Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance By: Dennis D. San Diego G.R. No.

115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration
by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning
and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did
not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections
24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively. Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill
passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
HELD No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the
bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate. SB. No. 1630, having been
certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing
but also of reading the bill on separate days.
ADDITIONAL KAY TOLENTINO
35 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills
EVAT Amendment by Substitution Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the
constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA
7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as
Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB
11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the
bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Taon Straight

v. Reyes
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
FACTS: June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE,
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX.
This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Taon Strait.
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon Strait. A
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done
to determine the areas underwater composition.
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Taon Strait (PAMB-Taon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of
JAPEXs application for an ECC.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon Strait. Months later, on November 16,
2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8,
2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both
dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined
from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no
general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for
service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
HELD: No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of
indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or
the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President
Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum
through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield
the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine
Government.
Contrary to the petitioners argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in
1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction
should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding
on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than
the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read
according to its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a
service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be
discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present
case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a
NIPAS area.
DIOSDADO LAGCAO,DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO,

Petitionersvs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU,
Respondents
G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
Facts: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965,
the 210 lots,including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the
province tried to annulthe sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners.
This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages
in the then Court of First Instance.The court a quoruled in favor of petitioners and
ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the finaldeed of sale in favor of petitioners. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.After acquiring title,
petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it
wasalready occupied by squatters. Thus
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against thesquatters. The Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order
of demolition.However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented,
Cebu City Mayor AlvinGarcia wrote two lettersto the MTCC, requesting the deferment
of the demolition on the groundthat the City was still looking for a relocation site
for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders
suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for petitioners,during the suspension period,
the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
(SP) of Cebu City passed a resolutionwhich identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing
site pursuant to RA 7279.Petitioners fi led with the RTC an action for declaration of
nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endea
vor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution.
Ruling: Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, locallegislative power shall be exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the city. The legislativeacts of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominatedordinances.Local government
units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only whenexpressly
authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon
localgovernment units the power to expropriate.Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized
the expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the SPof Cebu City to provide
socialized
housing
for
the
homeless
and
low-income
residents
of
theCity.However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious
social problems of thecountry, local government units do not possess unbridled
authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this
problem.There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power:
(1) no person shall bedeprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be deniedthe equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the elepanxercise by
local government units of the power of eminent domainis not absolute. In fact,

Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not
supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is

there

constitutional

right

to

run

for

or

hold

public

office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the
provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of
legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written,
the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely openended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.

Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long
as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt
from
the
limitations
or
the
burdens
which
they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification
of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are
rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add
into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless
sacrifice
on
the
part
of
the
State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand
of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section
69
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer
and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school
dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the
following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read
and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.
FARIAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. 147387 December 10 2003 [En Banc]
FACTS:

SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office.
Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of
Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for
being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67
of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA
9006.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING: No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does
not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received
the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be
claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the
House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed
their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain

provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount
to
a
violation
of
the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after
a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority LeaderAlbano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been
declared
by
the
Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules
of
the
House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them
as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently,
mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer thedispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but
only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA Digest

First Lepanto Ceramic v CA
Facts:
1.

Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular,
1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal
of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2.

BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed
floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider
the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa
filed a petition for review with CA.

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction.
5.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA
does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with
the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6.

Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular
1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order
or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis
of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7.

While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27,
1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to
be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., Respondents.
Castillo, Laman. Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
De Borja, Medi, Aldea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private respondent.

-->
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division 1sustaining
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of
Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Because of the importance of the question
raised, the Court en banc agreed to accept the matter for
consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded
art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O.
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise of
legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the
jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a
rule of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under
Art. VIII 5(5). Petitioner questions the holding of the Second Division that although the
right to appeal granted by art. 82 of the Code is a substantive right which cannot be
modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what
manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has
the power to regulate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Even assuming that there is merit in petitioner's contention, however, the result reached
in the main decision is nonetheless, correct from another point of
view.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. No. 1789), 2
Art. 78 of which stated:
Art. 78. Judicial Relief . - All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the
provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or
decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or
decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.
Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3by granting in 9 thereof exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of
Appeals) over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July 17, 1987,
the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court
was again granted. Thus, the present Code provides:chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 82. Judicial Relief . - All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the
provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or
decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or
decision:Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within

thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or

decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. 4The Constitution now
provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence." This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and
thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound
national aspects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to
the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this
Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed
to have amended BP
Blg. 129, 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases
appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129,
9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 191.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly
appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of
9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the
decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those
issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the
Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final
orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Francisco vs House of Representatives
Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
Facts:
1.

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

2.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which

directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

3.

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

4.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

5.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

Issues:
1.

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint

constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

2.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted

by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.

3.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:
1.

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the
judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

2.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly

unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

2.

The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

1.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.

2.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.

3.

It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.

Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,

another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former

President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against
the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden,
as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in
violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be
no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in
the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.