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An InterviewWithPierreBourdieu
For a Socio-Analysis
of Intellectuals:
On Homo Academicus*
Introductionby Loc J.D. Wacquant
An exceptionallyproductiveand inventivethinker,Frenchsociologist
Pierre Bourdieu has, over the past three decades, produced one of the
mostambitiousand fertilebodies of sociologicalworkof the post-classical
era. After a protractedhistoryof partial and often distortedreadings
among Anglo-Americanscholars,1his writings,which range widelyfrom
the anthropologyof Algeria,the sociologyof language,culture,class and
politics,to the philosophyand epistemologyof the social sciences, have
become one of the major sources of the currenttheoretical renewal.
Beyond its apparentdispersion,one major thrustof Bourdieu's work has
been to explore the manifoldformsof symbolicpower and to unmaskits
contributionto the constitutionand reproduction of domination in
modern society. This problematicof a political economy of symbolic
violence has led him,time and again, to aim his sociological weapons at
the preeminentcontendersin the symbolicclass struggle:intellectuals.In
Homo Academicus,a dense volume which packs more than twentyyears
of intenseresearchand thinkingon the subject,Bourdieu (1988a) tackles
the issue of practiceand power among French universityprofessors.
The end-resultis a livelyand often surprisingjourney throughthe
intricate landscape of academia in France. Combining ethnographic
vignettes,statisticalprofiles,and prosopographicdetail, the book offers
a vividdepictionof the structuredconflictsand intereststhatdefine and
shape the French intellectualspace and link it to the larger arena of
politics,as well as a lucid illustrationof Bourdieu's highlydistinctive
theories,concepts, and methods.Homo Academicus, however,is much
more than an empiricalinvestigationof French academics and the May
'68 crisis.It is an attemptto providean experimentaldemonstrationfor
the necessityand potencyof a genuinelyreflexivesociology: Bourdieu's
aim is to show thatsociologistscan overcome the antinomyof objectivist
and account forthe veryworld
explanationand subjectivistunderstanding
withinwhich they live on condition of turningupon themselves the
2. Reflecting
on HomoAcademicusshortly
afteritspublication,
Bourdieu(1987a, p.
of
117) writeswithrare emotion:"Sociologycan be an extremely
powerfulinstrument
whichallowsone betterto understand
whathe or she is by givingone an
self-analysis
of one's ownconditions
of production
and of thepositionone occupiesin
understanding
thesocialworld.. . It followsthatthisbookdemandsa particular
mannerof reading.One
is not to construeit as a pamphletor to use it in a self-punitive
fashion.. . If mybook
were read as a pamphlet,I would soon come to hate it and I would ratherhave it
burned."
And Practice
Field,Interest,
it shouldbe emphasizedthatHomoAcadmicasis nota book
Precisely,
on intellectualsbut ratheron the intellectual
field.I thinkthat this
and in thetheoretical
a fundamental
difference
ofperspective
introduces
of theobject Whatis themeaningof this notionof field
construction
in
and howdid it helpyou,in the particularinstanceof intellectuals,
shapingyourproblematic?
much-a
BeforeI put fortha definition-Ido not like definitions
de sociologue
briefaside on theirusage.I couldreferhereto Le mtier
(Bourdieuet al. 1973),whichis a didactic,almostscholasticbook,3but
which nevertheless
containsmanytheoreticaland methododological
thatwouldmakepeople understand
thatmanyof thegapsor
principles
and
forwhichI amreproached
are infactconsciousrefusals
shortcomings
deliberatechoices.For instance,the use of open conceptsis a wayof
thisis a ready-made
rejectingpositivism-but
phrase;it is, to be more
other
a
that
reminder
have no definition
permanent
concepts
precise,
thansystemic.
Such notionsas habitus,field,and capitalare definable,
butonlywithinthetheoretical
not in isolation.
systemtheyconstitute,
This applies also to a questionwhichis oftenput to me in the
UnitedStates:whydo I not proposeanylaws of the middlerange?I
thinkthat thiswould firstof all be a way of satisfying
a positivistic
of
the
kind
in
earlier
times
represented
expectation,
by a book by
Berelsonand Steiner(1964) whichwas a rote compilationof small,
partiallaws establishedby the social sciences.This kindof positivistic
is something
thatsciencemustdenyitself.
Thereare no such
gratification
laws"
in
the
of laws,as
social
there
are
world,
"middle-range
onlysystems
is the case in physics-Duhem
said it some thirty
yearsago, and more
Quine has developedit.4Andwhatis trueofconceptsis trueof
recently
whichacquiretheirmeaningonlywithina system
of relations.
relations,
to be effective,
to produceeffects,
in this
possessthenecessary
properties
field.6
Ateverymomentthereis something
likea "barrierto entry"
or a right
of entrythat the field imposes and which defineseligibilityfor
participation.
Thisis indeedthedefinition
I usedto construct
mysampleof agents
activein the humanities
and social sciencesdepartments
'facultdes
whenI studythetotality
of thefaculties
or disciplines,
lettres]:
mysample
is a representative
randomsample;fortheanalysis
of thecollegeof arts,
I retainedtheset of agentswho had titlesof access,who had
however,
one or severalof the properties
thatone musthavein orderto existas
such in thisuniverse.I foundout thatone can exist in the French
fieldbecause one detainsacademicpower,definedas the
university
of the institution
powerto controlthe reproduction
(thatis, controlof
and
of
the
of
and other
allocation
financial
positions,appointments,
resources).In France,thismeansbeinga memberof the University
which nominatesuniversity
AdvisoryCommittee[comitconsultatif]
In theUnitedStates,I couldnotsayforsurewhatwouldbe
professors.
the equivalentbodybut I believethereare analogousmechanisms
at
workthatare controlled
in
the
definite
by people occupying
positions
field.
to enterthe fieldby
People are at once foundedand legitimized
theirpossessing
a definite
One of the goals
of
configuration properties.
of researchis to identifythese active properties,these efficient
thatis,theseforms
ofspecific
characteristics,
capital.Thereis thusa sort
of hermeneutic
circle:in orderto construct
the field,one mustidentify
theformsof specificcapitalthatoperatewithinit,and to construct
the
formsof specificcapitalone mustknowthe field.There is an endless
movement
to and fro,in theresearchprocess,whichis quitelengthy
and
arduous.
To say thatthe structure
of the field-notethatI am progressively
definition
of theconcept-isdefinedbythestructure
buildinga working
of the distribution
of the specificformsof capitalthatare activein it
means thatwhen myknowledgeof formsof capital is sound,I can
differentiate
thatthereis to differentiate.
For example,and
everything
thisis one of theprinciples
thatguidedmywork,one cannotbe satisfied
6. For further
see Bourdieu(1971b, 1987e)and Bourdieuand de Saint
elaborations,
Martin(1982) on thereligious
field;Bourdieu(1981c,1989e,1989f)on thescientific
field;
Bourdieu(1981a) on the fieldof representative
politics;Bourdieu(1983b, 1988c)on the
artisticfield;Bourdieu(1987d) on the juridicalfield;Bourdieu(1983a) on the fieldof
and Bourdieuand de SaintMartin(1978) and Bourdieu(1989a) on the"field
philosophy,
of power."
in a manner
Correct,buttheydo notstruggle
freely:
theystruggle
consistentwith the positionthey occupy in the field. They are
on thebasisof theperception
thattheyhaveof thefield,
differentiated
of thepointof viewtheytakeon thefieldas a viewtakenfroma point
in thefield.
Ifone definesthefieldbya specificformofcapitaland,conversely,
the
of
the
that
in
fact
it
is
in
a
field,
then,
type capitalby
currency given
this is not tautological:thereis a dialecticalmovementof mutual
whichone termhelpsprogressively
to definethe
specification
through
other.It seemsto me,however,
thatthereis a thirdterm,lackingso far
in the discussion,whichconstitutesthe conceptualbridgebetween
capital and fieldby providingthe mechanismthat "propels"definite
agents,who bear certainvalencesof capital,to take up this or that
subversionor conservation.
This tertiwn
strategy,
quid is the concept
of habitus.It playsa pivotalrole in allowingyou to breakout of the
structuralist
visionwhichreducesthesocial agentto the merebearer,
in thesenseof Trger,
ofa capital(or ofa positionin a network
in the
case of "Americanstructuralism1*)
that mechanically
determinesthe
strategyhe or she will follow,and thuseliminatesactionfromsocial
analysis.
One would need to specifythe meaning of the adjective
"structuralist.11
Marxist
forinstance,
does noteven havethe
structuralism,
of
the
notion
that
there
can be, withinsocial
concept specificcapital,
whichenjoya degreeof autonomyand
space, sub-spacesof struggles
followspecificlogicsthatare irreducible
to economiclogiceven though
In short,theyignorea wholerangeofphenomena
theyhavean economy.
thatare critical,
even fromwithintheirownapproach.
The notionof habitusis important
in thatit allowsus to escape
structural
mechanism
without
intotheintentionalist
behaviorism
relapsing
whichis butitstransfigured
Thisperspective
expression.9
positsthatthere
are externalstimuli
associatedwitha positionand thatresponsesto them
can be somewhatdeducedfroma description
of the position,following
a logicwhichcan be eithermechanistic
and deterministic
or teleological
and voluntaristic.
On theone handit is proposedthatagentsact under
theconstraint
in the situationand we have
of causes thatare inscribed
the mechanistic
on the otherit is arguedthatagentsacts
perspective;
10
BERKELEY
JOURNAL
OF SOCIOLOGY
of theFrenchexpressions
10. Translator's
note:hereBourdieuplayson thesimilarity
"undertheconstraint
of causes")and en connaissance
de causes(literally
sous la contrainte
of finalistand
de cause ("withknowledgeof causes") to bringhome the similarity
mechanistic
formsof socialanalysis.
11. On practiceas the productof the "meetingof two formsof history,"
history
in fields,see Bourdieu(1980a, pp. 95-101;
embodiedin habitusand history
objectified
1980c,1981b,1984,1986b).
11
12
seeksto getaway
12. On thenotionof fieldofpower,bywhichtheFrenchsociologist
castof theconceptof"ruling
fromthesusbstantialist
class,"see Bourdieu(1989a,especially
definition
is the following:
The fieldof poweris a fieldof
pp. 373-427).A preliminary
of theexisting
balanceof forcesbetweenformsof power,
forcesdefinedbythestructure
or betweendifferent
speciesofcapital.It is also simultaneously
forpower
afieldofstruggles
in
formsofpower.It is a space of playand competition
amongtheholdersof different
13
in officialadministrative
you have indicatorssuch as membership
boards,unions,etc. In
committees,
commissions,
advisory
governmental
the UnitedStates,I thinkthatone wouldneed to turnone's attention
Offices of the Dean, scientific
to the control of departments,
andespecially
thelargeresearchand
"blue-ribbon"
panels,expertreports,
and
institutes
of
research
whichseemto
foundations
policy
philanthropic
a
in
the
broader
directions
albeit
role
hidden,
crucial,
defining
play
largely
wouldbe thatthe structural
of research.On thiscount,myhypothesis
in
fieldand thefieldof powerare stronger
linksbetweentheuniversity
theUnitedStates.Of course,one wouldneed to takeintoconsideration
thespecificity
of theverystructure
of theAmerican
anotherdifference:
political field, characterized,very cursorily,by federalism,the
and conflicts
betweendifferent
levelsof decision-making,
multiplication
of oppositional
the absenceof leftistpartiesand of a strongtradition
theweakroleof "publicintellectuals,"
and so on.
trade-unionism,
In yourperspective,
on theFrench
youhavenotproduceda monograph
but studieda set of verygeneralmechanismsthatbear on
university
intellectuals
throughone of its specifichistoricalrealizations.
I followhere the Bachelardian
idea of the "particular
case of the
possible."One of the virtuesof the notionof fieldis preciselythatit
allowsone to ask verygeneralquestionsabout objects thatare very
in time and space. It generatesbroad
specificand well-demarcated
or problems-take
forinstance
thenotionthatthefieldis the
propositions
site of strugglesaround specificstakes-whichimmediately
specify
themselves
as theyare appliedto a concretehistorical
case, and which
call forcomparisons,
and so on. In
suggestnew issuesthatimmediately
use the knowledge
myown work,I constantly
acquiredof one fieldto
throwlighton anotherand to ask questionsof boththateach couldnot
possibly
generateon itsown.Thusin mylatestbook,The StateNobility
ofelite
ofconsecration
[Bourdieu1989a],inwhichI analyzethefunction
whichthe social agentsand institutions
whichall possess the determinate
quantityof
sufficient
to occupythe
specificcapital(and economicand culturalcapitalin particular)
dominant
within
theirrespective
fields[theeconomicfield,thefieldof highercivil
positions
serviceor thestate,theuniversity
one anotherin
field,and theintellectual
field]confront
aimedat preserving
or transforming
thisbalanceof forces.(...) Thisstruggle
for
strategies
the imposition
of the dominantprincipleof dominationleads, at everymoment,to a
balancein thesharing
of power,thatis,to whatI calla divisionin theworkofdomination.
It is also a struggleover the legitimate
and forthe legitimate
of legitimation
principle
mode of reproduction
of the foundations
of domination.
This can take the formof real,
or warsof religion
forinstance)or ofsymbolic
physical
struggles,
(as in"palacerevolutions"
confrontations
(as in the discussionsover the relativerankingof oratores,priests,and
in Medieval Europe). [...] The fieldof power is organizedas a
bellatorts,knights,
charismatic
structure:
thedistribution
tothedominant
ofhierarchization
according
principle
to thedistribution
(economiccapital)is inversely
symmetrical
accordingto thedominated
ofhierarchization
lectureon "TheFieldof Power,"
principle
(cultural
capital)"(unpublished
of Wisconsin-Madison,
University
April1989).
14
15
13. The 'unconscious' is indeed never but the forgettingof historythat historyitself
produces by turningthe objective structuresit itselfengenders into those quasi-natures that
habituses are" (Bourdieu 1980a:94).
14. Albert Hirschman's (1977) The Passions and the Interestsrecounts part of that
storyand argues persuasivelyfor its role in the cultural legitimationof early capitalism.
16
BERKELEY
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
circumstances.
(It goes withoutsayingthatthisis not the onlywayto
an
ground ethic.)[...]
Wheredoes this significance
you attributeto the autonomyof the
scientific
fieldlie preciselyand howdoes it relateto youranalysisof
thesocial world?
Therewouldbe too muchto say on this.I willsimplystate,in a
rathercoarse and hastymanner,that autonomyis the conditionof
thatone does notfindfreedom
alone.
butmoreimportantly
scientificity,
Justas one is notan artistalone,butbyparticipating
in theartistic
field,
fieldwhichmakesscientific
likewisewe can say thatit is the scientific
itsveryfunctioning.15
freedom
possiblethrough
of the intellectual,
it is not the
In otherwords,if thereis a freedom
individualfreedomof a Cartesian cogitobut a freedomachieved
datedand situatedconstruction
of
collectively
throughthe historically
a space of regulateddiscussionand critique.
who are
This is something
thatintellectuals
veryseldomrecognize,
inclinedto thinkin singularfashionand who expectsalvation
typically
fromindividual
in thelogicofwisdomand initiatory
liberation,
conquest.
toooftenforget
thatthereis a politicsofintellectual
Intellectuals
freedom.
On the basis of everything
I have said, one can clearlysee thatan
scienceis possibleonlyifthesocialand politicalconditions
emancipatory
to putan
thatmakeit possibleare gathered:thisrequires,forinstance,
end to theeffects
of domination
whichdistortscientific
by
competition
preventing
peoplewhowantto enterintothegameto do so-byturning
or bycutting
offresearch
downmeritorious
forfellowships
applications
butwe mustnotforget
funds(thisis themorebrutalformof censorship
suchas
thatit is exercisedon a dailybasis).Thereare softerformulas,
academic
somebody
byobliging
censorship
through
propriety
[biensance]:
to expenda considerable
who has a lot to contribute
portionof his or
canonsof
to thepositivistic
hertimeto providethefullproof,according
her
one can prevent
thetime,ofeach andeveryone of herpropositions,
she
whosefullvalidation
a greatmanynewpropositions
fromproducing
could leave to others.As I showedin Homo Academicus,it is mainly
thecontrolof timethatacademicpoweris exercised(Bourdieu,
through
1988a,pp. 90-105).
acute mannerin the case of
This problemarisesin a particularly
sociologybecausesociologyis a fieldwherepoliticalforcescan exert
15. For Bourdieu, the scientificfieldis both a field like all others and a unique space
of strugglesin that it is capable of yieldingproducts (true knowledge) that transcendtheir
historicalconditions of production. This "peculiarityof the historyof scientificreason" is
discussed in Bourdieu (1981c, 1989e, 1989f).
17
18
reflexes
You are absolutely
right(I can evensaythatone of myfirst
as a youngsociologist
was to constitute
myself
againsta certainimageof
to use
the Frankfurt
School as a sortof "spiritualist
pointd'honneur,"
Marx's expression,that some bourgeoisintellectualslike to avail
themselvesof). I thinkthat it is the ignoranceof the collective
mechanisms
andtheoverestimation
ofpoliticalandethicalsubordination,
of the freedom
of intellectuals,
thathas too oftenled the mostsincere
intellectuals
suchas Sartre-whodoes not at all belongin thiscategory
in myestimation-to
remaincomplicit
withthe forcestheythought
they
to escape
werefighting,
and thisin spiteof theefforts
investedin trying
theshacklesof intellectual
determinism.
Because theyengagein forms
of struggle
thatare unrealistic,
naive,"adolescent."
Partof the difficulty
here is that,amongthe risksthatone must
take to defendpositionslike mine,there is that of disappointing
senseof theterm,that
notthebiological,
adolescents
(in thesociological,
All intellectuals
scholarsand graduatestudents).
is,in particular
younger
of theword.
of youth,"
dreamof beingthe "corrupters
in all meanings
subversive
their
that
to
tell
adolescents
it
is
Granted,
disappointing
unrealistic.
intentions
thatis,oneiric,Utopian,
are adolescent,
immature,
thatare in effect
Thereis a wholerangeof suchstrategies
of subversion
this
of intellectualsof displacement.
(The specificPharisaism
strategies
to
us
enables
book
was remarked
but
I
think
that
graspits
my
longago,
the
more
of
the
more
distant,
revolutionary,
being
principle-consists
the issuesat stake.)One of thegoalsof
and historically,
geographically
of all this
of all thesemalpractices,
myworkis to showthattheprinciple
19
20
a breakwiththeprofessional
as "unattached
and
ideologyof intellectuals
and social.)17
disinterested"
whichis inseparably
epistemological
In theend,althoughyouuse thesameexpression,
reflexive
as
sociology
from
youconceiveit (e.g.,Bourdieu1982and 1987a),is quitedifferent
the kind of reflexivity
advocated by Gouldner or claimed by
ethnomethodologists.
as it is, firstof
I believethatit is somewhattheoppositeinasmuch
because fundamentally
anti-narcissistic.
all, a paradoxicalreflexivity
is bettertoleratedand receivedbecause,ifthe
reflexivity
Psychoanalytic
mechanisms
it makesus discoverare universal,
theyare also tied to a
therelationto thefatheris alwaysa relationto a singular
uniquehistory:
Whatmakesforthe absenceof charm,the
fatherin a singularhistory.
is thatit makesus discover
even,of sociologicalreflexivity
painfulness
that
that
are
are
Now,
shared,banal,commonplace.
generic,
things
things
in the table of intellectual
values, thereis nothingworse than the
commonand the average.This explainsmuchof the resistancethat
reflexivesociology,
sociology,and in particulara non-narcissistic
encounters
amongintellectuals.
thefactthat
Underthisangle,mycontribution
residesin uncovering
intellectual
are related,not to the social positionof the
productions
producerdefinedin the broadestterms,but to the locationhe or she
of the intellectualuniverse.The
occupiesin the objectivestructure
and forces
externalfactors
intellectual
fieldprovidesa crucialmediation:
structure.
Thisis already
itsspecific
actuponitsparticipants
onlythrough
a considerableadvanceand we could stop here. There is, however,
thatI discovered
in myanthropological
evenmoreimportant
something
thatare associated
the factthattherearefallacies,blunders,
fieldwork:
thatgo withthe postureof the "thinking
withthe positionof thinker,
depense]whoretiresfromactionin orderto thinkit (see
man"[homme
Bourdieu1977,1986a,and 1980a,Book I).
bias that inheresin the scientificproject,
A sort of intellectualist
cannot
inscribedwithinthe "scientific
eye"itself,and whichtherefore
see itself?
in the positionof
bias inherent
Exactly.Thereis an intellectualist
whoobservesfromtheoutsidea universeinwhichhe
thesocialscientist
relationto
involved.It is thisintellectualiste
or she is not immediately
theworld,whichreplacesthe practicalrelationto practicethatagents
social
fromutilitarian
and itsdifference
17. Bourdieu'susageof thenotionof interest
of theSociologist"
is discussedin Bourdieu(1988b) and in The Interest
(Bourdieu
theory
1987a:124-131).
21
have with that between the observer and his object, that must be
objectivized.This is one of the thingsthat separate me fromGarfinkel
and ethnomethodology.
I grantthatthere is a primaryexperience of the
social which, as Husserl and Schutz showed, rests on a relation of
of the world that makes one take it for
immediatebelief in the facticity
granted,and so on. This analysis is excellent as far as descriptionis
concerned,but we mustgo beyondit and raise the issue of the conditions
of possibilityof this doxic experience. We must recognize that the
coincidence between objectivestructuresand embodied structureswhich
creates the illusionof immediateunderstanding
is a particularcase of the
relation to the world, namely the native relation. The great virtue of
ethnologicalexperienceis thatit makes one immediatelyaware thatsuch
conditionsare not universallyfulfilled,
as phenomenologywould have us
believe by universalizingreflectionbased on the particularcase of the
indigenousrelationto one's own society.
But thisis not all: ethnomethodology
is a depoliticized
formof analysis
We need thoroughly
to sociologize the phenomenological
of conformismo
analysisof doxa as the uncontestedacceptance of the daily lifeworld,not
simplyto establish that it is not universallyvalid for all perceivingand
actingsubjects,but also to discoverthat,when it realizes itselfin certain
social positions,among the dominatedforinstance,it representsthe most
radical formof acceptance of the world,of conservatism.This relationof
pre-reflexiveacceptance of the world groundedin a fundamentalbelief
in the immediacyof the structuresof the Lebenswelt represents the
absolute, ultimate form of conservative conformism(it lies below
orthodoxy,that is, the "rightbelief," which presupposes at least an
awareness of a "wrongbelief,"a croyancegauche). There is no way of
adheringto the establishedorder that is more undivided,more complete
than this infra-political
relationof doxic evidence; there is no fullerway
of findingnatural conditions of existence that would be revoltingfor
somebodysocialized underotherconditionsand who does not grasp them
throughcategories of perceptionissued out of this world.18This alone
between intellectualsand
explains a good numberof misunderstandings
workers,where proletarianswill take for granted and find acceptable,
even "natural," conditions of oppression and exploitation that are
sickening to those "on the outside"--whichdoes not exclude practical
formsof resistanceand the possibility
of a revoltagainstthem (Bourdieu
1980c).
22
Whatseparatesyoufromethnomethodology
on thiscountis thatwhere
of
a
of
talk
they
genericexperience doxa,youarguethatthereare daxak
thereis nota singledoxabutvariousformsofdoxicexperience,
specific
to different
fieldsand regionsof social space, each of whichwithits
and efficacy.
definite
historicalconditionsof possibility
Yes and, moregenerally,
I arguethatdoxa is political.The doxic
relationto theworld.As soon
relationto theworldis notan individual
we remindourselvesthat,
as we recallitssocialconditions
of possibility,
of beingand livingin thisrelation,
first
thereare different
manners
and,
thatwhatcomeswitha narrowly
analysisis
secondly,
phenomenological
of thisrelationand of its
the neglectof the historical
underpinnings
thatis,depoliticization.
politicalimport,
For a SociologicalUtopianism
If I understand
then,scienceis stillthebesttoolforthe
youcorrectly,
critiqueof domination.You are verymuchin line withthe modern
when you presentsociology,when it is
projectof the Aufklrung
force.But isn'tthere
as an inherently
scientific,
politically
progressive
a paradoxhere in the factthat,on the one hand,you increasethe
possibilityof a space of freedom,of a liberatingawakeningof
consciousness
whichbringswithinrationalreachhistoricalpossibilities
hithertoexcludedby symbolicdominationand by the misrecognition
of the social world,while,on the
impliedin the doxicunderstanding
that
effecta radical disenchanting
otherhand, you simultaneously
makesthissocial worldin whichwe mustcontinueto strugglealmost
between
unlivable?Thereis a strongtension,perhaps,a contradiction,
for increasingconsciousnessand
this will to provideinstruments
thatan overlyacute consciousnessof
freedom
and thedemobilization
threatensto produce.
thepervasiveness
of social determinisms
Reflexive
purposes.
analysisas I conceiveof itservestwoimportant
is notan end in itselfand,on
is a scientific
function:
The first
reflexivity
thiscount,I mustdisassociatemyselfcompletelyfromthe formsof
thathave recentlybecome popularin the UnitedStates,
"reflexivity"
(viz. the booksbyMarcusand Fisher[1986]
especiallyin anthropology
or by Rosaldo [1989]) and in the sociologyof science (Latour and
Woolgar1983,Latour1988),and thatculminatein a sortof relativist
nihilism.In Homo Academicus,I use the instruments
providedby
and to make
to controlthebiasesintroduced
byun-reflexivity
reflexivity
thatcan altermyreflection.
intheknowledge
ofthemechanisms
headway
more
not
less.
is
a
tool
to
science,
Reflexivity
produce
of
of scienceand thusthegrowth
Secondly,
byhelpingtheprogress
makespossiblea more
knowledgeabout the social world,reflexivity
23
24
25
the rulesof the game in factand in law. As soon as a law is stated,it can becomethe
stakeof struggles...The
of tendential
lawsis thecondition
of successof actions
uncovering
aimedat proving
thesocial
themwrong...
Justas it'denaturalizes'
'de-fatalizes'
it,sociology
world...True politicalactionconsistsof usingtheknowledge
of the probableto increase
the likelihood
of the possible"(Bourdieu1980b:46).
26
1977
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1979
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prefacethatopensThe
within
us to discoverexternality
internality,
LogicofPracticewiththosewords:HByforcing
thecommonin thesearchforthe unique,sociology
behindtheillusionof rarity,
banality
of narcissistic
all the impostures
has not onlythe effectof denouncing
egotism;it also
of
theconsciousness
ifonlythrough
offersa means,perhapsthe onlyone, to contribute,
abandonedto the forcesof the world,of
otherwise
to theconstruction,
determinations,
Illusion."
likea subject."See also Bourdieu's(1987g) "The Biographical
something
27
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