1

G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO,
JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA,
respondents-appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenorappellant.
FERNAN, J.:
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one
involving pure questions of law pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50
of the Revised Rules of Court.
The antecedents are as follows:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private
respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina Gaza
Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo
Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged that
private respondents were the legitimate possessors of a
30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of
the Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal,
by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their
favor by the former Land Tenure Administration [which later
became the Land Authority, then the Department of Agrarian
Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitioner
surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo
posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter began the
construction of a house thereon; and that these acts of
petitioner, which were unlawful per se, entitled private
respondents to a writ of preliminary injunction and to the
ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon
denial thereof, filed his Answer to the complaint, specifically
denying the material allegations therein and averring that the

Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior

possession over the questioned lot had already been
cancelled by the Land Authority in an Order signed by its
Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and
as a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the
pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case before
the Office of the Land Authority between the same parties and
involving the same piece of land. In said administrative case,
petitioner disputed private respondents' right of possession
over the property in question by reason of the latter's default in
the installment payments for the purchase of said lot.
Petitioner asserted that his administrative case was
determinative of private respondents' right to eject petitioner
from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which
bars a judicial action until after its termination.
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss
contained in petitioner's affirmative defenses. It ruled that
inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was the recovery
of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and
hear the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan City in
Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with injunction
against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the
Municipal Court of Malabon and private respondents, praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment
case until after the resolution of said petition. As prayed for,
the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order enjoining
further proceedings in the ejectment case.
In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to
the sound discretion of the CFI in the disposition of the petition
for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the
administrative case did not constitute a prejudicial question as

2
it involved the question of ownership, unlike the ejectment
case which involved merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for
Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-1576 alleging the
pendency of an administrative case between the same parties
on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying
that the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment
complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be
allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of
prior possession, the CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari
and lifted the restraining order previously issued. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in
toto by Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal filed by petitioner Quiambao and intervenor
Land Authority with the Court of Appeals, and certified to Us as
aforesaid.
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of
whether or not the administrative case between the private
parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case
constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar
to said ejectment case.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 1 The
doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally
in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending
and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively
resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a
civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the
suspension of the latter pending final determination of the
former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided

under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
[a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil
and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically,
there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent,
however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion
depends primarily on the resolution of the pending
administrative case. For while it may be true that private
respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the
time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very least,
suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not
private respondents can continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the
issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the
validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would
have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area.
Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and
so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course
for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment
proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to
undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right
of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case

3
is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as
well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to
be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for
a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide
the outcome of another pending in another court,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same,
for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where
the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed. 2
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two
[2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same
considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of
time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as
well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession
before the ejectment case may be properly determined,
justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502,
provides another analogous situation. In sustaining the
assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental ordering the suspension of the criminal case for
falsification of public document against several persons,
among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the
civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged
forged document shall have been decided, this Court cited as
a reason therefor its own action on the administrative charges
against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative
case filed in this Court against Santiago Catane upon the
same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

"As it appears that the genuineness of the document

allegedly forged by respondent attorneys in
Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard Ignacio Celdran
vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is necessarily involved
in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of First
Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld
until that litigation has finally been decided.
Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such
decision." 3
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of
a prejudicial question to an administrative case, We see no
reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the
proper case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events
occurring during the pendency of this petition attest to the
wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in the
Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated that
the intervenor Land Authority which later became the
Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a decision in
the administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affirming the
cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of
private respondents. With this development, the folly of
allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need
further elaboration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil
Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal
is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO

MERCADO, petitioner,

a.k.a.

VINCENT

G.

correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to

eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused.[2]

vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

The Facts
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in
CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution
denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of
bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G.
Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby
renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three
(3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the

trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced
by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on
June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract
was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in
said document, the status of accused was single. There is no
dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding
with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having
been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued
in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed
by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious
rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same
manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant
was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of
Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of
the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two
children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused
with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of

5
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the
present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the
bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a
Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage
with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991
when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As
shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the
essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that
the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential
requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s],
accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d]
been judicially declared null and void and that the private
complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was
entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was

subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any

judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of
his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married
man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly
married to his first wife.[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. But here, the final judgment declaring null and
void accuseds previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case
for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And
what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person
who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A

6
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is
present in order to convict petitioner.

before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively

dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in
relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the
guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis
of reasonable doubt.[6]

The elements of this crime are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.[7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of

the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all

the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu
City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a
second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan
who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio.Unlike voidable
marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a
competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed
never to have taken place at all. [8] Thus, he concludes that
there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the
commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now
settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is

7
a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first
marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the
crime had already been consummated. She argues that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must
be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a
bigamy case involving an accused who married three times,
the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In
that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during
the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he
married for the third time. The second wife then charged him
with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second
marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted
while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second
marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that
there was no need for a judicial declaration of its
nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he
married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court
in People v. Aragon,[12] which involved substantially the same
facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need
for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
GSIS,[13] Jose Consuegra married for the second time while
the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the
Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement

benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife
and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the
second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observes that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death
Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said
entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the
first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for
such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia
Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing
marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to
present evidence to prove, among others, that her first
husband had previously been married to another woman. In
holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court
ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence
about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration
of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x
x x.

8
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the
ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need
for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a
judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the
recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile
spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The
Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[18]
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the
other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of
a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect
several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of
Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second

marriage without the spouse present having news

of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, the marriage as
contracted being valid in either case until declared
null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision
plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages.[19]
The provision appeared in substantially the same form
under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the
Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new
provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final
judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily,
the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in
Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and
void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact
before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86,

9
143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a
marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).[20]
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling
in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside
by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now
necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent
that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement
in Terre v. Terre,[21] which involved an administrative Complaint
against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers
argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage
because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court
further noted that the said rule was cast into statutory form by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that the
second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was void, was bigamous and criminal in
character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law
whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view
on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and
wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting
a subsequent marriage:[22]

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x
x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second
marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant
had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime
had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy
cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty
of the charge against him.
Damages

10
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set
aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her
claim of damages and attorneys fees.[23]
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of
the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief
from this Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to reverse
or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which
we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented
in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that
she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the
previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr.
Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this,
and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of
his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she
had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We
are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the
fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado,
she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case
where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her
act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation
in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case,
ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are
indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own
willful making.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Melo,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,

Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment for
bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed
brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it
is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage which can
constitute a defense against the criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code
is a given but I have strong reservations on its application
beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject
of the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case,
and the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent
Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family code reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all
insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent

11
from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the
Family code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is
contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full
legal consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be
in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52, of
the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to
cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly,
had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my
view, should still be deemed essential when the marriage, for
instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either
or both parties had not at all given consent to the
marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code
has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages
declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38
and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not
have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and
related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.

xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had

the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages
been within the contemplation of the legislature, an
express provision to that effect would or should have
been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by
said rule of strict interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until
judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if the
second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously
contracted
marriage,
being
a
total
nullity
and inexistent, should be capable of being independently
raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see
no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of
the Family Code, and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not

void, prior marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus be, for
instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and
subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as
People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the

effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We
hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not

12
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage
with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The
two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in
lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage

with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent

marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for
validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed
a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He
further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the
Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all
between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN
THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING
THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY,
DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

13
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND
EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered
defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the
elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both

documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated
November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a
Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas
that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued
by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

14
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage
contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and
it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and
that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3,
1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a
positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of such a marriage.
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite
different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of
any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is
absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no
record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite
for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are
Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners

own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to
verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported nonexistence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued
by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of
Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the
accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in
this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of
the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws
are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab

15
initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A
plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage,
and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator
that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and

marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare

their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects
is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the
crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages
to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although

16
this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused
displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage,
and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage
is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate
pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social
institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has
a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition
for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION>

VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for
contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a
second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas.
Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas
has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the
crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a
valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted
during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have
been binding were it not for its being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second
marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void,
constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so
hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as
the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the
fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the
rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of
nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of
a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision
to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law,
(but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of
strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable
marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and,

17
therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second
marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously
contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent,
can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family
Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first
marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the
second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong
reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has
expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage
may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to
state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the
Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held
that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior
void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were
contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the
Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to
say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered
void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family
Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal
Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence
on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class
by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to
reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with

those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to

comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is
completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are
confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage,
such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the
contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage
license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity
of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the
earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining
to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus,
Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or
born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of
nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable
marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume,
that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and
successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a
voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially
declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological
incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage
under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the
formal requisites of a valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the
other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority
of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the
parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration,
psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may
not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been logical for
the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly
voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to
make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and
nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity
appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that,
unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or
prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No.
8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense

18
of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36,
celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in
ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The
initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to
betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages
falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the
fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity
remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and
efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such
marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise
dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy.
Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage
would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a
civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until
annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other
than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has
declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is
committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be
held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown
that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of
a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union.
Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has
been contracted without the necessary license and thus
void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the
second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime
of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the
lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid
marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the
contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are
shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can
unassailably arise.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does

not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential
or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration
of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to
that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a
criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity
of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it
does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous
marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of
the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had
entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

SALVADOR
S.
ABUNADO
and
ZENAIDA
BIAS
ABUNADO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and
set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal
Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of
bigamy.
The
records
show
that
on September
18,
1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at the Manila City

19
Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.[2] In1988 Narcisa left
for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when
she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital
affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon
City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered
that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second
marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian
Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.[3]

correccionalasMinimumtosix(6)yearsandone(1)dayofprision
mayorasMaximum.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.[7]
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it
stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995
when in fact it should have been 1989.

On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed

by Salvador against Narcisa.[4] On May 18, 1995, a case for
bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.[5]

Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation against him. [8] It is required
that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be alleged in the Information.[9]

Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida

on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge
in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to
their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was
no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida
remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son
for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his
commission in the military.

The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the

facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the
Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the
offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the
Information must be determined by reference to the definition
and essential elements of the specific crimes.[10]

On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner

Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner
Zenaida Bias was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.[6]

The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been

sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent
marriage with another woman while his first marriage was
subsisting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification

the decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE,theDecisionappealedfromisherebyMODIFIEDas
tothepenaltyimposedbutAFFIRMEDinallotherrespects.
Appreciatingthemitigatingcircumstancethataccusedis76yearsof
ageandapplyingtheprovisionsoftheIndeterminateSentenceLaw,
theappellantisherebysentencedtosufferanindeterminateprison
termoftwo(2)years,four(4)monthsandone(1)dayofprision

The information against petitioner alleges:

ThatinoraboutandsometimeinthemonthofJanuary,1995atthe
MunicipalityofSanMateo,Rizalplace(sic)withinthejurisdiction
ofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,havingbeen
legallymarriedtocomplainantNarcisaAbunadoonSeptember16,
1967whichhasnotbeenlegallydissolved,didthenand
therewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslycontractasubsequent

20
marriagetoZenaidaBiasAbunadoonJanuary10,1989whichhas
alltheessentialrequisitesofavalidmarriage.

onlybythepersonaffectedtherebybutevenbyacivicspirited
citizenwhomaycometoknowthesame.[14]

CONTRARYTOLAW.[11]

Third, petitioner
claims
that
his
petition
for
annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial
question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should
have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment
case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29,
1999.[15]

The statement in the information that the crime was

committed in or about and sometime in the month of January,
1995, was an obvious typographical error, for the same
information clearly states that petitioner contracted a
subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10,
1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information
was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot
support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured
by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have
been raised.[12] It should be remembered that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur two
of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which possesses all the requisites for validity.[13] All of these
have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during
the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect
in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for
the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his
marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of
criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it
ruled, thus:
xxx,whileheclaimsthattherewascondonationonthepartof
complainantwhenheenteredintoabigamousmarriage,thesame
waslikewisenotestablishedbyclearandconvincingevidence.But
then,apardonbytheoffendedpartydoesnotextinguishcriminal
actionconsideringthatacrimeiscommittedagainsttheStateandthe
crimeofBigamyisapublicoffensewhichcanbedenouncednot

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on

a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle
of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[16]
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal
case. We cannot allow that.[17]
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.[18]

21
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding.[19] In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him
was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The
penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed
by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law
to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition
of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[20]
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of
age,[21] which is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision
mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term
should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods
which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of

Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding
petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169766

March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA
A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

22
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence,
in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights
shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate
union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September
13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner
Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal
A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a
civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of
Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites,
and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant

Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil
Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent
marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted
the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being
declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis,
because the deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly
done so because divorce is not allowed under the New
Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not
have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the
provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the
marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been
one contracted under Muslim law as provided under
Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual
desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19,
1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30
days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995,
both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a
Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared
that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were
married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the
latters disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita

23
argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and
divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus,
Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On
December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14 which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC
continued to try the case since there can be no default in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to
participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996,
suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CAs temporary
restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it
from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to
Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18Estrellita
then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC
ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26,
1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing
was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled
hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,

Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for
decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet
filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No.
126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as sharia
courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in
cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and
PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not
precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas
motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the
RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring
Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos
subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately
shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with
[Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first
marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent
marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any
way affect the void character of the second marriage because,

24
in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is
not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a
previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage
was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30

celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim

celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to
the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen.
Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators
subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right
to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to
file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She
maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as
his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is
governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted
Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her
marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17,
2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to
file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be
heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse
of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed
by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her
pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as
an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the
proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that
Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being
bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide
for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied

Estrellitas Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the
public prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in
violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate
the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the
parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of
collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined
before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal
to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas
allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment
way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case
ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the
validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita
now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment
as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to
dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage.
She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36laid down the rule
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the
trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet

25
been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition
questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated
this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on
August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No.
126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11,
1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public
prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this
being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held
when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if

there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer
essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in
the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol
Gen also supports private respondents legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with
Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may
attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and
Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones
prejudiced by the marital union.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with

the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced
under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She
asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of
Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims
whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She
pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under
Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
the deceased.38

Issues

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal

standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can
file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen)
defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was
never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of
the main action before the RTC.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any
comment.

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
judgment, even though the latter was rendered
prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered
without waiting for the Supreme Courts final resolution
of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she
has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due
process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late
Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing
to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling

26
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of
her right to answer; and her pending petition for
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of
her right to due process. She was never declared in default,
and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion
to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we
affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is
Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to
Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing
of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer
to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent
Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The
Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying
the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the
Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11
of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the
complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced

therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it
finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the
appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due
process in the course of the proceeding of the case because
after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately
proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte
and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the
rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In
the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer,
as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period
earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for
extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her
Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this
Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled
that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend
the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for
certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did
the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of
Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court

27
from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it
was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait
first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an
answer and her refusal to present her evidence were
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it
deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side
of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision
in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should
it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R.
No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to
Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the
public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists,

he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The
parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a
copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion
exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the
public prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find
to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated
March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar.
Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a
lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a
fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates
the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these

28
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings
in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late
Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD
1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void
ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage
to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD
1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However,
PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083
does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,
1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code
which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the

prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise

provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior
to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except
as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability
incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that
all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or
is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited
enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the
force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the
Muslim Codes enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is
Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity
of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be
considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the
spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for
the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the
Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda
and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims
whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.

29
Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab
initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the
filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does
not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a
bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the
Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section
2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of
others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity,
therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the
validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void
marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses
may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate
heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable

Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for

annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is
to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If
Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what
the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if
he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that
the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage
void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all,

30
it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity
of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August

17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on
September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the

son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in
the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme
Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the
Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not
apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58

SO ORDERED.

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of

Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code
is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no
marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights,
any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children
of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his
mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple,
they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their
respective rights which include striking down bigamous
marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 030382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated
July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to
RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage
license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code
of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

31
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that
Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License

filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued
in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met

Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St.,
Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men.
He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He
claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he
did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license,
and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11,
2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing
in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued
to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR.

SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January
8, 1993.

11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for

whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed
bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on
advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an
employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for
marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July
11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that
their office had not issued any other license of the same serial
number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

32
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo
and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a
minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He
testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9,
1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified
that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that
he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further
testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract
was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and
copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of
the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of
the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a
certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to
him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the
marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and
the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and
Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her
house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez

at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and

that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their
house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to
Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the
contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against
Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending
before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both
parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993;
(b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify
all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he
will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for them to
sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified
that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born
on June 15, 1993.29

33
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed,
who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on
August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that
no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into
account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed
on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner

Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent even if no
property was acquired during their cohabitation by
reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil
Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are
hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil
registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on
January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7,
2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.

34
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT
LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON
THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY
RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having
signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and
that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order
dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between
Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on
09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1,
200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME
IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

35
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code
of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles
3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the

validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered
by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of
the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority
of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I
of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges
on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for
the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage
license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage
license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract
as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was
issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec.
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

36
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed
by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the
civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the

certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite
diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification
used stated that no marriage license appears to have been
issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that
a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that
the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same
did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent
search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The
fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

37
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or
a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to
the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the
other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even
testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors,
whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license
came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated
to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the
marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy
of the marriage license could have simply been secured from
that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of
Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to

prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot
be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license
was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote
the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy
of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of
appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well
as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife
and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was
born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10)

38
years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family
Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have
been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy
(Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma.
Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to

Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took
steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding

ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement
under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.