G.R. No.

L-24796

June 28, 1968

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DISTRICT 13, BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY 1 and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, the SHERIFF OF
THE PROVINCE of BULACAN, and PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
INC.,respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-25459

June 28, 1968

PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of National Defense;
HON. ENETERIO DE JESUS, in his capacity as Undersecretary of National Defense;
GENERAL RIGOBERTO ATIENZA, in his capacity as the Chief of Staff; 2 Armed Forces of the Philippines,
COLONEL MANUEL V. REYES, in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General, Armed Forces of the
Philippines;
and the TASK FORCES COMMANDER, Task Force Preserve (Tabak Division), 1st Infantry Division, Fort
Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, respondents.
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
for
petitioner
Director
Gualberto Cruz for respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation.

of

Forestry,

et

al.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Two original actions involving divers legal questions are now before this Court.
In the first, L-24796, the corresponding government officials seek on certiorari and prohibition to annul the order
and writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case 3035-M allowing
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco, for short) to haul its logs in the area hereinafter
to be mentioned.
In the second, L-25459, it was Piadeco's turn to ask on prohibition and injunction for a ruling that respondent
government officials are "without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction of the roads,
cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products" from said corporation's private woodland area.
Because of their interrelation, the two case are here jointly considered.
The following undisputed facts control:
Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray
and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence
of ownership consists of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894, 4 and a deed of absolute sale of July 12,
1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau
of Forestry, on December 4, 1963, issued in Piadeco's name Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR
2065-New, covering but a portion of the land an aggregate area of 4,400 hectares and an average stand of 87.20
cubic meters, situated in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose del Monte, all of the province of

Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on December 31, 1964. By virtue of the registration certificate,
Piadeco conducted logging operations..
The controversy in the these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera
issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him.
Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the
Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.5
On April 14, 1964, Forest Station Warden Reinaldo B. Marquez, District 13, Bureau of Forestry, wrote Piadeco
requesting the latter to desist, effective the same day, April 14, 1964, from conducting its logging operation inside or
outside the area covered by PWR 2065-New, and to refrain from removing logs already cut unless they have been
scaled and properly invoiced by forestry officers.
Previously, on April 10, 1964, Nawasa's board of directors advised Piadeco, by letter, of the revocation of the 1964
grant to Piadeco, of a right of way from a barrio in Bosoboso, Antipolo, to Montalban, Rizal, as an access road to its
logging concession under PWR 2061.
Offshot of the foregoing is Piadeco's petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, lodged on April
17, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 6 This petition was directed against the Director of Forestry,
Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon the averment that their acts heretofore narrated were
"all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and capricious." On the same day, April 17, 1964, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of
the Bulacan court directed the government authorities to show cause why preliminary injunction should not issue.
On May 4, 1964, over the Director of Forestry's opposition, the judge ordered the issuance upon a P10,000-bond
of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden and Nawasa from
carrying out and executing the April 10, 1964 revocation by Nawasa of Piadeco's right of way, the April 11, 1964 order
of the Director of Forestry, and the April 14, 1964 directive of the Forest Station Warden, heretofore mentioned.
On May 5, 1964, Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure to answer its petition on time.
On May 6, 1964, unaware of Piadeco's May 5 motion, the forestry officials, upon a motion dated April 29, 1964, asked
the Bulacan court to dismiss Piadeco's petition upon the averments that said court had no jurisdiction over their
persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted by
Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a separate motion, said forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the
lower court's order granting preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by
Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations which are the main source of water supply of the
City of Manila and its surrounding towns and cities poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up to the
prejudice and irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. Piadeco file written opposition on May 13, 1964.
On May 14, 1964, acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and opposition thereto, the judge below ruled
that although Piadeco is entitled to injunction, the continuance thereof would cause great damage to the government,
while Piadeco can be fully compensated for any damages Piadeco may suffer because of the dissolution thereof.
That bond, however, was not filed by the forestry officials.
On July 13, 1964, upon Piadeco's May 5 motion earlier adverted to, the forestry officials were declared in default.
On July 24, 1964, said forestry officials filed a verified motion to set aside the default order and to admit their answer
thereto attached. They pleaded excusable neglect and/or oversight of the clerk of the records of the Records section
of the Bureau of Forestry.
On July 29, 1964, the court shunted aside the foregoing motion for the reason that their six days' delay was not
excusable and their answer was prepared only after three days from their receipt of the order of default. A motion for

reconsideration registered by the forestry officials on August 12, 1964 was unavailing. The court below struck down
that motion on September 4, 1964.
Thus it is, that Piadeco submitted evidence ex parte to the court below against the Director of Forestry and the Forest
Station Warden.
Piadeco had, in the meantime, entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco's case against
Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco remaining revoked and cancelled; and
Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also withdrawn in consideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to
Nawasa, representing the former's liabilities to the latter.
On December 29, 1964, the court below rendered judgment. It approved Piadeco's compromise agreement with
Nawasa. It held that Piadeco was the owner of the land in question; that its operation was not in violation of forestry
rules and regulations; that aside from its regulation certificate, Piadeco was permitted by Nawasa thru the latter's
Resolution 1050, Section of 1963, to conduct selective logging within the Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment of
P2.00 for every cubic meter of timber classified in the first group and P1.75 belonging to the second group; that
similar permits were issued to other individuals by the Director of Forestry with the acquiescence of Nawasa; that
Piadeco's logging under Resolution 1050 aforesaid could not be contrary to forestry rules and regulations; and that,
upon the doctrine laid down in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31, 1963, even if Piadeco's
private woodland was unregistered, it still retains its inherent "rights of ownership, among which are (its) rights to the
fruits of the land and to exclude any persons from the enjoyment and disposal thereof", its only liability being the
payment of surcharges on the timber severed from the land. Thereupon, the court reinstated the writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued and made it permanent, with costs.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1964, one day before the rendition of the judgment just mentioned, Piadeco applied for
the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration PWR 2065-New, which would expire on the last day of
that month. On January 12, 1965, in reply thereto, Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal
requested. He informed Piadeco that its Titulo de Propiedad 4136 was not registerable under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 12-2 which took effect on January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration certificate and the non-renewal
thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was
denounced by some members of Congress thereby attracting national attention. This led to a directive by the
President of the Philippines on March 8, 1965 to stop all illegal logging operations. Complying therewith, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources wrote the Secretary of National Defense with the request that units of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines be detailed at the areas involved, deputizing them agents of the Bureau of
Forestry to assist in the enforcement of forest laws, rules and regulations, and the protection of the forests. The
Secretary of National Defense, in turn, direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And,
the Chief of Staff dispatched at ask force of the army into the Angat area, which impounded and seized all logs cut by
Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedly conducting illegal operations.
On May 11, 1965, Piadeco sought from the Bulacan court an ex parte writ of execution of the December 29, 1964
decision. That decision had by then become final for failure of the forestry officials to appeal therefrom. Piadeco
prayed that it be not molested in its logging operations including the hauling of about 600 pieces (unscaled) and
1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled and unscaled) timber from the log ponds.
On May 12, 1965, the Bulacan court presided over temporarily by Judge Ricardo C. Puno set Piadeco's motion for
execution for hearing on May 27, 1965. Before the day of the hearing arrived, however, Piadeco withdrew its ex
parte motion for execution with the manifestation that it would look for a more expeditious way or a more appropriate
remedy to enable it to haul the logs before the rains set in. But on May 27, 1965, Piadeco refiled its motion for
execution with Judge Muoz, who had meanwhile resumed his duties.
On June 1, 1965, Judge Muoz granted Piadeco's motion. In line therewith, on June 3, 1965, the corresponding writ
of execution was issued, directing a special sheriff to make effective and execute the aforesaid lower court's decision
of December 29, 1964.

Execution notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to haul its logs. Because of this, on
June 11, 1965, Piadeco asked the court below to declare the forestry officials and those acting under them in
contempt. On June 30, 1965, the forestry officials opposed. They averred that Piadeco's registration certificate
already expired on December 31, 1964; that despite this expiration, Piadeco continued illegal logging operations,
which resulted in the seizure of its logs: that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court
below became functus officio and could no longer be executed. Piadeco's rejoinder of July 1, 1965 was that its
registration certificate is not expirable and that it is not a license.
On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration of petitioner's
[Piadeco's] license (?) on December 31, 1964, their said property remains registered with the Bureau of Forestry
subject only to renewal, in which case it can still pursue its logging operations, conditioned upon the payment by it of
forest charges." The judge took into consideration a certificate issued on May 4, 1965 by Assistant Director of
Forestry J. L. Utleg, as officer-in-charge, that "all the timber cut ... during the lifetime" of the registration certificate
"may be transported by" Piadeco "provided they are properly documented." Finding that Piadeco "complied with all
the requirements of the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Internal Revenue as regards the proper documentation
of the logs in question," the judge thereupon directed the forestry officials "and all members of the Armed Forces
stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul its logs which have already been properly documented."
This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden, the Armed Forces
Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition with this Court (L-24796, now at bar) for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to annul the June 1,1965 order of execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution and the July 8,
1965 order allowing Piadeco to haul its logs. Named respondents were Piacedo, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the
Bulacan court, and the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan..
On July 30, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, as prayed for by the aforenamed government
officials. On August 3, 1965, Piadeco sought the dissolution thereof for the reason, amongst others, that Mr. J. L.
Utleg, Assistant Director of Forestry and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Forestry, was already agreeable
mentioned, as per his letter of June 7, 1965 to Piadeco informing the latter that the writ of execution was being
referred to the Forest Station Warden for compliance. On August 9, 1965, the Solicitor General blocked Piadeco's
motion to dissolve, with an allegation, amongst others, that the June 7, 1965 letter just mentioned was deemed
recalled when the Director Forestry realizing that the said writ would allow Piadeco to continue logging after the
expiration and non-renewal of its certificate in a public forest area or in an area excluded from the expired permit
did not give effect to the said letter.
On August 18, 1965, manifestation was made by the Solicitor General to this Court thru a motion dated August 17,
1965, that the logs seized and imposed by the armed forces were being exposed to the elements; that the rainy
season having set in, there was grave danger that the said logs might deteriorate and become useless. He thus
prayed that the forestry officials be authorized to turn the logs over to the engineer corps of the Armed Forces for the
construction of prefabricated schoolhouses pursuant to General Circular V-337, series of 1961, of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. On August 31, 1965, Piadeco objected upon the ground that the said logs are still its private
property; and that there is no law empowering the State to seize, confiscate and turn over the cut logs to the Armed
Forces.
On September 29, 1965, Piadeco, in turn, petitioned for preliminary injunction and moved again to dissolve this
Court's writ of preliminary injunction of July 30, 1965. It called attention to the fact that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the court below on May 4, 1964 in Civil Case 3035-M is still enforceable and has not yet been
dissolved because the forestry officials have not filed their P10,000.00-bond as required by the trial court in its order
of May 14, 1964.
On October 8, 1965, this Court denied the two motions of Piadeco, declared that the writ of preliminary injunction it
issued stands enforced and is effective until otherwise lifted, and authorized the Solicitor General to effect the
removal of all the logs subject of his motion of August 17, 1965 from the log ponds but only for the purpose of turning
them over to the Armed Forces for safekeeping and custody pending final resolution of the case.

On October 14, 1965, Piadeco traversed the averments of the forestry officials' petition before this Court, thru an
answer dated October 12, admission of which was however denied for being late. The case was submitted without
further memoranda.
Meanwhile, a companion case (L-25459, also at bar)emerged from subsequent events hereunder related.
On October 20, 1965, pending this Court's resolution of the foregoing petition of the forestry officials (L-24796),
Piadeco wrote the Director of Forestry with a request to grant it "AUTHORITY to cut, gather and remove timber" from
its alleged private woodland. At the same time, it advised the Director of Forestry that "in the absence of such
authority or permit", it "shall cut, gather and remove timber from the said area subject to the payment of regular forest
charge and 300% surcharge for unlawful cutting in accordance with the penal provisions" of Section 266 of the Tax
Code.
On November 4, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg replied. He told Piadeco that "pending meticulous study" of its
application for renewal of PWR 2065-New, his "[o]ffice is not now in a position to grant" the desired authority and "will
consider any cutting, gathering and removal of timber" from the land "to be illegal, hence, subject to the provisions of
Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code."
Obviously taking the foregoing letter as a case, Piadeco, on December 6, 1965, advised the Director that immediately
upon receipt of said letter, it (Piadeco) resumed logging operations within its private woodland area in the municipality
of Montalban, Rizal, "thereby subjecting all timber cut therefrom to the payment of 300% penalty, plus regular forest
charges." Piadeco also requested the Director to inform the Task Force Commander that it "can be allowed to
continue its logging operation within their private woodland" subject to Section 266 of the Tax Code.
So, on December 7, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg notified the Task Force Commander, through the
Undersecretary of National Defense, that Piadeco "can conduct logging operations within its private woodland, as it is
a constitutional right on its part to use and enjoy its own property and the fruits thereof" but that whatever timber cut
therefrom "should be subject to the payment not only of the regular charges but also of the surcharges imposed by
Section 166" of the Tax Code. This notwithstanding, the army authorities refused to heed Utleg's December 7, 1965
letter and stood pat on its posture not to allow Piadeco to conduct logging operations.
Hence, it was Piadeco's turn to come to this Court on December 22, 1965 on an original petition for injunction and
prohibition (L-25459 aforesaid) against respondents Secretary of National Defense, the Undersecretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff, the Judge Advocate General and the Task Force Commander (Task Force Preserve,
Tabak Division). Specifically, Piadeco charges as follows: On December 17, 1965, army men [Capt. Zamuco, Lt.
Oresque, Sgts. Albino, Gutierrez, Ramirez, and Sawada, and Cpl. Manlapus], boisterously, unlawfully, wilfully, and
feloniously entered upon orders of a certain Major Elfano Piadeco's land at Barrio Anginan, Montalban, Rizal,
outside the watershed reservations. They made a portion of the land their private quarters. They prevented Piadeco's
officers (a) from continuing its logging operations, especially the construction of the road inside the land; (b) from
cutting, gathering and removing timber and other forest products therefrom; and (c)from living and moving in freedom
and engaging in the pursuit of happiness on said land. Piadeco asks principally that respondent officials be declared
"without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and
removing of timber and other forest products from the Private Woodland area" of the former.
There was a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which this Court, however, denied on
December 31, 1965, and upon reconsideration, on February 1, 1966.
After respondents' answer, and hearing on oral arguments, the case was submitted for decision.
1. Basic to an intelligent appraisal of the rights of Piadeco, who comes to us as an alleged private wood landowner, is
the all-important question: Is Piadeco's title registrable with the Bureau of Forestry?

The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, viz:
SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private owner of land containing timber, firewood and
other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with
a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal
Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies shall render
assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry.
Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as amended by Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It reads:
7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering lands containing timber, firewood and other minor
forest products may be registered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;
(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent, free patent, and sales patent;
and
(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended) or under the
Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 consisted in
theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the titles registrable pursuant to Section
1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the islands and duly
recognized as valid titles under the existing laws."
Piadeco's position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829, which does not specify the titles that are
registrable thereunder; and that it is diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the Attorney General of October 15,
1919, which ruled that a royal title "issued in September, 1896, and inscribed in the Registry of Property within a year
after its issuance is valid, and therefore its owner is entitled to the benefits" of Section 1829 aforesaid. Also cited are
the Opinion of the Secretary of the Interior of November 7, 1916, stating that registration under Section 1829 is not
subject to change and revocation unless title is established in a different person by judicial declaration; the Opinion of
the Director of Forestry of January 8, 1925, which recognized as registrable, titles "such aninformacion
posesoria ..., composicion con el estado and purchase under the Spanish sovereignty" amongst others; and the
Opinion of the Collector of Internal Revenue of February 6, 1926, declaring imperfect titles within the purview of
Section 45(a) of Act 2874, as also registrable.
True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the Bureau
of Forestry. Concededly, too, administrative authorities in the past considered as registrable, titles issued during the
Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force, authorizing registration
of such Spanish titles. But when Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order
should be deemed to have repealed all such previous administrative determinations.
There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was
promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the
approval of the department head, to issue regulations "deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and
conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest
products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end."
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects
and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of

administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to
the standards that the law prescribes."8 In Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712, we pronounced that the
necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations for various and varying
details of management has been recognized and upheld by the courts.
And we are certainly totally unprepared to jettison Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 as illegal and unreasonable.
Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the present system. Although evidences of
ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru prescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor
imprescriptible. The law in this jurisdiction, both under the present sovereignty and the previous Spanish regime is
that ordinary prescription of ten years may take place against a title recorded in the Registry of Property "in virtue of
another title also recorded,"9 and extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years will run, even "without need of title or of
good faith."10 For possession for along period fixed by law, the "unquestionable foundation of the prescription of
ownership ... weakens and destroys the force and value of the best possible title to the thing possessed by one who
is not the owner thereof."11 The exception, of course, is the Torrens title, expressly recognized to be indefeasible and
impresciptible.12
And more. If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the
public domain, and cannot be appropriated.13 Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide
for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. 14 Possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.15
In this case, it is undisputed that Picadeco's title which it sought to register was issued by the Spanish sovereignty
Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is unmistakably not one of those enumerated in
Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can
never be renewed.
2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather, and remove timber from its alleged private
woodland, upon payment of forest charges and surcharges.
The purposes of registration, as succinctly stated in Section 6, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 dated July 1, 1941,
are:
6. Objects of registration (a) to exempt the owners of private woodlands from the payment of forest products
gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes.
(b) To regulate the transportation of forest products gathered or collected therefrom and to avoid fraud which may be
committed in connection with utilization of such forest products with respect to their origin.
(c) To determine the legality of private claims for the protection of the interest of the owners as well as of the
Government, and to exclude all land claimed under valid titles from the mass of the public forest in order to facilitate
the protection, administration, and supervision of the latter.
The foregoing has in part gained judicial approval in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, L-15532, October 31,
1963, where we pronounced: "Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in Section 1829 of the
Administrative Code is to exempt the titled owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for
under Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code." 16 And Section 266 of the Tax Code, therein mentioned,
provides in full:
SEC. 266. Charges collectible on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered private lands. The
charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removedfrom any private

land the title to which is not registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law: Provided, however,
That in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest
products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and
regulations. The cutting, and the removing of timber and other forest products from said private lands without license
shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forest and shall be
subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this Chapter. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 173, approved June
20, 1947.)17
Following this provision in the Tax Code is Section 267, which in part provides:
SEC. 267. Surcharges for illegal cutting and removal of forest products or for delinquency. Where forest products
are unlawfully cut or gathered in any public forest without license or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof,
the charges on such products shall be increased by three hundred per centum....
To recapitulate, registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry results in an
exemption "from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes." If an
owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code,
because "he still retain(s) his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)." 18 However, as provided in Section
266 above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other
forest products from his land, he may "secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest
Law and regulations." If he does not, under the same Section 266, his cutting, gathering and removing of timber and
other forest products "shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public
forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases." And this would bring into play Section 267,
where, as heretofore quoted, the charges on forest products "unlawfully cut and gathered in any public forest without
license, or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof ... shall be increased by three hundred per centum."
But it should be stressed that all of the situations herein mentioned refer specifically to owners of private woodlands.
The position Piadeco has taken is a jump ahead of where it should be. We are not ready to grant the assumption that
Piadeco owns the forest land it seeks to register. Such unwillingness can come from even a superficial assessment of
Piadeco's pretensions of ownership based on the Titulo de Propiedad in question.
Neither said Titulo, nor a copy thereof, was presented in the two proceedings before us. What we have is merely a
description thereof, viz:
TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136
DATED APRIL 25, 1894, ISSUED BY
GOBIERNO CIVIL DE LA PROVINCIA
DE BULACAN
Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, in the name of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, dated April 25, 1894, being a
gratuitous composicion title, grated to Dn. Mariano San Pedroy Esteban, by the Spanish Government in the
Philippines, pursuant to Resolution dated April 14, 1894, of the Board of Land Adjustment of the (Spanish)
Administration Civil de Filipinas, as authorized under Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, and signed
by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefede la Provincia de Bulacan and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado El Secretario de la
Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines attached thereto and to said Titulo de Propiedad
Numero 4136, is affixed a "Sello 10aA*s 1894 y 95 de Peso" documentary stamp bearing Serial Number NO. 292404 inscribed in the Office of the Registry of Property of Bulacan, on pages 127 and 129 of Book I, for Norzagaray, as
Tax Declaration (Fincas) Nos. 57 and 58, Inscripcion No. 1, on July 16, 1894 (or within one (1) year from April 25,
1894, pursuant to Royal Decree of January 12, 1863), the inscription of the said TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO
4136 of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, having been accomplished by the Office of the Land Registry of Bulacan,
on the said date of July 16, 1894, by the then Registrar of Bulacan, Dn. Miguel de Lizan, as follows:

Ynscrito el titulo que precede, a los folios ciento veinti-sietey ciento veintinueve del Tomo primero de Norzagaray,
fincas numeros cincuenta y siete y cincuenta y ocho inscripcion numero uno, Bulacan, diez y seis de julio de mil ocho
cientos noventa y cuatro (Fdo.) MIGUEL DE LIZAN.
Two (2) vast parcels of land (agricultural and mountainous lands), together with the improvements thereon, including
all the trees in the mountains, all mineral deposits or resources ( pertenecia minera), including lime, gravel and
lumber for ship building, located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon and Quezon City, and bounded, on the
North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi, Umiray and
Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to
Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauan to Laog).
The various types of titles granted by the Spanish crown, it will be remembered, were: (1) the "titulo real" or royal
grant; (2) the "concession especial" or special grant; (3) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (4)
the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (5) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which
could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.19
Piadeco's Titulo appears to be an adjustment title. Piadeco asserts in its answer in L-24796 20 that it is a "titulo de
composicion con el estado"21 or a "composicion" with the State. 22 The given description of Titulo de Propiedad No.
4136 above-quoted calls it a "gratuitous composition title."
Title by "composicion con el estado" was granted by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, pursuant to the
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, or by the Chief of the Province by delegation, pursuant to the Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888, or under the Royal Decree of February 13,1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law. The theory
behind this title is that all lands belong to the State. Applicants to be entitled to adjustment must possess the lands
sought to be acquired for a number of years.23 These titles, as the "titulo real", altho evidences of ownership, may be
lost by prescription.24
Piadeco's Titulo de Propiedad 4136, as heretofore described, was signed, pursuant to the Royal Decrees of May 14,
1867 and August 31, 1888, by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, el Jefe de la Provincial de Bulacan, and Dn. Mariano Lopez
Delgado, el Secretario de la Junta, purportedly with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines.
The main difficulty here lies with the requirements, then obtaining, for the issuance of Spanish adjustment titles.
The Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 under which Piadeco's title was issued classified public lands subject to
adjustment into two groups:
First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands belonging to the State, and those which, though entirely
encircled by private lands, had a total area of more than 30 hectares.
Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares and entirely bounded by private lands.
By this royal decree, adjustment of the lands of the first group just mentioned continued to be heard and determined
by the general directorate of civil administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of Forests; adjustment
of lands of the second group were heard and determined by "a provincial board for the adjustment of lands "headed
by a Civil or Military-Civil Governor as president. When the provincial board approves the adjustment, "the chief of the
province, in his capacity as deputy of the General Directorate of Civil Administration, shall issue the corresponding
title."25
The property here involved unquestionably belongs to the first group. That is because the area thereof is more than
30 hectares (72,000 or 74,000 hectares); and, going by the descripcion of its boundaries, the property is bounded by
public land. In particular, the description is that it is "bounded, on the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio
Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on

the South by Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and SapangAlat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauanto Laog)."26
As stated, the title were was "signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefe de la Provincia de Bulacan, and by Dn. Mariano
Lopez Delgado, El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines attached
thereto."
Piadeco now claims before this Court that its title "appears to be issued by (on its face) the DIRECTOR GENERAL
DE ADMINISTRACION DE FILIPINAS"; that the title is in printed form, with the dry seal in the form of a mountain,
bearing the inscription, "Office of the Inspector General of Forests in the Philippine Islands Adjustment of Lands"
and the rubric of the said Inspector General of Forests and is serially numbered, pursuant to the Circular dated
February 14, 1894 of the General Directorate of Civil Administration. In the same breath, however, Piadeco avers that
the title was approved by the Chief of the Province of Bulacan as Deputy of the General Directorate of Civil
Administration and the said Chief issued Titulo 4136 pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31,
1888.27 Theseaverments, we must say, merely emphasize the necessity of adducing evidence to prove the validity of
Piadeco's title, which should be done in appropriate land registration proceedings. Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60
Phil. 114, 123, struck down a similar title covering land which it thereupon declared public forest land, upon grounds,
amongst others, that the title was not issued by the proper authority. On this ground, this Court there specifically
declared
Judging from the area of the land28 in question and that of the two-third portions from which it has been segregated,
upon the supposition that the three-third portions above-mentioned constitute the whole tract of land which had
originally passed from Tomas Ilao, it is obvious that the same belonged to the first group, as defined in the aforesaid
Royal Decree, on the ground that the area thereof greatly exceeded thirty hectares and was not entirely bounded by
private lands. Notwithstanding such facts, the title Exhibit D-2 was not issued by the General Directorate of Civil
Administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of Forests, but merely by the provincial board, in open
violation of the laws and regulations relative thereto.29
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The title embraces land
"located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The title was signed only by the
provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries
desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved not only
through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. 30 This Court ruled in a case involving
a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or perquion, not in
mass (cuerpos ciertos),31 That fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for
classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite are seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28,
1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified the area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares.32In its
"Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares. 33 Which is
which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers
from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights
over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, 34 the basic decree that
authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment showing the location, boundaries and
area of land applied for were to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered
the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative.35
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from the date
of the publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the

Royal Order of July 15, 1881.36 If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have,
then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which
limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands.37 And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or
74,000 hectares of lands.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de
Manila on April 17, 1894.38 That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication,
for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law.39 Said law also abolished the
provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by
Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards
established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they
may hold in their possession.40
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that that title was either dated April 29 or April
25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The
original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation not its
evidence 41 we cull the following: On December 3,1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro,
redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been
registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano failed to redeem within the stipulated period. When Don
Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only her, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same
time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed
the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of
Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain
Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an
affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was
paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on
the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad4136?
This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's
title.
The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the State, and any person seeking to establish
ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner. 42 And his presumption clings with greater force
here where "a portion" of the land Piadeco claims is, as Piadeco itself admits, directly affected by Proclamation No.
71 dated March 10, 1927 of the then Governor-General Leonard Wood of the Philippines, which reserved for
watershed purposes an area of 62,309.0952 hectares of land located in Montalban, Province of Rizal, in San Jose del
Monte, Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, in Pearanda, Province of Nueva Ecija,
and in Infanta, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon),subject to "private rights if any there be." Private rights must then
have to be proved. It will be remembered that, by Article VIII of the Treaty of Paris of December 10,1898, property of
the public domain was relinquished and ceded by the Kingdom of Spain to the United States of America, which, of
course, transferred the same to the present Republic.
Assertion has likewise been made that Piadeco's title has already been judicially recognized in the judgment
rendered in Civil Case 3035-M, the case below, at least insofar as the portion of the land that lies in Bulacan is
concerned. This is less than persuasive. Piadeco's title was not directly in issue in the court below. A reading of the
decision thereof suggests that said title was not submitted therein. The judge did not even examine that title.
According to the decision, Piadeco's ownership was gleaned merely from the registration certificate which stated that
a copy of Piadeco's land title, including the corresponding plan, was submitted to the Director of Forestry. A mere

statement by the judge below that Piadeco appears to be the owner of the land cannot wipe out the objectionable
features of its title.
From all the foregoing, our conclusion is that we cannot give prima facie value to Piadeco's title. We cannot thus truly
state that Piadeco is a private woodland owner for purpose of these proceedings. This all the more strengthens our
view that Piadeco needs to acquire an indefeasible title to be entitled to registration under Section 1829 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
3. Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said corporation cannot complain against the
cancellation thereof by the Director of Forestry on April 11, 1964. Why?
When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's registration certificate, he only performed his duty as he saw fit. By
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "[t]he Director of Forestry may cancel a certificate of registration for any violation
of the provision of this Order or of the forest and internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and conditions
embodied in the certificate, or when found that the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the
landowner thereof, or of his representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said Director of
Forestry."43 To him, a condition expressly written into the registration certificate was being violated. Piadeco was
found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations in direct contravention of a specific
prohibition in the certificate. And this, upon the basis of positive and actual findings of qualified and competent
forestry officers.
Quite revealing is Piadeco's admission44 before the court below that "it made cuttings on that portion of its own private
land within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation where it was constructing its access road to the area
covered by P.W.P. No. 2065 to the construction of which no objection was interposed by ... Nawasa as per its
resolution No. 126, Series of 1964."45 Deducible from the foregoing is that Piadeco was cutting within the watershed
reservations outside the area covered by its registration certificate, altho within the land it claims in private ownership,
which is now disputed.
Piadeco's registration certificate should remain cancelled. It could be stricken down anytime. It is a nullity. And,
notwithstanding the fact that said registration certificate had expired and was not renewed, Piadeco had the temerity
to continue operations. Correctly, there was necessity for freezing forthwith Piadeco's illegal acts.46
4. True it is that the judgment below virtually reinstated Piadeco's registration certificate. However, as shall be
discussed later on in this opinion, that judgment has now no legal effect. For, said certificate, by its very terms,
expired on December 31, 1964. Piadeco cannot be heard to protest further.
But Piadeco still insists that it objected to the expiry date of the registration certificate, when it was issued that
certificate. Granting the truth of this averment, Piadeco nonetheless accepted the certificate, did not follow up its
objection to its logical conclusion, sat supinely until the certificate was cancelled; only then did it renew the bid that its
registration certificate is non-expirable.
At all events, Piadeco's submission is inaccurate. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, promulgated pursuant to law,
amended Section 11 of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1, the pertinent part of which reads:
(b) Duration of the certificate. The certificate of registration issued under this Order shall be made to expire on the
last day of the 12th month from the date of its issuance.
This regulation is not without rational basis. This Court had occasion to say once 47 that: "Land may be classified as
forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, land
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 verily
declares that certificates "are renewable for as long as there are substantial amounts of forestry in the area, upon

filing of the necessary application therefor" and that those "cancelled for causes may be renewed upon submission of
application for registration by the owner and if the cause of cancellation is explained satisfactorily." 48If only for
purposes of effective regulation, annual registration of private woodlands cannot be successfully assailed.
5. We cannot place our stamp of approval on Piadeco's claim that it should be permitted to remove from the premises
those logs that have already been cut before December 31, 1964, the expiry date of its registration certificate. We
have already said that its registration certificate is a nullity. Even if it is not, the facts and the law will not support its
plea.
It is not altogether clear whether the 600 pieces of unscaled and the 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled and
unscaled)timber sought to be hauled by Piadeco, were cut before December 31, 1964. Piadeco could present only
one auxiliary invoice thereon, which but covers 256 logs and that very invoice stated that those logs were "cut or
ordered cut" in the area covered by P.W.R. No. 2065-New, "after its expiration on Dec. 31, 1964."49
Worse, a factual assumption that the logs were cut before that date, is meaningless in law. A contrary view would
easily lend itself to misuse and mischief. For, loopholes could then be bored through which an unscrupulous logger
may crawl. Such that a holder of a registration certificate could be at complete liberty to just cut and cut during the
lifetime of that certificate and leave the hauling for later, as he pleases, even long after expiry thereof. This, we must
say, should not be allowed to pass.
6. Absent a valid registration certificate under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, or a license to cut,
gather and remove timber, and more important, credible evidence of private ownership over the forestry land in
question, Piadeco's logging operations logically descend to the level of unlawful cutting from public forests.
Seizure made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be branded as illegal. It was but in
obedience to Bureau of Internal Revenue General Circular No. V-337 of May 24, 1961, which prescribed rules on the
disposition of illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the Office of the President to the Secretary of Finance on
March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337 declares as follows:
3. Logs illegally cut from public forests, such as timberlands, forest reserves other than national parks, 50communal
forests and communal pastures shall be subject to seizure and delivered to the nearest Bureau of Internal Revenue
Officer who in turn shall deliver them to the duly authorized representative of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for
use in the manufacture of prefabricated school houses. The illegal cutter shall not be allowed to pay the forest
charges and surcharges and other fees on the logs cut. However, if such forest charges and fees have already been
paid, the same shall be retained by the Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer concerned as part of the collection for
forest charges, but shall not be the basis for the release of such logs. On the other hand, such payment shall be used
as evidence should the illegal cutter be prosecuted in court for the violation of the corresponding forest laws.51
Could this Court then justifiably order the delivery to Piadeco of the logs impounded right there on the land? The
answer must certainly have to be in the negative; a contrary posture is tantamount to abetting a wrong. The logs
belong to the State. They are not Piadeco's. Piadeco cannot later on come back to claim them by curing defects in
the proof of its ownership over the land. It has submitted the controversy over the logs for decision to this Court. Any
ruling thereon should bind Piadeco. It cannot be overturned by fresh convincing proof of ownership, which it should
have offered in the first place.
We hold that government seizure of Piadeco's logs here complained of is valid.
7. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with
respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing
need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence
of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without

the trees, watersheds try up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue.
Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to regulate the use and
occupancy of forests and forest reserves.
To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the general welfare cannot be seriously
attacked. Our Government has definite instructions from the Constitution's preamble to "promote the general
welfare." Jurisprudence has time and again upheld the police power over individual rights, because of the general
welfare. Five decades ago, Mr. Justice Malcolm made it clear that the "right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good" and that the "liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
interest of public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."52 Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed the precept when he declared that "the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations"
and that"[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state." 53 Recently, we quoted from a leading American case, 54 which
pronounced that "neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellow, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm," and
that, therefore, "[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate in the common interest.55
These precepts more than suffice to sustain the validity of the government's action with respect to Piadeco's logging
operations.
8. We come to consider the effects of the judgment in Civil Case 3035-M, where the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan adjudged Piadeco's operation not to be in violation of forestry rules and regulations and made permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defaulting forestry authorities, upon Piadeco's ex-parteevidence. That
judgment, it should be remembered, is sought to be executed by Piadeco and the execution proceedings in that case
are not before this Court on review.
Said judgment enjoined the forestry officials from carrying out and executing the order of April 11, 1964 and the
implementing letter of April 14, 1964, cancelling Piadeco's registration certificate, PWR 2065-New. But when
execution was ordered on June 1, 1965, and the writ of execution issued on June 3, 1965, and when the court
ordered on July 8, 1965 that Piadeco be allowed to haul its logs, the registration certificate had already expired on
December 31, 1964. It is, therefore, not inappropriate for us to say that judgment had already become functus
officio56 and can no longer be executed.
The over-all position we have here taken should dispose of all other issues raised by the parties; hence, unnecessary
is a discussion thereof.
For the reasons given The petition for certiorari and prohibition in L-24796 is hereby granted; the June 1, 1965
order of execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, and the July 8, 1965 order, allowing
respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. to haul its logs, all of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case 3035-M, are hereby declared null and void; the writ of preliminary injunction issued
herein is hereby made permanent; and the Chief of the Engineer Corps, Armed Forces of the Philippines, who was
permitted by this Court on October 8, 1965 to retain for safekeeping and custody the logs previously seized by the
State from the log ponds of respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., is now given
authority to use the same for the manufacture of prefabricated school houses; and
The petition of Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. for injunction and prohibition in L-25459 is
hereby denied.

Costs in both cases against Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. So ordered

G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and the Director of
Lands, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of
SALMING PIRASO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287,
Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late Salming Piraso and later by
his successors-in-interest, who are his children for a period of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown
to have a registerable title on the property which this Court therefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law.
Let the land so described in the technical description of the survey made of the same and in accordance with the
corresponding plan be so registered. (p. 50, Rollo)
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed with the Court of
Firing Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering the following describe property:
A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the Barrio of Ansagan Municipality of Tuba, Mountain
Province. Bounded in the, NE., along line 1-2 by property of Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW.,
along lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on the We, along lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing an area of TWO
MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879)
SQUARE METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo)

On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for
registration stating, among others:
That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcel of land the same not
having been acquired by them either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
present application;
That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
(pp. 13-14, Rollo)
On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for registration on the following
grounds:
That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929;
That the area sought to be registered is neither release for disposition nor alienation; and that the herein applicant
has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in law. (p. 14, Rollo)
After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, as earlier stated, adjudicating the parcel of land to
the applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by Government oppositor's having been denied, an appeal was
made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the land registration court.
In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF
REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL CORDILLERA FOREST
RESERVE:
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE LAND BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORSINTEREST WAS NOT IN CONCEPT OF OWNER
UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEING INALIENABLE;
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE
GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FOR FOREST PURPOSES;
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATED FROM THE
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP UPON
APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925;
E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15 HECTARES OF
THE LAND APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THEY HAD ACQUIRED
OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE REST OF THE (219.7879) HECTARES APPLIED
FOR. (p. 18, Rollo)
The issues raised are:

1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have established registerable title over the land in question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of the public forests
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry
Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of said property was made by Land
Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry, the
Land Registration Court, and the applicants for registration. During the ocular inspection, the land was found to be
rolling and stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is
covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes.
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to the Provincial Fiscal a
separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry who had administrative
jurisdiction over the same.
The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the public forest and has not been
reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can not be the subject of registration either under Act 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner points out that lands within the forest zone or within a duly established
reservation do not form part of the disposable portion of the public domain nor can the same be alienated as said
lands are not capable of private appropriation or ownership and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
that same into private property.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest, Salming Piraso,
had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its classification as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve use there
is no evidence on record that Salming Piraso had possessed the property for any appreciable period prior to 1929
when the land became part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve.
On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals show that the land
subject of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and the same land applied for registration is
disposable and alienable. The private respondents, as applicants, claim to have sufficiently shown by preponderance
of evidence that the land being applied for registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far back as 1915
when he and his workers planted the arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products and raised cows
on the other portion suited for pasture. The late Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor Jose
Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on
March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated only on February 16, 1929. They state that the approval
of the said survey by the government thru the Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only mean that said land was no
longer included in the overall survey of the government as it was no longer part of the public land. As applicants, they
contend that they have possessed the land applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse against the
whole world and continuously for more than thirty (30) years before they filed the application over the land which is
agricultural and separate from the public domain.
We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, of convert them into private property (Vano vs.
Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry vs.
Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic vs. De la Cruz 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs. Director of
Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry,
but even then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and
alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing of reclassification by the Director of

Forestry that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals which the government
oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry
L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into
forest lands. This is wrong. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not
ease a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation merely declared
a special forest reserve out of already existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before
the proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a (219.7879)
hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government
must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation,
and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
The records positively establish that the land in question is part of the public forest which the Executive formally
proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve its integrity and to give it a status which is
more special for certain purposes than that of ordinary forest lands.
One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a registerable title for the private respondents is its
observation that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes. The court
noted a failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land.
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a big difference between
"forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain in the
Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution).
One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status a classification for legal purposes.
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees and underbush.
However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest and not automatically convert the lands of
the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.
As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains
or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classffied as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas,(56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of
the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void at initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. (at p. 75)

On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned property was conducted by Land Inspector Crisogono
Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy
Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as representative of the land registration court, Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes
as representative of the applicant.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated April 17, 1970, which states, among others, that the
land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates
the claim of the private respondents that the land has been cultivated since 1915.
More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its status, as stated in the separate report dated April 6,
1970 submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the
whole area applied for by the applicant fails within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not
been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry who has administrative jurisdiction over the same.
This has not been successfully refuted. It has not been proved erroneous.
Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero stated that:
Q Do you know the land in question here in this case?
A I know, sir.
Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are subject matters of land registration cases, have you
inspected this land in question also?.
A Yes, I inspected it, sir.
Q What is the purpose of your inspection?
A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the area if it falls within the reservation or within the
alienable or disposable area.
Q What is your finding, if any ?
A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Q Was that finding reduced into writing?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of the records which for purposes of Identification, we
pray that the same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the government oppositors, your Honor.
COURT:
As what?
FISCAL BRAWNER:
Rather as Exhibit "1"
COURT:

Have it marked.
Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you made?
A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to the Provincial Fiscal.
Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name "Ricardo D. Zapatero", whose signature is that?
A That is mine, sir.
Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that the land falls within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve, how did you arrive at that conclusion?
A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the applicant and because of the Bureau of Forestry map.
Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied for?
A Yes, air.
Q So, you actually saw this land applied for?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the nature of this land applied for?
A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and there are certain enemies of plants inside the land, in
some area.
COURT:
Q What are the species of plants?
A There are species of Binayuyu.
Q That is for lumber?
A No, that is not.
FISCAL BRAWNER:
Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of the land applied for is generally stony, and because
of the Binayuyu species, the condition of the land is not suited for agricultural purposes?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the basis of that statement?
A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we believe that is not good for agricultural purposes. The
land applied for is more suited for pasture purposes. (pp. 203-206, tsn., September 6,1971; Emphasis supplied)

The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the contention of the petitioner
that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case
of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted:
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, Paid by the courts to the opinion of the
technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestry matters.
There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in question was no longer part of
the public land when the Government through the Director of Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan
(Plan Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real property even if approved by the Bureau
of Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA
623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which
forms part of the country's forest reserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private property.
Assuming that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such approval is nun and void. There must first
be a formal Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable and disposable
agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring
public agricultural lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
land registration court which granted the private respondents' application for registration of the land in question is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for land registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134209

January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more
particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said
parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage
or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession
thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the
ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments
of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide
acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title
or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the exception
of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru
the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor
manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat,
adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T.
Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together
with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act
No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be

issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued.
(Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision "is not in accordance with law,
jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee
simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or
Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the
length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the
fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. 5 As
to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be
addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or
other inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act 7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded
land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, 10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. 11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the
public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the
government and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the
appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is
directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . .
that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal

fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her
predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) 16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the
requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for
the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was
established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. 18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the
survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the
classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to
in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that
declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable
lands need an express and positive act from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land,
as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original
registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69,
is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE
TIMBER
PRODUCTS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO
AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.
Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition the correct application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within
the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring
on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with
damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint;
2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited
by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on
February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the
trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for
reconsideration.4
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and
pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found
that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained
thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111
requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained
unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to
petitioner.
Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy
siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the
Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging
operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the City
Council of Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When
the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy
floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the court
intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the council's request seven years
back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage
and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of
Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as
soon as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval,

revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions,
licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial
power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities
in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of
justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds
allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it
operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the
case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of
the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified
by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are
usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise
would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the
question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8)
when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings.19
The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not
require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely
legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the
reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such
reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power
and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and
"to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the
Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of
the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment
clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy
coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents
have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court
of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry
laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such
evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national
interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary
circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to
the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention
that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.
In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had
been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows:
DISTRICT
PAGADIAN CITY

FORESTER

QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE
IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT
REPORT ASAP.
RED BATCAGAN
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending
up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR
pending further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended
petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse
of almost 3 years." 24
These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court
and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.
There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as
the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the
petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had
indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest
Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of
the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a
court of justice.
In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the
case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this
same question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution
dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15,
1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE
AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES
JOSE
Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL
RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO
HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,
MAKASIAR, J:
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in
Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2.
rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state
a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and
the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract
of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p.
15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine
Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the
necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the
deadline (p. 29, rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be
awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the
Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:
It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed
purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest
reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of
the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area
may be reserved as above stated. ...
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
(pp. 98, CFI rec.).
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and re
comendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is
made available for exploitation under certain conditions," and
We quote:
Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to
the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice
fully concurs.
The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest conservation and
watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to
declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and
regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an
adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers'
of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and
despoilers. On the other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall
conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a
sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.
Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to determine the
most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the
Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having
been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only
have to be announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much
expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without
strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.

In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the
announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal
Officer, "respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for
appropriate action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for
decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago
Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of
Forestry on December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon who succeeded
Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions
of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: ... ... ...
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.
1. ... ... ...
2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered
thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not
exceeding 5,000 hectares each;
3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing
secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General
memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum
order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963.
Pertinent portions of the said Order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963
1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority
delegated to the Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new
ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension
of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the
issuance of' new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied).

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No.
20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of
Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January
6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not
signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by
Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion
for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the
grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the
name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore
void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the
name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect
whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any,
in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon
pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this case"
(pp. 30-31, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
denied the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:
In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12,
1964, that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo
watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire
watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood
control in relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest
of agricultural areas influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge
Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963,
awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other
applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of the Director
of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect
public interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the
opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals
should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is
concerned" (p. 78, rec.).
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila),
Special Civil Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally
whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of
discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the
equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in

effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of
the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null and void,
unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and
sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral
and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The respondentsappellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial
Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were granted, and they
too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not
exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that
purely administrative and discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18,
1964, he avers the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is
improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere
in purely administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp.
172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in intervention with special and affirmative defenses
(pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, wherein
evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors, and extensive discussion was held both orally
and in writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not only the
question on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition
did not state a sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in
its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion
on the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration
in resolving not only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the
parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having
been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
I
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:
(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and
(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient
cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the
term cause of action wherein he contended that the three essential elements thereon, namely, the legal right of the
plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right
are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for
dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in
the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that
in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As already observed,
this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon
by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore
void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose
of the motion, ail facts which are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the
motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to
legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing
cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence
introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of
tile allegations iii his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to
determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be
considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where
the case was presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts
which the court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint,
supplemented be such facts as the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held
that the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without
a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of
said decision is hereby quoted:
Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the motion,
dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued without any hearing on the motion to dismiss?
Is it void?
WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February 10
following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest postponement motion dismissal
till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his
wire, with his written opposition to the motion to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page
opposition thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the question of the board's power to abolish
petitioner's position to discussed the problem said profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order
recited at length the said arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case.
One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in
support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. Existence of
a cause of action or lack of it is determined be a reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The
question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the
opposition thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and
should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion,
i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the
motion,' has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over substance (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of
action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim
enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the
International Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court

of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were presented on
the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the
resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no
reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitionerappellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp.
482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping
him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. " I question not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint
states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the
rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been
misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1,
Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).
What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare of the
inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately
imperilled by forest denudation.
The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p.
265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the
steady supply of water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation
and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had
been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once
lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal
loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license it
is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that
this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact
that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado
Macapagal which in parts read as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado
Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to
private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels
of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau
of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the timber
concession in question. He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to
log in the area covered by his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents
to give effect, recognize and respect the very timber license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the
respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving him his day in court and in
preventing him from using and enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of official business" (p.
32, rec.).

In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or
invalidity of his timber license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released
without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby
quote such findings:
In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized
to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the
tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in
Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000
hectares does not state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into
consideration that the 1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the
whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,'
gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commmercial and operable forest
(Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:
Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was
declared available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice, there were received bid proposals
from the following persons: ...
Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it
is hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: ... ...
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority
to grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released
to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license was contained in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked
by general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore
voidab initio (pp. 479480, CFI rec.).
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19,
1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the
date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber
license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right
under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs.
Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as
supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon
and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said complaint does not give
plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held that, in acting on a motion
to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the
plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitionerappellant's petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as
respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue

operation in the area covered by his timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the
last official act of the respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber
license referred to above after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative act.
Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959),
wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the
President cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a
department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the
implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67
Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the
area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court,
in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of
the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of
the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative
remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the
government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil.
Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs.
U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can
be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and
some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive
department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department
of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department
are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed
and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and
adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitionerappellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved n certiorari is jurisdiction,
either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari when the same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia
Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that
there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the respondents-appellees. certiorari is not a
substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time

honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative
remedies available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).
Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the
present action for certiorari in the court below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure
to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place
petitioners' case beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls which it does not within the
cases where, in accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies within
his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No.
L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs. Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose
Rodriguez, G. R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959;
Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R.
No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs.
Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).
III
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a
suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its
consent to be sued Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973
Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the scope of their
authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound
principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection
afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that
petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He
cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of
public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State.
Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action
against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly
invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the
State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35;
Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 11211125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as
officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual
cannot issue a timber license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial
part of its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives
its consent to be sued.
IV
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke
his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber
license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p.
22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest

resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this ceise
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G.
7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was held that:
A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be
deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper
exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The
State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs.
Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The
utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry.
However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered
and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate
officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise
of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power
of control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of
subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134,
Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the
Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a
wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and
therefore, valid.
Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the
alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected.
We do so again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving
the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SO ORDERED,