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Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship

Vol. 13, No. 1 (2008) 7798
World Scientific Publishing Company

TRIPLE HELIX NETWORKS IN A MULTICULTURAL

CONTEXT: TRIGGERS AND BARRIERS FOR FOSTERING
GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY

ETHEL BRUNDIN
Jnkping International Business School
P.O. Box 1026, SE 551 11 Jnkping, Sweden
ethel.brundin@jibs.hj.se
CAROLINE WIGREN
Jnkping International Business School and Circle
Lund University, Sweden
ESLYN ISAACS, CHRIS FRIEDRICH and KOBUS VISSER
University of the Western Cape
South Africa
Received September 2006
Revised December 2007
This article deals with Triple Helix (university, industry and government cooperation) from an institutional theory perspective. The empirical context is the Western Cape Region in South Africa and the
focus is entrepreneurship development. The purpose is two-fold: first, the existing Triple Helix model
is adapted to the South African context; and second, facilities and impediments for working according
to Triple Helix in South Africa are identified. The empirical material consists of a survey and three
longitudinal case studies illustrating the degree of cooperation between the three parties. The article
contributes to knowledge about how the Triple Helix model works on a regional level in a developing
country. The study draws the following conclusions: when cooperation is to be identified between the
three actors, only two of the three are involved; one missing link in the Triple Helix model is the focus
on the entrepreneur; cooperation between the three parties are incidental rather than planned and there
is lack of structure. In turn, some of these conclusions may be an effect of institutional changes on a
national level. For a normative legacy, the article proposes a set of suggestions for incorporating all
relevant parties on a practical level.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship development; Triple Helix model; institutional theory; emerging
economies.

1. Introduction
This paper engages the Triple Helix model, as developed and described by Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff (2000) on the dynamism of university-industry-government relations in the
context of a developing country and in regards to entrepreneurship development. The Triple
Helix model and its intricacies received great attention in the Western world as a means
77

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78 E. Brundin et al.

to foster innovations and growth, implying the creation of a climate and certain attitudes
that enable coordination between the agents directed to achieving innovation (Cook et al.,
1997). In emerging economies in general, and as in the case of this paper, in South Africa,
the concept received lesser attention and, subsequently, an espoused rhetoric about Triple
Helix does not exist.
2. Background to the Research Challenge
In terms of the guidelines for small business development and support in a South African
context, its government formulated a national framework (White Paper, 1995) which acts as
a guide for existing and potential role players. This White Paper outlines a national strategy
for the development and promotion of small business in South Africa where the Triple Helix
concept is indirectly called for.
In view of the diverse and uncoordinated nature of enterprise development in the period
preceding 1994, a call for coordination, cooperation and a clear national strategy framework
became inevitable. In order to address the economic imbalances of the past, the objectives
of the national policy framework for South Africa are six-fold:

create an enabling environment for small enterprises;

facilitate greater equalization of income, wealth and economic opportunities;
create long-term jobs;
stimulate economic growth;
strengthen the cohesion between small enterprises; and
level the playing fields (i.e., creating levels of equality) between large and small businesses.

For the policy framework to be effective, the following groups have been targeted for
specific support: women, rural enterprises, undereducated individuals, and previously (economically) disadvantaged groups. The targeted support areas are of critical importance for
the national support strategy; not only do they stress the need for some degree of public sector involvement, but they also emphasise the need for explicit differentiation in the support
framework.
On whether the national framework has, after 12 years, created an environment conducive for enterprise growth and development, research shows that, in general, no significant
improvement in the SME sector had taken place over the stated period. For example, from
the 2004 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report (Orford et al., 2004: 25) there is general agreement that the South African deficient entrepreneurial capacity can be ascribed to
three key elements in the environment, namely, weaknesses in the educational system, the
governments lack of support and difficulty in accessing financial resources. It is within
the context of low entrepreneurial capacity that the model of Triple Helix is presented as a
nexus in the discourse of entrepreneurial development.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, we aim to adapt the existing Triple Helix
model to the South African context; and second, we intend to identify facilities and impediments for working according to Triple Helix in South Africa.

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Triple Helix Networks in a Multicultural Context 79

The study is presented in four sections. Section 3 introduces the Triple Helix concept
and its theoretical underpinning. In this regard, the model as suggested by Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff (2000) is further elaborated upon with theories from the field of institutional
theory the latter theory contributes to our argument that innovation, i.e., entrepreneurship
development, does not come naturally from the tripartite cooperation, as suggested in the
model. Section 4 of the paper introduces the South African case. The relationship between
university, industry and government is investigated and reported on and three cases are
presented. Facilities and impediments are identified in relation to each case. Section 5 of the
paper is a discussion based on the empirical evidence where we examine the theory of Triple
Helix based on our findings. Four observations, of relevance South Africa and the Triple
Helix concept in general, are presented and discussed. Section 6 suggests implications to
facilitate entrepreneurship development according to Triple Helix in South Africa and a
future research agenda is presented.
3. Triple Helix: A Theoretical Overview
The Triple Helix model has been advocated as a useful method for fostering entrepreneurship
and growth. The model identifies three helices, namely industry, academia, and governments. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2001) state thata Triple Helix of academia-industrygovernment relations is likely to be a key component of any national or multinational
innovation strategy in the late twentieth century. The relationships between the three actors
span networks that enable and constrain flux of communication (Leydesdorff and Meyer,
2003: 191). This relationship, as espoused by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), is presented in Figure 1 as a set of trilateral networks between the state, industry and academia.
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) propose three different types of Triple Helix configurations. According to the first model, the nation state encompasses academia and industry
and directs the relationships between them; the second model consists of separate institutional spheres with strong borders dividing them and highly circumscribed relations among
the spheres. Finally, according to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), the third model,
academia, government and industry together, are generating a knowledge infrastructure in
terms of overlapping institutional spheres, with each taking the role of the other and with
hybrid organizations emerging at the interfaces.
The first helix model (or spiral) is applicable to the former Soviet Union and other
countries under existing socialism and gives little room for bottom-up initiatives (Etzkowitz

Academia
Trilateral networks and
hybrid organizations
State

Industry

Fig. 1. The Triple Helix model of university-industry-government relations.

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80 E. Brundin et al.

and Leydesdorff, 2000). The aim is to reach the third helix, which implies that the parties jointly realize that university spin-off firms, trilateral initiatives for knowledge-based
economic development, strategic alliances between different types of firms, governmental
laboratories, and academic research groups together constitute an innovative environment.
The role of the government is to support and encourage but not to control. To manage, the
different parties have to cooperate even if they have different motives (Eriksson et al., 2002).
When interaction between the different actors takes place, relationships are established and
boundaries eliminated. Viewed differently, this means that knowledge flows are not linear
and there is no longer a sender and a receiver of the knowledge; rather, knowledge is mutually constructed in interaction between the different actors. According to the third model,
the helices are assuming the roles of each other, i.e., the university is supposed to transfer
knowledge to the surrounding world, taking an active role in new venture creation, etc. The
firm, on the other hand, should develop an academic dimension in their daily work. Tdtling
(1998) postulates that:
innovations are non-linear, common learning takes place in networks between different
actors;
knowledge, both codified and tacit, is important in the innovations process;
institutions (i.e., rules of the game, organizations, values and routines), reduce uncertainty
which benefits the innovation process;
a regions or countrys governance model (i.e., actions of public, semi-public and private actors and organizations) is important for the stimulation and implementation of
innovations; and,
there is a risk for lock-in effects in regions where the world view is too homogenized.
The innovation process is an interactive process and thereby a social process. The purpose with the Triple Helix model is that interaction and communication should take place
between actors from the different helices, which might lead to new institutional arrangements. The model aims at increasing the level of innovations in a country or a region and
Triple Helix is discussed as a prerequisite for managing the process, i.e., the focus is either
on the national systems of innovation (cf. Freeman, 1995), or the regional systems of
innovation (cf. Cook et al., 1997).
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an innovation system is defined as the network of public and private institutions, within which
production, diffusion, and application of new knowledge and technology takes place (Eriksson et al., 2002). Cook et al. (1997) concludes that the innovation system (national as well
as regional) can be studied intellectually by specifying the actors and the linkages between
those. However, they emphasize the problem of researching this on a national level and suggest that studies should be done at the regional level, which together can give the national
perspective. To date, the model has been applied mainly in knowledge-based societies,
i.e., industrialized countries. This paper focuses on the regional level and contributes to
understanding about Triple-Helix on a regional level in a developing country.
In a few studies, the model has been applied in developing countries, such as Brazil,
where the system of business incubators in the country was researched. Etzkowitz et al.

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(2005) identified several Triple Helix hybrids and the relationship between universityindustry-government resulted in a focus from (i) incubator to incubation; (ii) from structure
to process; and (iii) from firms to creating diverse organizations. Academics formed businesses in addition to being transformers of knowledge; industry became partners in training
and the government contributed financially to research and development. Furthermore, the
model has been applied in Croatia where it was found that the Triple Helix model has
not sufficiently developed to a level of significance and that it exists in exceptional cases
as two helices, namely government and university (Laznjak and Svarc, 2004). Laznjak and
Svarc further postulate that the research sector was government-supported and had a closedsystem focus, while, on the other hand, the capability of industry to absorb research services
in post-socialist Croatia was limited.
From our understanding of the Triple Helix model, we now draw two conclusions:
(i) when people from different institutional backgrounds meet, we believe that new constellations of networks emerge and thereby new opportunities arise; (ii) identifying which
agenda to follow, which is a shared understanding, regarding the future development of a
country or region facilitates strategic decision-making.
When applying the model in the South African context, we have two limitations. First,
we have limited the study to one specific region, the Province of the Western Cape in South
Africa. Second, we have chosen to focus on how the Triple Helix actors in this region are
dealing with the development of SMEs. The emphasis on the SME sector is made since this
focus is stressed in the White Paper (1995) and the strong belief in South Africa that the
SME sector is of great importance for the development of the country (Orford et al., 2004).
This implies that the focus of the paper is quite narrowed, which we find useful, since, to
our knowledge, the model has not yet been applied in this context.
Next, we turn to institutional theory and argue that combining the three different institutions of university, industry and government might encompass some barriers to cooperation
and change.
3.1. Institutional theory
Organizations are embedded in institutional environments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Tolbert, 1985; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Teo et al., 2003) and they seek to match
regulatory demands and normative, as well as moral prescriptions and expectations, in order
to obtain and keep legitimacy. The goal is to stand up to standards of desirable, proper, or
appropriate [behaviour] within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs
and definitions (Suchman, 1995: 574). Once an organization is regarded as legitimate, it
is less vulnerable and more trustworthy in the eyes of its audience, i.e., the environment.
Legitimacy leads to persistence, which is desirable, as resources are more likely to be given
to those institutions that seem appropriate.
Along the way to gain legitimacy as a means to survive, the organization is subjected to
different pressures. Depending on the pressure from the environment, an organization can be
positioned in a typology where the pressure from the market is combined with the pressure
from the institutional environment (Meyer et al. 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Scott, 1992).
Scott and Meyer (1991) identify the two dimensions of technical control and institutional

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82 E. Brundin et al.

Stronger

Industry

Weaker

Public day-care
centres

Technical controls

Banks,
Hospitals

University,
Government,
State
Weak
Strong
Institutional controls

Fig. 2. Scott and Meyers matrix.

Source: Adapted from Scott, WR and JW Meyer (1991). The organization of societal sectors. Propositions
and early evidence. In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, WW Powell and PJ DiMaggio
(eds.). Chicago: Uniersity of Chicago Press, p. 124.

control and they should not be regarded as being mutually exclusive (see Figure 2). The
main drive of technical control is the pressure to conform and to be competitive within the
market. Control is thus based on the output, such as quality and efficiency, and is related to
instrumental rationality (Scott, 2003).
The institutional control is normally considered to originate from state, trade associations, trade unions, professionals and similar organizations. This type of control mechanism
lays stress on formal rationality and whether suitable procedures and structures are put in
practice (Scott, 2003). The institutional control is thus harder to measure against a specific
outcome. Along the two dimensions the pressure might be stronger or weaker.
The institutional control can be exercised through coercive, mimetic and/or normative pressures (Oliver, 1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive pressure is exerted
through governmental mandates, mimetic pressure through norms and practices within the
organizations specific institutional field, and normative pressure is mainly derived from
professionalization and exercised through trade and membership associations and the like.
By adapting to environmental pressure (the technical as well as the institutional) the
organization follows a three-step process including: (i) mimetic behaviour, in order to secure
better technical performance; (ii) objectification, whereby it can be understood that practices
are no longer rational but becoming habitualized to the degree that they are regarded
objectified, i.e., being more or less the most obvious way of doing things right; and (iii)
sedimentation, implying width and depth where the practice is taken for granted, without
further thought (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). By completing the three steps, the organization
becomes an institutionalized and taken-for-granted entity (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).
3.2. The three institutions within the Triple Helix concept
Within the Triple Helix model, we argue that it combines three institutionalized entities:
university, industry and government (see Figure 2). By combining the different control
mechanisms of Scott and Meyers typology (1991), university is placed in the lower, right
quadrant where the pressure to conform to regulations dominate, even if the demands to
produce knowledge meeting certain standards exist as well. Academia/university is thus
constrained to procedural as well as structural controls (Scott, 2003). Academia is not subject

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Triple Helix Networks in a Multicultural Context 83

to competition in a general sense, however the more legitimacy an academic institution gains,
the more competitive advantage it usually obtains. Government and governmental bodies
are institutions per se and are naturally compelled to their own restrictions and regulations,
which constitute a strong institutional pressure. These bodies are, at the same time as they
seek legitimacy, legitimacy judgers and creators for others (cf. Scott, 1995). Their outcome
is not measured by market-driven measurements, but rather in standardized dimensions, and
sometimes not at all, in publicly-driven childcare centres for example.
In some cases, governmental bodies, for instance state-owned banks and hospitals or
municipal energy supply companies, compete on the open market and are subject to high
technical control mechanisms. A governmental body can thus be placed in the left, lower
quadrant, in the right lower quadrant or in the upper right quadrant. Industry, exclusive
of not-for-profit organizations, normally operates under very strong technical pressure and
less of institutional constraints. Some scholars would probably not even consider industry as institutionalized. In this paper, we argue that industrial fields have built-up certain
industry-specific rules that may render or reject legitimacy and thereby consciously, and
unconsciously, are subject to institutionalization. The institutional control exists, and can
be very strong on requirements for statement of accounts, industry specifications, environmental control and the like. Industry, as defined here is placed in the upper, left quadrant.
The difference between university and governmental bodies is that the outcome of industry
is measured mainly in monetary terms and the technical pressure to survive on the market
is extensive.
University, industry and government are all subject to isomorphism, i.e., the constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same
set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, the two former
bodies are subject to institutional isomorphism, rather than competitive isomorphism which
is more apt for industry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1996). National and contextual differences may interfere with the argumentation here and place the three institutions in slightly
different positions. However, generally speaking, most people can probably agree upon the
suggested grouping within the typology.
3.3. Institutional theory and change
From the preceding review on institutional theory, the following conclusions can be drawn:
(i) it is considered of vital importance to be regarded as a legitimate body of institution;
(ii) the rules of attaining legitimacy and the way to achieve it varies depending on what
kind of pressure the organization is exposed to; and
(iii) the rules of gaining and keeping legitimacy differ between them.
For these reasons it is safe to presume that once legitimacy is obtained it is revered and
not easily jeopardized. Furthermore, there is reason to assume that stability is a condition
strived for and that resistance to change is likely to exist. Scott and Meyer (1991) contend
that the stronger the institutionalized environment is and the tighter the coupling is between
the prevailing structure/archetype and a rigid embeddedness of the institution, the harder it

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is for change to occur and the more instability is created through change. Greenwood and
Hinings (1996) argue in a parallel way when they claim that archetypes (i.e., institutionalized
entities) are institutionally derived and that radical change, being a movement toward another
archetype, is problematic because of the normative embeddedness of an organization.
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), radical change affects deeply rooted and
sedimented aspects whereas convergent change is considered to happen within an existing
template without challenging the foundation at its roots. Dalum et al. (1992) are of the
same opinion when they conclude that change involving economic growth and innovation
systems is complicated by the fact that it is linked to permanent institutional change.
4. The South African Case with Particular Reference to the Province of the
Western Cape
4.1. The role of universities in entrepreneurship development
The Ministry of Education expects higher education institutions to engage in teaching,
research, consultation and community outreach projects. Therefore, universities accumulate knowledge through research and act as the transferors of knowledge through teaching and consultation. This also holds true for entrepreneurship education and, although
entrepreneurship is not new, it has received more attention during the last three decades.
This provides valuable input for entrepreneurship education and consultancy. Furthermore,
many academic institutions have been involved in entrepreneurship education for more than
30 years; however, the components of entrepreneurship courses vary from institution to
institution (McMullan and Gillin, 2001; Ladzani and van Vuuren, 2002).
In the Province of the Western Cape, Brijlal (2005) identified four university institutions
and a technical college involved in entrepreneurship education and development in a regional
context. These five institutions in the Province of the Western Cape are the University of the
Western Cape, University of Cape Town, University of Stellenbosch, the Cape Peninsula
University of Technology and the Cape Technical College. All of these institutions are
involved in entrepreneurship development to varying degrees through formal and outreach
programs and consultation. For the purpose of this study, the focus will be on the work done
by the University of the Western Cape and, in particular, its Entrepreneurship Development
Unit. The unit was established to provide training, consulting and engagement in research
projects to improve the quality of life of the small and medium enterprise community.
4.2. The role of government in entrepreneurship development
The national government tasked the Department of Trade and Industry with the responsibility
of creating an enabling business environment. In 1995, the Department of Trade and Industry
published the National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business in
South Africa, and in 2004, the Review of ten years of small-business support in South Africa
1994 to 2004. In 2005, it published the Integrated Small-Business-Development Strategy:
Unlocking the potential of South African Entrepreneurs. From the State of Small Business
in South Africa: Annual Review (Ntsika Promotion Agency, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004)

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Triple Helix Networks in a Multicultural Context 85

it showed that there is a constant increase in the number of small businesses. The 800,000
SMEs in 1995 increased to 2.5 million in 2004 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004).
In alignment with the South African governments national strategy for small business,
the Provincial government of the Western Cape has been rolling out a range of support
services to the small business sector via the SMME (small, medium and micro enterprises)
sub-directorate of its Department of Economic Development and Tourism. This is primarily
done in the form of facilitating small business development and entrepreneurship support,
access to capital, joint ventures, training and mentorship programs (Cape Gateway, 2005a).
Therefore, (as a government department) the Department of Economic Development and
Tourism is viewed as an essential element in the Triple Helix model.
4.3. The role of industry in entrepreneurship development
In South Africa, business development is initiated by industry associations such as the South
African Chamber of Business, the Black Business Council, the Chamber of Mines, the
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (i.e.,
a business chamber), the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, and the
South African Foundation. These employer organizations, as well as foreign chambers of
commerce in South Africa, regularly liaise with government and also comment on draft
legislation.
In the Province of the Western Cape, the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CTCCI), the Western Cape Business Opportunities Forum (WECBOF), Western Cape
Minibus Taxi Association, Business Opportunities Network (BON) and Clothing and Textile Association (CLOTEX) are the main role players with regard to the initiation of business
development (Brundin et al. 2006). The industry is also represented by an individual company in this study.
4.4. Evidence of cooperation between university, industry and government: survey
and case illustrations
Initially a survey was carried out in order to form an opinion about the degree of cooperation
between university, industry and government. Fifteen respondents, equally representing
university, industry and government, filled in a questionnaire and were interviewed over the
phone. Each interview lasted half an hour. The purpose was to determine if the Triple Helix
concept is too far out of reach for the representatives of the three parties mentioned in the
model. The respondents were from the executive management of the Provincial Government,
University (Deans of Faculties) and Industry.
Three closed-ended questions were used to determine first, if there was any interaction
between the respondent and the other actors; second, whether or not planned cooperation
occurred; and third, whether or not the cooperation was successful. During follow-up interviews it was also established that the cooperation was primarily of a planned nature and
occurred at the executive level, i.e., at Director-General or Ministerial level for government, at the Executive Director level in Industry, and at faculty and/or rectorate level for
universities. Table 1 summarizes Questions 13.

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Table 1. Summary of findings of survey.a
Q1

Q2

Q3

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

University
Industry
Government
Total

5
5
5
15

0
0
0
0

5
4
5
14

0
1
0
1

5
5
5
15

0
0
0
0

Percentage

100

93

100

Q1. Have you inter-acted with government/industry/academia at all during the last
five years? If yes, continue; if no, stop and thank you.
Q2. Did you experience any cooperation between government/industry/academia
in a planned way during the last five years?
Q3. Was the cooperation successful?

From these findings, it can be deduced that in the Western Cape there is interaction and
positive cooperation between the universities, government and industry. Some respondents
have expressed sentiments of strength in policy development and weakness in application
of policy by government. In order to determine if this is an espoused rhetoric that is also
valid in practice we needed to turn to some practical examples.
As a next step, three examples of cooperation between university-industry-government
were selected to demonstrate problems, weaknesses and successes in tripartite agreements
within the Province of the Western Cape. These cases were selected because they highlight
and identify the typical problems and challenges experienced on a regular basis and why it
may be a complex task for the Triple Helix model to work effectively. The cases describe
the application of the Triple Helix concept. The cases presented are:
(i) A training program for minibus taxi-owners. This case was followed from September
2004 to April 2006. During this time, representatives of the Provincial Department
of Transport, The Minibus Taxi Association and the University of the Western Cape
attended 14 meetings.
(ii) The evaluation of a service provider, namely RED Door (Real Enterprise Development). The intention from the researchers side was to evaluate this initiative through a
longitudinal, quantitative study. Management of the University of the Western Cape and
the RED Door attended eight meetings before the research component of the project
was given up one year later.
(iii) A mini-tunnel farming project in the rural town of Bot River. This case was followed from January to October 2005 with a half-day on-site visit and one followup interview six months after the start and one follow-up interview three months
later.

a We express our thanks and appreciation to Goosain Solomon for collecting the data in Table 1.

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4.4.1. Case 1: Implementation of a training program for the owners of minibus taxis
in the province of the Western Cape.
As a result of the former policies, rules and regulations of separate development (apartheid),
the majority of the population was located as distant as 40100 kilometres from central
business districts. Due to an inadequate system of buses and trains, the only means of
transport was minibus taxis. These taxis have always been considered to be part of the
informal sector and very few of the owners have valid permits to transport commuters.
In an environment of informality and lack of proper controls as well as an absence of
appropriate safety procedures, the large number of taxis not only creates congestion, but
has also increasingly been the major cause of accidents. Since 2004, the government has
attempted to change from the old and unsafe 10-seater vehicles currently being used to
modern 25-seater taxis. Most of the owners have poor educational backgrounds and it is
important for these owners to receive proper business and entrepreneurship education and
training.
The minibus taxi industry is very lucrative, controlled by a few taxi associations (i.e.,
under oligopolistic conditions). This industry is riddled with crime, delivers poor service
and often adopts a no-care attitude regarding passenger safety. In 2004, the Department of
Transport commissioned a skills audit based on a general belief that the industry should
play a major role in the tourism industry, while understanding that for that to become
possible the industry would need to improve its service delivery. The audit was strongly
supported by the Minibus Taxi Association. Improved service would reduce the strain placed
on passengers who often arrive late to work (or not at all), simply because these taxis
experienced mechanical failure or were involved in accidents.
Faculty members of the Department of Management at the University of the Western
Cape completed the skills audit in 2004. Not surprisingly, the skills audit highlighted and
identified a need for training the owners and management committee members of the taxi
industry. The aim of such training would be to improve the managerial capacity of the taxi
owners and committee/board members by means of a training program specifically designed
to cater to the problems and challenges experienced by its members.
By the end of 2004, the university was requested to submit a detailed proposal for
offering 52 three-day programs to the members of this industry at a cost of R1,000,000
(approximately 125,000; = R8.00). The minibus taxi council was highly supportive of
this endeavour. The standard procedure for accepting proposals is guided by cost, e.g., if
the total project cost is less than R100,000 ( 12,500), no tender needs to be issued; if the
total project cost exceeds 12,500, a formal tender needs to be issued. Since the total project
cost was 125,000, formal tender should have been offered. However, based on the level of
satisfaction by the manager of the Provincial Department of Transport with the quality of the
research produced (i.e., the social audit) the training project was awarded to the University
of the Western Cape.
The proposal for the training program method and content was developed and presented
to and verbally accepted by the Department of Transport, while the members of the university
department were tasked with the development of the course material. The training was

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earmarked to commence early in 2005, at which stage the training responsibility in the
Department of Transport was transferred to another manager.
However, no single module has been offered to date. A time consuming process consisting of numerous meetings to revive the training project has begun. All the hours invested in
developing course material and attending numerous meetings were fruitless.
4.4.1.1. An empirical analysis
The two institutions involved, the University of the Western Cape and the Department of
Transport, usually get along well. The respective rules of the game are well known to each
other and they both rely on a well-established legitimacy. Furthermore, the two institutions
are both devoted to creating an enabling environment where micro and small businesses can
reach sustainability and achieve growth. The conditions for a successful cooperation and
outcome were in place.
However, a number of impediments can be identified. The rules of the game were
changed over time. First, the formal tender was set aside. Second, a legally binding contract
was not set up. Third, the person responsible at the Department of Transport was exchanged
and acted according to other rules, following the formal and bureaucratic process. This
person was seemingly more guided by institutional pressure.
In their endeavour to gain legitimacy, the representatives for the minibus taxi industry
were eager to fulfil this project. They wanted to get away from low institutional pressure
where not even the basic rules of safety and permits were followed and to operate on an
extended market. As it seems, the taxi industry had the desire to conform to both institutional
and technical pressures while being open to entrepreneurial development.
In this case, we cannot present a win-win-situation, which would be the ultimate effect of
the tripartite cooperation. The university did not benefit and neither did the taxi-owners, or
the government, as the government department has now put the project out on tender for the
fourth time. It is believed that this project was finally awarded to a Gauteng-based consulting
company. The case illustrates how governmental bodies were unable to recognize technical
pressure. They continued to follow institutional pressure meeting the demands from the
government.
4.4.2. Case 2: Evaluation of real enterprise development project: RED Door
In the period preceding the South African democracy of 1994, the majority of its population
had been restricted to owning micro-enterprises. However, in the post-1994 era, a concerted
drive by government has made more business opportunities available to (formerly) disenfranchised communities. Although support services were available, the providers were
located in central business districts and not in communities where the need for such services
was highest.
For this specific purpose, a service marketed as Real Enterprise Development (RED)
(Cape Gateway, 2005b) has been developed as a one-stop service in locations in close
proximity to most needy communities with an announcement by the Department of Economic Development and Tourism in 2004 to open 35 RED Doors across the Province of the

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Western Cape to complement approximately 1,000 existing small business service providers.
By August 2006, seven RED Door units have been made operational to ensure that their
services are not only relevant to the people, but also to the type of businesses that these
people intend to start.
Adopted by the Department of Economic Development and Tourism, this concept has
proved to be highly successful in Brazil, Northern Ireland and Israel. In addition, it is
also based on Open for Business, a Canadian concept that has been operational in Cape
Town and Gauteng for some time. The capital investment to commence this organization
is approximately 30,000 with an annual operating budget of 120,000 (Department of
Economic Development and Tourism, 2005).
In light of the considerable investment into this service project, the university suggested
that, in the interest of all participants (university-industry-government), an evaluation of
a number of these RED Doors be made to ensure that their delivery of services and the
type of services are appropriate for the relevant business communities. The manager of the
relevant government department, who was well-acquainted with the university representatives, requested a detailed proposal. The university representatives designed an evaluation that was longitudinal in character and made it possible for the university to use it for
research purposes. This was subsequently approved verbally and in principle by the relevant
authorities.
Since the manager in the provincial government did not have the power to approve the
budget, it was forwarded to a higher authority. After much deliberation, the funds were
finally approved as a gentlemens agreement and transferred to a financial service provider
who would monitor the transfer of the funds to the university. The responsible person with
whom the university had all the discussions later resigned and the new manager required
the university to revise the initial proposal, which was duly taken care of.
A further resignation in the provincial government resulted in this project being put
on a protracted hold. The third incoming person was a former student at the university.
At a seminar, she had heard the seminar leader from the University of the Western Cape
mention that many initiatives from governmental bodies were not successful. The incumbent
declared that she was not satisfied with the university as service provider and also held the
opinion that since the RED Door initiative was only in its infancy stage, it was inappropriate
to start with an evaluation process. Despite the fact that the tendering process was completed
(i.e., tender issued, proposals received and evaluated), the project was never awarded to the
successful bidder and the money never reached its final destination.
Eighteen months after the suggested start of the evaluation, nothing had materialized
and the RED Door initiative lost essential insights from an evaluation process. All three
parties of university-industry-government have thereby lost an invaluable opportunity for
joint learning and entrepreneurship development.
4.4.2.1. An empirical analysis
Initially the three parties of industry, here represented by the individual entrepreneur,
academia and government had good intentions of cooperating. However, many impediments undermined those intentions. Personal contacts seem to be one possible explanation

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for the delays when people in charge changed positions. The fact that established contacts
were exchanged was disadvantageous for the project. The first replacement seemed to be
intent on ensuring that things would be run by the book when it was demanded that the university revise its proposal. He thereby stressed the organizations institutional controls. The
second replacement acted as if she was afraid of losing legitimacy on behalf of the provincial
governmental body when she decided that the university was no longer wanted as a service
deliverer. There is also a lack of knowledge about the relevance of an evaluation from the
governmental side. The tacit knowledge that was possessed on the university side was not
shared or explained in a convincing way to the representative of the Provincial Department
of Economic Development and Tourism. The governmental department never understood
how it could benefit from such an evaluation. The two parties did not discuss and clarify
their opinions and possible contributions enough. That the initiative was one-sided may also
have contributed to the aversion to the suggested evaluation on the governmental side.
4.4.3. Case 3: Employment creation at the Bot River mini-tunnel farming
Bot River (locally known as Botrivier) is situated on the scenic route to Hermanus via the
Houw Hoek Mountains. Originally, the first inhabitants (the Khoi-Khoi tribes) called the
area Couga and translated, it means rich in fat or lots of butter. The early Europeans
settlers bartered for barrels of butter and they initially referred to the river as Botter Rivier
(Butter River), which was later changed to Bot River.
Bot River is one of many typical rural towns where the majority of people are unemployed
and job creation opportunities are non-existent. The only business activities operational in
Bot River are a few retail outlets and only a limited number of new houses are being built.
Job opportunities are scarce and most of the people work on fruit and wine farms and in
nearby towns, such as Hermanus, Hawston and Caledon. Due to high unemployment and
limited business opportunities in such a small rural town, it was a natural idea to start a
farming business. As a first step, a mini-tunnel farming project was considered a probable
solution with an ultimate aim to produce value-added products, such as canned vegetables.
The tunnels are 1 meter high and made of plastic material for rapid cultivation.
Land and financial support were provided by the local municipality, with research and
fundraising support forthcoming from the Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR);
the initiator of the project. A researcher from the University of the Western Cape acted as a
research consultant to the FCR. The business operations, here represented by Eco-tunnels,
provided assistance with the tunnel development and installation. The produce is limited to
onions and spinach and sold to businesses and the community. Due to the limited number
of tunnels, it is not possible to produce in large enough quantities to supply large businesses
on a daily basis.
The project is built on informal contracts. Each party contributes in accordance with
their assigned role. For example, FCR has research capabilities and, with its networking
skills, is able and capable of obtaining sponsorships; Eco-tunnels provide assistance with
the tunnel construction and business management; the government has financial resources
and is prepared to invest in this project. Employees are making decisions regarding planting
and all related activities.

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The project employs six women and each is paid 75 per month. This joint project
between government-academia-business commenced in 2003 with the first 90 tunnels
becoming operational by 2004. In 2006, 180 tunnels are operational. The future plans
include purchase of additional produce (such as potatoes and pumpkin) that can be packaged with their produce. Other value additions are in the pipeline, and through this process,
additional funds could be generated to increase the number of jobs or to increase the wages
of existing staff members.
4.4.3.1. An empirical analysis
In the third case, we can identify a few facilities. It appears that each role player recognizes
its role and responsibilities. Tangible contributions are made from each party combining
different set of skills or resources. No key persons were exchanged during the initial phase
before the project commenced. The project has led to an expansion with a possible increase
in job creation.
5. Discussion
This study set out to adapt the existing Triple Helix model to the South African context and
to identify facilities and impediments for working according to Triple Helix in South Africa.
By referring to three typical examples of current endeavors to work according to the model,
we have pinpointed triggers and barriers for the model to work in practice. Based on our
findings, we will attempt to discuss them on a more general level in a set of observations.
Observation 1: Cooperation. Elements of cooperation, as found in the Triple Helix model,
have been observed in the South African context. However, in two of the three cases the
forms of interaction are between two participants, rather than as the theoretical model would
suggest, between all three helices, namely, university, industry and government. This is the
same observation that was made by Laznjak and Svarc (2005) in Croatia. It is also clear that
the traditional functions performed by these institutions mentioned in the Triple Helix model
are not that clear cut. The first two cases illustrate how the Triple Helix intention collides with institutional thinking. It is evident that institutional barriers are often the biggest
stumbling-block in long-term cooperation and actions. This is in line with institutional
theory, which can be used for explaining that institutional barriers can obstruct cooperation and co-action between academia, government and industry, and thereby innovation.
There is thus a certain amount of overlap taking place, which contributes to entrepreneurship development which is in agreement with the theory which stresses that overlapping
institutional spheres of university, industry and government increases cooperation and coaction and thereby innovation. However, if all the institutions were to work together (i.e.
cooperate) as a well-oiled machine, the outcomes could be significantly better. The contribution to entrepreneurship development, i.e., job creation through new venture creations
and ultimately to poverty alleviation could be much greater. Arguably, results of cooperation
between all three elements of the helix would, on a pro-active and organized basis, contribute
significantly toward an environment of fostering growth and economic development.
Observation 2: Planning and structure. In our empirical analyses, we have concluded that
there appears to be a missing link in cooperation between the participants of the Triple

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Helix model in a South African context, namely lack of planning and structure. The cooperation is not based on planned and coordinated efforts of cooperation, but more on ad hoc
interventions and interactions. The cases also illustrate the lack of structure for handling
cooperation projects. None of the three cases relied on a formed and sealed contract, but
merely on informal, verbal agreements. In the two first cases (Minibus Taxis and RED
Door), representatives from each respective helix knew each other and the informal agreements were embedded in a social context of established relationships. In all probability,
there would not have been a problem if the people involved in the project had not been
exchanged over time. The replacements had no insight into the prior process and more or
less had to rely on formal agreements, which did not exist. However, with written contracts
in place, the initiatives would probably have continued as planned.
In conclusion, where the model suggests planned cooperation (Leydesdorff and Meyer,
2003), we find incidental cooperation. These incidental approaches are short term and often
develop as a result of ideas generated out of urgency, or opportunity scanning by one
participant, followed by the selling of the idea to another participant, who then buys into
the process. Although the latter is an explanation for the commencement of many successful
cooperations, it is our view that organizational cooperation of a planned nature far exceeds
the benefits derived from incidental cooperation. Viewed differently, many initiatives are
likely to be more successful when cooperation is planned from the outset. Not only does
this form of cooperation produce significant elements of synergy, it also implies interaction
of a pro-active nature (i.e. planned cooperation), rather than incidental cooperation which
tends to be haphazard and of a reactive nature.
Observation 3: Institutional theory and change. In terms of assessing the three major groupings of the Triple Helix model in a South African context, it would appear that since institutional change has taken place to some degree in accordance with Broad-Based Black
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), it would be easier to form tripartite cooperations. The
sedimentation aspect (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) is, in this context, more or less out
of play. Staff members of governmental institutions have been exchanged and the representatives of the three helices respectively are in a situation where they can mould new and
innovative ways to collaborate. However, this does not seem to have been the case. It may be
that the lack of such cooperation can be attributed to institutional change on a national level
rather than on the inability of staff to change. In the new governments endeavour to form a
new nation based on BBBEE, governmental personnel have been exchanged step-by-step.
The incoming people have not been able to stay long enough to build up structure and feedback systems or form continuity before they have been asked to take on new positions in the
system. Individuals might be open to change, but when they change positions within such
short periods of time, there is no time to conform to mimetic behaviour (Tolbert and Zucker,
1996). Thus, the balancing between change and continuity has been too rapid. As it is now,
there is no loop back with requested feedback to any of the helices of tri-partite projects.
Had there been the pressure to obtain set goals, this pressure could work as an incentive.
Observation 4: A focus on the entrepreneur. The cases illustrate that there is a need for a
shared understanding and a shared language when actors from different parties cooperate.

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Triple Helix Networks in a Multicultural Context 93

This understanding has to be shared between the people within respective helices as well.
Otherwise it is problematic to transfer knowledge between the involved individuals. The
major challenge is for the three parties to agree on a shared vision and an idea that they all
find beneficial since they seem to have different objectives for their work. Although involved
in activities such as entrepreneurship education and assessments, like in the above cases,
universities are often more interested in the research component, which might not always
benefit the entrepreneur. Second, government is responsible for policies, but fails dismally at
ensuring that these are successfully implemented or fails to provide the financial resources
required for the implementation of these policies. Third, industry organizations ensure that
the interests of its members, who are big business, are met and are not bothered by the
success or failure of micro enterprises.
Within the Triple Helix concept, the three institutions of university, industry and governmental bodies are supposed to cooperate and jointly foster innovation and growth. This
implies a re-conceptualization regarding core beliefs and purposes of these institutions.
Taking support from institutional theory, we claim that theoretically-suggested change in
behaviour, thinking and acting might have small practical consequences. Their respective
present mindsets are so deeply rooted that inertia may hinder, rather than foster, change.
In other words, the rules of attaining legitimacy differ between the three parties in such a
way that they work as impediments for focusing on the main purpose for their collaboration,
the focus on the entrepreneur and entrepreneurial development. The above observations
support the claim that the entrepreneur suffers from the three helices resistance to radical
change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) since all three seem to be victims of coercive,
mimetic and normative pressures, as postulated by Oliver (1997). Institutional barriers,
such as diverse vision and objectives, organizational structures and the attitudes of people
may add complex modalities to cooperation and the achievement of a common focus on
the entrepreneur. Therefore, the focus on the vision to create entrepreneurial development
needs much greater emphasis. A determining factor, and therefore an important addendum,
is the incorporation of the entrepreneur in the Triple-Helix model. It is our opinion that,
for this process to be successful, the entrepreneur should be the driving target and force.
In none of our cases was the entrepreneur the initiator of the process, though he/she was
the targeting person. As stressed in the beginning of this paper, when people from different
institutional backgrounds meet, new constellations of networking emerge and thereby new
opportunities arise. This is illustrated in Case 3, which is an example of a new institutional
arrangement when the research side, in collaboration with an entrepreneur, formed a new
venture.
We are aware that it is probably not feasible in the South African context for the individual
entrepreneur to exert power. However, missing out on placing him/her at the top of the
pyramid would lead to a fatal interpretation of a future Triple Helix model. We are also
aware that Etzkowitz and Zhou (2006) doubt an amendment of any new helix, since the
dynamic aspect might get lost. Rather, they suggest twin helices to operate in parallel where
one of the helices is exchanged. For the empirically-based study here, we definitely argue
that all three helices remain intact. The adding of the entrepreneur is a way to put the issue
at hand, i.e., entrepreneurial development, in the limelight.

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Cooperation
for growth and
sustainability

Legend
E = Entrepreneur
I = Industry
A = Academia
G = Government

Fig. 3. A proposed model for cooperation between the stakeholders in a South African context.

It is for the above mentioned reasons that an amendment to the Triple Helix model, as
shown in Figure 3 is presented. The model is shown as a pyramid-shaped model with the
four relationships shown as the corners of the pyramid, with the entrepreneur (E) at the top
and the government (G) at the bottom.
In terms of the relationships between the helices, the government should only be involved
in policy development, identifying partners to cooperate with and to provide the required
resources as to successfully implement the process. For these reasons, the governmental
body is placed at the bottom of the pyramid. Furthermore, a model with four helices will
need to include the structure and feedback loops that we have argued for.
6. Triple Helix in the South African Context
We can conclude that the Triple Helix concept is applied in a South African context. In view
of the critical assessment of Triple Helix role players in a South African context, there is little
doubt that the Triple Helix concept (at least from an institutional perspective) could work.
However, institutional barriers, such as vision and objectives, organizational structures and
the attitudes of people may add complex modalities to cooperation and the achievement of
common goals.
The Triple Helix, from a theoretical perspective, possesses and presents the elements
required for introducing innovative practices and procedures for SME growth, i.e., what we
here have referred to as entrepreneurship development. However, a factor negating robust
movement in this direction and that has become a feature of South Africas policy environment is reflected in the perception that South Africa is strong on policy (development), yet

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weak on implementation. As illustrated in the cases above, it may be that the governmental
body in the two first cases competed for political power at the expense of entrepreneurship development, being a victim of so called institutional isomorphism (cf. DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983).
6.1. Implications
In our capacity as researchers and our involvement in entrepreneurship development in
the Western Cape area, we conclude with the following more or less normative advice to
whom it may concern and suggest the following considerations that lend support for our
illustrated cases. In particular these are:
(i) University: From the standpoint of the university, it would be important to act only
on written agreements when dealing with government institutions. Furthermore, written contracts should be entered into before proceeding with any projects. The latter
condition will protect the university against committing scarce resources for which it
would not be remunerated at a later stage.
(ii) Government: From the perspective of the government, it would be beneficial to ensure
that civil servants are properly trained in procedures for dealing with individuals and
organizations outside governmental structures. This will ensure that communication
between the managers and departments are improved, that communication filters
through to all levels so that projects are successfully implemented and completed, and
that structures including feedback systems are set up. Furthermore, government could
initiate programs in which the three parties are expected to cooperate. Cooperation
between the three helices can increase the legitimacy of the government and help it
to increase the quality in delivery of support (Etzkowitz and Zhou, 2006).
(iii) Industry: Communication between industry, government and universities can be
viewed imperative to improve service delivery to the business community. It would
also help if industry applies its influence more effectively to bring about the required
changes, which will ensure growth and development, thereby contributing to job
creation and poverty alleviation.
(iv) The creation of a climate and certain attitudes that enable coordination between the
agents directed to achieving innovation (Cook et al., 1997), need to be applied in
the context of the examples cited above.
(v) Start with understanding in the South African context, it appears as if the concept
of reliable insight (i.e., the way in which each of the participants are supposed to have
insight and understanding for the other) did not manifest itself in a manner that was
conducive for the development of such a dynamic relationship.
(vi) Exert strong leadership and presence this key ingredient was absent in the South
African experience, in the sense that participating groups were almost too afraid to
assume a dynamic and influential leadership role for fear of being perceived as being
too aggressive.
(vii) Design and customize cross-sector engagement in review, this is the purpose of
a Triple Helix interaction; however, turfism (i.e., entering onto the domain that

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others perceive as their own) and excessive levels of political correctness may have
been instrumental in the lack of cross-sector engagement.
(viii) Launch experiments, learn from them and collectively monitor progress the very
essence of the Triple Helix model is contained in this fourth domain.
If one of the three parties is not functioning at a level regarded as the minimum level of
efficiency by the others, there is a high probability that the project could fail. With particular
reference to South Africa, the government often does not have suitably skilled employees
to partner in the Triple Helix application. While academics are keen to become involved in
and add value to community projects, it is not reasonable to expect that universities take
part in the cooperation without the pay-back, i.e., the possibility to get research value back.
Furthermore, on a more pragmatic level, it is not reasonable to expect that well-educated
university academics spend hours in fruitless meetings. Business people (i.e., industry) are
anxious to get the projects started and are not interested in too many rules and regulations
to comply with which often precedes the launch of a project.
6.2. Prospects for further research
It is evident that the nature of cooperation between the actors in the Triple Helix model
in the South African context towards entrepreneurship and small business development
needs to be explored in greater detail. There exists a need for further research to better
understand the relationships of partners while engaged in cooperative activities, the nature
and purpose of their cooperation, and the policies under which these forms of cooperation
occur. The potential research will allow opportunity to be leveraged to have a more conducive
environment for entrepreneurship and small business development within the conceptual
framework of the Triple Helix model. For a start, our findings can form a point of departure
to test a set of hypotheses on a larger scale.
South Africa is characterized by a dual economic system and therefore, other dimensions can be added to the Triple Helix model, namely donors and non-governmental organizations. Donors currently play a significant role in providing different resources to the
non-governmental sector in particular. Future research can decide to what degree these two
actors add value to the Triple Helix cooperation.
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