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` lUniversity of Pennsylvania
Randall Collins est professeur de sociologie a
et President de lAmerican Sociological Association. Dans cette entrevue,
R. Collins parle de la sociologie des emotions, de la tradition interactionniste ainsi que de la violence. Lentrevue permet de situer les contributions
de Collins dans le developpement contemporain de la sociologie critique et
la microsociologie interactionniste.
Randall Collins is Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania
and is the President of the American Sociological Association. In the
following interview, Collins discusses the sociology of emotions, the
interactionist tradition, and violence. The discussion situates Collins
contributions as part of an intellectual trajectory that incorporates elements of critical sociology and the micro-sociology of interaction.
RANDALL COLLINS IS ONE OF THE most renowned American sociologists alive today. His works span the gamut of sociological inquiry, from
macro- and systems-level considerations to detailed analysis of interactional
processes. Some of Professor Collins key texts include Conflict Theory
(1974), The Sociology of Philosophies (1998), and Macrohistory: Essays in
the Sociology of the Long Run (1999). He is author or editor of 17 books. He
has written 150 articles and chapters, many of which are translated into
several languages. Professor Collins two most recent booksInteraction
Ritual Chains (2004) and Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory (2008),
Thanks to Nicolas Carrier and Justin Piche for help with the translation.
Kevin Walby, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, B750 Loeb Building, Carleton University,1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S 5B6. E-mail: walbymswresearch@gmail.com
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RC: This has fairly deep theoretical significance. Metaphors are needed
because of the micro-macro relation. In our experience, everything comes to
us in the micro, in the here-and-now of some particular situation. This is
true even when we are seeking information about larger patterns. When we
ask somebody about their social class, their occupation or their education,
we get a brief cryptic answer, but it is a mistake to take that wordtypically
a noun, or a numberas if it were an entity. To depict ones occupation in a
word is to compress a huge number of experiences in situations, and to gloss
over the way in which that persons experiences are related to the chains of
experiences of the persons they have interacted with. Class, occupation, educationeven age or raceare actually metaphorical transformations of
social processes which play out over large numbers of microsituations. My
old teacher Herbert Blumer used to challenge us by saying: What are you
actually talking about when you say structures, or social class? Show me social class, where do you see it? Of course we need ways to summarize
patterns that operate in chains of situations. In the case of class, we have
metaphors like stratathings are said to be higher or lower, although in
fact that is not usually what class interactions look like if we actually see
them in a situation. Unlike the early ethnomethodologists, who dismissed
all macrostructure as rhetorical gloss and concentrated instead on the patterns of situated cognition, I am quite willing to admit that macropatterns
existas chains of microinteraction. But we need better ways of getting at
their real character and especially their dynamics. The question I am puzzling over is whether metaphors help or hurt. If you get rid of the metaphor
of higher or lower, what do you replace it with? Do you get something analytically useful out of changing vocabulary? In the case of violence, it was
helpful to get rid of the conventional metaphors, which badly got in the way
of seeing what the phenomenon actually is.
Both Goffman and Blumer interpret Mead. Mead does not show up a lot
in Goffman, here and there with references. Blumer wrote a whole book
about Mead, and many papers. Where do you think the key turning points
are in how Goffman and Blumer interpret Mead? How do Goffman and
Blumer differ in their use of Mead?
RC: Blumer and Goffman were two of the big stars of the Berkeley department of the 1960s, which had a lot of important people working in it,
including macrosociologists. But Goffman and Blumer were the ones who
inspired people to look deeply at the micro. Although Blumer was pretty respectful of Erving Goffman, it was not true the other way around. Often
Goffman was a wise guy, ironic, sardonic, puncturing people, whereas
Blumer was an old-fashioned mid-western gentleman. Also Goffman did
not consider himself a symbolic interactionist, even though he had come
from Chicago and had been there under the Blumer regime. Goffman had
studied with a British social anthropologist when he was at the University of
Toronto and although I do not think he had crystallized his micro position at
that time, later he liked to consider himself as doing a version of Durkheim-
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ian ritual analysis but on new materials. I think the turning point did happen at Chicago. Everett Hughes, who was a leader of ethnographic
research in the symbolic interactionist camp at Chicago, told me that Goffman arrived from Toronto as an arrogant young man and in his early phase
was very Freudian. This probably did not last long. You can see that references to Freud are absent from Goffmans writings even though he was
quite interested in mental illness. Goffmans move was to investigate mental illness as a form of social activity rather than something one dug up from
the past in psychoanalytic sessions. I think under the influence of the ethnographic emphasis at the Chicago School, Goffman started trying to see
what he could find in everyday life interactions, but what he was looking for,
unlike Blumer, was not a version of Meads theory. Instead Goffman was
looking for a version of Durkheimian ritualism. The other piece of the puzzle is W. Lloyd Warner, trained in British social anthropology, who worked
on Aboriginal society in Australia but had come to the United States and did
one of the first famous community studies of stratification, in Newburyport,
MA. Warner interpreted social classes as if they were tribes with distinctive
rituals. Goffman was his research assistant. Goffmans very first paper is
called Symbols of Class Status, and there you can see the combination of
Durkeimian ritualism and the empirical topics of American sociology.
In memoriam and tribute to Goffman, you once wrote that you would
have liked to see Goffman write a book about sex. In your own book Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) you have written about sex. How does what you
have written about sex and interaction rituals differ from a more conventional Goffmanian account?
RC: I once made this same comment to a friend, another sociologist,
who had been at Berkeley with Goffman that I wished Goffman had written
about sex because it obviously can be analyzed from his perspective. For instance, sex has front stages and back stages. My friend said that he did not
think Goffman had enough sexual experience to write such a book. You
never know. Goffman was a very private person. Goffman says very little
about sex but there is a footnote I think in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) where he raises the question of whether there is an
ultimate self behind the backstage, and he says some people think your sexual self is the ultimate backstage. Then he discourages this reading by
saying that sex is a performance and that in Italy there is a saying that sex is
the poor mans opera. My early thinking was, how do you translate Freud
into microinteractions? In a way, Freuds conscious and repressed map
onto the front stage and backstage. Later I developed a more explicit analysis of what makes rituals work, which led to seeing the various kinds of
sexual activities themselves as rituals that produce different degrees of bodily and emotional entrainment. There are a number of puzzles. Most
naturalistic or biological theories of sex have a great deal of trouble explaining almost anything except vaginal heterosexual intercourse. Simple
things like kissing, or more elaborate acts like oral sex, are very difficult to
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movement going. There are interesting ways this can be achieved with
different emotions. My former student Erika Summers-Effler has worked
on movements, like the antideath penalty movement, which do not have
much successso how do they keep themselves going? At one point she
quotes a movement leader who says something like our energy is getting
down, so I think it is time to get arrested. A lot of the techniques of these
middle-sized organizations are about establishing and trying to keep up an
emotional atmosphere.
In your new book Violence (2008) you argue violence is not easy. It must
be achieved through interactional processes. Can you explain a bit more
what the emotional dynamics of achieving violence are?
RC: This is an aspect that surprised me as I went along. The initial
thrust of my conflict theory was to try and make things more vivid and material and bodily, so I was looking for more violent conflict. I had become
very critical of the theory of the state as this institution that had legitimacy,
as if this were a matter of course. Instead I tried to push Weber in a more
dynamic direction, conceptualizing the state as the institution that attempts to monopolize violence, its legitimacy coming from the extent of
success in its monopolizing activities. But as I got more and more into it, I
realized that if you look at specific violent situations there is much more
posturing and bluster than actual violence. So that is a first consideration,
that people are not very competent at violence. Furthermore, there is stratification in violence, between those who are good at it and those who are not.
But when I pushed it further I realized that actual physical violence itself
largely hinges on the prior establishment of emotional dominance. Microtechniques of emotional interaction are crucial in whether violence is
successful or not, and indeed in whether it will happen or abort. Sometimes
successful violence has a very rapid onset and a strong temporal rhythm
for instance, a successful armed robber has a technique of finding when is
exactly the right moment to pull out the gun and threaten others. I am certain now that microtechniques are crucial in almost every form of violence.
If you observe or examine videos of people who argue and sometimes have
fist fights, you always see the process of attempting to establish emotional
dominance. The turn of phrase from sportshaving the momentumis
actually quite accurate. But it is a reciprocal and interactional process.
When one side has the momentum the other side does not. Sports commentators do not think this through. They say the defense is getting tired
because they have been on the field too long. But the offense has been on the
field exactly the same time as the defense so there must be a process where
one side is getting more energized and the other side is unenergized. It is
more a matter of who is establishing the initiative, who is setting the
rhythm in this situation.
Can you say a bit more about your concept of confrontational tension?
RC: This is the central concept of my theory of violence. It is an empirical discovery, but I do not want to claim originality because a U.S. Army
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army, the larger network exists primarily to get soldiers to some physical situation where they can attempt to threaten violence against some other group
of soldiers. The larger structure does most of its work preliminary to the time
when the fighting actually takes place. The moment of fighting is the time
when confrontational tension emerges, because fighting has to go through
the microlevel. In this respect, let me compare traditional or historical forms
of combat and newer forms. Older armies, as described for instance in the
accounts of Julius Caesar, operated by marching several thousand soldiers up
to a point where they can come into direct contact with the front line of a
similar force of opponents. The side which broke down least from confrontational tension would win the fight; the art of warfare was to try to keep from
losing group coherence until the other side broke apart, at which point they
could be killed because they were no longer resisting.
We still have fights like that. To some extent brawls and riots look like
Caesars legions when they entered the melee. But over time armies have
developed long-distance weapons. Up until the 1860s weapons were inaccurate enough so that soldiers still had to get within a small number of meters
or else the chance of hitting anyone was not very high. Fighting remained
within the zone of face-to-face confrontational tension, and managing that
emotional tension was the key to winning or losing.
But now our weapons have become fairly precise at a distance where
you can barely see the enemy, or only on an electronic screen, and battles
can be carried out from miles away. Does this mean the confrontational
tension disappears? The research question is open. But as far as I can tell, it
does not disappear. Even in a long-distance combat zone, soldiers using
weapons still experience some confrontational tension. The most advanced
militaries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, are now attempting to control combat entirely by computers, using informational
inputs from long-distance sensors. The aim is to take humans out of the
loop because they are the fallible element. Since the time of Clausewitz military thinkers have had the idea of friction, or what in popular parlance is
called the fog of war. On the microlevel, this friction or fognotice the use
of metaphorstranslates into the emotional processes of confrontational
tension and the way it propagates through the links of an armys human
network. Todays military planners are optimistic that for the first time in
history, armies can get rid of the fog or friction. If that is so, it would completely change the process of winning a war, since in traditional battle the
more coherent organizationin traditional terms, the one with the higher
morale in the confrontational situation itselfwould beat the organization
which is less able to cope with confrontational tension. But if warfare can be
carried out entirely at a distance, or by long-distance controls, the confrontational tension disappears, and winning is entirely a matter of having
superior technology.
I am attempting to analyze various aspects of this now. One of the
things that complicate matters is that most wars right now are so-called
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