Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270

January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of
a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered
thereon appealed to this court, where under proper
assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No.
55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the
facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction.

port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the

said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said
vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of
December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring
into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel,
from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred
and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull,
master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to
provide stalls for said animals so in transit and
suitable means for trying and securing said
animals in a proper manner, and did then and
there cause some of said animals to be tied by
means of rings passed through their noses, and
allow and permit others to be transported loose in
the hold and on the deck of said vessel without
being tied or secured in stalls, and all without
bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect
and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in transit,
the noses of some of said animals were cruelly
torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly
wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and
No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign

port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to
provide for the suitable sustenance of such
animals during the ordinary period occupied by the
vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the
port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals
to be provided with adequate forage and fresh
water at least once in every twenty-four hours from
the time that the animals are embarked to the time
of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was
amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable
and proper facilities for loading and unloading
cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon
which they are transported, without cruelty or
unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful
to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by
swinging them over the side by means of ropes or
chains attached to the thorns.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of
December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and
there master of a steam sailing vessel known as
the steamship Standard, which vessel was then
and there engaged in carrying and transporting
cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1,

1901, provides that
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of
such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to
comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for
every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not

less that one hundred dollars nor more that five

hundred dollars, United States money, for each
offense. Prosecution under this Act may be
instituted in any Court of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because
it does not state that the court was sitting at a port where
the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was
committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under
the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created
thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court
organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in
Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization
of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely
extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain
offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in
accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S.vs. Fowler, 1 Phil.
Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court
of First Instance in any province into which such ship or
water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall
come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been
committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there
could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law.
But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is
conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense
of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the
master thereof, when the neglect and omission which

constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship

was within the territorial waters of the United States. No
court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105;
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter.,
ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the
proper political agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles
before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage
the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the
same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on
the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at
the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and
every element necessary to constitute it existed during the
voyage across the territorial waters. The completed
forbidden act was done within American waters, and the
court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction
raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is
restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every.
Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public
vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a
prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public
ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels
from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not
established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794,

Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General

Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations
invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no
exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he
comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was
also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to
the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case
of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.),
116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied
license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may
reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the
jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she
claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted
by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that
"the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war
has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute
right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of
courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law,
sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2.
C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace
to come and go freely. Local official exercise but little control
over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are
justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to
which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the
general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely
upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in
the fact that experience shows that such vessels are
generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which
are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port.
But comity and convenience does not require the extension
of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels.
There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the
French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the
port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by

the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The

French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in
foreign ports by one member of the crew against another.
(See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628;
Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de
la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such
jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great
Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it
by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231;
British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider
exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to
restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the
leading English authority, says that
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters
of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon
as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they
become subject to the local jurisdiction on all
points in which the interests of the country are
touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that
when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to
the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local
sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such
jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int.
Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law
Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of
the Exchange, said that
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of
trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to
continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not

owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not

amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said
that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of
another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the
laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they
remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless
otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S.,
520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts
are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United
States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, viceconsuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit
as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise
between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to
the nation whose interests are committed to their charge,
without the interference of the local authorities, unless the
conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the
order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in
Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ship's company,
and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int.
Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass.,
188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected
by many events which do not amount to a riot or general
public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the
crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the
public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this
treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local
authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and
Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the
port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a
justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney

was instructed by the Government to take the necessary

steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the
governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard
against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian
charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not
appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount
to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879
the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted
in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and
battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port
of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the
treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels to
the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts,
Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the
Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the
matter careful consideration in connection with the
views and suggestion of your note and the
provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of
1827 between the United States and Sweden and
Norway. The stipulations contained in the last
clause of that article . . . are those under which it is
contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on
the consular officers, not only in regard to such
differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as
to disposing of controversies resulting from
personal violence involving offense for which the
party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in
question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the
consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to

sit as judges or abitratorsin such differences as

may arise between captains and crews of the
vessels, where such differences do not involve on
the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the
order or tranquillity of the country. When, however,
a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by
the captain or one or more of the crew of the
vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such
magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such
circumstances in the United States it becomes a
public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at
liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it
must necessarily be left to the local judicial
authorities whether the procedure shall take place
in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in
fact there had been such disturbance of the local
order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is
supported by such proof as results in the
conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the
offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the
place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of
jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant
vessel by one member of the crew against another which
amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the
country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the
language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal
laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The
offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to
so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It
was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the
country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither
by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty
or general principle of public law, are the court of the

Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense

charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective
because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is
claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at
that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would
be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly
against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals
is not necessary in order to constitute the completed
offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of
the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the
port into which the animals are bought. They are then within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of
their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is
concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of
the animals constituted a constitutional element in the
offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient
because
it
fails
to
allege
that
the
defendant knowingly andwillfully failed to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of
the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes
the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416),
"the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in
connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must
be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the
will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in
Wongvs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The
first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of
the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act
complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel that the words 'willfully' and
'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an
act implies that it was done by design done for a certain

purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it

was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs.
The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours
with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were
knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion
that "according to his experience, the system of carrying
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable
and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It
was conclusively proven that what was done was done
knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders,
No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or
omission complained of as constituting a crime or public
offense in ordinary and concise language, without
repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the
statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint
which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the
master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The
allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the
defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by
reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to
provide suitable means for securing said animals were
cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty
wounded, bruised, and killed."

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish

text of the information does not charge him with failure to
provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used
are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view
of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in
English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the
words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we determine
this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and
that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of
Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon
a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional
law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and
ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock
between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands,
and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports
been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the
Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I,
section 3, of the Constitution of the United States.
(Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to
the United States is controlled by constitutional principles
different from those which apply to States of the Union. The
importance of the question thus presented requires a
statement of the principles which govern those relations,
and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative
power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of
the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable
diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional
doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the
express power to make war and treaties, and it has the

power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by

conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the
United States, and to guard against the possibility of the
power of Congress to provide for its government being
questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in
express terms that Congress should have the power "to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the
United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition
of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally
incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a
government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may
govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local
government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers
required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S.,
486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has
provided such governments for territories which were within
the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet
incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into
executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an
organic act certain general conditions in accordance with
which the local government should act. The organic act thus
became the constitution of the government of the territory
which had not been formally incorporated into the Union,
and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature
was determined by its conformity with the requirements of
such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U.
S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government
Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power
which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to
annul the action of the local legislature and itself legislate
directly for the territory. This power has been exercised
during the entire period of the history of the United States.
The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power
can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195
U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own

force operate within such territory, although the liberality of
Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous
territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of
many people that it went there by its own force.
(Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with
reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited
only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the
very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or
place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Limavs. Bidwell,
182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244;
Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U.
S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the
whole history of the United States, and legislation founded
on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of
the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the
Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution
and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all
the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter
organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When
Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it
expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutes
should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of
1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was
acquired by the United States as a result of the war with
Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have
consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles
above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the
United States on August 13, 1898, and the military
commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine
the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The
duty then devolved upon the American authorities to
preserve peace and protect person and property within the

occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper

orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the
duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed
December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the
President announced that the destruction of the Spanish
fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected
the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of
the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of
peace the future control, disposition, and government of the
Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the
periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of
peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until
Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the
territory was governed under the military authority of the
President as commander in chief. Long before Congress
took any action, the President organized a civil government
which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely
military government which it gradually superseded, in the
war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or
civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary
Root in his report for 1901
The military power in exercise in a territory under
military occupation includes executive, legislative,
and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens
that in a single order of a military commander can
be found the exercise of all three of these different
powers the exercise of the legislative powers by
provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial
power by determination of right; and the executive
power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed
and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil
government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full
investigation, the organization of civil government was
initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil
authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1,

1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of

the President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its
character" was transferred from the military government to
the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and
regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of
War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative
power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to
include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of
law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and
imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds
of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system
to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and
establishment of courts; the organization and establishment
of municipal and departmental government, and all other
matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now
competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative
character." This grant of legislative power to the
Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain
declared general principles, and subject to certain specific
restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The
Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be
instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression
of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the
measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the
fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government."
The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found
in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and

to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that

excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist
except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder
or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or
of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these
proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the
Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that
"all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern
the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by
Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall
be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United
States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government,
and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said
Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and
religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which
had been exercised previously by the military governor, was
transferred to that official. The government thus created by
virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the
affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President
until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control
of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in
connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes
the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in

the form of government which the President had erected.
Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and
approved the action of the President in organizing the
government. Substantially all the limitations which had been
imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus
extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the
Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the
rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate
under the conditions. The action of the President in creating
the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and ViceGovernor-General,
and
through
the
Commission
establishing certain executive departments, was expressly
approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the
President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification
of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by
Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincolnvs. U.S., 197 U.S.,
419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to
continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided."
In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read
"By authority of the United States" instead of "By the
authority of the President." In the course of time the
legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the
Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was
to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses
the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly.
The government of the Islands was thus assumed by
Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory
not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a
Territory, although its form and organization somewhat
resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional
relation which unites the States and Territories into the
Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which,

however, operates on the President and Congress, and not

directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of
the United States, acting through the President and
Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but
from different parts thereof. For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted
and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its
organic laws are derived from the formally and legally
expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the
popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and
when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of
the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a
constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the
Philippines is a complete governmental organism with
executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising
the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The
separation of powers is as complete as in most
governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is
this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement
of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the
Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to
some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a
State the veto power enables him to exercise much control
over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a
member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he
has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the
government on the model with which Americans are familiar,
and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of
the public interests and the protection of individual rights
and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have
been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined which are
inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must

enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as

Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the
States under the national and state constitutions. The
executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally
enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating
under written constitutions, must determine the validity of
legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private
and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with
the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries
in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory
could there be that government of laws and not of men
which is essential for the protection of rights under a free
and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must
consider the question of the validity of an act of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a
State court considers an act of the State legislature. The
Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the
United States, while the States exercise all powers which
have not been granted to the central government. The
former operates under grants, the latter subject to
restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends
upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains
a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a
State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State
constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An
Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines
Government which has not been expressly disapproved by
Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been
covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines
is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations.
The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on
certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power

subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific

authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government
relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress
has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These,
however, should be viewed simply as enactments on
matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to
act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty.
Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific
acts of legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends
strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of
construction the Government of the Philippines should be
regarded as one of general instead of enumerated
legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its
authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity of
legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to
grant general legislative power to the new government,
subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and
reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met
with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws
passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and
authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902,
sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the
Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress,
or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the
Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners
Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then
ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or
implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the
Constitution of the United States operated only upon the
States of the Union. It has no application to the Government
of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign

commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power

to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may
regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this
directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it,
to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has
by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be
paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has
expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors
and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions
relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of
Congress, but its general regulation is left to the
Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved
power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not
meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the
power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not
affect the authority with respect to the regulation of
commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted
before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and
this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
government, and the civil government instituted by the
President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign
nations and the ports of the territory. (Crossvs. Harrison, 16
How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.),
73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment
without annulment or other action by Congress, and must
be presumed to have met with its approval. We are
therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws
for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries
and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55,
as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable
within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment
of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be
determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2,

1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in

the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals,
contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found
the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the
evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and
master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or
thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
was engaged in the transportation of cattle and
carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and
into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the
defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard
said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was
anchored, under the directions of the said
defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the
city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the
jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said
cattle then and there had broken legs and three
others of said cattle were dead, having broken
legs; and also that said cattle were transported and
carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said
ship, without suitable precaution and care for the
transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger
and risk to their lives and security; and further that
said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by
the defendant and brought into the said bay, and
into the city of Manila, without any provisions being
made whatever upon said decks of said ship and
in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a

suitable condition
transportation.

and

position

for

such

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to

transport cattle abroad steamship coming into
Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is
by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing
partitions between the cattle and supports at the
front sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon
the floor on which they stand and are transported,
of that in case of storms, which are common in this
community at sea, such cattle may be able to
stand without slipping and pitching and falling,
individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on
account or cattle were transported in this case.
Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a
very intelligent and experienced seaman, has
testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government,
and stated positively that since the introduction in
the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall
system for the transportation of animals and cattle
he has suffered no loss whatever during the last
year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in
his own behalf, that according to his experience
the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks
and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory
of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs
or common reason. It can not be urged with logic
that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports for
the feet and without stalls or any other protection
for them individually can safely and suitably carried
in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature.
One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or
unprotected, might produce a serious panic and
the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if
transported in the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a

fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

People vs. Vera

65 Phil. 56

probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it

violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue

delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law
however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be
followed by the provincial board.

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal

case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for
probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation
Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs
petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera
concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution
opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the
hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First
Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera)
have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under
probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The
Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in
provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is
not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a
province, has no designated probation officer hence, a
Manila court cannot grant probation.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an

encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon.
They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation
law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power to
grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the
issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance
was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila
while recognizing its application in provinces).

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter

alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of
provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a
province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no

1. May the State question its own laws?

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that,

the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the
People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a
law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu
Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had
used the Probation Law in the past without question but is
now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly

authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a
law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had
been using an invalid law.

the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a

power of the president to commute penalties.

2. No, Act 4221

unconstitutional.

Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan

or

the

[old]

Probation

Law

is

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken
on this note. There is violation of the equal protection
clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to
apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So
if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then
the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of
the provisions of the Probation Law.

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of

Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and
lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was
the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to
prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the
case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased
to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055
which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter,
against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he
is seeking to have permit issued to him.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation
officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards
follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation
law in their province. This only creates a roving commission
which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation.
Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to
grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within

L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury

from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which
was appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is
already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said
CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to

the president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of
Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is
giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President)
may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues
to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon
reconvening or upon early repeal.
Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO)
545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545
appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action
and other calamities.
2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
"in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to

promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared

national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the
national policy that "the existence of war between the
United States and other countries of Europe and Asia,
which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest
the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the
resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the
President, "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
section 1."
3.
House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency
Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may
at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the
Congress to formally declare the termination of the
emergency powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still

operative
NO.
1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal
anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly
been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of
the Government, public works, and many others purposes,
with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress
must be deemed to have long decided to assume the
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from
the President.
2.
CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional
provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly
intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended

that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step
is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the President, the result would be obvious
unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the
President may wield his veto.
3.
If the President had ceased to have powers with
regards to general appropriations, none can remain in
respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it
is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of
the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so
that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is
doubtful whether the President can by executive orders
make new appropriations.
4.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise
such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable
the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain
and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the
Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been
normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable
field, the President still has any residuary powers under the
Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if
not conflict.
5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision
of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative
powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war
or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to
the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with
any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it
alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and
should not create power. In our democracy the hope and

survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish

patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of
Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take
up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance
with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as
required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as
follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval
of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is

authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the

interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of
the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a
department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

Department Head, discretionary authority as to the

execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial
governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge
when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have
the conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.

HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is
valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code,
the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the

Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan

G.R. No. L-10202, Mar. 27, 1917
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff.
Moreno and Guevara for defendants.
MORELAND, J.:
The plaintiff amended his complaint in this action after a
demurrer thereto had been sustained. No new or additional
facts have been alleged and the case stands precisely
where it stood before the amended complaint was filed. A
demurrer having been offered to the amended complaint,
that also must be sustained.
The plaintiff still insists with great vigor that section 1 of Act
No. 1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of

provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the

change of capitals of provinces and subprovinces, as may
be necessary from time to time to serve the public
convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative
powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of
Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine
Legislature.
Section 1 of the Act referred to provides in substance that,
whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the
public welfare requires, he may, by executive order, enlarge,
contract, or otherwise change the boundary of any province,
subprovince, municipality, or township or other political
subdivision, or separate any such subdivision into such
portions as may be requires, merge any of such
subdivisions with another, divide, any province into one or
more subdivisions as may be required, name any new
subdivision so created, change the seat of government
within any subdivision existing or created thereunder, to
such place therein as the public interests require, and shall
fix in such executive order the date when the change,
merger, separation or other action shall take effect. The
section also provides that whenever the Governor-General
creates a new political subdivision he shall appoint such
officers for the new subdivision with such powers and duties
as may be required by the existing provisions of law
applicable to the case and fix their salaries; and that such
appointees shall hold office until their successors are
appointed or elected and qualify. Successors to the elective
offices shall be elected at the next general election following
such appointment.
The contention of the plaintiff is not well founded. The
delegation of the power referred to on the GovernorGeneral does not involve an abdication of legislative
functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the
particular subject-matter with which it authorizes the
Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of

certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and

townships, many of them newly created, and all of them
subject to more or less rapid change both in development
and centers of population, the proper regulation of which
might require not only prompt action but action of such a
detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as
such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act
applicable so far as it touches this case which is in violation
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
The demurrer is sustained and the complaint is finally
dismissed, with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 47065

June 26, 1940

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years
in the business of transporting passengers in the Province
of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the
Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor
vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public
convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility
Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973, 36830, 32014
and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the
Public Service Commission an application for authorization
to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No.
56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with
the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a
result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the

decision of September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's

application for increase of equipment, the Public Service
Commission ordered:
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley
No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada
por el articulo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la presente se
enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de
convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos.
24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el
expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran incorporadas
en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y
authorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos y
subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco (25) anos,
contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta
decision.
Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el
Commonwealth de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del
mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del
precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una depreciacion
razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su
adquisicion.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus
incorporated in its existing certificates, the petitioner filed on
October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Public Service Commission on November 14,
1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present
petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court
praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of
the Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to this
court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that
this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void;
that, if this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of

Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be

rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not
applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to
June 8, 1939. Stated in the language of the petitioner, it is
contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service
Commission by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,
without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered
discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a
complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its
functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and
void.

2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of

Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of
legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has
exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to
future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates
issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and
(b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the
respondent Public Service Commission in the decision
complained of in the present proceedings, reads as follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding
section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from
the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of
public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and
public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do

business will promote the public interests in a proper and

suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the
issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding
paragraph that the service can be acquired by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that
the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time;
and that the violation of any of these conditions shall
produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without
the necessity of any express action on the part of the
Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the
equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or
other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall
be taken into consideration.

The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or

amendment of certificates actually force and to those which
may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and
time schedules of public services and to authorization to
renew and increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of
Act No. 146, as amended, no public service can operate
without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of
convenience and public necessity to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do
business will "public interests in a proper and suitable
manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the
conditions which the Public Service Commission may
prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the
first paragraph is that "the service can be acquired by the

Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumental

thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which
is virtually a restatement of the principle already embodied
in the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides
that "the State may, in the interest of national welfare and
defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of
just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and
other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
"Another condition which the Commission may prescribed,
and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate
"shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is
a relation between the first and second paragraphs of said
section 15, the two provisions must be read and interpreted
together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the
Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation
of the service under said certificate during a definite period
fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a proper
and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of
Commonwealth Act. No. 146 which is a complement of
section 15, the Commission is empowered to issue
certificates of public convenience whenever it "finds that the
operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner." Inasmuch as the
period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is
inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be
disregarded by the Commission in determining the question
whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the
Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only
limitation to its power being that said period shall not
exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already ruled that
"public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs.
Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated
June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G. R.

Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, citing

New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287
U.S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter
Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570,
1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among
other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any other form
of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
"for a longer period than fifty years," and when it was
ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public
Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the
issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a
definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such
certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty
years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to the
aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this, it has
thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by
the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty
years. All that has been delegated to the Commission,
therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use
discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly
having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests
in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National
Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus
conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not
make
the
provision
in
question
constitutionally
objectionable.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its

originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall
overaction which necessarily results from undue
concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and
prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was
established which narrows the range of governmental action

and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a

corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative
authority, and from the earliest time American legal
authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative
power must be exercised by the legislature alone. It is
frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the
mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of
confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the
development of the principle of separation of powers and
that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or
delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton
(De Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but
which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D.
17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not
only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea,
G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.)
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there
is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist, v.
Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs.
Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In
harmony with such growing tendency, this Court, since the
decision in the case of Compaia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil.,
136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances,
extended its seal of approval to the "delegation of greater
powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs.
Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De
Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G.
R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs.
Rosenthal & Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs.

People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.).

Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454,
the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribed
the conditions "that the service can be acquired by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable," and "that the certificate shall
be valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly made
applicable "to any extension or amendment of certificates
actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and
increase equipment and properties." We have examined the
legislative proceedings on the subject and have found that
these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing
certificates of public convenience. The history of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an
attempt to suppress, by way of amendment, the sentence
"and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a
definite period of time," but the attempt failed:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sr. CUENCO. Seor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la

misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las
palabras 'and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only
for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion del proyecto
autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo
de vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el
mundo sabe que bo se puede determinar cuando los
intereses del servicio publico requiren la explotacion de un
servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si
en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos buses
en cierta ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en
cuenta; que la explotacion de los servicios publicos
depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del volumen
como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio
publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicos el

interes publico asi lo exige. El interes publico no tiene

duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas o
menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso
en el caucus de anoche.

EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. Que dice el Comite?

Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa
enmienda, en vista de que esto certificados de
conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia: sepuede
extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compaia
durante el tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la
extension y se le extendera; pero no creo conveniente el
que nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia publica
de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta anos, porque
seria anticonstitucional.
xxx

xxx

xxx

By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated.

(Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply
because its existing certificates had been granted before
June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454,
amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146,
was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of
holding them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill
provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be
granted to any corporation except under the conditions that
it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress of the United States." The Jones Law,
incorporating a similar mandate, provided, in section 28,
that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual,
firm, or corporation except under the conditions that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the

Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of

the Philippines provided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or
corporation, except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National
Assembly when the public interest so requires." The
National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, logically
succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the
power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right
granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and
when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted,
the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has
declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing
certificates of public convenience.
Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of
public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its
police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities
coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to
those already established and in operation.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that,
because of the establishment of petitioner's operations prior
to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the
Commission. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are
a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon
as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of
established utilities, become at once subject to the police
power thus called into operation. Procedures' Transportation
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct.
131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad Commission, 184
Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is
applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already
established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck
Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed
in pursuance of the police power. The only distinction
recognized in the statute between those established before
and those established after the passage of the act is in the

method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate

of public convenience and necessity it required for any new
operation, but no such certificate is required of any
transportation company for the operation which was actually
carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in
the creation of their operative rights in no way affects the
power of the Commission to supervise and regulate them.
Obviously the power of the Commission to hear and
dispose of complaints is as effective against companies
securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as
against those subsequently securing such right under a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. (Motor
Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission of California et al.,
209 Pac. 586.)

Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not

only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but
are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating
or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines.
(Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The
business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation
to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the
right of public regulation. When private property is "affected
with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only."
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public
an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by
the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by
discounting the use, but so long as he maintains the use he
must submit to control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so
far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of
the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities
may be exercised through boards of commissioners. (Fisher
vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128
U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc.

R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556, 571; Connecticut etc. R. Co.
vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs.
Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to
regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power,
and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a
legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public
as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are,
therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the
obligation of contracts, taking property without due process,
or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially
inasmuch as the question whether or not private property
shall be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens
assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he
voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot
complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of
the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of
authorities which hold that a certificate of public
convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract,
confers no property right, and is mere license or privilege.
(Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95,
100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of
Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E.
321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581;
Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St.
271, 7 N. E. [d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs.
Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
454 are valid and constitutional, we are, however, of the
opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission
should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for
further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The
Public Service Commission has power, upon proper notice
and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any
certificate issued under the provisions of this Act, whenever
the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said
certificate was issued have been misrepresented or
materially changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth
Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for an

increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the

conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the
matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its
certificates of public convenience, there had been neither
notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or
present evidence. The Commission appears to have taken
advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's
equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25)
years which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any
number of years. This is, to say the least, irregular and
should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan
v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129),
"the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by
the rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298
U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed. 1288.) In the language
of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right
to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without or
consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly
attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
genius of constitutional government is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the

case remanded to the Public Service Commission for
further proceedings in accordance with law and this
decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ.,
concur.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530
pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July
18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption
of
thethemeasure
proposed
in
the
resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public
Works and Communication to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the
Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila
and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of
the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to
the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the

necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondent.
Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor
Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.
REYES, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General
denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as
manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.
It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the
NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of
the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on
January 19 of that year, he was granted quarters allowance
of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that
month. Submitted the Control Committee of the
Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said
resolution was on August 3, 1949, disapproved by the said
Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the
NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1)
that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation
prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the
salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to
exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial

condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of

such allowance.
On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control
Committee to reconsider its action and approve his claim for
allowance for January to June 15, 1949, amounting to
P1,650. The claim was again referred by the Control
Committee to the auditor General for comment. The latter,
in turn referred it to the NAFCO auditor, who reaffirmed his
previous recommendation and emphasized that the fact that
the corporation's finances had not improved. In view of this,
the auditor General also reiterated his previous opinion
against the granting of the petitioner's claim and so
informed both the Control Committee and the petitioner. But
as the petitioner insisted on his claim the Auditor General
Informed him on June 19, 1950, of his refusal to modify his
decision. Hence this petition for review.
The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No.
332, approved on June 18, 1939, with a capital stock of
P20,000,000, 51 per cent of which was to be able to be
subscribed by the National Government and the remainder
to be offered to provincial, municipal, and the city
governments and to the general public. The management
the corporation was vested in a board of directors of not
more than 5 members appointed by the president of the
Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. But the corporation was made subject to the
provisions of the corporation law in so far as they were
compatible with the provisions of its charter and the
purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy the
general powers mentioned in the corporation law in addition
to those granted in its charter. The members of the board
were to receive each a per diem of not to exceed P30 for
each day of meeting actually attended, except the chairman
of the board, who was to be at the same time the general
manager of the corporation and to receive a salary not to
exceed P15,000 per annum.

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved

authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other
things, to effect such reforms and changes in government
owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of
promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their
operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on
October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93
creating the Government Enterprises Council to be
composed of the President of the Philippines as chairman,
the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as vice-chairman,
the chairman of the board of directors and managing heads
of all such corporations as ex-officio members, and such
additional members as the President might appoint from
time to time with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The council was to advise the President in
the excercise of his power of supervision and control over
these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy
and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their
functions and activities. The Executive Order also provided
that the council was to have a Control Committee
composed of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as
chairman, a member to be designated by the President from
among the members of the council as vice-chairman and
the secretary as ex-officio member, and with the power,
among others
(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the
President, all the corporations owned or controlled by the
Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and
economy in their operations;
(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly
budget of expenditures approved by the respective Boards
of Directors of the said corporations; and

(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the

Government Enterprises Council with the approval of the
President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No. 93.)
With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the
power of appointing its directors vested in the President of
the Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is
Government controlled corporation subject to the provisions
of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93)
promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was
also subject to the powers of the Control Committee created
in said executive order, among which is the power of
supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and
economy in the operations of the corporation and also the
power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly
budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors.
It can hardly be questioned that under these powers the
Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and
consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the
NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to
the petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an
item of expenditure in the corporation's budget. That the
Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the
resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor
General and the NAFCO auditor, the granting of the
allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's
salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and
was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial
condition of the corporation.
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null
and void, not only because it is based on a law that is
unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislature power
to executive, but also because it was promulgated beyond
the period of one year limited in said law.
The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation
of the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the

last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act

was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was
given a period of one year within which to promulgate his
executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated
on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule
the said executive order was promulgated within the period
given.
As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the
Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11
Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms
and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays
down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to
meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of
the free and independent government of the Philippines and
to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their
operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The
President had to carry the mandate. This he did by
promulgating the executive order in question which, tested
by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power.
It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not
compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner by
the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the
provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the
chairman of said board who is also to be general manager
shall not exceed P15,000 per anum. But regardless of
whether quarters allowance should be considered as
compensation or not, the resolution of the board of the
directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner
cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the
Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by
Executive Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's
contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a
proposition on which American authorities appear divided,
cannot be insisted on behalf of officers and employees

working for the Government of the Philippines and its

Instrumentalities, including, naturally, government-controlled
corporations. This is so because Executive Order No. 332
of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional
compensation to those working for the Government and its
Instrumentalities,
including
government-controlled
corporations, was in 1945 amended by Executive Order No.
77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition the payment
of quarters allowance "in favor of local government officials
and employees entitled to this under existing law." The
amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance
was meant to be included in the term "additional
compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not
have expressly excepted it from the prohibition. This being
so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just
mentioned, quarters allowance is considered additional
compensation and, therefore, prohibited.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed,
with costs.

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer,

filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had
been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this
new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and
that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor

and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power
to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the
RAC.

any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration

of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as
the public welfare may require which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare
may require is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the
first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may
require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes
hence, the proper interpretation is the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only
the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).

Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive
orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the
boundary of any municipality and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although

Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked

Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service

Commission, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)
FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged
with black market of electric meters and that its meters were
installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner
received a communication from General Auditing Office
(GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a
subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce
before PSC, during a conference scheduled for April 10,
1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash

such subpoena. The conference was postponed twice until

it was finally cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an order,
which after finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues
by 18%, lowered the present meter rates of petitioner.
Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted.

previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of

the due process clause, and hence, null and void.

ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE

PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.

RULING: Yes.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

In support to its special defense, respondent PSC maintains

that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or
rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised
without previous notice or hearing. Although the rule-making
power and even the power to fix rates when such are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout
the Philippines may partake of legislative character, such
is not the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order
exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it is
predicated upon the finding of fact, whether the petitioner is
making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital which
is denied by the petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to
cross-examine the maker of the said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the
conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other
words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed
a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO,

RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
AND
MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.

Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly

require notice and hearing.
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue
involved in the order complained of partakes the nature of
quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
(PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said
PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees,
their
co-principals,
accomplices
and
accessories during the previous administration and submit
their findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a
quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job
is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the

grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for
its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the
Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made
the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating
and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE: WHETHER
unconstitutional.

OR

NOT

the

said

E.O

is

RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is

violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality
of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected
by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former used the offices
and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Lacson-Magallanes, Co., Inc. v. Pano,

21 SCRA 895
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land
used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone
which was later declared as an agricultural zone.
Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes
Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the
same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos
request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his
petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC
averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of

Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He

also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is
an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC
asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be delegated to the
Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

assists the President. The rule which has thus gained

recognition is that under our constitutional setup the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director
of Lands, may issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be

delegated to the Executive Secretary.

The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego

of the President, shall remain valid until reversed,
disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case,
no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the
land to Pao cannot be reversed.

HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must

exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the
president may delegate certain powers to the Executive
Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate
powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to
perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact
that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which