Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
06/05/15 7:19 pm
Page 1 of 7
06/05/15 7:19 pm
2012, nearly a year after post-revolutionary elections, show that institutions matter
more than Islam in the democratization of both countries. Therefore, instead of
fretting over Islamists, the international community needs to have a more nuanced
conception of political transition in the Arab world and should strive to bolster
institutions and economic reforms in post-Arab Spring countries.
Our research shows that citizens have more moderate attitudes toward the role of
religion in politics than conventional wisdom suggests. A minority of the population -26 percent of Tunisians and 28 percent of Egyptians -- believes that Islam should play
a large role in government. In Tunisia, only 27 percent of those who voted for the
religious Ennahda party in 2011 want a close relationship between religion and
politics. Similarly, in Egypt, only 16 percent of those who voted for the Islamist
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and 22 percent of those who voted for the ultrareligious, Salafist Nour Party in the 2011-12 elections believe that religious leaders
should influence politics.
Both Tunisians and Egyptians also want economic growth. When asked about the
most important feature of a democracy, 69 percent of Egyptians and 32 percent of
Tunisians put providing people with basic necessities or narrowing the gap between
rich and poor at the top of their lists. Both secularists and Islamists associate
democracy with economic prosperity. In Egypt, 69 percent of those supporting the
FJP and 67 percent supporting secularist parties believe that democracy will have
positive economic outcomes. In Tunisia, 29 percent of Ennahda supporters and 32
percent of secularist supporters share this belief.
Islamist parties received considerable support in both countries' recent elections -not only because there is a broad ideological affinity for Islamism among the
population but also because of Islamist parties' effective campaigning. Going into the
elections, Islamist parties were simply better organized and had more resources than
other parties. In Egypt, for example, they had roughly fourfold the members and
twofold the campaign volunteers of non-Islamist parties. According to polls
conducted by the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute and the Al-Ahram Centre for
Political and Strategic Studies, Egypt's Islamist parties increased their share of
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/tunisia/2013-02-14/islamists-arent-obstacle
Page 2 of 7
06/05/15 7:19 pm
eligible voters' support from 45 percent to 70 percent during the election campaign
from September to November 2011. Also, 19 percent of the Egyptians we polled
received campaign materials from the FJP, compared with just six percent who got
something from the Nour Party, which had the second most resources.
As a result, those we polled knew where Islamists stood on key issues but were less
sure about other parties' platforms. Eighty-five percent of Egyptians knew the FJP's
position on religion and 61 percent could identify their economic proposals, compared
with only 25 to 59 percent of respondents who knew where other parties stood on
these key issues. In Tunisia, 83 percent could identify Ennahda's position on religion
and 60 percent knew its position on the economy, versus 46 to 65 percent who
recalled other parties' positions.
Despite Islamists' popularity, some onlookers argue that these parties will lose
support once tested with the hard job of governing. Indeed, our recent study shows
that 47 percent of Tunisians and 38 percent of Egyptians feel that their country is
worse off than before the revolution. But this does not mean that Islamists are losing
support. No other parties have come close to challenging their dominant positions.
Moreover, Islamist parties appear to have even gained popular support since they
assumed power. Our Tunisian post-election survey found that Ennahda now pulls in
about 46 percent of voters, up from 35 percent in the October 2011 election. In Egypt,
43 percent of decided voters support the FJP, up from 38 percent during the 2011
elections. Support of the Nour Party has also increased since the 2011 elections.
On a related note, Islamist parties have shown a remarkable ability to maintain their
base. Among decided voters, 86 percent of those who voted for the Ennahda and 84
percent of those who supported the FJP in the last elections would vote for them
again. Other parties simply do not have this pull. Egypt's liberal Wafd party, for
example, has retained only 60 percent of its voter base. Islamist parties are also
pulling ahead of their more conservative counterparts. Twenty-three percent of those
who voted for the Nour Party in Egypt's November 2011 election state that they would
vote for the FJP if elections were held tomorrow, compared with only two percent of
FJP voters who would vote for Nour. In Tunisia, only 29 percent of those who voted
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/tunisia/2013-02-14/islamists-arent-obstacle
Page 3 of 7
06/05/15 7:19 pm
for the social democratic Ettakatol party and 33 percent of those who voted for the
Congress for the Republic party would vote for them again in the next election. To be
sure, Islamist parties might have a hard time maintaining high levels of support given
the uncertain political environment in both countries. A large proportion of voters
remain undecided: 60 percent of Tunisians and 39 percent of Egyptians.
Furthermore, both countries are still in the throes of profound change.
Tunisia has fared better than Egypt so far in the post-Arab Spring transition, with less
violence, fewer demonstrations, and greater political stability. This is in part because
challenges are easier to confront in a country of only 11 million, 98 percent of whom
are Sunni Muslim, compared to the more diverse and populous Egypt. But Tunisia's
success is primarily a result of its stronger institutions, which provide a conduit for
political debate. Most important, conflicts over difficult decisions have largely
remained within institutions, especially the Constituent Assembly. Even when
debating contentious topics, such as women's rights and the establishment of an
electoral commission, representatives have remained seated, and public attention
focuses on debates within the legislature, as opposed to on the street. The assembly's
slow process has generated criticism but has also helped to avoid crises. In Egypt, on
the other hand, parliament has been dissolved, the presidency is highly contested, and
street violence is frequent. Many onlookers claim that Egypt's more tumultuous postrevolution trajectory is because of the country's legacy of religiosity and Islamism.
Indeed, there are substantial historical differences between Egypt and Tunisia when it
comes to the role of religion in the state. The postcolonial Tunisian regime led by
President Habib Bourguiba promoted a secular society and cracked down on
Islamists. Islamism was also weakened by Bourguiba's modernization reforms, which
increased women's participation in society and set Tunisia on a path of secularization,
and later by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's repressive regime. In Egypt, on the
other hand, observers argue, secular leaders, such as President Gamal Abdel Nasser,
sought to reconcile Islam and modernity rather than to exclude religion from the
public sphere. Consequently, Egypt's Islamists have enjoyed greater latitude and are
more conservative than their Tunisian counterparts. Egypt's Salafist movement is also
much stronger and better organized: its influence was demonstrated in the electoral
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/tunisia/2013-02-14/islamists-arent-obstacle
Page 4 of 7
06/05/15 7:19 pm
gains of the Nour Party, which won nearly 28 percent of the votes and came second
only to the FJP in the 2011 parliamentary elections.
Our research, however, debunks the myth that religiosity is to blame for the
divergence between Egypt and Tunisia post-Arab Spring. Egyptians, in fact, are no
more religious than Tunisians. For example, Egyptians are more likely to say that they
rarely attended religious services than Tunisians (30 percent compared to 11 percent).
In the end, it is not religiosity but the relative strength of state institutions that
accounts for post-Arab Spring differences between Tunisia and Egypt.
Egypt's institutions are weak and have been routinely undermined by entrenched
interests. The countries' different geopolitical situations play a role here. Tunisia's
minimal strategic importance means that foreign countries have less reason to
intervene. But Egypt's proximity to Israel and the Palestinian territories, its 1979
peace treaty with Israel, and its role as an intermediary between Israel and Hamas
make its political developments important to Israel and the United States.
Consequently, Egypt is vulnerable to foreign interference, particularly to attempts to
prop up its military. Furthermore, beyond serving as a pillar to Egypt's authoritarian
regimes, the Egyptian military has significant business interests and accounts for ten
to 30 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product.
Egypt's judicial branch, which is also more powerful than Tunisia's, has at times
undermined democratic processes. With a tradition of autonomy and liberalism -most notably demonstrated in the Supreme Constitutional Court's dissolution of two
pro-Mubarak parliaments in the 1980s -- the Egyptian court has taken center stage in
the transition and its involvement has been divisive and destabilizing. Last year, for
example, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the Islamistdominated parliament and the Constituent Assembly it elected were unconstitutional,
because Islamist parties contested seats intended for independent candidates. The
move polarized the country and pushed the executive branch to take extreme
measures. Following the presidential elections, and to avoid a similar court ruling,
President Mohamed Morsi controversially granted immunity to the Constituent
Assembly and to his own decrees. This in turn sparked the most serious wave of
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/tunisia/2013-02-14/islamists-arent-obstacle
Page 5 of 7
06/05/15 7:19 pm
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/tunisia/2013-02-14/islamists-arent-obstacle
Page 6 of 7
06/05/15 7:19 pm
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/tunisia/2013-02-14/islamists-arent-obstacle
Page 7 of 7