Van Dorn vs J. Romillo Jr.

(Richard Upton, private respondent) 139 SCRA

139,
G.R. No. L-68470 (1985)
Facts:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines who married Richard
Upton, a citizen of the United States in Hongkong. After 10 years of
marriage and two children, they got divorced in Nevada, United States of
America, where the petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van Dorn.
One year after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with the Regional Trial
Court Branch 115 in Pasay City praying to for the accounting of the
business, the Galleon Shop, and to be given the right to manage the
business, on the ground that the business is conjugal property. He further
contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is
contrary to local law and public policy, therefore he has legal standing to
claim said property. On her part, the petitioner filed for dismissal of the civil
case contending that the private respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because in the divorce proceedings, by
which the alien spouse is bound, the private respondent agreed that they
had no community property. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the property is located in the Philippines so the divorce decree
has no bearing in the case. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the alien spouse, divorced from the Filipina spouse,
has legal standing on the alleged conjugal assets, in the Philippines?
Ruling:
No. Generally, divorce is not recognized in the Philippines as it is against
morals, good customs and public policy. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which the Philippines may recognize, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada, USA is
valid, thus, in the spirit of comity, it is recognized as also valid in the
Philippines. Hence, the private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of
his own coutry's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he has no legal standing in the
Philippine court as husband of the petitioner as the divorce legally dissolved
their marriage. He is further estopped by his own representation before the
foreign Court in the divorce proceedings, from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. To maintain the petitioner to still be legally
obligated to the divorced husband is a discrimination against her in her own
country. Hence, it is only just that the petition be granted. The civil case
against petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.

Note: This case was decided before August 3, 1988 when the Family Code
took effect. It became the basis for the codification of Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code.

SUBJECT MATTER: Validity of Foreign Wills/Renvoi Doctrine

BELLIS v. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
FACTS
Mr. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his
death. He had five (5) legitimate children with his first wife, Mary Mallen,
whom he divorced. He had three (3) legitimate daughters with his second
wife, Violet, who survived him, and another three (3) illegitimate children
with another woman. Before he died, he executed two (2) wills, disposing of
his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both
wills, he recognized his illegitimate children but they were not given
anything. Under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs or legitime
reserved to illegitimate children.
Naturally, the illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Merriam Palma,
opposed the wills on the ground that they were deprived of their legitime as
illegitimate children. Under Philippine law, they are entitled to inherit even
if they are illegitimate children. They claim that Philippine law should be
applied.
ISSUE:
What law should be applied, the Philippine law or the Texas law?
May the illegitimate daughters inherit?
HELD
What applies is the Texas law. Mr. Bellis is a national and domicile of Texas
at the time of his death. Hence, both the intrinsic validity of the will

(substance or successional rights) and the extrinsic validity (forms of the

will) are governed by Texas law. Since under Texas law, the decedent may
dispose of his property as he wishes, the Will should be respected. The
illegitimate daughters are not entitled to any legitime.
Assuming that Texas law is in conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of domicile) should govern, the same should not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to the Philippine law since Mr. Bellis was
both a national and domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Nonetheless,
if Texas law has a conflict rule, renvoi would not arise, since the properties
covered by the second will are found in the Philippines. The renvoi doctrine
applied in the case of Aznar v. Garcia cannot be applied since said doctrine
is pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and domiciliary
of another country. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the decedent
executed two (2) wills- one to govern his Texas properties and the other his
Philippine estate; the latter being the basis of the argument of illegitimate
children that he intended Philippine law to govern. Assuming that such was
the intention of the decedent in executing a separate Philippine will, it
would not alter the law. As rule in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision of
foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with the national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored.
PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA 174 SCRA 653
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the
respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married
at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and
a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against
Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila in
January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15,
1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner. On June 27, 1986,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still

married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia

and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent
city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but
before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of
proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to
quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused
to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against
the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior
to the filing of charges.
HELD:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended
spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with
relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the
legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has been finalized through
the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of the couple
were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent
filed against the petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to
petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case as the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case was made permanent.

Bayot v CA, 2008

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
G.R. No. 155635
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,vs.THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
FACTS:
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco,
California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From
then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured
as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial
District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
duly represented by counsel.
DECISION OF COURTS:
(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic - ordering the
dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition,
this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. On
June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismisson, inter alia, the grounds of
lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment
of divorce.
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
granting Rebecca's application for supportpendente lite
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above August
8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its
consequent legal effects?
RULING:
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case. When Divorce
Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet
Recognized as One. From the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a
Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is
hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."
The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen
by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of
the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996.
In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within
the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before
the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with

the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of

action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.

RENVOI DOCTRINE APPLIED

Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 3, 1963
FACTS:
Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the
Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria Helen a certain amount of
money and giving the rest of his estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the
partition on the ground that she is deprived of her legitime. Her contention
is that thelaw of California directs that the law of the domicile (Philippines)
should govern the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary law should apply
HELD:
The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national law of the
decedent. In the present case, the national law of Edward is the laws of
California. However, there were two conflicting California laws regarding
succession. One is enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does not provide for
legitimes) and another is Art. 946 of the California Civil Code (which
provides that the law of the domicile applies). SC held that the national law
is Art. 946, which is the conflict of laws rule of California. The reason is that
In Re Kaufman applies only to residents while Art. 946 is specific to nonresidents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a refer-back to Philippine laws (the
law of the domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 266
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband.
At the time of her
death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the
Philippines. To see whether
the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know
what law should be
applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.
RULING:
Prior evidence already presented to prove the existence of Texas Law.
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven
whether a renvoi will
happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In
line with Texas law,
that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges

and not in any other

time.
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter,
is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death
(and not said law at any other time).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found, shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law
of Texas, which is the national law of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges,
provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see paragraph 2, supra)
should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over
movables (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property
(also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with regards
immovable (real properties). Thus applying the Renvoi Doctrine, as
approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the case of In The Matter
Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen, G.R. No. L-16749,
promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will
of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate
insofar as her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are
concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should govern the
assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas, because the
only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this
motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings.
Nota bene: When can foreign law be given judicial notice
1. If the court of the forum is familiar of the law
2. Or it is within the actual knowledge of the court

MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)

[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment
in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to
roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous
violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final
Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees
based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging
the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the
Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary
estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering
the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination
of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was
P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper
filing fee.
Ruling:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same
amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati
erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of
the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The
Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is
clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable
of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners
state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC,
MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under
the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129
refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to
an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject
matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the
complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary
estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the
Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of

pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on

judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule
141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over
Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving
other actions not involving property.

Conflict Of Laws Digest: Phil. Export And Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. V.
V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc. (2004)
G.R. No. 140047
March 31, 2003
Lessons Applicable: No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts
(conflicts of law)

FACTS:

November 8, 1980: State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of

Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of
the Institute of Physical TherapyMedical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II,
in Baghdad, Iraq, (Project) to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company
(Ajyal), a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce for
ID5,416,089/046 (or about US$18,739,668)

March 7, 1981: 3-Plex International, Inc. represented by Spouses

Eduardo and Iluminada Santos a local contractor engaged in
construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal.
However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board (POCB), it had to assign and transfer all its right
to VPECI.

VPECI entered into an agreement that the execution of the project

will be under their joint management.

To comply with the requirements of performance bond of

ID271,808/610 and an an advance payment bond of ID541,608/901, 3Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with
Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue
guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance
of approved service contracts abroad.

Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to

the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was, therefore,

engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required

a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee
The Surety Bond was later amended to increase the amount of
coverage from P6.4 million to P6.967 million and to change the bank in
whose favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait
SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service
contract for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy
Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq. It commenced
only on the last week of August 1981 instead of the June 2 1981
Prior to the deadline, upon foreseeing the impossibility to meet it, the
surety bond was also extended for more than 12 times until May 1987
and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three times more
until it was cancelled for reimbursement
On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the
petitioner demanding full payment of its performance bond counterguarantee
VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister
Mohammad Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex call on the performance
guarantee for being a drastic action in contravention of its mutual
agreement that (1) the imposition of penalty would be held in abeyance
until the completion of the project; and (2) the time extension would be
open, depending on the developments on the negotiations for a foreign
loan to finance the completion of the project.
VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay yet Al Ahli Bank
because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the
Project
VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank
stating that it had already paid to Rafidain Bank the sum of US$876,564
under its letter of guarantee, and demanding reimbursement
by Philguarantee
VPECI requested the Central Bank to hold in abeyance the payment
by the Philguarantee "to allow the diplomatic machinery to take its
course, for otherwise, the Philippine government , through the
Philguarantee and the Central Bank, would become instruments of the
Iraqi Government in consummating a clear act of injustice and inequity
committed against a Filipino contractor
Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank

Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit US$876,564 to Al

Ahli Bank, and reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the
respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances made on
its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed in the
RTC
RTC and CA: Against Philguarantee since no cause of action since it
was expired because VPECI. Inequity to allow the Philguarantee to pass
on its losses to the Filipino contractor VPECI which had sternly warned
against paying the Al Ahli Bank and constantly apprised it of the
developments in the Project implementation.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine laws should be applied in

determining VPECI's default in the performance of its obligations under the
service contract

HELD: YES.

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly

provided for in our laws
The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the
intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the lex contractus or
"proper law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by
the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis) - none in this case
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the
transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the
place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent
VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the
presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual
presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same
as ours
In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have
emerged as "kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose the
governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the applicable

law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties Another authority proposed that all matters
relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid excuses
for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of
performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is
undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the
transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the
place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent
VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the
presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual
presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same
as ours
delay or the non-completion of the Project was caused by factors not
imputable to the respondent contractor such as the war in Iraq
petitioner as a guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is,
it cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the
debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said
debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up
compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal
debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived
these rights and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that
was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of
the principal debtor.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R.

No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting
respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were
married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and
after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was
living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after
obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to
remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him
to remarry.
The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of
that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American

wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the
Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26
should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may
therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirits or intent.

WOLFGANG ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11,
1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on
February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987,
respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The parental custody of the children was granted to the father.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when
she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact
that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?
RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must
still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by

the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental
custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded
promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.

G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner,
vs.
M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF
INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED and/or TRANSMAR SHIPPING,
INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of
Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India
(SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and
principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by
respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean
company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the
Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent
Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil
products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine

fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2,
1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,
petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of
US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another
Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the
Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker
fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges
to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief
Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery
receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the
US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a
check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was
duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice
dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or
Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in
the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or
before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were
made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner
Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred
additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal
fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City,
petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a
sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv
and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the
Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer
for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI,
and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28,
1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers
letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the
attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the
letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the
attachment.
ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to
maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port
and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has
or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such singlefactor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact
test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to
the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The
following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of
the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign
forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal
injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under
maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application
of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a
maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of
Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one the law of the forum. All
other elements are foreign Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the
allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the
law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D.
No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind
the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry.
Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien
under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their
laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various
foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant
interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the
sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the
entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of
contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in
Canada.

4. Lex Fori
The law of the forum governs all matters pertaining to procedural or
remedial rights.
B. Applicability of Foreign Laws and its Exceptions
WHEN FOREIGN LAW, EVEN THOUGH APPLICABLE, MAY NOT BE GIVEN
APPLICATION:
1. Foreign law contravenes prohibitive law or public policy of the forum
2. Relationship of the parties affects public interest
3. Real property is involved (apply lex rei sitae)
4. Foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum
5. Foreign law is procedural in nature (lex fori governs procedural matters)
6. Foreign law is penal in nature
EXCEPTION: CONTRARY TO SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
Bank of America, NT vs. American Realty Corporation, .G.R No.
133876, Dec. 29, 1999
FACTS:
Bank of America, duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and existing
under the laws of California, USA, granted US Dollar loans to certain
foreign corporate borrowers. These loans were secured by two real estate
mortgages by American Realty, a domestic corporation. When the borrowers
defaulted, Bank of America sued them before English courts. While these
cases were pending, Bank of America likewise judicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgages in the Philippines. Thus, American Realty sued for
damages against Bank of America.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bank of America can judicially foreclose the real
estate mortgages despite pendency of the civil suits before English courts
HELD:
English law purportedly allows the filing of judicial foreclosure of mortgage
despite pendency of civil suit for collection. But English law was never
properly impleaded and proven. Thus, the doctrine of processual

presumption applies.
SC further held that even assuming arguendo that English laws were
proven, said foreign law would still no find applicability. When the foreign
law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and establishedpublic
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be
applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective b laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The
public policysought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting of a single cause of
action.
Moreover, the foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
C. Authentication, Electronic Evidence and Judicial Cognizance of Foreign
Judgments
**To be recognized by Philippine courts, foreign laws and judgments must
be alleged and proved.
HOW FOREIGN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ARE PROVED:
1. Official publication
2. Certified true copy or one attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody
The certificate must be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept
Authenticated by his seal of office
**If the foreign law or judgment does not comply with the above
requirements, it will not be recognized and the Doctrine of Processual
Presumption will apply (Philippine courts will assume the foreign law is the
same as Philippine laws).
GENERAL RULE: Philippine courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of foreign laws.
EXCEPTIONS:

 Where there are exceptional circumstances when the foreign laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the court (generally known or
actually ruled upon in a prior case)
Where the courts are familiar with the specific foreign laws (e.g. Spanish
civil law)
Where the adverse party did not dispute the application of foreign law
Where the tribunal is a quasi-judicial body which is not bound by strict
rules of technicality

EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs National Labor Relations

Commission
Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of Foreign Law
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin
Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from
which OAB can choose a computer specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It
was agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into
his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and right
there and then was removed from his post. The termination letter states
that he was incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which
is required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during
his 5 month stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because he
failed to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then signed a
quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB from any liability in
exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI
and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the dismissal is valid because
when Gran and OAB signed the employment contract, both parties agreed

that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of
Grans employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Grans termination due to
incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Grans insubordination and
incompetence is outlined in the termination letter Gran received. The labor
arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did
not present proof as to the existence and the specific provisions of such
foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and Philippine labor
laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be
terminated upon just cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only
merit a suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven because
prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required trade test to
prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he is competent
and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his
incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is
likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track
records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was also a lack of
due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to the two notice rule
whereby prior to termination he should receive two notices. In the case at
bar, he only received one and he was immediately terminated on the same
day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws
is again applied here sans proof of Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a
quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly examined. In this case,
based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the
quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation pay was merely
2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).
VILLAREAL vs. CA
G.R. No. 107314 September 17, 1998
FACTS:The complaint to recover damages for killing petitioner's husband
Jose Villareal was filed with the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. It was found

that prior to the filing of the complaint, the Sevillas had abruptly left the
country and had started disposing of their properties in the Philippines. On
August 39, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by
Publication which was later granted by the trial court. Meanwhile, at the
instance of petitioner Patricia, an information charging private respondents
with murder was filed on October 10, 1988 with the RTC of Makati.
Defendants were declared in Default for failure to file their Answer within
the 60-day period counted from the last day of publication and petitioners
were then allowed to present evidence ex-parte. After presenting their
evidence, petitioners amended their complaint to make it conform to the
evidence. The trial court admitted the Amended Complaint and granted
petitioners' Motion for Extra-territorial Service of Summons. Accordingly,
summons was published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
newspaper Abante. Copies of the Amended Complaint, the summons, and
the order were sent by registered mail to the last known addresses of
private respondents at Paraaque, Metro Manila and the United States. On
February 7, 1990, counsel for private respondents, Teresita Marbibi, filed a
Notice of Appearance on their behalf. On February 14, 1990, again through
counsel, private respondents filed a verified Motion to Lift Order of Default
with Motion for Reconsideration. On March 27, 1990, the trial court issued
an order denying the Motion to Lift Order of Default with Motion for
Reconsideration, on the ground that private respondents herein failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 18. On April 2, 1990, the trial court
rendered a decision finding private respondents liable for the killing of Jose
Villareal. Subsequent motions, without questioning courts jurisdiction,
were later filed by the private respondents but were also later denied by the
trial court. Thus on September 11, 1991, private respondents filed in the CA
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, alleging (1) that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
them since they are non-resident defendants and petitioners' action is
purely in personam and (2) that they were denied due process of law. CA
granted the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion
was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated September 30,
1992. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the private
respondents.
RULING: It is true that where the defendant in an action in personam is a
non-resident, as in this case, and refuses to appear and submit to the

jurisdiction of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the

property within the country which the court may have ordered attached. In
such a case, the property itself is "the sole thing which is impleaded and is
the responsible object which is the subject of the judicial power."
Accordingly, "the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him." But the Court also
acknowledged in Banco Espaol-Filipino that if property is attached and
later the defendant appears, "the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam,
with the added incident that the property attached remains liable, under the
control of the court, to answer to any demand which may be established
against the defendant by the final judgment of the court." In this case, not
only was property in the Philippines of private respondents attached, but,
what is more, private respondents subsequently appeared in the trial court
and submitted to its jurisdiction. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the trial
court to render a judgment in personam against them is undoubted. There
can be no question regarding the trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over
the persons of respondents when the latter's counsel entered her
appearance on their behalf on February 7, 1990. Through counsel, private
respondents voluntarily appeared by filing a Notice of Appearance without
qualification and a Motion to Lift Order of Default with Motion for
Reconsideration, in which they prayed for affirmative reliefs, thus
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. The following instances have
been considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court: the
filing by defendant of a motion to admit answer; the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment by default; and the filing of a petition to set
aside the judgment of default. Not only did private respondents voluntarily
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they never
questioned the validity of the mode of service of summons, that is, by
extraterritorial service upon them. As already stated, private respondents
filed a notice of appearance without qualification.

G.R. No. 138104

April 11, 2002

MR HOLDINGS, LTD., petitioner,

vs.

SHERIFF CARLOS P. BAJAR, SHERIFF FERDINAND M. JANDUSAY,

SOLIDBANK
CORPORATION,
AND
MARCOPPER
MINING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Marcopper Mining Corporation was unable to pay its loans from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Later, ADB transferred all its rights to collect
from Marcopper to MR Holdings, Ltd. In order to pay MR Holdings,
Marcopper assigned all its assets to MR Holdings and executed therefor a
Deed of Assignment in MR Holdings favor.
Meanwhile, another creditor of Marcopper, Solidbank Corporation, won a
case against Marcopper. The court then issued a writ of execution directing
Sheriff Carlos Bajar to levy Marcoppers assets.

MR Holdings then filed an opposition asserting that it is now the owner of

Marcoppers assets hence, Bajar cannot levy them. The lower court denied
MR Holdings on the ground that the Deed of Assignment was made in bad
faith and that MR Holdings was a foreign corporation doing business
without a license in the Philippines (by virtue of the Deed of Assignment)
and as such cannot sue in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not MR Holdings may sue on this particular transaction.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized the following rules when it
comes to foreign corporations doing business here in the Philippines:
1.

if
a
foreign
corporation does
business in
the
Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;

2.

if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the

Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an
isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any
business transaction;

3.

if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with

the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
Being a mere assignee does not constitute doing business in the
Philippines. MR Holdings, a foreign corporation, cannot be said to be doing
business simply because it became an assignee of Marcopper. MR Holdings
was not doing anything else other than being a mere assignee. The only
time that MR Holdings is considered to be doing business here is that if it
continues the business of Marcopper which it did not.
Therefore, since it is not doing business here, pursuant to the rules above, it
can sue without any license before Philippine courts on an isolated
transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business
transaction.
Anent the issue of bad faith, the same was not proven. It appears that the
deed of assignment was an earlier agreement incidental to the loan
agreement between ADB and Marcopper which precedes the action brought
by Solidbank against Marcopper.

Conflict Of Laws Digest: Bank Of America V. CA (2003)

G.R. No. 120135
March 31, 2003
Lessons Applicable: forum non conveniens (conflicts of laws)
FACTS:

Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas) were

engaged in the shipping business owning 2 vessels: Don Aurelio and El
Champion
Because their business where doing well, Bank of America (BA)
offered them to take a loan for them to increase their ships.
BA acquired through them as borrowers four more ships: (a) El
Carrier; (b) El General; (c) El Challenger; and (d) El Conqueror. The
registration, operation, income, funds, possession of the vessel belonged
to the corporation.
May 10, 1993: Litonjuas filed a complaint to the RTC Pasig claming
that during its operations and the foreclosure sale, BA as trutees failed
to fully render an account of the income. They lost all their 6 vessels and
10% of their personal funds and they still have an unpaid balance of their
loans.
BA NT&SA, and BA international filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds
of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them
RTC and CA: Dismissed

ISSUE:
1. W/N there is grounds of forum non conveniens
2. W/N there is litis pendentia
HELD: Denied
1. NO.

The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is

inconvenient', emerged in private international law to deter the practice
of global forum shopping
Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; - present

(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an

intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, - present

(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to

enforce its decision - present

This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a
matter of defense
2. NO.

litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there must

be:
(a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions -present
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same acts - not shown
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other - not shown
It merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and
England

K. Nationality and Domicile of Corporations

**The nationality of a private corporation is determined by the character or
citizenship of its controlling stockholders.
**The domicile of a domestic corporation is its principal place of business
(contained in the AOI). For foreign corporations, their domicile is in the
country under whose laws they are incorporated.
2 TESTS TO DETERMINE FILIPINO CORPORATION:
1. Grandfather rule - governs the strict application of the ownership of a
corporation (generally 60% Filipino-owned)
2. Control test - a corporation that is at least 60% Filipino-owned is
considered a Filipino for purposes of determining the Filipino ownership of
a corporation whose nationality is put in issue

CORPORATION DOMICILED IN ONE STATE BUT DOING BUSINESS IN

ANOTHER IS A RESIDENT OF THE LATTER
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 112573, Feb. 9, 1995

FACTS:
Northwest, a US corporation, and Sharp, a Filipino corporation but with a
branch in Japan, entered into an agreement whereby the former authorized
the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Sharp, however, was unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, prompting Northwest to sue for
collection in Japan. Summons was served on Sharps branch office in Japan
but because the manager authorized to receive summons was said to be in
Manila, the same was also served on Sharps Manila head office through
diplomatic channels. Sharp nevertheless failed to appear during the hearing
and judgment was rendered. Northwest now filed a case before the
Philippine court to enforce the foreign judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Japanese court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Sharp
HELD:
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was
incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a corporation may
have is single in its essence and a corporation can only have one domicile
which is the state of its creation. Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one
state may, for certain purposes, be regarded as a resident in another state
in which it has offices and transacts business.
In as much as Sharp was admittedly doing business in Japan through its
duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed,
then in the light of the processual presumption, Sharp may be deemed a
resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the
courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts
lawful methods of serving process.

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS,

G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003
FRAUD and VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
Summons.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person.

Facts:
Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married. Marital differences,
squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such
that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board.
Margarita then left for the United States with her children. She filed with
the courts of California a petition to divorce her husband, and it was
granted.
Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of
Properties, which was duly granted by the RTC Makati.
Meanwhile, Abelardo commenced the proceeding on the voiding his
marriage with Margarita on account of psychological incapacity. As
Margarita was in the US, Abelardo initially moved that summons be served
through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied
the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well
as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given
address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all
at the expense of Abelardo. An Officers return was duly submitted
declaring the completion of the service of summons. Finally, the marriage
was declared void through Article 36 Family Code by the RTC.
Margarita appeared before the Consulate Office in San Francisco to sign
the agreement on separation of property. Abelardo allegedly threatened to
cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did
not sign the documents.
9 years later, Margarita contested such declaration of nullity of marriage on
account of extrinsic fraud and questioned the court that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over her, hence such decision is void and ineffectual.
Issue:
WON Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo? YES

WON there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of
the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its
annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties? NO
Held:
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of
the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or
quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such
instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
Jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem
or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear
factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected
through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court.
Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring
the marriage a nullity.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not
found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial
service in four instances: (1)when the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and
order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address,
also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient. The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does
not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14,
but under the third mode.

On the Issue of Fraud: A meticulous perusal of the Petition and Agreement

readily shows that Margarita signed the same on the proper space after the
prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. In the instant
case, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez. The
certificate of acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that
Margarita personally appeared before him and acknowledged before me
that SHE executed the same of her own free will and deed. Thus, there is a
prima facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the
Agreement. Margarita has failed to rebut this prima facie presumption with
clear and convincing proof of coercion on the part of Abelardo.