Disini Jr vs.

Justice Secretary
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and
19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. It
held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom of expression by
prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications. It found Section 12 in violation of the right to
privacy because it lacked sufficient specificity and definiteness in
collecting real-time computer data. It struck down Section 19 of the
Act for giving the government the authority to restrict or block access
to computer data without any judicial warrant.
Facts
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the governments
platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate
sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the
right to freedom of expression and access to inforamtion.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a
temporary restraining order against the government to halt
enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.
Decision Overview
Justice Abad delivered the Courts opinion.
The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012 for the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace.

Several sections of the law define relevant cyber crimes and enable
the government to track down and penalize violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3),
12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial
electronic communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services unless the
recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the
communication is for service or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, or when the following conditions are
present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a
simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of
further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not
purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The
commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce
the recipients to read the message.
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications
amount to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to
interfere with the enjoyment of using online services and that they
enter the recipients domain without prior permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech,
which does not receive the same level of protection as other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,but is nonetheless
entitled to protection. It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting
unsolicited communications would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.

Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court

warrant to collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system. Traffic data under this Section includes the origin,
destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication, but
not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their
civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the
government. They also claimed that this provision violates the right to
privacy and protection from the governments intrusion into online
communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of
private communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of
whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a governments
compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have a
compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-time
traffic data.

names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the

recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section
12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the
existence of enough data may reveal the personal information of its
sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient
safeguard. The Court viewed the law as virtually limitless, enabling
law enforcement authorities to engage in fishing expedition,
choosing whatever specified communication they want.
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity
and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to a computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The
Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to freedom of
expression, as well as the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first

recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy,
defined as the right not to have private information disclosed, and the
right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining
whether a communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court
applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a
legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and (2)
whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively
reasonable in the society.

The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal

property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Also, the Philippines Constitution requires the government
to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal
property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19
precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it
unconstitutional.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable

expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted online.
However, it did not find the expectation as objectively reasonable
because traffic data sent through internet does not disclose the actual

This case expands freedom of expression by invalidating portions of

the Cybercrime Prevention Act that infringed upon the right to
freedom of expression and access to information. Particularly, the

Expands Expression

Supreme Court of the Philippines recognized unsolicited electronic

commercial communications as legitimate forms of expression.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence;

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Held:

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by
her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo

Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting
of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for
use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the

spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified

exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another

is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other.
And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Salcedo Ortanez vs. CA

presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of
justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to
rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on
jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the
appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special
civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it
exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari.

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner
and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of
evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondents
offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration,
prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to
assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private
respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not
inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be
admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in
evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any

wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly

overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not
available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The
proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and

accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the
headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of
the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of
words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations
made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who
provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man ,
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan,
which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in
view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation

or threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed
by the voice recording he had made.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in
Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent
show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of

private communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590
[1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of

the accused, constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to
be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be
sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be
sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must
also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the
scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no
intent to kill the latter.
HUMAN SECURITY ACT 2007 sec 7
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of
Communications. -The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (AntiWire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written
order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the
use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any
other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication,
message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words
between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients,
journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence
shall not be authorized.
Limitations on the Right to Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence (Sec. 3, Art. III)
The right to privacy of communication and correspondence is not
violated when the interference is made:

1. Upon lawful order of the court; or

2. When public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
A. Exclusionary Rule (Second paragraph of Section 3)
People v. Marti package bound for Switzerland The Bill of Rights
is not meant to be invoked against act of private individuals. It is
directed against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. The constitutional against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by a
private individual.

Ople vs. Torres

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System was
issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas
Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right
to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing
to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Oples concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the
power of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to
execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.

Pollo vs. David

Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous
letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional
Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a
memo directing the team to back up all the files in the computers
found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard
disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson
David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in
the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to
and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents,
were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases
in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and
accused the CSC Officials of fishing expedition when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the
formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the
petitioners answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner
and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner
was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which
then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the

CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a
motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his
constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his
personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative
of the issue raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held
that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his
right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right
under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a
person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154
(1968),thus recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.
OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically
declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights

merely because they work for the government instead of a private

employer. In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs
authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for workrelated reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable
expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither
probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law
enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos.
157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427,
(citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA
141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate
intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the
affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of
the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its
inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous LetterComplaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November
19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from
which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
Section 15
In Re-Petition for habeas corpus of
CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN, et. al. v. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,et
al.
GR 160792, August 25, 2005

A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into

custody the military personnel under their command who took part in
the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to
make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the
detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the
detainees are already charged of coup detat. Habeas corpus is
unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid
indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether
a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals
that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person.
If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It
is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): Marquez vs. Disierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez
to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch
manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the
Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A.
No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement
between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with

the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection
of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on
secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).
HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there
must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending case

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,

reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based
on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom

to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures
in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO.

L-82380; 29 APR 1988]

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie

production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987,
for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release,
the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by
the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script.

Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available

to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the
writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: chanrobles
virtual law library
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or chanrobles virtual law
library

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved

party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or chanrobles
virtual law library

Sec. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data

should contain:

Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional
Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which
has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. chanrobles
virtual law library

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
chanrobles virtual law library

The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data
files of government offices.
Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a
Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before
such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of
its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice
thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the
place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court
of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be
required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall
be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to
subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15)
days from the filing of the petition. chanrobles virtual law library

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data
or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order
enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court,
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on
its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under
the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days
from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any
officer or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the
petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date
of its issuance. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of
court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court,

justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary

actions. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court,
justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent,
the rules on substituted service shall apply.
Sec. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written
return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days
from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by
the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets,
privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of
information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the
nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security
and confidentiality of the data or information; and chanrobles virtual
law library
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

that the release of the data or information in question shall

compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or
information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or
privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings
and motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,
position paper and other pleadings; chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief
orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order.

Sec. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making
a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.

Sec. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return,
the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte,
granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless
the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in

chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense

Sec. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be

summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a

preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the

possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for

the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate
criminal, civil or administrative actions.

Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or
rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other
relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege
of the writ shall be denied.

Sec. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to

the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with
the criminal action.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any
lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge
within five (5) working days.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to

govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

Sec. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final
judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a
verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of
the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the
database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated,
rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the
respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced
and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the
parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
Sec. 18. Hearing on Officer-s Return. - The court shall set the return
for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.
chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law or both. chanrobles virtual law library
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of
notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and
amparo cases.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent
to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated
with the criminal action.

Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal

action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be
filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party
by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the
reliefs available under the writ of habeas data.
Sec. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
Sec. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this
Rule. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008,
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
chanrobles virtual law library
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
in the history of the country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of

public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have
lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013, SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA
HING, PETITIONERS, VS. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND
ALLAN CHOACHUY, RESPONDENTS.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained
Bill and Victoria, spouses, filed a Complaint for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against Alexander and Allan. According to them, they own the lot
adjacent to the lots owned by Aldo Development and Resources,
where Alex and Allan are stockholders. The corporation built an autoshop building on Lot 1900-C adjacent to the lot owned by Bill and
Victoria. In April, 2005, Aldo filed a case for injunction and damages
against Bill and Victoria claiming that they were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and the construction would destroy its building.
The court denied the application by Aldo for preliminary injunction for
failure to substantiate its allegations. To gather evidence against the
spouses, Aldo illegally set-up on the building of Aldo two video
surveillance camera facing petitioners party and through their
employees and without the consent of spouses took pictures of their
on-going construction; thus it violates their right to privacy. The
spouses prayed that Alexander and Allan be ordered to remove their
video-cameras and stopped from conducting illegal surveillance.
Answering, Alexander and Allan claimed that they did not install the
cameras, nor ordered their employees to take pictures of the spouses

construction; they also averred that they are mere stockholders of

Aldo;
The Regional Trial Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining
order and directed Alexander and Allan to remove their video cameras
and install them elsewhere where the spouses property will no longer
be viewed.
Alexander and Allan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which granted their petition.
Bill and Victoria therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court:
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws.
It is defined as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. It is
the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to
live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which
the public is not necessarily concerned. Simply put, the right to
privacy is the right to be let alone.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects
them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one,
not even the State, except in case of overriding social need and then
only under the stringent procedural safeguards, can disturb them in
the privacy of their homes.
xxx
Our Code specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers
residence. This does not mean, however, that only the residence is
entitled to privacy, because the law covers also similar acts. A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter
may come in. x x x[ (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend
to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence,
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized
by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code only to residences.

xxx
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we
enunciated that the reasonableness of a persons expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an
individuals reasonable expectation of privacy. Hence, the
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation
of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should
these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which
is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for [ones] personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and [non]-interference demands respect.
Vivares vs. ST. Theresa College
Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Right to Privacy
Online Privacy (Social Media)
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Writ of Habeas Data
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas
College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their

teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and
downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and
banned them from marching in their graduation ceremonies
scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining
order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the
students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other
mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at
Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used
and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the
court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data
be declared illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to
privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a

users posts on his wall (profile page):

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is
not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and

(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is

not an entity engaged in the business of gathering, collecting, or
storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied
only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances.
Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some

privacy, then he must choose any setting other than Public. If it is
true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so
much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how
come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was
not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and
showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it
appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook
hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures
of them scantily clad.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like
Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy
tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected
and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned
made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their
post (status) on Facebook were published as Public.

(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which
the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it
appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture
to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a
legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the
standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed

to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children
there).

d. freedom of expression, press and right to peacefully assemble

Freedom from censorship and content neutral regulation

Read full text

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this
case:
1. United States v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph
on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.
2. United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages
sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded
from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): The law has
to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but
also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x
x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.
This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to customize their
privacy settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its
policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a users
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.

March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646
and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution
provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful
election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any
election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections assails the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars
and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is

violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section

11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit
their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it
fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15
(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that decals
and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in
designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void
on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed
by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or
the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646)
and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in
this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals
or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a
greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a liberty
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must
be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in
this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a

poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is
not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on
cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the
citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the
financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile
places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.
OSMENA VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized
elections violates the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the
holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second
Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3
thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates
Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in
effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be
elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods
for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the

provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on

Elections of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems
mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local
elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992,
are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the
local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the
process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise
ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not
feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in
the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the
denial of this petition arguing that the question is political in nature
and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what
they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being
no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen
contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative
power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed
by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take
cognizance of the instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056.
Hence, contrary to SolGens contention, the issue in this case is
justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were political
in nature, it would still come within the Courts power considering the
expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Regarding the challenge to the petitioners standing, the Supreme
Court held that even if the petitioners have no legal standing, the Court
has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the
transcendental importance of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII,
Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the
other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by
mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of
synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under
the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under
Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over
beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus
Juris Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature to
extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until
their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in
effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the
Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there
is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period,
even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of
1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local
officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local
election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under
RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and
seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not
three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the
Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a
different campaign period, as follows

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty

(130) days before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the
election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and
local elective provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45)
days before the day of the elections.
Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 |
February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello

Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone
conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under
the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to
arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go
after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile,
respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.

respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of contentbased prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the AntiWiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these
acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the antiwiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and
the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements
were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in
the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
SWS vs Comelec

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the AntiWiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of

Facts:

Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election

survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media
the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners
argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER

OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON,
Respondents.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and
exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media,
valid and constitutional?

G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression
is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.
The O'Brien test is thus: The law in question must. be within the
constitutional power of the government to enact. further an important
or substantial government interest. That interest must be unrelated to
the suppression of speech (or "content neutral", as phrased in later
cases)
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST
REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins

within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet
(10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral

within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message

IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of
the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience
Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a
check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against
it form Team Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither

sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that
the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the

tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Courts power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of
expression.

Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or

content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can
be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial

review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination

of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon

political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there

are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions
of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to

the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that
a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of

administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ
of government before a court may come into the picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the

message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially
during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the

election offense against petitioners is already an actionable

infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation
is enough to curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative

remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to

support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political

consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is

election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates
who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it,
holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was
not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate,
political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are

not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of

invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be

prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a

contribution to public deliberation about some issue, fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation. On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from
the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions

based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is contentbased. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents

failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial
state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen
by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners.
Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective

confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that

regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that
it encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create

without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.

Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

It has a secular legislative purpose;

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by

petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face
of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not

hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
persons or institutions religion.

It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK VS.

ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security
Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the AntiTerrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs
Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar Calderon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take

religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs

HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed

REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie against respondents who

do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition
for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question,
it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action,
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being

suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to
"close security surveillance by state security forces," their members
followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies
of the State. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have
yet to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and
the implementation of RA 9372.
REMEDIAL LAW- Requisites of Judicial Notice
Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to
take judicial notice of respondent's alleged action of tagging them as
militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army
(NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be oneof common and general
knowledge; (2) it must bewell and authoritatively settledand not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of

judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has
been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,belies any claim
of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R.
No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the
CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of
specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.
The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP
and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding,
there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the
CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely
without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription
under RA 9372.
REMEDIAL LAW- A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,whereas
citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that
generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public
right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key.
POLITICAL LAW- judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and
supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations,
the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official
aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed
only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad
the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms
like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby

invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.
Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only
extant facts affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.

inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of

the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing
of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual
charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future
effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
Petitions Dismissed

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring

opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a
facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may
only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against
them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful
demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand."
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.

Requisites of Privileged Communication:

Atty.-client relationship (or a kind of consultancy relationship
with a prospective client
Communication made by client to lawyer in the course of
lawyers professional employment
Communication is intended to be confidential (see Rule 130,
Sec. 21(b), Rules of Court)
When communication is not privileged:
after pleading has been filed
communication intended by the client to be sent to a third
person through his counsel (it loses its confidential character as
soon as it reaches the hands of third person)
Even if the communication is unprivileged, the rule of ethics
prohibits him from voluntarily revealing or using to his benefit
or to that of a third person, to the disadvantage of the client, the
said communication unless the client consents thereto.
This is applicable to students under the Student Practice Law
Program

ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
ART. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:

public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are

privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of their functions.
DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These
requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element
of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he
was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public
would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom

of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the

declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members
and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be
funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with
public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and
even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that
freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected
with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical
standards in the exercise thereof.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A privileged communication may be either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication those which are not

actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is
found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any Committee thereof.
3. Qualifiedly privileged communications those containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have

been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this

genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true
report without any comments or remarks."
Rodolfo R. Vasquez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118971
September 15, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore
Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area
went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager
Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay
Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with
Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were
met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound
concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the
following exerpts of the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang
Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed allegations by
Vasquez that (1) nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo
upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa; (2) ang mga lupa ay
ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa
mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din
umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at
maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel
against petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast aspersions
on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner
guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue:

Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times versus
Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions for criminal libel.
Held:
The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to
be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability
can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges
made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they
were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable
ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art.
361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel was used as a form of harassment:
Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making
the charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant
filed this case to harass petitioner.
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the
publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the
editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The
charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his
clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the
newspaper.