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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 111
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145391

August 26, 2002

FACTS:
Two Cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac as a result of a vehicular
accident involving two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other
owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan. Laroya filed a criminal
case against Casupanan for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
While on the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict. The criminal case was on its preliminary investigation stage when the civil
case was filed. Upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC
dismissed the civil case. Casupanan and Capitulo filed Motion for Reconsideration
insisting that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal case. MCTC Denied the Motion. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac and the RTC ruled that
the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case
and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict
against the private complainant in the criminal case
HELD: YES
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may
be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement
of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or
filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action
for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. These two actions arose from the

same act or omission but have different causes of action. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
other a civil case for quasi-delictwithout violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other and the civil
action requires only preponderance of evidence. What is prohibited is for a party to
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action as
clearly stated in Section 3 Rule 111.
The accused in the criminal case can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act
or omission he is accused of in the said criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that
is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo
is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of the Civil Case on the ground of forumshopping is erroneous.

SPS. BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE BALBOA, respondent.
G.R. No. 158177

January 28, 2008

FACTS:
Vicente Balboa filed 2 cases against Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok
Ching Teng. One for Civil case for Sum of Money based on 3 checks issued by Caroline
before RTC Manila, and another for a Criminal Case of Violation of B.P. 22 covering the
same checks before MTC Manila.
The RTC found the spouses liable and ordered them to pay the amount. On the other
hand, the MTC acquitted Caroline but held her civilly liable. On appeal, the RTC
modified the decision of MTC by deleting the award of damages.
Herein petitioners contends that the act of Vicente Balboa constitutes forum shopping
by filing both criminal and civil case against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Balboa filing both civil and criminal action constitute forum
shopping
HELD: NO.
Section 1 Rule 111 states that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the foregoing rule, an action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in
the criminal proceedings, unless:
(1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or
(2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or
(3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.
Since respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case
No. 97-82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and
there is no forum shopping to speak of.

JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner,


vs.
EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
G.R. No. 133978

November 12, 2002

FACTS:
Herein Petitioner, assisted by a Private Prosecutor filed 3 cases of Violation of B.P. 22
and 3 cases of Estafa against Emerenciana Isip for allegedly issuing 3 checks with
insufficient funds. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed one case and
proceeded with 2 counts of Violation of B.P. 22. The 2 cases were dismissed by MTC
Pampanga on the ground of failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, 3 cases of Estafa were filed with RTC Pampanga. After failure to present its
2nd witness, prosecution moved to dismiss the case against the accused but reserved its
right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. The trial court
granted the motion without prejudice to the refilling of the civil aspect of the cases.
Petitioner filed the instant case for Collection of the Sum of Money, seeking to recover
the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Emerenciana Isip filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of
Res Judicata and that Cancio be held in contempt of court for forum shopping. Trial
court granted the Motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the Estafa cases against respondent bars the institution
of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases
HELD: NO
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender:
1. Civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC
2. Independent civil liabilities, such as those:
a. not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony; or
b. where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action.
Under the present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action
before the prosecution starts to present evidence.

One of the elements of Res Judicata is identity of causes of action. In the case at bar, a
reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on
culpa contractual, an independent civil action which remains separate and distinct from
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Cancios cause of action is the
respondents breach of the contractual obligation.
There is also no forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favourable judgment. Although the cases
filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are,
however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for Estafa are based
on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal action.
Petition is Granted and the case was Remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 147703

April 14, 2004

FACTS:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Triple Homicide, Multiple Physical Injuries and Damage to Property and was sentenced
to suffer a penalty of imprisonment and payment of damages to the victims. The court
further ruled that in the event of insolvency of the accused, the employer, Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
The accused, Napoleon Roman, through his counsel filed a Notice of Appeal which was
denied by the Court as the accused jumped bail and remains at large. Simultaneously,
herein Petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the trial court which the
Court gave due course but was later on denied by OSG.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accusedemployee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused

HELD: NO
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes
final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a
notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary
civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary
civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and
executory.
Section 1 Rule 111 provides that "When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article

103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee. Herein petitioner is not a direct party
to the criminal case. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein,
this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist
their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case,
the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
Moreoved, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO


ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL B.
GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,* respondent.
G.R. No. 133347

October 15, 2008

FACTS:
This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in Philippine history, the declaration of
martial law by then President Ferdinand Marcos and the simultaneous sequestration of
not a few private corporations, including one of the petitioners herein, ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN)
The day after the declaration of martial law, just before midnight, military troops arrived
at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center ordering the closure of all radio and television
stations in the country. When it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a
permit to re-open, ABS-CBN terminated all its employees giving them their retirement
benefits. At the same time, Eugenio Lopez also wrote to Juan Ponce Enrile expressing
his desire to sell the network to the government but he was later on arrested by the
military. After such proposal to sell to the government did not materialize, ABS-CBN
started doing negotiations with other companies.
On June 1973, Kanlaon Broadcasting System an umbrella corporation of which
operated TV Channel 9 - were consumed by fire. Respondent Benedicto was one of the
principal stock holders of RPN and at the same time was the Chairperson of the Board
of Directors for ABS-CBN. He then relayed his plan to temporarily use ABS-CBNs
broadcast studios to operate TV 9 until the burnt studio is fixed. The parties was not
able to arrive at an agreement in terms of monthly rentals. The petitioners met and
discussed with respondents the fixing of rental rate and having failed to do so, wrote a
demand letter to respondents for the payment of rentals.
In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN through
Senator Taada, returned to ABS-CBN the radio and TV stations on a gradual and
scheduled basis. As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia,
filed their respective counter-affidavits, with Benedicto adopting that of Gonzales',
denying petitioners' charges. Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the
Ombudsman issued the herein assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners'
complaints. To the Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to
probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the various felonies charged. On
April 1999 and June 2000, the respective counsels for respondents Tan and Benedicto
filed a Notice of Death and Dismissal of the Case

ISSUE:
Whether or not separate civil action can be filed by filing an action for recovery
HELD: YES
The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of
obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil
action against the accused founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted
in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action
is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the
same criminal action.
The civil liability of respondents Benedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts
herein was extinguished upon their death. But other civil liabilities founded on other
sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be prosecuted either
against the estate of the deceased if based on contract or against the executors and
administrators of the deceased's estate if based on quasi-delict. The claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Where the civil liability survives,
an action for recovery may be pursued filing a separate civil action.
Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as
private respondents without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their
respective estates.

Samson Ching
vs
Clarita Nicdao and the Honorable Court of Appeals
FACTS
October 6, 1997 - Petitioner Ching instituted 11 criminal complaints against respondent
Clarita Nicado for violations of BP 22, and that even after the latter received a notice of
dishonor from the drawee bank, the accused failed to pay the value of the check in the
amount of 20,000,000.00, or to make arrangements with the drawee bank for the
payment of the same.
Simultaneously, 14 other criminal complaints for the same offense was filed against
respondent by Emma Nuguid, the checks this time amounting to 150,000.00.
Respondent pleaded not guilty to all charges. The cases were thus consolidated.
The MCTC convicted the respondent, declaring that the conviction of respondent
Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a worthless check was
malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or
guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and conviction of
BP 22.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in separate
Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of the MCTC
convicting respondent Nicdao of 11 and 14 counts of violation of BP 22. The CA
however, reversed the decision and acquitted respondent based on evidence alluding to
the fact that the assailed checks had not been delivered to petitioner, because it was in
fact stolen from the premises of respondent. (See Section 15, Negotiable Instruments
Law)
The instant petition is limited solely to the civil aspect of the case, as petitioner Ching
argues that nothwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal in the BP 22 criminal case,
she should be held liable to pay petitioner the amount of the dishonored checks to the
total amount of 20,950,000.00.
Petitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal
by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on
her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
He theorizes that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
action for the recovery of damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 arising from the
same act or omission of the accused is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
ISSUE
Whether civil liability arises despite the acquittal of the accused in an alleged violation of
BP 22

HELD
In the immediate case, the Supreme Court held that respondent cannot be civilly liable
to petitioner Ching.
As a general rule, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Under
the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action is generally
impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party,
may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal
by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did
not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, as a
mere preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (b) where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c)
where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the
accused is acquitted.
Applying this principle in the immediate case, the court thus finds:

The CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable


doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized
under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a
stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to
petitioner Ching.
In acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to
petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid
her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by respondent Nicdao vis-vis her loan obligations. On the other hand, its finding relative to the
P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved
respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well.
While petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdaos liability did not
arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex
delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however, petitioner
Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of these
unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings
of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the act or omission
from which her civil liability may arise did not exist.

Sonny Romero y Dominguez


Vs.
People of the Philippines, Isabela Padua, Regina Breis, Minerva Montes and
Ofelia Belando Breis
FACTS:
On April 1, 1992, at around noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner and the Apego
taxi driven by Jimmy Padua collided along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at
Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
Consequentially, petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the MTC of
Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged. Petitioner
was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total
amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral
damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity. The RTC affirmed the
decision in toto.
Upon appealing to the CA, the petitioner contends that his acquittal should have freed
him from the payment of civil liability. The CA disagreed, claiming that the acquittal of an
accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the
court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein petitioner should be held to face civil liability
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court concurred that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not
commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with
moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at
the time of the accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability
for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter.
While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was
established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to
prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a
ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to
hold him civilly liable.

Jamie U. Gosiaco
vs
Leticia Ching and Edwin Casta
FACTS:
On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with
ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of
48 days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB
through its Business Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS
checks no. 0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00
respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati
Head Office branch. ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000, acknowledged that it
owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.
Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to
deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored
and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of
funds. Petitioner informed respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000, about
the dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of the
money placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan against the private
respondents.
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability and
claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have
knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks. Such responsibility, she
claimed belonged to another department.
On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve
her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was
civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks. The RTC subsequently absolved
Ching from civil liability. On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the RTC and stated that the amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to
ASB and not to Ching.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not an officer of a corporation who signed a bouncing check civilly
liable under BP 22
B. Whether or not the petitioner may implead a juridical entity in a BP 22 case
HELD:
A. Yes. When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he
may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes
criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or
property, draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no
sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment. Moreover, the

personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he


cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a
corporate act and not his personal act. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22
states: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall
be liable under this Act."
In theory the BP 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check
in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the
corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. BP 22 itself fused
this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to
recover such civil liability not from the corporation, but from the person who
signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the amendments to the rules on criminal
procedure, it clearly was permissible to pursue the criminal liability against the
signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the civil liability.
However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal
liability attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to
directly pursue the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil
obligationthe corporation itselfis no longer that clear. In theory, the implied
institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22 should not affect
the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied
institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation.
B. A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal laws is
strictly construed against the State and liberally construed against the accused.
Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as
an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the
litigation of the civil aspect thereof.
Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable
obligations against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule
of procedure. Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical person on whose behalf
the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate
civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22,
including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.

Neplum, Inc.
vs.
Evelyn Orbeso
FACTS:
On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting the accused of
the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public
and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation.
On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy
of the Judgment. Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its
Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a Monday
On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order
of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. On 31
January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the
Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000
Amended Notice of Appeal.
The RTC refused to give due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and Amended
Notice of Appeal. It accepted respondents arguments that the Judgment from which the
appeal was being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the
Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day
period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be
reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period from which a private offended party may appeal from the civil
aspect of a judgment in a civil action should be reckoned from the date of receipt of a
written notice of judgment
HELD:
No. Had it been the accused who appealed, the Court could have easily ruled that the
reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the judgment.
In In People v. Tamani, the Court held that the reglementary period should start from the
time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether
it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the
decision.
However, this ruling does not find application in this case, because it is the offended
party which appealed only the civil aspect of the case.
The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones.
Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,27 33,28 3429 and 217630 of the Civil

Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution
based on the same act.
Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to
protect such remaining civil interest therein.
And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability
arising from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.
Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings
brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latters
original jurisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal. An
appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the
counting of the period to appeal from the "promulgation" of the judgment to the accused.
Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the
Judgment, for "the parties would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof
which] they can review or refer to from time to time."
If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then the period for
appeal would never have run. True, no law requires the offended party to attend the
promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date. But fiction must
yield to reality. By mere presence, the offended party was already actually notified of the
Decision of acquittal and should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a timely
appeal be filed.
Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief
statement of its intention to elevate the trial courts Decision to the CA. There was no
reason why it could not have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse
Judgment during the promulgation. Parties and their counsels are presumed to be
vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay
and without resort to technicalities.

Paulino S. Asilo
vs.
People of the Philippines and Spouses Visitacion and Cesar C. Bombasi
FACTS:
Spouses Bombasi filed a criminal complaint against Nagcarlan, Laguna Mayor
Comendador, Municipal Administrator Paulino Asilo and Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator Alberto S. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not Guilty."
During the pendency of the case, Comendador and Angeles died.
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Comendador and
Asilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Asilo contends that there is no liability when a
public officer commits in good faith an error of judgment. The counsel of the late mayor
alleges that the death of the latter totally extinguished both criminal and civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of an accused extinguished civil liability in connection with the
criminal act
HELD:
No. The death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have
extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed.
However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law
on human relations.
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
In this case, there was a violation of the right of the spouses Bombasi to their property
when the accused public officials failed to accord due process of law in demolishing the
improvements made on the contested property, which was subject to execution by the
local government.
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order,
hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property
subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment

obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after
due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable
time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary,
there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the
issuance of a special order of demolition.
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been
litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case
was even filed by the municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice
and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an
otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations
was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the
deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria
who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above
captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned
in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it
maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their
consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."

Francisco Magestrado vs. People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo


FACTS:
An information for perjury was filed against the petitioner Francisco Magestrado with
MeTC of Quezon City for allegedly executing an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public
falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate of TCT No. N-173163, which document
was used in support of petition for issuance of New Owners Duplictae Copy of
Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to which
Magestrado signed and swore its verification. The property subject of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Libroja as collateral for
loan amounting to P758, 134.42 and as a consequence of which, said title to the
property was surrender by him to Libroja.
Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on prejudicial
question. Petitioner alleged that a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 84 and a case for cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery
of Title and Damages pending before RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be
resolved first since the said civil cases are similarly or intimately related to the issues
raised in criminal action.
MeTC denied the motion for suspension and a motion for reconsideration was filed but
was also denied.
ISSUE:
WON a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of criminal action to await
the outcome of the civil cases.
HELD:
The Supreme court ruled negatively.
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that civil cases pending before
RTC-Branch 77 and RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a

loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner
executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163.
On the other hand, criminal before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of
whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his
request for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of
each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the
innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by
petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing
whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit
of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

EDDIE B. SABANDAL VS. HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO

FACTS:
Petitioner Eddie Sabandal, who entered into a memorandum of agreement on
dealership with respondent Philippines Today, Inc. for the distribution of the newspaper
Philippines Today, was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing
dishonored checks to the respondent in payment for the deliveries made.
Three years later, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Negros Occidental at
Himamaylan, a complaint against Philippines Today, Inc. for specific performance,
recovery of overpayment and damages. And a motion to suspend trial in the criminal
cases against him based on a prejudicial question was also filed.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion to suspend trial based on a prejudicial
question.
ISSUE:
WON a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the criminal
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner until after the
resolution of the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and
damages.
HELD:
No prejudicial question exists.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is whether
the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages is whether complainant Sabandal overpaid
his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is
shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for
the bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense.

Rule 111 Case #16


Integrated Bar of the Philippines, represented by its National President, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners
Vs.
Mayor Jose Lito Atienza, Respondent
GR. No. 175241, February 20, 2010
Facts:
IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with
the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot
of Mendiola Bridge. Respondent issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola
Bridge.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved within 24
hours from its filing, petitioners filed before Supreme Court a petition for certiorari which
assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period
provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
In the pendency of the case, the rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. The
MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge
Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit.
Petitioners argued that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a
prejudicial question to the criminal case against Cadiz.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to resolve prejudicial question
through a petition for certiorari.
Held:
No. The Court finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.
Under the Rules, the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to
suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or
the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial
question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be
filed only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial

question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before this
Court in an appeal from the civil action. ###
Rule 112, Case #3
RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioaner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV, and SUSAN ALOA, respondents.
GR. No. 143375, July 6, 2001
Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City,
charging petitioner for violation of BP22. The investigating prosecutor issued a
resolution recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of
BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.
Petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a
petition for review of the resolution, which was denied. Then after, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied. The denied motion was then
appealed to the Court of Appeals for review, however, CA issued a resolution denying
due course outright and dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for review of decisions from ORSP to CA is proper.
Held:
No. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 43 applies to "appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasijudicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions."
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a
quasi-judicial function. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasijudicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court
and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the

fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While
the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for
it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. ###
Rule 112 Case #4
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE
TAGLE, JR., Petitioners
Vs.
WILSON GO, Respondent.
GR. No. 156081, October 19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa against petitioners before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI. After
the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for
estafa. This dismissal was appealed to the Secretary of Justice, which rendered a
decision modifying the prosecutors decision and directed said officer to file an
information of estafa against the petitioners.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 concerning the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice in modifying the decision of the prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal
from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Held:
No. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals
to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax
Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The
Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule
43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body which perform adjudicatory functions such
that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect
as judgments of a court, and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or
resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the

Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore,
not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review.
Though some case describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasijudicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. ###
Rule 112
People of the Philippines vs Quisay

FACTS:

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA)7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently an information was filed
before the RTC on January 11, 2013.
On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the
ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support
of her motion, petitioner pointed out that the resolution issued by the OCP-Makati was
penned by Assistant City Prosecutor approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor while
the information penned by ACP without any approval from any higher authority, albeit
with a Certification claiming that ACP has prior written authority or approval from the
City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard petitioner claimed that
nothing in the aforesaid resolution and information would show that the ACP and/or
SACP had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve
the filing of the Information against her. As such, the Information must be quashed for
being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.
its Comment and Opposition,the OCP-Makaticountered that the review prosecutor, was
authorized to approve the resolution pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order
No.32.Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of
the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Motion to Quash of the information should be dismissed.

HELD:
NO
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the
filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the
named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts,
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the
prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same
defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the
same Rules.
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De
La Cruz was authorized to file the information before the RTC by himself. Records are
bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La
Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division
chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate
that ACP De La Cruz sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those
authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the information.
Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal
case against petitioner.

People vs Garfin

FACTS:
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in
relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Act," in an information. The information contains a certification signed
by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by
respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused
Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.
Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor
as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition, against which the
accused filed a rejoinder. The people filed a reply to the rejoinder on December 21,
2001. A rejoinder was filed by the accused on January 1, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in
its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special
prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle SSS cases within
Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information involving
violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor.
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order.

ISSUE :
Whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor
in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as
an objection before arraignment.

HELD:
NO
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand
illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to paragraph 3, Section 4 of
Rule 112, to wit:

Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
(emphasis supplied)

Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:


No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)

Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or
approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in
the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since
lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after
arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based
on this ground.

AAA, PETITIONER
VS.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 27, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION AND
ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON, RESPONDENTS
FACTS: Petitioner AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car
Service Center. On May 27, 2001, on her way out she saw Arzadon standing beside a
parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near him and upon reaching his side,
through threat and force, she was raped by the accused.
On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Azarcon. The Assistant
City Prosecutor issued Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing
of information for rape. On March 5, 2003, the petitioner filed another AffidavitComplaint with a comprehensive account of rape incident which was assigned to 2 nd
Assistant Provincial prosecutor. As per Resolution of the investigating prosecutors, there
is a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending the filing of information.
Azarcon moved for reconsideration to review the case which was denied by panel of
prosecutors. The accused appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors before
the Department of Justice. The Acting Secretary of Justice then issued Resolution
directing the withdrawal of the Information because of absence of probable cause for
rape incident. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and the Secretary of
Justice reversed the Resolution of then Acting Secretary of Justice and issued another
Resolution that probable cause exists. The respondent Judge Carbonell directed the
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand. However, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently
established the existence of probable cause.
The Information for rape was filed before the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando. La Union
which was later transferred the venue to RTC of Manila Branch 25 upon request of the
petitioner.
Meanwhile, the respondent Judge Carbonell issued an Order dismissing the criminal
case for lack of probable cause and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The dismissal of criminal case was based on the ground that the petitioner and her
witnesses failed to comply his orders to take the witness stand. He claims that under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except

upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES : (1) Whether or not the respondent Judge Carbonell is correct in dismissing
the criminal case because of the failure of the petitioner and her witnesses to take the
witness stand which constitutes lack of probable cause; (2) Whether or not the
respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
HELD: No. In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this constitutional provision
does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon, where we held that
before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of
arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there
is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the
function of the investigating prosecutor.
In Okabe vs. Gutierrez, the Court stressed that if the report, taken together with the
supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not
compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be
conducted.
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that
petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand considering that there is
ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause.

Supreme Court of the Philippines


640 Phil. 620
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182677, August 03, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, PETITIONER
VS.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner was, by Information of January 16, 2007, arrested without warrant
and charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150. After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond
which the trial court approved, he was released from detention. On the other hand, the
private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter
alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine
the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Manifestation and Motion to defer acting on the
public prosecutor's recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court
resolves his application for injunctive reliefs and to defer action on the admission of the
Amended Information. The trial court nonetheless admitted the Amended Information for
murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate
court which the latter dismissed.
The petitioner, in his present petition, posits that the prosecution has no right under the
Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or re-evaluation of the case except
through a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an
accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of
preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without warrant the
remedy of preliminary investigation belongs to the accused.

HELD: No. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:


When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense
which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information
may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided
an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the
absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be
filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask
for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver,
he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns
of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.
Further, the Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal
case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the
reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party
for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.
Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the
criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by
counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the
public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured.
In Abugotal v. Judge Tiro case, the Court held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be
preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where
the interest of justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case
pending before it.

Case Digest
ELVIRA ONG, petitioner,
Vs.
JOSE CASIM GENIO, respondent.
GR. NO. 182336
DECEMBER 23, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Ong filed a criminal complaint against respondent Genio for the crime of
Robbery, for taking divesting and carrying away the kitchen and canteen equipment as
well as her personal things worth P700, 000.00, which was dismissed by the City
Prosecutor of Makati City on January 2006. However, pursuant to a resolution, the
Department of Justice charge the respondent of the same crime.
On December 15, 2006, the RTC of Makati Branch 56 dismissed the case because the
other elements of the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and
either violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things were not
specifically alleged in the Information filed against Genio.
Despite the dismissal of the case, Ong filed for a partial motion for reconsideration and
it was granted by the RTC. The lower court also dismissed the case for the lack of
probable cause to section 6(a), Rule 112 and held that the evidence on record failed to
establish probable cause to charge respondent with the crime of Robbery.
Subsequently, Ong filed filed a motion for reconsideration claiming RTC erred in relying
on Sec. 6(a) of Rule 112 since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and it does not cover the determination of the probable cause for the filing of the
Information against Genio, which is executive in nature, primarily vested in the Public
Prosecutor.

Again, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Ong but the RTC denied her motion for
holding that the aforementioned provision authorizes the RTC to evaluate not only the
Resolution of the prosecutor who conducted preliminary investigation and eventually
filed the Information in Court, but also the evidence upon which the Resolution was
based. In the event that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause,
the RTC may dismiss the case.
Aggrieved, Ong files a petition for certiorari and mandamus before Court of Appeals.
The appellate court observed that the People of the Philippines was impleaded as
petitioner without showing the Office of Solicitor Generals (OSG) participation. Hence,
CA ordered Ong to furnish a copy of the petition and latter to comment thereon.
Consequently, the OSG filed its Comment taking the stand that only OSG can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines filed before the CA or the
Supreme Court. The OSG submitted that, for being fatally defective, the said petition
should be dismissed in so far as the criminal aspect was concerned, without prejudice
to the right of petition to pursue the civil aspect of the case.

CA rendered its Resolution, dismissing the case without prejudice to the filing of the
petition on the civil aspect thereof on the basis of the arguments raised by both
respondent and the OSG. Petitioner file for Motion of Reconsideration and the appellate
court denied it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ong as the private offended party in a criminal case has no
personality to elevate that case to the CA without conformity of the OSG even
before the accused is arraigned.
2. Whether or not RTC has authority to dismiss the Information on the ground of
lack of probable cause when it has previously concluded that the same
Information is defective.

HELD:
The instant petition is BEREFT of merit to both issues.
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states
that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or

matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government in this Court and the CA in all criminal proceedings. While there may be
rare occasions when the offended party may allowed to pursue the criminal action on
his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstances
does not obtain in the instant case.

Before the CA, the OSG itself opined that the petition therein was fatally defective for
having been files without the OSGs participation. Before this court, petitioner failed to
advance any justification or excuse why she failed to seek assistance of the OSG when
she sought relief from CA, other than the personal belief that the OSG was burdened
with so many cases. Thus, we find no reversible error to disturb the CAs ruling.

Petitioner, however, is not without recourse. In Rodriguez v, Gadiane, we held:


It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party
is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense,
the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.
The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal.
However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the
civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and
the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special
civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.
On this ground alone, the instant Petition fails. Even on the issue of the RTC's
dismissal of the case, the Petition ought to be denied.

Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly
provides a judge may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.
Pursuant to aforementioned provision, the Judge clearly complied with the case.
Wherefore, the Petition is DENIED.

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY


CLARO C. CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ,
STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in
their capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of prosecutors
investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief,
Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT.
YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72
June 1, 2007
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of
petitioners cases.
Beltrans Petition
Following the issuance by Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
on 24 Feb 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Beltran on
the next day, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform
Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an
inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the RPC
based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 Feb 2006, on the
occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint
affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest

prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (MeTC).
On 27 Feb 2006, Beltran was subjected to another inquest conducted by the DOJ panel of
prosecutors and issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. The
inquest was based on 2 letters from Tanigue and Mendoza.
Maza and LadLad Petition
DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office to get copies of
the complaint and attachment. Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had quartered
themselves inside the House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to
warrantless arrest.
During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for the CIDG presented a
masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness
against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor Emmanuel
Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the
proceedings. The panel of prosecutors gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their
counter-affidavits. Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the
CIDGs letters only on 17 March 2006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted
with irregularity.

HELD:
Yes, the Preliminary Investigation was tainted with irregularities.
The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years, two
months and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier
ruling, "so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any
material damage," respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. They failed to comply
with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public.
Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG,

PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of
them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified
government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint,
must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall
dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here, after
receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to
petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the
complaints and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the
CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent
prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to
petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It
was only four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the
attachments to the CIDG letters.
These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors statement in the Order of 22 March
2006 that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f]
Criminal Procedure." Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the
complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to
members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent
credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an
individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on
the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized
the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a
"substantive" one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. This especially holds true here
where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for
those accused as principals.
We find merit in petitioners doubt on respondent prosecutors impartiality. Respondent
Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors,
stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, "We [the
DOJ] will just declare probable cause, then its up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x." Petitioners
raised this issue in their petition,but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement.
This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the absence of
probable cause.

CASE DIGEST
Mario Crespo, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable Leodegario Mogul, Presiding Judge, Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City, The People of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General, Ricardo
Bautista, Et Al., respondents.
GR No. L-53373
June 30, 1987

FACTS:
Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When
the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on
the ground that there was pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
on the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for filing of the information.
However, the presiding Judge Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was
deferred in a much later time for the accused to elevate the matter to the appellate
court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary
writ of injunction to the CA. Subsequently, the appellate court restrained Judge Mogul
from proceeding with arraignment of the accused until the further orders of the Court. A
comment was filed by the Solicitor General where he recommended that the petition
should be given due course.

Meanwhile, the undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr. resolved the
petition for review and reversed the resolution made by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused.
CA rendered a decision granting the writ and perpetually restraining the Judge from
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused of the case until the Dept.
of Justice have finally resolved the petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and
trial on the merits.

HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may
or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the
offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direct control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious and
unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The
Courts cannot interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible of a court to compel the fiscal to
prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an Information, if he finds that the
evidence relied upon by him is insufficient of information. Thus, a fiscal who asks for
the dismissal of the case for insufficiency or evidence has authority to do so, and Courts
that grant the same commit no error.
In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscals should
normally prevail.

However, an action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The
same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of
Justice, who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the
fiscal. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may direct the motion to dismiss the case
to be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon filing of the information in the proper court, which in turn will sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court, any disposition as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot
impose his opinion and control on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within the exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused of that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justivve who reviewed the
records of the investigation.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

NOTE:
This is a landmark case. It is best to read the whole text.