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Julia K.

Perry

On Kuhn and the Notion of Paradigm Shift


May 19, 2009

Dr. Steve Kreis


HIST501 K001 Win 09
American Military University

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The academic landscape is littered with the decaying remains of theories, tenets and rules

which have been widely accepted at one time and then later cast aside. Or we can explore the

flower beds and gardens where a theory has sprouted and is fighting for its existence to survive

alongside rows and rows of hearty theories that have grown tall standing on strong roots. Roots

which have allowed the theory's core, or trunk, to become hearty over time and as a result

allowed the theory to bear bushels of fruits, or reams of paper. This virtual organic landscape

contains both physical science and social science. But, what can we learn from the theories in our

academic garden? The little ones, theories fighting for their lives, have structurally poor root

systems. There is not much to support them and help them grow. The scientists and researchers

attached to these theories are limited in number or have not developed their work enough to

allow their ideas to conceptually take hold with the community at large. Whereas, the theories

which are strong and bear fruit season after season have many followers and their works are

scientifically valid, reliable and well accepted. They have borne many books and articles and so

have become well established, creating a need through the growth of the trunk itself for more

root support. So, whole academic departments have aligned with them, and students come to

these specific schools to be fed and fertilized so they can become part of the root system of this

specific theory. In this way, strong theories thrive and continue to grow, while the weak or new

theories must continue to fight for the limited resources between weeds and strong theories alike.

Thomas Kuhn saw the nature of scientific revolutions in much the same way as I have described

our virtual academic garden. Each theory, or rather set of theories, was individual or its own

plant in the academic garden. For Kuhn the history of scientific revolutions was in the notion of

scientific research itself, not in the individual theories which researchers attributed themselves to

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following and refining. This is probably the greatest change Kuhn brought about in the

historiography of science; that science was not best seen as an accumulation of research over

time, but it was more accurately seen as a series of blips which comprised a whole.

Thomas Kuhn himself was a converted scientist who became a scholar of the history of

science. His major work is called The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). It is an

account of the development of science and in fact, much of this text is historiography as Kuhn

uses examples of past theories to lace the tenets of his thesis. He then extends the historical

cases and draws conclusions about how, as we view the past exploits of scientific researchers,

we can interpolate a view for the way in which science progresses. It is this progress that Kuhn

labels scientific revolution. For Kuhn scientific revolutions are comprised of paradigms which

he defines as sets of beliefs. A revolution occurs when one lexicon or taxonomy is replaced by

another incompatible lexicon or taxonomy.1 As "paradigms", theories are not only sets of

propositions about nature, but rather ways of conceiving nature and natural phenomena.2 And,

it is important to note that Kuhn, in the very definition for the term he is credited with coining,

implies a direct bias in every researcher by using the word "beliefs." Kuhn suggests a personal

scientific bias when he discusses the individual in a paradigm shift, "The man who embraces a

new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by

problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many

large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A

decision of that kind can only be made on faith."3

"For Kuhn, the periods when a single paradigm is prevalent and researchers are focusing

on developing the theoretical framework are called periods of normal science. According to

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Kuhn, science progresses most of the time in a quiet piecemeal fashion. During these periods

scientists are occupied with solving "puzzles," i.e., problems still left open by the prevailing

paradigm. Solutions of these puzzles usually fit in well with - and thus do not lead to a change of

- the prevailing paradigm."4 During these times of normal science researchers are able to ask and

answer questions and time is spent verifying the reliability of other research. If there are

questions for which answers can not be found it is considered that the current paradigm can

address them, but scientists have not found a way to directly apply it. "The accumulation of

anomalies with respect to a given paradigm does lead to dissatisfaction with that paradigm and

creates a climate of opinion in which a new paradigm is welcomed."5 But, these questions do pile

up over time. "The key idea was that of change: scientists work within a framework, or

paradigm, until more and more phenomena prove difficult to account for within that framework.

This accumulation of anomalies prompts the development of an alternative way of working, and

scientists may change wholesale from one paradigm to the other, changing their ways of talking

and thinking about the world. Between these changes, or revolutions, the main activity of

scientists is that of ‘puzzle-solving’. This is a worthy endeavor, but it is not quite the great march

towards truth in which scientists had previously seemed to be involved. After each revolution,

different puzzles present themselves, and the process begins again."6 In this sense, there will

always be a change, as it would be illogical to continue accepting a paradigm when it no longer

can address completely questions which researchers want to answer. "Further, Kuhn uses the

term “revolution” as a term of success only. Given his definition, there is no such thing as a

failed scientific revolution."7

The essence of the criticism against Kuhn came from this particular component of his

theory where he actually posits the change between accepted paradigms. For Kuhn, since each

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proponent of a paradigm had to rationally believe in the truth of their accepted paradigm the

major concern is that in order to go from one paradigm to another a researcher would have to

consider one or the other paradigms, likely the first, as being irrational. Of course, this argument

is really only subjective and is a result of Kuhn incorporating a glaring generalization in his

theory by the fact that he chose to emphasize the community over the individual researcher.

When you break each paradigm down to its lesser theoretical components it is easier to accept

that some of the lesser theories could be irrational and still consider the entire paradigm as

rational, but logically weak.

It is this question of paradigm shifts that I will examine in this paper. The academic

discussion of the change between paradigms is extensive and there are perspectives from

historians, philosophers and even sociologists which try to cut out their own view and thus

academic ownership of Kuhn's thesis. For example consider Demir's account of Kuhn's concept

of a paradigm shift8. Demir's account adequately represents a summary of Kuhn's work. It is

this academic interchange that I would like to explore. I will examine the core criticisms and

supports from several academic fields to see just how the question is framed. What are the

academic criticism of Kuhn's thesis, and specifically the notion of paradigm shift, from The

Structure of Scientific Revolutions and how are these criticisms framed?

Hoyningen-Huene spent a year with Kuhn and is generally considered to be the best

source for information which would accurately resemble Kuhn's own statements. Hoyningen-

Huene discussed six ways in which Kuhn altered the prevalent view of the nature of scientific

revolutions. I will use Hoyningen-Huenes frame which he developed to categorize the ways in

which Kuhn's thesis changed the prevalent views, at the time Structures was released in 1970, of

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the history of science to discuss the criticism of Kuhn. I will then examine the criticisms specific

to history.

The first way Kuhn altered the prevalent view regarding the history of science was to

suggest that the Darwinian notion of evolution could be applied to the nature of scientific

progress. Here, "The Origin of Species (1859) recognized no goal set either by God or nature.

Instead, natural selection, operating in the given environment and with the actual organisms

presently at hand, was responsible for the gradual but steady emergence of a more elaborate,

further articulated, and vastly more specialized organisms."9 For Kuhn science progressed, but

not toward a goal, the progress was measured by the refinement of the theories, or paradigms.

According to Cao, "Before [Kuhn] …the history of science was taken by historians as a

cumulative and progressive process of rational activities and their products." History is viewed

as a straight line, and progress is achieved but it is not progress made to reach a specific goal.

"Kuhn recognized that a successful scientific theory is usually a better instrument for finding and

solving puzzles than its predecessor. That is what he meant by ‘progress’."10 Consider Larvor's

statement that, "New with Darwinism was the idea that the differentiation of species is not aimed

at any goal, likewise with Kuhn’s conception of scientific progress."11 Go back to our virtual

garden and consider our discussion on the growth of plants, or paradigms. It is accepted that

plants grow, and this growth is undoubtedly progress, but is there a goal for the tree, or does it

just grow?

The second alteration Kuhn suggested was the idea that science is not bias free, but

instead is based on the history of the paradigm and may change in the future. Kuhn felt that

scientists brought their values and beliefs with them to their research and that was in fact, why

they chose certain problems to investigate. "One cannot fully understand a scientific paradigm

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without deep commitment to it. One must already believe it."12 Cao says that, "For any

individual investigators, according to Kuhn, a given conceptual framework or a paradigm is the

precondition for any kind of scientific inquiries, including observations, theory-constructions and

interpretations."13 But Kuhn himself used the example of flipping open and closing a light switch

to portray the manner in which scientists change from one paradigm to another." So changes of

paradigm in revolutionary science, for Kuhn, do not proceed in accordance with generally

agreed-upon rules as in normal science, but rather require something more akin to a conversion

experience."14

Kuhn's third alteration is that because of the nature of scientific revolutions paradigms

cannot be reliably reduced from the theories of other paradigms. "In this sense there is also no

doubt at all that science as a whole is a rational enterprise. In all three revolutionary transitions,

therefore, key elements of the preceding paradigm are preserved as approximate special cases in

the succeeding paradigm."15 But, beyond special cases there is no equivalency between

paradigms, in fact Kuhn suggested scientists of different paradigms would have a hard time

communicating because they would not have a shared meaning for key terminology. "In fact, as

has become clearer in Kuhn's work after Structure, mutual untranslatability of some of the key

terms is the hallmark of incommensurability between theories."16 "It is for this reason that Kuhn

describes the two paradigms as incommensurable: there is no common measure to which the

proponents of two rival paradigms can appeal in order to resolve their differences. As a

consequence, the proponents of the two paradigms face communication, comparison and

adjudication problems."17

Kuhn's fourth alteration was to the view of another researcher, Popper, who was the only

other researcher to deal with scientific revolutions. "Thus according to Kuhn, theory falsification

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as described by Popper is a stereotype that is not found in the actual history of science."18 "Why

is the normal scientist so dangerous? Because, according to Popper, Kuhn’s normal scientist ‘has

been indoctrinated’, is ‘dogmatic’, ‘acritic’ and, to sum up, such scientist continues epistemically

attached to the theory/paradigm even when empirical tests show evidence against it. This is the

core of Popper’s charge, an activity like this cannot be rational in principle since rationality

amounts to the disposition to critically revise our beliefs when contra-evidence is found."19 The

basis of this discontinuity is the interpretation of the normal scientist. Popper had to massage out

the altered meaning of a normal scientist, which Kuhn described, to conclude that he was

"indoctrinated" and will not accept a change in paradigm. When in fact it is a core component of

Kuhn's paradigm shift thesis that scientists will move to the paradigm that provides better

answers to questions the scientist is trying to solve.

The fifth alteration Kuhn established was to "the idea that science is guided by the

scientific method, construed of a set of rules rigorously to be followed."20 According to Kuhn

normal science does not reduce to a set of rules; in normal science the ability to capture

similarities among paradigms/exemplars plays a more important and essential role. "It is in this

sense that normal science is not guided by rules but by paradigms."21 "Yet Kuhn…continued to

hold that the evolution of science is a rational and progressive process despite the revolutionary

transitions between scientific paradigms which are absolutely necessary to this process. The

scientific enterprise, Kuhn suggests, is essentially an instrument for solving a particular sort of

problem or “puzzle”—for maximizing the quantitative match between theoretical predictions and

phenomenological results of measurement. Given this, however, there are obvious criteria or

“values” that are definitive of the scientific enterprise as such. Such values are constant or

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permanent across scientific revolutions or paradigm-shifts, and this is all we need to secure the

rationality of scientific progress."22

The last way Kuhn altered the common beliefs of the time was to consider the principal

agents of science to be communities, not individuals. "Knowledge is the property of communities

not of individuals, who find themselves reduced to being representatives of a group, members of

a community."23 Looking back at our virtual academic garden the researchers and scientists are

the roots, for Kuhn they are the principal reason for the growth of the theories and thereby

science. "As Kuhn's historiography intends to show, the arguments and beliefs of many historical

figures are accordingly constrained by their paradigmatic allegiances; only a rare genius, such as

Galileo, is able to see beyond the confines of extant paradigms and synthesize a revolutionary

successor."24 "According to Kuhn, an individual’s decision to adopt a theory different from the

ones he accepted in the past does not qualify as a revolution. Hence, when Tycho Brahe accepted

a new theory of planetary motion that embodied a lexicon or taxonomy at odds with the then

widely accepted Ptolemaic taxonomy, a revolution in astronomy did not occur. The relevant

locus of taxonomic change is the research community. A revolution occurs only when a research

community changes taxonomies."25

Kuhn called himself a historian, and in fact many of the critiques of his works and their

perceived weaknesses seem to be based on the fact the he drew upon historical literature and

theory to frame some of his concepts and the philosophers weren’t able to fully understand what

he was trying to say (or if they did, they disagreed). "Kuhn claimed that the hostile accusations

of relativism and irrationalism arose because he was writing as an historian, whereas his noisier

critics were reading as philosophers. Discussing the reception of his incommensurability thesis,

he declared that, "Only philosophers, have seriously misconstrued the intent of these parts of my

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argument" (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 198, as quoted in Larvor). Kuhn did not attempt to specify exactly

what it is about philosophy that caused its practitioners to misread him."26 But, he tried to draw a

line between philosophy and history and his account is based mainly on the works of historians,

"he observes that history seeks to understand particulars in their contexts whereas philosophy

looks for the universal aspect of any given particular."27 Another critique of Kuhn's thesis based

on philosophy is based on the idea of paradigm shifts being comparable to a light switch. "Crises

are not, contrary to Kuhn, terminated by gestalt switches. The gestalt switch is only the

beginning. The new paradigm idea has to be formulated, published, argued, defended, tested, and

submitted to examination by colleagues with different preconceptions and with access to various

sorts of evidence."28 Here Scheffler does not take into account that the change has occurred,

regardless of if and when the scientific community accepts it. For Kuhn, it is critical to

understand that once the switch has been flipped, the shift is inevitable. In fact, Kuhn would

place that period within the scope of natural science.

So, to understand whom Kuhn was writing to at the time let's consider the state of

philosophy in the 1960s. Larvor notes, "We know what ‘philosopher’ meant to Kuhn in this

context. Philosophy of science in North America in the decades surrounding the Second World

War was “positivist”. That is to say, formal logic was the principal tool, anti-psychologism was

the received wisdom, and the tension between empiricism and realism was the central problem.

Kuhn's response to this was to suggest that we should switch our epistemological perspective

from a static and foundationalist one, as in logical positivism and empiricism, to what he

occasionally called the ‘historical perspective’. The crux of the latter is that the prevailing or

inherited system of beliefs is taken as presumptively justified, and the focus of epistemic

evaluation is shifted from beliefs per se to changes of beliefs."29

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Now that we see the state of accepted knowledge let us consider his legacy. "Kuhn’s

legacy to philosophy of science is his theory of scientific change according to which the growth

of scientific knowledge is punctuated by unsettling revolutionary episodes. The positivists

implied that all scientific knowledge is embodied in theories whose content is expressible in

sentences. Kuhn, though, insists that some scientific knowledge is embodied in concrete

scientific accomplishments that serve as exemplars for solving hitherto unsolved problems.

Kepler’s model of the orbit of Mars presented in The New Astronomy is a typical paradigm. It

provided astronomers with a template for modeling the motion of the other planets."30 Though

Kuhn was a historian by trade and we have seen that his work was often criticized by

philosophers of science what about historical analysis? What contribution could Kuhn be said to

have had to the field of history specifically? A component of Kuhn's thesis is the idea of

incommensurabilites, or Kuhns third alteration which was discussed previously regarding the

inability to reduce the theories within a given paradigm. According to Kuhn scientists would not

be able to communicate on some ideas which may appear to continue from paradigm to

paradigm. However, variances in meaning would necessitate a translation of terms. Kuhn used as

a model the term "planet" which possessed a different meaning depending on whether one was

versed in the Ptolemaic or Copernican paradigm. "An example Kuhn gives which illustrates all

three aspects of analysts’ incommensurability is the difference between the Ptolemaic system and

the Copernican system. In the Ptolemaic system the term ‘planet’ refers to both the Sun and the

Moon. In the Copernican system the term ‘planet’ acquires a new meaning. The Sun becomes a

star, the Earth becomes a planet like Mars and Jupiter and the Moon becomes a new sort of a

body, a satellite (2000, p.15)."31 This examination of incommensurability was based on a

historical interpretation, or reading. In fact, Kuhn noted that he was working as an historian when

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he first realized the importance of incommensurability while trying to understand Aristotle's

Physics.32 So, for Kuhn the historian must interpret the past, and perhaps act as a translator for

the meaning of what he is studying as he strives to represent the past accurately to the modern

reader. "What I am presupposing will be suggested by the following claim: to understand some

body of past scientific belief, the historian must acquire a lexicon that here and there differs

systematically from the one current in his own day."33 Kuhn elaborates that occasionally the

historian may need to read and consider parts of a work as erroneous and extraneous therefore

worthy of possible omission. To be accurate the historian must judge these omissions or

anomalies critically. The historian must base himself in the terminology of the writer and the

work at hand. Or, to use a common expression, the historian must put himself in the time he is

studying. But how does the idea of incommensurability blend with historical research? How can

the historian understand the past when he lives in the present? "There is…something extremely

odd about the incommensurability thesis in that if it is true that the participants in the relevant

scientific communities did not understand each other during a dispute about whether one

paradigm should succeed another, how much more difficult is understanding going to be for the

historian? Even a weak form of the argument would seem to render his task almost impossible,

given additional difficulties of the lapse of time and so on."34 To go back to Kuhns illustration of

reading and trying to comprehend Aristotle consider the effort involved. At first glance you

might suggest that he merely looked up and stared out the window and was given to a moment of

epiphany. However, we must consider the prior to this moment Kuhn was well versed in the

writings of Aristotle, and also likely writings of Aristotle's contemporaries. Kuhn would have

likely had some exposure to current (1900s) thought on the work of Aristotle. Kuhn also had a

firm understanding of modern science and mathematics. And then, staring out the window, it all

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seemed to fall into place. What the historian should take away from Kuhn is that the there is no

temporal boundary to historical research. If we were to consider Kuhns thesis based on Beards35

three perspectives of history we would easily conclude that Kuhn believes history is linear, and it

progresses but not toward a goal. The effective historian is critical, logical, a meditator, a

dreamer and an investigator. The historian should be well read, but should be willing to question

and should know their bias(es). Though many of Kuhns critics claim that a loss of objectivity

resulted from Kuhn's thesis I would disagree. Or, I would posit that it is at best a deformed

interpretation of Kuhn's incommensurability thesis that was the catalyst.36 The fact that Kuhn

used historical methodologies, based his work on historical accounts and called himself a

historian should also declare that he felt history was an integral part of the academic community.

What are the academic criticism of Kuhn's thesis, and specifically the notion of paradigm

shift, from The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and how are these criticisms framed? We have

seen that the main criticisms of Kuhn's thesis has focused on six areas in which he dramatically

altered the currently accepted thinking (in 1970.) Of the six areas the disagreement around the

notion of paradigm shift and its resulting axioms was examined in detail. It is more easily

accepted that differing paradigms exist, but it is the way in which Kuhn posited how they were

sequenced that is criticized. The main criticism being that if the community must accept its

current paradigm as true and reasonable how can a paradigm shift occur if this does not result in

one of the paradigms actually being irrational. And, should a scientist ever accept a paradigm, or

set of beliefs, when he is not sure if it is rational? To this Kuhn would likely reply that each

paradigm must be examined based on the time it was held. For, what is rational in one time can

be irrational in another. Even the more "advanced" paradigm could have been considered

irrational in the time of the earlier paradigm. But, Kuhn would add that anomalies would

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eventually develop in the first paradigm which could no longer be answered. And if the second

paradigm was able to answer these questions, then it would be the rational paradigm at that time.

1
Wray, K. Brad. "Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited." Synthese 158, (2007): 66.
2
Reisch, George A. "Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?" Philosophy of Science 58, no. 2 (1991): 267.
3
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure and Function of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996. 145.
4
Pinter, G.G., Vera Pinter. "From Epistemology to Rational Science Policy: Popper versus Kuhn. (scholars Karl R.
Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn)" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 41 no.2 (1998): 293.
5
Meiland, Jack. "Kuhn, Scheffler, and Objectivity in Science." Philosophy of Science 41, no.2 (1974): 182.
6
Hawley, Katherine. "Thomas S. Kuhn’s Mysterious Worlds." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 27, no.
2 (1996): 291.
7
Wray, "Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited." 66.
8
"These are the times when normal scientific activity is interrupted. The dominant paradigm encounters
anomalies which cannot be ignored and put aside. As more and more scientists start seeing the resolution of the
anomalies as crucial for the future of their field, they devote attention to overcoming them. During this time,
the ontological, methodological and other commitments of the paradigm are questioned. New and different
perspectives begin to appear. Over time, one of those new perspectives gains increasing attention and numbers
of supporters. Scientists in the field find themselves faced with a choice: either to stay with the old paradigm
and its defenders or to switch allegiance to the newly emerging paradigm. The choice is not straightforward.
There are no general, impartial, universal criteria which scientists can use to resolve their differences
concerning the superiority of one paradigm over the other. The practitioners of the two rival paradigms
disagree about their ‘problem fields’ and what counts as a permissible solution to them. They also attribute
different meanings to some of the terms they both use. Moreover, new exemplars emerge, older ones are
applied in totally new and unexpected ways, similarity and dissimilarity relations are altered. The newly
emerging paradigm not only describes nature differently but also establishes new relationships between
existing terms (Kuhn 1996 [1962])."
9
Kuhn, The Structure and Function of Scientific Revolutions. 172.
10
Larvor, Brendan. "Why did Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions Cause a Fuss?" Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 34 (2003): 370.
11
Larvor, "Why did Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions Cause a Fuss?" 383.
12
Nickles, Thomas. "Kuhn, Historical Philosophy of Science, and Case-Based Reasoning." Configurations 6 no. 1
(1998): 55.
13
Cao, Tian Yu. "The Kuhnian Revolution and the Postmodern Turn in the History of Science." Physics 30, no. 2-3
(1993): 480.
14
Friedman, Michael. "Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of Science." Philosophy of Science 69, (2002): 181.
15
ibid
16
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. "On Thomas Kuhn's Philosophical Significance." Configurations 6, no.1 (1998): 4.
17
Demir, Ipek. "Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
39, (2008): 134.
18
Hoyningen-Huene, "On Thomas Kuhn's Philosophical Significance." 5.
19
Dı´ez , Jose. "Falsificationism and the Structure of Theories: the Popper–Kuhn controversy about the rationality
of normal science." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38, (2007): 546.
20
Hoyningen-Huene, "On Thomas Kuhn's Philosophical Significance." 5.
21
Dı´ez, "Falsificationism and the Structure of Theories: the Popper–Kuhn controversy about the rationality of
normal science." 545.
22
Friedman, "Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of Science." 183.
23
Caneva, Kenneth. "Objectivity, Relativism, and the Individual: a Role for a Post-Kuhnian History of Science."
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29, no.3 (1998):341.
24
Reisch, "Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?" 267.
25
Wray, "Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited." 66.

14
26
Larvor, "Why did Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions Cause a Fuss?" 372.
27
ibid
28
Scheffler, Israel. "Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on Kuhn." Philosophy of Science 39, no.3 (1972):
373.
29
Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Kuhn, the Correspondence Theory of Truth and Coherentist Epistemology." Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 38, (2007): 556.
30
Wray, "Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited." 65.
31
As referenced in Demir, Ipek, "Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn." 136.
32
"I was sitting at my desk with the text of Aristotle’s Physics open in front of me and with a four-colored pencil in
my hand. Looking up, I gazed abstractedly out the window of my room—the visual image is one I still retain.
Suddenly the fragments in my head sorted themselves out in a new way, and fell into place together. My jaw
dropped, for all at once Aristotle seemed a very good physicist indeed, but of a sort I’d never dreamed possible.
Now I could understand why he had said what he’d said, and what his authority had been. Statements that had
previously seemed egregious mistakes, now seemed at worst near misses within a powerful and generally successful
tradition. (Ibid., pp. 16–17)" As quoted in Demir, Ipek, "Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn." 137.
33
As quoted in Demir, Ipek, "Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn." 136.
34
Jones, Keith. "Is Kuhn a Sociologist?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no.4 (1986): 446.
35
Beard, Charles, "Written History as an Act of Faith." Annual address of the president of the American Historical
Association, delivered at Urbana. December 28, 1933. From the American Historical Review 39, no. 2, (1933): 231.
36
Kuhn questioned whether we could ever actually say who discovered oxygen. But, he was not proclaiming a loss
of objectivity in academic research. Rather he was saying the question itself is imprecise.

15
Works Cited

Beard, Charles. "Written History as an Act of Faith." Annual address of the president of the
American Historical Association, delivered at Urbana. December 28, 1933. From the American
Historical Review 39, no. 2, (1933): 219-231.

Caneva, Kenneth L. "Objectivity, Relativism, and the Individual: a Role for a Post-Kuhnian
History of Science." Studies in History and the Philosophy of Science 29, no. 3 (1998): 327-344.

Cao, Tian Yu. "The Kuhnian Revolution and the Postmodern Turn in the History of Science."
Physics 30, no. 2-3 (1993): 477-504.

Demir, Ipek. "Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn." Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 39, (2008): 133–142.

Di´ez , Jose. "Falsificationism and the Structure of Theories: the Popper–Kuhn controversy about
the rationality of normal science." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38, (2007): 543–
554.

Friedman, Michael. "Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of Science." Philosophy of Science 69,
(2002): 171–190.

Hawley, Katherine. "Thomas S. Kuhn’s Mysterious Worlds." Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science 27, no. 2 (1996): 291-300.

Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. "On Thomas Kuhn's Philosophical Significance." Configurations 6.


no.1 (1998): 1-14.

Jones, Keith. "Is Kuhn a Sociologist?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no.
4 (1986): 443- 452.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure and Function of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996.

Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Kuhn, the Correspondence Theory of Truth and Coherentist


Epistemology." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38 (2007): 555–566.

Larvor, Brendan. "Why did Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions cause a fuss?" Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 34 (2003): 369–390.

Meiland, Jack W. "Kuhn, Scheffler, and Objectivity in Science." Philosophy of Science 41, no. 2
(1974): 179-187.

Nickles, Thomas. "Kuhn, Historical Philosophy of Science, and Case-Based Reasoning."


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