*cases on the amendments or the revisions of the

constitution:

1.

Santiago vs. COMELEC

2.

Facts:
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.
Delfin filed w/ COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein
Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and
the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions
of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member
of the Movement for People's Initiative and that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers
intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2,
Article 17 of the Constitution.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC,
through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing
Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition and the
notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general
circulation at his own expense" and (b) setting the case
for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was
left to some future law.
Issue:
WON R.A. NO. 6735 IS INTENDED TO INCLUDE
THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION
Ruling:
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution BUT:

3.

Contrary to the assertion of public respondent

COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed, as the case may be. THIS CLAUSE only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence
as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws.
R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of
the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:

The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the
Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the
part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on
all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What
is essential at this time would only be to resolve whether
or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as a founding
member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative and
seeking through a people initiative certain modifications
on the 1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and
given its due course.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of
complying with the constitutional imperatives, the
petition would rather have much of its burden passed on,
in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would require
COMELEC to schedule signature gathering all over the
country, to cause the necessary publication of the
petition in newspapers of general and local circulation,
and to instruct Municipal Election Registrars in all
Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations at the time and
on the dates designated for the purpose.

Lambino vs. COMELEC

Facts:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA
6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per

centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group

also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII
entitled "Transitory Provisions."
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.9
Issue:
WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative
Ruling:
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal
based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution.
For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section

2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the

"people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in
the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that
"ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria MacapagalArroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group
thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an
"unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent
President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the
Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or
"sovereign will" in the present initiative.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
inSantiago and People's
Initiative
for
Reform,
Modernization
and
Action
(PIRMA)
v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On
this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal.
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land,
deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the
citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the
Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
174153.
Puno: This petition must then be granted, and the
COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system.
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is
sufficient to implement the people's initiative. The
legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear
intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to
implement people's initiative.
The doctrine of stare decisis does
reexamination of Santiago.

not

bar the

I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance

on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did
not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a
sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision
allowing people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To
recapitulate, the records show that in the original
decision, eight (8) justices 106 voted that R.A. 6735 was
not a sufficient law; five (5) justices 107 voted that said law
was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from
voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper
initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not ripe for
adjudication.
Corona J: Santiago should not apply to this case but only
to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable
to make it apply to all petitions which were yet
unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused
on the Delfin petition alone.

Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to

initiate changes to the Constitution via initiative claim
thatSantiago barred any and all future petitions for
initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare decisis and res
judicata. The argument is flawed.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially
different from each other. They are not based on the same
facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and
defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise
their sovereignty by proposing changes to their
fundamental law.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC
Facts:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being
by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint
sessions of Congress.
In the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is A
RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF
ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE
TO 18. It is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of
the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by
(male) citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over
and are able to read and write, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for
one year and in the municipality
wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the
Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with
the local elections in November 1971.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado
Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the
Convention implement (the above) resolution."
This resulted to a petition for prohibition principally to
restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971,"
where the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing
the voting age" to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for
ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution
No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971. hence all
of Comelec's acts in obedience are null and void, on the
ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is,
by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised
by the Convention.
Issue: Is the CONSTI violated by the act of the
Convention in calling for a plebiscite on the amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1?

Ruling:
Yes. It is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must
be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now
proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose, We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the
same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971
is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the
respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample
basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts
of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to
the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that
the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1
of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can
base their judgment on.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing
acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8,
1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec
complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby
declared null and void.
Fernando: Clearly, insofar as amendments, including
revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and
thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two
constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the
Philippines in the mode therein provided, and a
constitutional convention that may be called into being.
Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the
Congress of the Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude
the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may
determine what amendments it would have the people
ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the
approval or disapproval of the electorate may be obtained,
the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed
possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that
whatever amendments it seeks to introduce would be
submitted to the people at an election called for that
purpose. It would appear to me that to view the
convention as being denied a prerogative which is not
withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not
find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention
are agencies for submitting proposals under the
fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be
denied the other. No justification for such a drastic
differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
The added reinforcement that to require ordinary
legislation before the convention could be enabled to have
its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a
power in the legislative and executive branches that

could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration

of the amending process.
Gonzales v. COMELEC
Facts:
The case is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary
injunction.
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing
that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership
of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of
180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, although each province shall have,
at
least,
one
(1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November,
1971;"
and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of
the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.

elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967

will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election,
in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to
the people for ratification, must be held under such
conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give
the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of
the nature and implications of said amendments.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2)
cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Sanidad v. COMELEC
Facts:
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law.
Twenty days after, the President issued another related
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the
previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.
the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating
the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

Issue: whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting

as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution
Ruling: yes.

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued,

do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the
referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution.

In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1

and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding,
it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:

The Commission on Elections was vested with the

exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite.

1. The Members of Congress, which approved the

proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de
facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives
propose amendments or call a convention therefore but
may not avail of both that is to say, propose
amendment and call a convention at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the
Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be
aspecial election, not a general election, in which officers
of the national and local governments such as the

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and

PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Issue: WON the Pres of the Ph can propose amendments
to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim
National Assembly which has not been convened.
Ruling: YES.

As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is

constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. HOWEVER, the
initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President.
And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted
to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the
people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition,
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies
in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the
President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
1. If the President has been legitimately discharging
the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there
is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments to
the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is
not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted
by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National
Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the
Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early
as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975,
the people had already rejected the calling of the interim
National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the
Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000
barangays, about the same number of Kabataang
Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60
cities had informed the President that the prevailing
sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim
National Assembly.
Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians"
endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the
foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of
amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September
22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed
amendments) to the people in the National ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the
said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.
Fernando: Commitment to such an approach results in
my inability to subscribe to the belief that martial law in
terms of what is provided both in the 1935 and the present
Constitution, affords sufficient justification for the
concentration of powers in the Executive during periods
of crisis.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1. On the merits: I dissent from the majority's dismissal of
the petitions for lack of merit and vote to grant the
petitions for the following reasons and considerations: 1. It
is undisputed that neither the 1935 Constitution nor the
1973 Constitution grants to the incumbent President the
constituent power to propose and approve amendments to
the Constitution to be submitted to the people for
ratification in a plebiscite.

3. Applying the above rulings of Tolentino to the case at

bar, mutatis, mutandis, it is clear that where the proposed
amendments are violative of the Constitutional mandate
on the amending process not merely for being a "partial
amendment" of a "temporary or provisional character" (as
in Tolentino) but more so for not being proposed and
approved by the department vested by the Constitution
with the constituent power to do so
This is so because the Constitution is a "superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means" 11 but
only by the particular mode and manner prescribed
therein by the people.
The convening of the interim National Assembly to
exercise the constituent power to proposed amendments is
the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the
Constitution.
The imposition of martial law (and "the problems of
rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation and
economic crisis a crisis greater than war") 32 cited by the
majority opinion as justifying the concentration of powers
in the President, and the recognition now of his exercising
the constituent power to propose amendments to the
Fundamental Law "as agent for and in behalf of the
people" 33 has no constitutional basis.
Martial law concededly does not abrogate the
Constitution nor obliterate its constitutional boundaries
and allocation of powers among the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial Departments.
*conditions for judicial review:
IBP v. Zamora
Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in
Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered
the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
The President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24
January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP
and the PNP Chief.[3] In the Memorandum, the President
expressed his desire to improve the peace and order
situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime
prevention program including increased police patrols.
The President further stated that to heighten police
visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief
to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
[6]
Finally, the President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary
in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved.[7]
Issues:

(2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination

of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review;
Ruling:
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are complied with,
namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota (cause
of the suit or action) of the case.[12]
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the
requisites of standing in this case.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is
too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards abovestated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion (

capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty ) in calling out the Marines.
The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief
powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified
in the commander-in-chief provision.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it
refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.
[22]
It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume
jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought
before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution.
- One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates
to rule on are political questions. The reason is
that political questions are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of
a particular act being assailed + the political
question, being a function of the separation of

powers, the courts will not normally interfere

with the workings of another co-equal branch
unless the case shows a clear need for the courts
to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
*political questions refer to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.
Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court,
thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.
It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon
the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in
his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless
the petitioner can show that the exercise of such
discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of
judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and
factual basis for calling the armed forces
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Mendoza: I dissent insofar as the opinion dismisses the
petition in this case on other grounds. I submit that
judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised
by petitioner must await an actual case involving real
parties with "injuries" to show as a result of the operation
of the challenged executive action.
- a citizens' suit challenging the constitutionality of
governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner must
have suffered an "injury in fact" of an actual or imminent
nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this
Court.1
My insistence on compliance with the standing
requirement is grounded in the conviction that only a
party injured by the operation of the governmental action
challenged is in the best position to aid the Court in
determining the precise nature of the problem presented.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
an impeachment complaint[4] (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices[5] of this Court for culpable

violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust

and other high crimes.

he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the

standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,

2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient
in form,[9] but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance.

2. Ripeness or prematurity

Since the Filing of the first complaint, a day after the

House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint[11] was filed with the
Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
Issue: WON Court should exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint
Ruling:
The courts power of judicial review is limited by the
following requisites: refer to previous case
1. Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on realparty-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is
a concept of civil procedure[73] while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. - he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which he claims infringes
his prerogatives as a legislator.
* the court found that requisites for intervention have
been complied with. Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos
motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while

In Tan v. Macapagal,[95] this Court, through Chief Justice

Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture.
[96]
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what
was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have
already been already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should
be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
3. Justiciability

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the

1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which
cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with truly
political questions. From this clarification it is gathered
that there are two species of political questions: (1) truly
political questions and (2) those which are not truly
political questions.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation
of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly
political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted
within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.
4. lis mota
this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis
mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15
and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the

second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives

Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Ynares-Santiago: I vote that this Court must observe
judicial self-restraint at this time and DISMISS the instant
petitions.

Puno: In light of our 1987 constitutional canvass,

the question is whether this Court can assume jurisdiction
over the petitions at bar. As aforediscussed, the power of
impeachment has both political and non- political
aspects.
I respectfully submit that the petitions at bar concern
its non-political aspect, the issue of whether the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
involving the JDF is already barred by the 1-year rule
under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. By any
standard, this is a justiciable issue.
As held in Casibang v. Aquino,[57] a justiciable
question implies a given right, legally demandable, and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right,
and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. The petitions at bar involve the right of
the Chief Justice against the initiation of a second
impeachment within one year after a first impeachment
complaint. The right is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution. It is demandable. It is a right that can be
vindicated in our courts.
The contention that Congress, acting in its
constitutional capacity as an impeachment body, has
jurisdiction over the issues posed by the petitions at bar
has no merit in light of our long standing jurisprudence.
The petitions at bar call on the Court to define the powers
that divide the jurisdiction of this Court as the highest
court of the land and Congress as an impeachment
court. In the seminal case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission,[58] we held that x x x the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituents thereof is the judicial
department.
Kilosbayan v. Morato

Facts:

[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA

(Equipment lease agreement) invalid on the ground that it
is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified
in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375
(Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110
(1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)].

Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease

Agreement is a different lease contract with none of the
vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the
Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the
ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding
because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No.
301, 1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the
ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the
Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds
the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery
equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5)
that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to
further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the
Court as their forum.
Issue: Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp. is invalid.
Ruling: No. Petition for prohibition, review and/or
injunction was dismissed.
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these
various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as
taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayer's suits.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the
validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which
petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot
raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization
give it the requisite personality to question the validity of
the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that
"the State shall respect the role of independent people's
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect,
within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means,"
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule
that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as
the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving
constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5.
In the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds
are being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling
doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624
(1975) where it was held that funds raised from
contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no
standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question their
disbursement by the President of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be
sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this
suit because no specific injury suffered by them is
alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of
Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be
invoked because they do not complain of any
infringement of their rights as legislators.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not
really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which

they regard to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal

issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and
Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the
validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which
petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot
raise.
FELICIANO, dissenting
With very great respect, it is submitted that the above
conclusion has been merely assumed rather than
demonstrated and that what is in fact before this Court
does not adequately support such conclusion.
REGALADO, dissenting
I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion premised on the constitutional and procedural
doctrines posed and interpreted in tandem therein. I also
regret that I have to impose on the majority with
this virtual turno en contra when I could have indicated
my disaccord by just joining Mr. Justice Davide in his
commendably objective presentation of the minority
position. I feel, however, that certain views that have been
advanced require a rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm
of unanimous precedents.
DAVIDE, dissenting
I register a dissenting vote.

was constrained to accept a downgraded employment

contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end
of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make
Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on
as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven
(7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint
against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month
from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March
1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and
exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and
awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for three
(3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential
and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total
amount; however, no compensation for damages as
prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and
awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months
salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and
10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the
provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July
15, 1995.

I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings

in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. (hereinafter
referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application
or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B,
Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as
amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus
standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
involving the on-line lottery system entered into between
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of
the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts
to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people,
specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and
stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the
floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of
such pronouncements and weakens this Courts judicial
and moral authority to demand from lower courts
obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their
opposite conduct.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but

this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last
clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042,
which reads:

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services

Issue: WON the subject clause is unconstitutional because it

unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and
stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate
employment period and a fixed salary package?

Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of
employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the
basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month
overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of

termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the
reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

Ruling:
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of
judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it
does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights
susceptible of judicial determination;[47] (2) that the constitutional

question is raised by a proper party[48] and at the earliest

opportunity;[49] and (3) that the constitutional question is the
very lis mota of the case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the
case or decide the same on some other ground.[51]
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual
controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally
aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his
monetary award based on the salary period of three months only
as provided under the subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in
mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at
the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the
pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not
raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be
considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot
be considered on appeal.[52] Records disclose that the issue on the
constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in
petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration with said labor tribunal,[53] and reiterated in his
Petition for Certiorari before the CA.[54] Nonetheless, the issue is
deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA
which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue.

The third condition that the constitutional

issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise
obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to
his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion
of his 12-month employment contract, and not just
for a period of three months, strikes at the very core
of the subject clause.

Thus, the stage is all set for the determination

of the constitutionality of the subject clause.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject
clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and
the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals areMODIFIED to the effect that petitioner
is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
Umali v. Guingona
Facts: (this is a petition for review)
On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali
was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. He was
assigned in Manila, from November 29, 1993 to March
15, 1994, and in Makati, from March 16, 1994 to August
4, 1994.
On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a
confidential memorandum against the petitioner for
alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and
regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director,

more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance

and nonfeasance.
Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum,
former President Ramos authorized the issuance of an
Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and
immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to
the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against
him. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC
issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a
prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12)
charges against petitioner. Upon the recommendation of
the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service,
with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the
law.
On October 24, 1994, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his dismissal but the Office of the
President denied the motion for reconsideration on
November 28, 1994.
The criminal aspects of the case where referred to the
Ombudsman for investigation and eventually the
Ombudsman dismissed the charges against petitioner.
Accordingly, all the informations against the petitioner
previously sent to the Office of the City Prosecutor, were
recalled.
In his petition for review before the SC, the
Issue: WHETHER THE PCAGC IS A
VALIDLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT AGENCY
AND WHETHER PETITIONER CAN RAISE THE
ISSUE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY BELATEDLY
IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
TRIAL COURTS DECISION
Ruling:
To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due
process before the PCAGC.
-petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with
respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws
and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the
investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his
protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of
any factual or legal basis.
Neither can it be said that there was a violation of
what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure.
- According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of
Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is a CESO eligible
entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioners claim
of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It
was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient
evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal.
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the
PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. It was certainly too late to raise the said issue for
the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.

How about the fourth issue, whether in view of the

Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges
against petitioner, there still remains a basis for the latter
dismissal with forfeiture of benefits, as directed in
Administrative Order No. 152?

a member of City Council of Manila, which called

attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for
the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the
Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously been held on May
26, 1990.

- It is worthy to note that in the case under

consideration, the administrative action against the
petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal
case. The charges included in Administrative Order No.
152 were based on the results of investigation conducted
by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the
Ombudsman.

Private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000

members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set
aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that
petitioner Secretary of Interior and Local Government had
no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC.

In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that

the issues posited by the petitioner do not constitute a
valid legal basis for overturning the finding and
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However,
taking into account the antecedent facts and
circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise
of its equity powers, has decided to consider the
dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the
Ombudsman,
the
succinct
and
unmistakable
manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in
pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor
General,[7] that there is no more basis for Administrative
Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening
events that cannot be overlooked.

RTC: DILG has no power to exempt the City of Manila

from holding SK elections, the COMELEC had already in
effect determined that there had been no previous
elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK
officers in every barangay, and the exemption of the City
of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist
that the City of Manila, having already conducted
elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted
Issue: WON the holding of the second elections on May
13, 1996[3] rendered this case moot and academic.
Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing effective

and substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of
its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition.
Accordingly, Administrative Order No. 152 is considered
LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full
benefits.

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact

necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties. For
one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of
those elected in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila
because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the
decision of the trial court and these officers continued in
office until May 13, 1996.

Alunan v. Mirasol

For another, this case comes within the rule that courts
will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it
is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[4] For the
question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the
DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely
to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the
question may not be decided before the date of such
elections.

Facts:
Section 532(a) of the Local Government Code
provides that the first elections for the SK shall be held
thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code
took effect on January 1, 1992.
The first local elections under the Code were held on
May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27, 1992, the
Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499,
providing guidelines for the holding of the general
elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The
guidelines placed the SK elections under the direct control
and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance
of the COMELEC.
Accordingly, registration in the six districts of
Manila was conducted.
On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG,
through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a
letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from
holding elections for the SK on the ground that the
elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be
considered the first under the newly-enacted Local
Government Code.
The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago,
acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila and

The first question is whether then DILG Secretary Rafael

M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether under
532(d) of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila
was required to hold its first elections for SK.
First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the
COMELEC placed the SK elections under the direct
control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to
respondents contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C,
2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the
COMELEC shall have the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
The authority granted was nothing more than the
ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between January
1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a
given kabataang barangay. If elections had been
conducted, then no new elections had to be held on
December 4, 1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term of
office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was
extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of
office of those elected under [the Local Government Code

of 1991]. In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local

Government was to act merely as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will was to take effect.[11] There
was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of
the discretion as to the execution of a law. That this is
constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases. [12]
Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the
barangays of the City of Manila from the requirement to
hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992
would deny the youth voters in those barangays of the
equal protection of laws.
Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the
records of this case. Merely showing that there were
5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does not
prove that despite that fact these same barangays were
permitted to hold elections on December 4, 1992.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case filed
against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.
Malaluan v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph
Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in
the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the
Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May
11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was
proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the
duly elected Mayor.
But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest
with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the
total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court
declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the
COMELEC.
petitioner filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an
order, dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond
in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order,
petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of
Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers
and functions of said office BUT (COMELEC) ordered
Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found
and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected
Municipal Mayor of said municipality.
Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31,
1995 as a consequence.
Issue: WON case is moot & academic
Ruling:
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local
officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired
on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot
and academic insofar as it concerns petitioners right to the
mayoralty seat in his municipality[7] because expiration of
the term of office contested in the election protest has the
effect of rendering the same moot and academic.[8]

Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and

academic because the herein parties are contesting an
elective post to which their right to the office no longer
exists. However, the question as to damages remains
ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner
liable for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies,
and unearned salary and other emoluments from March,
1994 to April, 1995, en mUsse denominated as actual
damages, default in payment by petitioner of which shall
result in the collection of said amount from the bond
posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his
motion for execution pending appeal in the trial
court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and
legality of this award upon private respondent on the
ground that said damages have not been alleged and
proved during trial.
*whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of
private respondent.
The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the
petitioner to be clearly unfounded because its own
appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results
contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming, ex gratia
argumentis, that this is a reasonable observation not
without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a
malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest
private respondent on the basis of what respondent
COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the trial
court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court,
after the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any
alleged error on its part does not, in the absence of clear
proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the
complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award
of protest expenses and attorneys fees are concerned,
therefore we find them to have been awarded by
respondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest
not having been a clearly unfounded one under the
aforementioned circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. While we uphold the COMELEC decision
dated May 5, 1995 that private respondent Joseph
Evangalista is the winner in the election for mayor of
the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, that
portion of the decision is deemed moot and academic
because the term of office for mayor has long
expired. That portion of the decision awarding actual
damages to private respondent Joseph Evangelista is
hereby declared null and void for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
Gonzales v. Narvasa
Facts:
on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and
recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin
the Commission on Audit from passing in audit
expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner

prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to

furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.
PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study
and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to
the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing
the same.
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on
two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office
which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
[2]
Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body
the President is intervening in a process from which he is
totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the
fundamental charter.
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the
PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We
agree.
An action is considered moot when it no longer
presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead.[4] Under E.O.
No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on
or before June 30, 1999.[5] However, on February 19,
1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O.
No. 70), which extended the time frame for the
completion of the commissions work
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the
President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day.

The staleness of the issue before us is made more

manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed
for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to
enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. [7] Clearly,
prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body
sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well
established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and
does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.
[8]
At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would
simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is
definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners
lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the
successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the
PCCR is concerned.
Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest
they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from
the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that
their interest falls short of that required to maintain an
action under Rule 3, d 2.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which
can claim any injury in this case since, according to
petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislatures powers to create a public office and to
propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR.

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the
law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power - it is readily apparent that there
is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue
of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is
appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced
from the funds of the Office of the President.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the
President, not by Congress.
the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it
will entertain a taxpayers suit.[22] In the case at bar, there
being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the
creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but
rather, he must establish that he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
[23]
In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real
party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the
avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the

exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish
petitioner with the information requested.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., vote to dismiss on the ground that the case is
moot.
Bayan v. Zamora
Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States
of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which
formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military
personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered
into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under
the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and
the United States negotiated for a possible extension of
the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the
Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security.
The United States panel, met with the Philippine panel,
headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing
strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines
in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both
panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which

in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and

negotiations[3] that culminated in Manila on January 12
and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
[4]

The Pres officially transmitted to the Senate of the

Philippines,[5] the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of
the President[6] and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted

Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443[8] recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a
Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its
implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No.
443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3)
vote[9] of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was
then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.[10]
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into
force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
Issue: Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?

sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct

injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the
legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board
resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.[19]
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount
importance and the constitutional significance of the
issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier
and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in
the early Emergency Powers Cases,[20] where we had
occasion to rule:
x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders
issued by President Quirino although they were involving
only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that
they were not proper parties and ruled
that transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the
President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary
or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional
powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much
less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear
showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.

Ruling:
A party bringing a suit challenging the
constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained
or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He
must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute complained of.[14]
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to
the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or
are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners
have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. [15] On this
point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a
case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.[16]
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by
taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of
any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being
misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers,
have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito
Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do
not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the
present suit: While it may be true that petitioners pointed
to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their
legislative powers, petitioners failed however to

It is the Courts considered view that the President, in

ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the
Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and
limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to
decide, such as those relating to national security, it has
not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations.[54] The
High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by Article VIII,
Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing (of)
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise
its corrective power. It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents, this Court- as the
final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of
the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct
an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely
executive and legislative in character and nature. For the
Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and
limits the metes and bounds within which each of the
three political branches of government may exercise the
powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing

disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
Lozano v. Nograles
The two petitions, filed by their respective
petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling
upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the
Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise
the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the
Members of Congress. In essence, both petitions seek to
trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a
definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article
XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or
revising the Constitution.
This Courts power of review may be awesome,
but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing
with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis
mota presented.[4] The
case-or-controversy
requirement bans this court from deciding abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions,[5] lest the court
give opinions in the nature of advice concerning
legislative or executive action.[6]
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the
requisite of ripeness. The issue of ripeness is generally
treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence,
a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.[10] An alternative road to
review similarly taken would be to determine whether
an action has already been accomplished or performed
by a branch of government before the courts may step
in.[11]
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners
case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly
lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from
the act complained of. In the second place, House
Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the
purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and
no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More
importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence,
no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has
yet taken place.
- In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves
a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent
future event that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet
performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial
power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus, generally,
a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. [13] In
the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental

injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to

sue.
- Locus standi requires a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy for significant reasons.
It assures adverseness and sharpens the
presentation of issues for the illumination of
the Court in resolving difficult constitutional
questions.[14] The lack of petitioners personal
stake in this case is no more evident than in
Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any
legal or jurisprudential basis.
- Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured
by the claim of petitioners that they are
instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit requires
that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation.[15] It is undisputed that there has
been no allocation or disbursement of public
funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing
as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in
cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental importance or when paramount
public interest is involved.[16] While the Court
recognizes
the potential far-reaching
implications of the issue at hand, the possible
consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is
yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners
with locus standi under the transcendental
importance doctrine.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an
increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi,
evolving from the stringent requirements of personal
injury to the broader transcendental importance
doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an
open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file
petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective
largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a
partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a
particular, concrete injury.[18] When warranted by the
presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review,
this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the
constitutional challenge that may confront it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are
dismissed.

a.
b.
c.

d.

there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and
justify this Court's assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant petitions.

2.

YES, SC CAN REVIEW FACTUAL BASIS. Under the

new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized
not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

3.

The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL

insofar as it constitutes a call by PGMA on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence.

FUNCTUIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

David v. Arroyo
FACTS:
-

President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation

1017 declaring a state of national emergency:
commanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by the Pres.
On the same day - the President issued General Order
No. 5 implementing PP 1017. Immediately after that:
Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of E d s a P e o p le P o w e r
I ; and revoked the permits to hold rallies.
- March 3, 2006 PGMA lifted PP 1017 and issued
PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.

In the interim, seven (7) petitions challenging the

constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were led with this
Court against the above-named respondents.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New People's Army (NPA), and
some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo.

However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP

to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Osmea vs. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750

FACTS:

On June 20, 1991, RA No. 7056 was enacted. Such

RA was made for the 1992 National and Local
Elections

On July 30, 1991, Governor Emilio Osmea of Cebu,

et al filed a petition against the COMELEC for the
nullity of the said RA on the reason that the said law
was unconstitutional.

Such provisions in the said RA that were deemed by

the petitioners unconstitutional were:
o Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of
the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on
the second Monday of May 1992.
o

Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd

paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing
that all incumbent provincial, city and
municipal officials shall hold over beyond
June 30, 1992

The same paragraph of Section 3 of

Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens
the term or tenure of office of local officials
to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November,

ISSUE:
1. Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot
and academic.
2. Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of
PP 1017.
3. Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional.

RULING:
1.

NOT MOOT AND ACADEMIC. The Court holds that

President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

The respondents, COMELEC,

questioned the
jurisdiction of the Court to review such case for they
stated that the controversy was merely a political one
and therefore does not fall under the courts
jurisdiction

Issues:

The petitioner states that up to the time martial law

was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance
to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the
charges against him nor any copies of the so-called
supporting evidence.

First, whether or not, the Court has the right to review

the case.
Second, whether or not, the RA 7056 was
unconstitutional

Decision:
On the first Issue:

The Court has the competence and right to act on the

matter at bar because what was presented was the
question on the legality of RA 7056 and not its
wisdom.

The Court also stated that even if the issue was

political in nature, it was not exclusively a political
one, hence, involving a question of national
importance and falls for juridical review.

The Court further stated that under Section 1, Art. VIII

of the 1987 constitution, it is within the powers of the
court to determine whether there is grave abuse of
discretion resulting to excess or lack of jurisdiction by
other branches of the government.
On the second issue:

YES. It is unconstitutional.

Consti only provides for the synchronization of

national and local elections. However, RA 7056
provides for the de-synchronization of election by
mandating that there be two separate elections in
1992.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the Constitution which

fixed the term of office of all elective local officials,
except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the
local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected
will be serving for only two years and seven months

On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a

motion to dismiss the charges for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against
him. - Judge Ernani Cruz Pano denied the motion.

On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution

ordering the filing of an information for violation of
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against
40 people, including Salonga.

It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been

established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an
information against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues:

SALONGA vs PAO

1.

Whether the above case still falls under an actual

case

2.

Whether the above case dropped by the lower

court still deserves a decision from the Supreme
Court.

Facts:
Held:

Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the

bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of
those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General

sent the petitioner a Notice of Preliminary
Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.
(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating
that the preliminary investigation of the aboveentitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on
December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten
(10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the
supporting evidence within which to file his counterevidence.

1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case,

a consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the
prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in
the information filed under the questioned resolution.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing

of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due

to the cases moot and academic nature, it has on several
occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where
mootness was clearly apparent.

the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the

holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
therefrom.
2. No.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting v. COMELEC

Facts:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez
Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey
of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly
for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately.
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict
with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to
undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner
ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until
further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit
polls were actually conducted and reported by media without
any difficulty or problem.
Issue: 1. WON this is moot & academic
2. May the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban
exit polls?
Ruling:
1. The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and
academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been
held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual
controversy before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution
referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its
implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a
basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature,
exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution
of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop
up again in future elections.[6]

In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as

having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to
ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election.
While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the
broadcast of the results thereof [are] x x x an exercise of press
freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the
exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the
community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that
"an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the
randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the
exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of
such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count
made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the
exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process."
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable.
First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as
much as possible be representative or reflective of the general
sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second,
the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the
official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the
polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably
voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled
individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate
and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of
the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all,
the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative
effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting
centers -- does not justify a total ban on them.
WHAT COURTS MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Tuazon v. CA
Facts:
-

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to

reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on
the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of
the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for

the land-owner J. M. Tuason & Company had also

applied for a writ of prohibition against the Land Tenure
administration, the Auditor General, and the Solicitor
General, to restrain them from instituting expropriation
proceedings of the petitioner Company's land in Quezon
City
the Company claimed mainly that the Republic Act 2616
was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed
at depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters
and occupants, even if the property had been actually
subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public
At petitioner's request, Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the
Quezon City Court of First Instance (to whom the
prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction
After injunction was issued, the evictees in Quezon City
cases Q-1401 and 1402, Bruna Rosete and Tranquilino
Dizon, petitioned the Court of First Instance to suspend

the order of demolition of their houses, on the ground

that they were tenants of the Tatalon Estate
Judge Nicasio Yatco of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City denied the suspension because no
expropriation proceedings had been actually filed.
the evictees Rosete and Dizon recoursed to the Court of
Appeals, and there instituted certiorari proceedings
against Judge Yatco and Caluag, J. M. Tuason & Co.
Inc., and the Land Tenure Administration.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the

constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation
without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the
improper exercise of legislative power by the former president
under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos
was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that
had the force of law.
Issue:

Issue: WON the question of the constitutionality of RA 2616

can be raised before the CA
Ruling:

1.
2.

WON the EO is constitutional

WON a lower court can exercise judicial review

Ruling:
It is urged by amicus curiae that Courts of First Instance have no
jurisdiction to entertain actions assailing the constitutionality of
statutes or treaties, because section 10 of Article VIII of the
Constitution prescribes that
No treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of the (Supreme) Court.
This contention is, however, destroyed by the terms of section 2
of Article VIII, wherein the Constitution itself inhibits Congress
from depriving the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive orders or
regulations is in question (Emphasis supplied).
Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both
provisions together, it is readily discerned that the two-third vote
of the Supreme Court, required by section 10 of Article VIII,
conditions only the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

1. we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of

the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
2. This Court has declared that while lower courts should
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply
means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.
POLITICAL LAW
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Facts:

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in
1984 and these wer confiscated by the station commander in
Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits
transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner,
for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner

Bermudez seeking for the clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom
between the incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected
Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers to.
Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for
declaratory relief?

Held:
It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. (Note: ROC provides that the
jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC )
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against
the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C.
Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
It being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and
provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992
for purposes of synchronization of election

valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a

separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the
supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the
majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently
already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats
(even though those will come from the majority party). This is
still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring
to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides,
the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided
such rules comply with the Constitution.
Estrada v. Desierto
Facts:

Taada v. Cuenco
Facts:
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate
was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The
lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to
the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was
a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3
senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party.

But since there is only one minority senator, the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by
the NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court.
So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP)
averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the
issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate
alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the
bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No.
The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The
Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to decide upon the
official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada was
whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings

involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee.
On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the House of
Representatives and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations
of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to
the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada.
As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as
the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for
a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added
that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared
that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post.
At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition
for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
Issue: WON the issue in this case is a political issue
Ruling: No.
Political questions " those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation
of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers
under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.

promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days.

Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare
before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Salazar v. Achacoso
Facts:

EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the

POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.

Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank

Facts:
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939,
maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage.
On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan,
defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for
the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.
Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen
years having elapsed from the date of maturity.
PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription
would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act extending the period of moratorium
was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation
of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the
recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such
contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
Issue: WON the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act
extending the Moratorium Law before the same were declared
invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration
of Unconstitutionality of a law)
Ruling: YES.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative
fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because
of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were
war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of
cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the
eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act
No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiffs suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July
13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were
started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short
of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however,
from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32,
to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was

Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a

telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the
complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34
of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code.
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went
to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs.
For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted
costumes.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of
the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and
hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged
that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties
were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code
Ruling:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting
officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure
and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code.
The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of
Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of
the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportation is, obviously, exceptional.
It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other
cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole

domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order

was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the

warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the

things to be seized.