EXECUTIVE BRANCH

1. Presidential Issuances
OPLE VS TORRES
[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]293 SCRA 141

FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the

Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of Computerized
Identification Reference System on the following grounds:
1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law
and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative
power of the congress to make laws, and
2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.

ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional
right to privacy?

HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to

privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right
to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also
lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered
from people through biometrics and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
1. Bicameralism
GARCILLANO vs. HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES
(G.R. No. 170338 , December 23, 2008)
FACTS
-Garcillano (in G.R. No. 170338) filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the
House Representatives Committees from using the tape recordings of the
"illegally obtained "wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.-Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R.
No. 179275), retired justices of the CA, filed a Petition for Prohibition to bar
the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in
the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.-Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member
of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R.
No. 179275. 18 While both petitions involve the "Hello Garci "recordings,
they have different objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of
the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
ISSUES
(1)WON petitioners have legal standing.
[YES]
(2)WON there is an actual case or controversy.
[NO: against the House of Rep. YES: against the Senate]
HELD
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.)

LOCUS STANDI
General Rule:
Legal standing
or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x, "thus, generally, a party will be allowed to
litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3)
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Exception/Liberal application:
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the
Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Macapagal- Arroyo articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings. Garcillano = direct injury. Ranada and Agcaoili= concerned
citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. Intervenor Sagge = alleges
violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the
useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of
the questioned hearings. Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege
an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic
.Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No.179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court inview of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and
should be resolved for the guidance of all.
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretionand given the liberal attitude it
has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the
Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoiliand
intervenor Sagge.

ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

Versus House of Representatives

Court dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court
of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
and controversies.
By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of
the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry
does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a
moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case
becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced. The Court notes that the recordings were already
played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were
completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees. Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition
has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. Versus the
Senate As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.

TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF

FINANCE
Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing
the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation
of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike
an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid,
its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and
pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one
thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another
thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the
sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of
its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

2. Extent of and Limitations on

Legislative Power

a) Section 25, 28, 29, 20 and 31 of the

1987 Constitution
b)Ople vs. Torres
c) ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS.
PURISIMA
ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335
(Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends
to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status2.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They
contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:

No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J.

Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress
to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power.

And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress'
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with
it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an

administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role
in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

d)DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS.

SENATE
G.R. No. 196271, : October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation

of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. "The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of
ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333
was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country. With the enactment into
law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from
different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333
and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as
the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the
1987 Constitution

HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153
in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three
years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve
synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011
based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the
terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized
to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that
the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized
with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on

the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the

ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X
of the Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article
wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore,
cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform
its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave
abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force
differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on
and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot
be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-ofthe-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to
adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence
to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these
limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 20082011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the
terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed
term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA
No. 10153 in fact only does is to" appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office." This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must
be therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim
measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.

e) IN RE: CUNANAN
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers
Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for
Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and
the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,

while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that
was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster
enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to
take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or
modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

3. Delegated Legislative Power

a) Administrative Rules and
Regulations
MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION VS. PARKWAY
ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION [Full Text]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136492. February 13, 2004]
MAXIMA
REALTY
MANAGEMENT
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. PARKWAY
REAL
ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION represented by LUZ LOURDES
FERNANDEZ
and
SEGOVIA
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION

Parkway Real Estate Development Corporation (Parkway) on October 16,

1989.[3]
Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty
Management and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an
agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of
the amount of 3 Million Pesos. [4] It was further agreed that failure to pay any
of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the
amounts paid by way of liquidated damages.[5]
Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was
granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00,
leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.[6]
Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia,
executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium
unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain
title in its name and use the same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), which amount will be used
by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia and
Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maximas
name subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of
P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility expenses, association dues and
miscellaneous charges.[7]
On June 5, 1990, RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maximas
P1,820,000.00 loan subject to the submission of, among others, the
Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the
Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.[8]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 9, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 [1] which
affirmed in toto the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 5697[2] dismissing petitioners appeal for having been filed out of
time.
The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower
Condominium, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12152 and
located along Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was
originally sold by Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) to Masahiko
Morishita, who in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in favor of

Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for

fees and charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium
unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it
cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of
Maxima.[9]
On May 2, 1991, Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication
and Legal Affairs of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a
complaint[10] for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and
sell Unit #702.

On December 17, 1992, the HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of

the Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the
amount of P1,180,000.00. Segovia was further ordered to issue the
condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway upon
payment by the latter of the registration fees. The dispositive portion thereof,
reads:

2) Ordering Respondent Segovia to immediately issue the certificate of title in

favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration
expenses. This order for delivery of title in the name of Parkway is now final
and immediately executory.

Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

3) Declaring the forfeiture of 50% of the total payments made by the

complainant to Parkway by way of damages and penalty, and for Parkway to
refund the remaining balance of the said payments to the complainant within
thirty (30) days from finality of this decision with legal interest thereon
thereafter, for each day said amount remain unpaid; and

1. declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant

Maxima and Parkway;
2. ordering respondent Parkway to refund to complainant Maxima the
amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P1,180,000.00);
3. ordering respondent Segovia to issue the certificate of title in favor of
Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[11]

and is modified as follows:

4) Ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of

attorneys fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed [17] to the Office of the President
which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. [18]

Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of

the HLURB (Board).[12] During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to
pay the balance of P1,820,000.00, which was accepted by Parkway. The
Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of managers
check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to
Maxima.[13] The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled
Parkway to file a Manifestation[14] that the appeal be resolved.[15]

Undaunted, Maxima filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
On October 1, 1998, Segovia filed its Comment that as the original ownerdeveloper of Unit #702, it had already consummated the sale and transferred
title of said property to Parkway.[19]

On March 14, 1994, the Board rendered judgment modifying the

decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the
total amount paid by Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the
amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. The decretal portion of the decision,
states:

Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue of: Was petitioners appeal
before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary period?

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office of Appeals Adjudication and Legal

affairs (OAALA) dated December 17, 1992 is hereby affirmed with respect to
the following:
1) Declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant
and Parkway;

On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the

Decision of the Office of the President.

In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President [20] it was settled

that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15 [21] of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 2 [22] of Presidential Decree No. 1344.
[23]
The Court ruled that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the
President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994
HLURB Rules of Procedure,[24] is not applicable, because special laws
providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as

Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail
over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. Thus:
[W]e find petitioners contention bereft of merit, because of its reliance on a
literal reading of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well
as presidential decrees on the matter.
Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides as follows:
Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President. Any party may, upon notice
to the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative
Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated February 12, 1987.
Decision of the President shall be final subject only to review by the Supreme
Court on certiorari or on questions of law.
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by
public respondent reads:
Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the
Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by
the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or
appealed from.
As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order
allows [the] aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision complained of.
Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there
are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws
governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary
period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the
administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that
an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict
but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.
We note that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of
fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First,
Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executory after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision. Second,
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the

National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides
that the decisions of NHA is appealable only to the Office of the President.
Further, we note that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and
land development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission, now known as HLURB [by virtue of E.O. No. 684 (7 February
1981) and E.O. No. 90 (17 December 1986)]. Thus, said presidential
issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply
in this case. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in
Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being
in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For it is
axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that
they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the]
statute itself is null and void.
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the decision of HLURB on October
23, 1995. Considering that the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen days,
petitioner has only until November 7, 1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately,
petitioner filed its appeal with public respondent only on November 20, 1995
or twenty-eight days from receipt of the appealed decision, which is obviously
filed out of time.[25]
In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from
receipt of the decision of the Board on April 19, 1994, [26] to appeal to the
Office of the President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was
clearly beyond the reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the December 9, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 which sustained
the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5697
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr.,

C.J.,

(Chairman),

Panganiban,

b)Local Ordinance

Carpio and Azcuna,

attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of

the Constitution.

PARTS OF STATUTES

The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of
retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers

1. Title of Bills

does not constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section

14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

15 SCRA 479 Political Law Salaries of the Members of Congress Other
Emolument
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of
Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives.
PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from
disbursing funds therefor.
According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt
to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members
of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class
legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after
twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year
salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years
of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24

constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick

leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for
computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an
indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the
Constitution, provides:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall,
unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of
Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for

rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another

the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per
annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of

G.R. 177508August 7, 2009FACTS

the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent
to approval of such increase.
In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power
of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase
would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of
the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI,
includes in the term compensation other emoluments.
Emolument is the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession
of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)

partylist petitioned in Court for the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill
No. 5352.Petitioner also assailed the constutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38,
and 43 of the said Republic Act and alleged that they were of questionable
application and their validity was doubtful. Petitioner raised the issue whether
RA 9369, RA 7166 as amended, being a consolidation of Senate Bill No.
2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated Section 26(1)of Article VI of the
Constitution which states that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
BANAT also questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it
violated Section17 or Article VI of the Constitution which specifies that the
Senate and the House of Representatives should each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and qualification
contests relating to its Members.

RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and

Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of

poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual
canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37,
38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject
matter of RA 9369.

Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval

ISSUE

of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were

Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI?

emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one

possessing any office.

immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full

term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby
declared unconstitutional by the SC.

BANAT VS. COMELEC

BANAT v. COMELEC

HELD
No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must
show that there is a clear an unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition
must fail.
Section 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC
maintained that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertained only to

the adoption and application of the procedures on the pre-proclamation

controversies. It did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "en banc" may
entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

GIRON VS COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair

Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the
one subject-one title rule?

HELD: The petition must fail.

G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule
HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent, ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and
RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention.

SERENO, CJ:

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor

of the constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have
enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption,
the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear,
unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the
petition must fail.

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the

constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the
Fair Election Act.

Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
requires: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof. He avers that these provisions
are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the
political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for
substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective
office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of
elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of
candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a
permanent capacity.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason
that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in
favor of the Fair Election Act.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes

should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject
of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment
into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
the legislators and the public.

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the
City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that under
Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by
converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806has done.

DISMISSED.

CAWALING VS COMELEC

Issue:
Cawaling vs. COMELEC

(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon

Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary

(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution

G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts:

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 8806which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of
the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former
President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating
The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."
The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and
submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the
plebiscite on the following grounds:

Held:
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the
modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province
city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by
the Code. The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under
the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required
120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54
thereof; and

LIDASAN VS COMELEC

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty

(20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. Petitioner instituted another
petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending, in
essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section
10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
1.

Facts:
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,
Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the
constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790,

12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to

the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
2.

Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon

in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are
parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to

Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the
second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of
the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became
RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an

enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is
there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated
in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del
Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged
purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the
law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.