Federation of Free Farmers v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-41461; September 10, 1981
Davao Oriental Electric Cooperative, Inc., v Province Of Davao Oriental
G.R. No. 170901; January 20, 2009
Facts:
Davao Oriental Electric Cooperative, Inc. (herein petitioner) was organized under PD
No. 269 which granted a number of tax and duty exemption privileges to electric
cooperatives, however, pursuant to PD No. 1955 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, withdrew these exemptions. During Cory Aquinos term as President, FIRB No.
24-87 restored the tax and duty exemption privileges of electric cooperatives under PD
No. 269 and became effective July 1, 1987. FIRB filed a complaint for collection of
delinquent real property taxes against petitioner for the years 1984 until 1989. Petitioner
contends that it was exempt from the payment of real estate taxes from 1984 to 1989
because the restoration of tax exemptions under FIRB Resolution No. 24-87 retroacts to
the date of withdrawal of said exemptions. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of
petitioner. Respondent appealed to the CA which set aside the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
WON the FIRB Resolution retroacts to the date of effectivity of PD 1955
Held:
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without interpretation. Even a cursory reading of the resolution bares no indication of
retroactivity of its application. FIRB Resolution No. 24-87 is crystal clear in stating that
tax exemptions will be restored effective July 1, 1987. There is no other way to construe
it.

PAGCOR v PEJI
586 SCRA 650
Facts:
RA 7903 was enacted to create the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBAECOZONE) and the ZAMBAECOZONE Authority which confer upon it the
power under Sec 7 to operate either directly or indirectly... tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports." In the exercise of its power,
ZAMBAECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 granting Philippine EGaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) license over online games of chance. This prompted
PAGCOR to file a petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of
chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue:
Whether or not the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority has the mandate to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE
Held:
RA 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license
games of chance in the ZAMBAECOZONE. The law only specifically allows the
operation of tourism-related activities including games, amusements and recreational
and sports facilities and not any gaming activity. The words "game" and amusement
have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from "game
of chance" or gambling. Congress could have easily employed the words "games of
chance" if they had intended to grant the power to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority,
however, they did not. The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or
will, and preclude the court from construing it differently.

Agencia Exquisite v CIR

578 SCRA 539
People v Jabinal
55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974
Facts:
The instant case was an appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme
Courts ruling in People v Mapa. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he
was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was
without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a secret
agent appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as
Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the
performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts
decision in People v Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his
aquittal. Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court
nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People v Macarandang and People v Lucero
were reversed and subsequently abandoned in People v Mapa.
Issue: WON appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in
Macarandana and Lucero
Held:
The SC held that the decision in People v. Mapa reversing the Macarandang and
Lucero doctrines came only in 1967, it has no proper application in this case. Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system in the Philippines. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was
part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found
by possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof. Petitioner incurred no criminal liability at the time of the
commission of the crime since the prevailing doctrine then were the doctrines of
Macarandang and Lucero.The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was
acquitted.

CEMCO Holdings v National Life Insurance Company

G.R. No. 171815; August 7, 2007
Canet v Decena
G.R. No. 155344; January 20, 2004
Facts:
Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Julieta Decena
was the mayor therein. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to
operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001
regulating the operation of cockpits. This ordinance was submitted to Decena for her
approval but she denied it because the said ordinance does not contain rules and
regulations as well as a separability clause. The council then decided to shelf the
ordinance indefinitely. Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayors permit for the operation
of his cockpit. Decena denied Canets application on the ground that under Secton 447
of the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the regulation of
cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang
Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued

Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit based on the 1998 resolution
allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances which
generally provide for the issuance of a mayors permit for the operation of businesses.
Issue: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit without a municipal
ordinance which would empower her to do so.
Held:
No. To compel Decena to issue the mayors permit would not only be a violation of the
explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also
be an undue encroachment on Decenas administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998
resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an
ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). It was supposed
to be Ordinance No. 001, however, it was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, since there is no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit, Resolution No.
049, S. 1998, authorizing petitioner to operate a cockpit in Camarines Sur cannot be
implemented. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that what is expressed puts
an end to what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body
would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Indeed, courts
may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers.