BARA LIDASAN, petitioner vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent

G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

Facts:
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan
however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao
Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of
RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration
in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating
Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
Issue:
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill?
Held:
No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult
to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted
for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Facts:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153
was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
Issue:
1.

Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the

ARMM elections]?
2.

Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule

under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3.

Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

Ruling:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among
the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.
2.

NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days

requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the
following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days
and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with
the three separate readings requirement.
3.

YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President
to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized
elections assume office.

Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation vs Parkway Real Estate

Development Corporation, G.R. No. 136492, February 13, 2004
Facts:
Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium in Makati City is subject of this controversy. [Summary of
this controversy: DEFAULT IN PAYMENT FOR CONDO
o

Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) sold it to Masahiko Morishita

Masahiko Morishita sold and assigned all rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real Estate

Development Corporation (Parkway)

o

Parkway and Maxima Realty and Development Corporation entered into an agreement to

buy and sell, on instalment basis for P3 million. Part of the stipulation included a default clause
that Maxima will forfeit amounts paid by way of liquidated damages in case of failure to pay.
o

Maxima defaulted, and was able to pay P1.18 million because of grace periods. (Balance =

P1.82 million)
o

On May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia arranged for a Deed of

Assignment transferring all rights to the condominium in favour of Maxima so that Maxima has
show property to secure a loan with RCBC. Segovia and Maxima agreed also that the title will be
transferred under Maximas name for P58,114 as transfer fees, and other expenses.
o

Maxima continued its default with Parkway and Segovia.

Parkway cancelled its agreement to buy and sell with Maxima, as well as the Deed of

Assignment.

Maxima filed a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for specific performance to enforce the
agreement to buy and sell. HLURB Arbiter sustained nullification.
[IMPORTANT FACTS:]

Maxima appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB (Board). At this level,

Maxima agreed to pay the outstanding balance but still failed to pay, and the appeal was again
resolved in favour of Parkway. Maxima received the decision on April 19, 1994.

On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed the Boards decision to the Office of the President,

which dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.

Maxima brought the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of

the Office of the President.

Issue:
Was the petitioners appeal before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary
period?

Ruling:
NO. Following the doctrine laid out in SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, it
resolved the conflict between two rules.

15 of PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Degree) and 2 of PD

1344 (Empowering the National Housing Authority to issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement
of its Decision under PD No. 957), the period to appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed decision.

While the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure suggest a 30-day period of appeal under Section

27, the same stipulation also provides for following Administrative Order No. 18 series of 1987,
which starts with Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office
of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from.

This Administrative Order qualifies such 30-day period, and because of the two PDs

mentioned above that falls squarely on the controversy (a sale of a condo), the 15-day period
applies.

In fact, Sec. 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict

with the provisions of the aforementioned presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that
administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to implement.
Any rule which is not consistent with [the] statute itself is null and void.

In the case at bar, the 15-day period applies, so if the adverse decision was received on

April 19, 1994, the appeal to the Office of the President should have been filed on May 4, 1994.
May 10 was beyond the reglementary period.

G.R. No. L-28089

October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent Suntay for petitioner
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act
4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from
attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's
answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic
Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct
and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton,
Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the
nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of
Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the
pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan,
Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through
the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared
that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the
1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that
Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for
electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in
the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House
Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading
it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects
the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton.
Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are

incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities
in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise
the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in
"the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental
legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that,
therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed
in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one
province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first
and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a
municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling
here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An
Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title
was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8
thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in
the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act
creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs
thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title.
The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of
barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical
consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the
two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of
Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its
section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory
in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby
constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was
challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village
from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on
Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the
statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of
nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a
sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not

agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as
surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for
the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those
affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW
262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act
goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in
the worst degree, for it is misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative
purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the
nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of
Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited
title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a
portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule,
thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of
this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,
while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language
used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose
whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part,
since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the
restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town
of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be
excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of
the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the

community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a
separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of
barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are
population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing
out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios
which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act
4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves
and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is
so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the
seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato.
And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an
independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twentyone? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed
that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an
independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be
derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate
obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet,
to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on
separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise
that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large
aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to
create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government
still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent
beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary
and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we
may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the
originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all,
it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no
substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated
differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional
requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore,
hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification
in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a
different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence
"in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in
his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case
here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a
part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to
remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and
benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may
express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for
the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of
a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any
citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit
respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself
unable to give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton
in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an
enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two other
municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity
by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the
insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not
in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is similar to
those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the evils, of the socalled omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the
legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The
construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object.
Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a
complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which
relates to its subject find expression in its title.3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in 1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing

for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed
through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank
Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act.
Justice Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the
act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation.
While the case of Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of
four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is
to be given the liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos,
and not the strict test as desired by the majority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v.
Commission on Elections,5 up to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion
coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the
invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional
provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING
SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we
noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service
Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a
subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion
of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such
as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the
subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System
and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our
opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus:
"we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to
construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."

It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible
to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject
which should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was the creation of the
municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions
coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged
erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary
and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling, as the freedom of
this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two
municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that
province. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad,
well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries.
What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios
in two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created
municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude
from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities
outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid

scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new
municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely
that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles
underlying precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth
v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a
"construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." In
Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The
above principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a
1913 decision, In re Guaria:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission
we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of
Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in
conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions
touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the
Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the
argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on
examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to
transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an
invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Stone, construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to
avoid doubts as to [their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12
"Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning that
may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication
which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious
constitutional questions avoided by another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the
above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will
avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275
US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine
then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought
an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by
Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater
change of surviving the test of constitutionality."14
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a
legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which
will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such peril."15
Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations
clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court.

DATU
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the
National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM
elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3)
years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as
well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned
petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in
petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for
these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required
by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of
the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,
entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the
next legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first
defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials
to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law
reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It
likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan
and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146,
seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22,
2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191)
Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756
(SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7,
2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30,
2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this
Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756,
and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional
plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another
petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for
the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its
constitutionality:
a)
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of
the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b)
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a
taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c)
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by
Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and

d)
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the
House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from
the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with
candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and
Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for
Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court
granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the
petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No.
10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties
were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these
laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people
of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant
to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the
power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the
parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I.

Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II.
Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to
Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No.

9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary
doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions
under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV.

Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI.

Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which
may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the
election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least
number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to
once every three years.[12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all
the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local
elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office
of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the
Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30,
1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in
the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.[15]
As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves
the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.[17]
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional
assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected
officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local
Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered
a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does
not include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in
the course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various
issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION represented by LUZ
LOURDES FERNANDEZ and SEGOVIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 9, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866[1] which affirmed in toto the June 2, 1998 Order of the
Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5697[2] dismissing petitioners appeal for having been
filed out of time.
The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium, covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12152 and located along Valero Street, Salcedo Village,
Makati City. Said unit was originally sold by Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) to
Masahiko Morishita, who in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real
Estate Development Corporation (Parkway) on October 16, 1989.[3]
Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and
Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment
basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos.[4] It was further agreed that
failure to pay any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the
amounts paid by way of liquidated damages.[5]
Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace
periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.[6]
Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of
Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed was
intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same as security for
P1,820,000.00 loan with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), which amount will be
used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed
to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maximas name subject to the condition that
the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility
expenses, association dues and miscellaneous charges.[7]
On June 5, 1990, RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maximas P1,820,000.00 loan
subject to the submission of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in
the name of Maxima and the Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.[8]
Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges.
Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was
not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of
Assignment in favor of Maxima.[9]

On May 2, 1991, Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a complaint[10] for specific performance to
enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702.
On December 17, 1992, the HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the
Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00.
was further ordered to issue the condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in
Parkway upon payment by the latter of the registration fees. The dispositive portion
reads:

Deed of
Segovia
favor of
thereof,

Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

1. declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant Maxima and
Parkway;
2. ordering respondent Parkway to refund to complainant Maxima the amount of One
Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P1,180,000.00);
3. ordering respondent Segovia to issue the certificate of title in favor of Parkway upon
payment by the latter of only the registration fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.[11]
Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB (Board).
[12] During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of P1,820,000.00,
which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the
form of managers check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to
Maxima.[13] The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file a
Manifestation[14] that the appeal be resolved.[15]
On March 14, 1994, the Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the HLURB
Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima and ordering
Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. The decretal portion of the
decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office of Appeals Adjudication and Legal affairs (OAALA)
dated December 17, 1992 is hereby affirmed with respect to the following:
1) Declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant and
Parkway;
2) Ordering Respondent Segovia to immediately issue the certificate of title in favor of
Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration expenses. This order for delivery of
title in the name of Parkway is now final and immediately executory.
and is modified as follows:
3) Declaring the forfeiture of 50% of the total payments made by the complainant to
Parkway by way of damages and penalty, and for Parkway to refund the remaining balance of the
said payments to the complainant within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision with legal
interest thereon thereafter, for each day said amount remain unpaid; and
4) Ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorneys
fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]

On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed[17] to the Office of the President which dismissed the
appeal for having been filed out of time.[18]
Undaunted, Maxima filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 1,
1998, Segovia filed its Comment that as the original owner-developer of Unit #702, it had
already consummated the sale and transferred title of said property to Parkway.[19]
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the Office of
the President.
Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue of: Was petitioners appeal before the Office of
the President filed within the reglementary period?
In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President[20] it was settled that the period
within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the
President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15[21] of
Presidential Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protection Decree) and Section 2[22] of Presidential Decree No. 1344.[23] The Court ruled that
the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from decisions of the Board as
provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure,[24] is not applicable, because
special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as
Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules
of Procedure. Thus:
[W]e find petitioners contention bereft of merit, because of its reliance on a literal reading
of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well as presidential decrees on the
matter.
Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides as follows:
Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President. Any party may, upon notice to the Board
and the other party, appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners or its division to the
Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance
with Administrative Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated February 12, 1987.
Decision of the President shall be final subject only to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari
or on questions of law.
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by public
respondent reads:
Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the
President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from.
As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows [the]
aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the
qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special
laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the
same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in
line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be
valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.
We note that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen (15)
days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final

and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision.
Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing
Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its
receipt. The latter decree provides that the decisions of NHA is appealable only to the Office of
the President. Further, we note that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land
development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as
HLURB [by virtue of E.O. No. 684 (7 February 1981) and E.O. No. 90 (17 December 1986)]. Thus,
said presidential issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply in
this case. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in Section 27 of HLURB
1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid
presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the
statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the] statute
itself is null and void.
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the decision of HLURB on October 23, 1995.
Considering that the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen days, petitioner has only until
November 7, 1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately, petitioner filed its appeal with public
respondent only on November 20, 1995 or twenty-eight days from receipt of the appealed
decision, which is obviously filed out of time.[25]
In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt of the
decision of the Board on April 19, 1994,[26] to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal
which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the December 9, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 which sustained the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 5697 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Lesson
What are statutes?
A statute is an act of the legislature, adopted pursuant to its constitutional authority, by
prescribed means and in certain form such that it becomes the law governing conduct within its
scope. Statutes are enacted to prescribe conduct, define crimes, create inferior governmental
bodies, appropriate public funds, and in general promote the public good and welfare.
I. Parts of a Statute
Title
Title -- The title of the statute is the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name
by which the act is individually known.
Example: Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969
Preamble
Preamble -- That part of the statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the
objects sought to be accomplished.
Enacting clause

Enacting Clause -- That part of the statute which declares its enactment and serves to
identify it is an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority.
Example: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled."
Body
Body -- The main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even
procedural provisions. Provisos and exemptions may also be found in the body of the statute.
Repealing clause
Repealing Clause -- That part of the statute which announces the prior statutes or specific
provisions which have been abrogated by reason of the new law.
Example: SECTION 13. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly. (From REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048)
Separability clause
Separability Clause -- That part of the statute which provides that in the event that one or
more provisions are declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in
force and effect
Example: SECTION 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is
declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be
affected by such declaration. (From REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048)
Effectivity clause
Effectivity Clause -- That part of the Statute which announces the effectivity date of the
law.
Example: SECTION 14. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. (From
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048)
II. References to Statutes
Statutes may be referred to as an Act or Presidential Decree or some other term. This
indicates that the statute was passed during a certain period, as follows:
4,275 ACTS - Enactments from 1900-1935
733 Commonwealth Acts - Enactments from 1935-1945
2034 Presidential Decrees - Enactments from 1972-1985
884 Batas Pambansa. - Enactments from 1979-1985
9335. Republic Acts - Enactments from 1946-1972, 1987- April 2005
During Martial Law, both President Marcos and the Batasang Pambansa (Parliament)
were issuing laws at the same time in the Presidential Decrees (by President Marcos) and Batas
Pambansa (Parliament) .
During Martial Law, aside from Presidential Decrees, the President promulgated other
issuances namely: 57 General Orders, 1,525 Letters of Instruction, 2,489 Proclamations, 832

Memorandum Order, 1,297 Memorandum Circular, 157 Letter of Implementation, Letter of

Authority, Letters of Instruction, 504 Administrative Order and 1,093 Executive Orders.
The Presidential Decrees issued by Pres. Marcos during Martial Law and the Executive
Orders issued by Pres. Aquino before the opening of Congress may be classified as legislative
acts for there was no legislature during those two periods.
Laws passed by the new 1987 Congress started from Rep. Act No. 6636, as the last
Republic Act promulgated by Congress before Martial Law was Rep. Act No. 6635.
III. How statutes are enacted
Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the constitution
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Sec. 27 (1), Art. VI of the Constitution
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections,
to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where
it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law
as if he had signed it
A bill may be introduced in the House of Representatives or the Senate. A bill must
relate to only one subject matter which must be expressed in its title.
On 1st Reading, the title and number of the bill is read, and then, it is referred to the
appropriate committee.
A committee studies the bill and conducts hearings on it. Thereafter, a committee report
is prepared on the bill. A committee only prepares a report on a bill it decides to recommend for
approval by the House. The committee report is read in open session, and together with the bill,
it is referred to the Rules Committee. The Rules Committee can place the bill in the 2 nd Reading
Calendar or in the Calendar of Unassigned Business.
On 2nd Reading, a bill is subject to debate and amendment before being placed in the
3rd Reading Calendar for final passage. A bill must undergo 3 readings on 3 separate days
except when the President certifies a bill as urgent to meet a public calamity or national
emergency.
After its passage by one house, the bill goes through the same process in the other
house.
If amendments are made in one house, the other house must concur. If a house has a
counterpart bill to a bill passed by the other house, and these bills have conflicting provisions, a

conference committee composed of representatives of each house is formed to harmonize the

conflicting provisions. Thereafter, if the conflicting provisions are harmonized, a conference
committee report is prepared for ratification or approval by both houses.
When the bill is passed by both houses, it is signed by their respective leaders and sent
to the President for approval.
The President may sign the bill into a law, or veto all or part of it. The bill becomes a law
if, within 30 days after receiving it, the President fails to sign or veto the bill. The bill, even if
vetoed by the President, also becomes a law when Congress overrides the veto by a 2/3 vote of
all its Members.
Posted by R et C

at 11:35 PM

Labels: Legal Bibliography