclarethe
assailedstatute(RepublicActNo.8177)asunconstitutional;butGRANTEDinsofar
asSections17and19oftheRulesandRegulationstoImplementRepublicActNo.
8177areconcerned,whichareherebydeclaredINVALIDbecause(a)Section17
contravenesArticle83oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbySection25of
RepublicActNo.7659;and(b)Section19failstoprovideforreviewandapproval
oftheLethalInjectionManualbytheSecretaryofJustice,andunjustifiablymakes
themanualconfidential,henceunavailabletointerestedpartiesincludingthe
accused/convictandcounsel.Respondentsareherebyenjoinedfromenforcingand
implementingRepublicActNo.8177untiltheaforesaidSections17and19ofthe
RulesandRegulationstoImplementRepublicActNo.8177areappropriately
amended,revisedand/orcorrectedinaccordancewiththisDecision.
SOORDERED.'
andthatthesamehas,onNovember6,1998becomefinalandexecutoryandis
herebyrecordedintheBookofEntriesofJudgment.
Manila,Philippines.

Court

G.DIMAISIP

Clerkof

By:(SGD)TERESITA
ActingChief
JudicialRecords

Office"
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998
a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998,
Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused
the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became
final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional;
(2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until
sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are

amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this
Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the
same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as follows:[2]
xxx
"thefinalityofajudgmentdoesnotmeanthattheCourthaslostallitspowers
northecase.Bythefinalityofthejudgment,whatthecourtlosesisitsjurisdiction
toamend,modifyoralterthesame.Evenafterthejudgmenthasbecomefinalthe
courtretainsitsjurisdictiontoexecuteandenforceit.[3]Thereisadifference
betweenthejurisdictionofthecourttoexecuteitsjudgmentanditsjurisdiction
toamend,modifyoralterthesame.Theformercontinuesevenafterthe
judgmenthasbecomefinalforthepurposeofenforcementofjudgment;the
latterterminateswhenthejudgmentbecomesfinal.[4]xxxForafterthejudgment
hasbecomefinalfactsandcircumstancesmaytranspirewhichcanrenderthe
executionunjustorimpossible.[5]
In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this
Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has
unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance,
[6]
viz:
"ThisSupremeCourthasrepeatedlydeclaredinvariousdecisions,whichconstitute
jurisprudenceonthesubject,thatincriminalcases,afterthesentencehasbeen
pronouncedandtheperiodforreopeningthesamehaselapsed,thecourtcannot
changeoralteritsjudgment,asitsjurisdictionhasterminated...Whenincasesof
appealorreviewthecausehasbeenreturnedtheretoforexecution,intheeventthat
thejudgmenthasbeenaffirmed,itperformsaministerialdutyinissuingtheproper
order.Butitdoesnotfollowfromthiscessationoffunctionsonthepartofthe
courtwithreferencetotheendingofthecausethatthejudicialauthority
terminatesbyhavingthenpassedcompletelytotheExecutive.Theparticularsof
theexecutionitself,whicharecertainlynotalwaysincludedinthejudgmentandwrit
ofexecution,inanyeventareabsolutelyunderthecontrolofthejudicialauthority,
whiletheexecutivehasnopoweroverthepersonoftheconvictexcepttoprovidefor
carryingoutofthepenaltyandtopardon.
Gettingdowntothesolutionofthequestioninthecaseatbar,whichisthatof
executionofacapitalsentence,itmustbeacceptedasahypothesisthat
postponementofthedatecanberequested.Therecanbenodisputeonthis
point.Itisawellknownprinciplethatnotwithstandingtheorderofexecution

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

andtheexecutorynaturethereofonthedatesetoratthepropertime,thedate
thereforcanbepostponed,eveninsentencesofdeath.Underthecommonlaw
thispostponementcanbeorderedinthreeways:(1)BycommandoftheKing;(2)by
discretion(arbitrio)ofthecourt;and(3)bymandateofthelaw.Itissufficientto
statethisprincipleofthecommonlawtorenderimpossiblethatassertioninabsolute
termsthataftertheconvicthasoncebeenplacedinjailthetrialcourtcannotreopen
thecasetoinvestigatethefactsthatshowtheneedforpostponement.Ifoneofthe
waysisbydirectionofthecourt,itisacknowledgedthatevenafterthedateof
theexecutionhasbeenfixed,andnotwithstandingthegeneralrulethatafterthe
(court)hasperformeditsministerialdutyoforderingtheexecution...andits
partisended,ifhoweveracircumstancearisesthatoughttodelaythe
execution,andthereisanimperativedutytoinvestigatetheemergencyandto
orderapostponement.Thenthequestionarisesastowhomtheapplicationfor
postponingtheexecutionoughttobeaddressedwhilethecircumstancesisunder
investigationandastowhohasjurisdictiontomaketheinvestigation."
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution[7] vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties
and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its
processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.[8] For this
purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure
to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out
by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears
repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own
Decision to give it reasonble time to check its fairness in light of supervening events
in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression,
did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents
that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it
can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in
our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the
rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the

assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power
to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39
governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120
governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed thatthe power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of
Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice."[9] Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for
it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was grantedbut it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power
of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII
provides:
"Sec.13.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertopromulgaterulesconcerning
pleading,practiceandprocedureinallcourts,andtheadmissiontothepracticeof
law.Saidrulesshallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegradeandshallnot
diminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights.Theexistinglawsonpleading,
practiceandprocedureareherebyrepealedasstatutes,andaredeclaredRulesof
Court,subjecttothepoweroftheSupremeCourttoalterandmodifythesame.The
Congressshallhavethepowertorepeal,alterorsupplementtherules
concerningpleading,practiceandprocedure,andtheadmissiontothepractice
oflawinthePhilippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re Cunanan[10] Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of
the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953[11] which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his
ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it
is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt
on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." [12] The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongsexclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone
of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxxxxxxx
"Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5)Promulgaterulesconcerningpleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts,the
admissiontothepracticeoflaw,andtheintegrationoftheBar,which,however,may
berepealed,altered,orsupplementedbytheBatasangPambansa.Suchrulesshall
provideasimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedureforthespeedydispositionofcases,
shallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshallnotdiminish,increase,or
modifysubstantiverights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar.[13]
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxxxxxxx
"Section5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5)Promulgaterulesconcerningtheprotectionandenforcementof
constitutionalrights,pleading,practiceandprocedureinallcourts,theadmissionto
thepracticeoflaw,theIntegratedBar,andlegalassistancetotheunderprivileged.
Suchrulesshallprovideasimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedureforthespeedy
dispositionofcases,shallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshallnot
diminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights.Rulesofprocedureofspecial
courtsandquasijudicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedby
theSupremeCourt."

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this
Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power
conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the
jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation ofits decision
in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on
November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December
8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this
Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the
Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him "x x xa
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the
designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal
or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial
court to the public when requested."The relevant portions of the Manifestation and
Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide
the appropriate relief" state:
xxxxxxxxx
5.InsteadoffilingacommentonJudgePonferrada'sManifestationhowever,herein
respondentissubmittingtheinstantManifestationandMotion(a)tostress,interalia,
thatthenondisclosureofthedateofexecutiondepriveshereinrespondentofvital
informationnecessaryfortheexerciseofhisstatutorypowers,aswellasrenders
nugatorytheconstitutionalguaranteethatrecognizesthepeople'srightto
informationofpublicconcern,and(b)toaskthisHonorableCourttoprovidethe
appropriaterelief.
6.Thenondisclosureofthedateofexecutiondepriveshereinrespondentofvital
informationnecessaryfortheexerciseofhispowerofsupervisionandcontrolover
theBureauofCorrectionspursuanttoSection39,Chapter8,BookIVofthe
AdministrativeCodeof1987,inrelationtoTitleIII,BookIVofsuch
AdministrativeCode,insofarastheenforcementofRepublicActNo.8177andthe
AmendedRulesandRegulationstoImplementRepublicActNo.8177isconcerned
andforthedischargeofthemandateofseeingtoitthatlawsandrulesrelativetothe
executionofsentencearefaithfullyobserved.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
7.Ontheotherhand,thewillfulomissiontorevealtheinformationabouttheprecise
dayofexecutionlimitstheexercisebythePresidentofexecutiveclemencypowers
pursuanttoSection19,ArticleVII(ExecutiveDepartment)ofthe1987Philippine
ConstitutionandArticle81oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamended,whichprovides
thatthedeathsentenceshallbecarriedout`withoutprejudicetotheexercisebythe
Presidentofhisexecutiveclemencypowersatalltimes."(Underscoring
supplied)Forinstance,thePresidentcannotgrantreprieve,i.e.,postponethe
executionofasentencetoadaycertain(Peoplev.Vera,65Phil.56,110[1937])in
theabsenceofaprecisedatetoreckonwith.Theexerciseofsuchclemencypower,
atthistime,mightevenworktotheprejudiceoftheconvictanddefeatthepurpose
oftheConstitutionandtheapplicablestatuteaswhenthedateofexecutionsetbythe
Presidentwouldbeearlierthanthatdesignatedbythecourt.
8.Moreover,thedeliberatenondisclosureofinformationaboutthedateofexecution
tohereinrespondentandthepublicviolatesSection7,ArticleIII(BillofRights)and
Section28,ArticleII(DeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePolicies)ofthe1987
PhilippineConstitutionwhichread:
SEC.7.Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallbe
recognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocumentsandpaperspertainingto
officialacts,transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdataused
asbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuch
limitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
SEC.28.Subjecttoreasonableconditionsprescribedbylaw,theStateadoptsand
implementsapolicyoffullpublicdisclosureofallitstransactionsinvolvingpublic
interest.
9.The`righttoinformation'provisionisselfexecuting.Itsupplies'therulesby
meansofwhichtherighttoinformationmaybeenjoyed(Cooley,ATreatiseonthe
ConstitutionalLimitations,167[1972])byguaranteeingtherightandmandatingthe
dutytoaffordaccesstosourcesofinformation.Hence,thefundamentalrighttherein
recognizedmaybeassertedbythepeopleupontheratificationoftheConstitution
withoutneedforanyancillaryactoftheLegislature(Id.,atp.165)Whatmaybe
providedforbytheLegislaturearereasonableconditionsandlimitationsuponthe
accesstobeaffordedwhichmust,ofnecessity,beconsistentwiththedeclaredState
policyoffullpublicdisclosureofalltransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest
(Constitution,Art.II,Sec.28).However,itcannotbeoveremphasizedthatwhatever
limitationmaybeprescribedbytheLegislature,therightandthedutyunderArt.III,
Sec.7havebecomeoperativeandenforceablebyvirtueoftheadoptionoftheNew
Charter."(DecisionoftheSupremeCourtEnBancinLegaspiv.CivilService
Commission,150SCRA530,534535[1987]."

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of
petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7,
1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to
information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not
oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more
jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the
relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its
Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has
lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend
on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision
in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive department x x x. By granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function."[14] Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section
19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
"Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,the
Presidentmaygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesand
forfeituresafterconvictionbyfinaljudgment.Heshallalsohavethepowertogrant
amnestywiththeconcurrenceofamajorityofallthemembersoftheCongress."
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested
by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused
who
has
been
convicted
by
final
judgment
still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction
cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.[15] As observed by Antieau, "today, it
is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution."[16] The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of
judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effect is the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any
time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been
enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and
their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the
power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his
final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the
three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has beengrievously distorted
especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO onDecember 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He
invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the
first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his
executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital
punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency
be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been
concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the
death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other
congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional
recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1999 [17] at 10.
a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5)
hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the
Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the
moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are merespeculations
or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and
surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under
oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of
judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one
hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still
unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that
enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A.
No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked

clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his
execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible
as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not
rush to judgment but took anextremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining
the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary - - - "until June 15,
1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the
law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled,
among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the
execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at
the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and
the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty
that the legislature will not change the circumstance of petitioner as alleged by his
counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before
allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired
result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review
capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior
events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend
the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx
"a.ThepublicpronouncementofPresidentEstradathathewillvetoanylaw
repealingthedeathpenaltyinvolvingheinouscrimes.
b.TheresolutionofCongressmanGolez,etal.,thattheyareagainsttherepealofthe
law;
c.ThefactthatSenatorRoco'sresolutiontorepealthelawonlybearshissignature
andthatofSenatorPimentel."[18]
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the
Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez
entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject
any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the
position of the House of Representatives on this matter and urging the President to
exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty
law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressmen as of January 11,
1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up to 3 o'clock in the morning,
the House of Representatives with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez
resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House "x x x does not desire at this time to review Republic Act

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify
the Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In
light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its
legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that "x x x the
question of capital punishment has been the subject of endless discussion and will
probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment."[19] In our clime
and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal
and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred
by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans
on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is
no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the
debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when
anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of
this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority
fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us "x x x it is the very purpose of the
Constitution - - - and particularly the Bill of Rights - - - to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." [20] Man has yet
to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where
justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown
away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by
rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The
business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus
test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by
society.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution
of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of
the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules
of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
EN BANC

power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a
longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO
CAPULONG
and
ERNESTO
B.
FRANCISCO,
JR.,respondent.

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public

Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to
investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives
Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to
impeach the petitioner.

[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH
E.
ESTRADA, petitioner,
ARROYO, respondent.

vs. GLORIA

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5,
2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor
and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of
receiving some P220 million in juetengmoney from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos
Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to
the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the
Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation.[2]

MACAPAGAL-

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are
important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on
the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the
office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected VicePresident. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would
rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a
six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora
of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11,
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the
Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down
from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. [3] Two days later or
on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for
the resignation of the petitioner.[4]Four days later, or on October 17, former President
Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-sacrifice
of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or
on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners resignation. [7] However,
petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members
of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto
Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno
and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from
the Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives
defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on
November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in
both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentabella. [12] On

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the
impeachment trial started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee
names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority
Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada,
Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios,
Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a
battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and
now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice
Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy
Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty.
Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course
enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December
hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of EquitablePCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he
affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the
spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were
exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as
petitioners Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner
jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing
charges of insider trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a
vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a
secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at
the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner
and the eleven (11) senators.

chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity in demanding petitioners
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to
show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all
masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people. [21]
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At
1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had
defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At
3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes,
together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. [22] In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of
cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that
we are withdrawing our support to this government. [23] A little later, PNP Chief,
Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar
stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. [25] Rallies for the
resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide
of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of
the highly controversial second envelop. [26] There was no turning back the tide. The
tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs
Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo,
Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented
by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto
Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. [27] Outside the palace, there
was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which
resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the
oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella

tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. [19] Senator Raul Roco
quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the
public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]

At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. [28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the following press statement:[30]

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners
resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human

STATEMENTFROM

20January2001

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
PRESIDENTJOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADA
Attwelveoclocknoontoday,VicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyotookheroath
asPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.Whilealongwithmanyotherlegal
mindsofourcountry,Ihavestrongandseriousdoubtsaboutthelegalityand
constitutionalityofherproclamationasPresident,Idonotwishtobeafactorthat
willpreventtherestorationofunityandorderinourcivilsociety.
ItisforthisreasonthatInowleaveMalacaangPalace,theseatofthepresidencyof
thiscountry,forthesakeofpeaceandinordertobeginthehealingprocessofour
nation.IleavethePalaceofourpeoplewithgratitudefortheopportunitiesgivento
meforservicetoourpeople.Iwillnotshirkfromanyfuturechallengesthatmay
comeaheadinthesameserviceofourcountry.
Icallonallmysupportersandfollowerstojoinmeinthepromotionofa
constructivenationalspiritofreconciliationandsolidarity.
MaytheAlmightyblessourcountryandbelovedpeople.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.)JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following
letter:[31]
Sir:
ByvirtueoftheprovisionsofSection11,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,Iam
herebytransmittingthisdeclarationthatIamunabletoexercisethepowersand
dutiesofmyoffice.ByoperationoflawandtheConstitution,theVicePresident
shallbetheActingPresident.
(Sgd.)JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADA
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January
20.[32] Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day
although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day,
this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC,
to wit:
A.M.No.01105SCInre:RequestofVicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoto
TakeherOathofOfficeasPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbeforethe
ChiefJusticeActingontheurgentrequestofVicePresidentGloriaMacapagal
ArroyotobesworninasPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,addressedto
theChiefJusticeandconfirmedbyalettertotheCourt,datedJanuary20,2001,
whichrequestwastreatedasanadministrativematter,thecourtResolved
unanimouslytoconfirmtheauthoritygivenbythetwelve(12)membersoftheCourt
thenpresenttotheChiefJusticeonJanuary20,2001toadministertheoathofoffice
toVicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoasPresidentofthePhilippines,atnoon
ofJanuary20,2001.
Thisresolutioniswithoutprejudicetothedispositionofanyjusticiablecasethat
maybefiledbyaproperparty.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors
and special envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign
governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d honneur at
Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco,
more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from
the White House conveying US recognition of her government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of
the House of Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175
expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines. [38] It also
approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of Representatives
to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
nations goals under the Constitution.[39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management
Act.[40] A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and
Fair Election Practices Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as
her Vice President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82
confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam DefensorSantiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea voted yes with reservations, citing as

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert
Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives also approved Senator
Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as
Vice President two (2) days later.[46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.[47]Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she voted against the closure of the
impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada
was still qualified to run for another elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public
acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26,
2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7,
2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo
as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo
is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71%
in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58%intheABCormiddletoupperclasses,64%intheDormass,and54%
amongtheEsorverypoorclass.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by
Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on
November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury,
serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees,
etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation,
Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo
Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use
of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by
Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-001758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and
corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall
Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de

Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses
as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with
this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756,
1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru
another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as
and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the
same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered
the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the
respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour
hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice
Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of petitioners counsel, former
Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they
have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on
one side but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the
short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their
simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of
resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by
counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1)toinformthepartiesthattheCourtdidnotissuearesolutiononJanuary20,2001
declaringtheofficeofthePresidentvacantandthatneitherdidtheChiefJustice
issueapressstatementjustifyingtheallegedresolution;
(2)toorderthepartiesandespeciallytheircounselwhoareofficersoftheCourt
underpainofbeingcitedforcontempttorefrainfrommakinganycommentor
discussinginpublicthemeritsofthecasesatbarwhiletheyarestillpending
decisionbytheCourt,and

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(3)toissuea30daystatusquoordereffectiveimmediatelyenjoiningtherespondent
Ombudsmanfromresolvingordecidingthecriminalcasespendinginvestigationin
hisofficeagainstpetitionerJosephE.Estradaandsubjectofthecasesatbar,it
appearingfromnewsreportsthattherespondentOmbudsmanmayimmediately
resolvethecasesagainstpetitionerJosephE.Estradaseven(7)daysafterthehearing
heldonFebruary15,2001,whichactionwillmakethecasesatbarmootand
academic.[53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were
deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whetherthepetitionspresentajusticiablecontroversy.
II
Assumingthatthepetitionspresentajusticiablecontroversy,whetherpetitioner
EstradaisaPresidentonleavewhilerespondentArroyoisanActingPresident.
III
Whetherconvictionintheimpeachmentproceedingsisaconditionprecedentforthe
criminalprosecutionofpetitionerEstrada.Inthenegativeandontheassumptionthat
petitionerisstillPresident,whetherheisimmunefromcriminalprosecution.
IV
WhethertheprosecutionofpetitionerEstradashouldbeenjoinedonthegroundof
prejudicialpublicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I

Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question

Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a
political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to

decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as
the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the
presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit
that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the Court cannot
enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad,
have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the
best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United
States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political
were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56]viz:
xxxProminentonthesurfaceonanycaseheldtoinvolveapoliticalquestionis
foundatextuallydemonstrableconstitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoa
coordinatepoliticaldepartmentoralackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageable
standardsforresolvingit,ortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicy
determinationofakindclearlyfornonjudicialdiscretions;ortheimpossibilityofa
courtsundertakingindependentresolutionwithoutexpressinglackoftherespectdue
coordinatebranchesofgovernment;oranunusualneedforunquestioningadherence
toapoliticaldecisionalreadymade;orthepotentialityofembarrassmentfrom
multifariouspronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsonquestion.Unlessoneof
theseformulationsisinextricablefromthecaseatbar,thereshouldbenodismissal
fornonjusticiabilityonthegroundofapoliticalquestionspresence.Thedoctrineof
whichwetreatisoneofpoliticalquestions,notofpoliticalcases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with
cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political
question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou
shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. [60] With
the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the
new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the
so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII
which empowers this Court in limpid language to x x x review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas
corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines
and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related
cases[62] to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the
government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more
cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited
cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a
successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the
Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through
a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a
government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial
scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In
checkered contrast,the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in
character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987
Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the
1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the
presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People
Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutionaland the legitimacy of the new government
that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse
on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial
of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our
national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of
the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the reforms sine quibus non.

[65]

The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in

1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the
right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of
the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human
life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions
to the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were
preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In
the instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by
President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was
carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and
the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Sec.4.Nolawshallbepassedabridgingthefreedomofspeech,ofexpression,orof
thepress,ortherightofthepeoplepeaceablytoassembleandpetitionthe
governmentforredressofgrievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to
democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson:first, freedom
of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is
an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is
essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society;
and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable
community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides
a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take
place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,[71] this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in
the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather
than force; and this means talk for all and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of
Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly stressed that "... it should be clear
even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to
petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the
people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions
in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, [74] and section 8[75]of Article

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11 [76] of Article
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the
doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the
doctrine of political is but a foray in the dark.
II

Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as
posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual
ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial
notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent
disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII
of the Constitution which provides:
Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromofficeorresignationof
thePresident,theVicePresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpired
term.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationof
boththePresidentandVicePresident,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhis
inability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthenactsasPresident
untilPresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified.
xxx.
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be
considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the
14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a
factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. [78] The validity
of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation
is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter
of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not

petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it
is important to follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor
Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed
revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation
spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding
snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more
than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies
began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate
President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his
resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11)
members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent
the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the
EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their
number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the
countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on
the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that in morning of
January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd
at EDSA, hence, they decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry
would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office
at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo
(Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m.,
the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would
not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where
he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give
up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of
EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of
support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a
president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did
nor disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a
graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that
petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion
for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.[84] At
10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed
that I would have five days to a week in the palace. [85] This is proof that petitioner
had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already
concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a
matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos
called up Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon
tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
[86]
There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we
note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately
started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. Thenegotiation was
limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners
resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3)
the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.
[87]
Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed
point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following
entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
xxx
Iexplainwhathappenedduringthefirstroundof
negotiations.ThePresidentimmediatelystressesthathejustwantsthefiveday
periodpromisedbyReyes,aswellastoopenthesecondenvelopetoclearhisname.
Iftheenvelopeisopened,onMonday,hesays,hewillleavebyMonday.
ThePresidentsays.Pagodnapagodnaako.Ayokonamasyadonang
masakit.Pagodnaakosaredtape,bureaucracy,intriga.(Iamverytired.Idont
wantanymoreofthisitstoopainful.Imtiredoftheredtape,thebureaucracy,
theintrigue.)
Ijustwanttoclearmyname,thenIwillgo.[88]

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to
resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the
Angara Diary, the following happened:
Oppositionsdeal
7:30a.m.RenearriveswithBertRomuloand(Ms.Macapagalsspokesperson)Rene
Corona.Forthisround,IamaccompaniedbyDondonBagatsingandMacel.
RenepullsoutadocumenttitledNegotiatingPoints.Itreads:
1.ThePresidentshallsignaresignationdocumentwithintheday,20January2001,
thatwillbeeffectiveonWednesday,24January2001,onwhichdaytheVice
PresidentwillassumethePresidencyoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
2.Beginningtoday,20January2001,thetransitionprocessfortheassumptionofthe
newadministrationshallcommence,andpersonsdesignatedbytheVicepresidentto
variouspositionsandofficesofthegovernmentshallstarttheirorientationactivities
incoordinationwiththeincumbentofficialsconcerned.
3.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesandthePhilippineNationalPoliceshall
functionundertheVicePresidentasnationalmilitaryandpoliceeffective
immediately.
4.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,throughitsChiefofStaff,shallguarantee
thesecurityofthepresidentandhisfamilyasapprovedbythenationalmilitaryand
policeauthority(VicePresident).
5.ItistobenotedthattheSenatewillopenthesecondenvelopeinconnectionwith
theallegedsavingsaccountofthePresidentintheEquitablePCIBankinaccordance
withtherulesoftheSenate,pursuanttotherequesttotheSenatePresident.
Ourdeal
Webringout,too,ourdiscussiondraftwhichreads:
Theundersignedparties,forandinbehalfoftheirrespectiveprincipals,agreeand
undertakeasfollows:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
1.AtransitionwilloccurandtakeplaceonWednesday,24January2001,atwhich
timePresidentJosephEjercitoEstradawillturnoverthepresidencytoVice
PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo.

respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates
the fateful events, viz:[90]
xxx

2.Inreturn,PresidentEstradaandhisfamiliesareguaranteedsecurityandsafetyof
theirpersonandpropertythroughouttheirnaturallifetimes.Likewise,President
Estradaandhisfamiliesareguaranteedfreedomfrompersecutionorretaliationfrom
governmentandtheprivatesectorthroughouttheirnaturallifetimes.
ThiscommitmentshallbeguaranteedbytheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP)
throughtheChiefofStaff,asapprovedbythenationalmilitaryandpoliceauthorities
VicePresident(Macapagal).
3.BothpartiesshallendeavortoensurethattheSenatesitingasanimpeachment
courtwillauthorizetheopeningofthesecondenvelopeintheimpeachmenttrialas
proofthatthesubjectsavingsaccountdoesnotbelongtoPresidentEstrada.
4.Duringthefivedaytransitionperiodbetween20January2001and24January
2001(theTransitionPeriod),theincomingCabinetmembersshallreceivean
appropriatebriefingfromtheoutgoingCabinetofficialsaspartoftheorientation
program.
DuringtheTransitionPeriod,theAFPandthePhilippineNationalPolice(PNP)shall
functionunderVicePresident(Macapagal)asnationalmilitaryandpolice
authorities.
BothpartiesheretoagreethattheAFPchiefofstaffandPNPdirectorgeneralshall
obtainallthenecessarysignaturesasaffixedtothisagreementandinsurefaithful
implementationandobservancethereof.
VicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoshallissueapublicstatementintheform
andtenorprovidedforinAnnexAheretoforeattachedtothisagreement.[89]
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner
has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during
and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on
the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their
side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the
signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the

11:00a.m.BetweenGeneralReyesandmyself,thereisafirmagreementonthe
fivepointstoeffectapeacefultransition.Icanhearthegeneralclearingall
thesepointswithagroupheiswith.Ihearvoicesinthebackground.
Agreement
Theagreementstarts:1.ThePresidentshallresigntoday,20January2001,which
resignationshallbeeffectiveon24January2001,onwhichdaytheVicePresident
willassumethepresidencyoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2.Thetransitionprocessfortheassumptionofthenewadministrationshall
commenceon20January2001,whereinpersonsdesignatedbytheVicePresidentto
variousgovernmentpositionsshallstartorientationactivitieswithincumbent
officials.
3.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesthroughitsChiefofStaff,shallguaranteethe
safetyandsecurityofthePresidentandhisfamiliesthroughouttheirnaturallifetimes
asapprovedbythenationalmilitaryandpoliceauthorityVicePresident.
4.TheAFPandthePhilippineNationalPolice(PNP)shallfunctionundertheVice
Presidentasnationalmilitaryandpoliceauthorities.
5.Bothpartiesrequesttheimpeachmentcourttoopenthesecondenvelopeinthe
impeachmenttrial,thecontentsofwhichshallbeofferedasproofthatthesubject
savingsaccountdoesnotbelongtothePresident.
TheVicePresidentshallissueapublicstatementintheformandtenorprovidedfor
inAnnexBheretoforeattachedtothisagreement.
xxx
11:20a.m.IamallsettofaxGeneralReyesandNenePimentelouragreement,
signedbyoursideandawaitingthesignatureoftheUnitedOpposition.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Andthenithappens.GeneralReyescallsmetosaythattheSupremeCourthas
decidedthatGloriaMacapagalArroyoisPresidentandwillbesworninat12noon.

1p.m.ThePresidentspersonalstaffisrushingtopackasmanyoftheEstrada
familyspersonalpossessionsastheycan.

Bakithindinamankayonakahintay?Paanonaangagreement(Whycouldntyou
wait?Whatabouttheagreement)?Iasked.

Duringlunch,RoniePunomentionsthatthePresidentneedstoreleaseafinal
statementbeforeleavingMalacaang.

Reyesanswered:Walana,sir(Itsover,sir).

Thestatementreads:Attwelveoclocknoontoday,VicePresidentGloria
MacapagalArroyotookheroathasPresidentoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines.Whilealongwithmanyotherlegalmindsofourcountry,Ihavestrong
andseriousdoubtsaboutthelegalityandconstitutionalityofherproclamationas
president,Idonotwishtobeafactorthatwillpreventtherestorationofunityand
orderinourcivilsociety.

Iaskedhim:Diyungtransitionperiod,mootandacademicna?
AndGeneralReyesanswer:Oonga,ideletenanatin,sir(Yes,weredeletingthat
part).
Contrarytosubsequentreports,Idonotreactandsaythattherewasadoublecross.
ButIimmediatelyinstructMaceltodeletethefirstprovisiononresignationsince
thismatterisalreadymootandacademic.Withinmoments,Macelerasesthefirst
provisionandfaxesthedocuments,whichhavebeensignedbymyself,Dondonand
MaceltoNenePimentelandGeneralReyes.
IdirectDemareeRaveltorushtheoriginaldocumenttoGeneralReyesforthe
signaturesoftheotherside,asitisimportantthattheprovisiononsecurity,at
least,shouldberespected.

ItisforthisreasonthatInowleaveMalacaangPalace,theseatofthepresidencyof
thiscountry,forthesakeofpeaceandinordertobeginthehealingprocessofour
nation.IleavethePalaceofourpeoplewithgratitudefortheopportunitiesgivento
meforservicetoourpeople.Iwillnotshrikfromanyfuturechallengesthatmay
comeaheadinthesameserviceofourcountry.
Icallonallmysupportersandfollowerstojoinmeinthepromotionofa
constructivenationalspiritofreconciliationandsolidarity.
MaytheAlmightyblessourcountryandourbelovedpeople.

IthenadvisethePresidentthattheSupremeCourthasruledthatChiefJustice
DavidewilladministertheoathtoGloriaat12noon.

MABUHAY!

Thepresidentistoostunnedforwords.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not

Finalmeal
12noonGloriatakesheroathasPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
12:20p.m.ThePSGdistributesfirearmstosomepeopleinsidethecompound.
ThePresidentishavinghisfinalmealatthePresidentialResidencewiththefew
friendsandCabinetmemberswhohavegathered.
Bythistime,demonstratorshavealreadybrokendownthefirstlineofdefenseat
Mendiola.OnlythePSGistheretoprotectthePalace,sincethepoliceandmilitary
havealreadywithdrawntheirsupportforthePresident.

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a
temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis,
the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
Sir
ByvirtueoftheprovisionsofSectionII,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,Iamhereby
transmittingthisdeclarationthatIamunabletoexercisethepowersanddutiesofmy
office.ByoperationoflawandtheConstitution,theVicePresidentshallbethe
ActingPresident.

Sec.12.Nopublicofficershallbeallowedtoresignorretirependingan
investigation,criminaloradministrative,orpendingaprosecutionagainsthim,for
anyoffenseunderthisActorundertheprovisionsoftheRevisedPenalCodeon
bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any
comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The
original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a
provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his
sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to
propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect
that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or
is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.
[92]
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section
15:

(Sgd.)JosephEjercitoEstrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed
by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the
circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner
reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by
the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest
hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him
to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to
govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the
time being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was preparedbefore the press release
of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the
resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press
release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioners resignation from the
presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is
another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners letter
and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also
argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

Sec.15.TerminationofofficeNopublicofficialshallbeallowedtoresignorretire
pendinganinvestigation,criminaloradministrative,orpendingaprosecution
againsthim,foranyoffenseundertheActorundertheprovisionsoftheRevised
PenalCodeonbribery.
Theseparationorcessationofapublicofficialfromofficeshallnotbeabartohis
prosecutionunderthisActforanoffensecommittedduringhisincumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the
legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the Presidents
immunity should extend even after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293,
was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but
the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the
President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was
hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public
official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it
may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective
shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case
against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can
be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional
right.[94] A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or
resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing
administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings
against him.He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the
cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the
cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 000-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed,
the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation
of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was
immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for
the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose
investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold
otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when
a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope,
the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed
indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.
III

Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely

temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is
a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January
20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and
Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII. [95] This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on
leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

SEC.11.WheneverthePresidenttransmittothePresidentoftheSenateandthe
SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunableto
dischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawritten
declarationtothecontrary,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice
PresidentasActingPresident.
WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentof
theSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwritten
declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhis
office,theVicePresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowersanddutiesofthe
officeasActingPresident.
Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtothe
SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinability
exists,heshallreassumethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shoulda
majorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfivedaystothePresident
oftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwritten
declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhis
office,theCongressshalldecidetheissue.Forthatpurpose,theCongressshall
convene,ifitisnotinsession,withinfortyeighthours,inaccordancewithitsrules
andwithoutneedofcall.
IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,or,ifnot
insessionwithintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo
thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunableto
dischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresidentshallactas
President;otherwise,thePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesof
hisoffice."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to
the Senate President and Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President
on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on
January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution
No. 176[97]which states:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
RESOLUTIONEXPRESSINGTHESUPPORTOFTHEHOUSEOF
REPRESENTATIVESTOTHEASSUMPTIONINTOOFFICEBY
VICEPRESIDENTGLORIAMACAPAGALARROYOAS
PRESIDENTOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,
EXTENDINGITSCONGRATULATIONSANDEXPRESSINGITS
SUPPORTFORHERADMINISTRATIONASAPARTNERINTHE
ATTAINMENTOFTHENATIONSGOALSUNDERTHE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS,asaconsequenceofthepeopleslossofconfidenceontheabilityof
formerPresidentJosephEjercitoEstradatoeffectivelygovern,theArmedForcesof
thePhilippines,thePhilippineNationalPoliceandmajorityofhiscabinethad
withdrawnsupportfromhim;
WHEREAS,uponauthorityofanenbancresolutionoftheSupremeCourt,Vice
PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyowassworninasPresidentofthePhilippineson
20January2001beforeChiefJusticeHilarioG.Davide,Jr.;
WHEREAS,immediatelythereafter,membersoftheinternationalcommunityhad
extendedtheirrecognitiontoHerExcellency,GloriaMacapagalArroyoasPresident
oftheRepublicofthePhilippines;
WHEREAS,HerExcellency,PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyohasespouseda
policyofnationalhealingandreconciliationwithjusticeforthepurposeofnational
unityanddevelopment;
WHEREAS,itisaxiomaticthattheobligationsofthegovernmentcannotbe
achievedifitisdivided,thusbyreasonoftheconstitutionaldutyoftheHouseof
Representativesasaninstitutionandthatoftheindividualmembersthereofoffealty
tothesupremewillofthepeople,theHouseofRepresentativesmustensuretothe
peopleastable,continuinggovernmentandthereforemustremoveallobstaclesto
theattainmentthereof;
WHEREAS,itisaconcomitantdutyoftheHouseofRepresentativestoexertall
effortstounifythenation,toeliminatefractioustension,tohealsocialandpolitical
wounds,andtobeaninstrumentofnationalreconciliationandsolidarityasitisa
directrepresentativeofthevarioussegmentsofthewholenation;

WHEREAS,withoutsurrenderingitsindependence,itisvitalfortheattainmentof
alltheforegoing,fortheHouseofRepresentativestoextenditssupportand
collaborationtotheadministrationofHerExcellency,PresidentGloriaMacapagal
Arroyo,andtobeaconstructivepartnerinnationbuilding,thenationalinterest
demandingnoless:Now,therefore,beit
ResolvedbytheHouseofRepresentatives,Toexpressitssupporttotheassumption
intoofficebyVicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoasPresidentoftheRepublic
ofthePhilippines,toextenditscongratulationsandtoexpressitssupportforher
administrationasapartnerintheattainmentoftheNationsgoalsunderthe
Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)FELICIANOBELMONTEJR.
Speaker
ThisResolutionwasadoptedbytheHouseofRepresentativesonJanuary24,2001.
(Sgd.)ROBERTOP.NAZARENO
SecretaryGeneral
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution
No. 178[98] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYOS NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS,thereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVicePresidentduetothe
assumptiontothePresidencyofVicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo;
WHEREAS,pursuanttoSection9,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,thePresidentin
theeventofsuchvacancyshallnominateaVicePresidentfromamongthemembers
oftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeswhoshallassumeofficeupon
confirmationbyamajorityvoteofallmembersofbothHousesvotingseparately;

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
WHEREAS,HerExcellency,PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyohasnominated
SenateMinorityLeaderTeofistoT.GuingonaJr.,tothepositionofVicePresidentof
theRepublicofthePhilippines;
WHEREAS,SenatorTeofistoT.GuingonaJr.,isapublicservantendowedwith
integrity,competenceandcourage;whohasservedtheFilipinopeoplewith
dedicatedresponsibilityandpatriotism;
WHEREAS,SenatorTeofistoT.Guingona,Jr.possessessterlingqualitiesoftrue
statesmanship,havingservedthegovernmentinvariouscapacities,amongothers,as
DelegatetotheConstitutionalConvention,ChairmanoftheCommissiononAudit,
ExecutiveSecretary,SecretaryofJustice,SenatorofthePhilippinesqualitieswhich
merithisnominationtothepositionofVicePresidentoftheRepublic:Now,
therefore,beit
ResolvedasitisherebyresolvedbytheHouseofRepresentatives,ThattheHouseof
RepresentativesconfirmsthenominationofSenatorTeofistoT.Guingona,Jr.asthe
VicePresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd)FELICIANOBELMONTEJR.

WHEREAS,theSenateofthePhilippineshasbeentheforumforvitallegislative
measuresinunitydespitediversitiesinperspectives;
WHEREFORE,werecognizeandexpresssupporttothenewgovernmentof
PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoandresolvetodischargeourdutiestoattain
desiredchangesandovercomethenationschallenges.[99]
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which
states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS,thereisitvacancyintheOfficeoftheVicePresidentduetothe
assumptiontothePresidencyofVicePresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo;
WHEREAS,pursuanttoSection9ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,thePresidentin
theeventofsuchvacancyshallnominateaVicePresidentfromamongthemembers
oftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeswhoshallassumeofficeupon
confirmationbyamajorityvoteofallmembersofbothHousesvotingseparately;
WHEREAS,HerExcellency,PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyohasnominated
SenateMinorityLeaderTeofistoT.Guingona,Jr.tothepositionofVicePresidentof
theRepublicofthePhillippines;

Speaker
ThisResolutionwasadoptedbytheHouseofRepresentativesonFebruary7,2001.
(Sgd.)ROBERTOP.NAZARENO
SecretaryGeneral
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve
(12) members of the Senate signed the following:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS,therecenttransitioningovernmentoffersthenationanopportunityfor
meaningfulchangeandchallenge;
WHEREAS,toattaindesiredchangesandovercomeawesomechallengesthenation
needsunityofpurposeandresolutecohesiveresolute(sic)will;

WHEREAS,Sen.TeofistoT.Guingona,Jr.isapublicservantendowedwith
integrity,competence,andcourage;whohasservedtheFilipinopeoplewith
dedicatedresponsibilityandpatriotism;
WHEREAS,Sen.TeofistoT.Guingona,Jr.possessessterlingqualitiesoftrue
statesmanship,havingservedthegovernmentinvariouscapacities,amongothers,as
DelegatetotheConstitutionalConvention,ChairmanoftheCommissiononAudit,
ExecutiveSecretary,SecretaryofJustice.Senatorofthelandwhichqualitiesmerit
hisnominationtothepositionofVicePresidentoftheRepublic:Now,therefore,be
it
Resolved,asitisherebyresolved,ThattheSenateconfirmthenominationofSen.
TeofistoT.Guingona,Jr.asVicePresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Adopted,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(Sgd.)AQUILINOQ.PIMENTELJR.
PresidentoftheSenate
ThisResolutionwasadoptedbytheSenateonFebruary7,2001.
(Sgd.)LUTGARDOB.BARBO
SecretaryoftheSenate
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No.
83[101] which states:
RESOLUTIONRECOGNIZINGTHATTHEIMPEACHMENTCOURT
ISFUNCTUSOFFICIO
Resolved,asitisherebyresolved.ThattheSenaterecognizethattheImpeachment
Courtisfunctusofficioandhasbeenterminated.
Resolved,further,ThattheJournalsoftheImpeachmentCourtofMonday,January
15,Tuesday,January16andWednesday,January17,2001beconsideredapproved.
Resolved,further,ThattherecordsoftheImpeachmentCourtincludingthesecond
envelopebetransferredtotheArchivesoftheSenateforpropersafekeepingand
preservationinaccordancewiththeRulesoftheSenate.Dispositionandretrieval
thereofshallbemadeonlyuponwrittenapprovaloftheSenatePresident.
Resolved,finally.ThatallpartiesconcernedbefurnishedcopiesofthisResolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)AQUILINOQ.PIMENTEL,JR.
PresidentoftheSenate

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such
vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May
14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without
any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner
continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.Implicitly clear in
that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim
of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of
both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise
its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to
use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and
duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely
to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by
this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jurePresident made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV

ThisResolutionwasadoptedbytheSenateonFebruary7,2001.
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

(Sgd.)LUTGARDOB.BARBO
SecretaryoftheSenate

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him
before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on
executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity
in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued
petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E.
Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the
City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to
China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Johnson, held:
Theprincipleofnonliability,ashereinenunciated,doesnotmeanthatthejudiciary
hasnoauthoritytotouchtheactsoftheGovernorGeneral;thathemay,undercover
ofhisoffice,dowhathewill,unimpededandunrestrained.Suchaconstruction
wouldmeanthattyranny,undertheguiseoftheexecutionofthelaw,couldwalk
defiantlyabroad,destroyingrightsofpersonandofproperty,whollyfreefrom
interferenceofcourtsorlegislatures.Thisdoesnotmean,either,thatapersoninjured
bytheexecutiveauthoritybyanactunjustifiableunderthelawhasnoremedy,but
mustsubmitinsilence.Onthecontrary,itmeans,simply,thattheGovernorGeneral,
likethejudgesofthecourtsandthemembersoftheLegislature,maynotbe
personallymulctedincivildamagesfortheconsequencesofanactexecutedinthe
performanceofhisofficialduties.Thejudiciaryhasfullpowerto,andwill,whenthe
matterisproperlypresentedtoitandtheoccasionjustlywarrantsit,declareanactof
theGovernorGeneralillegalandvoidandplaceasnearlyaspossibleinstatus
quoanypersonwhohasbeendeprivedhislibertyorhispropertybysuchact.This
remedyisassuredtoeveryperson,howeverhumbleorofwhatevercountry,when
hispersonalorpropertyrightshavebeeninvaded,evenbythehighestauthorityof
thestate.ThethingwhichthejudiciarycannotdoismulcttheGovernorGeneral
personallyindamageswhichresultfromtheperformanceofhisofficialduty,any
morethatitcanamemberofthePhilippineCommissionorthePhilippine
Assembly.Publicpolicyforbidsit.
Neitherdoesthisprincipleofnonliabilitymeanthatthechiefexecutivemaynotbe
personallysuedatallinrelationtoactswhichheclaimstoperformassuch
official.Onthecontrary,itclearlyappearsfromthediscussionheretoforehad,
particularlythatportionwhichtouchedtheliabilityofjudgesanddrewananalogy
betweensuchliabilityandthatoftheGovernorGeneral,thatthelatterisliablewhen
heactsinacasesoplainlyoutsideofhispowerandauthoritythathecannotbesaid
tohaveexercisediscretionindeterminingwhetherornothehadtherightto
act.Whatisheldhereisthathewillbeprotectedfrompersonalliabilityfordamages
notonlywhenheactswithinhisauthority,butalsowhenheiswithoutauthority,
providedheactuallyuseddiscretionandjudgment,thatis,thejudicialfaculty,in

determiningwhetherhehadauthoritytoactornot.Inotherwords,heisentitledto
protectionindeterminingthequestionofhisauthority.Ifhedecidewrongly,heis
stillprotectedprovidedthequestionofhisauthoritywasoneoverwhichtwomen,
reasonablyqualifiedforthatposition,mighthonestlydiffer;butheisnotprotectedif
thelackofauthoritytoactissoplainthattwosuchmencouldnothonestlydiffer
overitsdetermination.Insuchcase,heacts,notasGovernorGeneralbutasaprivate
individual,and,assuch,mustanswerfortheconsequencesofhisact.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not
granted immunity from suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state
delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation;
disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the State and
for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a
distrust as to the integrity of government itself.[105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific
provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years
under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was
born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive
immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
ThePresidentshallbeimmunefromsuitduringhistenure.Thereafter,nosuit
whatsoevershalllieforofficialactsdonebyhimorbyotherspursuanttohisspecific
ordersduringhistenure.
TheimmunitieshereinprovidedshallapplytotheincumbentPresidentreferredtoin
ArticleXVIIofthisConstitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential
Immunity And All The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions
For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former Dean of the UP college of Law,
Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected by this constitutional
amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
InthePhilippines,though,wesoughttodotheAmericansonebetterbyenlarging
andfortifyingtheabsoluteimmunityconcept.First,weextendedittoshieldthe
Presidentnotonlyfromcivilclaimsbutalsofromcriminalcasesandother
claims.Second,weenlargeditsscopesothatitwouldcoverevenactsofthe
Presidentoutsidethescopeofofficialduties.Andthird,webroadeneditscoverage
soastoincludenotonlythePresidentbutalsootherpersons,betheygovernment
officialsorprivateindividuals,whoacteduponordersofthePresident.Itcanbesaid
thatatthatpointmostofusweresufferingfromAIDS(orabsoluteimmunitydefense
syndrome).

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this
Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution.The move
was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo,
who argued that the after incumbency immunitygranted to President Marcos
violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the
immunity as a return to the anachronism the king can do no wrong. [107] The effort
failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from
office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was
crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973
Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108]
Mr.Suarez.Thankyou.
Thelastquestioniswithreferencetothecommitteesomittinginthedraftproposal
theimmunityprovisionforthePresident.IagreewithCommissionerNolledothat
theCommitteedidverywellinstrikingoutthissecondsentence,attheveryleast,of
theoriginalprovisiononimmunityfromsuitunderthe1973Constitution.Butwould
theCommitteemembersnotagreetoarestorationofatleastthefirstsentencethat
thePresidentshallbeimmunefromsuitduringhistenure,consideringthatifwedo
notprovidehimthatkindofanimmunity,hemightbespendingallhistimefacing
litigations,asthePresidentinexileinHawaiiisnowfacinglitigationsalmostdaily?
Fr.Bernas.Thereasonfortheomissionisthatweconsideritunderstoodinpresent
jurisprudencethatduringhistenureheisimmunefromsuit.
Mr.Suarez.Sothereisnoneedtoexpressithere.
Fr.Bernas.Thereisnoneed.Itwasthatwaybefore.Theonlyinnovationmadeby
the1973Constitutionwastomakethatexplicitandtoaddotherthings.
Mr.Suarez.Onthatunderstanding,Iwillnotpressforanymorequery,Madam
President.
IthanktheCommissionerfortheclarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this
history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events
that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus

Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in
a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be
sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President,
the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr.Aquino.Onanotherpoint,ifanimpeachmentproceedinghasbeenfiled
againstthePresident,forexample,andthePresidentresignsbeforejudgmentof
convictionhasbeenrenderedbytheimpeachmentcourtorbythebody,how
doesitaffecttheimpeachmentproceeding?Willitbenecessarilydropped?
Mr.Romulo.Ifwedecidethepurposeofimpeachmenttoremoveonefrom
office,thenhisresignationwouldrenderthecasemootand
academic.However,astheprovisionsays,thecriminalandcivilaspectsofit
maycontinueintheordinarycourts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted
and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch
of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It
will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
in the same footing as any other trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current
literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President Richard
Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and
other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National
Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential
campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted coconspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among
others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first
be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in
a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the
US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil
damages covers only official acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the
occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case ofClinton v. Jones[117] where it held that
the US Presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the
scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the
1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.[118] It declared as a state
policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." [119] It ordained that
(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. [120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them
or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.[121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the
office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. [123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also
given fiscal autonomy.[124] These constitutional policies will be devalued if we
sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit
for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped

from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of
prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due
process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how
to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of
high profile cases.[125] The British approach the problem with the presumption that
publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal
trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. [126] The American
approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential
effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of
irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this
Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.
[127]
In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that:
Wecannotsustainappellantsclaimthathewasdeniedtherighttoimpartialtrialdue
toprejudicialpublicity.Itistruethattheprintandbroadcastmediagavethecaseat
barpervasivepublicity,justlikeallhighprofileandhighstakecriminaltrials.Then
andnow,wenowrulethattherightofanaccusedtoafairtrialisnotincompatible
toafreepress.Tobesure,responsiblereportingenhancesanaccusedsrighttoafair
trialfor,aswellpointedout,aresponsiblepresshasalwaysbeenregardedasthe
handmaidenofeffectivejudicialadministration,especiallyinthecriminalfieldxx
x.Thepressdoesnotsimplypublishinformationabouttrialsbutguardsagainstthe
miscarriageofjusticebysubjectingthepolice,prosecutors,andjudicialprocessesto
extensivepublicscrutinyandcriticism.
Pervasivepublicityisnotperseprejudicialtotherightofanaccusedtofair
trial.Themerefactthatthetrialofappellantwasgivenadaytoday,gaveltogavel
coveragedoesnotbyitselfprovethatthepublicitysopermeatedthemindofthetrial
judgeandimpairedhisimpartiality.Forone,itisimpossibletosealthemindsof
membersofthebenchfrompretrialandotheroffcourtpublicityofsensational
criminalcases.Thestateoftheartofourcommunicationsystembringsnewsasthey
happenstraighttoourbreakfasttablesandrighttoourbedrooms.Thesenewsform
partofoureverydaymenuofthefactsandfictionsoflife.Foranother,ourideaofa
fairandimpartialjudgeisnotthatofahermitwhoisoutoftouchwiththeworld.We
havenotinstalledthejurysystemwhosemembersareoverlyprotectedfrom
publicitylesttheylosetheirimpartiality.xxxxxxxxx.Ourjudgesarelearnedin
thelawandtrainedtodisregardoffcourtevidenceandoncameraperformancesof

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
partiestoalitigation.Theirmereexposuretopublicationsandpublicitystuntsdoes
notpersefatallyinfecttheirimpartiality.
Atbest,appellantcanonlyconjurepossibilityofprejudiceonthepartofthetrial
judgeduetothebarrageofpublicitythatcharacterizedtheinvestigationandtrialof
thecase.InMartelino,etal.v.Alejandro,etal.,werejectedthisstandardof
possibilityofprejudiceandadoptedthetestofactualprejudiceasweruledthatto
warrantafindingofprejudicialpublicity,theremustbeallegationandproofthatthe
judgeshavebeenundulyinfluenced,notsimplythattheymightbe,bythebarrageof
publicity.Inthecaseatbar,therecordsdonotshowthatthetrialjudge
developedactualbiasagainstappellantasaconsequenceoftheextensivemedia
coverageofthepretrialandtrialofhiscase.Thetotalityofcircumstancesofthe
casedoesnotprovethatthetrialjudgeacquiredafixedopinionasaresultof
prejudicialpublicitywhichisincapableifchangeevenbyevidencepresentedduring
thetrial.Appellanthastheburdentoprovethisactualbiasandhehasnotdischarged
theburden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs.
Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:
Again,petitionersraisetheeffectofprejudicialpublicityontheirrighttodueprocess
whileundergoingpreliminaryinvestigation.Wefindnoproceduralimpedimenttoits
earlyinvocationconsideringthesubstantialrisktotheirlibertywhileundergoinga
preliminaryinvestigation.
xxx
Thedemocraticsettings,mediacoverageoftrialsofsensationalcasescannotbe
avoidedandoftentimes,itsexcessivenesshasbeenaggravatedbykinetic
developmentsinthetelecommunicationsindustry.Forsure,fewcasescanmatchthe
highvolumeandhighvelocityofpublicitythatattendedthepreliminary
investigationofthecaseatbar.Ourdailydietoffactsandfictionaboutthecase
continuesunabatedeventoday.Commentatorsstillbombardthepublicwithviews
nottoomanyofwhicharesoberandsublime.Indeed,eventheprincipalactorsinthe
casetheNBI,therespondents,theirlawyersandtheirsympathizershaveparticipated
inthismediablitz.Thepossibilityofmediaabusesandtheirthreattoafairtrial
notwithstanding,criminaltrialscannotbecompletelyclosedtothepressand
public.InntheseminalcaseofRichmondNewspapers,Inc.v.Virginia,itwaswisely
held:
xxx

(a)ThehistoricalevidenceoftheevolutionofthecriminaltrialinAngloAmerican
justicedemonstratesconclusivelythatthetimethisNationsorganiclawswere
adopted,criminaltrialsbothhereandinEnglandhadlongbeenpresumptivelyopen,
thusgivingassurancethattheproceedingswereconductedfairlytoallconcernedand
discouragingperjury,themisconductofparticipants,ordecisionsbasedonsecret
biasorpartiality.Inaddition,thesignificantcommunitytherapeuticvalueofpublic
trialswasrecognized:whenashockingcrimeoccurs,acommunityreactionof
outrageandpublicprotestoftenfollows,andthereaftertheopenprocessesofjustice
serveanimportantprophylacticpurpose,providinganoutletforcommunityconcern,
hostility,andemotion.Toworkeffectively,itisimportantthatsocietyscriminal
processsatisfytheappearanceofjustice,Offuttv.UnitedStates,348US11,14,99L
Ed11,75SCt11,whichcanbestbeprovidedbyallowingpeopletoobservesuch
process.Fromthisunbroken,uncontradictedhistory,supportedbyreasonsasvalid
todayasincenturiespast,itmustbeconcludedthatapresumptionofopenness
inheresintheverynatureofacriminaltrialunderthisNationssystemofjustice,Cf.,
e.g.,Levinev.UnitedStates,362US610,4LEd2d989,80SCt1038.
(b)Thefreedomsofspeech,press,andassembly,expresslyguaranteedbytheFirst
Amendment,shareacommoncorepurposeofassuringfreedomofcommunication
onmattersrelatingtothefunctioningofgovernment.Inguaranteeingfreedomssuch
asthoseofspeechandpress,theFirstAmendmentcanbereadasprotectingtheright
ofeveryonetoattendtrialssoasgivemeaningtothoseexplicitguarantees;theFirst
Amendmentrighttoreceiveinformationandideasmeans,inthecontextoftrials,
thattheguaranteesofspeechandpress,standingalone,prohibitgovernmentfrom
summarilyclosingcourtroomdoorswhichhadlongbeenopentothepublicatthe
timetheFirstAmendmentwasadopted.Moreover,therightofassemblyisalso
relevant,havingbeenregardednotonlyasanindependentrightbutalsoasacatalyst
toaugmentthefreeexerciseoftheotherFirstAmendmentrightswithwhichitwas
deliberatelylinkedbythedraftsmen.Atrialcourtroomisapublicplacewherethe
peoplegenerallyandrepresentativesofthemediahavearighttobepresent,and
wheretheirpresencehistoricallyhasbeenthoughttoenhancetheintegrityand
qualityofwhattakesplace.
(c)EventhoughtheConstitutioncontainsnoprovisionwhichbyitstermsguarantees
tothepublictherighttoattendcriminaltrials,variousfundamentalrights,not
expresslyguaranteed,havebeenrecognizedasindispensabletotheenjoymentof
enumeratedrights.Therighttoattendcriminaltrialisimplicitintheguaranteesof
theFirstAmendment:withoutthefreedomtoattendsuchtrials,whichpeoplehave
exercisedforcenturies,importantaspectsoffreedomofspeechandofthepress
couldbeeviscerated.
Bethatasitmay,werecognizethatpervasiveandprejudicialpublicityundercertain
circumstancescandepriveanaccusedofhisdueprocessrighttofairtrial.Thus,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
inMartelino,etal.vs.Alejandro,etal.,weheldthattowarrantafindingof
prejudicialpublicitytheremustbeallegationandproofthatthejudgeshavebeen
undulyinfluenced,notsimplythattheymightbe,bythebarrageofpublicity.Inthe
caseatbar,wefindnothingintherecordsthatwillprovethatthetoneandcontentof
thepublicitythatattendedtheinvestigationofpetitionersfatallyinfectedthefairness
andimpartialityoftheDOJPanel.Petitionerscannotjustrelyonthesubliminal
effectsofpublicityonthesenseoffairnessoftheDOJPanel,forthesearebasically
unbeknownandbeyondknowing.Tobesure,theDOJPaneliscomposedofan
AssistantChiefStateProsecutorandSeniorStateProsecutors.Theirlongexperience
incriminalinvestigationisafactortoconsiderindeterminingwhethertheycan
easilybeblindedbytheklieglightsofpublicity.Indeed,their26pageResolution
carriesnoindubitableindiciaofbiasforitdoesnotappearthattheyconsideredany
extrarecordevidenceexceptevidenceproperlyadducedbytheparties.Thelengthof
timetheinvestigationwasconducteddespiteitssummarynatureandthegenerosity
withwhichtheyaccommodatedthediscoverymotionsofpetitionersspeakwellof
theirfairness.Atnoinstance,wenote,didpetitionersseekthedisqualificationofany
memberoftheDOJPanelonthegroundofbiasresultingfromtheirbombardmentof
prejudicialpublicity.(emphasissupplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant
this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof. [131] He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office
of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed,
the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second
guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman
himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has
been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the
threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs. [132] News reports have also been
quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases
of the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner
will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner
is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner
cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials
of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of
good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is

entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e.,
that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth,
our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled
to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases
which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors
should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes
that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will
now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of
the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a
higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It
is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which
has been categorized as the most fundamental of all freedoms. [135] To be sure, the duty
of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to
insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free
atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the
impatient vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the
mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights
necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of
the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy
has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right
of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of
thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from the cave
to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples
prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging
the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the
Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY

POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,respondent.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state
believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well
as an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA

JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,

JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold
the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the
Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and
now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or
is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and
American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and
common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09
January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a naturalborn Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan
F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January
2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy
of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her
having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by
the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the
fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or
Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in
the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by
Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National

Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of
the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley,
and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War
II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack
of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would
include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed
G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
Section78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.A
verifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateofcandidacy

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
maybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterial
representationcontainedthereinasrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section
52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section52.PowersandfunctionsoftheCommissiononElections.Inadditiontothe
powersandfunctionsconferreduponitbytheConstitution,theCommissionshall
haveexclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofalllawsrelativeto
theconductofelectionsforthepurposeofensuringfree,orderlyandhonestelections

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would

authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in an action forcertiorari under Rule
65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads
"EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor
matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfor
decisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionor
resolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandum,requiredbythe
rulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.Unlessotherwiseprovidedby
thisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmay
bebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirty
daysfromreceiptofacopythereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides
that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824
was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right
to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be
elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.

161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional
provision cited reads:
"TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingto
theelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident,andmay
promulgateitsrulesforthepurpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the
1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge
of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to
declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect
of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although
the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the
1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal
of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise Rule12.Jurisdiction.TheTribunalshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingto
theelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresidentof
thePhilippines.
Rule13.HowInitiated.Anelectioncontestisinitiatedbythefilingofanelection
protestorapetitionforquowarrantoagainstthePresidentorVicePresident.An
electionprotestshallnotincludeapetitionforquowarranto.Apetitionforquo
warrantoshallnotincludeanelectionprotest.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Rule14.ElectionProtest.OnlytheregisteredcandidateforPresidentorforVice
PresidentofthePhilippineswhoreceivedthesecondorthirdhighestnumberof
votesmaycontesttheelectionofthePresidentortheVicePresident,asthecasemay
be,byfilingaverifiedpetitionwiththeClerkofthePresidentialElectoralTribunal
withinthirty(30)daysaftertheproclamationofthewinner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President"
or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President
or Vice-President. A quo warrantoproceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined
by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et
al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to
a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of
the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who
would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. [7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the
one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting,
a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his
private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil

citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom,

such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. [9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. [10] The
20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship,
which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the
modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and
final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global
village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish
regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the
natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the
19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law.Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended
by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the
law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing
views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably
made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of
14 August 1841,[16] theRoyal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining
the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally,
the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. [18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine
Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would
be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on
18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of
who were Spanish citizens. (a)PersonsborninSpanishterritory,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(b)ChildrenofaSpanishfatherormother,eveniftheywerebornoutside
ofSpain,
(c)Foreignerswhohaveobtainednaturalizationpapers,
(d)Thosewho,withoutsuchpapers,mayhavebecomedomiciled
inhabitantsofanytownoftheMonarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in
the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have
no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between
Spain and the United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the
United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanishsubjects,nativesofthePeninsula,residingintheterritoryoverwhichSpain
bythepresenttreatyrelinquishesorcedeshersovereigntymayremaininsuch
territoryormayremovetherefrom,retainingineithereventalltheirrightsof
property,includingtherighttosellordisposeofsuchpropertyorofitsproceeds;and
theyshallalsohavetherighttocarryontheirindustry,commerce,andprofessions,
beingsubjectinrespectthereoftosuchlawsasareapplicabletoforeigners.Incase
theyremainintheterritorytheymaypreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpain
bymaking,beforeacourtofrecord,withinayearfromthedateoftheexchangeof
ratificationsofthistreaty,adeclarationoftheirdecisiontopreservesuchallegiance;
indefaultofwhichdeclarationtheyshallbeheldtohaverenounceditandtohave
adoptedthenationalityoftheterritoryinwhichtheyreside.
Thus
"Thecivilrightsandpoliticalstatusofthenativeinhabitantsoftheterritorieshereby
cededtotheUnitedStatesshallbedeterminedbytheCongress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United
States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and
were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in
the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of
the United States on the Philippines "....thatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandscontinuingtoresidetherein,who
wereSpanishsubjectsonthe11thdayofApril,1891,andthenresidedinsaid
Islands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentthereto,shallbedeemedandheldtobe
citizensofthePhilippineIslandsandassuchentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnited
States,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownof
SpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnited
StatesandSpain,signedatParis,Decembertentheighteenhundredandninety
eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11thday of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant
who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines
from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law
was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United
States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided,ThatthePhilippineLegislatureisherebyauthorizedtoprovidebylawfor
theacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbythosenativesofthePhilippineIslands
whodonotcomewithintheforegoingprovisions,thenativesofotherinsular
possessionoftheUnitedStates,andsuchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippine
IslandswhowouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStates,underthelawsofthe
UnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of
"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was
used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the
Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 ThatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandswhowereSpanishsubjectsonthe
eleventhdayofApril,eighteenhundredandninetynine,andthenresidedinsaid
Islands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentlythereto,shallbedeemedandheldto
becitizensofthePhilippineIslands,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreserve
theirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreaty
ofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain,signedatParisDecembertenth,
eighteenhundredandninetyeightandexceptsuchothersashavesincebecome
citizensofsomeothercountry;Provided,ThatthePhilippineLegislature,herein
providedfor,isherebyauthorizedtoprovidefortheacquisitionofPhilippine
citizenshipbythosenativesofthePhilippineIslandswhodonotcomewithinthe
foregoingprovisions,thenativesoftheinsularpossessionsoftheUnitedStates,and
suchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippineIslandswhoarecitizensoftheUnited
States,orwhocouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStatesunderthelawsofthe
UnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated
the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns Section1,ArticleIII,1973ConstitutionThefollowingarecitizensofthe
Philippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthis
Constitution.
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(3)ThosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshippursuanttotheprovisionsofthe
Constitutionofnineteenhundredandthirtyfive.
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided

Section1,ArticleIII,1935Constitution.Thefollowingarecitizensofthe
Philippines
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthis
Constitution
(2)ThoseborninthePhilippinesIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoption
ofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesanduponreachingtheageof
majority,electPhilippinecitizenship.

that
"AfemalecitizenofthePhilippineswhomarriesanalienretainsherPhilippine
citizenship,unlessbyheractoromissionsheisdeemed,underthelawtohave
renouncedhercitizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthis
Constitution.
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973ofFilipinomothers,whoelect
Philippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority;and
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthe
Philippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageon
thedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyears
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e.,jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that
the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that
he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an

uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.

Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of
some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would be that 1.TheparentsofFPJwereAllanF.PoeandBessieKelley;
2.FPJwasborntothemon20August1939;
3.AllanF.PoeandBessieKelleyweremarriedtoeachotheron16
September,1940;
4.ThefatherofAllanF.PoewasLorenzoPoe;and
5.Atthetimeofhisdeathon11September1954,LorenzoPoewas84
yearsold.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact
that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and
Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last
two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan
F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Section3,Rule130,RulesofCourtstatesthat
Originaldocumentmustbeproduced;exceptions.Whenthesubjectofinquiryis
thecontentsofadocument,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginal
documentitself,exceptinthefollowingcases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d)Whentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustodyofapublicofficeoris
recordedinapublicoffice.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court provides:
Entriesinofficialrecords.Entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofhis
dutybyapublicofficerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformanceofa
dutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthefactsthereinstated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to
a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870
when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that
Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise
failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship
or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or
civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under
civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from
08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil
Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity.Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil
Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that Incaseofanillegitimatechild,thebirthcertificateshallbesignedandswornto
jointlybytheparentsoftheinfantoronlybythemotherifthefatherrefuses.Inthe
lattercase,itshallnotbepermissibletostateorrevealinthedocumentthenameof
thefatherwhorefusestoacknowledgethechild,ortogivethereinanyinformation
bywhichsuchfathercouldbeidentified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered
the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
[33]
In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled "SinceRodolfowasbornin1935,aftertheregistrylawwasenacted,thequestion
herereallyiswhetherornothisbirthcertificate(Exhibit1),whichismerelya
certifiedcopyoftheregistryrecord,mayberelieduponassufficientproofofhis
havingbeenvoluntarilyrecognized.Nosuchreliance,inourjudgment,maybe
placeduponit.Whileitcontainsthenamesofbothparents,thereisnoshowingthat
theysignedtheoriginal,letalonesworetoitscontentsasrequiredinSection5of
ActNo.3753.Forallthatmighthavehappened,itwasnoteventheyoreitherof
themwhofurnishedthedatatobeenteredinthecivilregister.Petitionerssaythatin

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
anyeventthebirthcertificateisinthenatureofapublicdocumentwhereinvoluntary
recognitionofanaturalchildmayalsobemade,accordingtothesameArticle131.
Trueenough,butinsuchacase,theremustbeaclearstatementinthedocumentthat
theparentrecognizesthechildashisorherown."

(1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgment;or

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,

nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed,
by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this
Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:

Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationshallbeprovedby:

"UndertheSpanishCivilCodetherearetwoclassesofpublicdocuments,
thoseexecutedbyprivateindividualswhichmustbeauthenticatedbynotaries,and
thoseissuedbycompetentpublicofficialsbyreasonoftheiroffice.Thepublic
documentpointedoutinArticle131asoneofthemeansbywhichrecognitionmay
bemadebelongstothefirstclass."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.Voluntary recognition
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment
took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had
in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,
however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged
before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article
173, and Article 175 provide:
Art.172.Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyanyofthefollowing:

(2)Anadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublicdocumentoraprivatehandwritten
instrumentandsignedbytheparentconcerned.

(1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofalegitimatechild;or
(2)AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.
Art.173.Theactiontoclaimlegitimacymaybebroughtbythechildduringhisor
herlifetimeandshallbetransmittedtotheheirsshouldthechilddieduringminority
orinastateofinsanity.Inthesecases,theheirsshallhaveaperiodoffiveyears
withinwhichtoinstitutetheaction.
Theactionalreadycommencedbythechildshallsurvivenotwithstandingthedeath
ofeitherorbothoftheparties.
xxxxxxxxx.
Art.175.Illegitimatechildrenmayestablishtheirillegitimatefiliationinthesame
wayandonthesame,evidenceaslegitimatechildren.
TheactionmustbebroughtwithinthesameperiodspecifiedinArticle173,except
whentheactionisbasedonthesecondparagraphofArticle172,inwhichcasethe
actionmaybebroughtduringthelifetimeoftheallegedparent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256
of the code reads:
"Art.256.ThisCodeshallhaveretroactiveeffectinsofarasitdoesnotprejudiceor
impairvestedoracquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"WeholdthatwhetherJosewasavoluntarilyrecognizednaturalchildshouldbe
decidedunderArticle278oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines.Article2260ofthat
Codeprovidesthat'thevoluntaryrecognitionofanaturalchildshalltakeplace
accordingtothisCode,evenifthechildwasbornbeforetheeffectivityofthisbody

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
oflaws'orbeforeAugust30,1950.Hence,Article278maybegivenretroactive
effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and nonlegitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private
and personal affairs of the family.There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his
political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed,
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions
must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly "CivilLawisthatbranchoflawwhichhasforitsdoublepurposetheorganizationof
thefamilyandtheregulationofproperty.Ithasthus[been]definedasthemassof
preceptswhichdetermineandregulatetherelationsofassistance,authorityand
obedienceamongmembersofafamily,andthosewhichexistamongmembersofa
societyfortheprotectionofprivateinterests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"InaccordancewithArticle9oftheCivilCodeofSpain,xxxthelawsrelatingto
familyrightsandduties,ortothestatus,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersons,
governSpaniardsalthoughtheyresideinaforeigncountry;that,inconsequence,'all
questionsofacivilnature,suchasthosedealingwiththevalidityornullityofthe
matrimonialbond,thedomicileofthehusbandandwife,theirsupport,asbetween
them,theseparationoftheirproperties,therulesgoverningproperty,marital
authority,divisionofconjugalproperty,theclassificationoftheirproperty,legal
causesfordivorce,theextentofthelatter,theauthoritytodecreeit,and,ingeneral,
thecivileffectsofmarriageanddivorceuponthepersonsandpropertiesofthe
spouses,arequestionsthataregovernedexclusivelybythenationallawofthe
husbandandwife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that "Lawsrelatingtofamilyrightsandduties,ortothestatus,conditionandlegal
capacityofpersonsarebindinguponcitizensofthePhilippines,eventhoughliving
abroad"

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the

Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on
successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property
laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of
the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil
law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code
or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law,
do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides ActorDeclarationaboutpedigree.Theactordeclarationofapersondeceased,or
unabletotestify,inrespecttothepedigreeofanotherpersonrelatedtohimbybirth
ormarriage,maybereceivedinevidencewhereitoccurredbeforethecontroversy,
andtherelationshipbetweenthetwopersonsisshownbyevidenceotherthansuch
actordeclaration.Theword`pedigreeincludesrelationship,familygenealogy,birth,
marriage,death,thedateswhenandtheplaceswherethesefactsoccurred,andthe
namesoftherelatives.Itembracesalsofactsoffamilyhistoryintimatelyconnected
withpedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant
is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred,
and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas,
sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC,
might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I,RubyKelleyMangahas,oflegalageandsoundmind,presentlyresidingin
Stockton,California,U.S.A.,afterbeingsworninaccordancewithlawdohereby
declarethat:

10.FernandoPoe,Sr.,andmysister,Bessie,wereblessedwithfour(4)
morechildrenafterRonaldAllanPoe.
xxxxxxxxx
18.IamexecutingthisDeclarationtoattesttothefactthatmynephew,
RonaldAllanPoeisanaturalbornFilipino,andthatheisthe
legitimatechildofFernandoPoe,Sr.
DoneinCityofStockton,California,U.S.A.,this12thdayofJanuary
2004.
RubyKelleyMangahas

1.IamthesisterofthelateBessieKelleyPoe.

Declarant

2.BessieKelleyPoewasthewifeofFernandoPoe,Sr.
3.FernandoandBessiePoehadasonbythenameofRonaldAllanPoe,
morepopularlyknowninthePhilippinesas`FernandoPoe,Jr.,or
`FPJ.
4.RonaldAllanPoe`FPJwasbornonAugust20,1939atSt.Luke's
Hospital,MagdalenaStreet,Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7.FernandoPoeSr.,andmysisterBessie,metandbecameengagedwhile
theywerestudentsattheUniversityofthePhilippinesin1936.I
wasalsointroducedtoFernandoPoe,Sr.,bymysisterthatsame
year.
8.FernandoPoe,Sr.,andmysisterBessiehadtheirfirstchildin1938.
9.FernandoPoe,Sr.,mysisterBessieandtheirfirstthreechildren,
Elizabeth,Ronald,AllanandFernandoII,andmyselflived
togetherwithourmotheratourfamily'shouseonDakotaSt.(now
JorgeBocoboSt.),MalateuntiltheliberationofManilain1945,
exceptforsomemonthsbetween19431944.

DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentagewillstillberesolvedusingconventionalmethodsunlessweadoptthe
modernandscientificwaysavailable.Fortunately,wehavenowthefacilityand
expertiseinusingDNAtestforidentificationandparentagetesting.TheUniversity
ofthePhilippinesNaturalScienceResearchInstitute(UPNSRI)DNAAnalysis
LaboratoryhasnowthecapabilitytoconductDNAtypingusingshorttandemrepeat
(STR)analysis.TheanalysisisbasedonthefactthattheDNAofachild/personhas
two(2)copies,onecopyfromthemotherandtheotherfromthefather.TheDNA
fromthemother,theallegedfatherandthechildareanalyzedtoestablish
parentage.Ofcourse,beinganovelscientifictechnique,theuseofDNAtestas
evidenceisstillopentochallenge.Eventually,astheappropriatecasecomes,courts
shouldnothesitatetoruleontheadmissibilityofDNAevidence.Foritwassaid,that
courtsshouldapplytheresultsofsciencewhencompetentlyobtainedinaidof
situationspresented,sincetorejectsaidresultistodenyprogress."

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to
Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a
certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by
no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent
and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20
August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married
to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried
parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley,
an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano
vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states "Wemustanalyzethesecasesandaskwhatthelismotawasineachofthem.Ifthe
pronouncementoftheCourtonjussanguiniswasonthelismota,thepronouncement
wouldbeadecisionconstitutingdoctrineundertheruleofstaredecisis.Butifthe
pronouncementwasirrelevanttothelismota,thepronouncementwouldnotbea
decisionbutamereobiterdictumwhichdidnotestablishdoctrine.Ithereforeinvite
theCourttolookcloselyintothesecases.
First,Moranovs.Vivo.ThecasewasnotaboutanillegitimatechildofaFilipino
father.ItwasaboutastepsonofaFilipino,astepsonwhowasthechildofaChinese
motherandaChinesefather.Theissuewaswhetherthestepsonfollowedthe
naturalizationofthestepfather.Nothingaboutjussanguinisthere.Thestepsondid
nothavethebloodofthenaturalizedstepfather.
Second,Chiongbianvs.deLeon.Thiscasewasnotabouttheillegitimatesonofa
Filipinofather.ItwasaboutalegitimatesonofafatherwhohadbecomeFilipinoby
electiontopublicofficebeforethe1935ConstitutionpursuanttoArticleIV,Section
1(2)ofthe1935Constitution.Noonewasillegitimatehere.
Third,Serravs.Republic.ThecasewasnotabouttheillegitimatesonofaFilipino
father.SerrawasanillegitimatechildofaChinesefatherandaFilipinomother.The

issuewaswhetheronewhowasalreadyaFilipinobecauseofhismotherwhostill
neededtobenaturalized.Thereisnothingthereaboutinvidiousjussanguinis.
Finally,Paavs.Chan.[46]Thisisamorecomplicatedcase.Thecasewasaboutthe
citizenshipofQuintinChanwhowasthesonofLeoncioChan.QuintinChanclaimed
thathisfather,Leoncio,wastheillegitimatesonofaChinesefatherandaFilipino
mother.QuintinthereforearguedthathegothiscitizenshipfromLeoncio,his
father.ButtheSupremeCourtsaidthattherewasnovalidproofthatLeonciowasin
factthesonofaFilipinamother.TheCourtthereforeconcludedthatLeonciowas
notFilipino.IfLeonciowasnotFilipino,neitherwashissonQuintin.Quintin
thereforewasnotonlynotanaturalbornFilipinobutwasnotevenaFilipino.
TheCourtshouldhavestoppedthere.Butinsteaditfollowedwithanobiter
dictum.TheCourtsaidobiterthatevenifLeoncio,Quintin'sfather,wereFilipino,
QuintinwouldnotbeFilipinobecauseQuintinwasillegitimate.Thisstatementabout
Quintin,basedonacontrarytofactassumption,wasabsolutelyunnecessaryforthe
case.xxxItwasobiterdictum,pureandsimple,simplyrepeatingtheobiterdictum
inMoranovs.Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Asidefromthefactthatsuchapronouncementwouldhavenotextualfoundationin
theConstitution,itwouldalsoviolatetheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitution
notoncebuttwice.First,itwouldmakeanillegitimatedistinctionbetweena
legitimatechildandanillegitimatechild,andsecond,itwouldmakeanillegitimate
distinctionbetweentheillegitimatechildofaFilipinofatherandtheillegitimate
childofaFilipinomother.
Thedoctrineonconstitutionallyallowabledistinctionswasestablishedlongagoby
Peoplevs.Cayat.[47]Iwouldgrantthatthedistinctionbetweenlegitimatechildren
andillegitimatechildrenrestsonrealdifferences.xxxButrealdifferencesalonedo
notjustifyinvidiousdistinction.Realdifferencesmayjustifydistinctionforone
purposebutnotforanotherpurpose.
xxxWhatistherelevanceoflegitimacyorillegitimacytoelectivepublic
service?Whatpossiblestateinterestcantherebefordisqualifyinganillegitimate
childfrombecomingapublicofficer.Itwasnotthefaultofthechildthathisparents
hadillicitliaison.Whydeprivethechildofthefullnessofpoliticalrightsfornofault
ofhisown?Todisqualifyanillegitimatechildfromholdinganimportantpublic
officeistopunishhimfortheindiscretionofhisparents.Thereisneitherjusticenor
rationalityinthat.Andifthereisneitherjusticenorrationalityinthedistinction,then
thedistinctiontransgressestheequalprotectionclauseandmustbereprobated.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member
of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority
and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not
to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that
the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and
year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions
or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position
of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that
FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential
and
vice-presidential
election
contest
under
the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or

not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled inRomualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
SO ORDERED.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional
History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall,
the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to
the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in
phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in
every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The
legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws,
the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal
liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline
and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history
of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "nonChristians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to
be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away form the reservation.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the
following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made
for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro,
which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless
some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this
province, no successful result will be obtained toward
educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in
one place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that
the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800
hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the
Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on
this reservation providing that said homestead applications are
previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of
Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February
21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro
issued executive order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current

series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the
Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21,
1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of
Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the
revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up
their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later
than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days,
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative
Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in
paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same
province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of
public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is
being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it
must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of
Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation
in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which
the court is called upon the decide.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject
at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by
provincial governor. With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted
section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed
habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the
directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section
two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up
habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to
Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted
to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of
1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69,
Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians."
This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other
laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper
category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it
is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the
authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the
legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on

March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the
forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on
November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In
San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES"
COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic
Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the
blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they
may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been
endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the
means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry
out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other
religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the
year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings
were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these
meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by
sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and
temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities
which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that
convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents,
and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing
inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and
who would see the good treatment and the protection of those
already in settlements would, of their own accord, present
themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes
more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in
the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the
same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and
form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid,
October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed
should have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress
and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with
those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE
LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be
concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of
the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by
them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect,
and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously
so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has

the right to alter or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once
constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that
the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or
consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And,
because these claims are often made for private interests and not for
those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied
with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained.
The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES,"
WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who
should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than
eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen,
also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should,
nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there
be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not
more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect
nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At
Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at
Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I,
Tit. 4, Book 7.

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF
THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO

SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores,
or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of
the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal,
trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and
useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would
leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and
mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of
their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal
which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and
tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon
the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be
tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors,
and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers
and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are
truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese halfbreeds (zambaigos), who are children of indiasand born among
them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not
be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate
them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230,
231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to
improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by
concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant
of a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect
and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty
to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the
obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to
grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in
those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any
longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from
the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer
the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon
wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government
of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has
been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the

missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end
that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of
Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure
them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain
cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving
and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a
lamentable state of things, taking into account the prestige which the
country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the
part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have
proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this
serious question which involves important interests for civilization,
from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After
hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon,
and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held
with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the
provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians,
Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the
Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived
at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in
a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated
races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing
such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out
these objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from
this date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions
prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of
instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different
pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these
races which may be divided into three classes; one, which
comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without
forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued
pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby
entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These
rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of
next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the
manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall
proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal may
suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the
towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary
regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none
as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening
or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the
administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this
be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning
of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations
which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only
exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to
render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located
infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall
not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of
absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing
for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which
prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an
effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the
sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian,
the organization and service of which shall be determined in a
regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de
Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty
which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and
sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco
which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and
conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against
these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of
any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which
shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of
the territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever
should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into
the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt
for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not
subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in
returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among
their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate
them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the
same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own
accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who
shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the
purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from
contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind
of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by
the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the
direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit
the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of
constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools,
and country roads which place them in communication with one
another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns
be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have
the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in
the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and
punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection,
and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on
the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and
vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the
Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the
divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses,
labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle.
Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and
for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such
operations shall take place and everything conducive to the
successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities,
and other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other
subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities,
shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in
all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some
of the provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I
intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied
to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as GovernorGeneral, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission
which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the
application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for
consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a
complement to the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with
this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers
within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15)
(Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the
question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has
been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section
1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these
instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes
are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization
to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and
active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the
Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view,
to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly.
The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the
Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that
part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law.
This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore
exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec.
12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya,
and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for
the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators
and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line
between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes,
and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts
of the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts
Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO.
82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No.
183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the
organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special
Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act
No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the
Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the
government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections
68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission,
having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422,
445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were
enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur,
Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan,
Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these
laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR
THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the

Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and
duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon
township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven
entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the
provincial governor is further authorized, when he deems such a
course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the
Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and
experience necessary for successful local popular government, and
his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end,
an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be
maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any
settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a
course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three
hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical
limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill,
the passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with
section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twentysixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine

Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable
to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial

Enacted, December 4, 1902.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed
by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied
the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the
provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines
and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be
followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in
varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to
the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian
tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in
section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in
Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among
other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127,
128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian
Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word
"tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms
can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of
1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and
in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as
in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian"
shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of
1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec.
3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of
course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would
be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be
those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this

view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code
and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note;
Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate
further to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly
to be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine
Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the
Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine
Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts
making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative
Code. The first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the
provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the
Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local selfgovernment. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is
still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live
persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In
fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of
1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical
conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law
relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known
as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R.
18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to
the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary
of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of
civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive
authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674,
and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative
Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian
tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian
tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The
question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with
article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as
legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of
uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance
with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold
also that the fact that the accused is shown to bea member of an
uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked
extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who
have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a
member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation
relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized
under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received

recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive

Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to
whether people who were originally non-Christian but have recently
been baptized or who are children of persons who have been
recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be
considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in
these islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon
any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to
enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the
designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real
purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient
advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the
degree of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the
time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your
province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have
embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to
remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or
what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the
degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are
requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the GovernorGeneral, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will
have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the
provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal
Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member
of this court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed
unfortunate, but while no other better classification has as yet been

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the
letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein
quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of
religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was
the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to
the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of
the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be
found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June
11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes"
from the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue
has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who
profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the
cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it
to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called
non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all
others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc.,
are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the
country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a
matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides
whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent
on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far,
this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining
his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian
tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one
occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he
was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a
Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes
from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in
Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city
are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen,
Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands,
and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in
most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being
collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-

civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject

thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal
Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed
circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to
all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial
treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of nonChristian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of
settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the
Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing
such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published
for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed,
not by reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but
because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as
members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in
so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and
uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have
had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member
of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the
same law that governs the other members of that community and
from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the
community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as
from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the
delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons
arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D,
F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without
penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in
determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax
is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity,
nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with
some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados"
and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of nonChristian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue
Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so
forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members
of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal
Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of
Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion,
Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of
the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The
Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the
status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel.
The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,
does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay
himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of AttorneyGeneral Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that
is probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so
that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling
the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions
of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian

inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code which we
are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the
Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but
simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes
of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam
in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of
the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian
tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a
social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction
based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling
on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase,
adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of
articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759)
should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes
of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the
law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law
null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of
the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority
than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and nonChristian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp.
411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes
that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is:
"Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian
tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes,"
which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and
different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term
"non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization.
The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third
class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in
his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage,"
"mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is
applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has
been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive
times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who
bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that
the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten.
In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from
which we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered
to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back
into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they
were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito
blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a
peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings
with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an
investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of

guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting
those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the
Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States,
and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from
hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the
clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of
the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as
follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United
States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the
United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery
of American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies
before the Revolution and the States and the United States since,
have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over
which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages.
But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the
Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or
peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a
tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or
the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was
the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make
such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves
these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when
they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a
possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of
the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of
Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for
their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because
of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found
are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power.
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of
the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.
it must exist in that government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the
question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and
their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New
Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these
Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as
wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official
supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed
to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not
within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very
good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government.
(Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S.,
278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra;
U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall,
616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169
U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84;
Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913],
232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.)
Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an
Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such
measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection
in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an
unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally,
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United
States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon
return to a writ ofhabeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging
to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the
relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of
Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal
relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and
were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and
without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were
thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of
the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was
that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca
tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated
some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary
of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required
the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to
be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater
importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory
from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the
friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for
the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the
Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or
not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully
exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The
decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to
conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the
United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ
of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all
cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of
authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in
violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of
the military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators,
under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the
relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed
to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well
as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the
laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United
States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be
discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.

As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used
as authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of
theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the
Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so
decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known
to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have
been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and
that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as
may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation
of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature
could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is
contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided
its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule
will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided
by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The
true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection
can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County
[1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S.vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful

delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval
of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection
and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands
ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters
arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate
a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary,
and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it
would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative
authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364,
reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An
exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The
Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune
of being in a backward state?

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted

on behalf of his unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear
and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal
as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians'
and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of
their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the
Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed;
judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E.
D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to
what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the
term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade
of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does
not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the
President's instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the
Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual
is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties,
compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other.
(Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that
authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined
idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never
understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to
wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us,
the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from
injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in
not being forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque,
spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license
to ac according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint
under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right
by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S.,
86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for
the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not
exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and
anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use
his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless
of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a
sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his
own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government especially of any free government existing under a
written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it
is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty
of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great
dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand."
(Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by

reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual.
(Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this
Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of
the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to
contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the
right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those
things which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted
Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2
Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana
[1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty
of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty.
"Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power,
in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means
simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it
shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
(U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the
situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal

Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It
has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what
form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910],
219 U.S., 219.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in
nature.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of
overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt
to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes
of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to
be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen
Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those
portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in
said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible
that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this
may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which

petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police
power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to
note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become
almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of
the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbiervs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is
the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police
power.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority
the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and
those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us,
before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.

their children with the object of making them useful citizens

of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will
ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of
their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make
depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort
the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live
in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of
the motives for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were
taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to
13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site
selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in
the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there
appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the
school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a
somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the
results obtained during the period of less than one year since the
beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and
development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that
segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of
the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement
to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over
those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the
influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy
to organize them into political communities and to educate

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision
of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his
administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our
population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian
inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of
seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of
public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian
people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan
regions to facilitate their development and the extention of
government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another
among non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse
and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian
people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources,
especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of
private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been
continued among the non-Christian people. These people are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they
may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who
are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being
made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to
organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus
bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to
live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a
civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being
impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of
leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and
unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country.
(See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly
relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government
towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue
the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited
by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a
systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material,
economic, social, and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and
non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
(Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United
States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise
Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of
these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the
Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing
for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished
to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children
for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in
fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish

times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other
peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved,
that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under
restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands
of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the
manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal.
Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The
Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they
are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true,
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a
low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of
the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the
purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch
in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because
these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great
Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government
must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the
interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to
homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all
convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the
Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of
destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal
caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead
injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of
these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for
which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a
heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse
them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of
liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They
understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from
one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully,
how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due
process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be

deprived of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of
persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous
idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the
case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the
mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the
remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble
sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them
alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with
national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has

tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such
people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people
under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the
signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they
will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been

accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the

backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a
certain element, believing that their personal interests would be
injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of
civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even
blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and
superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously
invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person
shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow
them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time
will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of
civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in
a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to
deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at
Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to improve their
living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object
of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and
permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work.
Their children are being educated in a school especially established
for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that
their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be
assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them
slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for
another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to
some other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this
connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and
wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move
from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and
the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the
nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering
from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the
government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed
place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over
the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of
the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for
the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will
always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life,

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live
together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing
them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific
objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking,
to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain
localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those
citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any
doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again
without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak
and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous
official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given
the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these
people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would
endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If,
indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the
power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always
open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law
is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not
unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable
purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with
freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual members of society be
subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has
assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now
purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it
has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such
an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government
renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the
Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period
has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive
march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case
of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the
attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the
Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi.
Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last
analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is
perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the
public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its
influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time
to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the
so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a
consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from
early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so
that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be
equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the
Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated,
and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole
tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part
of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the
many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a
chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad
conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as
are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs
shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set
forth in the prevailing, opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification
when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied
to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts
and provinces throughout the Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this
connection in our statute-book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the
individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would add
that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes is, or
is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American
occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement
in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17,
1910, and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly
discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be
found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraces with
the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine
statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and
enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations,
administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the
admitted civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a made of life, furthermore,
which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may
be brought in contact with members of the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of
inhabitants of particular province in these Islands, or any individual member
of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such
group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of
"non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and
normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or
adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or
maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether
they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to
maintain a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such
tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or
general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are
brought in contact.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the
validity of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give
these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes
affected by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any
attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course,
tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of
such an order.
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had
attained that degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to
serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the
members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether
the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been
justified in its enforcement By what proceeding known to the law, or to be
specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any province
provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration
order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon
one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of
Mindanao, and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of
residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of
Mindoro.

Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be

consulted, after the practice in the United States when tribes or groups of
American Indians have been placed upon reservations; but since nonChristian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful authority to
bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing,
would have the same force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order
was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such
orders rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and
freedom or action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained,
without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general
welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and
is properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individual
are found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their own wishes
cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special
and necessarily paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular
Government is well illustrated by the following provisions found in the
Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian
tribes). It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to
continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions
inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate
means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner the moral,
material, economic, social and political development of those
regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the
mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian
and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago.
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. There shall be
maintained in the provincial treasuries of the respective specially
organized provinces a special fund to be known as the township and
settlement fund, which shall be available, exclusively, for
expenditures for the benefit of the townships and settlements of the
province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon
approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the
jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to
review the action of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he
is a "non-Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express
no opinion on that question at this time.

The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied
in the majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro
with the prior approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the
placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very
low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive,
seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in
the preamble to Act No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government."

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That
fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the
humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a
Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to
a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.

It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of
Mindoro (not including smaller islands which together make the Province of
Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361 of
which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be
the total Mangyan population of the province. The total population was less
than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).

MOIR, J., dissenting:

The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.

I dissent.

It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos

along the coast and by Manguianes.

I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of
justice will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing
may strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a
majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into
the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and
human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a
reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from
the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares
of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred
manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from
the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in
prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The
Manguianes used out a writ ofhabeas corpus in this court, alleging that they
are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.

The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at
will long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of
Cebu. They have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They
are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people," whom the Government
of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of
civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for
those who like Dadalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing
them section 2759 provides the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions,
but only the fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections
of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion,
are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected
by that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes
is similar to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is
made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary
to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the
United States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in
regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the United States
Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties,
reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected
form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were
larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but
in thousands of square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within
a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens
of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the
rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from
their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800
hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due
process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos
whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and
must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "bought
under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the
return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having
been committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."

A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is

copied in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of
their offense which is that
Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of
destruction burning and destroying the forests and making
illegal caiginsthereon. No bringing any benefit to the State but,
instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately
become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve
and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not
they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may
want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right
conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way.
They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going
from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully,
how can they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be

deprived of his liberty without due process of law" apply to a class of
persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous
idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the
case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people be let alone in the mountains
and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest
hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them
alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with
national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has

tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such
people and fitting them to be citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is
that the Manguianes destroy the forest by making a caigin. What is a
"caigin?" Simply this. These people move their camp or place of abode
frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to clear the
land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down
the smaller trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that
they can plant their crops. The fires never spread in the tropical undergrowth
of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within thecaigin are killed and crops
are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on due to
superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from
exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caigins or clear lands in spots and
then abandon them for the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be
just over the hills, we cannot see that they are committing such a great abuse
as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land for incarceration it
is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to
the state and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those
who want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and
never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the law
punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate
that we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent the
possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary
servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected
to involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a
livelihood as they have been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they
will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not
escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad to
exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding
themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who
will feed them and clothe them in return of their services.?

It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be
subjected to involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has
been. How will they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them
money with which to buy food on the promise that they will work for them.
And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another
law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their
necks, and they may be fined not more than two hundred pesos or
imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence
expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will
again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are
cast adrift.
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It
does not appear they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It
does not appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any
defense. It seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by the
authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they
are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be
clear there is no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian"
means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the socalled "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes
are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others,
about one millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros,
Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. The have
beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor they have herds of cattle and
horses and some few of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians,
like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but
they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in
law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be
taken from their homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the
provincial governor, with the prior approval of the department head. To state
such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the
section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But
it is argued that there is no probability of the department head ever giving his
approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has done it in the
present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary and
unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's
legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm.
It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men;
that there is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional
principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not
leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these
provisions which the people have, the through the organic law,
declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised
over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially
the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall
be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it
was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation
of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or
unreasonable classification, or which singles out any particular
individuals or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating
legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the
fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection clause
thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion. (Vol.
4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest,
and review the history of their development, we are constrained to
conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action
of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of
course, not subject to law, for its is the author and source of law; but
in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies
of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom
and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the
definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there
must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the
authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration
the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the
ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the
pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as
individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of
constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious
progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of
Commonwealth "may be a government of law and not of men." For
the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of
life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)

It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the
Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for
determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of
the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life,
liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.
In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes
of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive
them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a
semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the
narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death.
From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime
of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where
they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and
fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria
infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields than it would
be to order their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes"
and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes
may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a
reservation in effect an open air jail then so may the Ifugaos, so may
the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may
the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands.
All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the
department, have the power under this law to take the non-Christian
inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them on a
reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
the court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine
Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be, subject to the
unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor
decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be
safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could
have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a
distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is
final.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the
majority opinion, should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in
administering the laws of my country, I have never been called upon
to hear or decide a case that appealed so strongly to my sympathy
as the one now under consideration. On the one side, we have a few
of the remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak,
insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised race; and the other,
we have the representative of one of the most powerful, most
enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times. On the
one side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming
into this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to
enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts
of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the
other side, we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous,
government, resisting this application with the determination of
sending these people back to the country which is to them less
desirable perpetual imprisonment in their own native land. But I think
it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and distinguished
officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no sort of
sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear
a part so conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I
think it not improper to say that, if the strongest possible sympathy
could give the relators title to freedom, they would have been
restored to liberty the moment the arguments in their behalf were
closed. no examination or further thought would then have been
necessary or expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated by
law, something more satisfactory and enduring than mere sympathy
must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It
follows that this case must be examined and decided on principles of
law, and that unless the relators are entitled to their discharge under
the constitution or laws of the United States, or some treaty, they
must be remanded to the custody of the officer who caused their
arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left without
the consent of the government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five
others, during the session of the court held at that time of Lincoln,
presented their petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a
writ of habeas corpus and their final discharged from custody
thereunder.
The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who
have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in

the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn
from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and
without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst
they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of
the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of
their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of
April, and, the distance between the place where the writ was made
returnable and the place where the relators were confined being
more than twenty miles, ten days were alloted in which to make
return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the
arrest and detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to
the writ, and the additional statement since filed, is that the relators
are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated in
some place within the limits of the indian Territory had departed
therefrom without permission from the government; and, at the
request of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had
issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return
the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to
the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the
Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for the
purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the
relators had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection
with the tribe to which they belonged; and upon this point alone was
there any testimony produced by either party hereto. The other
matter stated in the petition and the return to the writ are conceded to
be true; so that the questions to be determined are purely questions
of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with
the Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north
of the Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the
permanent home of the aid Indians, in which the government agreed
to protect them during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or
why, or under what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in
Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does not appear.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
xxx

xxx

xxx

A question of much greater importance remains for consideration,

which, when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy.
This relates to the right of the government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to a point in the
Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not
vain enough to think that I can do full justice to a question like the
one under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so much
valuable material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I
shall try to present it as viewed from my own standpoint, without
reference to consequences or criticisms, which, though not specially
invited, will be sure to follow.
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On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general

Indian appropriation bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the
secretary of the interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas
to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with
consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
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The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and

cultivated a portion of the same, until two or three years ago, when
they removed therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not
appear. At all event, we find a portion of them, including the relators,
located at some point in the Indian Territory. There, the testimony
seems to show, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the
principal witness, states that out of five hundred and eighty-one
Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian
Territory, one hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and a
great proportion of the others were sick and disabled, caused, in a
great measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to save
himself and the survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble
remnant of his little band of followers, he determined to leave the
Indian Territory and return to his old home, where, to use his own
language, "he might live and die in peace, and be buried with his
fathers." He also stated that he informed the agent of their final
purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his followers had

finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with the
Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or
band of Indians, and to cut loose from the government, go to work,
become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs of a
higher civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable
and laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work to
earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same language,
and with whom many of the Poncas have long continued to
intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to
make them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha
reservation, and when thus employed, that they were arrested by
order of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the
Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to see the justice, or reason,
or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from their own
native plains and blood relations to a far-off country, in which they
can see little but new-made graves opening for their reception. The
land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love
of home and native land was strong enough in the minds of these
people to induce them to brave every peril to return and live and die
where they had been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing
Bear were not to repose in the land they hoped to be leaving forever,
but were carefully preserved and protected and formed a part of what
was to them melancholy procession homeward. Such instances of
parental affections, and such love home and native land, may be
heathen in origin, but it seems to that they are not unlike Christian in
principle.
And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the
United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and ordered their release from custody.
This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.
I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the
petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been
denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents
immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.