Demographic Trends in Israel in the Arab and Jewish Populations

Possible Policy Implications

MS Global Affairs-NYU Center for Global Affairs

Masters Thesis Spring 2010
Advisor: Sylvia Maier

Stefan Kirschner

Abstract

This paper will explore the demographic trends presently occurring in Israel
and the Palestinian Territories (Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) in an effort to analyze
and possibly predict outcomes if present circumstances continue. I will focus
extensively on the demographic controversy between leading Israeli
demographer Sergio Della Pergola and a study put out by Bennett Zimmerman
and colleagues claiming that there is a million man gap in the Palestinian
population and the implications for policy planning in such a scenario. I will focus
both on the Arab population over the green line and the Arab population with
Israeli citizenship and possible policy implications if current trends continue.

I will also analyze the demographic situation vis--vis the Jewish population,
namely between the religious and secular sectors. I found there to be a general
dearth of research in this area and feel that this paper therefore fills in a gap in
the literature. I will be analyzing and discussing the various sectors within the
religious sector and likely scenarios and likely leaders of a religious regime in the
case that such a regime comes to power due to that communitys greater
population growth. I will be focusing especially, and giving concise background
to, what is known as the radical right wing, or Jewish fundamentalist sector of
this community as I figure them as the probable future leadership of such a

regime. Lastly, I will discuss likely policy objectives that such a regime is likely to
pursue.
Table of Contents

Abstract

...2

Introduction .4
Background6
Demographic Question between Jews and Arabs according to
Zimmerman..10
Demographic Question between Jews and Arabs according to
Della Pergola..... 19
Emigration.27
Abortion.31
Summary of Findings..34
Israeli Arabs

.37

Demographic Question between Religious and Secular Jews.. 42

The ultraorthodox.49
The national religious.... 53
The Jewish fundamentalists.....56
Bibliography.71

Introduction

Israel is a unique nation in the world. It is the only Jewish state in the world
today. It is the only state made up of a people who had been exiled from it
centuries earlier and then returned. It is the only state that has been in a
constant state of war since the day she declared independence. It is the only
state that considers it a triumph when her right to exist is acknowledged. It is the
only country in the world where the United States does not have its embassy in
the capital city.

Together with its uniqueness in the world, Israel has inherited a unique set of
problems. The modern state of Israel was reconstituted in 1948 as a result of
political Zionism. One of the main goals of Zionism was the reestablishment of a
Jewish state. This state would be the panacea for Jewish suffering, pogroms,
and anti-Semitism that the Jews had suffered throughout the ages. Though there

were disagreements among the various Zionist groups, all could agree that the
minimum definition of a Jewish state was a state with a Jewish majority.

There have been studies on the demographic balance between Jews and
Arabs in the Land of Israel before, but as stated above, there have not been
many studies on the demographic balance between the religious and secular
sectors of the Jewish population within the same area. And to my knowledge
there has not been any study which links demographic data between Arabs and
Jews, demographic data between religious and secular Jews and then discusses
possible scenarios and policy implications that can be deduced from this data.
That is why I feel that this paper will fill a unique niche in the literature on the
Middle East that has yet to be explored, despite all the ink that has been spilled
on more popular aspects of the conflict.

I feel therefore, that it is important for policy makers and all involved in the
conflict in the Middle East to be informed of this data and the backgrounds and
ideologies of players that may come to the fore in the near future. It will clarify for
policy analysts, involved people, and the players themselves the unique position
and history and background in which they find themselves and will hopefully help
them to formulate their policies and actions accordingly. It will especially help US
policymakers know who and what they will be facing in the future when they
attempt to bring their various peace plans and road maps to the region.

Background

There are varying opinions regarding how many Jews and Arabs lived in the
Land of Israel or Eretz Yisrael1 over the ages. The Jews ceased to be a majority
in the land after the Roman conquest around 70 CE. Later, Christians were a
majority during the Byzantine age from the 2 nd to the 6th centuries. After the rise
of Islam in the 7th century the Muslims would be the majority. They would be the
majority up until 1947. During the Ottoman period the population fluctuated
between 150,000 and 250,000 for a span of several centuries (Della Pergola
Population 282). Starting with the 19th century, rapid population growth
appears. Palestines total population doubled to over half a million toward the
end of the 19th century. In the 20th century it doubled again to one million by the
time of the second British census in 1931, and then it doubled again to about two
millions in 1947 on the eve of the proposed United Nations partition plan. The
1947 United Nations partition plan would leave a small, convoluted Jewish state
with a sizable Arab minority and an Arab state consisting of Judea and Samaria
(West Bank) and large parts of the Galilee and the Negev. This population of 2
million consisted at the time of 1.35 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews.
1

Eretz Yisrael ( ) refers to the Biblical Land of Israel which G-d promised to Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob. The borders are mentioned in Genesis 15 (18-21), Numbers 34 (1-15), and Ezekiel 47 (13-20).
with the Genesis description of from the river of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates being the most
widely known. For our purposes we are referring to the region between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea.

Fortuitously for the Jews in this case, the Arabs declared war in 1948 and in
its aftermath the Jews liberated large areas of the lands originally assigned to the
Arab state. In addition 625,000 to 675,000 Arabs according to Israeli sources
(Bachi 1977) or 700,000 to 800,000 Arabs according to Arab sources (Kossaifi
1996) either left or were expelled leaving the new Jewish state with 148,000
Arabs at independence. In Table 2 we see the population levels of each group
through the centuries.

Source: Della Pergola Demography in Israel; Brazil lecture 5.

While the number of Arabs left in what would be the Jewish state was a much
smaller percentage than the United Nations partition plan envisioned, it still left a
large number of Arabs in the new State of Israel, especially in the Galilee and the
Negev, which were originally planned to be part of the Arab state. The Arabs

that were left behind in the Jewish state, however, had an extremely high
birthrate. Their numbers grew from 156,000 in 1948 to over a 1.2 million in 2001.
(Arab Population in Israel CBS pamphlet). This was accomplished solely
through population growth and not immigration. 1 This growth can be seen in the
Table A-1 below. Almost simultaneously, approximately 800,000 Jews arrived in
Israel from Arab countries, most having been expelled from areas they had
inhabited since before the rise of Islam. These Jews were integrated into Israel
as opposed to the Arab governments who preferred to use the Arab refugees as
pawns and let them fester. A graph showing the massive influx of Jews at this
time can be seen In addition, after the 1967 War, Israel regained the West Bank
(Judea and Samaria) and Gaza including all the Arab inhabitants therein. This
greatly changed the demographic balance as well.

Fears of a demographic war between Jews and Arabs were discussed even
since before Israels independence. In articles published between 1942 and
1944, A.H. Fraenkel, a distinguished Professor of Mathematics at the Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, suggested that the demographic and political implications
of continued demographic patterns between Arabs and Jews in Palestine would
be grave (Friedlander 1979: 124). Demographer Roberto Bachi had discussed
the issue with Prime Minister David Ben Gurion who stated that a Jewish state,
and perhaps the survival of the existing Jewish community, would be impossible
if the Jews would become a minority (Friedlander 1979: 122). In 1975,
demographer Leonard Singermans population projection predicted that No
1

except for small family reunification cases

longer able to rely on immigration, the Jews would be a minority in an Arab state
by 2047 (Singerman 1975: 52) (Katz 13).

Source: (Arab Population in Israel CBS pamphlet)

Jewish immigrants to Israel 1919-2000 absolute numbers and rates per
1000 residents

Source: Della Pergola Demography in Israel; Brazil lecture 5.

The Demographic Question between Jews and Arabs according to

Zimmerman
The question then arises, what will the future hold? As of September 2009
the population of Israel stands at 7,465,500 which includes 5,634,300 Jews,
1,513, 200 Arabs, and 318,000 others (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics). The
population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, however, is an entirely different
question and is mired in controversy. Countless articles and warnings have
been thundered at all the governments of Israel concerning the demographic
demon that would be involved in the annexation of the territories. Figures of all
kinds, statistics, numbers, projections, have been produced, all warning of the

10

need to rid ourselves of the territories because of the Arabs who go along with
them. Indeed, just a few months after the 1967 war, the Peace and Security
Movement issued a statement warning that annexation of the territories would
force Israel to lose either its Jewishness or its democracy, since the enormous
Arab population and birthrate would eventually make the Arabs a majority
(Kahane 1981: 101). Israeli demographers have for many years warned of the
demographic threat that a large Arab population would present. In 1976, Israel
Koenig, the northern district commissioner for the Ministry of the Interior
published what became known as the Koenig Report when it was leaked to the
media. It spoke of the demographic problem in the Galilee and how the Arabs
there were increasing almost six times as fast as the Jews and that this was
dangerous to Israels security since the Arabs increase in Galilee will endanger
our control of that area and will create possibilities for military forces from the
north to infiltrate that area (Portugese 84). He continued that the increase gives
the Arab nationalists a feeling of power and a hope that time is working for
them Recently former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated Above all hovers
the cloud of demographics. It will come down on us not in the end of days, but in
just another few years (Barnea). Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon also
echoed this sentiment when he declared The idea that it is possible to continue
keeping 3.5 million Palestinians under occupationis bad for Israel, and bad for
the Palestinians, and bad for the Israeli economy (Burston).

11

Despite the large Arab population growth, the Arab numbers were always
never more than 20% of the population in the State of Israel. This was due in
large part to massive Jewish immigration, including 1 million from the former
Soviet Union. That was something that no demographer could expect. Very few
forecasters saw the influx of one million Russian Jews even a few years before it
started to happen in the 1990s (Levine).
In 2005, Bennett Zimmerman, Dr. Roberta Seid, and Dr. Michael Wise
published The Million Person Gap: The Arab population in the West Bank and
Gaza. This paper turned on its head the conventional wisdom that Israel was
losing the demographic war with the Arabs and that the territories were an
albatross around Israels neck. Although none of the authors were professional
demographers, their results were well publicized and began a debate in policy
circles as to what should be Israels foreign policy in light of these new findings.
The paper basically explains that the number of Palestinians has been inflated
due to incorrect data from the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
They suggest that the real population of the West Bank and Gaza is only 2.49
million rather that the 3.83 million as suggested by the PCBS. This massive
discrepancy is due to several factors. Firstly, the PCBS only conducted its
census in 1997, after the Oslo accords and after the Israeli Central Bureau of
Statistics (ICBS) stopped their population monitoring. Since then, the PCBS has
only released predictions of what the population is each year without actually

12

counting. The main blatant mistake (whether willingly or unwillingly) 1 was that
they double counted Jerusalem Arabs. This resulted in 210,000 Jerusalem
Arabs who live within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem being counted both
in the Israeli census and the Palestinian census. The PCBS also counts, by its
own admission, Palestinians who have left the area completely. 13% of the
census or 325,000 Arabs were thereby included in the registry. Israel, on the
other hand, takes off people who have left the area after one year. Accounting
for these two anomalies brings the discrepancy between Palestinian and Israeli
counts for 1997 to only 113,000.
Subsequently, the PCBS took these numbers and predicted an annual growth
rate of 4.75% (the highest in the world) from 1997 to 2004. This rate was to stem
from high birth rates and increased immigration. Both the birth rates and the
immigration turned out to be lower than these predictions (Zimmerman Voodoo
65). The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Health (MOH) reported 308,000 fewer
births than the PCBS predicted (ibid). Also, the Palestinian Ministry of Education
records agree with this lower number when showing the number of children
1

The Palestinians receive foreign aid on a per capita basis so it is in their best interests to have
high numbers. Also it is part of a psychological war against the Jewish state which wishes to say
that the future is in our hands and it is only a matter of time until we outnumber you. As Yasser
Arafat said they [the Israelis] are concerned about our children and the Palestinian woman, who
bears yet another Palestinian every ten months[she] is a biological bomb threatening to blow
up Israel from within (Portugese 165). The great Arab weapon in the battle against Jewish Israel
is: babies. In an article in the newspaper Haaretz (March 10, 1978), leftist Natan Yelin-Mor wrote:
One of the Arab notables once told me, following news of the death of several young Arab
terrorists: If they would listen to me they would stop all military actions that cause only losses and
suffering. We have to sit quietly, to work, and to bring forth children. In this way we will become
the majority in the not-to-distant future. And then there will be no more Israel as we know it
(Kahane 1981: 99). Israeli Arab poet Owani Sawit has also written poetry stating Hey
murderers, Do you really think that you can murder my people? This is an impossible mission, If
you murder six, we shall bring to the world sixty on that same day (ibid). He is not be outdone by
great Israeli Arab poet Mahmood Darwish who wrote Write down, I am an Arab! Fifty thousand is
my number, Eight children, the ninth will come next summer. Angry? Write down, I am an Arab
(ibid)!

13

entering first grade. These figures cause a 276,000 person inflation in the PCBS
census.

The PCBS also predicted that a net 236,000 Palestinians would immigrate to
the territories from abroad when in reality according to Israeli Border police
records (the Israelis monitor Palestinian entries and exits through Ben Gurion
International Airport and the Egyptian and Jordanian border crossings) 74,000
Arabs left the territories (Zimmerman Voodoo 66). Also the Israeli Ministry of the
Interior reported that 105,000 Palestinians moved into Israel proper. These
Arabs ended up being double counted exactly as the Jerusalem Arabs were. All
these errors result in a discrepancy of 415,000 people. The authors thereby
come to the sum total of 1.34 million Arabs who in reality do not exist.
The authors of the Million Person Gap also discuss the Israeli Arab
population which for the years 1997 to 2003 had a growth rate of 3.3% versus
the Jewish rate of only 2.1% (Zimmerman Voodoo 68). This higher rate is what
caused the Israeli Arab population to increase from 10.5% of the regional total in
1967 to 14% of the total in 2004 despite massive Jewish immigration during
those years. The authors contend that the data could be manipulated by
putting non-Jewish Russian immigrants outside of the Jewish count, thus
removing some 300,000 people (if not more) (Cook Rabbis 2009).

14

The Million Person gap authors quote that the Jewish Israeli TFR (Total
Fertility Rate) has increased to 2.7 between 2000 and 2005 and is the highest
rate in the advanced industrialized world (Zimmerman Voodoo 69). Much of this
growth is due to the burgeoning Orthodox Jewish subgroup which makes up
about 20% of the Jewish population. The Arab birth rate on the other hand is
declining and went down to 4.0 in 2004 from 4.4 in 2000. But it is important to
note that the Muslim TFR has been on a plateau since 1985. Israel's Muslim
population had a TFR of over 10 during the 1960s, declining to slightly above 4.5
by the mid-1980s, and steady at that level throughout the subsequent fifteen
years (Pergola Brazil 12). The West Bank fertility rate has also fallen from 5.7 in
1999 to 5.0 in 2003 and the Gaza Strip fell from 6.6 to 5.7 as well (ibid 14). Also
Della Pergola notes regarding the Bedouin of the Negev The TFR of Bedouins,
an originally nomadic group now increasingly relocated to permanent settlements
especially in Israel's Southern District (the Negev desert), was cautiously
estimated at 10 to 12 by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. This is the highest
fertility currently on record worldwide according to Della Pergola. The incidence
of polygamy and Israeli National Insurance payments for each child born may
also influence this fertility rate. Although the Israeli Arab birthrate may have
indeed dropped due to higher living standards and better education, social
science professor Gerald S. Ferman noted regarding Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahus emphasis on the Israeli Arab demographic problem that
"Netanyahu's approach for a solution reflects the Western world's mentality and
culture, namely that an improved economy will lead to a lower birthrate... But this

15

does not take into account the importance of large families in the Arab-Moslem
culture... It is likely that the birthrate will drop somewhat, but it will take years during which time we might already lose the Jewish majority (Demographic
Problem-Arutz Sheva).

Zimmerman and his colleagues also speak about the potentially large
Orthodox Jewish population who could possibly immigrate to Israel and therefore
raise the Jewish population level as well as threatened Jewish communities in
Europe, especially France, who could conceivably come to Israel. Additionally,
the authors note, there are hundreds of thousands of Israelis residing overseas
whom could potentially be drawn back to Israel if the economy improves
(Zimmerman Voodoo 70). This, however, is debatable as currently Nefesh
bNefesh1 brings only a few hundred Jews over a year, out of all the millions of
Jews in the United States.

Zimmerman and colleagues then came up with a projection for 2025 based on
low growth, medium growth, and high growth scenarios for both Jewish and Arab
populations based on their revised data. Therefore, in Israel and the West Bank
if there was high Arab growth and high Jewish growth, the Jews would be 71% of
the total. If there was medium growth for both groups then Jews would be 63%

Nefesh BNefesh is a private organization that cooperates with the Jewish Agency in Israel to facilitate
Jewish immigration (aliyah) from North America and the United Kingdom.

16

of the total and if there was high Arab growth and low Jewish growth, the Jews
would remain 56% of the total (Zimmerman Population Forecast). (These figures
do not take into consideration the Gaza Strip at all, where the Israeli forces had
already withdrawn, its Jewish residents had already been expelled and no
foreseeable future under renewed Jewish rule was considered.)

Zimmerman and colleagues summarize by concluding The Arab

demographic time bomb is, in many crucial respects, a dud (Zimmerman
Voodoo 73). Later they seem to modify the dud statement a bit by saying Do
the Jews of Israel face a demographic threat? The answer is still a qualified yesbut the threat has been greatly exaggerated. As the real numbers make clear,
Arab population growth is not an overwhelming force that is destined, sooner or
later, to relegate the Jews to minority status (Zimmerman Voodoo 75). They
blame the Israeli establishment for accepting the Palestinian numbers and also
other Israeli demographers such as Arnon Soffer who they claim fully accepted
the PCBS claims. In addition, in Soffers Israel Demography 2004-2020; In Light
of the Process of Disengagement he also doubled the Jerusalem Arab
population, did not classify Russian gentiles as Jews and even included foreign
workers with the Arabs (Zimmerman Voodoo 74). Below in Figure 1.1 we see
the calculations that Zimmerman and colleagues reached to arrive at their
numbers.

17

18

Figure 5.5 shows the revised numbers of all the population groups according
to Zimmerman and colleagues.

The Demographic Question between Jews and Arabs according to Della

Pergola
Israeli demographer Sergio Della Pergola has been involved with Israeli and
worldwide demographic issues for years and is considered as one of the worlds
experts on the subject. He notes that at the end of 2005 the population of the
19

Land of Israel from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River is 10,320,700. Of this
total 51.5% are core Jews and 54.4% are enlarged Jews (Della Pergola Azure
17). What Della Pergola calls enlarged Jews are actually gentiles who qualify
under Israels Law of Return to immigrate1. While Zimmerman and colleagues do
not take into account legal foreign workers, let alone illegal ones, Della Pergola
does. So with the addition of another 250,000 legal non-Jewish foreign workers
in Israel these percentages change to 50.6% and 53.5% respectively (Della
Pergola Brazil 17). Della Pergola does not take into account illegal non-Jewish
foreign workers and refugees who have overstayed their visas or infiltrated the
Egyptian and Jordanian borders. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz estimates there
are 100,000 illegal foreign workers in Israel (Felter).

Della Pergola has also constructed a projection until 2050 where he projects
current trends. His projection, however, offers only low, medium, and high
growth rates for all populations together unlike Zimmerman which offers low,
medium, and high rates for both Arab and Jewish populations separately. Table

Israels definition of who qualifies to immigrate is based on the Nazi laws of who is a Jew.
Therefore anyone with even one single maternal or paternal grandparent qualifies for immigration
privileges even though under Jewish law, one is Jewish only if ones mother is Jewish or if one
converts according to Jewish Law (Halacha).

20

8 shows his projection:

21

Table 10 reflects the percentages that each group are expected to achieve.
This can be compared to Zimmermans projections and one can see Della
Pergolas lower Jewish percentages (albeit Della Pergola does include Gaza).
Della Pergola states that there seems to be a firm Jewish majority entrenched
into the mid 21st century but that an emerging Israeli Arab minority in the range
of 30% calls to mind international comparisons such as Cyprus or more recently,
Macedonia. In the former case, a 70-30% ethnoreligious Greek-Turkish balance
ended up with enhanced conflict and eventual territorial and political split; in the
latter case, the Macedonian-Albanian struggle is still in progress. (Della Pergola
Brazil 21)

22

Della Pergola noted in his response to the Million Man Gap paper several
issues regarding the evidence and conclusions of the paper. He notes that when
the authors advocate a greater understanding of demography and the specific
forces that drive it, it is unfortunately the very absence of such an understanding
that shows up in their own writings. This is because that although the authors are
academics, none of them is a demographer. He strongly questions why the
authors deemed the PMOH figures to be accurate while denying accuracy to the
other Palestinian institutions such as the PCBS.

He suggests that the authors preferred data that was consistent rather than to
proceed with a multiplicity of techniques aimed at reconstructing the frequency
of vital events, or else to proceed with some other independent field assessment
of the accuracy of vital-records reporting. (Della Pergola Azure 7). He noted that
the authors found correspondence between the number of births registered at the
PMOH and the number of school children registered at the Palestinian Ministry of
Education (PMOE). He claims the authors never entertained the notion that
many children may not have been enrolled, or dropped out. Della Pergola even
went so far as to say that the higher the agreement between the number of
births and the number of actual pupils, the more suspect is the birth data of
under-reporting (ibid).

Della Pergola also criticizes the authors for their check on the Palestinian
Election Registrar. The registrar had a lower number than the PCBS and the

23

authors therefore took it as accurate. They did not assume that there could be
low registration due to difficulty in getting to registration sites, old age, sickness,
low education, lack of awareness, and even apathy to political matters. He then
sums up by stating their efforts at validationby means of either school
enrollment statistics or voter registrationcannot be considered conclusive proof
of inflated population estimates.

Della Pergola goes on to discuss the issue of immigration (aliyah) to Israel.

He says that the Jewish majority was 82.1 percent in 1948; grew to 85.8 percent
in 1967; and dropped to 76 percent in 2005, excluding non-Jewish immigrants,
and 80.3 percent including non-Jewish immigrants under the Law of Return.
This decline in Israels Jewish majority occurred despite massive immigration
from the Former Soviet Union (FSU). He says that the reserve of Jews in the
former Soviet Union is likely spent and that 90% of world Jewry now lives in
relatively calm democratic regimes that have living standards that are higher than
Israels. This therefore makes it very unlikely that these Jews will immigrate to
Israel unless there is a major upheaval.* He dismisses Zimmerman and Seids
claims regarding aliyah from Orthodox Jews in the West and from France as
being minimal and not pointing to a conclusive new trend. Della Pergola
notes that in 2005 the net-migration balance was 16,300 which consisted mostly
of non-Jews. There were 7,200 Jewish immigrants (3,100 under the Law of
Return, and 4,100 returning Israelis); 7,400 non-Jewish immigrants related to
Jewish households (4,400 under the Law of Return, and 3,000 under family-

24

reunion provisions); and 1,700 Arab immigrants (mostly Muslims under familyreunion provisions) (ibid). He also notes regarding the 250,000 foreign workers
that they somehow affect the cultural makeup and character of Israeli society,
and thus they cannot be ignored altogether (ibid). Indeed, illegal entrants from
Sudan and Eritrea are behind a recent rise in violent crime in Tel Aviv including
anti-Semitic attacks and sexual assaults on women (Miskin).

Della Pergola also makes the point that although many Arabs have left to
Jordan and the Gulf countries, many, especially after the Gulf War when
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait, made their
way back to the West Bank. Also the ICBS counts as residents Jews who
actually reside overseas but who visit Israel at least once a year. Della Pergola
also makes light of the issue of Palestinians moving over the green line. While
Zimmerman and Seid relied on the records of the Israeli Population Registrar at
the Interior Ministry for these numbers Della Pergola states that there is an
ongoing disagreement between two official Israeli authorities, the ICBS and the
Population Registrar at the Interior Ministry. Clearly, it is the former that
establishes the more authoritative population estimates, while the latters are
notoriously plagued by hundreds of thousands of inaccuracies, due largely to late
or missed reporting of personal changes. (Della Pergola Azure 13). In addition it
does not really matter what side of the green line they are on because the entire
discussion is regarding the number of Jews and Arabs between the
Mediterranean and the Jordan.

25

A very important subject that Zimmerman and colleagues seemed to have

glossed over and that Della Pergola agreed with me 1 is the issue of age
composition of the two populations. Della Pergola states that Lack of attention to
this fundamental facet of demography is perhaps the most serious flaw in
Voodoo Demographics (Della Pergola Azure 14) Della Pergola also
interestingly points out that It is perhaps surprising to note that in 2000 the
number of Jews and Palestinians aged 15-24 was quite similar. Both
ethnoreligious groups can dispose of 800-900,000 young men and women of that
age (whether or not actively involved) (Della Pergola Brazil 23). One can see in
graph A-4 the massive percentage of young Arabs at the 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14 age
ranges which is double the Jewish percentage.

Source: (Arab Population in Israel CBS pamphlet)

Personal email communication from Sergio Della Pergola

26

This in turn influences the total number of births on each side and the Total
Fertility Rate. In 2005 there were 105,112 births and 35,043 deaths of Jews and
non-Jewish relatives in Israel which produced a net enlarged Jewish population
increase of 70,069 persons. There were also 38,801 births and 3,844 deaths of
Israeli Arabs that year which added 34,957 persons. This means that a total of
66.7% of all births were Jewish and 33.3% were Arab whereas their population is
currently 20% of the total.

Della Pergola goes on to explain that a similar

increase in the territories of 35,000 people would thereby equalize the Jewish
amount of increase. If the Palestinian population was indeed 2.4 million than this
increase would amount to 1.5% and 1% of the amount would be 3.5 million. But
their real rate of growth, he states, is around 3% which makes the total amount of
increase about 100,000. Therefore, it can easily be seen that a striking majority
of the annual overall population increase between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan comes from Arabs and/or Palestinians. (Della Pergola Azure 13).

Della Pergola notes that since the 1967 War, when the Palestinians came
under Israeli rule, their infant mortality rate has been lowered to European levels
due to access to advanced Israeli medical care. The TFR of Israeli Jews has
remained steady at about 2.6 to 2.7 children per woman. This is actually the
highest TFR rate in the industrialized world. The rate has not gone down since
the 1970s as in other industrialized nations, but Della Pergola disagrees with
Zimmerman et al that fertility has been steadily rising in the Jewish sector The
orthodox subgroup of the Jewish community plays a very large part in the high

27

TFR rate of Israeli Jews. A study of demographic differentials in Jerusalem

during the mid-1990s estimated the range of variation of Jewish TFRs between
6.5 in the more religious neighborhoods and 1.4 in the least religious. (Della
Pergola 2001).

The TFR of Christian Arabs has indeed declined to a level lower than the
Jewish one and the Druze TFR has also now declined to reach the Israeli Jewish
population. Della Pergolas states, however, when Zimmerman et al speak about
the lowered Muslim Arab Israeli fertility rate they are only half true. Although
Muslim Arab TFR rates have dropped from their record high of 10 in the 1960s
and have plateaued at about 4.5 since 1985 they are still high and higher than
most surrounding Arab countries. Since 2005, the rate has further declined to 4.0
and Della Pergola states that perhaps a convergence with the Jewish rate is at
hand.

The Palestinian TFR is again caught in some controversy. The TFR is a ratio
that is computed by having the births by age of the mother and the total number
of women at each age. The PMOH, whose data on birth records Zimmerman et
al accepted does not have the total number of women at each age. Only the
PCBS had those numbers and Zimmerman et al claimed those numbers were
way too high. Therefore if the original population was overestimated, while the
birth records were correct then the subsequent TFR would be too low. The
subsequent TFR that resulted from this data was 3.8 and everyone knew that to

28

be too low. Della Pergola writes that the most recent Palestinian TFR rates from
the PCBS ranges from between 5.8 and 6.6 in Gaza and between 4.1 and 5.1 in
the West Bank. According to Della Pergola, this data was obtained through
internal consistency checks of reported events, population size, and age
composition which thereby makes it more accurate (ibid 16.)

Emigration
I believe that it is also wise to mention the issue of Jewish emigration or
yerida from Israel. Emigration has always been a touchy subject in Israel due to
the fact that those who left the land were disparaged and looked down upon. 1 It
is also notoriously difficult to measure since most emigrants do not actually
declare their intention of doing so when they leave. The ICBS now uses the 1
year length of time to consider someone an emigrant and delete them from the
registrar. But if someone comes back for a visit within that year he is then put
back on so theoretically an emigrant can live overseas, visit Israel once a year
and be considered as if he lives there. In fact throughout the 1950s and 1960s
and up until the 1960s emigration records were kept but after that these records
were suspended (Lustick: 2004 2).

It is now estimated that there are between 450,000 and 900,000 Israelis living
abroad.** (The term yordim has now become politically incorrect with the term
( Israelis living outside the land now being used)) (Lustick:
1

The literal meaning of the word yerida means going down in contradistinction to aliyah
which means going up
**
They might become a political factor if the Knesset passes a law that will allow them to vote
using absentee ballots

29

2004 6). Former Minister of Knesset Avraham Burg sums up the feeling of many
high class and educated Israelis when he was interviewed and said
When you ask Israelis today whether their children will be
living here 25 years down the road you dont get an unequivocally
positive answer. You dont hear a booming yes. On the contrary:
Young people are being encouraged to study abroad. Their parents
are getting them European passports. Whoever can checks out
possibilities of working in Silicon Valley in California; whoever has
the wherewithal buys a house in London. So that slowly but surely,
a society is developing in Israel which isnt certain that the next
generation will live here. A whole society is living here that has no
faith in its future.
What is actually happening is that the leading Israeli class is
shrinking, because it is no longer ready to pay for the caprices of
the government. It is no longer willing to bear the burden of the
settlements and the burden of the transfer payments. But what
were getting in the meantime is not a revolt in the streets, its a
quiet revolt of people leaving, getting out. Its a revolt of taking the
laptop and the diskette and moving on. So if you look up and look
around, you will see that the only people who are staying here are
those who have no other option. The economically weak and the
fundamentalists are staying. Before our eyes Israel is becoming
ultra-Orthodox, nationalist and Arab. It is becoming a society that

30

has no sense of a future, no narrative and no forces to maintain

itself (Burg).

Knesset member Aryeh Eldad sees it differently. He sees it as a weeding out

of weaker elements rather than a brain drain. Those that were not
sufficiently attached to the Land of Israel are weeded out as the verse says
) ), - , , -

( And let the land not vomit you out for having defiled it, as it
vomited out the nation that preceded you) Leviticus (18:28). And those
that remain will leave their imprint on the land and guide it to its destiny
(Lustick: 2004 6). Below is a table of relevant emigration data. Source
(Lustick Recent Trends in Emigration from Israel: The Impact of Palestinian
Violence)

31

This can be contrasted with the following table of immigration data but one
must note that many of the immigrants subsequently became emigrants
themselves. As Lustick states that According to representatives of the Central
Bureau of Statistics testifying before the committee, 270,000 Israeli citizens had
emigrated between 1990 and 2001, including 68,000 of those who immigrated
from the former Soviet Union (Lustick: 2004 6).

Abortion

I will now close out this discussion by mentioning the issue of abortion in
Israel as part of the demographic struggle. Prime Minister David ben Gurion
himself said in 1964 that the increase of abortion which is felt even among the
Oriental communities and the constant decrease of the birthrate in families of
European origin endangers severely our future existence in the StateOnly by

32

increasing the birthrate are we capable to prevent Israel from becoming a second
Cyprus ( Portugese 82). The chief rabbis at the time, Rabbi Isser Yehuda
Unterman and Rabbi Yitzchak Nissim agreed when Rabbi Nissim stated The
encouragement of the Jewish birthrate has a particular significance in this period
following the brutal HolocaustOur strength and future existence can only be
guaranteed by increasing the dimensions of the Jewish people and Rabbi
Unterman stated we must interest ourselves more in increasing our population
(ibid). Abortion was completely outlawed in Israel until 1977. It was illegal to
undergo the procedure or to carry out the procedure. The punishment was a 14
year sentence to the person doing the procedure and a 5 year sentence to the
patient (Katz 49). Illegal abortion became widespread and was used as a
default fertility control method due to the lack of an overall family planning
system. Approximately one third of Jewish Israeli women had undergone at
least one induced abortion by the early 1970s (Peled 1979: 8). At a rate of 50 per
1000 women aged 15-44, induced abortions reached a staggering high of 2030,000 per year in 1977 (Katz 50).

In 1977 a Labor party sponsored bill legalized abortion but stipulated that the
women requesting the abortion would need to appear before a special hospital
committee consisting of a gynecologist, a general practitioner, and either a social
worker or a nurse. In 1983 the Likud introduced the Plan to Prevent Abortions. It
was initiated by the Demographic Center and demographic reasons were openly
given for the decision to support it. This plan called for several recommendations

33

to reduce the number of abortions. It called for a reduction in the number of

abortions outside recognized medical establishments and for material and
psychological assistance to women considering abortions. The women were
also to be counseled regarding the dangers of abortion, both physical and
mental, and the option of adoption (Portugese 1998: 140). As a result, the
abortion rate decreased to 14.9 per 1000 women by 1990, a figure comparable to
other developed countries (Remennick 1996: 29). In 1999, 19,674 applications
out of 20,581 were approved (96%) and 18,785 pregnancies were terminated. In
addition, 16,000 abortions were illegally performed in private doctors' clinics. In
general, about 40,000 abortions are carried out in Israel every year (Jewish
Virtual Library).

We can therefore see that there have been hundreds of thousands of

abortions in Israel since the founding of the state. One organization, Efrat, which
helps women considering abortion due to financial difficulties, estimates that it
has saved approximately 34,000 children in its 30 year existence (Efrat website).
One can therefore see how important this issue is in the demographic battle in
Israel precisely because the overwhelming majority of those having abortions are
Jewish women as the following table shows.
2003- 1990 , :2 '

2003

1990

2003

1990

2003

1990

2003

1990

18.2

19.6

5.5

6.1

12.3

19.3

12.0

17.3

"

34

9.2

2.3

2.0

0.9

11.9

12.0

10.7

9.5

19

25.3

21.6

5.6

4.6

15.5

22.6

15.1

19.1

20-24

28.1

28.6

8.2

8.0

15.6

24.2

15.5

21.4

25-29

25.4

28.1

8.2

12.0

17.0

24.0

16.4

22.5

30-34

22.5

24.1

7.7

9.9

15.4

21.5

14.8

20.4

35-39

11.1
..

12.5

4.5
(0.4

8.4

8.0
0.9

12.6

7.7
0.8

12.2

40-44
45

* Source: CBS of Israel; Patterns of Fertility in Israel in 2004

The highest percentage of women having abortions was the non-categorized

which is mainly Russian gentile immigrants. Here the number is 24.1 per 1,000.
The second highest is Christian Arab with 18.2 followed by the Jewish rate of
12.3, the Druze rate of 6 and the Muslim Arab rate of 5.5 (Central Bureau of
Statistics).

Summary of Findings

I will now sum up the various differences between Zimmerman et al and Della
Pergola in order to clarify and get to the bottom of what is in reality not such a
large disagreement. At the end of 2005 there were 5,313,800 core Jews residing
within the State of Israel according to the ICBS. This represented a total of 76%
of the total population of the state and includes East Jerusalem, the Golan
Heights and the Jews of the West Bank and Gaza. There were also 298,800
non-Jewish members of Jewish households (non-core Jews) which constituted
another 4.3 percent of Israels population. Therefore, the enlarged (core and noncore) Jewish population of 5,613,600 represented 80.3 percent of Israels

35

population. 1.377 million Israeli Muslims, Christians, Druze, and others

constituted 19.7 percent of the total.

5,073,800 of the enlarged Jewish

population were within the pre-1967 borders, including East Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights, where they formed 75.2 percent of the total legally permanent
population. This comes out to about 240,000 Jews living in the West Bank where
they made up over 10 percent of the total population. 1

The Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza was revised
downward by the PCBS (Della Pergola Azure 17) by about 200,000 to account
for expected immigration that did not materialize. This left the PCBS estimate at
3,888,292.

Della Pergolas teams estimate after allocating 240,000 East

Jerusalem Arabs to the Israeli side, taking into account an estimated negativemigration balance of 100,000 Palestinians and the related natural increase, and
re-examining population bases and growth rates through the 1990s, among other
corrections, was 3.33 million at the end of 2005. This can be contrasted with
Zimmerman et al who came out with an estimate of 2.49 million. Therefore, at
the end of 2005 the total legal population resident in Israel and the territories
according to Della Pergola is 10,320,700. Core Jews comprised 51.5 percent,
and enlarged Jews 54.4 percent of the total. With the addition of an additional
180,000 non-Jewish foreign workers residing in Israel, core and enlarged Jews
represented, respectively, 50.6 percent and 53.5 percent of a total population
resident in Israel and the territories.
1

The Jews who were expelled from their homes in Gaza and the four northern Samarian towns
largely now reside within the pre-1967 borders but others have become residents in other towns
in Judea and Samaria, although their population was only about 12,000.

36

What effect then would a million person gap in the Palestinian population
mean in the long run? While one can calculate the Jewish population as only the
core Jewish population or also with the non-core Jewish population or include
non-Jewish foreign workers as well, according to Della Pergola the narrow
Jewish majority is reduced until it is lost by 2020 according to all scenarios.
This is due to the overwhelmingly young age of the Palestinian population,
something that I pointed out to him myself and in which agreed. 1 This is the main
reason for the inevitable overtaking of the Jewish population by the Arab
population. The addition or subtraction of 1 million Palestinians, therefore, only
accounts for a change in population percentages of 5 to 6 percent. So while
Israel left Gaza, he points out, this only delayed the inevitable by about 10 years.
In demographic terms, then, leaving Gaza has provided Israel with, at best,
twenty years of oxygen (ibid 19).
And as we close our discussion on Arab and Jewish demographics in Israel
we need to ask: What are the implications and what does it all mean in the end.
What does it matter if the Jews are 40%, 50%, or 60% of the population? I am
forced to quote Della Pergola here because he states the concept so succinctly.
For clearly, the fundamental issue in this debate is not the specific percentage
point of the extant Jewish majority, or the specific date at which Jews will or will
not lose their current majority over the entire territory between the Mediterranean
Sea and the Jordan River (or even within the Green Line). Neither a difference of
1

Personal email communication with Sergio Della Pergola

37

or 5 percent, nor advancing or deferring the date of the demographic tie by one
or five years, is the main issue at stake (ibid 20). The question that both Della
Pergola and Zimmerman, Seid, and Wise need to ask themselves is: What kind
of state will there be there? Will it be a Jewish state, the only one in the world, or
will it be a bi-national state that eventually crumbles and is plagued by eternal
ethnic tensions as both sides seek to assert power. Will it be another Northern
Ireland, Cyprus, Rwanda, etc.? Or will it become a state where the minority
retains power and the majority population is powerless as the situation was in
South Africa and is today in many Gulf States. Also, even before the Arabs will
be the majority one can expect from them a struggle not only for civil rights but
for the changing of Israel from a Jewish state into a bi-national one or the more
innocuous state of its citizens.

Israeli Arabs

There is ample evidence of Israeli Arab opposition to Israel as a Jewish state

and there has been for years. There can also be seen a radicalization in the
words and deeds from Israeli Arabs and Israeli Arab Knesset members that only
seems to become more extreme as time passes. From 1948 until 1966 the
Israeli Arabs lived under military rule and severe restrictions. In 1967 after the
Six Day War they came into contact with their brothers on the other side of the
Green Line and became more politicized. In 1975 the Committee for the
Defense of the Land was established to help prevent land expropriations by the

38

Israeli government. In 1976 six Arabs were killed in expropriation protests and
the date March 30 is commemorated each year as Land Day. In 2000, with the
beginning of the Second Intifada, thirteen Israeli Arabs were killed in clashes with
soldiers in the Galilee. The Israeli Arab radicalization and extremism came to the
fore especially after the beginning of the Second Intifada as Israeli Shin Bet
director Yuval Diskin reported to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert Israeli Arabs are
identifying more and more with terrorist organizations backed by Iran," and now
pose a "strategic danger" to the Jewish state (Israel Insider).

Leading the way for the Israeli Arabs in their hatred for Israel are their elected
officials in the Knesset, Israels parliament. Arabs currently hold 12 seats in the
120 seat body. In 2008 several Arab Knesset members, Jamal Zahalka and
Wassal Taha honored the late head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) terrorist group George Habash in the town of Lod where
Israels airport is located. It is also the place where the PFLP conducted their
biggest terror attack in 1972 when they gunned down 27 people (Klein). In 2001
the group also assassinated Israels tourism minister Rehavam Zeevi.

During the war with Lebanon in 2006 Knesset Member Azmi Bishara
supported Hezbollah. "The Hezbollah has won, and for the first time since 1967
we have tasted the sweet taste of victory. The Hezbollah should be proud of their
achievement and of humiliating Israel", stated MK Azmi Bishara while speaking
before 500 at a victory convention in Umm al-Fahm [an Arab village within pre-

39

1967 Israel, all of whose residents are Israeli citizens]. Bishara also has a long
history of anti-Israeli activities including visits to Syria to encourage the war
against Israel and statements in Lebanon that the Jews should leave Israel. He
has currently fled Israel and gone into hiding to avoid prosecution for treason and
espionage (Rosenblit). Some other headlines from the Rosenblit website section
entitled In Their Own Words: The Arab Members of Israels Knesset
(Parliament) Speak: Arab MK Ahmed Tibi believes that Israels Jewish Symbols
and Ceremonies should be Abolished. Arab MK Azmi Bishara Supports
Palestinian Jailed for Israeli Embassy Explosion. Arab MK Taleb a-Sanaa
wants the Knesset to honor Arabs who were killed while attempting to murder
and maim Jews. Arab MK Taleb a-Sanaa condemns proposal for nationwide
campaign to display the Israeli flag as "infuriating" and too "controversial". MK
Mohammed Barakei exhorts "Israeli" Arabs to join the new Intifada. Arab MK
Tawfik Khatib justifies the murder of Arabs who are alleged to have assisted
Israel in fighting against terrorism. New Minister Tarif Cited for Anti-Israel
Remarks. Minister Tarif also sent good wishes to Hamas terrorist chief Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin, and blessed his interviewers (PA Television) that they should
"reach Jerusalem, with the help of Allah". Arab MK Dahamshe disrupts Knesset
committee meeting to protest statement that Temple Mount is holy to Jews.
Arab MK Issam Makhoul compares Israel to Nazi Germany. He also gave a full
Nazi salute inside the Knesset. Arab MK Abdel Malek Dahamshe took an
original stance on last night's Israeli attack of the Syrian [radar] installation [inside
Lebanon in retaliation for the increasing Syria-backed, Lebanon-based Hezbollah

40

attacks against Israel]. He sent a fax this morning to Syrian President Bashar
Assad condemning the Israeli attack and expressing sorrow over the deaths of
the three Syrian soldiers. "I would like to express my condolences over the
Government of Israel's criminal attack, which is a declaration of war not only on
the Palestinians but also on the Syrians," wrote MK Dahamshe. Arab MK
Ahmed Tibi accuses "fascist" IDF Chief of Staff of "murder". Arab MK Talab aSana rebukes Mauritania for its foreign minister's visit to Israel and demands that
it be punished by the Arab League. Arab MK Azmi Bishara, speaking in Syria
before a coalition of Israel's adversaries, calls upon Arab countries to unite in
jihad against Israel. Arab MKs Accuse Israel of Racism for Not Permitting them
Access to Israels Intelligence Secrets after they align themselves with Israels
Enemies. Knesset Member Ahmed Tibi brought Arab violence to the Knesset
yesterday when he slugged an Israeli citizen during a committee session. The
civilian, Yehuda Levinger, security officer of Jerusalem's Ramat Shlomo
neighborhood, filed a complaint with the police. A criminal investigation will
apparently be opened against Arab MK Muhammed Kenaan for punching and
cursing a policeman this morning. Arab MKs Ahmed Tibi and Abdulmalik
Dehamshe incited Arabs to riot on the Temple Mount on Tisha B'Av. Arab MK
Taleb a-Sanaa publicly praises terror assault in Tel Aviv as being "an attack of
special quality"; and Arab MK Azmi Bishara says that he "agrees with every
word". Thousands took part in the funeral this afternoon of arch-terrorist Abu Ali
Mustafa in Ramallah today; he was killed yesterday by a precisely-aimed missile
fired by Israeli forces. Among the mourners was Arab MK Ahmed Tibi, who said

41

that many of those leading the Palestinian violence against Israel are his
personal friends. Arab MK Azmi Bishara feels that Israel, the country in whose
legislature he is a member, is an "enemy." He said this in Durban, South Africa
[during the United Nations' World Conference against Racism], in a phone
interview with a Palestinian newspaper. Arab MK Dehamshe: I'm willing to be
an Islamic martyr. Arab MK Hashem Mahameed explains motivation of Israeli
Suicide Bomber. Arab MKs refuse to condemn Palestinian joy over U.S.
attacks. Arab MK Muhammad Kanaan expresses support for Osama Bin
Laden. Soldier says MK Barakei spit at him. MKs from across the political
spectrum have expressed outrage at a draft bill from [the mostly Arab] Hadash
[party] that says Palestinians attacking IDF soldiers should not be considered
terrorists.

Gideon Ezra, minister for internal security at the time, said, "Since
September 2000 we have seen a significant connection, in terrorist attacks,
between Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli Arabs." In 1999, Israeli
Arabs perpetrated two attacks. In 2000, there were eight; in 2001 it rose to 30;
and in 2002 the number jumped dramatically to 77. In 2004, Avi Dichter, the
director of Israel's General Security Services (GSS) told the Israeli cabinet that
the Arab population in East Jerusalem "represents today the largest reservoir for
terror attacks within the Green Line." He noted that terror attacks perpetrated by
East Jerusalem Arabs stemmed from the same ideological roots as terror attacks
by Palestinians from the territories (Seener). As we saw recently in the Merkaz

42

Harav Yeshiva massacre, as well as the Jerusalem bulldozer attack, the

perpetrators were Israeli Arabs from Jerusalem with full access to the area. As
Seener concludes As such, the state of Israel will likely face many challenges in
its attempts to balance the civil rights of its Arab citizens while simultaneously
preventing security breaches from this sector of society that grows more
dangerous with each passing year.

There are therefore several options that Israel can choose to proceed with at
the present time considering all the aforementioned data. Israel can give up the
West Bank and let a Palestinian state be created there with all the dangers that
that implies. The Jews living there could be expelled or left to fend for
themselves. Alternately, Israel could annex the three largest settlement blocs of
Maale Adumim, Ariel, and Gush Etzion and give Wadi Ara, (known as the
Triangle a large bloc of Arab villages which abuts northern Samaria) which
includes the large Israeli Islamic fundamentalist town of Umm al Fahm, to the
nascent Palestinian state in exchange. This is what Israeli foreign minister
Avigdor Lieberman calls the Lieberman plan (Walt). There is also the Elon Plan
put forth by former Member of Knesset Binyamin Elon which calls for annexing
the West Bank and having the Arab residents there become Jordanian citizens
(Israel Initiative website). Israel could also annex all the territory, grant the Arabs
there Israeli citizenship and all would live together in a one-state solution which
would rapidly be an Arab state. This was what the PLO advocated for years as a
secular, democratic Palestinian state and what Libyan leader Muammar

43

Qaddafi has recently called Israteen (Qaddafi). Alternately Israel could annex
the West Bank and only the Arabs would be expelled and the Jews would be
allowed to stay. This plan was advocated by Rehavam Zeevi and his Moledet
party who advocated a voluntary transfer and Rabbi Meir Kahane and his Kach
party who advocated even a forced transfer if need be.

While all these scenarios are possible, some are more likely than others to
occur. Also, some of these solutions may take longer than others to implement.
One of these solutions may be tried and then another one adopted or a
combination of the solutions may be adopted. The Middle East is a very volatile
region and therefore predicting events there is tricky, to say the least.
Nevertheless, regardless of whatever scenario does unfold, another
demographic change is occurring. This one relates to the Jewish people only
and concerns the religious/secular divide.

Demographic Question between Religious and Secular Jews

Israeli Jewish society today is made up of hardcore anti-religious Jews and

ultra-orthodox Jews and a range of levels of observance between these two
poles. As per the Israeli Foreign Ministry website 20 percent of Israeli Jews
fulfill all religious precepts, 60 percent follow some combination of the laws
according to personal choices and ethnic traditions, and 20 percent are

44

essentially non-observant. The following pie chart illustrates the various groups
from a study done in 2002 by the Israeli Democracy Institute.

Source: Guttman Center of the Israeli Democracy Institute, 2002.

What we see here is that half of the population is Non-religious and Anti
religious and the other half is Traditional, Religious, and Ultraorthodox. I find it
curious that the Institute decided to categorize Non-religious and Anti-religious
into two distinct categories. The Anti-religious grouping would presumably
consist of the now defunct Shinui party led by the late Tommy Lapid which ran for
the Knesset on the one issue of being against the ultraorthodox. It would also
include hardcore communists and old time Labor Zionists with ideological issues
and others of that ilk. The non-religious are the majority of Israels Jews but who
paradoxically self-identify themselves as somewhat observant as the Guttman
scale graph shown below shows. The traditional group consists mostly of
Sephardic or Oriental Jewry whom although not totally observant, do indeed

45

observe many of the precepts. The religious group is what is known in Israel as
the National Religious or kippa seruga (knitted kippa) group who generally work,
serve in the army, dress in modern clothes, and are generally supportive of
Zionism.1

The ultra orthodox or Haredim consist of the traditionally non-Zionist or anti

Zionist observant Jews who dress in 19th century European garb and generally
eschew serving in the army. There are roughly three subgroups including the
Lithuanian or yeshiva Haredim, Hasidic Haredim, and Sephardi or Oriental Jews
who identify with the Haredim.

Source: Guttman Center of the Israeli Democracy Institute, 2002

When we look at the makeup of the population, however, things change

dramatically. The haredi population is much younger than the general Jewish
population. The average age is younger, the birthrate is much higher, even
1

this group contains a variety of sub-groups and is not a homogenous block.

46

higher than the Arab rate, the average age of marriage is younger, and average
number of children is much higher. The statistics would fit well in any country in
sub-Saharan Africa. Yet here these choices are made willingly as part of a
lifestyle and part of a religion and ideology. The following graph shows well the
differences in age between the haredim and general Jewish population with the
haredim in dark purple and the general Jewish population in light purple.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004

47

The second table shows the average age of the haredi population in dark purple
on the left and general Jewish population on the right in light purple. The
intermediate columns marked (bet) and (gimmel) show outlying haredi areas.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004

The third table shows the fertility rate of three groups of women divided by age;
the haredim at the top, Muslims in the middle and general Jewish rate at the
bottom.

48

A study by the Washington-based American-Israel Demographic Research

Group called Forecast for Israel 2025" said that by 2025, Israel's ultra-Orthodox
Jewish sector would grow from 16 percent to 23 percent of the nation's
population. The ultra-Orthodox were expected to increase to 29 percent of the
Jewish sector (World Tribune). Additionally a study by Gilad Malach, a
researcher at the Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist
Thought, finds that if the annual rate of natural increase among Haredim stays at
5 percent, by 2050 they will comprise 37 percent of Israeli Jews (Ilan).

49

The statistics on the ultra-orthodox were basically from two sources; voting
patterns and self-identification (Gurovich 4). 1 The statistics on the national
religious sector are harder to come by due to the fact that this population is much
more diverse and porous. The high birthrate, coupled with high retention rates
and numerous baalei tshuva, (returners to religion) will cause the ultra-orthodox
to continue to grow. They, together, with the national religious camp will seem to
be, according to the statistics, the largest growing force today in Israel. It is then
conceivable that at some point in the future, this block may become the majority
in Israel and vote in a religious regime.
The Ultraorthodox
Who then, are we actually referring to when we speak of ultra-orthodox and
national religious Jews? Where do they come from, what do they think, and what
will they do? These questions are rarely if at all addressed in any forums. The
word haredi comes from the verse in the book of Isaiah (66:5) ,'- ,
-
,( Hear the word of the L-rd you who tremble at his word). Haredim
see themselves as not a separate sect called haredim or a subgroup in a new
homeland for Hebrews but very simply the true Jews (Heilman 13)

The Ashkenazic ultra-orthodox coalition of Agudat Yisrael and Degel Hatorah (United Torah
Judaism) receives its votes almost exclusively from ultra-orthodox Jews. The Sephardic ultraorthodox party Shas, however, also receives votes from traditional Sephardi voters which enabled
it to garner 17 seats at one point and make it the third largest party in the country. UTJ has never
had more than 5 seats. This does not mean, however, that haredim do not vote for other parties
as well, as I will explain later.

50

Approximately 250 years ago all Jews in the world were what we today call
ultra-orthodox or haredi or at least nominally so. There were no Reform or
Conservative movements to require observant Jews to have an orthodox label.
2

Those movements sprang up as a reaction to the Enlightenment when Jews

thought they needed to modernize and reform Judaism in order to be able to

fit into European society. In some places more than others, but everywhere to
some degree, the ramparts of tradition which enclosed them in ghettos and a
world ruled by the eternal yesterday of Judaism began to collapse (ibid. 14).
Others followed the dictum of be a Jew at home and a man in the street. But
for many who followed this path, the street took over. The ultra-orthodox
movement today is essentially a backlash against these reform and
assimilationist movements. This backlash led to a virtual freezing of the Torah as
Rabbi Moses Sofer (1762-1839), known as the Chatam Sofer said
( the new is prohibited by the Torah). This meant clothing styles, customs,
and general habits would be conserved as they now stood and no innovations
would be tolerated in anything, lest it lead to a breach in the walls that ultraorthodoxy built around it in order to shield it from the rapidly changing (and in
their view rapidly decaying) outside world.

While the use of the term Orthodox in connection with Jews has been traced back to 1795,
perhaps the first major reference was in 1807 by Abraham Furtado, president of the Paris
Sanhedrin called to endow certain basic laws of the state with the authority of Jewish law. The socalled Orthodox Jews resisted the effort because it seemed to them to subordinate Jewish law, or
Halacha, to state law (Heilman 367).

51

Therefore when the secular political Zionist movement began it was mostly
met with disdain from orthodox Jews and their leaders. Secular Zionism
advocated the return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel and the
establishment of a Jewish state there. The Jews would become a nation like all
other nations and a new Jew would be born. The Jewish religion and the Torah
would be dumped and nationalism and Zionism would take there place. This was
of course anathema to orthodox Jewry.

The main religious argument against Zionism was based on the Three Oaths in
the Ketubot tractate of the Babylonian Talmud on folio 111a.
'

.
"What are these Three Oaths? One, that Israel should not (literally go over)storm
the wall [Rashi (French biblical commentator (1040-1105) interprets: forcefully].
Two, the Holy One made Israel take an oath not to rebel against the nations of
the world. Three, the Holy One made the nations vow that they would not
oppress Israel too much"."
The rebuilding of the Jewish national home was therefore seen as violating
these oaths. Other arguments included the problem of banding together with
atheists and sinners in rebuilding the land and the political problems that Jews
remaining in the exile would face. The latter was what the neo-orthodox Jews of
Germany and the Reform Jews both agreed upon with their opposition to
Zionism. But while those arguments have mostly faded over time, especially with
the eventual establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the argument of the

52

Three Oaths has remained and even generated spirited debate as recently as
the last couple of years. The Satmar rebbe, Yoel Teitelbaum (1887-1979), the
principal ultra-orthodox opponent to Zionism in this century penned an entire
book on the subject entitled ( Vayoel Moshe) where he blames
Zionism for the Holocaust (section 110), says it is forbidden to accept any
funding from the State of Israel, that it is forbidden to speak Hebrew, and that
one should be killed rather than vote in Israeli elections.

The Satmar approach to Zionism is followed by the ( Eida

Hachareidit), the ultra-orthodox rabbinate in Jerusalem formed in 1919 which
shortly preceded the establishment of the Chief Rabbinate of the British Mandate
of Palestine. These Jews will not vote in elections in Israel, take any funding
from the state and will definitely not serve in the armed forces. The Neturei
Karta, a splinter group which advocates the dismantling of Israel and openly
supports her enemies including Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah, also subscribes to
this ideology.

Most ultra-orthodox Jews however, do not subscribe to this ideology and have
come to recognize the State of Israel especially after 1948, albeit on a de facto
and not de jure basis. They have come to an agreement with the state called the
status quo which the first Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion agreed to in

53

order for the ultra-orthodox to back statehood. This meant that the Chief
Rabbinate would have control of personal status issues such as marriages,
burials, and conversions. Saturday would be the Sabbath day and there would
be no public transportation on that day, food served in public institutions would
be kosher, there would be separate educational institutions for religious and nonreligious and yeshiva students would be exempted from the army. These ultraorthodox Jews therefore send their children to separate independent religious
schools called ()

(Chinuch Atzmai) which do receive state funds but.

These Jews vote and presently have two ultra-orthodox parties in the Knesset:
The Ashkenazic Agudat Israel and the Sephardic Shas party.

The Agudat Israel movement came into being in 1912 in Kattowitz, Poland. It
was the umbrella organization for all Orthodox Jews in Europe and was a
reaction against the forces of assimilation, reform, and secular Zionism that were
raging at the time. It was the first international political movement among
Orthodox Jews and the largest political movement among the Jews of Poland
(Rabinowicz xviii). The Aguda was even elected to and sent representatives to
the Polish parliament. The Aguda and Shas are mostly parochial parties
interested in gaining funding for their intuitions and issues affecting their
constituencies specifically. This is similar to the role that Agudat Israel played in
Poland. This is because these parties do not accept the State of Israel in a
theological sense and therefore have no position on such central issues as giving

54

away land and foreign policy issues. They can therefore be plied either to the left
or to the right and that has been the pattern ever since the Aguda were members
of the first Knesset in 1948 and since Shas entered the Knesset in 1984 as a
breakaway party from the Aguda.1 There has been a trend for the ultra-orthodox
parties to back right wing nationalist governments since Menachem Began and
the Likud came to power in 1977. But Shas bucked the trend in 1993 by
supporting the Oslo accords and the leftist Rabin government.
The National Religious
The other major sector of religious Jewry in Israel is known as the Religious
Zionists or National Orthodox. The forerunners of what today would be
considered religious Zionism would be rabbis like Zvi Hirsch Kalisher (17951874) and the Sephardi rabbi Yehuda Alkalai (1798-1878) from Serbia who
began to advocate for the return of Jews to their homeland both in their writings
and speeches. Jews who agreed with this idea formed the Mizrachi movement in
Vilnius, Lithuania in 1902. The motto of the organization was the Land of Israel
for the people of Israel according to the Torah of Israel (Mizrachi website). The
Mizrachi also had representatives in the Polish parliament as did the Aguda and
later in Israel it morphed into the Mafdal (National Religious Party). The
Mizrachi was originally a pragmatic group which believed that the lot of the
Jewish people would be improved by returning to Israel. They tried to separate
the practical needs of resettling the Jews from the messianic expectations of the
Time to Come (Ravitzky 1996: 86). The founder of the movement Rabbi Yitzchak
1

Shas felt that Sephardi interests were not being represented sufficiently by the Aguda.

55

Yaakov Reines (1839-1915) at one point even approved of the Uganda plan
since it would alleviate Jewish suffering.

Only later under Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Kook (1865-1935), the first Chief
Rabbi of the British Mandate of Palestine, did the movement become infused
with messianism. Under him the redemptionist position was fully articulated, in a
manner laden with historiosophic and mystical overtones (ibid 86). The
messianism within the religious Zionist movement greatly increased and was
sharpened under the son of Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Kook, Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda
(1891-1981), and exploded after the Six Day War when Judea, Samaria, Gaza,
the Golan, and Sinai were returned to Jewish rule after 2,000 years. 1

Rabbi Kook and his son held that the Zionist undertaking did not stem from a
merely human initiative or breakthrough, from nationalistic arrogance or self
assertion. Rather, it sprang from a divine thrust toward redemption, a compelling
higher call to which the people of Israel responded with historic fidelity (Ravitzky
1996: 79). The Kooks held the exactly opposite view of the majority of the haredi
rabbis and were diametrically opposed to the anti-Zionist view that Zionism was
the work of the devil. The Kooks viewed the secular Jews as unwittingly being
the builders of the Third Commonwealth, the State of Israel, and that they would
1

The week before, Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda, at an Israeli Independence day celebration lamented the
fact that the holy places of Jerusalem, Hebron and Shechem were still not under Jewish rule. A
week later they were.

56

eventually return to being observant. Kook sought and believed the return to the
Land would bring about not only a return to faith but a thoroughgoing
renaissance-political, cultural, legal and spiritual. He wrote when nationalism
alone-in the absence of spiritual or moral depth takes root among the people, it is
likely to debase and dehumanize their spirit as to elevate it (ibid 89).

They viewed this era as the beginning of the redemption . The

era that the Jews now lived in had changed from that of exile to that of the
beginning of the redemption and subsequently an entire paradigm shift and
change in worldview had occurred. The 2,000 years of exile were over and a
Jewish state had arisen with all the halachic ramifications that that implied. As
Ravitzky wrote we may say that in this concept religious faith sanctifies the
sociopolitical structure, transferring it to the realm of the absolute and thereby
bestowing upon it a transcendent validity (ibid 83). Again this contrasts strongly
with the Haredim who deny that any change has taken place and continue to try
to live as much as possible as they did in 18th century Eastern Europe while living
in 21st century Israel.

Therefore, if this era was indeed the beginning of the Messianic era, then
preparations would need to be made in order to usher in the final redemption.
Whereas in the exile these were primarily prayers and supplications, in Israel

57

these were transformed into concrete actions; namely the settling of the land.
Under Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda, the organization Gush Emunim (literally bloc of the
faithful) was established in order to settle all the liberated areas of 1967. The
rabbi sent out many of his student and settlements, some with government
approval, others without, began to sprout up all over Judea, Samaria, Gaza, the
Golan and Sinai. Many were retroactively recognized by Israeli governments,
both Labor and Likud, albeit those governments also set up their own
settlements. Most poignantly, the Gush Emunim settlers managed to return to
the City of the Forefathers, Hebron, from which the Jews had been massacred
and exiled from in 1929. Attempts to settle Shechem, the site of the Biblical tomb
of Joseph, however, were unsuccessful.
I have now discussed the two main blocks of religious Jews in Israel. If these
two groups do become the majority and vote in a religious regime in the Knesset,
the leadership will most certainly be from the latter, religious Zionist group due to
the fact that the ultra-orthodox by virtue of their ideology, are not interested in
actually ruling the state as was discussed above. I would now like to begin to
discuss more practically who these leaders will be and what actions and/or
policies they are likely to take.
The Jewish Fundamentalists
The contemporary Jerusalem Rabbi David bar Hayim, has stated that in
his opinion there are only two kinds of Jews today (Bar Hayim lecture). Despite
the differences between Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Yemenites, and Ethiopian

58

Jews and despite the differences between religious and secular, urban and rural,
rich and poor he feels Jews can be differentiated into two main camps today.
One camp, the large camp, consists of about 90% of world Jewry. He throws
into this camp all those Jews who are basically happy and content within their
form of Jewish existence today, be it a Hasid from Meah Shearim or a reform
Jew from Atlanta. Even most members of the religious Zionist public as Liebman
writes did not want to or did not believe it possible to change the status quo It
was to retain the slogan of a Torah state, continue to pay lip service to the
compatibility of a democratic state and the Jewish traditions, and make no
concerted effort to do anything about it (Liebman 53). The other small group,
however, is not satisfied and yearns for something more. This could cause a
Jew living outside the Land to make aliyah or to become observant. In our case
it also pushes Jews to the next level, towards a more authentic form of Jewish
existence. These Jews today are a minority within the religious world but
uniquely blend elements of the religious Zionist camp with haredi elements. This
group crosses party lines, social origin, economic strata, education and ethnicity.
I believe that leadership will eventually come from these smaller, more
passionate circles. As Sprinzak writes The radical right is shown to consist of a
relatively small number of true believers whose intense dedication to their cause,
penetration of all echelons of Israels power structure, and strategic location in
the occupied territories make their influence in national politics much greater than
their sheer numbers (Sprinzak 1991: 6).

59

What Sprinzak calls the radical right, others call the extreme right, and
others call Jewish fundamentalists. As he so eloquently writes the radical right
should not be seen as an isolated extremist faction that stands in diametrical
opposition to both Israeli democracy and the moderate right, but rather as a very
influential school that has been pushing the entire Israeli right toward greater
ultra nationalism, greater militarism, greater ethnocentrism, and greater
religiosity (Ibid 14).

While the haredim yearn for and venerate the Eastern European mode of
exilic Judaism as evidenced by the names they give their children and the style
of clothing they choose to wear, this group looks toward its biblical forefathers as
models and strives to rid Judaism of all foreign, gentile influences that have been
picked up in the exile and to return to a pre-exilic Land of Israel form of Judaism.
As Spiro notes From its (the Torahs) perspective, modern democracy is not the
be-all and end-all. While representing a significant stage in the historical
process, modern democracy is not the ultimate state for humanity (Spiro 273).
The religious right wishes to reach that stage.

This movement can be said as loosely having formed after the Six Day War
against any retreat from the liberated lands. The main and most well know figure
in these circles was Rabbi Meir Kahane (1932-1990). Kahane arrived in Israel in

60

1971 from New York after having established the Jewish Defense League (JDL).
It originally began as an anti-crime patrol to protect poor and elderly Jews in the
inner cities from thugs and hooligans but gradually championed other causes,
most notably that of Soviet Jewry. Most controversially, however, was that the
movement was occasionally violent and used violence as a means to achieve its
objectives.
While he was originally lauded when he first arrived in the country, that soon
changed as he focused his activities on the black Hebrew cult in Dimona and on
Christian missionaries. The government was unsure as how to handle Kahane
because it had never encountered his type of style and activities. At times he
was ignored, at times hounded by the authorities, at times blacklisted and
imprisoned.
But there are several overarching aspects to Kahanes particular ideology that
need to be mentioned and that can be seen throughout his career in his
speeches, writings, and actions. As Ravitzky states There has been an
admixture here of various elements: In his consciousness and in his utterance
the negation and the sharp rejection of the secular Jew, in the style of the
extreme wing of ultra-Orthodox Jewry, have combined with a radical Messianic
approach to the State of Israel, in the style of the most extreme wing of religious
Zionism (Ravitzky 1986:1). At the core of his ideology is the concept of Kiddush
and Hillul Hashem, meaning respectively the sanctification and desecration of Gds name. This concept is popularly interpreted to describe a Jew doing either a

61

good deed or bad deed and the subsequent raising up or lowering of the
reputation of the Jewish people in the eyes of the gentiles on account of this
deed. While this maybe so on an individual, personal level, Kahane interprets
the concept on a national level, which was the original meaning of this technical
term which stems from Moshe petitioning G-d not to destroy the Jewish people
on account of the golden calf due to the fact that the Egyptians would say that Gd did not have enough power to bring the Jews into Israel. This would then be a
Hillul Hashem from the Hebrew word which means empty, or
space because it is then as if G-d does not exist. Kahane extrapolates from the
commentary of Rashi on the verse in Ezekiel (36:20) And they entered the
nations where they came, and they profaned My Holy Name, inasmuch as it was
said of them, 'These are the people of the Lord, and they have come out of His
land.' Rashi states and they profaned My Holy Name: They lowered My honor.
And what is the profanation? In that their enemies said of them, These are the
people of the Lord, and they have come out of His land, and He had no power to
save His people and His land. And Rashi states on chapter 39:7 there and I will
no longer cause My Holy Name to be profaned: For Israels degradation is a
profanation of His Name, inasmuch as it is said of them, these are the people of
the Lord (above 36:20), and He is unable to save them. Kahane explains the
reason for the rise of the Jewish state in our times. From the furnaces and from
the ashes, a Jewish state arose not because we had earned it but because the
gentiles had; because G-d in His terrible anger had decided to mete out
punishment to a world that had mocked and despised and degraded the Almighty

62

God of Israel (Kahane 1983:3). Thus, even though the Zionist pioneers were
secular, Kahane explains that the rise of the state occurred despite this and was
because of the Holocaust and all the previous persecutions that the Jews had
endured throughout history. Kahane states in his magnum opus Or Haraayon
(Kahane 1992:155) that this (national Kiddush Hashem) is the key to the
redemption.
One can see this approach of national Kiddush Hashem throughout Kahanes
entire career. In his dealings with black anti-Semites and Soviet diplomats in
America, with Christian missionaries and Arabs in Israel there was always the
intent to uplift and defend degraded and persecuted Jews so as to wipe out Hillul
Hashem. In tandem with the return to Israel, Kahane wished the Jewish state
would return to its roots and embrace the Halacha (Jewish law). In this he was
more adamant than Agudat Israel and all the haredim. Kahane was a true
believer who was certain that present-day reality should be governed according
to all the laws and injunctions of the Torah (Sprinzak 1991:7).

It is from here that Kahane adopted his position vis--vis the Arab population
in Israel and not out of shallow racism or xenophobia. As he says himself The
analysis and proposed transfer of Arabs from Israel that I have set down are not
personal views. They are certainly not political ones. This is the Jewish outlook,
based on Halacha the law as postulated in the Torah (Kahane 1981:267).
Kahane bases himself on the verse And you shall drive out all the inhabitants of

63

the land from before you. . . . But if you will not drive out the inhabitants of the
land from before you, then it shall come to pass that those which you let remain
of them, shall be thorns in your eyes and thistles in your sides and shall torment
you in the land wherein you dwell. And it shall be that I will do to you as I thought
to do to them (Numbers 33:52-56). Non-Jews may stay only if they recognize
Jewish sovereignty over the land and then only has resident strangers with no
national rights but with their personal benefits intact. This is what Maimonides 1
codified in his Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Melachim 6:11) and this is what Kahane
wished to enforce in Israel.

Kahane was assassinated in 1990, two years after his party, Kach, had been
banned from participating in Knesset elections. 10 years later, his son and
successor, Binyamin Zeev and his wife Talia, were also gunned down by Arab
assassins. These murders constituted a drastic and dramatic setback to the
entire religious right. Kahane, for all thoughts and purposes, had been a one
man show and was basically irreplaceable. But there are groups and individuals
who continue to struggle and espouse ideals that Kahane and the religious right
fought for. Moshe Feiglin, leader of the Manhigut Yehudit (Jewish Leadership)
faction of the Likud party is actively trying to lead the nation and become prime
minister. Although his positions on various issues are somewhat vague, he is
widely derided as a Jewish extremist and he speaks of a faith based
1

Maimonides, Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, known by his acronym Rambam (1137-1204) was a rabbi,
physician, and philosopher and is widely known as the greatest codifier of Jewish law of all time in his
magnum opus Mishneh Torah.

64

leadership. His poll numbers are growing and Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu has resorted to what some would say nasty dealings in order to
bounce Feiglin down the Likud list for Knesset when he was a shoe in for the last
elections. Feiglin openly says his goal is to take over the Likud and then become
the largest party in Knesset and form a right wing religious block which could
then not be defeated politically (Feiglin newsletter). Michael ben Ari, presently a
Knesset member in the National Union party is a disciple of Rabbi Kahane and
the first Kahanist to be in the Knesset since the Rabbi himself. His speeches
and activities stand in contrast to the tepid and perfunctory speeches and
activities of his fellow party members and other religious Knesset members.

Other issues which Rabbi Kahane and others on the right espoused are being
handled by other groups. The issue of the building of the Third Temple on the
Temple Mount is an extremely controversial issue both between Jews and vis-vis Arabs as well. Presently the Dome of the Rock and the al Aqsa mosque sit
on top of the holiest site in Judaism, the Temple Mount. Jews are not allowed to
pray there at all as this might offend the Arabs. For many years Jews were not
allowed up at all and even today only small groups are allowed and they are
accompanied by Israeli policeman and officials of the Islamic Waqf to insure that
no prayers are said or that anything that might look like an attempt at prayer or
anything of the sort is attempted. If it is, the person is subject to physical
violence from the Waqf and arrest by the Israeli police (Inbari 4).

65

Since Jewish control returned to the Temple Mount in 1967, several groups
have attempted to change the passive approach of the Jewish religious
establishment and the Israeli government on the question of the site. These
groups advocate action to end Muslim control of the site and to start a process
that will lead into the establishment of the Third Temple (ibid 4). As Maimonides
rules (Hilchot Beith HaBechira 1:1) it is a commandment to build the Temple.
With this in mind the Temple Institute began actively to build vessels for use in
the Temple, to train cohanim (priests) regarding there duties there and to
educate the public and generate awareness of these issues. They advocate the
renewal of sacrifices, especially the Passover sacrifice for which no Temple is
required, only an altar.1 There have been several attempts to blow up the
mosques but they were unsuccessful.

What types of policies can therefore be expected with such a government, led
by these types of leaders? First of all there will be no negotiations for a two state
solution. No more land presently under Jewish rule will be given over to foreign
rule. The present situation of the Obama administration pressuring Israel not to
build Jewish housing in Jerusalem will pale in significance when a religious
administration not only builds in Jerusalem but all over Judea and Samaria.
Missile attacks from Gaza and Lebanon will be met with vicious force, unlike in
1

Rabbi Tsvi Hirsch Kalisher also advocated this

66

Operation Cast Lead. Presumably the Palestinian Authority will begin to be

dismantled and an exodus of Arabs into Jordan and neighboring countries will
likely occur. Removal of the mosques on the Temple Mount will likely cause an
uproar. Foreign news media will not be granted the almost free access to cover
news in any way they see fit and foreign provocateurs will no longer be allowed
entry. Israelis who oppose government policies will be dealt with harshly as right
wing opponents were dealt harshly with in the past. The education system as
well as the Israeli media and Supreme Court will be overhauled and reformed
accordingly as well. Plans for the renewal of the Jewish Supreme Court
(Sanhedrin) will also presumably move forward. In fact, a nascent Sanhedrin has
already been formed with 70 rabbis with the famous rabbi Adin Steinsaltz at its
head, an amazing display of Jewish unity, yet it has largely been ignored by the
media, secular and ultra-orthodox (Sanhedrin website).

How will the world react to such changes? The United Nations, European
Union, and Arab world will continue on as they do now. The United Nations will
continue to single out Israel for censure, the Europeans will continue to rebuke
and the Arabs will continue to accuse Israeli of genocide. But how will the United
States react? It depends on the administration 1 but if history is our guide we can
expect more of the same pressure and threats despite the special relationship
that is professed by all. To this day United States policy remains basically

if Christian fundamentalists such as Mike Huckabee win election in the United States things will
presumably be different.

67

consistent from one President to the next, except for style and nuances (Sohar
28). Beginning in 1949 the US began to pressure Israel for territorial
concessions to the Arabs (ibid 26). At that time it was the Galilee and Negev, but
the pressure and threats were always there as George Marshall wrote to
President Truman in 1949 It must be made very clear to the Israeli Government,
that should it refuse to accept the friendly advice (he referred here to bringing
back Arab refugees, creating a corridor from Egypt to Jordan, and relinquishing
territories) given by the United States Government with the aim of securing true
peace in the Middle East, the United states will have to reconsider its attitude
towards Israel. US interests in the Middle East have always included trying to
balance their relationship with Israel with that of the Arab world.

Israel on the other hand, had been a strategic ally for the United States as a
bulwark to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East during the Cold War. But as
the Cold War ended, Americas interests have and will inevitably shift. As I wrote
nearly 20 years ago America aids Israel because it is (was) in its interest to do
so. Now with the new changes in the world and the fall of communism,
Americas interest in the region will inevitably shift. Israel needs to be ready for
this shift because in the end Israel cannot depend on anyone but herself
(Kirschner). As Joseph Sisco, Under-Secretary of state told the Israeli politician
and writer Shmuel Katz, I can assure you, Mr. Katz, that if we would not receive
in return full value for our money, Israel would not receive even once cent from

68

us (Sohar 142). But the US does receive valuable intelligence from Israel so it is
difficult to tell how this relationship will progress. Continued military aid does not
for the most part relate to Israels behavior in as much as the US funds countries
that are a lot more less nice than Israel. In any case since 1998 Israel has
begun to voluntarily reduce the amount of economic aid it receives by $120
million a year which will eventually phase it out.

In contrast, Israel has begun to develop a robust relationship with the second,
and soon to be most populous country in the world, India. Although both
countries gained their independence from Great Britain in the 1940s and both
had sizable Moslem minorities the two countries did not identify with another.
This was mainly because India had joined with the Non-aligned Movement which,
together with the Arabs, had adopted an anti-Israel attitude (Inbar 236). After the
Cold War, however, and the demise of the Soviet Union, the political
constellations began to change. The rise of the right wing Hindu Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) in India also helped relations. The BJPs nationalist and Hindu
outlook viewed the Jewish state not as a diplomatic burden, but as a potential
ally against Pakistan and radical Islam (ibid 236). Seth Frantzman notes the
similarities between Zionism (Judaism) and Hinduism But what truly unites
Zionism and Hindu Nationalism is the fact that both represent the aspirations of
unique peoples and states. There is only one Hindu state and one Jewish state in
the world. Both are accused of daring to declare themselves Jewish and Hindu

69

and thus seek homogeneity. This accusation is made in a world with some 48
countries with a Muslim majority and 169 Christian majority countries. India and
Israel, far from being homogenous anachronisms are tiny drops of diversity in a
world that is increasingly homogenous (Frantzman). Formal diplomatic relations
were thereby entered into in 1992. Since then bilateral defense and trade
relations have flourished and trade agreements, taxation protocols, and direct air
links which facilitated trade and tourism were established.

Unlike Peter Demant who writes about doomsday scenarios such as a

populist Likud with Shas and Gush Emunim or Kach taking over the
government, I do not feel his assessment is correct. Things change, political
constellations change and world shaking events occur. But some things always
remain the same. As the rabbis taught It is a law Esau hates Yaakov meaning
that there will always be enmity between the two brothers with Esau symbolizing
the gentiles and Yaakov the Jews. Demant continues in the long run there is
simply no way how tiny Israel with its meager demographic reserves can hold out
against one billion Muslims, if the latter are really determined, no matter the
costs, to defeat it (Demant 21). If the Jewish people had followed this negative
and depressing advice they never would have survived the exile and never would
have come back to their land. He continues saying If Messianic fundamentalists
would ever be able to dictate Israeli policies, they will have no time to implement
their social or religious program- long before that they will have launched Israel

70

into a war against the whole Islamic world (ibid 22). From where he gets this
opinion I do not know, but the Islamic world has been at war with Israel for a long
time now with or without Messianic fundamentalists at its helm. It could then
perhaps be these people, behaving like their forefathers of old, who extract the
present day Israel from the quagmire in which it finds itself, put there by people
operating on an exilic, Western, mentality. The Muslims always accused the
Israelis of being outsiders, intruders and for the most the Israelis acted the part.
Once that changes, we may begin to see changes throughout the Middle East as
well.

71

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