1

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUB OFFICERS/ ADMIN LAW

REPUBLIC V PACHEO
On May 7, 2002, the BIR issued Revenue Travel
Assignment
Order (RTAO) No.
25-2002,[3] ordering
the
reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division
from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga.
The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis for
the issuance of the said RTAO.

treated Pacheos Complaint as an appeal and dismissed the

same, without prejudice, for failure to comply with Sections 73
and 74 of Rule V(b) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.[7]
In its Letter-reply[8] dated September 13, 2002, the
BIR, through its Deputy Commissioner for Legal and
Inspection Group, Edmundo P. Guevara (Guevara), denied
Pacheos protest for lack of merit. It contended that her
reassignment could not be considered constructive dismissal
as she maintained her position as Revenue Attorney IV and
was designated as Assistant Chief of Legal Division. It
emphasized that her appointment to the position of Revenue
Attorney IV was without a specific station. Consequently, she
could properly be reassigned from one organizational unit to
another within the BIR. Lastly, she could not validly claim a
vested right to any specific station, or a violation of her right to
security of tenure.

Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her

Letter dated May 9, 2002[4] addressed to Rene G. Banez, then
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). She complained that
the transfer would mean economic dislocation since she would
have to spend 200.00 on daily travel expenses or
approximately 4,000.00 a month. It would also mean physical
burden on her part as she would be compelled to wake up
early in the morning for her daily travel from Quezon
Not in conformity with the ruling of the BIR, Pacheo
City to San Fernando, Pampanga, and to return home late at
appealed
her case before the CSC.
night from San Fernando, Pampanga to Quezon City. She was
of the view that that her reassignment was merely intended to
November 21, 2005, the CSC issued Resolution No.
harass and force her out of the BIR in the guise of exigencies
of the revenue service. In sum, she considered her transfer granting Pacheos appeal. Although reassignment is a
management prerogative, the same must be done in the
from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting to a constructive
exigency of the service without diminution in rank, status and
dismissal.
salary on the part of the officer or employee being temporarily
Reassignment of small salaried employees, however
Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo reassigned.
filed a
is
not
allowed
if it will cause significant financial dislocation to the
complaint[5] dated May 30, 2002, before the CSC- National
employee
reassigned.
Otherwise the Commission will have to
Capital Region (CSC-NCR), praying for the nullification of
RTAO No. 25-2002. In its July 22, 2002 Order,[6] the CSC-NCR
The facts established on record show that Pacheo
belongs to the rank and file receiving an average monthly
salary of Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) under the
salary standardization law and a monthly take home pay of
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00). She has to spend
around Four Thousand Pesos (4,000.00) a month for her
transportation expenses as a consequence of her
reassignment, roughly twenty eight percent (28%) of her
monthly take home pay. Clearly, Pacheos salary shall be
significantly reduced as a result of her reassignment.
Still not satisfied, Pacheo moved for reconsideration.
She argued that the CSC erred in not finding that she
was constructively dismissed and, therefore, entitled to
back salary.
On March 7, 2006, the CSC issued Resolution No.
060397[11] denying Pacheos motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a
petition for review.
In its February 22, 2007 Decision, the CA reversed the
CSC Resolution and ruled in favor of Pacheo.

While this Court agrees that petitioners reassignment

was not valid considering that a diminution in salary is
enough to invalidate such reassignment, We cannot
agree that the latter has not been constructively
dismissed as a result thereof.
It is well to remember that constructive dismissal does
not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in
rank, compensation, benefits and privileges. For an act
of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer may become so unbearable on the part of the
employee that it could foreclose any choice by him
except to forgo his continued employment.
Moreover, it would be inconsistent to hold that the
reassignment was not valid due to the significant
reduction in petitioners salary and then rule that there is
no constructive dismissal just because said reduction in
salary will not render petitioner penniless if she will
report to her new place of assignment. It must be noted
that there is constructive dismissal when the
reassignment of an employee involves a diminution in
pay.

In its own Memorandum,[16] the CSC, through the OSG,

argues that constructive dismissal is not applicable in
this case because it was Pacheo herself who adamantly
refused to report for work either in her original station or
ordered by the CSC. Therefore, Pacheo should have first
reported to her new place of assignment and then appealed
her case to the CSC if she indeed believed that there was no
justification for her reassignment. Since Pacheo did not report
for work at all, she is not entitled to backwages following the
principle of no work, no pay.
WON PACHEO IS ENTITLED TO BACK WAGE AND SHE
WAS CONTRCUTIVELY DISMISSED
HELD:
It appears undisputed that the reassignment of Pacheo was
not valid.
The question that remains to be resolved is whether or
not Pacheos assignment constitutes constructive dismissal
and, thus, entitling her to reinstatement and backwages. Was
Pacheo constructively dismissed by reason of her
reassignment?
Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal
as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the
agency heads unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning
actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence,
the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This
may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of
salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position
of dignity to a more servile or menial job.
The Court finds Itself unable to agree to CSCs
argument that the subject RTAO was immediately executory.
The Court deems it necessary to distinguish between a detail
and reassignment, as they are governed by different rules.
A detail is defined and governed by Executive Order
292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus:
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one
agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and
shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific
positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification
for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission.
Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
[Underscoring supplied]

On the other hand, a reassignment is defined and

governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5,
Section 26 (7), thus:

new place of assignment in clear violation of Section 24

(f) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 807.[17] Citing
jurisprudence,[18] the CSC avers that the RTAO is
immediately executory, unless otherwise
(7) Reassignment.An employee may be reassigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency; Provided,
That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank,
status or salaries. [Underscoring supplied]

The principal distinctions between a detail and

reassignment lie in the place where the employee is to be
moved and in its effectivity pending appeal with the CSC.
Based on the definition, a detail requires a movement from one
agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement
within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the
CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a
reassignment order does not become immediately effective.

In the case at bench, the lateral movement of Pacheo as

Assistant Chief, Legal Division from Quezon City to San
Fernando, Pampanga within the same agency is undeniably a
reassignment.
Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively
dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement and back wages?
The Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to
reinstatement, but finds Itself unable to sustain the ruling that
she is entitled to full back wages and benefits. It is a settled
jurisprudence[22] that an illegally dismissed civil service
employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a
maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries
from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.

REPUBLIC V DRUGMAKERS LABORATORY

Department of Health (DOH), thru then-Secretary Alfredo R.A.
Bengzon, issued Administrative Order No. (AO) 67, s. 1989,
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of
Pharmaceutical Products." Among others, it required drug
manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products
with the FDA before they may release the same to the market
for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability /
bioequivalence7 (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to
secure a CPR for these products. However, the
implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on
hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting
the same. The issuance of Circular No. 1, s. 19978 resumed
the FDAs implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement
with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country.
Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s. 19979 which

provided additional implementation details concerning the

BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.10
Respondents manufacture and trade a "multisource
pharmaceutical product"11 with the generic name of
rifampicin12 branded as "Refam 200mg/5mL Suspension"
(Refam) for the treatment of adults and children suffering
from pulmonary and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis.13 On
November 15, 1996, respondents applied for and were issued
a CPR for such drug, valid for five (5) years, or until November
15, 2001.14 At the time of the CPRs issuance, Refam did not
undergo BA/BE testing since there was still no facility capable
of conducting BA/BE testing.
Accordingly, respondents engaged the services of the
University of the Philippines (Manila) Department of
Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Medicine to conduct
BA/BE testing on Refam, the results of which were submitted
to the FDA.16 In turn, the FDA sent a letter dated July 31, 2006
to respondents, stating that Refam is "not bioequivalent with
the reference drug."17
Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam,
respondents filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of
Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it
is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the authority
to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and thereby declared
Circular Nos. 1 and 8 null and void, ordered the issuance of
writs of permanent injunction and prohibition against the FDA
in implementing the aforesaid circulars, and directed the FDA
to issue CPRs in favor of respondents products.
The RTC held that there is nothing in RA 3720 which granted
either the FDA the authority to issue and implement the subject
circulars, or the Secretary of Health the authority to delegate
his powers to the FDA. For these reasons, it concluded that
the issuance of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.
ISSUE The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the
FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.
1997. In resolving this issue, there is a need to determine
whether or not the aforesaid circulars partake of administrative
rules and regulations and, as such, must comply with the
requirements of the law for its issuance.
HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA 3720, as
amended by Executive Order No. 175, s. 198737 prohibits, inter
alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products
without obtaining the proper CPR from the FDA.38 In this
regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same law to accept
applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due
course, grant or reject such applications.39 To this end, the said

law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the

recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and
regulations that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical
products.40
However, due to the supervening factor that there had yet
been no bioavailability testing unit in the country when the A.O.
67 s. 1989 became effective, the Bureau did not strictly
enforce the said requirement.
The supervening factor no longer exist [sic] as of date. As a
matter of fact, one of the registered products tested by the
Bioavailability Testing Unit at the University of Sto. Tomas
under the NDP Cooperation Project of the Philippines and
Australia failed to meet the standard of bioavailability. This
finding brings forth the fact that there may be registered
products which do not or may no longer meet bioavailability
standard.
On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be
considered as administrative regulations because they do not:
(a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain
the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of
these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the
implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including
those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with
and pursuant to RA 3720.43 Therefore, the FDA has sufficient
authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not
affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to
govern as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative
regulations in the first place no prior hearing, consultation,
and publication are needed for their validity.
In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 are
valid issuances and binding to all concerned parties, including
the respondents in this case.
PEOPLE V SANDIGAN AND BASCO
in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David and Rogelio L.
Luis, all high ranking public officers, being then Chairman and
President/Presidents and Chief Executive Officers of the
Bases Conversion Development Authority [BCDA], Clark
Development Corporation/Clark International Airport, [CDC
/CIAC] and Philippine National Construction Corporation
[PNCC], respectively, while in the performance of their official
functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing
the offenses in relation to their office, confederating and
conspiring with one another, with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

criminally enter into contracts/transactions for the construction

of the Mabalacat-Clark Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter
Road, without the benefit of public bidding and at the price
higher by 60 to 167% than the typical roadway construction
cost, thus, depriving the government of the opportunity of
obtaining the most advantageous construction cost, causing
undue injury to the same and giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to their preferred private
contractors.
It appears that accused Rogelio L. Luis and Victorino
A. Basco (and several other BCDA officers) were also charged
administratively in the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as
OMB-ADM-0-98-0430 and entitled Joseph M. Ocol//FFIB vs.
Victorino A. Basco et. al., based on the same act subject of the
criminal indictment. The Office of the Ombudsman found one
of the respondents therein (Isaac Puno III) administratively
liable for simple misconduct. In the case of Basco and Luis,
however, the complaint against them was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.[7]
On the exoneration in the administrative case,
Sandiganbayan was of the view that there was disparity in the
nature of the two proceedings and in the quantum of evidence
required, and so it did not necessarily bar a successful criminal
prosecution involving the same or similar acts.
The private respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration which was granted in a Resolution dated July
23, 2004. The fallo of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court is
constrained to GRANT, as it hereby GRANTS, the Motions for
Reconsideration of accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S.
David and Rogelio L. Luis, as the evidence of the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish the essential elements of the
offense charged and to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the said accused. Accordingly, the cases
against accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David and
Rogelio L. Luis are hereby DISMISSED.
The Sandiganbayan further stated that the prosecution
failed to establish the fact of overpricing. The prosecution
witness was unable to justify her sole reliance on DPWH table
of Typical Construction Costs, 1999 vis--vis the roadway
construction cost of the projects involved to prove
overpricing. It noted that the Office of the Ombudsman itself
was not firmly convinced of respondents culpability as shown
by (i) its issuance of two conflicting memoranda, viz: one in the
administrative case dated June 28, 2000 (OMB-ADM-0-980430) where it found that there was no overpricing; and the
other, in the criminal case (this case) dated June 19, 2000
(OMB-0-98-1629 and OMB-0-99-0368), where it found
evidence that the project was overpriced; and (ii) the
recommendation of Special Prosecutor Roberto Agagon that
the contracts be reviewed by the COA, at a time when the
Information was already filed in court.

ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED MAY BE PROSECUTED FOR A

CRIMINAL CASE DESPITE DISMISSAL OF ADMIN CASE?
NO
WAS THERE A PROPER REMEDY? NO.
HELD:
Not surprisingly, petitioner has not attributed any
commission of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Sandiganbayan in issuing the questioned resolution, on the
mistaken assumption that it can assail the resolution on purely
legal questions. As explained above, it cannot do so. A
judgment of acquittal cannot be reopened or appealed
because of the doctrine that nobody can be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Granting arguendo that petitioners recourse under
Rule 45 was proper, nevertheless, petitioner failed to raise
pure questions of law. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented. There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on certain state of facts.[20]
Contrary to petitioners contention, the determination of
whether the established facts fall squarely within the provisions
of the law, that is, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, would require
us to reassess and reexamine the evidence, and essentially to
supplant the lower courts finding. This is beyond
the province of Rule 45. Judicial review under Rule 45 does
not envisage a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which respondent courts action was predicated. It bears
reiterating that a judgment of acquittal, even if seemingly
erroneous, is the final verdict.[21]
Similarly, the second issue posed by petitioner is a
question of fact disguised as a question of law. An affirmative
ruling thereon would also require us to review the factual
bases of the ruling of the CA in the administrative case. In fact,
as noted by respondent court, the same issue of legality or
validity of the subject contracts had already been passed upon
by the CA, and the Ombudsman did not even attempt to
question the CA ruling, which could only mean its adherence
thereto.
2. Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot
be pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings primarily
on the ground that the quantum of proof required to sustain
administrative charges is significantly lower than that
necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold true if it
were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the
administrative case is being invoked to abate the criminal
case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence

to be presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is

certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence to
discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases.
[24]
However, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on
the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case,
and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the
absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the
basis of the criminal indictment, [25] then to still burden the
accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure
of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent
evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.
FERRER V SANDIGANBAYAN
That on or about August 20, 1998 or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, DOMINADOR C.
FERRER, JR., being the Administrator of the Intramuros
Administration (IA), Manila, while in the performance of his
official and administrative functions as such, and acting with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally give unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction
and Development Company, by causing the award of the
Lease Contracts to said company, involving Baluarte de San
Andres, Ravellin de Recolletos, and Baluarte de San Francisco
de Dilao, Intramuros, Manila, without conducting any public
bidding as required under Joint Circular No. 1 dated
September 30, 1989 of the Department of Budget and
Management, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and Department of Public Works and Highways,
and by allowing the construction of new structures in said
leased areas without any building permit or clearance required
under the Intramuros Charter (P.D. 1616) and the National
Building Code, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
On May 19, 2003, before he can be arraigned, petitioner filed
yet another motion with public respondent, this time a Motion
for Re-determination of Probable Cause,15 invoking the ruling
of the Office of the President (OP), dated February 29,
2000,16 which absolved petitioner of administrative liability. The
OP reviewed the administrative case filed against petitioner
with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in good faith and within
the scope of his authority.
On July 2, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued herein assailed
Resolution denying the Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause.
Petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan should have
dismissed the criminal case filed against him, since the alleged
wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those
alleged in the administrative case against him which have
been dismissed.

The respondents cite jurisprudence, which states that the

dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar
the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar
acts.22
WON THE CRIMINAL CASE BE DISMISSED?
HELD
NO. But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another
thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our
determination of the administrative liability for falsification
of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of
criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily
bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts which were the subject of the administrative
complaint.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from Paredes that the criminal case against
petitioner, already filed and pending with the Sandiganbayan,
may proceed despite the dismissal of the administrative case
arising out of the same acts.
The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice
versa.26 The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same
or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative
complaint.27
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these rules.
Petitioner argues that the criminal case against him requires a
higher quantum of proof for conviction -- that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- than the administrative case, which needs
only substantial evidence. He claims that from this
circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the administrative
case should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal case.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of
the administrative case against them based on the same
subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case
because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while that
in administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While
that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the
basis of administrative liability differs from criminal
liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is
mainly to protect the public service, based on the timehonored principle that a public office is a public trust. On
the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is
the punishment of crime.

Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the

administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they
were re-elected to office. Indeed, a re-elected local official may
not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this
holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and
character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.

Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit

Complaint[9] dated September 5, 2003 before PAGC charging
Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act),
Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) In its Decision [13] dated June 29,
2004, the OP adopted by reference the findings and
recommendations of PAGC. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:

However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only

the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him
during his previous term of office x x x.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the PAGC,

respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz, is hereby DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE, with the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment to government service and forfeiture of
retirement benefits, effective immediately upon receipt of this
order.
The CA promulgated its Decision on January 31, 2008, which
reversed and set aside the Amended Resolution of the OP.

The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates that

the Sandiganbayan must determine petitioner's criminal liability
without its hands being tied by what transpired in the
administrative case. The court is duty-bound to exercise its
independent judgment.35 It is not ousted of its jurisdiction by
the ruling in the administrative proceeding. It is axiomatic that
when the court obtains jurisdiction over a case, it continues to
retain it until the case is terminated.36
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT V CATAQUIZ
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was
appointed as General Manager of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) on April 16, 2001.[4]
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the
Management Committee and the rank-and-file employees of
the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary
Elisea
G.
Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster of
Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager[5] on the grounds of
corrupt and unprofessional behavior and management
incompetence.
In her Memorandum[7] for the President dated May 23,
2003, Secretary Gozun reported that there is prima
facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz
which may be used to pursue an administrative or criminal
case against him. It was further noted that respondent lost his
leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that
Cataquiz be relieved from his position and that he be
investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter[8] to then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo),
the
Concerned
Employees
of
the
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority(CELLDA), a duly organized employees union of the
LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust Cataquiz
and likewise called for his immediate replacement.

The issues can be condensed into four essential questions:

(1) Whether the CA made an incorrect determination of

the facts of the case warranting review of its factual findings by
the Court;

(2) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges

against Cataquiz serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.[24] Since this Court is not a trier of facts, findings of
fact of the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon this
Court.[25] There are, however, several recognized exceptions to
this rule, namely:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went

beyond the issues of the case, and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The result of PAGCs investigation, however, was simply
brushed aside by the CA, without citing any evidence on which
its findings were based. As plain as that, without any analysis
of the evidence on record or a comprehensive discussion on
how the decision was arrived at, the CA absolved Cataquiz of
the acts he was accused of committing during his service as
General Manager of the LLDA.
The one-paragraph pronouncement of the CA
that Cataquiz had authority to perform the acts complained of
is grossly insufficient to overturn the determination by PAGC
that he should be punished for acts prejudicial to the LLDA
committed during his service as General Manager of the said
agency. It should be emphasized that findings of fact of
administrative agencies will not be interfered with and shall be
considered binding and conclusive upon this Court provided
that there is substantial evidence to support such findings.
[29]
Substantial evidence has been defined as that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion[30] or evidence commonly
accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs.[31]

In the case at hand, respondents act of not giving

credence to the Board Resolution resulted to undue prejudice
to the best interest of the public service considering that the
Authority incurred Revenue loss from the direct transaction of
respondent Cataquiz amounting to Seven Hundred Fifty Five
Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos 755,700.00.
The presumption that the official duty has been
regularly performed was overcome by the fact that the
government was deprived of much needed revenue as a result
of the act committed by respondent Cataquiz.

The Commission finds that the act of respondent

Cataquiz in condoning penalties and reducing the
fines imposed by the Public Hearing Committee (PHC) of the
LLDA has no basis in law. The premise of the respondent citing
Section 26 (b) giving him the executive prerogative and
Section 4 (a) justifying the condonation and reduction is
misplaced. A careful examination of the aforementioned
provisions would reveal that Section 26 (b) does not vest the
respondent the executive prerogative. Said provision gives him
the authority to execute and administer the policies, plans,
programs and projects approved by the Board. There is no
showing that the condonation of penalties and reduction of
fines has been approved by the Board. Section 26 (b) is clear
in its terms that before respondent executes any policy,
program or project, the same has to be approved by the
Board. Thus, there is no executive prerogative to speak of.
The findings of the PHC, although a recommendatory
body, must be accorded great respect. The penalties imposed
by the PHC cannot be substituted by the respondent without
any basis and the latter cannot simply claim that he has the
sole authority to condone penalties and reduce fines.
Evidently respondents act of condonation of penalties
and reduction of fines was uncalled for. Thus, his act resulted
to undue prejudice to the best interest of the service and will
set a dangerous precedent to the justice system of the
government.
From the aforementioned section, nowhere can the
Commission find any grant of power to adjudicate in favor of
respondent Cataquiz and the latter cannot hide under the cloak
of managerial prerogative absent any law that justifies his act
of dismissing the case. To reiterate, the dismissal of the case
against Twenty First Century is an act clearly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Consequently, the Authority was
deprived of a committed service to the government and this
fact cannot be overlooked upon by the Commission.
The contention of the respondent that the LLDA
Administrative Section failed to advise him regarding the
requisites laid down by law cannot stand. Occupying an
executive position, respondent is required to exercise diligence
in the highest degree in the performance of his
duties. Respondent cannot pass responsibility to other Division
which in the first place, he has supervision and control of,
pursuant to Section 31 of RA 4850. Supervision as defined is
the overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control on the other hand, is the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. There is therefore
a given authority to the respondent by law to regulate the acts
of the Administrative Division and respondent cannot simply
evade responsibility by invoking the shortcomings of his
subordinates. In signing the contract, without verifying
compliance of existing laws, respondent falls short of the

required competence expected of him in the performance of

his official functions. Incompetence, has been defined as lack
of ability, legal qualification or fitness to discharge the required
duty; want of physical or intellectual or moral fitness.
The Commission finds that the transaction entered into
by the respondent and Phil-Tai Fishing and Trade Company is
violative of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. There was manifest
partiality when respondent Cataquiz entered a transaction with
Phil-Tai disregarding the requirements set forth by RA 4850
which requires the approval of the Board. Worse, the joint
venture proposal by Phil-Tai which was accepted by the
respondent took place without any contract at all. The
contention of the respondent that Phil-Tai is only given the
authority to conduct a preliminary study and including the
technical survey and Pilot testing at the aforesaid facility for the
purpose of determining its structural integrity and commercial
viability cannot prevail over the records available at hand.
Applying the fourth element in the case at bar,
respondent Cataquiz gave Phil-Tai unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference when he entertained the joint venture
proposal without any consideration. In fact, as stated in
respondents position paper, LLDA was assured by Phil-Tai that
in the event the agreement does not materialize, it will remove
all its equipment without damage to the LLDA aqua culture
facilities. Be it noted that the assurance was not made in
writing.
The Commission finds that the promotion of the film
entry of RVQ Productions by respondent Cataquiz does not
offend Section 7 (d) of RA 6713 which provides as follows:
Public officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any
person in the course of their official duties, or in connection
with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office.
There was no undue solicitation of patronage of the
film considering that the tickets sold are voluntary participation
of interested employees. In fact, no monetary consideration
was received nor accepted by the respondent.

Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman

of the case against him constitutes the law of the case
between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of
the petition before this Court.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public
officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of
their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may
be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the
same act.[37] Obviously, administrative liability is separate and
distinct from penal and civil liability.[38] In the case of People v.

Sandiganbayan,[39]the Court elaborated on the difference

between administrative and criminal liability:

The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding

from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence required and,
correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against
two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the
same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative
liability.[40]

Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the

Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against
Cataquiz.[41] His absolution from criminal liability is not
conclusive upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be
administratively liable. The pronouncement made by the
Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be
unsettling as it would undermine the very purpose of
administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service
and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a
public trust.
UNICAN V NEA
Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were
terminated from their employment with the implementation of
the assailed resolutions.
Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation created in accordance with Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 269 issued on August 6, 1973. Under PD 269,
Section 5(a)(5), the NEA Board is empowered to organize or
reorganize NEAs staffing structure. Thereafter, in order to
enhance and accelerate the electrification of the whole country,
including the privatization of the National Power Corporation,
Republic Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was
enacted, taking effect on June 26, 2001. The law imposed
upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of
the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national
electrification.
Thus, the Rules and Regulations to implement RA 9136 were
issued on February 27, 2002. Under Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of
the Rules and Regulations, all the NEA employees and officers
are considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of
NEA vacant
Petitioners raise the following issues:

1.
The NEA Board has no power to
terminate all the NEA employees;
2.
Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the
NEA Board the power to terminate all NEA employees; and
3.
Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried
out in bad faith.

Evidently, the fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating

all the incumbent employees of NPC and, later on, rehiring
some of them, cannot, on that ground alone, vitiate the bona
fides of the reorganization.

HELD:

PAT-OG V CSC

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the
RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the
principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special
and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of
NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively
dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the
mind of the Court entails its attention.
Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed
resolutions of the NEA Board may have long been
implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be
repeated by other government agencies in the reorganization
of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of
injunction.

On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a

14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, tiled an
affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school
teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).
Pat-og then held his right arm and punched his stomach
without warning for failing to follow instructions; and that as a
result, he suffered stomach pain for several days and was
confined in a hospital from September 10-12, 2003, as
evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated that he
sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric area.

The meat of the controversy in the instant case is the issue of

whether the NEA Board had the power to pass Resolution Nos.
46 and 59 terminating all of its employees.
This must be answered in the affirmative.
Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be
considered legally terminated with the implementation of a
reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by
Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which
the reorganization was carried out.
In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power
Corporation,[4] the Court upheld the dismissal of all the
employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In ruling
that the power of reorganization includes the power of removal,
the Court explained:
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the
loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an
office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be
valid, it must pass thetest of good faith; otherwise, it is void
ab initio. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA
was within the NEA Boards powers and may not successfully
be impugned absent proof of bad faith.

While the proceedings of the administrative case were

ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case
and found Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury.
He was meted the penalty of imprisonment from eleven (11) to
twenty (20) days. Following his application for probation, the
decision became final and executory and judgment was
entered.
Ruling of the CSC-CAR
In its Decision,3 dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR
found Pat-og guilty and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises told, respondent Alberto Pat-og,
Sr., Teacher Antadao National High School, is hereby found
guilty of Simple Misconduct.
The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but, instead, fully
acquiesced in his conviction in the criminal case for slight
physical injury, which was based on the same set of facts and
circumstances, and involved the same parties and issues. It,
thus, considered his prior criminal conviction as evidence
against him in the administrative case.
CA 8 the CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that
Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively
participated in the proceedings.
WON THERE IS JURIS OF THE CSC: YES
WON PATOG WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS: YES

10

SUSPENDED? YES
HELD:
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the
body charged with the establishment and administration of a
career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies
of the government.11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines)13 expressly provide that the CSC has the power to
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power
to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service,
including public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over
administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with
the investigating committee constituted therein.14 Also, under
Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers
Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional
Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to
suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a
professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.15
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the
same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or
more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.16
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the
body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was
CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because
the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to
proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd
and the Board of Professional Teachers.17
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.22 Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative
proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always

necessary23 and technical rules of procedure are not strictly

applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due process.24 The
petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on
and his witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his
guilt.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute
an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or t1agrant disregard of an established
rule must be manifest.25
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not only be
competent in the practice of their noble profession, but must
also possess dignity and a reputation with high moral values.
They must strictly adhere to, observe, and practice the set of
ethical and moral principles, standards, and values laid down
in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which apply to
all teachers in schools in the Philippines, whether public or
private, as provided in the preamble of the said
Code.26 Section 8 of Article VIII of the same Code expressly
provides that "a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment on
offending learners."
Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in punching Bang-on,
he was exercising his right as a teacher in loco parentis to
discipline his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a
public school teacher, deliberately violated his Code of Ethics.
Such violation is a flagrant disregard for the established rule
contained in the said Code tantamount to grave misconduct.
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it
the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.27 This penalty must, however, be
tempered with compassion as there was sut1icient provocation
on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the mitigating
circumstances that the petitioner has been in the government
service for 33 years, that this is his first offense and that he is
at the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension for six months as appropriate under the
circumstances.