PARDELL VS BARTOLOME

RESUENA VS CA

FACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde

Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late Miguel
Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar
de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without an judicial
authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration of
the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties
included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house
in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes Street,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia;
and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.

Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be

rendered in restoring and returning to them one half of the total value
of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the
aforementioned properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted
that she never refused to give the plaintiff her share of the said
properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband,
Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation of
the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.

ISSUE:
WON Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation
of the said property

Held:
NO.
The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their
occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of their right to
use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owners
right of use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the
interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party
failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses
Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.

ANGELA MARIE A. ALMALBIS

The late Borromeo Sr., is the co-owner and overseer of

certain parcels of land in Cebu. He owns 6/8 of Lot No. 2587
while the late Sps Bascon own 2/8 thereof.
On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by
Borromeo and heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the
proportion of their undivided shares was not determined.
Petitioners Resuena et al resided in the upper portion of Lot
No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Sps
Bascon and their heir Andres Bascon. On the other hand,
petitioner Rosario occupied a portion of the other lot,
allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Maneja.
Borromeo developed portions of both lots occupied by him
into a resort. To expand and extend the facilities of the
resort, he demanded that petitioners vacate the property.
However, they petitioners refused to vacate their homes.
Borromeo then filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC
against the petitioners.
MTC dismissed the complaint. MTC ruled that since
Borromeo owns the lots with other persons, he has no
preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by
the petitioners since both lots were not partitioned yet nor
disputed portions assigned to Borromeo as his determinate
share. So, he has no right to evict the petitioners.
On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held
that Art 487 of the Civil Code (which allows any one of the
co-owners to bring an action in ejectment) may successfully
be invoked by Borromeo because, in a sense, a co-owner is
the owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners.
Assuming petitioners were authorized to occupy some
portion of the lots, they could just resume occupation when
the properties shall have been partitioned.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

the Sps Bascon. Since, there is no evidence to claim right of

occupancy, petitioners then do not have the right to stay on the
property.

1.) WON Borromeo has a right to eject the petitioners

2.) WON petitioners have a right to stay on the property as
assignees under Art 493

CRUZ VS CA
FACTS:

RULING:
1.) YES.
Under Art 487 of the Civil Code, "anyone of the co-owners
may bring an action for ejectment". Thus, a co-owner may
bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all.
Borromeo's action for ejectment against petitioners is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the
property since petitioners were not able to prove that they
are authorized to occupy the same. Petitioners' lack of
authority coupled with Borromeo's right under Art 487, clearly
settles Borromeo's prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot
No 2587.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who
occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are
necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
2.) NO.
Assuming there was indeed a verbal contract between Borromeo
and any owners of the lots as to the portions they each were to
occupy, such verbal contract does not detract from the fact that the
common ownership over the said lot remained inchoate and
undivided, thus casting doubt and rendering purely speculative any
claim that the other co-owners somehow had the capacity to assign
or transmit determinate portions of the property to petitioners.
Petitioners must establish a legal basis for their continued occupancy
of the properties. The mere tolerance of one of the co-owners does
not suffice to establish such right. Petitioners have no convincing
evidence that they have somehow become successors-in-interest of

ANGELA MARIE A. ALMALBIS

Petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a parcel of

land in Rizal. Yet, the property was registered only in the
name of Arnel. According to the petitioners, the property was
among the properties they and Arnel inherited upon the
death of their father.
Petitioners and Arnel executed a Deed of Partial Partition,
distributing to each of them their shares consisting of several
lots previously held by them in common. Among the
properties adjudicated to Arnel was the subject property of
this case.
Subsequently, the same parties agreed in writing to share
equally in the proceeds of the sale of the properties although
they had been subdivided and individually titled in their
names. This arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA).
One of the petitioners, Thelma Cruz, discovered that the
property had already been cancelled and issued in the name
of Summit. Upon further investigation, petitioners learned
that Arnel had executed an SPA in favor of Tamayo, husband
of one of the petitioners Nerissa, authorizing him to obtain a
loan from respondent Summit, to be secured by a real estate
mortgage on the subject parcel of land.
Since the load had remained outstanding on maturity,
Summit foreclosed the property, it being the highest bidder.
Consequently, Sheriff Sta. Ana issued a Certificate of Sale to
Summit. Then, the Register of Deeds cancelled the previous
TCT and issued a new one in the name of Summit.
Before the RTC, Petitioners asserted that they co-owned the
properties with Arnel, as evidenced by the MOA. Hence, they
argued that the mortgage was VOID since they did not
consent to it.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring that with the

execution of the MOA, petitioners and Arnel had intended to
keep the inherited properties in a state of co-ownership. It
declared Summit as negligent in its failure to inquire further
into the limitation of Arnel's title. Thus, only the share of Arnel
was validly transferred to Summit.
Private Respondents elevated the case to the CA. CA
reversed the RTC's decision stressing that the MOA does
not contain any proscription against the mortgage of the
property although it provides that the parties thereto are
entitled to the share in the proceeds of the sale of the
properties covered by it.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision but
CA denied it.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the mortgaged property was the exclusive property of Arnel
Cruz when it was mortgaged, thus the REM on the property was
valid.
RULING:
YES.

Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial

partition of the properties owned in common.
From reading the Deed of Partial Partition, no other meaning
can be gathered other than that petitioners and Arnel had put
an end to the co-ownership.
In such deed, the shares of petitioners and Arnel in the mass
of co-owned properties were concretely determined and
distributed to each of them, in particular, to Arnel was
assigned the disputed property.
Since a partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him, it
follows that Arnel acquired absolute ownership over the
specific parcels of land assigned to him in the Deed of
Partial Partition. As the absolute owner thereof, Arnel had
the right to enjoy and dispose of the property, as well as the

ANGELA MARIE A. ALMALBIS

right to constitute a REM over the same without securing the

consent of petitioners.
On the other hand, there is nothing in the MOA which
diminishes the right of Arnel to alienate or encumber the
properties allotted to him in the deed of partition.
Thus, the Court held that the real estate mortgage on the disputed
property is valid and does not contravene the agreement of the
parties.

LAVADIA VS MENDOZA
FACTS:
This case is about the possession and custody of the jewelry
adorning image of Our Lady of Guadalupe consisting of a
crwon, necklace, belt, collar and bracelet, all in gold with
diamonds and precious stones.
In 1880, 6 pious ladies from Laguna named Martina, Matea,
Isabel, Paula, Pia and Engracia all surnamed Ladavia
agreed with their own money to contribute the
abovementioned jewelries.
The sisters agreed that these jewels would be left with Pia.
She had the jewels' custody until her death after which Paula
died. On Paula's death, the custody of the jewelry was given
to her husband Pedro and after him their daughter Paz took
custody.
After the death of Paz, the custody was passed to her
husband Baldomero then to Manuel and eventually
succeeded by the defendant Rosario.
From 1880 up to present, the jewels were used to decorate
the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Pagsanjan every
year and none of them who keep these jewels claimed
possession as the sole owner. Defendants Rosario et al
stated that they did not intend to solely own the jewels.
Rosario, as latest custodian, entrusted the jewels to the
Catholic Bishop of Lipa. All these jewels are now locked and
deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Islands because
Rosario deposited those things there. The descendants of
Isabel, Martina and Matea Lavadia as well as the plaintiff
Engracia Lavadia filed a case in CFI Laguna to claim
possession and custody of the jewels.

There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by

the co- owners who represent the controlling interest in the
object of the co- ownership." In this case, the plaintiffs
constituted the majority, since they represent 4/6 of the original
owners. Defendants only represent 2/6. Thus CFI ruling that
Rosario return the jewelry as an obligation of a depositary holds.

MELENCIO VS DY TIAO LAY

ISSUE:

FACTS:

WON the plaintiffs constitute the majority of the co-owners and

therefore can elect who has custody of the property owned in
common?

RULING:
YES

The plaintiffs have such right. With the amount of individual

contribution undetermined, the law presumes that all of them
contributed proportionately.
As there is no evidence of the contribution of the six primitive
owners in the making or acquisition of the jewels often
mentioned in the same proportion, the conclusion, as
reasonable as it is - and this is supported by a presumption
of law (Art. 393, Civil Code) -is that the cost is the same and
as such the portions corresponding to the participants of the
community shall be presumed of an equal share.
For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned
in common, according to article 398 of the Civil Code, it is
mandatory that there be an agreement of the majority of the
participants 3) The deposit agreement is such that allows the
depositor to withdraw from the depository, the thing
deposited, any time he wanted, especially, when the latter,
as in the case of Rosario Cosme Mendoza, has executed an
act against the order received intrying to entrust to another's
custody and administration the thing deposited, on their own
without the consent of depositors or their heirs.

ANGELA MARIE A. ALMALBIS

Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija was originally

owned by one Julain Melencio who died before the 1905,
leaving his widow Ruperta Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta
held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land. Contract of
lease in favor of Yap Kui Chin. Term of Lease: 20 years, for
the establishment of a rice mill with necessary buildings for
warehouses and quarters for employees. Document
evidencing lease acknowledged but never recorded with the
Register of Deeds.
Lessee took possession of the land and erected the mill and
other necessary buildings. Lease was transferred to Uy Eng
Jui who transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co. (unregistered
partnership); until the lease finally came to Dy Tiao Lay.
Land was registered under the Torrens system in 1913 but
the lease was not mentioned in the title, though it was
mentioned that one house and 3 warehouses were owned
by Yap Kui Chin.
1920 - heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial
partition of parts of the inheritance. After Mrs. Macapagal,
wife of one the heirs of Julian, Ramon, demanded an
increase of the lease from P20 per mo. to P300/mo., she
was informed by Dy Tiao Lay that a written lease existed and
that according to its terms, Dy Tiao was entitled to an
extension of the lease at the original rental.
Plaintiffs insisted they had no knowledge of it and in such
case the lease was executed without their consent and was
thus void.

ISSUE:
WON the contract of lease is null and void for lack of consent of all
the co-owners

RULING:
YES.

The power of the majority (of co-owners of an indivisible

property) would be confied to decisions touching the
management and enjoyment of the common property and

ANGELA MARIE A. ALMALBIS

would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease of 12

years w/c gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded
and which can be performed only by owners of the property
leased.
Where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in
favor of the lessee (constituting a sundering of the ownership
which transcends mere management) then the part owners
representing the greater portion of the property held in
common have no power to lease the property for a period
longer than 6 years w/o the consent of all co-owners.
In this case, the fact that the lease was for 20 years
amounted to an act of rigorous alienation and NOT a mere
act of management, thus necessitation of the consent of ALL
co-owners.