Lorenzo v.

Posadas
FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and
considerable amount of real and personal
properties. His will provide 10 years after his
death, his nephew Matthew Hanley would
become owner of his properties. Plaintiff
Lorenzo was appointed as trustee. During
plaintiffs incumbency as trustee, the defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the
estate left by the deceased at the time of his
death consisted of realty and personalty,
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax.
The defendant prayed that the trustee be ordered
to pay the Government the inheritance tax
together with the penalties for delinquency in
paying such tax. The trustee, plaintiff Loada,
paid under protest and however, he demanded
that he be refunded for the amount paid. The
defendant overruled plaintiffs protest and
refused to refund the amount.
ISSUES:
1. When does the inheritance accrue?
2. Should the inheritance be computed on the
basis of the value of the estate at the time of the
testators death or on its value 10 years later?
HELD:
1. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or
devolution of property of a decedent, made
effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or
privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed to,
receive, or take property by or under a will or
the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to
become operative at or after death. Thomas
Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the
inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of
the testators death - If death is the generating
source from which the power of the estate to

impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if,

upon the death of the decedent, succession takes
place and the right of the estate to tax vests
instantly, the tax should be measured by the
value of the estate as it stood at the time of the
decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent
contingency value of any subsequent increase or
decrease in value.
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the
time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding
the postponement of the actual possession or
enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and
the tax measured by the value of the property
transmitted at that time regardless of its
appreciation or depreciation.

Uson v. del Rosario

FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership
and possession of five (5) parcels of land in
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria
del Rosario and her four illegit children.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino

Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow
Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law
wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally
of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special

defense that Uson and her husband, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to

separate as husband and wife and, in

consideration of which Uson was given a parcel
of land and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson.
Defendants appealed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Uson has a right over the

lands from the moment of death of her husband?

2. Whether or not the illegitimate children of

deceased and his common-law wife have
successional rights?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is

the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case.

There is likewise no dispute that Maria del

Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with
whom she had four illegitimate children with the
deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this
background, it is evident that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the
moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).

As this Court aptly said, The property belongs

to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death. From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had
relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire
and leave upon his death in the deed of
separation, cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given

retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the
prior legislation only if no vested rights are
impaired.Hence, since the right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband, the new right recognized by the new
Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children
of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria
Uson over the lands in dispute.

Bonilla v. Barcena

FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother
of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil
action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over
certain parcels of land located in Abra.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena
is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss,
counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by
her minor children and her husband; but the
court after the hearing immediately dismissed
the case on the ground that a dead person cannot
be a real party in interest and has no legal
personality to sue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI erred in dismissing the

complaint?

HELD:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot
sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.
The records of this case show that the death of
Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975
while the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975. This means that when the complaint was
filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was
still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired
jurisdiction over her person.

Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court

whenever a party to a pending case dies it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death and to give the
name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives. This duty was complied with
by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court that

Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and

asked for the proper substitution of parties in the
case.

The respondent Court, however, instead of

allowing the substitution, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that a dead person has
no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided
for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance whether such
right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs
to the property of the deceased vests in them
even before judicial declaration of their being
heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her

claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation
in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by
her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest
in the properties in litigation and became parties
in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no
reason for the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in interest for the
deceased plaintiff.

The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an

action to quiet title over the parcels of land in
litigation affects primarily and principally
property and property rights and therefore is one
that survives even after her death. It is,

therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to

order the legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her.
But what the respondent Court did, upon being
informed by the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss
the complaint. This should not have been done
for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a
legal
representative
of
the
deceased.
Unquestionably, the respondent Court has
gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in
dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of
parties in the case.

De borja v. vda de Borja

FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of
the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco,
with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed
executor and administrator, until he died; his son
Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco
had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she
instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of
Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed
special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered
upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana
opposed the approval of the compromise
agreement. She argues that it was no valid,
because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was
made, the will was still being probated with the
CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement is
valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet
been probated?

HELD:
YES. The compromise agreement is valid. The
agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive
P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary
share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.

There was here no attempt to settle or distribute

the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a
hereditary share in a decedents estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.

BUTTE vs. MANUEL UY & SONS

FACTS:

1. Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house

and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the
death of Jose V. Ramirez, all his property
including the 1/6 undivided share was
bequeathed to his children and grandchildren
and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M.
Butte.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may
exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of
them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is gross expensive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

2.
Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold
the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.
including the undivided 1/6 share property in
Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of
letter regarding the above-mentioned sell was
sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
administrator of the property of Jose V. Ramirez.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise

the right to redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share that may respectively
have in the thing owned in common.

3. Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against

Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption
when the latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the
said sold property.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the

right of succession to exercise legal redemption
over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda
de Ramirez.
HELD:

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of

succession to exercise legal redemption over the
share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de
Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the
heirs of the 1/6 undivided property of Jose V.
Ramirez.

SALVADOR vs. STA. MARIA

7 parcels of titled land and 2 parcels of

untitled land (Bigaa, Bulacan) were owned by
Celestino Salvador.

In 1941, he executed a deed of sale in

favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and
Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void
for lack of consideration, he filed a suit for
reconveyance against said vendees (CFI of
Bulacan, Br. I).

On 4/27/1956, Celestino Salvador died,

testate. As his alleged heirs, 21 persons were
substituted as plaintiffs in the action for
reconveyance.

Meanwhile, a special proceeding for the

probate of his will was instituted. In said
proceedings,
Dominador
Cardenas
was
appointed as special administrator (CFI of
Bulacan, Br. II).

The administrator filed in Br. II an

inventory of properties of the estate, covering

the same parcels of land subject matter of the

reconveyance action.

Subsequently, Celestino Salvador's will

was admitted to probate and Dominador
Cardenas was appointed executor of said will.

23 persons were instituted heirs in the

will. Of these, 9 were not among the 21 alleged
relatives substituted in the reconveyance case
and of the 21 substituted alleged heirs 7 were
not instituted in the will.

In the suit for reconveyance, the CFI

ordered that the defendants (Sps. Alfonso &
Anatolia), to reconvey the parcels of land to the
estate of Celestino Salvador. The defendants
Appealed to CA, but the decision was affirmed
by CA, with the correction that reconveyance be
in favor of the 21 heirs substituted as plaintiffs
therein.

3 years later, pursuant to an order in the

testacy proceedings, Lot 6 was sold so that
debtors who filed claims may be paid. The PNB
bought it and the amount was then deposited in
the same bank by the administrator, subject to
Court order.

The defendants in the suit for

reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance
over the subject parcels of land, in favor of
Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same
in accordance with the final judgment. Br. I
ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be
executed, in favor of the 21 persons substituted
as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, a new
deed of reconveyance was made, in favor of said
21 persons as heirs of Celestino.

Subsequently, a new title certificate was

issued in the names of the 21 persons.

Br. I (reconveyance court) ordered the

PNB to release the proceeds of the sale of Lot 6,
to the 21 plaintiffs in the reconveyance case.

Apparently, although the passbook was given by

the administrator to said 21 persons, no release
was made, as the PNB awaited Br. II's order.

On March 1, 1966, Br. II, approved

claims against the estate.

On March 30, 1966, Br. II (probate

court), ordered return of the passbook to the
administrator and release to the administrator by
the PNB of the P41,184.00, or so much thereof
is needed to pay the afore-stated debts of the
estate.

After failing to get reconsideration of

said order, the 21 substituted heirs filed with the
Court the present special civil action for
certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail
the order to pay the debts of the estate with the
P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6; and to
question Br. II's (probate court) power to dispose
of the parcels of land involved in the
reconveyance suit in Br. I.
ISSUES:
(1)
Are the parcels of land and the proceeds
of the sale of one of them, properties of the
estate or not? YES
(2)
Does
final
judgment
in
the
reconveyance suit in favor of the 21 heirs who
substituted Celestino Salvador, bar the
disposition of the reconveyed properties by the
settlement court? NO
RULING:
The right of heirs to specific, distributive shares
of inheritance does not become finally
determinable until all the debts of the estate are
paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their
rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and
subject to the existence of a residue after
payment of the debts.

They only contend that the properties involved

having been ordered by final judgment
reconveyed to them, not to the estate the same
are not properties of the estate but their own, and
thus, not liable for debts of the estate.
The said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners
rely for their rights on their alleged character as
heirs of Celestino; as such, they were substituted
in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to
them was reconveyance to them as heirs of
Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties
they claim are, even by their own reasoning, part
of Celestino's estate. The right thereto as
allegedly his heirs would arise only if said
parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino,
not otherwise. Their having received the same in
the reconveyance action was perforce in trust for
the estate, subject to its obligations. They cannot
distribute said properties among themselves as
substituted heirs without the debts of the estate
being first satisfied.
At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone appears
more than sufficient to pay the debt and there
will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As
to the question of who will receive how much as
heirs, the same is properly determinable by the
settlement court, after payment of the debts.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied,
without costs.

RAMIREZ vs. BALTAZAR

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a

real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this
case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the
mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of
Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs
Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the

deceased. Felimon was later appointed as

adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio
Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator
of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a
foreclosure of the property in question and
succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer
against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued,
the property was bought by the mortgagees
themselves and the sale was confirmed by the
court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the
entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among
others the failure of the judicial administrator to
protect their interests. Defendants contended that
plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava
no cause of action.

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action

against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights

to succession are automatically transmitted to
the heirs from the moment of the death of the
decedent. While, as a rule, the formal
declaration or recognition to such successional
rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court
has, under special circumstances, protected these
rights from encroachments made or attempted
before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs.
Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no
legal standing in court upon the commencement
of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule
admits of an exception as "when the
administrator fails or refuses to act in which
event the heirs may act in his place."

LOCSIN VS. CA

Facts:

Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last

Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina
Jaucian Locsin, as the sole and universal heir of
all his properties. The spouses being childless,
had agreed that their properties, after both of
them shall have died should revert to their
respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's
properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"
(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian
relatives."
Don Mariano died of cancer on
September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In
due time, his will was probated in Special
Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any
opposition from both sides of the family. Don
Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the
terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years
after his death, as if in obedience to his voice
from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was
also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment,
Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to
their respective nephews and nieces. She made
the following sales and donation of properties
which she had received from her husband's
estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
Four years before her death, she had
made a will on October 22, 1973 she had made
a will affirming and ratifying the transfers she
had made during her lifetime in favor of her
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the
reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that
there was no need to submit it to the court for
probate because the properties devised to them
under the will had already been conveyed to
them by the deceased when she was still alive,
except some legacies which the executor of her
will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,
proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews

and nieces who had already received their
legacies and hereditary shares from her estate,
filed action in the RTC-Legaspi to recover the
properties which she had conveyed to the
Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the
conveyances
were
inofficious,
without
consideration, and intended solely to circumvent
the laws on succession. Those who were closest
to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA
affirmed the said decion,hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces
of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled
to inherit the properties which she had already
disposed of more than ten (10) years before her
death.

Held: NO
They are not entitled since those
properties did not form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of (the
decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession."
The rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death, and
do not vest in his heirs until such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had
transferred or conveyed to other persons during
her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate
at the time of her death to which her heirs may
lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the

property that remained in her estate at the time

of her death devolved to her legal heirs.
Even if those transfers were, one and all,
treated as donations, the right arising under
certain circumstances to impugn and compel the
reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter
vivos does not inure to the respondents since
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or
forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory
heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any
such, hence there were no legitimes that could
conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her
property during her lifetime. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in
nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even
her entire estate subject only to the limitation set
forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it
were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the
present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of
the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without
such reservation, the donation shall be reduced
on petition of any person affected.

dissolve their partnership and executed an

agreement of partition and distribution of the
partnership properties among them.

Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any

statement of assets and liabilities of the
partnership, and to render an accounting of the
partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on
his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the
deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the
partnership. Tabanao's filed against petitioner an
action for accounting, payment of shares,
division of assets and damages.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the

capacity to sue the petitioner.

HELD:

FACTS:

No. The surviving spouse does not need to be

appointed as executrix or administratrix of the
estate before she can file the action. She and her
children are complainants in their own right as
successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights
insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.

Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto

Divinagracia were partners in a business concern
known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry.
Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had

against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law,
more particularly by succession, which is a

Petition for review is granted.

EMNACE vs. CA

mode of acquisition by virtue of which the

property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted. Moreover, respondents became
owners of their respective hereditary shares from
the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes

died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano
as the executrix. Hence, this case.

CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS

Whether or not the will was valid

ISSUES:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over

probate proceedings
GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the
probate court
EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issues.

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes

Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the
surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is
Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the
entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for

reprobate of a will, alleging among others that
Adoracion was an American citizen and that the
will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in
Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.

HELD:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is

limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
The intrinsic validity normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that

Adoracion was an American citizen and the law
which governs her will is the law of
Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of
the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic

validity of the provisions of the will, the national
law of the decedent must apply.

As to the issue of jurisdiction --

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos

was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where
she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania,
USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court
in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief, against his opponent
and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdictio