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Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property (Articles 124 125); Article 165, 173, 1390 NCC; Rule on Forum Shopping; Article 124 FC v. Guardianship
v. Summary Proceedings
Title
1. Aggabao v.
Parulan
GR# 165803,
Sept. 1, 2010,
629 SCRA 563
Facts
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio
(Atanacio) offered two parcels of land and their
improvements registered in the name of respondents
Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been
estranged from one another to the petitioners.
On February 2, 1991, Ma. Elena showed to them the
following documents, namely: (a) the owners original
copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT
No. 63377; (c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy of
the special power of attorney (SPA) allegedly executed
by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.
Before the meeting ended, they paid P20,000.00 as
earnest money, for which Ma. Elena executed a
handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the
parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional
payment of P130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b) they
would pay the balance of the bank loan of the
respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before
February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final
payment of P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over
the property on March 31, 1991.
The petitioners checked on the authenticity of TCT No.
63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the
land records; and that they had also gone to the Los
Baos Rural Bank to inquire about the mortgage
annotated on TCT No. 63377.
Following their verification, the petitioners
delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on
February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baos
Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then released
the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them.11
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final
amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a
deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma.
Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of
Issue/s
Whether the sale of
conjugal property
made by respondent
wife by presenting a
special power of
attorney to sell (SPA)1.
purportedly executed
by respondent
husband in her favor
was validly made to
the vendees, who
allegedly acted in
good faith and paid
the full purchase
price, despite the
showing by the
husband that his
signature on the SPA
had been forged and
that the SPA had
been executed during
his absence from the
country.
1) Which
between
Article 173
of the Civil
Code and
Article 124
of the Family
Code should
apply to the
sale of the
conjugal
property
executed
Held
We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CAs finding
that the vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they did not
exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wifes authority to sell.
We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the
husband was not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the
Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the
property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed
by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment
of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the
Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired
xxx. Herein, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the
retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio,
while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his
1
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
without the
consent of
Dionisio?
2) Might the
petitioners
be
considered
in good faith
at the time of
their
purchase of
the
property?
brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they
did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the
administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include
acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As
such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer,
and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by
following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to
Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a
special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did
not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer
during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the
written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence,
ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.32
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing
offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of
accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma.
Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of
Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of
the other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
2. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and
pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing
was the owner and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his
eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he
acted in good faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but
must be proven by the person invoking it. xxx
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both
spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage,
or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a
standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who
had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required before the
2
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
3
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
2. Ravina v.
Villa Abrille
GR# 160708,
Oct. 16, 2009,
604 SCRA
120
duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being handed to them by Ma. Elena
indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners. It is true
that she promised to produce and deliver the owners copy within a week
because her relative having custody of it had gone to Hongkong, but their
passivity in such an essential matter was puzzling light of their earlier alacrity
in immediately and diligently validating the TCTs to the extent of inquiring at
the Los Baos Rural Bank about the annotated mortgage. Yet, they could
have rightly withheld the final payment of the balance. That they did not do
so reflected their lack of due care in dealing with Ma. Elena.
Lastly, xxx they did not take immediate action against Ma. Elena upon
discovering that the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in the
possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elenas representation. xxx Instead,
they contented themselves with meeting with Atty. Parulan to negotiate for
the possible turnover of the TCT to them.
3. xxx Veloso is inapplicable because the contested property therein was
exclusively owned by the petitioner and did not belong to the conjugal
regime. xxx
In contrast, the property involved herein pertained to the conjugal regime,
and, consequently, the lack of the written consent of the husband rendered
the sale void pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Moreover, even
assuming that the property involved in Veloso was conjugal, its sale was
made on November 2, 1987, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code;
hence, the sale was still properly covered by Article 173 of the Civil Code,
which provides that a sale effected without the consent of one of the spouses
is only voidable, not void. However, the sale herein was made already during
the effectivity of the Family Code, rendering the application of Article 124 of
the Family Code clear and indubitable. xxx
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which
was an exclusive property of Pedro. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. xxx
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro. xxx Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses xxx.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124
of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a)
4
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one
spouses inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code,
the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit. xxx
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years
to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family
Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null
and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale
is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the
wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale
within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and
lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without
Mary Anns consent.
On the second assignment of error the contention is bereft of merit. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.15 To establish his status as a
buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the
name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face
of the sellers certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered
in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted,
such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the
Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in
order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.161avvphi1
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his
wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of
the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. Mary Anns conformity did
not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith
that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were
apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still
proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent.
Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public
5
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
3. De La Cruz
v. Segovia
GR# 149801,
June 26, 2008,
555 SCRA 453
possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus,
at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in
the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed
of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to
purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been
given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if
subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by
good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance with justice and equity
and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, we
sustain the appellate courts order directing Pedro to return to petitioner
spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T88674 and the house thereon.
Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the
house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina
continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e
who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to
respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.20
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent
and her children were removed from the family home deserves our
condemnation. xxx
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."22 When
a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and
results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages
caused.23 It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of
these established civil law standards.
The four (4)-year period for filing an action for annulment of the September 9,
1991 Agreement, on ground of vitiated consent, had already lapsed when the
complaint subject of the present controversy was filed on March 8, 1996.
This is in accordance with Article 1391 of the Civil Code. xxx
xxx The Agreement was read to the parties before they affixed their
signatures thereon. Petitioners were thereafter furnished a copy of the
subject Agreement. Petitioners are presumed to have discovered the alleged
6
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
4. Villanueva
v. Chiong
GR# 159889,
June 05, 2008,
554 SCRA 197
7
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property.19 Moreover, the
conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a coowner of the subject lot.20
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is
not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v.
Agbayani,21 citing Villaranda v. Villaranda,22 we held that without the wife's
consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely
voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code 23 provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnership before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten
years from the transaction questioned,ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary
for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite
consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in
1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly,
the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during
the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale
when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years
from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
xxx In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.,
xxx it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only
insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely
voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same. Thus:
8
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
5. JaderManalo vs.
Camaisa
GR# 147978,
Jan.23, 2002,
374 SCRA 498
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that
the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the
wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
"prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in
the statute. xxx
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been
given is proper.27 Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall
restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter
of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except
in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis
for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to
restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original
situation before the contract was entered into.28
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to
respondents the land with its fruits and respondent Florentino should return
to petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of the land,
together with interest thereon. xxx
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no
genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein.
9
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
6. Jardeleza
vs. Jardeleza
GR# 112014,
Dec. 05, 2000,
347 SCRA 10
Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code
was not applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the
proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial guardian
under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
10
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
7. Uy
(Jardeleza)
vs. Jardeleza
GR# 10955,
Nov. 29, 2000,
346 SCRA 246
Whether petitioner
Gilda L. Jardeleza as
the wife of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. who
suffered a stroke, a
cerebrovascular
accident, rendering
him comatose,
without motor and
mental faculties, and
could not manage
their conjugal
partnership property
may assume sole
powers of
administration of the
conjugal property
under Article 124 of
the Family Code and
11
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
dispose of a parcel of
land with its
improvements, worth
more than twelve
million pesos, with
the approval of the
court in a summary
proceedings, to her
co-petitioners, her
own daughter and
son-in-law, for the
amount of eight
million pesos.
The sale
of a conjugal
property
requires
the
consent
of
both
the
husband and
12
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
13
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Rights (Exh. A) and the amicable settlement (Exh. 3) are null and void.
9. Roxas vs.
CA
GR#92245,
June 26, 1991,
198 SCRA 541
Whether or not
a husband, as
the
administrator
of the conjugal
partnership,
may legally
enter into a
contract of
lease involving
conjugal real
property
without the
knowledge
and consent of
the wife.
Whether or not a
lease is an
encumbrance and/or
alienation within the
scope of Art. 166 of
the New Civil Code.
14
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in, the land
which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land,
but consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that
impairs the use or transfer of property or real estate . . ." (42 C.J.S., p. 549).
xxx
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the
parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a
price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However,
no lease for more than ninety-nine years shall be valid." Under the law, lease
is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession as
opined by the Court of Appeals. xxx
In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his light of use in favor of the
lessee. The lessor's right of use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected
by the lessee if the lessor uses the leased realty. Therefore, lease is a
burden on the land, it is an encumbrance on the land. xxx The concept of
encumbrance includes lease, thus "an encumbrance is sometimes construed
broadly to include not only liens such as mortgages and taxes, but also
attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower rights, water rights, easements, and
other RESTRICTIONS on USE." (Capitalization is Ours) (533 Pacific
Reporter [second series] 9, 12).
Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a "qualified alienation,
with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to
its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease." (51 C C.J.S., p. 522)
Thus, the joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of
conjugal realty which does not exceed one year in duration, is required in a
lease of conjugal realty for a period of more than one year, such a lease
being considered a conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions of
the Civil Code requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by which real
property is conveyed or encumbered (See also 41 C.J.S., p. 1149). In case
the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife
has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173
of the Civil Code states "the wife may, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required. . . .
xxx Petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered
into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her
marital consent being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil
Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case
for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent.
Petitioner has a cause of action not only against her husband but also
15
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Facts
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997,
Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal)
sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could
legally live separately and dissolve their marriage
solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then prepared a
document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
Marantal and Espinosa started implementing its terms
and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took
custody of all their children and took possession of
most of the property they acquired during their union.
Issue/s
Whether Omaa
violated the Canon of
Professional
Responsibility in the
notarization of
Marantal and
Espinosas
"Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay."
Held
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this
case.
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where
the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in
this case.
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff
who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her
notarial duties. xxx
xxx Omaa knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no
legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be
suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner
and respondent's marriage. The validity of petitioner and respondent's
marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage. The marriage between petitioner
16
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
court's Decision
which dismissed the
action for dissolution
of conjugal
partnership of gains.
17
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
5. Relucio vs.
Lopez
GR# 138497,
Jan.16, 2001,
373 SCRA 578
1. Whether
respondent's petition
for appointment as
sole administratrix of
the conjugal property,
accounting, etc.
against her husband
Alberto J. Lopez
established a cause
of action against
petitioner.
2. Whether
petitioner's inclusion
as party defendant is
essential in the
proceedings for a
complete adjudication
of the controversy.9
other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies,
and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and
respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's
approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent on even date.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the
proceedings below.
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
6. Alipio vs.
CA
GR# 134100,
Sept. 29,
2000, 341
SCRA 441
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly
and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their
solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors. In the case at bar, there is no allegation that
the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term
of the sublease. xxx
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when
there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. xxx
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided
into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
7. Partosa-Jo
vs. CA
GR# 82606,
Dec.18, 1992,
216 SCRA 692
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Go v. Servacio
GR 157537
Sept 2011
FACTS
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two
parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he
affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go,
Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property). In 1987, Marta Barola Go
died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of
the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr.
and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B.
Go) sold aportion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester
L. Servacio (Servacio). On March 2, 2001, the
ISSUES
Whether or not the
sale by Protacio, Sr.
to Servacio was void
for being made
without prior
liquidation?
RULING
NO.
Article 130 of the
Family Code reads:
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Agtarap v.
Agtarap
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Vda de
Consuerga v.
GSIS
NO.
Berdin averred that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to
designate the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants who
were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance should automatically be
considered the beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits.
The GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of benefits to its members
one is the life insurance and the other is the retirement insurance. These
two distinct systems of benefits are paid out from two distinct and separate
funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever
is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case of a life
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
insurance provided for in the Insurance Act, the beneficiary in a life insurance
under the GSIS may not necessarily be a heir of the insured. The insured in a
life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to
be so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the absence of any
beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance
will go to the estate of the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee, to
provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the
government for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the age
of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance.
The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the
retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the employee
failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the
retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs
in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is
named in the insurance policy.
GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be divided
equally between his first living wife and his second. The lower court has
correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao v Dee.
Gomez vs. Lipana- in construing the rights of two women who were married
to the same man, held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in
his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has
an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute....
With respect to the right of the second wife, although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "the only lust
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her
husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership
of the first marriage."
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Is the conviction of
the respondent of the
crime of adultery a
disqualification for her
to share in the
conjugal property?
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during
the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the
right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by
any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read
with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment
shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification
provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
Whether or not
petitioner is entitled to
any right or interest
over the subject
properties
NO.
In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of
that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution
to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of
it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in
the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Salas v. Aguila
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under
the name of Esteban.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot
order a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of a co-ownership.Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21
March 2011 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they
had no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during
their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas
failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during
their marriage.
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption
of regularity.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were
acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed
that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas name were acquired during
his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered
on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and
Aguilas marriage.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules
of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action." Rules of Court,
Rule 19, Sec. 1.
In Di v. Di, G.R. No. 178044, 19 January 2011we held that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this
case.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and
governed by the rules on co-ownership.Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996)
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case
where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we
held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by
both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Lacbayan v.
SAmoy
1.
WON an
action for
partition
precludes a
settlement
on the issue
of
ownership.
2. Would a resolution
on the issue of
ownership subject the
Torrens title issued
over the disputed
realties to a collateral
attack?
1. No.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same
is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties. Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in
this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior
settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether
the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties.
2. No.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known
as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Mercado Fehr
v. Fehr
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of
her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple
alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to
an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent
evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere
in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears
in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction
materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the
absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share
shall be presumed to be equal.
Carino v.
CArino
Mallilin Jr. v.
Castillo
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are
incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Valdez v. RTC
Br 102
Family Home
Chapter 1: Family as an Institution
Iing v. Vega
1. Whether Leonardo
is entitled to a share
in Leons estate;
2. Whether Leon sold
the subject property
to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether
Leonardos claim has
prescribed, or that he
is barred by estoppel
or laches.
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Tinggangay v.
Wacas
No. Alienation of land acquired thru patent is restricted only for such period
and not indefinitely;
considering also that the land was already alienated before the patent was
issued; concerning the
house, it was not instituted in accordance with law and that it was also
established, granting that it was
a family home, after the debt (judgment) was incurred.
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the
State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to
such benevolent intention
the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116)
within five years after the
grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead;
but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his
interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of
the Solicitor General, who has
The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands acquired by
homesteads or free patents
commences is the date of the approval of the application and the prohibition
embraces the entire
five-year period from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant.
The application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved only on 19
October 1973 and Free Patent
was issued on 10 December 1980. Under the aforecited provision, the subject
land could not be made
liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted from the time of the
application and during the 5-year
period following 10 December 1980, or until 10 December 1985. However,
debts contracted prior to the
approval of the application for free patent, that is prior to 18 October 1973,
are not covered by the
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
prohibition. This is because they do not fall within the scope of the prohibited
period. In this case, the
judgment debt in favor of defendant-appellee was rendered on 24 June 1964,
the writ of execution
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Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Hontiveros v.
RTC
39
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Silva v. CA
40
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162); ARTS 225. 229-231, 233; 240. 242 NCC
1.
TITLE
Fortaleza
Lapitan
vs.
FACTS
Spouses Fortalezaobtained a loan from
spouses Rolando and AmparoLapitan. As
security, spouses Fortaleza executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgageover their residential house.
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the
indebtedness including the interests and
penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure
At the sale, the creditors spouses Lapitan
emerged as the highest bidders. The one-year
redemption period expired without the spouses
Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
RTC- Issues a Writ of Possession explaining that
it is their ministerial duty. CA-Affirmed.
ISSUE/S
Whether
the subject
property is a family home
exempt from forced sale.
HELD
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly
allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages
on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is
no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28,
1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which
was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming
that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not
set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it
was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of
Appeals:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop
the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period
within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, wellsettled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable
period thereafter.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year
period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.
Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor
41
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
2.
Olivia
de
Mesa vsAcero
Whether
the subject
property is a family home
exempt from forced sale
42
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
3.
Ramos
vsPangilinan
Respondents
filed
in
2003
a
complaintfor illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M.
Ramos (Ramos). The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of respondents and ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the aggregate amount of
P1,661,490.30 representing their backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service
incentive leave pay.
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
which the Deputy Sheriff implemented by levying
a property in Ramos name.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was
the family home, hence, exempt from execution
to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of
execution.Respondents, however, averred that
the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now
rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under
Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before
its sale on execution by the sheriff.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence;
there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right
to exemption or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the
sale of the property at public auction. It is
not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is
a family home. This claim for exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff. xxx.
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed
exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public
auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to
do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
Whether
the subject
property is a family home
exempt from forced sale
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted
over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. lays down the rules relative to the
levy on execution over the family home, viz:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution
provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the
alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or
by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and
their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family
home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with
the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the
family.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction
43
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
4.
Cabang
Basay
vs.
GR#180587/March 20,
2009
44
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
that
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
There can be no question that a family home is generally
exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is
likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property
owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley,
Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. "[T]he family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on
the property of the unmarried head of the family." In other words: The
family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute
community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property
of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established
on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it
can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property
and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of
the latter.1avvphi1
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where
there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be
constituted only on his or her own property.
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all
their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is that the
property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by
respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest
with the finality of the appellate courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No.
55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents.
All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue.
Without doubt, the instant case where the family home issue has been
vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy meant to
forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision.
The execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the
45
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
5.
Josef
Santos
vs
46
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
6.
Kelly
Planters
Products
vs
47
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Arriola
Arriola
vs.
Whether
the
subject
house should be included
in the public auction of
the subject land.
48
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns
the property or constituted the family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the
family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by
imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs
cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a
longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and
second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid
periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No
compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC
found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or
through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against
the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to
the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them,
this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary
property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The
rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot
subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the
family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of
the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at
this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the
parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10
years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if
there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he
constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason
exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the
partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for
exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject
house although for a different reason.
49
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Honrdovs CA
In this case, the RTC acted in accord with case law when it
issued the assailed order. The petitioner admits to having been notified
of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at 9:30 a.m.
on May 17, 2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However,
he did not bother to object to the levy and the projected sale on the
ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home.
The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the
Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the
private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated the property after
the said sale. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief
from the Sheriff or the court until May 3, 2002, when he filed his motion
to declare the property exempt from execution under Article 155 of the
Family Code and Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Even then, there was no showing that, during the hearing of said
motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to prove the value of the
property and that it is, indeed, a family home.
Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on
May 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private respondent opposed the motion,
but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the petitioner
never informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had
rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-1998-C earlier on April 29,
2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the petitioner revealed to
the RTC of Quezon City that there was such a case and a decision had
already been rendered. The petitioner has not justified why he
concealed such matters for such considerable period of time.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is
exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so
would estop the party from later claiming the exemption
50
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
9.
Taneovs CA
GR # 108562/ March
09, 1999
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners
included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
(Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said
Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have
retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, .Since
petitioners debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore
not exempt from attachment
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil
Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the
family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the
Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
51
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
1.
TITLE
Republic
vsSagun
FACTS
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S.
Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in
Baguio Cityand did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the
age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun,
she executed an Oath of Allegianceto the Republic
of the Philippines. Said document was notarized
by Atty. CristetaLeung .
Sometime
in
September
2005,
respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth
certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that
she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and
Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in
Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and
the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed
ISSUE/S
HELD
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing
charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec.
1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right
to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having
52
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
2.
Reyes
Mauricio
vs.
53
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
3.
Lee vs CA
Whether
or
not the CA erred in ruling
that the trial court may
compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case
that respondent Lee-Keh
children filed for the
correction of the certificate
of birth of petitioner Emma
Lee to show that she is
not Kehs daughter.
54
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
55
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
1.
LiyaovsTanhotiLiyao
56
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
2.
Labagala
Santiago
vs.
Whether or not
respondents may impugn
petitioners filiation in this
action for recovery of title
and possession
57
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
3.
Whether
Respondent
(plaintiff in the lower court
a quo) does not have the
legal capacity to file the
special proceeding of
appeal under CA GR No.
CV-56031 subject matter
of
this
review
on
certiorari;
58
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
59
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Title
4. Benitez-Badua vs. CA
.
Facts
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian were owners of various
properties located in Laguna.
Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died
in 1989.
Vicentes sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicentes estate in favor of
the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was
raised and cared by the deceased spouses
since childhood, though not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted. To prove that
she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses
name were reflected as her parents. She
even
testified
that
said
spouses
continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter.
On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
declared that said spouses were unable to
physically procreate hence the petitioner
cannot be the biological child.
Issues
Whether or not
petitioners
certificate of live
birth will suffice to
establish her
legitimacy.
Ruling
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon
the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such
act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the
sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants
and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it
appeared thathe was the petitioners father.
60
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Mariategui v CA
Whether
or
not
respondents
are
legitimate children of
Lupo Mariategui.
61
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Title
Perla v Baring
Facts
Respondent Mirasol Baring and her then
minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a
complaint for support against Antonio Perla.
According to Mirasol, she and Antonio had a
common law relationship for 2 years, and
Randy was the result of their affair.
Randy testified in court that the Perla family
treated him as a member of their family.
Antonio denied the allegations of Mirasol.
He claimed that he had sexual intercourse
with Mirasol only once.
He further alleged inaccuracies in the birth
certificate of Randy.
RTC ordered Antonio to support Randy.
CA upheld the decision of the RTC
Issues
Whether or not
Randy is entitled
to receive support
from Antonio
Ruling
No. Respondent failed to establish Randys illegitmate filiation to
Antonio
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175
of the Family Code which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
62
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
children.
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy
identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no
probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the
latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate." We also
cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in
having any participation in the preparation of the document as well
as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not
present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain
entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in
the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios nonparticipation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who
signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness
stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate
filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called
Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and
promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a
relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place,
cannot be considered as indications of Randys open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
63
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously."
Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and
promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of
continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he
fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist.Here, except for that singular
occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio
treating Randy as his son.64Neither can Antonios paternity be
deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court,
Lelitas actuations could have been done due to charity or some
other reasons.
Makati-Shangri-La v. Harper
64
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
said documents did not comply with the requirement under Section
24 of Rule 132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the
Philippines a certificate of the person having custody must
accompany the copy of the document that was duly attested stating
that such person had custody of the documents, the deviation was
not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for the
purposes they were intended to serve.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry of births of
Oslo, Norway issued on March 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B.
Nordal, Registrar, and corresponded to respondent Jonathan
Christopher Harper and victim Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively.
Exhibit Q explicitly stated that Jonathan was the son of Christian
Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested
to the birth of Christian Fredrik Harper on December 4, 1968. Exhibit
Q and Exhibit R were authenticated on March 29, 2004 by the
signatures of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway as well as by the official seal of that office. In turn, Consul
Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in Stockholm,
Sweden authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie and the official
seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on Exhibit Q
and Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of Tanja Sorlie to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway.
Exhibit Q-1, the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen
Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, contained the following data,
namely: (a) the parties were married on June 29, 1996 in Ullern
Church; and (b) the certificate was issued by the Office of the Vicar
of Ullern on June 29, 1996. Exhibit Q-1 was similarly authenticated
by the signature of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway, with the official seal of that office. Philippine
Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity of Sorlie to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, and further certified that the document was a true
translation into English of a transcript of a Marriage Certificate
issued to Christian Frederik Harper and Ellen Johanne Clausen by
the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit R-1, a Probate Court certificate issued by the Oslo Probate
Court on February 18, 2000 through Morten Bolstad, its Senior
Executive Officer, was also authenticated by the signature of Tanja
Sorlie and with the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway. As with the other documents, Philippine Consul
65
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
66
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
67
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
68
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
o
o
o
1.
2.
Whether or not
Joseltio Musni
Puno was able to
prove satisfactorily
his filiation to the
deceased
stockholder.
Whether or not
Joselito Musni
Puno may inspect
respondents
corporations
books and receive
dividends on the
stocks owned by
Carlos L. Puno
69
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
70
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
W/N
respondents
petition for the issuance
of
letters
of
administration
sufficiently states a
cause
of
action
considering
that
respondent
merely
alleged therein that she
is an illegitimate child of
the decedent, without
stating that she had
been acknowledged or
recognized as such by
the latter
71
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
o
o
o
o
o
(b)
72
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
majority age.
Rogelio appealed to CA but he died in
February 2005 during its pendency
December 2000: CA granted appeal and
remanded case to RTC for the issuance of
an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the
purpose of determining the paternity of
Joanne
good reasons;
(c)
(d)
(e)
73
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
74
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Verceles v Posada
Whether or not
paternity and filiation
can be resolved in
an action for
damages with
support pendente
lite
Whether or not the
filiation of Verna Aiza
Posada as the
illegitimate child of
petitioner was
proven.
Whether or not
respondents are
entitled to damages
1.
2.
3.
Bernabe v Alejo
75
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Whether or
not habe
as
corpus is
the
proper
remedy?
(2) Whether
or
not
Edgardo
Tijing,
Jr., and
John
Thomas
Lopez
are one
and the
same
person
and
is
the son
of
petitioner
s?
76
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical
records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever
submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez
declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez
was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal
wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen
years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private
respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John
Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and
on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only
in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil
registrar within thirty days after the birth.[16] Significantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan,
which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is
a common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to doubt the other
data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
[18] Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given
high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike
77
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Cenido v Apacionado
1. Whether or not
Petitioner Renato
Cenido is the
illegitimate son of
Aparato, the deceased
owner of the subject
property.
78
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Heirs of Cabais v CA
Evidentiary Value of
Baptismal Certificate
79
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
80
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
the fact leading to its execution and the date thereof, the
administration of the sacrament on the day therein specified, but not
to the veracity of the statements therein contained regarding the
kinsfolk of the person baptized.
Rodriguez v CA
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated
November 2, 1988 in CAG.R. SP No. 14276, which
allowed, in an action for
compulsory recognition, the
testimony of the mother of a
natural child on the identity
of the putative father.
81
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Philippines provided:
In any of the following cases, the father is
obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child:
In cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
When the child is in continuous possession
of status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
When the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
When the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness
can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his own knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules.
Code.
82
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi