Aff Speech Docs

1AC

1AC FW
Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, which is
fundamentally flawed because exclusion is not based on dessert
but rather on arbitrarily perceived differences
Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|[Psychologist that specializes in Social
Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology
Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup
responses to transgressions of justice] Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.
Finally, to

recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and
why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who
unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan
Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our

normal perceptual cognitive

processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie
outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or
know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do
not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who
are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded , and
become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral
exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social
cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed,
invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like
Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware
of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence
may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about
how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal
social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural
violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and
celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

Intent and means-based frameworks reflect privilege and

decenter our frame --- we must be concerned with the
consequences of our actions.
Utt 13: Jamie Utt is a writer and a diversity and inclusion consultant and sexual violence prevention educator,
Intent vs. Impact: Why Your Intentions Dont Really Matter, July 30, 2013
Imagine for a moment that youre standing with your friends in a park, enjoying a nice summer day. You dont know me, but I walk right up
to you holding a Frisbee. I wind up and throw the disc right into your face. Understandably, you are indignant. Through a bloody nose,
you use a few choice words to ask me what the hell I thought I was doing. And my response? Oh, I didnt mean to hit you! That was never
my intent! I was simply trying to throw the Frisbee to my friend over there! Visibly upset, you demand an apology. But I refuse. Or worse, I
offer an apology that sounds like Im sorry your face got in the way of my Frisbee! I never intended to hit you. Sound absurd? Sound
infuriating enough to give me a well-deserved Frisbee upside the head? Yeah. So why is this same thing happening all of the time when it
comes to the intersection of our identities and oppressions or privileges? Intent v. Impact From Paula Deen to Alec Baldwin to
your annoying, bigoted uncle or friend, we hear it over and over again: I never meant any harm It was never my intent I am not a
racist I am not a homophobe Im not a sexist I

cannot tell you how often Ive seen people

attempt to deflect criticism about their oppressive language or actions by
making the conversation about their intent. At what point does the intent
conversation stop mattering so that we can step back and look at impact?
After all, in the end, what does the intent of our action really matter if our
actions have the impact of furthering the marginalization or oppression of
those around us? In some ways, this is a simple lesson of relationships. If I say something that hurts my partner, it doesnt
much matter whether I intended the statement to mean something else because my partner is hurting. I need to listen to how my
language hurt my partner. I need to apologize. And then I need to reflect and empathize to the best of my ability so I dont do it again. But

when were dealing with the ways in which our identities intersect with
those around us and, in turn, the ways our privileges and our experiences
of marginalization and oppression intersect this lesson becomes
something much larger and more profound. This becomes a lesson of justice. What we
need to realize is that when it comes to peoples lives and identities, the impact of our
actions can be profound and wide-reaching. And thats far more important
than the question of our intent. We need to ask ourselves what might be or
might have been the impact of our actions or words. And we need to step
back and listen when we are being told that the impact of our actions is out
of step with our intents or our perceptions of self. Identity Privilege and Intent For people of identity privilege, this is
where listening becomes vitally important, for our privilege can often shield us from
understanding the impact of our actions. After all, as a person of privilege, I can never fully
understand the ways in which oppressive acts or language impact those
around me. What I surely can do is listen with every intent to understand, and I can work to change my behavior. Because
what we need to understand is that making the conversation about intent is
inherently a privileged action. The reason? It ensures that you and your identity
(and intent) stay at the center of any conversation and action while the
impact of your action or words on those around you is marginalized. So if someone
ever tells you to check your privilege, what they may very well mean is: Stop centering your experience and
identity in the conversation by making this about the intent of your actions
instead of their impact. That is: Not everything is about you. What They Did vs. What They Are The incredible Ill
Doctrine puts it well when he explains the difference between the What They Did conversation and the What They Are conversation,
which you can watch here. In essence, the intent conversation is one about what they are. Because if someone intended their action to be
hurtful and racist/sexist/transphobic/pickyourpoison, then they must inherently be racist/sexist/transphobic/pickyourpoison. On the other
hand, the

impact conversation is one about what they did. For you, it takes the person who
said or did the hurtful thing out of the center and places the person who was
hurt in the center. It ensures that the conversation is about how what they
did hurts other people and further marginalizes or oppresses people. And its
important for people to understand the difference. Just because you did something sexist doesnt mean that you are sexist. Just because you
said something racist doesnt mean that you are racist. When your actions are called into question, its important to recognize that thats all
that is being called into question your actions, not your overall character. Listen. Reflect. Apologize. Do Better. It doesnt matter whether
we, deep down, believe ourselves to be __________-ist or whether we intended our actions to be hurtful or _________-ist.
It.Doesnt.Matter. If the impact of our actions is the furthering of oppression, then thats all that matters. So we need to listen, reflect,
apologize, and work to do better in the future. What does that look like? Well, to start, we can actually apologize. I dont know about you,
but I am sick of hearing the I am sorry your face got in the way of my Frisbee! I never intended to hit you apologies. Whether its Paula
Deen weeping on TV or Alec Baldwin asking us to simply trust that hes not a homophobe, those are not apologies. Thats why I was
incredibly inspired and relieved to see a major organization do it well when Kickstarter apologized and took full responsibility for their role
in funding a creepy, rapey seduction guide. They apologized earnestly and accepted the role they played in something really terrible. hey
pledged to never allow projects like this one to be funded in the future. And then they donated $25,000 to RAINN. At the interpersonal
level, we can take a cue from Kickstarter. When

we are told that the impact of our action,

inaction, or words is hurtful and furthers oppression, we can start by
apologizing without any caveats. From there, we can spend the time to
reflect in hopes of gaining at least some understanding (however marginal)
of the harmful impact. And we can do our best to move forward by acting
more accountably.

Thus the standard is minimizing structural violence.

1AC Plan
The U.S. uses provisions of arms as the perfect illusion. This
Option C alternative lets us moralize about our impact and
assistance without saving anyone.
Lynch 13 (2-14, Marc, associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington
University, where he is the director of the Institute for Middle East Studies and of the Project on Middle East Political
Science. Shopping Option C for Syria http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/14/shopping-option-c-for-syria/)
The failure

of American diplomacy to end Syrias parade of horrors has rightfully driven the policy
community to search for a useful alternative. But arming the rebels was always a classic
"Option C." Every bureaucrat knows the trick of offering three options one to do
nothing, one so outlandish that it is easily rejected, and then one that takes the
seemingly sensible middle ground, allow[s]ing the decision-maker the illusion that they
are resolving the problem. Whether or not Option C has any chance of actually working
is almost an afterthought. For an example of how this works, see "the Afghan Surge," which lacked even a plausible theory of
how it might work. In Syria, the most likely effect of arming the rebels is simply to set up the
president for another decision point six months later as the battle rages and the rebels
seem unable to close the deal. And at that point, the president would face an even starker decision: Option A, give up and
be tarred forever for cutting and running; Option B, full-scale military intervention, which of course would be rejected; and Option C,
escalation through some combination of no-fly zones, a bombing campaign, and safe areas. When this debate began in earnest one year ago,

I predicted that policy would move toward arming the rebels as the easiest way to appear
to be "doing something" even if nobody really believed that it would work. It does not surprise
me that Petraeus, Clinton, or Panetta would gravitate toward this option. It surprises me even less to find their preferred policy stance, once
it was thwarted, would magically appear in the media. What does surprise me is that the White House managed to cut off this option at the
pass.

Thus the Plan Text: The United States Federal Government

ought to end provision of arms to Syrian insurgents.

1AC IS Adv
Contention 1 is the Islamic State
Weapons in Syria risk falling into the hands of IS
Robinson 14 (July 21, Eugene, writes a twice-a-week column on politics and culture, contributes to the
PostPartisan blog, and hosts a weekly online chat with readers. The downside of giving weapons to rebels in Ukraine or
Syria https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene-robinson-the-downside-of-giving-weapons-to-rebels-inukraine-or-syria/2014/07/21/d67b5090-110d-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html)
The government of Bashar al-Assad

has survived largely through the brutal use of air power

against defenseless civilians. Partly neutralizing this advantage by credibly threatening to shoot Assads
planes down might have changed the course of the war, though now it might be too late. From the beginning, Obama
has been extremely reluctant to send anti-aircraft weapons of any kind into Syria. Now his
critics should understand why. When weapons are given to non-state actors, there is no guarantee they will be
used competently and no guarantee that they wont fall into the wrong hands. In Syria, the good
rebels have been outmaneuvered and outfought by the bad rebels: the jihadist militia that calls itself the
Islamic State and now controls a huge territory encompassing parts of Syria and Iraq. The
Islamic State is so fanatical and bloodthirsty that it was disowned by al-Qaeda. Imagine that the Pentagon had
given U.S.-supported rebels enough shoulder-fired missiles to seriously threaten the Syrian
armys low-flying aircraft, including its helicopters. Imagine that these weapons were captured by
the Islamic State. Imagine the grave threat this would pose, not just to allied forces struggling against the Islamic
State but potentially to commercial aviation as well. Flooding a war zone with weapons is like dumping
gasoline on a fire. Vladimir Putin should pay a heavy price for doing so. And Obamas critics owe him an apology.

Regional warlords guarantee arms trade for IS

Lynch 13 (2-14, Marc, associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington
University, where he is the director of the Institute for Middle East Studies and of the Project on Middle East Political
Science. Shopping Option C for Syria http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/14/shopping-option-c-for-syria/)
That was then what about now? Many very sharp analysts, ranging from Steven Heydemann to Salman Shaikh, argue that with
militarization a reality, the United States should manage the process, accelerating the endgame and gaining influence over the Syrian
opposition by taking a leading role in directing the flow of arms. As I pointed out a few weeks ago, this case has grown stronger with time:
Some of the key reasons for avoiding arming the rebels no longer apply, since the negative effects of militarization have already largely
manifested. Robin Yassin-Kassab may have a case that arming the moderates has never really been tried, but theres no question that arms
have flooded in and the Syrian arena has become fully militarized. Theres not much of a political process to save: undecided Syrian
constituencies have already retreated back into the embrace of the regime, arms are flowing, the men with guns are calling the shots, and a
new political economy of insurgency has taken root. In this context, a coordinated flow of arms is superior to an uncoordinated flow of
arms. But I doubt that an American decision to get into that game would do much good. Offering weapons and money might buy influence

The reporting from inside Syria

offers a consistent portrait of emergent warlordism, with local commanders eager to take
bids from external patrons. Arming and funding militias basically means renting them
until a better offer comes along, as suggested by the endless parade of articles reporting
Syrian groups turning to Islamists because they are better financed or better armed. Sure,
in the moment, but they dont buy love or guarantee the alignment of values or priorities.

the United States could enter this crowded market but why would anyone expect Washington to dominate it, or to fundamentally change
its patterns? It wont make the Islamist groups tied to al Qaeda disappear they were drawn to the opportunity to wage jihad, and they
certainly arent going to leave just because America decides to muscle onto their turf. It is also not obvious why U.S.-provided weapons
would be better or more attractive than Gulf weapons, especially if ours come with human rights guidelines and inconvenient political
limitations. Everyone

wants to find a way to end the killing in Syria. But theres very little
reason to believe that American arming of the rebels would achieve that goal. President Barack
Obamas administration was right to focus instead on sorting out the opposition leadership, and trying to establish it as an effective political
umbrella rather than turning on an arms pipeline to the rebels. Thats

not to say there isnt more the United

States can be doing. I do think the administration missed a major opportunity to rapidly
funnel significant humanitarian aid and non-lethal support through the National
Coalition it laboriously helped construct, in order to give them something to offer
Syrians on the ground. Fixing that should be a priority. The ever-escalating disaster in Syria cries out for

more effective international diplomacy, vastly more humanitarian support for refugees and the displaced, and more work to strengthen the
political structures of the opposition. Efforts

should be focused on such initiatives, rather than on a

poorly conceived Option C which drags the United States deeper into an abyss with no
real prospect of victory.

Empirically confirmed many of ISs arms are obtained through

our arms provisions.
Bernabe 15: (Nick Bernabe, ISIS Showcases Massive Arsenal Of American-Made Weapons In New Video.
Mint Press News. December 10, 2015//FT)
However, prior

to the capture of Mosul, the groups, which eventually became ISIS, were
receiving weapons from U.S. allies in the region including Saudi Arabia and Turkey in an
attempt to use Islamist fighters to overthrow the Russian-backed Syrian government of
Bashar al-Assad. The weapons these Sunni states were supplying to ISIS, then in its infancy, were being sold by the
West to the Gulf countries. The largest seller was the Unites States, followed by the United Kingdom two countries that
are now bombing ISIS. Sound confusing? Thats because it is. And we cant forget about the moderate Syrian opposition
that the U.S. and its allies have been training and arming since 2013. According

to a new report from

Amnesty International, many of ISIS arms have come from units defecting from the Free
Syrian Army, as well as other rebel groups previously aligned with the United States and
its plan to oust Bashar al-Assad. ISIS has also gained access to weapons from other
sources through the capture or sale of Syrian military stocks supplied to armed opposition
groups in Syria by countries including Turkey, the Gulf States and the U.S., concluded CNN.

ISIS kills a lot of people

Obeidallah 14 [(Dean, former lawyer turned political comedian and writer, is the host of The Dean Obeidallah show
on SiriusXM radio) ISISs Gruesome Muslim Death Toll Daily Beast 10.07.14] AT
Last Thursday, the United Nations released a report that could provide us with one of the keys to defeating ISIS.
Unfortunately, it received almost zero media attention. What makes this 26-page report (PDF) so powerful is that it
describes to us the gruesome circumstances in which ISIS

has killed fellow Muslims. We are talking

beheadings, killing of women for objecting to ISIS policies, and executing Sunni Muslim clerics
for refusing to swear allegiance to ISIS. Why is this important? This information can hopefully
help dissuade other Muslims from joining or financially supporting ISIS. And it may
even persuade other Muslim countries to join or increase their efforts in fighting ISIS. The
reason being that slaughtering fellow Muslims is seen as universally wrong across the Muslim world and as a violation of
Islamic values. In fact, Al Qaeda has even publicly criticized ISIS for this very conduct. Now the report also details ISIS
horrific actions against Christians, Yazidis, and other minorities. But these eventsalong with the grisly beheadings of
American journalists and Western aid workers- have been covered extensively by our media. The killing of Muslims has
not, and part of the reason may be because we lacked facts surrounding those events. After all, ISIS releases videos of its
gruesome actions that it wants the world media to discuss but doesnt publicize events it understands can hurt its cause.
This report changes that. It provides us with evidence we were missing about the specifics of ISIS actions towards
Muslims. This investigation, undertaken by UNs Human Rights Office together with the UNs Assistance Mission for Iraq,
conducted more than 500 interviews with witnesses and visited locations across Iraq to examine how many civilians were
killed in Iraq between July and September of this year. What did the UN find? ISIS had carried out attacks deliberately
and systematically targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, with the intention of killing and wounding civilians. The
UN concluded that in

the first eight months of 2014, at least [nine thousand three hundred
forty-seven] 9,347 civilians had been killed and at least 17,386 wounded. While all these deaths
are not attributable to ISIS alone, ISIS is identified as the primary actor. (The report also documents what
could be considered war crimes committed by the Iraqi military.) Here are a few examples from the report to give you an
idea of the way ISIS has methodically slaughtered Muslims: -On September 5, ISIS executed three Sunni women in Mosul.
What was their crime? They refused to provide medical care to ISIS fighters. - On September 9, ISIS executed a Sunni
Imam in western Mosul for refusing to swear loyalty to ISIS. - On August 2, a man from the Salah ad Din province was
abducted and beheaded for refusing to swear allegiance to ISIS. -On August 19, a female Muslim doctor south of Mosul
was killed for organizing a protest to object to ISIS mandate that female doctors cover their faces with religious veils when
treating patients -On August 31, 19 Sunni Muslim men were executed in Saadiya for refusing to swear allegiance to ISIS.
-On July 22, a Sunni Imam in Eastern Baquba was killed for simply denouncing ISIS. -On September 9, ISIS executed two

Muslim women by shooting them in the back of the head. Their exact crime was not known. And the

list goes on
from ISIS slaughtering 1,500 Iraqi soldiers in June to blowing up numerous Sunni
mosques because apparently the leaders of those mosques refused to swear loyalty to
ISIS. Heres the thing: The leaders of ISIS are very aware that the killing of fellow Muslimsespecially Sunnis- could
hurt their cause in attracting support from the Sunni Muslim world. In fact, ISIS is so concerned about the possible
backlash that the groups leaders addressed this subject (PDF) in the latest issue of its online magazine. The leaders of
ISIS are very aware that the killing of fellow Muslimsespecially Sunnis- could hurt their cause in attracting support from
the Sunni Muslim world. In between its threats against Obama and promises of a great life for Muslims in their new socalled caliphate, ISIS offered justifications for killing fellow Muslims. For example, they claim that some Muslims
ambushed ISIS fighters, took them hostage and and then tortured, amputated, and executed prisoners. They even
alleged that some of the Sunni Muslims they killed were drowning in alcohol and drugs and had more than four wives.
But when you read the details of the UN report, you realize the

common thread in ISIS killings of

Muslims has nothing to do with Islam. It has to do with absolute power. It doesnt matter
if you are a Sunni cleric or a Christian woman, your choice is to submit to ISIS or die. I
wish the media would give more coverage to ISIS crimes against Muslims. The publicity would hurt the groups cause
tremendously, and it could also make the case to my fellow Americas that this fight is not Islam versus the West. Rather,

its everyone who doesnt want to live under ISIS brutal dictatorship versus ISIS. And those
Muslims who gave their lives fighting against or refusing to give into ISIS in our common struggle should be recognized in
the media for their bravery. It would be very powerful to see images in our media of the Muslims killed by ISIS, not just
Westerners. Going forward in our war against ISIS, sadly we will likely see more gruesome acts perpetrated by them
against Americans. These acts will understandably receive extensive media coverage. But that is only one part of the story
in our fight versus ISIS. The Muslims being slaughtered by ISIS on a daily basis is the other, bigger part. And its this other
part of the story that might just hold the key to defeating ISIS.

1AC Russia Adv

Contention 2 is Russia
US arms sales to Syria draws Russia further into the conflict
Sly 15 (Oct 11, Liz, is the Posts Beirut bureau chief, and is currently covering the turmoil in the wider Middle East.
Did U.S. weapons supplied to Syrian rebels draw Russia into the conflict? https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/didus-weapons-supplied-to-syrian-rebels-draw-russia-into-the-conflict/2015/10/11/268ce566-6dfc-11e5-91eb27ad15c2b723_story.html)
BEIRUT American

antitank missiles supplied to Syrian rebels are playing an unexpectedly

prominent role in shaping the Syrian battlefield, giving the conflict the semblance of a
proxy war between the United States and Russia, despite President Obamas express
desire to avoid one. The U.S.-made BGM-71 TOW missiles were delivered under a two-year-old covert program coordinated
between the United States and its allies to help vetted Free Syrian Army groups in their fight against President Bashar al-Assad. Now that

Russia has entered the war in support of Assad, they are taking on a greater significance than was originally intended. So
successful have they been in driving rebel gains in northwestern Syria that rebels call the missile the Assad Tamer, a play on the word
Assad, which means lion. And in recent days they have been used with great success to slow the Russian-backed offensive aimed at
recapturing ground from the rebels. Since Wednesday, when Syrian

troops launched their first offensive

backed by the might of Russias military, dozens of videos have been posted on YouTube
showing rebels firing the U.S.-made missiles at Russian-made tanks and armored
vehicles belonging to the Syrian army. Appearing as twirling balls of light, they zigzag across the Syrian countryside
until they find and blast their target in a ball of flame. The rebels claim they took out 24 tanks and armored vehicles on the first day, and the
toll has risen daily since then. It was a tank massacre, said Capt. Mustafa Moarati, whose Tajamu al-Izza group says it destroyed seven
tanks and armored vehicles Wednesday. More

missiles are on the way, he said. New supplies arrived

after the Russian deployments began, he said, and the rebels allies have promised
further deliveries soon, bringing echoes of the role played by U.S.-supplied Stinger
antiaircraft missiles in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan in the
1980s. The hits also plunged Washington into what amounts to a proxy war of sorts with Moscow, despite Obamas insistence this
month that were not going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United States and Russia. Its a proxy war by happenstance, said
Jeff White of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who counted at least 15 tanks and vehicles destroyed or disabled in one day.
The rebels happen to have a lot of TOWs in their inventory. The regime happened to attack them with Russian support. I dont see it as a
proxy war by decision. Whether it will become one is one of the key questions confronting the Obama administration in the wake of
President Vladimir Putins decision to throw Russias support behind Assads regime. The TOW missile program overseen by the CIA is
entirely separate from a failed program run by the Pentagon that was intended to influence the outcome of the other war being waged in
Syria, the one in the northeastern part of the country against the Islamic State. The CIA program got underway before the Pentagon one, in
early 2014, with the goal of propping up the flagging rebellion against Assads rule by delivering training, small arms, ammunition and the
antitank missiles, which have proved instrumental in eroding the governments key advantage over the lightly armed rebel force its tanks
and heavy armor. Supplied mostly from stocks owned by Saudi Arabia, delivered across the Turkish border and stamped with CIA approval,

The
plan, as described by administration officials, was to exert sufficient military pressure on
Assads forces to persuade him to compromise but not so much that his government
would precipitously collapse and leave a dangerous power vacuum in Damascus. Instead,
the Russian military intervened to shore up the struggling Syrian army an outcome
that was not intended. A primary driving factor in Russias calculus was the realization that the Assad regime was militarily
the missiles were intended to fulfill another of the Obama administrations goals in Syria Assads negotiated exit from power.

weakening and in danger of losing territory in northwestern Syria. The TOWs played an outsize role in that, said Oubai Shahbandar, a
Dubai-based consultant who used to work with the Syrian opposition. I think even the Americans were surprised at how successful theyve
been, he added. It

was no accident, say U.S. officials and military analysts, that the first targets
of Russian airstrikes in Syria were the locations where the rebels armed with TOW
missiles have made the most substantial gains and where they most directly threaten
Assads hold over his familys heartland in the coastal province of Latakia. Those areas were also
where the first offensive since the Russian intervention was launched, with columns of Syrian armored vehicles and tanks setting out from
government strongholds into the countryside of the provinces of Hama and Idlib. What the TOWs have done, White said, is offset the
regimes advantage in armor. The TOWs have cut away at that edge, and thats what weve seen playing out. Its like the Stingers in
Afghanistan. It is unclear whether the TOWs will be able to change the course of the war, as did the Stinger antiaircraft missiles introduced
in the 1980s by the CIA in Afghanistan, where they were used by the mujahideen to shoot down Russian helicopters and paralyze the Soviet
army. Now that the Russians have introduced more intensive and heavier airstrikes and, for the first time, combat helicopters have been
seen in videos strafing villages in the Hama area, the TOW missiles may only be able to slow, but not block, government advances. The
rebels have appealed for the delivery of Stinger missiles or their equivalents to counter the new threat from the air, but U.S. officials say that

is unlikely. The Obama administration has repeatedly vetoed past requests from the rebels, as well as their Turkish and Saudi allies, for the
delivery of antiaircraft missiles, out of concerns that they could fall into extremist hands. But the TOW missile program is already in
progress, and all the indications are that it will continue. Saudi Arabia, the chief supplier, has pledged a military response to the Russian
incursion, and rebel commanders say they have been assured more will arrive imminently. Under the terms of the program, the missiles are
delivered in limited quantities, and the rebel groups must return the used canisters to secure more, to avoid stockpiling or resale. The
system appears to have helped prevent the missiles from falling into extremist hands. Robert Ford, who was serving as U.S. envoy to Syria
when the program got underway, said he was aware of only two TOWs obtained by the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, while dozens and
dozens have been fired by moderate groups. Nusra made a big public display of having these two missiles, said Ford, who is now a fellow
at the Middle East Institute. Had they acquired more, he said, they would be using them now. The supplies of the missiles, manufactured
by Raytheon, are sourced mainly from stocks owned by the Saudi government, which purchased 13,795 of them in 2013, for expected
delivery this year, according to Defense Department documents informing Congress of the sale. Because end-user agreements require that
the buyer inform the United States of their ultimate destination, U.S. approval is implicit, said Shahbandar, a former Pentagon adviser. But
no decision is required from the Obama administration for the program to continue, Shahbandar said. It doesnt need an American green
light. A yellow light is enough, he said. Its a covert effort and its technically deniable, but thats what proxy wars are.

Arms transfers to Syrian rebels causes Russia proxy war

Barnard and Samaan 15 (Oct 12, Anne Barnard reported from Beirut, and Karam Shoumali from
Istanbul. Maher Samaan contributed reporting from Beirut, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. U.S. Weaponry Is
Turning Syria Into Proxy War With Russia http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/middleeast/syria-russiaairstrikes.html)

Insurgent commanders say that since Russia began air attacks in support of the
Syrian government, they are receiving for the first time bountiful supplies of powerful
American-made antitank missiles. With the enhanced insurgent firepower and with
Russia steadily raising the number of airstrikes against the governments opponents, the
Syrian conflict is edging closer to an all-out proxy war between the United States and
Russia. The increased levels of support have raised morale on both sides of the conflict, broadening war aims and hardening political positions, making a diplomatic settlement all the
BEIRUT, Lebanon

more unlikely. The American-made TOW antitank missiles began arriving in the region in 2013, through a covert program run by the United States, Saudi Arabia and other allies to help certain

The weapons are delivered to the field by American allies,

but the United States approves their destination. That suggests that the newly steady
battlefield supply has at least tacit American approval, now that Russian air power is
backing President Bashar al-Assad. We get what we ask for in a very short time, one commander, Ahmad al-Saud, said in an interview. He added that
in just two days his group, Division 13, had destroyed seven armored vehicles and tanks with seven TOWs: Seven out of seven. Spirits are rising on the
government side as well. Weapons and morale are at a new level, said an official with
the newly revived alliance of Russia, Iran and the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah that
is fighting on the behalf of Damascus. Instead of a dim light at the end of a tunnel, the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss
C.I.A.-vetted insurgent groups battle the Syrian government.

military matters, the alliance is seeking something closer to victory. The aim now is to retake Syrian land that had been given up for lost, take the ouster of Mr. Assad off the table for good and
reach a far more advantageous political solution after establishing new facts on the ground. But as Russian airstrikes against Syrian insurgents have picked up, so have insurgent attacks,
documented in online videos. TOW missiles weave across fields, their red contrails blazing, chasing Russian-made vehicles used by Syrian government forces and blowing them up. At least 34 such
videos have been posted in just the last five days from the battlefield in Hama and Idlib Provinces, where TOWs have helped blunt the Syrian governments first ground offensive backed by Russian
air power. One official with a rebel group that is fighting in Hama called the supply carte blanche. We can get as much as we need and whenever we need them, he said, asking not to be
identified to avoid reprisals from rival Islamist insurgents he has criticized. Just fill in the numbers. He said he believed Russias entry into the conflict had made the difference. By bombing us,
Russia is bombing the 13 Friends of Syria countries, he said, referring to the group of the United States and its allies that called for the ouster of Mr. Assad after his crackdown on political
protests in 2011. The C.I.A. program that delivered the TOWs (an acronym for tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles) is separate from and significantly larger than the failed
$500 million Pentagon program that was canceled last week after it trained only a handful of fighters. That was unsuccessful largely because few recruits would agree to its goal of fighting only the
militant Islamic State and not Mr. Assad. Rebel commanders scoffed when asked about reports of the delivery of 500 TOWs from Saudi Arabia, saying it was an insignificant number compared
with what is available. Saudi Arabia in 2013 ordered more than 13,000 of them. Given that American weapons contracts require disclosure of the end user, insurgents said they were being
delivered with Washingtons approval. Equally graphic videos of new Russian firepower have been posted by pro-government fighters and journalists embedded with them. Russian attack
helicopters swoop low over fields, seemingly close enough to touch, then veer upward to unleash barrages of rockets, flares and heavy machine-gun fire. Explosions pepper distant villages, with
smoke rising over clusters of houses as narrators declare progress against terrorists. They appear to be using techniques honed in Afghanistan, where the occupying Soviet Army fought
insurgents who were eventually supplied with antiaircraft missiles by the United States. Some of those insurgents later began Al Qaeda. That specter hangs over American policy, and has kept
Syrian insurgents from receiving what they most want: antiaircraft missiles to stop the government airstrikes that have been one of the wars largest killers of civilians. Now, they want them to use
on Russian warplanes as well. Mr. Saud, of Division 13, said he and other commanders renewed their requests for antiaircraft weapons 10 days ago to the liaison officers they work with in an
operations center in Turkey. They told us they would deliver our requests to their countries, he said. We understand that it is not an easy decision to make when it comes to antiaircraft missiles
or a no-fly zone, especially now that Syrian airspace is filled with jets from different countries. Both Russia and the United States have declared they are fighting the Islamic State, also known as
ISIS or ISIL, but the two global powers support opposite sides in the battle between Mr. Assad and the Syrians who rebelled against his rule. With air support from Russia, the government of Mr.
Assad is trying to retake territory seized this year in Idlib and Hama Provinces by insurgent groups that include both the Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front and American-backed units calling
themselves the Free Syrian Army but not ISIS, which is strong in northern and eastern Syria into Iraq but has little presence in the west. Instead, the advances there, which have posed the most
immediate threat to Mr. Assad, have come from a coalition of Islamist insurgents called the Army of Conquest, which includes the Nusra Front but opposes the Islamic State. Advancing alongside
the Islamist groups, and sometimes aiding them, have been several of the relatively secular groups, like the Free Syrian Army, which have gained new prominence and status because of their access
to the TOWs. Even in smaller quantities, the missiles played a major role in the insurgent advances that eventually endangered Mr. Assads rule. While that would seem like a welcome
development for United States policy makers, in practice it presented another quandary, given that the Nusra Front was among the groups benefiting from the enhanced firepower. It is a tactical
alliance that Free Syrian Army commanders describe as an uncomfortable marriage of necessity, because they cannot operate without the consent of the larger and stronger Nusra Front. But Mr.
Assad and his allies cite the arrangement as proof that there is little difference between insurgent groups, calling them all terrorists that are legitimate targets. Either way, the newly empowered
Free Syrian Army, long a marginal player as Islamist groups have risen in influence, is playing a more prominent role. Islamic groups have always labeled us as agents, infidels and apostates
because of our dealing with the West, Mr. Saud said. But now they can see how effective we are because of our dealing with the West. Several American-aided units have come under direct fire
by the Russians. But they claim to have held their territory, with the help of TOW missiles, better than their Islamist counterparts. In a further shift of American aid to fighting groups already
operating inside Syria, American cargo planes on Sunday dropped the first shipment of small-arms ammunition to Syrian Arab fighters combating the Islamic State, a military spokesman, Col.
Steve Warren, said on Monday. He declined to identify the groups or their locations, citing operational security, but said American officials had screened them. The likely recipient was a coalition
of mixed Arab and Kurdish groups that have been battling Islamic State fighters in northeastern Syria alongside Kurdish militias, now calling itself the Syrian Arab Coalition. Syrian government
troops advanced on Monday toward a strategically important highway held by insurgents, taking several villages in the central province of Hama with the help of Russian airstrikes, according to
Syrian and Russian state news media, antigovernment activists and fighters. But the front lines remained heavily contested, according to activists, with each side making liberal use of its new
weapons.

Middle East most likely scenario for World War 3---consensus of

experts
Nathan Francis 12-25 is a veteran of the newspaper industry, having worked at both daily and weekly papers and as a trade
magazine editor. He has covered New York state and national politics, government, education and the business sector and was nominated
for the National Newspaper Association's 2012 Better Newspaper Contest. Aside from his work in journalism, Nathan is also a contributor
to several financial and business-related blogs. 2016 Predictions: World War 3 Could Erupt As Tensions in Middle East Spill Over into
Large-Scale Conflict. Inquisitr. December 25, 2015. http://www.inquisitr.com/2656670/2016-predictions-world-war-3-could-erupt-astensions-in-middle-east-spill-over-into-large-scale-conflict/#kLR0oKRzMC0iTtIa.99

The predictions for 2016 could be grim, with many world leaders and political
experts warning that World War 3 may be brewing over the growing
conflict in the Middle East . The lingering civil war in Syria , the rise and rapid
spread of ISIS , and the intervention by a large coalition of world superpowers had
led many to fear that the conflict could erupt into a large-scale war . There have
already been flare-ups, with Turkey shooting down a Russian jet that had been
engaged in strikes against ISIS. Leaders in Turkey claimed that the jet violated the
nations airspace, a claim that Russia denies. The plane fell on Syrian territory 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) away from
the Turkish border, Russian President Vladimir Putin said after the incident (via CNN). It was flying 1 kilometer away from the Turkish
border when it was attacked. In any case, neither our pilots nor our jet posed any threat to Turkey. That is obvious. They were carrying out
an operation fighting against ISIL in Northern Latakia. Meanwhile, there

are concerns that Russia is using its

involvement in the war against ISIS to protect its own interested in Syria. Russia backs
President Bashar Assad and has been accused of conducting airstrikes not only against ISIS but
also Syrian rebels. The United States backs the rebels, leading some to believe the Syrian civil
war could become a proxy battle between Russia and the U.S . But other 2016
predictions point to World War 3 being fought across the globe . After the terrorist
attacks in Paris this November, Jordans King Abdullah said that we are facing a Third
World War against humanity and that world leaders would need to work collaboratively
to address interconnected threats. We are facing a Third World War against humanity and this is what brings us all
altogether, Abdullah said (via the Jerusalem Post). This is a war, as I said, repeatedly within Islam and
unfortunately over 100,000 Muslims have been murdered by Daesh (Islamic State) alone
over the past two years, and that doesnt also count for the atrocities like-minded groups
have also done in Africa and Asia. Even Pope Francis has warned of World War
3, saying that instead of a giant conflict with the worlds largest nations raising armies
and fighting battles, it has been fought piecemeal through crimes, massacres, and
destruction. But 2016 predictions point to ISIS as the biggest threat . As Salon explained,
there is something that sets the conflict in Syria and Iraq apart from previous large-scale
wars. Unlike the Korean War, which was a proxy war between China and the U nited States,
and the Cold War, which saw the United States and USSR teeter at the brink of nuclear war,
the fight with ISIS has some more foreboding consequences. The report noted that ISIS holds
apocalyptic views , with leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi seemingly obsessed with end-of-times.
It also believes that a grand battle essentially Armageddon between the Muslims
and Romans, i.e., the Western forces, will soon occur in the small Syrian town of Dabiq. This
is why the Islamic State fought ferociously for control of Dabiq in 2014, despite its
military insignificance, and its why the Islamic State named its online propaganda
magazine Dabiq.

1AR

1AR Prolif DA
Assurance gone
Kaye 3-19 (2016, Dalia Dassa, is the director of the Center for Middle East Public
Policy and a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
The Iran Deal Is Working: What Now? http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-irandeal-working-what-now-15445?page=2)
On the one hand,

the United States is facing increasing pressure from regional allies who perceive

a declining U.S. commitment to the region

and seek a more robust (e.g., military) response to regional conflicts,

most notably in Syria. In the short-term, U.S. policy will continue to focus on how to reassure allies, particularly in the Arab Gulf, that the United States is still
committed to countering Iranian influence in the broader region.

Its difficult to know what type of

reassurance measures would satisfy partners given the current hostility to U.S.
policies in the region. The presence of U.S. military bases and forces in the region that are the
foundation of U.S. containment policies toward Iran have not fundamentally changed
since the nuclear deal. And the dominant view in Washington across the political spectrum is that the United States should find new ways to
contain Iran to compensate for the nuclear deal and demonstrate American commitment to allies in the region. Yet such realities are
unlikely to dispel the perception in the region that the U nited S tates is walking
away .

No prolif impact.
Suzuki 15 (June 2015, Akisato, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction,
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, Is
more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests, Research and
Politics, SagePub)

Given these conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what overall

effect would nuclear proliferation have on a systemic propensity for conflict? This is difficult to answer, not only due to the
controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to conflict, but also because the existing theories do not explain whether those conflict-reducing/provoking effects are large enough

This challenge motivates the

empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. Empirical investigation by Random Forests The
to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system.

interstatesystemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. The dependent variable is the number of
militarized interstate dispute onsets (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per systemic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War
Project, 2011) hereafter, the disputestate ratio. Observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to make sure that causal effects precede a variation in the disputestate ratio.2 Two regressors are
used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter nuclear year
counter), measuring the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a
nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).3 The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score 6 in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate system, the gross world product (Earth Policy
Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal,
2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables suffer from multicollinearity (see Table A-9 in the
online appendix), and this paer later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The temporal scope
is 19502009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at t+1. The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4. As mentioned in the
introduction, this paper uses the machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests for the empirical investigation.5 Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international
relations analysts, Random Forests has been widely used in numerous scientific studies (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact
that Breimans (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.6 Random Forests generates two useful analytics: first, conditional variable importance measures how important
each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regressors (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The
significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the lowest negative score. If none
applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second relevant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the
dependent variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration. Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation

Random
Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some
theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for
conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between
regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated,
and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states
and the g ross w orld p roduct). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are
of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second,

therefore essential . The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year
counter is not important in explaining the disputestate ratio. This suggests that

the optimist theory is supported . The remaining regressors

have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important.

Controlling for

democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity , the number of nuclear states is
still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate
conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower disputestate ratio, although the
changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically nonlinear , as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is
supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the
disputestate ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of
militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a
substantively significant decline.

Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the disputestate ratio, suggesting that

the pessimist theory finds no support from

either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the
number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the disputestate ratio, but if the number of democratic
states and the g ross w orld p roduct are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the disputestate
new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus,

ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of
nuclear states . When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the
number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37.

Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the disputestate ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a
systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible , as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per
system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting.
Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks

The main

findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between

nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported :9 first, a
larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict;
and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases
the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the
probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect
existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this studys
findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study ( Bell and Miller , 2015). The
fewer disputes in the system.

current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic

It is possible that nuclear proliferation

decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence
and/or fear of nuclear states intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the
conflict-provoking effect of nuclearasymmetrical dyads . Thus, dyadic-level empirics
conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict.

cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links

systemic-level empirics deserve attention .

between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The