Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise
Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing
look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest
is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should
be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt
of this Decision.