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SECRETARYOFAGRICULTUREv.
CENTRALROIGREFININGCO.etal.
PORTORICANAMERICANSUGAR
REFINERY,Inc.v.CENTRALROIG
REFININGCO.etal.GOVERNMENTOF
PUERTORICOv.SECRETARYOF
AGRICULTUREetal.
338U.S.604(70S.Ct.403,94L.Ed.381)
SECRETARYOFAGRICULTUREv.CENTRALROIGREFININGCO.etal.PORTORICANAMERICAN
SUGARREFINERY,Inc.v.CENTRALROIGREFININGCO.etal.GOVERNMENTOFPUERTORICOv.
SECRETARYOFAGRICULTUREetal.
Nos.27,30,32.
Argued:Oct.17,1949.
Decided:Feb.6,1950.
opinion,FRANKFURTER[HTML]
Mr.OrlandoJ.AntonSanti,SanJuan,P.R.,forPortoRicanAmericanSugarRefinery,Inc.FredericP.Lee,
Washington,D.C.,forCentralRoigRefiningCo.andWesternSugarRefiningCo.
Messrs.JoseTreasMonge,Asst.Atty.Gen.,ofPuertoRico,WaltonHamilton,Washington,D.C.,forthe
GovernmentofPuertoRico.
Mr.NeilBrooks,Washington,D.C.,forSecretaryofAgriculture.
Mr.DonaldR.Richberg,Washington,D.C.,forrespondentsAmericanSugarRefiningCo.,etal.
TOP()

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Mr.JusticeFRANKFURTERdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.
ThesethreecasesbringbeforeusthevalidityofanorderoftheSecretaryofAgriculture,issuedbyhimonthe
basisoftheSugarActof1948.ItisclaimedthattheSecretarydisobeyedtherequirementsofthatAct.Ifitbe
foundthattheSecretarybroughthimselfwithintheAct,thepowerofCongresstogivehimtheauthorityhe
exercisedischallenged.ByaseriesofenactmentsCongressaddresseditselftowhatitfoundtobeserious
evilsresultingfromanuncontrolledsugarmarket.Thecentralaimofthislegislationwastorationalizethe
mischievousfluctuationsofafreesugarmarketbythefamiliardeviceofaquotasystem.TheJonesCostigan
Actof1934,48Stat.670,7U.S.C.A.608,608a,609611,613,615617,620,theSugarActof1937,50
Stat.903,andtheSugarActof1948,61Stat.922,7U.S.C.(Supp.II,1949),11001160,7U.S.C.A.
11001160.
ThevolumeofsugarmovingtothecontinentalUnitedStatesmarketwascontrolledtosecureaharmonious
relationbetweensupplyanddemand.1Toadaptmeanstothepurposeofthesugarlegislation,theActof
1948definesfivedomesticsugarproducingareas:twointhecontinentalUnitedStates,andoneeachin
Hawaii,PuertoRicoandtheVirginIslands.Toeachareaisallottedanannualquotaofsugar,specifyingthe
maximumnumberoftonswhichmaybemarketedonthemainlandfromthatarea.202(a).Aquotais
likewiseassignedtothePhilippines.202(b).Thebalanceoftheneedsofconsumersinthecontinental
UnitedStates,tobedeterminedeachyearbytheSecretary,201,ismetbyimportationfromforeign
countries,predominantlyfromCuba,oftherequisiteamountofsugar.202(c).
Thequotasthusestablishedapplytosugarinanyform,raworrefined.Inaddition,207oftheAct
establishesfixedlimitsonthetonnageof'directconsumption'orrefinedsugar2whichmaybemarketed
annuallyonthemainlandfromtheoffshoreareasaspartoftheirtotalsugarquotas.Butmainlandrefinersare
notsubjecttoquotalimitationsuponthemarketingofrefinedsugar.
ThePuertoRicanquotafor'directconsumption'sugaris126,033tons.Thisfigurehaditsgenesisinthe
JonesCostiganActof1934,whichprovidedthatthequotaforeachoffshoreareawastobethelargest
amountshippedtothemainlandinanyoneofthethreeprecedingyears.48Stat.670,67273.Inthecaseof
PuertoRicothiswascomputedbytheSecretaryat126,033tons.GeneralSugarQuotaRegulations,Ser.2,
Rev.1,p.4,August17,1935.BytheSugarActsof1937and1948,Congressembeddedthisamountin
legislation.Allthedetailsforthecontrolofacommoditylikesugarcouldnot,ofcourse,belegislatively
predetermined.Administrativepowersareanessentialpartofsucharegulatoryscheme.Thepowers
conferredby205(a)upontheSecretaryofAgricultureraisesomeoftheseriousissuesinthislitigation.By
thatsectionCongressauthorizedtheSecretarytoallottherefinedsugarquotaaswellastheinclusive
allowanceofaparticularareaamongthosemarketingthesugaronthemainlandfromthatarea.3Thesection
providesthat'Allotmentsshallbemadeinsuchmannerandinsuchamountsastoprovideafair,efficient,and
equitabledistributionofsuchquotaorprorationthereof,bytakingintoconsideration'threefactors:(1)
'processingsofsugar***towhichproportionateshares***pertained'4(2)pastmarketingsand(3)abilityto
markettheamountallotted.
OnJanuary21,1948,theSecretaryissuedPuertoRicoSugarOrderNo.18,13Fed.Reg.310,allottingthe
1948PuertoRicanrefinedsugarquotaamongthevariousrefineriesoftheisland.Havingsatisfiedhimselfof
theneedforanallotmenttheSecretary,inconformitywiththeproceduralrequirementsof205(a),
apportionedthequotaamongtheindividualrefiners,settingforthinappropriatefindingsthemannerinwhich
heappliedthethreestatutorystandardsforallotment.
Asto'pastmarketings'hefoundthatthepropermeasurewastheaverageofthehighestfiveyearsof
marketingsduringthesevenyearperiodof19351941.Whilerecognizingthatordinarilythemostrecent
periodofmarketingsfurnishedtheappropriatedata,heconcludedthattheperiod19421947was
unrepresentativeinthatthewarneedsmadethoseyearsabnormalandnotafairbasisforpurposesofthe
economicstabilizationwhichwastheaimofthe1948Act.Shortagesastotransportation,storageand
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materials,causedbythewar,ledtospecialgovernmentcontrol.Thesecircumstancesresultedinhardshipsor
advantagesinvaryingdegreestodifferentrefiners,quiteunrelatedtoafairsystemofquotasforthepostwar
period.
Likewiseasto'theability***tomarket,'theSecretaryrecognizedthatmarketingsduringarecentperiod
ordinarilyfurnishedthebestmeasure.Butagainhefoundthatthederangementsofthewaryearsservedto
makethatmeasureabnormal.Hethereforeconcludedthatafairerguidetohisjudgmentcamefromthe
highestmarketingsofanyyearduringthe19351947period,using,however,presentplantcapacityasa
corrective.
TheSecretarydulyconsidered'theprocessingsofsugar'towhichproportionatesharespertained,but
concludedthatthisfactorcouldnotfairlybeapplied.Thiswassobecauseitreferredtoprocessingsofraw
sugarfromsugarcane,whereasthethreelargestPuertoRicanrefiningconcernsrestrictedthemselvesto
refiningrawsugarafterithadalreadybeenprocessed.Hefeltbound,therefore,togivenoweighttothis
factorinthesumhefinallystruck,andgaveequalweighttopastmarketingsandabilitytomarket.
Availingthemselvesof205(b),respondents,CentralRoigRefiningCompanyandWesternSugarRefining
Company,twoofthethreelargestrefinersinPuertoRico,appealedfromtheSecretary'sordertotheCourtof
AppealsfortheDistrictofColumbia.TheychargedtheSecretarywithdisregardofthestandardswhich
Congressimposedby205(a)forhisguidanceinmakingallotmentofquotastheychallengedthevalidityof
theActitselfundertheDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment.PortoRicanAmericanSugarRefinery,
Inc.,petitionerinNo.30,thelargestofthePuertoRicanrefiners,intervenedtodefendtheSecretary'sorder
againstthestatutoryattack.TheGovernmentofPuertoRico,petitionerinNo.32,intervenedtourgethe
unconstitutionalityofthestatute,whichtheAmericanSugarRefiningCompanyandothermainlandrefiners
intervenedtomeetthisattack.BeingofopinionthattheSecretary'sorderwasnotauthorizedbytheAct,the
CourtofAppealsreversedit.84U.S.App.D.C.161,171F.2d1016.Sincetheorderfailedonstatutory
grounds,amajorityofthatcourtdidnotdeemitpropertodecidetheconstitutionalquestion.Becauseofthe
obviousimportanceofthedecisionbelowintheadministrationoftheSugarActwegrantedcertiorari.336U.S.
959,69S.Ct.889(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/336/959).
I.InmakingquotaallotmentstheSecretaryofAgriculturemustofcoursekeepscrupulouslywithinthelimits
setbytheSugarActof1948.IndevisingtheframeworkofcontrolCongressfixedtheflatquotasforthesugar
producingareas.Congresscouldnotitself,asapracticalmatter,allottheareaquotasamongindividual
marketers.Thedetailsonwhichfairjudgmentmustbebasedaretooshiftingandjudgmentuponthemcalls
fortoospecializedunderstandingtomakedirectcongressionaldeterminationfeasible.Almostinescapablythe
functionofallottingtheareaquotasamongindividualmarketersbecomesanadministrativefunctionentrusted
tothememberoftheCabinetchargedwithoversightoftheagriculturaleconomyofthenation.Hecouldnot
beleftatlargeandyethecouldnotberigidlybounded.Eitherextremewoulddefeatthecontrolsystem.They
couldbeavoidedonlybylayingdownstandardsofsuchbreadthasinevitablytogivetheSecretaryleewayfor
hisexpertjudgment.Itsexercisepresumesajudgmentatoncecomprehensiveandconscientious.
Accordingly,CongressinstructedtheSecretarytomakeallotments'insuchmannerandinsuchamountsasto
provideafair,efficient,andequitabledistribution'ofthequota.
Inshort,CongressgavetheSecretarydiscretioncommensuratewiththelegislativegoal.Allocationofquotas
toindividualmarketerswasdeemedanessentialpartoftheregulatoryscheme.Thecomplexityofproblems
affectingrawandrefinedsugarinwidelyseparatedandeconomicallydisparateareas,accentuatedbythe
instabilityofthedifferentiatingfactors,musthavepersuadedCongressoftheneedforcontinuousdetailed
administrativesupervision.5Inanyevent,suchistheplainpurportofthelegislation.
BywayofguidingtheSecretaryinformulatingafairdistributionofindividualallotments,Congressdirectedhim
toexercisehisdiscretion'bytakingintoconsideration'threefactors:pastmarketings,abilitytomarket,and
processingstowhichproportionatesharespertained.Plainlythesearenotmechanicalorselfdefining
standards.Theyinturnimplywideareasofjudgmentandthereforeofdiscretion.ThefactthattheSecretary's
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judgmentisfinallyexpressedarithmeticallygivesanillusorydefinitenesstotheprocessofreachingit.
Moreover,heisunderadutymerelytotake'intoconsideration'theparticularizedfactors.TheSecretary
cannotbeheedlessofthesefactorsinthesense,forinstance,ofrefusingtohearrelevantevidencebearing
onthem.ButCongressdidnotthinkitwasfeasibletobindtheSecretaryastotheparthis'consideration'of
thesethreefactorsshouldplayinhisfinaljudgmentwhatweighteachshouldbegiven,orwhetherina
particularsituationallthreefactorsmustplayaquantitativeshareinhiscomputation.
Itwasevidentlydeemedfairthatinacontrolledmarketeachproducershouldbepermittedtoretainmoreor
lesstheshareofthemarketwhichhehadacquiredinthepast.Accordingly,pastmarketingsweretobetaken
intoconsiderationintheSecretary'sallotments.Butthepastisrelevantonlyifitfurnishesarepresentative
indexoftherelativepositionsofdifferentmarketers.Andthereisnocalculusavailablefordeterminingwhether
abaseperiodformeasurementisfairlyrepresentative.Whetherconditionshavebeensounusualastomake
aperiodunrepresentativeisnotamatterofcountingfiguresbutofweighingimponderables.Ifheisto
exercisethefunctionofallottingalimitedsupplyamongavidcontendersforit,theSecretarycannotescape
thenecessityofpassingjudgmentontheirrelativecompetitivepositions.ForCongressannouncedthatoneof
themainpurposesjustifyingthemakingofallotmentsis'toaffordallinterestedpersonsanequitable
opportunitytomarketsugar.'205(a).
IndirectingtheSecretarytotakeintoconsiderationabilitytomarket,CongressineffectchargedtheSecretary
withmakingaforecastofthemarketers'capacitytoperformintheimmediatefuture.Suchaforecastnodoubt
drawsheavilyonexperience,buthistoryneverquiterepeatsitselfeveninthevicissitudesofindustry.Whether
abilitytomarketismostrationallymeasuredbyplantcapacityorbypastperformance,whether,ifthelatter,
thebaseperiodshouldbeayearandwhatyearoragroupofyearsandwhatgroupthesearenotquestions
tobedealtwithasstatisticalproblems.Theyrequireadisinterested,informedjudgmentbasedon
circumstancesthemselvesdifficultofpropheticinterpretation.
Thepropermodeofascertaining'processingsofsugar***towhichproportionateshares***pertained'isnot
hereincontroversy.Perhapsthisfactortooimplieschoice.Butthequestioncommontoallthreestandardsis
whethertheSecretarymayconclude,afterdueconsideration,thatintheparticularsituationbeforehimitisnot
essentialthateachofthethreefactorsbequantitativelyreflectedinthefinalallotmentformula.Concededly,
205(a)empowerstheSecretarytoattributedifferentinfluencestothethreefactors.Obviouslyonefactormay
bemoreinfluentialthananotherinthesenseoffurnishingabettermeansofachievinga'fair,officient,and
equitabledistribution.'ButitisnotconsonantwithreasontoauthorizetheSecretarytofindinthecontextof
thesituationbeforehimthatacriterionhaslittlevalueandisentitledtonomorethannominalweight,butto
finditunreasonableforhimtoconcludethatthisfactorhasnosignificanceandthereforeshouldnotbeatall
reflectedquantitatively.
Congressdidnotpredeterminetheperiodsoftimetowhichthestandardsshouldberelatedortherespective
weightstobeaccordedthem.Inthisrespectthesugarquotaschemediffersfromthequotasdesignedby
Congressfortobacco,wheat,cottonandrice,respectively.See313(a),334(a),344(a)and353(a)ofthe
AgriculturalAdjustmentActof1938,52Stat.47,53,57,61,asamended,7U.S.C.1313(a)
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1313#a),1334(a)(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1334#a),
1344(a)(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1344#a),1353(a)
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1353#a),7(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7)U.S.C.A.
1313(a),1334(a),1344(a),1353(a).Nordothebarewordsof205(a)confinetheSecretaryinthe
responsibleexerciseofdiscretionbeyondthelimitationinherentuponsuchdelegatedauthority.Heisnotfree
tobecapricious,toactwithoutreason,thatis,inrelationtotheattainmentoftheobjectsdeclaredby205(a).
Theverystandardsforhisconduct,theattainmentof'fair,efficient,andequitabledistribution'preclude
abstractordoctrinairecategories.Avarietyofplansofallotmentmaywellconformtothestatutorystandards.
ButthechoiceamongpermissiveplansisnecessarilytheSecretary'sheistheagencyentrustedbyCongress
tomakethechoice.
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Theseconsiderationsdisposeofthisphaseofthecase.WewouldhavetoreplacetheSecretary'sjudgment
withourowntoholdthatontherecordbeforeusheactedarbitrarilyinreachingtheconvictionthattheyears
19351941furnishedafairermeasureofpastmarketingsthanthewaryears19421947.Norcanwehold
thatitwasbaselessforhimtodecidethatincreasedmarketingsduringthewaryearsmaybetakentomean
improvedabilitytomarketbutdecreasedmarketingsdonotjustifytheoppositeconclusion.Anditwaswithin
hisprovincetoexcludefromhisdeterminationtheprocessingsofsugartowhichproportionateshares
pertained.Itisnotforustorejectthebalancehestruckonconsiderationofallthefactorsunlesswecansay
thathisjudgmentisnotonethatafairmindedtribunalwithspecializedknowledgecouldhavereached.This
wecannotsay.Weconclude,therefore,thatinissuingOrderNo.18theSecretarydidnotexceedtheauthority
givenhimbyCongress.
II.WemustthereforefacethechallengetotheconstitutionalityoftheActof1948.Thisobjectiontotheorder
insupportoftheirjudgmentbelowisclearlyopentorespondentsinNos.27and30.TheGovernmentof
PuertoRicolikewisechallengestheconstitutionalityoftheAct.Butitsstatusinthislitigationraisesadistinct
issue,considerationofwhichwillbepostponedforthemoment.
Thesugarproblemofthecountryisanoldandobstinateone.ForfourteenyearsCongressgrappledwithit
throughthemechanismofquotas.Threeenactments,culminatingintheSugarActof1948,representedan
efforttodealwithwhatweredeemedtobetheharmfuleffectsoninterstateandforeigncommerceof
progressivelydepressedsugarpricesofearlieryearscreatedbyworldsurpluses,or,ifoneprefersit,bythe
conditionsthatreflectedtheimbalancebetweenproductionandconsumption.6Thelegislationpresupposesa
findingbyCongressthatproducersandmarketersofsugarcouldnotadequatelyrespondtomarketchanges
merelythroughthemechanismofafreemarketandthatthepublicinterest,insofarastheCommerceClause
maybedrawnupontomeetit,neededcontrolstosupplementandreplacethehagglingofthemarket.
Congressmightofcoursehavelimiteditsinterventiontotherawsugarmarket,trustingthattherebystabilityin
therefinedsugarmarketwouldbeproduced.Congressthoughtotherwiseitevidentlyfeltthatcompetition
amongrefinersforalegallylimitedsupplyofrawsugar,inaperiodofoverexpandedrefiningcapacity,7ought
nottobeleftatlarge.Inanyevent,Congresshadtheconstitutionalrighttothinkotherwiseandtobringthe
refiningofsugarwithinitsregulatoryscheme.SeeMulfordv.Smith,307U.S.38,59S.Ct.648,83L.Ed.1092
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/307/38)UnitedStatesv.RockRoyalCooperative,Inc.,307
U.S.533,59S.Ct.993,83L.Ed.1446(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/307/533)Wickardv.
Filburn,317U.S.111,63S.Ct.82,87L.Ed.122(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/317/111).
Itisacommonplacethatreformsmaybringintheirtrainnewdifficulties.Inanyschemeofreform,their
preventionormitigationbecomesaproperlegislativeconcern.Whileamelioratingtheeffectofdisorderly
competition,marketcontrolsgenerateproblemsoftheirown,notencounteredunderacompetitivesystem.
SuchnewproblemsarenotoutsidetheconprehensivescopeofthegreatCommerceClause.Nordoesthe
CommerceClauseimposerequirementsofgeographicuniformity.(CompareArt.I,8,cl.1andcl.4.)
Congressmaydevise,asithasdoneintheSugarActof1948,anationalpolicywithdueregardforthe
varyingandfluctuatinginterestsofdifferentregions.Seee.g.,ClarkDistillingCo.ofCumberland,Md.v.
WesternMarylandR.Co.,242U.S.311,37S.Ct.180,61L.Ed.326
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/242/311),L.R.A.1917B,1218,Ann.Cas.1917B,845Kentucky
Whip&CollarCo.v.IllinoisCentralR.Co.,299U.S.334,57S.Ct.277,81L.Ed.270
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/299/334)PrudentialInsuranceCo.v.Benjamin,328U.S.408,
66S.Ct.1142,90L.Ed.1342,164(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/328/408)A.L.R.476.And
sincetheActof1948doesnotevenremotelyimpingeonanyofthespecificlimitationsupontheCommerce
Clause(Art.I,9,cl.5andcl.6),wearenotconcernedwiththevexingproblemoftheapplicabilityofthese
clausestoPuertoRico.CompareDownesv.Bidwell,182U.S.244,21S.Ct.770,45L.Ed.1088
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/182/244)Dooleyv.UnitedStates,183U.S.151,22S.Ct.62,
46L.Ed.128(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/183/151)TerritoryofAlaskav.Troy,258U.S.
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101,42S.Ct.241,66L.Ed.487(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/258/101)Hooven&AllisonCo.
v.Evatt,324U.S.652,670,n.5,65S.Ct.870,879,89L.Ed.1252
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/324/652).
However,notevenresorttotheCommerceClausecandefythestandardsofdueprocess.Weassumethat
thesestandardsextendtoregulationsofcommercethatenmeshPuertoRico.SeeUnitedStatesv.Carolene
ProductsCo.,304U.S.144,(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/304/144)148151,58S.Ct.778,
781,783,82L.Ed.1234UnitedStatesv.Darby,312U.S.100,
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/312/100)125126,61S.Ct.451,462,463,85L.Ed.609,132
A.L.R.1430Balzacv.PeopleofPortoRico,258U.S.298,313,42S.Ct.343,348,66L.Ed.627
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/258/298).TheSugarActof1948isclaimedtooffendtheDue
ProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendmentbecauseoftheallegeddiscriminatorycharacterandtheoppressive
effectsoftherefinedsugarquotaestablishedbytheAct.Ifeverclaimsofthissortcarriedplausibility,they
seemtoussingularlybelatedinviewoftheunfoldingoftheCommerceClause.
Theuseofquotasonrefinedsugar,legislativelyapportionedtodifferentgeographicareasand
administrativelyallocatedtoindividualbeneficiaries,isadevicebasedontheAgriculturalAdjustmentActof
1938,52Stat.31,asamended,7U.S.C.1281(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1281)etseq.,7
U.S.C.A.1281etseq.,andsanctionedbythisCourtinMulfordv.Smith,supra.Theproblemwhich
confrontedCongresswasnotthesettingofquotasabstractlyconsideredbutsotofixtheiramountasto
achieveapproximatejusticeinthesharesallottedtoeachareaandthepersonswithinit.Torecognizethe
problemistoacknowledgeitsperplexities.
Congresswasthusconfrontedwiththeformulationofpolicypeculiarlywithinitswideswathofdiscretion.It
wouldbeasingularintrusionofthejudiciaryintothelegislativeprocesstoextrapolaterestrictionsuponthe
formulationofsuchaneconomicpolicyfromthosedeeplyrootednotionsofjusticewhichtheDueProcess
Clauseexpresses.Tofixquotasonastricthistoricalbasisishardonlatecomersintotheindustryoronthose
initwhodesiretoexpand.Ontheotherhand,totheextentthatnewcomersareallowedtoenteroroldtimers
toexpandtheremusteitherbeanincreaseinsupplyorareductioninthequotasofothers.Manyotherfactors
mustplaguethosechargedwiththeformulationofpolicytheextenttowhichprojectedexpansionisa
functionofefficiencyorbecomesadepressantofwagestandardsthewisedirectionofcapitalinto
investmentsandtheeconomicwasteincidenttowhatmaybeontheshortorthelongpulloverexpansionof
industrialfacilitiestheavailabilityofamoresuitablebasisforthefixingofquotas,etc.,etc.Thefinaljudgment
istooapttobeahodgepodgeofconsiderations,includingconsiderationsthatmaywellweighwithlegislators
butwhichthisCourtcanhardlydisentangle.
SufficeittosaythatsinceCongressfixedthequotasonahistoricalbasisitisnotforthisCourttoreweighthe
relevantfactorsand,perchance,substituteitsnotionofexpediencyandfairnessforthatofCongress.Thisis
soeventhoughthequotasthusfixedmaydemonstrablybedisadvantageoustocertainareasorpersons.This
Courtisnotatribunalforrelieffromthecruditiesandinequitiesofcomplicatedexperimentaleconomic
legislation.SeeWickardv.Filburn,supra,317U.S.atpage129,63S.Ct.atpage91,87L.Ed.122
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/317/0).
Congress,itisinsisted,hasnotestablishedrefinedsugarquotasforthemainlandrefinersasithasforthe
offshoreareas.Whateverinequalitiesmaytherebybecreated,thisisnottheforumfortheircorrectionforthe
allsufficientreasonthattheextentandnatureofinequalitiesarethemselvescontroversialmattershardly
meetforjudicialsolution.Thus,whilethemainlandrefinersarelegallyfreetopurchaseandrefineallsugar
withintherawsugarquotaandPuertoRicanrefinersarelimitedtotheirsharesoftherefinedsugarquota,
CongressapparentlythoughtthatPuertoRicanrefinersoperatedatcostssufficientlylowtoinsulatethemfrom
mainlandcompetition.Inaddition,itisclaimedthatsincethetotalsupplyofrawsugarpermittedtoenterthe
mainlandmarketislimitedthemainlandrefinersareineffectalsosubjecttotherefinedsugarquota,although
incontrasttotheunchangingquotasoftheterritoriesthemainlandquotawillvarywithchangesinthetotal
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consumerdemand.Becausethisdemandtendstobestable,however,themainlandrefiners'shareofthe
refinedsugarhasnot,itisurged,greatlyexpandedduringtheyearswhenquotaswereineffect.Congress
mightwellhavethoughtthatrelativelyminorcontractionsandexpansionsinsupplyfromyeartoyearshould
thusbeabsorbed.
Plainlyitisnotthebusinessofjudgestositinjudgmentonthevalidityorthesignificanceofsuchviews.The
Actmayimposehardshipshereandtheretheincidenceofhardshipmayshiftinlocationandintensity.Itisnot
forustohaveviewsonthemeritsofthislegislation.Itsufficesthatwecannotsay,aswecannot,thatthereis
'discriminationofsuchaninjuriouscharacterastobringintooperationthedueprocessclause.'Currinv.
Wallace,306U.S.1,14,59S.Ct.379,386,83L.Ed.441
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/306/1).ExpressionsofdissatisfactionbytheExecutiveandin
somequartersofCongressthattherefinedsugarquotaswere'arbitrary,''discriminatory,'and'unfair'may
reflectgreaterwisdomorgreaterfairnessthanthecollectivewisdomofCongresswhichputthisActonthe
statutebooks.ButtheissuewasthrashedoutinCongressCongressistheplaceforitsreconsideration.
III.ThereremainsPuertoRico'srighttoparticipateinthislitigation.PuertoRicocanhavenobetterstandingto
challengetheconstitutionalityoftheSugarActof1948thanifitwereafullfledgedState.TherightofaStateto
presssuchaclaimraisesfamiliardifficulties.CompareCommonwealthofMassachusettsv.Mellon,262U.S.
447,43S.Ct.597,67L.Ed.1078(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/262/447)StateofFloridav.
Mellon,273U.S.12,47S.Ct.265,71L.Ed.511(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/273/12)Jones
exrel.Louisianav.Bowles,322U.S.707,64S.Ct.1043,88L.Ed.1551
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/322/707),withStateofGeorgiav.TennesseeCopperCo.,206
U.S.230,27S.Ct.618,51L.Ed.1038,11(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/206/230)Ann.Cas.
488PeopleofStateofNewYorkv.NewJersey,256U.S.296,41S.Ct.492,65L.Ed.937
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/256/296)StateofGeorgiav.PennsylvaniaR.Co.,324U.S.
439,65S.Ct.716,89L.Ed.1051(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/324/439).Whateverrights
PuertoRicohasasapolity,seePeopleofPortoRicov.Rosaly,227U.S.270,33S.Ct.352,57L.Ed.507
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/227/270)PeopleofPuertoRicov.ShellCo.,302U.S.253,58
S.Ct.167,82L.Ed.235(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/302/253)PeopleofPuertoRicov.
RubertHermanos,Inc.,309U.S.543,60S.Ct.699,84L.Ed.916
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/309/543),theIslandisnotaState.Additionallegalquestions
areraisedwhetherPuertoRicocanpresstheintereststhatitisherepressing.Inviewoftheconclusionthat
wehavereachedontheconstitutionalissueswhichhadtobemetapartfromanyjurisdictionalquestion,it
wouldentailanemptydiscussiontodecidewhetherPuertoRicohasastandingasapartyinthiscase.It
wouldineffectbemerelyanadvisoryopiniononadelicatesubject.SincetherealissuesraisedbyPuertoRico
havealreadybeendecidedinNos.27and30,itbecomesunnecessarytodecidethequestionofPuertoRico's
standingtosue.Wickardv.Filburn,supra,317U.S.atpage114,n.3,63S.Ct.atpage83,87L.Ed.122
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/317/0).
Nos.27and30reversed
No.32dismissed.
Mr.JusticeBLACKwouldaffirmthejudgmentoftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbia
Circuitforthereasonsgiveninthecourt'sopinion.84U.S.App.D.C.161,171F.2d1016.
Mr.JusticeDOUGLAStooknopartintheconsiderationordispositionofthesecases.
CC|TransformedbyPublic.Resource.Org
1
Inthecourseofthisopinionallexpressionsofaneconomiccharacteraretobeattributedtothosewhohaveauthorityto
makesucheconomicjudgmentstheCongressandtheSecretaryofAgricultureandarenottobedeemedthe
independentjudgmentsoftheCourt.Itisnotourrighttopronounceeconomicviewsweareconfinedtopassingonthe
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rightoftheCongressandtheSecretarytoactonthebasisofentertainableeconomicjudgments.
2
Withminorexceptionsnotrelevanthere,theterm'directconsumption'sugarintheActreferstorefinedsugar.
3
Thefulltextof205(a)isasfollows:
'WhenevertheSecretaryfindsthattheallotmentofanyquota,orprorationthereof,establishedforanyareapursuantto
theprovisionsofthisAct,isnecessarytoassureanorderlyandadequateflowofsugarorliquidsugarinthechannelsof
interstateorforeigncommerce,ortopreventdisorderlymarketingorimportationofsugarorliquidsugar,ortomaintaina
continuousandstablesupplyofsugarorliquidsugar,ortoaffordallinterestedpersonsanequitableopportunitytomarket
sugarorliquidsugarwithinanyarea'squota,aftersuchhearinganduponsuchnoticeashemaybyregulationsprescribe,
heshallmakeallotmentsofsuchquotaorprorationthereofbyallottingtopersonswhomarketorimportsugarorliquid
sugar,forsuchperiodsashemaydesignate,thequantitiesofsugarorliquidsugarwhicheachsuchpersonmaymarketin
continentalUnitedStates,theTerritoryofHawaii,orPuertoRico,ormayimportorbringintocontinentalUnitedStates,for
consumptiontherein.Allotmentsshallbemadeinsuchmannerandinsuchamountsastoprovideafair,efficient,and
equitabledistributionofsuchquotaorprorationthereof,bytakingintoconsiderationtheprocessingsofsugarorliquid
sugarfromsugarbeetsorsugarcanetowhichproportionateshares,determinedpursuanttotheprovisionsofsubsection(b)
ofsection302,pertainedthepastmarketingsorimportationsofeachsuchpersonandtheabilityofsuchpersontomarket
orimportthatportionofsuchquotaorprorationthereofallottedtohim.TheSecretarymayalso,uponsuchhearingand
noticeashemaybyregulationsprescribe,reviseoramendanysuchallotmentuponthesamebasisastheinitialallotment
wasmade.'61Stat.926,7U.S.C.1115(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1115),7
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7)U.S.C.A.1115.
4
Tohelpeffectuatethemarketingcontrols301oftheActprovidesthatcertainpaymentswillbemadetofarmersonlyif
theylimitthemarketingofsugarcaneorbeetsgrownontheirfarmstoa'proportionateshare'ofthequantitynecessaryto
fillthearea'squota,plusanormalcarryover.Therelevanceofthisprovisionhereisthatprocessingsofsugargrownwithin
the'proportionateshare'restrictionareoneofthethreefactorstobeconsideredbytheSecretaryinthemakingof
allotmentsunder205(a).
5
WithrespecttotheSecretary'scomparablefunctionoffixingproportionatesharesforfarmsunder302oftheAct,the
HouseCommitteeonAgriculturestated:'Inviewofthedifferencesinconditionsofproductionobtaininginthevarious
sugarproducingareas,thecommitteehasnotattemptedtospecifytheexactmannerinwhichtheSecretaryshalluse
productionhistory.ItisthejudgmentofthecommitteethatconsiderablediscretionshouldbelefttotheSecretarytodeal
withthevariedandchangingconditionsinthevariousproducingareas,inordertoestablishfairandequitable
proportionatesharesforfarmsinsuchareas.'H.R.Rep.No.796,80thCong.,1stSess.8.
6
Theaveragepriceperpoundofdutypaidrawsugargraduallydeclinedfrom6.98centsin1923to2.80centsinearly1932.
UnitedStatesTariffComm'n,ReporttothePresidentonSugar,ReportNo.73,2dSer.,p.46.SeealsoDalton,Sugar,A
CaseStudyofGovernmentControl,cc.IV,V,especiallyp.4116Dept.StateBull.44.
7
Itwasestimatedthatthemainlandrefineriesalonehadacapacityinexcessofdemandoffromonethirdtoonehalf.See
UnitedStatesTariffComm'n,ReporttothePresidentonSugar,ReportNo.73,2dSeries,p.91cf.SugarInstitute,Inc.v.
UnitedStates,297U.S.553,574,56S.Ct.629,631,80L.Ed.859
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/297/553).

COMPOSE

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