People v. Perfecto G.R. No.

L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force."
public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of
testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La
Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the
author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps,
but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and
robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate,
filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty
Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the
laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military
Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory
affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g.
the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible
with the new order of things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new
theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown
or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with
bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American
character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its
authority in the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts
against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official
class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based
upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some
authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves.
These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the
scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to
enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it
place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the
people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for
different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
Facts:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an
appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated
October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to
the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal
shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

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On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot
1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and
spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234
in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that
Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of
the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A.
3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that
Judge Asuncion be exonerated.
Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No.
3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency
as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act
unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving
the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of
the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question
was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier
purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no
legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the
business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes
the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
THE ISSUES
1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

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3.
Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a
Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII
is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs
are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State
still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially

enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as
a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest;
its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51%
of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone
makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state action
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore
the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

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When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions
of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide
by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger
reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be

expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
JAVELLANA VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present
constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that the president is without power to
proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo
Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens
Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in objective.
ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in
compliance to applicable laws?
3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?
4. Are the petitioners entitled relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing
constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether
the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution. The
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification
(election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the
environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law) the Court cannot
honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to
dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by
the cases which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.
CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it

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conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process
and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial
and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In
compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case,
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National
Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The
respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of
having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house
of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation,
defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the
other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to
seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding
representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It
is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could
have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it
is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from
the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional
Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it

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was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records
of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress, in the context of JBC representation,
should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the
two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in
the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative
influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or onehalf (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half
(1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to
the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be
countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including
the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no
matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the
call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and
the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that
the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes
thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of
judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount
circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first
applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers
when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the
Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of
the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries
really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon
buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real
property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments
are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is
to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the
fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and
block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character
of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but

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a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs.
Gore).
ENDENCIA VS DAVID
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and
Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the
constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and
thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the
compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial
officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the
Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their
service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the
republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary
with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a
diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the
Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the
continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary but the SC
decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income
tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations,
was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just
like members of the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What

is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and
caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax
as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and
such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the
time of the passing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such
will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity
of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.
TANADA v. ANGARA 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of
the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO
agreement.
Held:

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In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines
joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept
of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as
WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it
should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international
trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND
ELIZABETH DIMAANO G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, En Banc (Carpio, J.)
The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum.
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG), through the AFP AntiGraft
Board (the Board), investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General
Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time
of former President Ferdinand Marcos.
Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure
warrant on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the
military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly,

communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos and
US dollars, were also seized.
In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have used the said
equipment without Ramas consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the owner of the money
because she has no visible source of income. The Board then concluded with a
recommendation that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez,
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic or Petitioner) filed a Complaint
against Ramas and Dimaano. On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private
respondents and (2) the search and seizure conducted was illegal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano; and
2. Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaanos house were illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. HELD: RECENT JURISPRUDENCE P
The PCGG, through the AFP Board can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the 2 categories mentioned in Section 2 of
E.O No. 1, i.e.: AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of
former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence; or:
AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG. In the case at bar, Petitioner does not claim that the President
assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, the present controversy should fall under the
first category of AFP personnel before PCGG could have jurisdiction.
In this regard, Petitioner argues that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos
because he was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, which enabled him to
receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief. We hold that Ramas was not a
subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as
this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close
association with former President Marcos. In the case of Republic v. Migrinio, it was held that
applying the rule in statutory construction of ejusdem generis, the term subordinate refers to
one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to
the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. Applying the foregoing, Ramas
position as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does

8 | Page

not make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that he was a close associate of the former
President, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of the
former President were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by his
complicity with the former President in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed
President or by the former Presidents acquiescence in his own accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth. This, the PCGG failed to do.
In fact, while the AFP Board Resolution states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379, said Resolution ends with a
finding of violation of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379, without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A. This absence of relation proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG
for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily, its powers must be construed to address
such specific and limited purpose. Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the
Amended Complaint do not show that Ramas accumulated the properties in question in his
capacity as a subordinate of his commanderin-chief. Such omission is fatal. It is precisely a
prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former
President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 clearly premises the creation of
the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the
forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim also deserves no
merit. Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to
waive. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.
Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the
PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case. Petitioner argues that at the time the search and
seizure was conducted, a revolutionary government was operative by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1, which withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. It was done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the resulting government was a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law. Thus, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.

With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights. From the natural law point of view, the right of
revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change
their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a
general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.
It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state
and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing
form of government without regard to the existing constitution. Nevertheless, even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines
is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had
the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a
signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.
Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
right of individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government
could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as
part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated
the 1973 Constitution.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for
the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. It was only
upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.

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Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not
have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched
and seized.
The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team had
no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the
raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these
items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
Occena v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that
the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue:
What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may
it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may
be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard
required for a proper submission?
Held:
The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads
thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall
have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. One of such

powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the
amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed
parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering that the
proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy
(70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and
has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue:
Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the
Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?
Held:
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on
an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be
submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may
be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because
amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would
become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.
Issue:
What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission?
Held:

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The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In
that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert
that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not
a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either
when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth
votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No.
1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the
vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution
No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must
elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments
having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained
that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the
Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The three resolutions were
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7,
1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice
President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create
the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis
of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably
vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the

winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional
provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed
any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair
and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there
are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents
office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the
scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot
stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO 73748 - May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines."
ISSUE:

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Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the
provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: The six-year term of
the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992, refers to
the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the
previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners,
Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous
People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and Vice-President was
held last May 2, 1992.
Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or
the previously elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of
Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and
his allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a

justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge, and the people have made judgment.
In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
Facts:
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals on 1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate
Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice.
Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire government,
including the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower
courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals
and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes
from number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the
President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana
who are affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals
and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
Held:
The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The
Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new
court.

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The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing
before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden. radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence."
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality
of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and
the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor
no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that
the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb
8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of
office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, - proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at
least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, - calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to
be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;"
and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, -proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended
so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become

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delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective

seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates
the Constitution.
Held: In as much as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913
and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and
(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the
public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments
to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106, 127325, March 19, 1997

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then,
upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.)
caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.)
instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against
the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no
such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of
initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two
latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates
that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the
Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there
per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it
needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally
guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

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Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition
had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution.
Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 14 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition
due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.
Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a
radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.
Held:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time
of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which
renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

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