Feliciano v.

Pasicolan
FACTS
Feliciano, upon learning that an amended
information charging him and 17 others of
kidnapping with murder had been filed, and
that a warrant for his arrest had been issued,
went into hiding. Without surrendering himself,
he filed a motion through his lawyer in which
he asks that the court fix at 10k the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending trial.
The Provincial Fiscal opposed this motion, on
the ground that the filing was premature as
Feliciano had not yet been arrested. CFI Judge
Pasicolan dismissed Felicianos motion on the
ground that "pending his arrest or surrender,
Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this
court to admit him to bail."
Feliciano contends that the Constitution
provides that All persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong. It is further
averred that the phrase "all persons has been
interpreted to mean "all persons, without
distinction, whether formally charged or not yet
so charged with any criminal offense."
Therefore, mandamus lies to compel Judge
Pasicolan to do so.
ISSUE & HOLDING
WON Feliciano is entitled to admission to bail.
NO. Feliciano is a free man; therefore, he is not
entitled to admission to bail.
RATIO
Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as
security required and given for the release of a
person who is in custody of the law.
There is no question as to the soundness of the
rule invoked by Feliciano, but it is subject to
the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of
the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.

Villasenor vs. Abano [GR L-23599, 29

September 1967]
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal charged Reynaldo C.
Villaseor
for the murder of Boac police
sergeant Alfonso Madla ebfore the Court of
First Instance of Marinduque (Criminal Case
2299). Villaseor was, on motion, admitted to a
P60,000.00 bail. The amount of the bond was,
on verbal representation of Villaseor's wife,
reduced to P40,000.00. On 29 May 1964,
Villaseor posted a property bond, was set at
provisional liberty. Before arraignment on the
murder charge, however, the Provincial Fiscal
amended the information. This time he
accused Villaseor with "Direct Assault Upon
an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder."
On 7 August 1964, the judge sua sponte (Judge
Maximo Abao) cancelled Villaseor's bond,
and ordered his immediate arrest. On
Villaseor's motion to reconsider, the judge, on
9 September 1964, after hearing, resolved to
admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash
bond of P60,000.00. On 15 September 1964,
on Villaseor's motion that the original bond
previously given be reinstated, the judge
resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property
in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted
only by residents of the province of Marinduque
actually staying therein" with properties which
"must be in the possession and ownership of
said residents for five years." On 1 October
1964, Villaseor came to the Supreme Court on
certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction.
Issue: Whether the P60,000.00-bond fixed by
judge transgress the constitutional injunction
that "excessive bail shall not be required, in
light of the fact that the accused is a mere
government employee, earning but a monthly
salary of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of
a family of five.

Held: To be read with the constitutional

precept, that "excessive bail shall not be
required, is Section 12, Rule 114, Rules of
Court, which provides that "the court may,
upon good cause shown, either increase or
reduce the amount" of the bail, and that
"defendant may be committed to custody
unless he gives bail in the increased amount he
is called upon to furnish." Along with the
court's power to grant bail in bailable cases is
its discretion to fix the amount therefor, and,
as stated, to increase or reduce the same. The
question of whether bail is excessive "lays with
the court to determine." In the matter of bail
fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all
times by the purpose for which bail is required.
The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, gives this purpose "the
security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he
will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance." And, in
amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same
rule states that the condition of the bail is that
"defendant shall answer the complaint or
information in the court in which it is filed or to
which it may be transferred for trial, and after
conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court
of First Instance upon application supported by
an undertaking or bail, that he will surrender
himself in execution of such judgment as the
appellate court may render, or that, in case the
cause is to be tried anew or remanded for a
new trial, he will appear in the court to which it
may be remanded and submit himself to the
orders and processes thereof." Expressions in
varying language spell out in a general way the
principles Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) governing bail
fixing. One is that the amount should be high
enough to assure the presence of defendant

when required but no higher than is reasonably

calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another is that
"the good of the public as well as the rights of
the accused," and "the need for a tie to the
jurisdiction and the right to freedom from
unnecessary restraint before conviction under
the circumstances surrounding each particular
accused, "should all be balanced in one
equation. The inability of a defendant to secure
bail in a certain amount, by itself, does not
make the amount excessive. For, where an
accused has no means of his own, no one to
bail him out, or none to turn to for premium
payments, any amount fixed no matter how
small would fall into the category of excessive
bail; and, he "would be entitled to be
discharged on his own recognizance." So it is,
that experience has brought forth certain
guidelines in bail fixing, which may be
summarized as follows: (1) ability of the
accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged; (4)
character and reputation of the accused; (5)
health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the
accused appearing at trial; (8) forfeiture of
other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if
the accused is under bond for appearance at
trial in other cases. But, at bottom, in bail
fixing, "the principal factor considered, to the
determination of which most other factors are
directed, is the probability of the appearance of
the accused, or of his flight to avoid
punishment." Importance then is the possible
penalty that may be meted. Of course, penalty
depends to a great extent upon the gravity of
the offense. Here, Villasenor is charged with a
capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of
a person in authority with murder. A complex
crime, it may call for the imposition of capital
punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated 5 July

1946 of the Department of Justice, reiterated in

Circular 48 of 18 July 1963, directed
prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at
the
rate
of
P2,000.00
per
year
of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium
period of the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, unless circumstances warrant a
higher penalty. The reasonableness of this
circular has already received the Court's
imprimature in Edao vs. Cea (GR L-6821, 10
May 1954). The Court is unprepared to
downgrade this method of computation, what
with a compound of reduced peso value and
the aggravated crime climate. The Court thus
find no discernible abuse of discretion, given
the facts and the law, when the judge fixed
Villasenor's bail at P60,000.00.

directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the

Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of
a
Temporary
Restraining
Order
and/or
PreliminaryInjunction" with the SC. She argued
that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the hold departure order
considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction
over her person as she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered.
The hold departure order was also issued sua
sponte without notice and hearing. She
likewise argued that the hold departure order
violates her right to due process, right to travel
and freedom
of
speech.
Issues:

Santiago vs Vasquez
Facts:
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An
order of arrest was issued against her with bail
for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the Santiago to post
cash bond which the later filed in the amount
of P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but
she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond
and that she be allowed provisional release on
recognizance.
The
Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment.
Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order
against
Santiago
by
reason
of
the announcement she made, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast
media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to
accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She

Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction

over
the
person
of
Santiago?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued
the hold departure order without any motion
from the prosecution and without notice and
hearing?
3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?
Held:
1. How the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
It has been held that where after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the
arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court
and the accused either voluntarily submitted
himself to the court or was duly arrested, the
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court

acquires jurisdiction over his person, is

accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court's
jurisdiction
thereover,
appearing
forarraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted
before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest
or
voluntary
surrender.
Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent
Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave
"that she be considered as having placed
herself
under
the
jurisdiction
of
(the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required
trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the
amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and
that by said motion "she be considered as
having placed herself under the custody" of
said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to
claim
otherwise
for,
by
her
own
representations, she is effectively estopped
from asserting the contrary after she had
earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court
and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over
the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
2. The ex parte issuance of a holddeparture order was a valid exercise of
the presiding courts inherent power to
preserve
and
to
maintain
the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the accused.

fact, even made a public statement that she

had every intention of leaving the country
allegedly to pursue higher studiesabroad. We
uphold the course of action adopted by the
Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such
fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold
departure order. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court's inherent power to preserve
and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused.
3. By posting bail, an accused holds
himself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, thus,
he may legally be prohibited from leaving
the country during the pendency of the
case.
Since under the obligations assumed by
petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. Parties with pending
cases should apply for permission to leave the
country from the very same courts which, in
the first instance, are in the best position to
pass upon suchapplications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications
or
implications
thereof.
(Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217
SCRA 633 (1993), G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
January 27, 1993)
MIRANDA vs TULIAO
FACTS:

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of

March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were

discovered I Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela.
September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested.
April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn confession
and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03
Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a certain Boyet dela
Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the death of Vicente Buazon
and Elizar Tualiao. Judge 6, 2001, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint order denying said urgent motion
on the ground that, since the Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the Court.
In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of the State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes
to the Department of Justice.
DOCTRINES:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest neither jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, nor custody of law over the body
of the accused.
CA Justice Oscar Herrerra:
Except in application for bail, it is not
necessary for the Court of First Instance to first
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the case or grant the relief.
The outright dismissal of the case even before
the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is authorized under Section 6
(a), Rule 112 Rule of Court, Criminal Procedure.
SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ
The voluntary appearance of the accused,
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading
to the merits (such as filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
Courts jurisdiction over, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.

Santiago shows discretion but custody of law

and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the
law is required before the Court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for
the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof,
constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.
EXCEPTION
TO
THE
RULE that
filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of ones person to the jurisdiction
of the Court. This is in the case of pleadings
whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of
the jurisdiction of the Court, lead to special
appearance. Failure to file them is WAIVER OF
DEFENCE
Civil cases, motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included.
Criminal cases, motion to quash a complaint on
the ground of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused
Motion to Quash a warrant of arrest Legality
of Court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused.
GENERAL RULE: One who seeks affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the
Jurisdiction of the Court.
Cortes vs. Catral [AM RTJ-97-1387, 10
September 1997] Resolution En Banc, Romero
(J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: A sworn letter complaint was filed by
Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B.
Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross
Ignorance of the Law committed when (1) he
granted bail in murder cases without hearing

(People v. Duerme, et al., Criminal Case 07-893

for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag,
Criminal Case 08-866 for murder); (2) he
reduced the bailbond granted by the provincial
prosecutor from P180,000 to P30,000 without
hearing
(Barangay
Captain
Rodolfo
Castanedas Criminal Case 11-6250 for Illegal
Possession of Firearm); (3) he granted a
bailbond of P14,800 in a homicide case
(Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors spreading
that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to
Jimmy Siribans house to get the envelop. The
Office of the Court Administrator recommended
the dismissal of the complaint saying that
there is nothing in the allegations of the
complainant that would warrant the imposition
of administrative sanction against the judge.
Issue: Whether Judge Catral is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for having granted bail to
the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08866.
Held: As held in Basco vs. Rapatalo, the judge
is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
cases where the prosecution chooses to just
file a comment or leave the application of bail
to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing
is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. The
importance of a hearing has been emphasized
in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that,
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to
the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against
the accused. The reason for this is plain.
Inasmuch as the determination of whether or

not the evidence of guilt against the accused is

strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may
rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner
having
the
right
of
cross
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) examination and
to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. The
fact
that
Criminal
Case
07-874
was
subsequently dismissed by Judge Alameda
does not completely exculpate Judge Catral.
The judge is not bound by the recommendation
of the prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn
statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay
statements which could hardly be the basis for
determining whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. The
procedural lapse of the judge is aggravated by
the fact that even though the accused in
Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed
Duerme), have yet to be arrested, respondent
already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00.
The right to bail can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would
be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a
petition for bail for some whose freedom has
yet to be curtailed. In sum, Judge Segundo B.
Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
having granted bail to the accused in Criminal
Cases 07-874 and 08-866 without having
conducted the requisite hearing.

People v. Nitcha

 murder; claim that arrest was illegal for want of

preliminary investigation Act of posting a bail bond,
apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty, is
tantamount to foregoing the right to question the
assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of
discretion when the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; If accused ins convicted by the crime
(reclusion perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor
a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted.

People v. Donato
rebellion is a bailable offense; bail as a matter of right
Right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
Prosecution does not have the right to present evidence
for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a
matter of right, such is required only bail is discretionary;
Waiver of the right
1) the right exists;
2) voluntary relinquishment;
Right to bail may be waived.

People vs. Donato [GR 79269, 5 June 1991]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 13 concur, 1 took no
part
Facts: In the original Information filed on 2
October 1986 in Criminal Case 86-48926 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in
an Amended Information which was filed on 24
October
1986,
Rodolfo
Salas,
alias
"Commander Bilog" (of the New People's Army
[NPA]), and his co-accused were charged for
the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in

relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal

Code. At the time the Information was filed,
Salas and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September
1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft
Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from
military detention and a cash reward of
P250,000.00 was offered for his capture. A day
after the filing of the original information, or on
3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus
for Salas and his co-accused was filed with the
Supreme Court which was dismissed in the
Court's resolution of 16 October 1986 on the
basis of the agreement of the parties under
which Salas "will remain in legal custody and
will face trial before the court having custody
over his person" and the warrants for the arrest
of his co-accused are deemed recalled and
they shall be immediately released but shall
submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person. On 7 November
1986, Salas filed with the court below a Motion
to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b)
the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants; and (d) the
criminal
action
or
liability
has
been
extinguished, to which the Solicitor General
filed an Opposition. In his Order of 6 March
1987, Judge Procoro J. Donato (Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila) denied
the motion to quash. Instead of asking for a
reconsideration of said Order, Salas filed on 9
May 1987 a petition for bail, which the Solicitor
General opposed in an Opposition filed on 27
May 1987 on the ground that since rebellion
became a capital offense under the provisions
of PD 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death on those who promote, maintain, or

head a rebellion, the accused is no longer

entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is
strong. On 5 June 1987, the President issued
Executive Order 187 repealing, among others,
PDs 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full
force and effect Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory
decrees. Thus, the original penalty for
rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.00, was restored. Executive
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Order 187 was
published in the Official Gazette in its 15 June
1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially
released for circulation on 26 June 1987. In his
Order of 7 July 1987 the Judge, taking into
consideration Executive Order 187, granted
Salas' petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at
P30,000.00 and imposed upon Salas the
additional condition that he shall report to the
court once every 2 months within the first 10
days of every period thereof. In a motion to
reconsider the above order filed on 16 July
1987, the Solicitor General asked the court to
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00
alleging
therein
that
per
Department of Justice Circular 10 dated 3 July
1987, the bail for the provisional release of an
accused should be in an amount computed at
P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on
the medium penalty imposable for the offense
and explaining that it is recommending
P100,000.00 because Salas "had in the past
escaped from the custody of the military
authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder,
homicide or robbery, where after the
commission, the perpetrator has achieved his
end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to
overthrow the government through armed

struggle and replace it with an alien system

based on a foreign ideology is attained." On 17
July 1987, the Solicitor General filed a
supplemental
motion
for
reconsideration
indirectly asking the court to deny bail to Salas
and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability
that the accused will not comply with this main
condition of his bail to appear in court for
trial." In a subsequent Order dated 30 July
1987, the Judge granted the motion for
reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing
the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
but
denying
the
Solicitor
General's
supplemental motion for reconsideration of 17
July 1987 which asked the court to allow the
Solicitor General to present evidence in support
of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order
of 7 July 1987. The People of the Philippines,
through the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila
and the Judge a Advocate General, filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for restraining order/ preliminary
injunction.
Issue: Whether Salas should be granted
temporary liberty pursuant to his right to bail.
Held: Bail cannot be denied to Salas for he is
charged with the crime of rebellion as defined
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to
which is attached the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is,
therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The

right to bail shall not be impaired even when

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required." Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, also provides that "all
persons in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong." Therefore, before conviction bail is
either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the
right to present evidence for the denial of bail
in the instances where bail is a matter of right.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the
right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
is
suspended;
overturning the Supreme Court's ruling in
Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile. However, Salas has
waived his right to bail in GR 76009 [In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile,
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa,
Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno]. On 3 October 1986, or the day
following the filing of the original information in
Criminal Case 86-48926 with the trial court, a
petition for habeas corpus for Salas, and his coaccused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion,
was filed with the Supreme Court by Lucia
Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas
against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos,
Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among

others, that the petition be given due course

and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) respondents to
produce the bodies of Salas and his co-accused
before the Court and explain by what authority
they arrested and detained them. When the
parties in GR 76009 stipulated that "Petitioner
Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody over
his person," they simply meant that Salas will
remain in actual physical custody of the court,
or in actual confinement or detention, as
distinguished from the stipulation concerning
his co-petitioners, who were to be released in
view of the recall of the warrants of arrest
against them; they agreed, however, "to
submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be
made of the deliberate care of the parties in
making a fine distinction between legal custody
and court having custody over the person in
respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused.
Such a fine distinction was precisely intended
to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas
will not be released, but should remain in
custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or
had this been unclear to Salas and his counsel,
they should have insisted on the use of a
clearer language. It must be remembered that
at the time the parties orally manifested before
the Supreme Court on 14 October 1986 the
terms and conditions of their agreement and
prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation
and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already
been issued by the trial court against Salas and
his co-accused. The stipulation that only the
warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only
they shall be released, further confirmed the

agreement that Salas shall remain in custody

of the law, or detention or confinement.
Consequently, having agreed in GR 76009 to
remain
in
legal
custody,
Salas
had
unequivocably waived his right to bail. The
right to bail is another of the constitutional
rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
Lavides vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129670, 1
February 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4
concur
Facts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie
San Miguel reported to the police that their
daughter, then 16 years old, had been
contacted by Manolet Lavides for an
assignation that night at Lavides' room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City.
Apparently, this was not the first time the
police received reports of Lavides' activities. An
entrapment operation was therefore set in
motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date,
the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of
the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was
staying. When Lavides opened the door, the
police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing
only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon
they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the
inquest, an information for violation of Article
III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for
Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection
against
Child
Abuse,
Exploitation
and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its
Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7
April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial

Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-9770550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an
"Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate
Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on
an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the
Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as
a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more
informations for child abuse were filed against
Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla,
Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting
(Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874). In
all the cases, it was alleged that, on various
dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides
had sexual intercourse with complainants who
had been "exploited in prostitution and given
money as payment for the said acts of sexual
intercourse." No bail was recommended.
Nonetheless,
Lavides
filed
separate
applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May
1997, the trial court issued an order resolving
Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in
Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is probable
cause to hold the accused under detention, his
arrest having been made in accordance with
the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain
under detention until further order of the Court;
and that the accused is entitled to bail in all
the case, and that he is granted the right to
post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each
case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases
under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the
informations against him, except those filed in
Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866.
Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the
trial court to suspend the arraignment
scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May
1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that

the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to

P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be
done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997,
the trial court, in separate orders, denied
Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash
the informations, and to suspend arraignment.
Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during
which he pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him and then ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure"
order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference
was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997,
Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's
order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders,
dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to
quash and maintaining the conditions set forth
in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While
the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) case was pending in the Court
of Appeals, two more informations were filed
against Lavides, bringing the total number of
cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the
first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to
a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at
the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the
event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and
forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall
proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained
the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed
the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the court should impose the
condition that the accused shall ensure his

presence during the trial of these cases before

the bail can be granted.
Held: In cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash. For if the information
is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
would then be no need for the arraignment of
the accused. Further, the trial court could
ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such
as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the
conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while
under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required. To
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1)
filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot
be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once
and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon valid complaint or information sufficient
to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides'
presence at the arraignment violates the
latter's constitutional rights.
SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

HELD:
FACTS:
Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of
Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. This foundation was
established to help provide educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged
but deserving Muslim youth and students.
Donations came pouring in from various
institutions, organizations and that of Chavit
Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000,
Chavit accused then President Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game
jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient.
The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and
find probable cause, thus the case of plunder
before the Sandiganbayan.
The accused, herein petitioner took all legal
remedy to bail but consequently due to
numerous petitions and motion to quash, the
same was suspended and counter petitioned.
Petitioner also prayed for issuance of habeas
corpus.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner should be arraigned first before
hearing his petition for bail;
WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the
amended
information
during
pendency of his petition to bail; and
WON petitioner should instead be released
through a writ of habeas
corpus.

A. Although he was already arraigned, no plea

has yet been entered thereby rendering the
case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes
cognizance and held that arraignment is not a
prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for
bail.
B. The court finds no inconsistency between an
application of an accused for bail and his filing
of motion to quash. Bail, is a security given to
release a person in custody of the law. A
motion to quash on the other hand is a mode
by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint filed against him for
insufficiency of its facts in posits law. This tow
has objectives not necessarily antithetical to
each other.
C. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be
granted by the court even when the person is
detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender. However, in the case at
bar, there is no showing of any basis for the
issuance of the writ. The general rule is that
the writ does not apply when the person
alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in
custody of an officer under process issued by
competent court; more so, petitioner is under
detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.
The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to
quash. The petition for habeas corpus and bail
was DISMISSED.