Good afternoon everyone,

We are group two and we are going to present our answers for the following
question, ..
So two pilot projects were mentioned in the case article. The first is the Family
First programme, which sought alternative out-of-home treatments for mentally
disturbed children and was led by the Department of Mental Health. The second
pilot project was the Family Preservation Services, which was initiated by the
Department of Social Services and sought to limit the children that are placed out
of home.
So these are some of the lessons that can be learnt from the Family First pilot
project.
Firstly, it was important that all agencies involved share blah blah. They shared
similar concerns about the disturbed children and saw the need for more
interagency collaboration in order to provide more comprehensive services to
help the children. This gave them a common goal to work towards, and also
increased the likelihood of coordination between the different parties.
Secondly, we have also learnt the importance of having regular meetings and
reevaluation of the programme on the interagency level. This is because repeated
interactions provide participants cooperation incentives to achieve long-term
gains (individual as well as collective). It will then create a pattern of relationship
that can then define mutual expectations and mutual dependence.
Thirdly, it is also important that participants are willing to learn from each other
through interagency interactions. Although they may share common goals and
ideology, different parties have different service delivery methods which may
result in disagreements. Therefore, it was crucial that the agencies involved in the
FF pilot project set up interagency teams at all levels of the cooperation and they
learnt the most through the interagency interactions.

1) ITERATIVE CO-ORDINATION POLITICS

Coordination processes are more effective when each event represents one in a
continuing series of interactions. If decisions are seen as entirely one-off and
separable, each participant has incentives to maximize gains on each decision
and not to cooperate. On the other hand, repeated interactions provide
participants cooperation incentives to achieve long-term gains (individual as well
as collective). It will then create a pattern of relationship that can then define
mutual expectations and mutual dependence.
The local community teams in the FF project met on a very frequent basis. This
team met monthly to assess the key problems that existed in the county for
children, as well as to evaluate their current social services system. Their job was
to identify the roadblocks that prevented children from receiving the
comprehensive services necessary for their progress.
This gave them a sense that even though the FF was only a pilot project, it can
have long-term benefits for the clients they serve. Therefore, it encourages the
participants to strive for long-term goals instead of short-term individual aims.

2) THE POLITICS OF COORDINATION

Coordination in the public sector is inherently a political process. When
coordination is emphasized during policy formulation, rather than at the
administrative stage, conflicts of interests inherent in politics dominate the
rational considerations that may appear in administrative actions.
For both pilot projects, state-planning committees were formed, and included
members from different agencies. These state-level committees set broad goals
and ideas for a collaborative structure. However, the actual working policy
details were formulated by technical assistance groups. The groups consist of
experts with deep knowledge in the field. Local community teams were also set
up to provide comprehensive services to the children. Most of the interagency
coordination was done at the lower echelons of the organizations instead of the
top managements.
3) COMMON IDEALOGY

As all the agencies involved were in very similar policy areas, coordination
would be unlikely if they lack common ideas about service delivery. However, all
three agencies that were involved in the FF programme shared similar concerns
about the disturbed children and saw the need for more interagency
collaboration in order to provide more comprehensive services to help the
children.
Eg. Concerned about costs of specialized out-of-home treatments, common goal
of finding alternative treatments for the disturbed children, all three agencies
committed money and manpower to the programme.