RULE 130

1. Object/Real Evidence
People v Mallilin
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else
can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not
by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by
obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of
Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the
residence of petitioner
Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his
mother, Norma--allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and
five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team,
testified on the circumstances surrounding the search
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the
examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness
to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the
two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty
sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same
substance.
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search
and seizure conducted by the police operatives.

RTC: Guily
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: Admissibility of the real evidence presented (sachets)
HELD: In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that
arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not
suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt.
An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
identifiable.
Graham v State - a substance later analyzed as heroin--was handled by
two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in
court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it
was in their possession-- was excluded from the prosecution evidence,
It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it
came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to
the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.
Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated
sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to
whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical
analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to
establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject
items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same
objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of
establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer
not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient
explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty

as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the

possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its
own detriment.
People v Pagaduan
After having received information that the appellant was selling illegal
drugs in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de Vera called, on his cellular
phone, PO3 Peter Almarez and SPO1 Domingo Balido - who were both
in Santiago City - and informed them of a planned buy-bust operation.
PO3 Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his initials.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police
Station for investigation.
Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination
Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the
letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic
sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2
Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the
Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an
examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for
the presence of shabu
RTC: Convicted appellant
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: Regularity in the chain of custody in re admissibility of evidence
obtained
HELD: Acquitted
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Black's Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the
narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the custody of
the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody
until the moment in which it is offered in evidence, and such
evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence.

In Malillin v. People, the Court explained that the chain of custody rule
requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain.
In the present case, the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the
chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was
the very same specimen seized from the appellant.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heatsealed plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on
cross- examination that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet
"after apprehending" the appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted
the totality of the prosecution's evidence on the marking of the seized
evidence. PO3 Almarez's testimony, however, lacked specifics on how
he marked the sachet and who witnessed the marking. In People v.
Sanchez, we ruled that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. In the present case, nothing in the records gives us an
insight on the manner and circumstances that attended the marking of
the confiscated sachet. Whether the marking had been done in the
presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that
merely mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the
appellant's apprehension.
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the
apprehending team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the
appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after his arrest.
However, he failed to identify the person who had control and
possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation to the
police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot presume
that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet - to
the exclusion of others - during its transfer from the place of arrest and
confiscation to the police station. The prosecution likewise failed to
present evidence pertaining to the identity of the duty desk officer who

received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the buy-bust team.
This is particularly significant since the seized specimen was turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not,
therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the seized items during
this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show
that the request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet
was prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he
was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from the buybust team.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show
that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP
Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by
PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the
person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for
transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier
discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu,
as well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized items
for two days, had not been established.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the
chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs
confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were
brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and
eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of
concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the
crime - the corpus delicti - has not been adequately proven. In effect,
the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating reasonable doubt on the appellant's criminal liability.
Salas v Matusalem
Annabelle
Matusalem
(respondent)
filed
a
complaint
for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional
Trial Court
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian
Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already
56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years
old, making her believe that he is a widower.

Petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the
mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified.
Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present evidence
and the case was considered submitted for decision based on
respondents evidence.
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by
petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and
financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of
respondents baby, respondents attempted suicide through sleeping
pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her
complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioners
wife at the headquarters.
RTC: In favor of respondent
CA: Affirmed
ISSUES:
1. The Honorable Court Of Appeals erred in pronouncing that petitioner
was afforded the full measure of his right to due process of law and in
upholding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it decided the instant
case without affording petitioner the right to introduce evidence in his
defense.
2. The Honorable Court Of Appeals erred in holding that the filiation of
Christian Paulo was duly established pursuant to Article 175 in relation
to Article 172 of the Family Code and existing jurisprudence and
therefore entitled to support from the petitioner.
HELD:
I
With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14,
1997, the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared
their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and

accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision.

The trial court thus ordered that the case be submitted for decision
stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner and
his counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence.
Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present
evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial courts duty
to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed on the part of one party.
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial
courts denial of the motion for postponement filed by petitioners
counsel, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his day in
court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party is
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of ones defense.
II
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo
Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is
not signed by him.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.
Baptismal Certificate - they are not necessarily competent evidence of
the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged
father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
As to the handwritten notes, they contained no statement of admission
by petitioner that he is the father of said child.
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondents evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of
the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while

respondent lived in Murillos apartment and his regular visits to her at

the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate
the overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial presented
in Ilano.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of
respondents evidence failed to establish Christian Paulos filiation to
petitioner.
People v Rosauro
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A.
No. 9165: the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to
possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly, willfully and
feloniously, did then and there, sell and convey to a third person, who
acted as a decoy in a buy bust operation, one (1) sachet of shabu,
containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which when examined gave
POSITIVE result to test for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
Accused-appellant claims that he was merely a victim of instigation
RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed, saying that the apprehending team was able to preserve
the integrity of the subject drug and that the prosecution was able to
present the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug.
HELD: The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant
to be the result of a legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find
nothing in the records as to warrant a contrary finding.
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded
as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing
accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security
reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the
retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the
confidentiality of the informants identity is protected in deference to
his invaluable services to law enforcement.
In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by

the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAIDSOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3
Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the place of that of the
confidential informant.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of
custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.
Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article
21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized from him inadmissible.
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the
prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in
the presence of the enumerated persons.
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential
informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the
sachet and marked it Exhibit A. Upon reaching the police station,
SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request
for laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the
marked money and accused-appellant were then brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2
Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Office, who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open
court as the same item seized from accused-appellant.
People v Calantiao
Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165; accused, without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) bricks of dried marijuana
fruiting tops with a total weight of 997.9 grams, knowing the same to
be a dangerous drug.
FACTS:

A certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for

police assistance regarding a shooting incident.
He had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab
The passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused
Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could
not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a
police station nearby where he reported the incident.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said
complaint
While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted
therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran
away.
PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing
two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to
SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police
Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks
of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, NM.
Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the
same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by
PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks of
marijuana confiscated from the accused.

RTC: Guilty.
RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it
was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in
flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.
CA: Affirmed.
The Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of
the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a
lawful arrest.
ISSUE: Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found
in his possession, as evidence against him on the grounds of either it
was discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was

broken.
HELD: This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized
drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody
because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the
seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the
time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.
2. Documentary Evidence
Spouses Silos v PNB
Spouses Eduardo and Lydia Silos (petitioners) have been in business
for about two decades of operating a department store and buying and
selling of ready- to-wear apparel.
To secure a one-year revolving credit line of P150,000.00 obtained from
PNB, petitioners constituted in August 1987 a Real Estate Mortgage
over a 370- square meter lot in Kalibo, Aklan
In addition, petitioners issued eight Promissory Notes and signed a
Credit Agreement.
The eight Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a stipulation
granting PNB the right to increase or reduce interest rates within the
limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board.
An Amendment to Credit Agreement was executed. Under this
Amendment to Credit Agreement, petitioners issued in favor of PNB the
following 18 Promissory Notes, which petitioners settled except the
last
Respondent regularly renewed the line from 1990 up to 1997, and
petitioners made good on the promissory notes, religiously paying the

interests without objection or fail. But in 1997, petitioners faltered

when the interest rates soared due to the Asian financial crisis
became past due, and despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to
make good on the note.
Despite demand, petitioners failed to pay the foregoing amount. Thus,
PNB foreclosed on the mortgage.
Petitioners filed Civil Case No. 5975, seeking annulment of the
foreclosure sale and an accounting of the PNB credit.
Petitioner Lydia Silos (Lydia) testified that the Credit Agreement, the
Amendment to Credit Agreement, Real Estate Mortgage and the
Supplement thereto were all prepared by respondent PNB and were
presented to her and her husband Eduardo only for signature; that she
was told by PNB that the latter alone would determine the interest
rate; that as to the Amendment to Credit Agreement, she was told that
PNB would fill up the interest rate portion thereof;
For his part, PNB Kalibo Branch Manager Diosdado Aspa, Jr. (Aspa), the
sole witness for respondent, stated on cross-examination that as a
practice, the determination of the prime rates of interest was the
responsibility solely of PNBs Treasury Department which is based in
Manila
RTC: Dismissed
CA: Affirmed.
The CA noted that, based on receipts presented by petitioners during
trial, the latter dutifully paid a total of P3,027,324.60 in interest for the
period August 7, 1991 to August 6, 1997, over and above the P2.5
million principal obligation. And this is exclusive of payments for
insurance premiums, documentary stamp taxes, and penalty. All the
while, petitioners did not complain nor object to the imposition of
interest; they in fact paid the same religiously and without fail for
seven years. The appellate court ruled that petitioners are thus
estopped from questioning the same.
PNBs contention: Documentary evidence prevails over testimonial
evidence; Lydia Silos testimony in this regard is self-serving,
unsupported and uncorroborated, and for being the lone evidence on

this issue. The fact remains that these documents are in proper form,
presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by Silos who
is an experienced business person that she signed questionable loan
documents whose provisions for interest rates were left blank, and yet
she continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of
years.
HELD: Petition granted
Thus said, respondents arguments relative to the credit documents
that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence; that
the credit documents are in proper form, presumed regular, and
endure, against arbitrary claims by petitioners, experienced business
persons that they are, they signed questionable loan documents whose
provisions for interest rates were left blank, and yet they continued to
pay the interests without protest for a number of years deserve no
consideration.
With regard to interest, the Court finds that since the escalation clause
is annulled, the principal amount of the loan is subject to the original or
stipulated rate of interest, and upon maturity, the amount due shall be
subject to legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum. This is the
uniform ruling adopted in previous cases, including those cited here.
Thus, the parties original agreement stipulated the payment of 19.5%
interest; however, this rate was intended to apply only to the first
promissory note which expired on November 21, 1989 and was paid by
petitioners; it was not intended to apply to the whole duration of the
loan. Subsequent higher interest rates have been declared illegal; but
because only the rates are found to be improper, the obligation to pay
interest subsists, the same to be fixed at the legal rate of 12% per
annum.
2a. Best Evidence Rule
MCMP Construction Corp. v Monark
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from
Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000,
the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site
of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by

invoices as well as Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667

and 5706, received and signed by representatives of MCMP,
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices,
MCMP failed to pay the rental fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP
to pay the amount due, partial payments were mad
Further demands went unheeded.
Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC
MCMP further averred that it had an agreement with Monark that it
would not be charged for the whole time that the leased equipment
was in its possession but rather only for the actual time that the
equipment was used although still on the project site. MCMP, however,
admitted that this agreement was not contained in the Contract.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo
Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino testified
that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one retained by
Monark, while the other was given to MCMP.
He further testified that Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent
efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented
a photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file.
MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to
search for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of
the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce
the same.
RTC: In favor of Monark
CA: Affirmed in toto
MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the appellate court
should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule.
MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino,
Monark did not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as
evidenced by the fact that:

1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented;

2) the alleged loss was not even reported to management or the
police; and
3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the document for the
purposes of the instant case.
HELD: Dismissed
The Best Evidence Rule:
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant
rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents
of a lost document:
"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of

witnesses in the order stated. (4a)

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody
or control. If the document is in the custody or under the
control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence
may be presented as in the case of its loss."
(Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v Lagman) Before a party is
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
non-production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which
the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are
present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has
been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to
no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted.
Loon v Power Master, Inc.
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed
and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro
Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims against Power Master, Inc.
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid
minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave,
and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents
made them sign blank payroll sheets.

They included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed

that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the
filing of their original complaint.
LABOR ARBITER: In favor of petitioners (employees)
The Proceedings before the NLRC
The petitioners disputed the LAs denial of their claim for backwages,
overtime, holiday and premium pays. Meanwhile, the respondents
questioned the LAs ruling on the ground that the LA did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons.
The respondents insisted that they were not personally served with
summons and other processes. They also claimed that they paid the
petitioners minimum wages, service incentive leave and thirteenth
month pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied and
computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on
appeal.
The respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal.
They attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of
employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the
supplemental appeal.
They also attached documentary evidence showing that the
petitioners were dismissed for cause and had been accorded
due process.
They reiterated that the genuine payrolls bore their signatures, unlike
the respondents photocopies of the payrolls. They also maintained
that their signatures in the respondents documents (which showed
their receipt of thirteenth month pay) had been forged.
NLRC: Partially ruled in favor of respondents
However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that they
had been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents
did not actually receive the LAs processes.
CA: Affirmed in toto

ISSUE: Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces

of evidence for the first time on appeal;
HELD:
B. The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought
to be proven
Why the respondents photocopied and computerized copies of
documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity
is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners claim that
the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While
we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to
photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of
forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the
respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the
petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to
examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing
the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents failure to present the originals raises the presumption
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the
employees. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the
employers cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the employees evidence.
Dimaguila v Monteiro
Respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro filed their Complaint for
Partition and Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners.
The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners and prayed
for the partition of a residential house
Covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored their
claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro
Dimaguila
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered

that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio Buenaseda,

had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and
Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and
instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject
property occupied by the Dimaguilas
In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the
Dimaguilas admission in their original answer that the subject
property had already been partitioned
During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of
Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who testified that Perfecto was his grandfather
and that at the time of Perfectos death, he had two properties, one of
which was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his
children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was survived by his
children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their
rights over the subject property to Sonia.
Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedros son, Francisco, and
was asked if she was interested in purchasing Pedros 1/3 share of the
southern portion of the Bahay na Bato, and that he showed her a deed
of extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the property to prove that
the property had already been partitioned between the two brothers.
Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer
hired by Spouses Monteiro who subdivided the lot into two and came
up with a survey plan.
RTC: RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the
Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1/3 portion of the
southern-half of the property
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided
the property into two share and share alike, evidence aliunde was
appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the property
into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such
partition was observed and honored by their heirs.
The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the

Dimaguilas themselves in their original answer. It gave no credence to

the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an error of their former
counsel and that she was unaware of the contents of their original
answer.
CA: Affirmed
The evidence aliunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the
cadastral map and the list of claimants, were timely objected to during
the trial as hearsay and a violation of the best evidence rule.
The petitioners reiterate that the Bilihan should not have been
admitted into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax
HELD: To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses
presented the following:
(1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed
by and between the brothers Perfecto and Vitaliano;
(2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484, dated August 6, 1976,
showing that the subject property had been divided into southern and
northern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and
(3) the Municipal Assessors records showing that the said lots were
respectively claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.
It, thus, appears that the subject property had already been partitioned
into definite portions more than 20 years prior to the original complaint
for partition filed
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were
presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk
III of the Municipal Assessors Office, a repository of such documents.
The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a
record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land
involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants,
as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the
exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the

rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this
rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
officials attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The documents trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the
department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of
cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the
corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as
they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they
are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they
presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent
spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the petitioners, the
respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence that there
had indeed been a partition of the subject property.
b. Parole Evidence
Ortanez v CA
Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land
in Quezon City through two deeds of absolute sale.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned
lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. The latter demanded
from the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents,
however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the
possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of
the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance
before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions, which
were never reflected in the deeds of sale

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally

testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although
such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale.
RTC: Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the
introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence
rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually
dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
CA: Affirmed the court a quo.
ISSUE: Issue on the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the
alleged oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds
of sale are silent on such conditions.
HELD: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First,
private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming
from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence.
Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in
this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only
repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must
have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds
of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to
any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.
The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a
contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake."
No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms

thereof.
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is
admissible, it should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other evidence
appears from the record to sustain the existence of the alleged
conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was
presented to testify on such conditions.
Lapu-Lapu Foundation v CA
Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the copetitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from the
respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory
notes in the amounts of P100,000 each.
As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61
and despite demands made on them by the respondent Bank, the
petitioners failed to pay the same.
The petitioner Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the
respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by petitioner
Tan in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the
strength of the personal information he furnished the respondent Bank.
For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from
the respondent Bank in his personal capacity. The parties, however,
agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of petitioner
Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation,
a real estate firm.
According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee required
him to affix two signatures on every promissory note, assuring him that
the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their
agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan
documents to the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a manner
not in accord with their agreement, such that the petitioner Foundation
was included as party thereto.
RTC: In favor of plaintiff
CA: Affirmed

The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the loans
were his personal loans as the promissory notes evidencing them
showed upon their faces that these were obligations of the petitioner
Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan himself in his official and
personal character. Applying the parol evidence rule, the CA likewise
rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten
agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay
the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu
Industries Corp.
HELD: While admitting that the loans were his personal obligation,
petitioner Tan avers that he had an unwritten agreement with the
respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year
basis and paid from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu
Industries Corp.

Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to

vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No
such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.
Leoveras v Valdez
Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners three- fourths (34) and one-fourth (14) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a
parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan
Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths (34) share to Benigna Llamas. The
sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna
died in 1944, she willed her three-fourths (34) share equally to her
sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and Josefa
each owned one-half (12) of Benigna's three-fourths (34) share.
Alejandra's heirs sold their predecessor's one-half (12) share (roughly

equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the respondent, as evidenced

by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Also on June 14, 1969, Josefa sold her own one-half (12) share (subject
property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by
another Deed of Absolute Sale.
The petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim over the subject property. The parties took possession of their
respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their
name for taxation purposes.
The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan
on the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to
him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned
that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer
certificates of title
The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the
1,004-square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No.
195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020
square meters identified in the parties' Agreement.
The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner's titles by
contesting the authenticity of the petitioner's documents. Particularly,
the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benigna's
death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have
executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the
petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The
respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties
her three-fourths (34) share in 1969 because she had already sold her
share to Benigna in 1932.
RTC: dismissed the complaint.
CA: reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna
Deed and the Affidavit.
HELD: We rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of
the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties' Affidavit of

Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties' Agreement, which cover the
subject property.
The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity
of these documents, particularly the Agreement. However, he claims
that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the
parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the
parties' true intention.
The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the parol
evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to
writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms
agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other
than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not
found in the writing is understood to have been waived and
abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court
allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to
the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading,
as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by
reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the
alleged true intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which
allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement
and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his
titles.
In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging
admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated, thereby completely
bolstering the respondent's cause of action for reconveyance of the
disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title.
Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the
mistake in the earlier Agreement) that supports the petitioner's claim
that the partition of the subject property is based on the parties' actual
possession.

c. Electronic Evidence
Heirs of Sabanpan v Comorposa
A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
[petitioners] against [respondents]
The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual
possessor. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and
grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza
was terminated from his job. The termination of his employment
caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos
Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his
problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo
allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez.
Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a
portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was
witnessed by several people.
Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez' property
without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his
possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and
are occupying the premises through petitioners' tolerance.
A formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that
they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises.
MTC: In favor of petitioners
RTC: Reversed
CA: Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of
respondents as claimants and possessors.
The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR's community
environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when

the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and
was not yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have
suffiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in
sustaining the Regional Trial Court's ruling giving weight to the CENR
Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter
raised for the first time on appeal?
Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a
sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere
facsimile.
In Garvida, the Court held:
"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission
and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original
copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone
of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x"
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at
best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as
there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a
facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile
referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The
one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as
a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in
banking, financial, and business transactions.
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the
admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the

trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to
cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no
full-blown trial is held.

Torres v PAGCOR
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit
Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila
Respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly
conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The
CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by
adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or
adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR
CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for
such
CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
The CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for
dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and
regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty
imposable is dismissal.
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio
Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to
petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty
Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its
Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
backwages and other benefits.
CSC: Denied petitioners appeal
In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was whether
petitioner's appeal had already prescribed which the former answered
in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he
sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the

period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the

Civil Service.
Petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile
transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint and not
only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its
Comment.
CA: Dismissed.
The CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found
insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's claim that he had sent
through a facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration
That assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was indeed sent
through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is
inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000
ISSUE: The threshold issue for resolution is whether the CA erred when
it affirmed the CSC's dismissal of the appeal for being filed beyond the
reglementary period.
HELD: Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on
August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been
submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August
19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his
motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt
of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by
certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter
reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile
transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal.
As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only
in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales

Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic
documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We
said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a
facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It
is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. (Italics ours.)
We, therefore, found no reversible error committed by the CA when it
affirmed the CSC in dismissing petitioner's appeal.
Ang v Republic
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence
against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of
a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud
(Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in
Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off"
sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards
that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had
gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and
tried to convince her to elope with him,
Irish rejected the proposal.
Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of
a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on
the figure

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from
Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he
sent through the Internet.
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and
computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to
lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body
of another woman in another picture.
In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied
from the picture of Irish
RTC: Ruled in favor of Irish
CA: Denied Rustans MR
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in the case.
HELD: Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items
were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented
against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the
prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM
cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest.
The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for
the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted
owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in
Irish's testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious
text messages that the sender's cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to
Irish.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under

Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasijudicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
People v Enojas
City Prosecutor of Las Pias charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit
(Enojas) with murder
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30
in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan
(PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM
Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop
The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified
as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having
entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them,
they asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile
car for further questioning.
A shootout ensued in a robbery incident
On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the
taxi driver they had with them had fled.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved
in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found
a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred
instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming
messages.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the
messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as Enojas,
communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an

entrapment operation
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed
HELD: Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution
presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the
accused.
The text messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged
PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to Kua
Justin as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a
hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by
Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the
wounding of Kua Justin, one of the gunmen, and his subsequent
death.
The context of the messages showed that the accused were members
of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was
a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3
Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient
of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.
The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by
accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.

3. Testimonial Evidence

Disqualifications
Marcos v Heirs of Andres Navarro
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in
1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind several parcels of land
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos,
herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their
only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents
herein.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are
claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based
their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19,
1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant
Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the
affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found
that Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard
signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness.
RTC: RTC granted respondents motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as
a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would
be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged
handwriting of Andres, Sr.
CA: dismissed their petition on the ground that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarezs disqualification
as a witness.
HELD: We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
in the Rules of Court.

In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration

of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive
and make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since
she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false,
but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and
false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani.
However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are often
offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents. More important, analysis of
the questioned signature in the deed of donation executed by the late
Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an
expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the
opinion of an expert witness. The value of PO2 Alvarezs expert opinion
cannot be determined if PO2 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on
the handwriting examination she conducted.
Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
People v Golimlim
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate.
When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996
to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and

custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita Guban and her husband

Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant,
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the
situation, appellant raped her.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her.
Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
Lorna immediately repaired to appellants home in Bical, and brought
Evelyn with her to Manila.
Examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant
Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it
is not true [b]ecause her mind is not normal
RTC: Guilty
ISSUE: The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to
the contradictory and implausible testimony of Evelyn Canchela, a
mental retardate
HELD: In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to
warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to
the assessment of Evelyns testimony.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness
nor render her testimony bereft of truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making

known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and of relating them truthfully.
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified
from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her
credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no
matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or
her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
Marital Disqualification
Alvarez v Ramirez
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson
The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to
the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband.
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court on marital disqualification.
RTC: issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from
further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.
CA: Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
ISSUE: whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband

HELD: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. - During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants
or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
I.

There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

II.

If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent

danger of perjury;

III.

The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

IV.

Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of

punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions: For instance,
where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is
no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may
be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility
fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to
the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in
a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the
other.
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sisterin-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in
fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien

to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the

disqualification primarily seeks to protect.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the
commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his
wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost
six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts
presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between
petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to
protect.
People v Castaeda
On the basis of the complaint [1] of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto,
herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the
crime of Falsification of Public Document
At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness
stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness
The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that
the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a
"criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."
RTC: respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria
Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband
ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F.
Manaloto - who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M.
Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter
gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to
their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not - may
be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband
against his wife, and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
HELD: We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to
the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime
committed by the accused- husband against the witness-wife.
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence

which gave rise to the offense charged.

To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion
which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant
case.
And it is undeniable that the criminal act complained of had the effect
of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the
fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused- husband have become so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed
Thus, there is no reason to apply the marital disqualification rule.
For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "(t)o espouse the
contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband
committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure,
seeking shelter in the anti- marital privilege as a license to injure and
prejudice her in secret - all with unabashed and complete impunity."
Death or Insanity (Dead Mans Statute)
Razon v CA
Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon be
ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings
of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for
an order to restrain the defendants from disposing of the said shares of
stock,
Defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of
stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by
defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement
between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were
actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon.
The evidence of the plaintiff shows that he is the administrator of the
intestate estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian

Stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant

corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and
after him, the plaintiff-appellant, were elected as directors
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to
April 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T.
Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any
action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon
instruction of the late Chuidian on April 23, 1966 was personally
delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary of
Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was himself an associate of the
Chuidian Law Office
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stock under Stock Certificate No. 003 were
delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter
who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the
defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant
Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have
possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other
nominal incorporators/stockholders
Petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its
alleged mis-application of the dead man's statute rule under Section
20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's
statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private
respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony
regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested
in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same
"SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason interest or relationship - The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are
interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound

mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased

person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person
or before such person became of unsound mind."
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of
an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is
that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed
in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased
Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case
was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late
Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within
the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the
estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never
objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature
of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's
testimony was subject to cross- examination by the private
respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony
is within the prohibition of Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
Sunga-Chan v Chua
Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against
Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga
(hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the
deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding Up of
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment

Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a

partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent
and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their
partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite),
under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship.
While Jacinto furnished respondent with the merchandise inventories,
balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989,
respondent however suspected that the amount indicated in these
documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and
Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.
Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife,
petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took
over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of
Shellite without respondents consent.
Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for
accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net
shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner
Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to
her own use and advantage its properties.
RTC: Ruled for respondent
CA: Dismissed
CONTENTION: Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between
respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence
of any written document to show such partnership between respondent
and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from
hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to
prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Mans Statute or
Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
that provides:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
party.-- Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or

other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of

unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
ISSUE: testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should
not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased
person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
Whether or not the Dead Mans Statute applies to this case so as to
render inadmissible respondents testimony and that of his witness,
Josephine.
HELD: A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where
immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in which
case a public instrument shall be necessary. Hence, based on the
intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained
from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may
arise.
The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to
bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
V.

The action is against an executor or administrator or other

representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;

VI.

The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the

estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;

VII.

His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to

this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in
their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case
from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the
rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of
the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action
not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives
of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans
Statute for the simple reason that she is not a party or assignor of a
party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to
establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and
Jacinto.
Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter
being the party plaintiff.
Bordalba v CA
The instant controversy stemmed from the subject lot is part of a
parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in
Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno
Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial
partition, written in the Spanish language was executed and disposing,
inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:
1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased
spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and the father of private
respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme;
and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are
private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen JaymeDaclan;

2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of

petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and
3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor
Jaymes house, which his family occupied since 1945.
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered
was originally a part of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses
Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said
land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition.
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their
opposition contending that said application included the 1/3 portion
inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition.
Petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No.
(VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776
be declared void and ordered cancelled.
RTC: fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent,
declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
CA: affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
CONTENTION: Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the
witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring
prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the
trial court, as the same violated the dead mans statute.
HELD: The contentions are without merit
As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute, suffice it to state
that said rule finds no application in the present case. The deadmans
statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through
personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made
by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their

witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with thedeceased, the questioned testimonies were
properly admitted by the trial court.
Privileged Communication
Chan v Chan
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan

Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family
and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical
records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by
a motion to be allowed to submit in evidence the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege.
RTC: sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes motion.
CA: denied Josielenes petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left with no
assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to
their physicians would be kept confidential.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court
correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician- patient communication.
HELD: SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:

xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined
as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means
that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a
patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients
consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation.
This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access
to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that
ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician
could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that
had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to
clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to
begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are
produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object,
not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case
are not privileged since it is the testimonial evidence of the physician
that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states
that the physician cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined regarding their professional conversation.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital recordsthe results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
him would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without
the patients consent.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to

testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,

without the latters prior consent.
Lacurom v Jacoba
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R.
Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against
defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but
Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and
explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001
motion.
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the
Jacoba- Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit
on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering
unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance
Against Velasco-Jacoba's statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked
the marital privilege rule in evidence.
HELD: By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect
certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was
not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the
motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of
paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001
motion only because of her husband's request but she did not know its
contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each other's
pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses.
According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other
that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost
count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other."
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not
appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of
Velasco-Jacoba's statement pointing to him as the author of the

motion.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by
failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any
conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies
to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001
motion.
Samala v Valencia
Before us is a complaint dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala
(complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties;
Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted
as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga
Respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of
Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
against Alba, respondent's former client
SC: Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act
as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present
or former client.
This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of
trust and confidence.
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded
on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the
attorneys duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to
maintain inviolate the clients confidence as well as from the injunction
forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged
communications of his client.

In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has
long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the
proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the
complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client
relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client
whose interest is adverse to his former client.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship
between him and Alba has long been severed without observing
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent
of his client is required.
Almonte v Vasquez
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the
subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman,
requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief
accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents
relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence,
such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and
to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB
The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed.
He, therefore, asked for authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit
their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as
a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the ElIB's Accounting Division
ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services
Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for
the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."
Rather it concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain
evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis
the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL

SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS
VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988"
ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE REACH OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to
personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea
that such documents are classified.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that
"knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its
operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole
of its being" and this could "destroy the EllB."
HELD: At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic
and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof,
the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge
before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case,
that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.
Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect
military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general
public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have
declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the
President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement
of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets

will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the

personnel of the EIIB.
It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable
records" be kept justifying the confidential or privileged character of
the information relating to informers. There are no such reasonable
records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be
confidential.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that
several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the
allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation.
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality
of petitioners.
Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds
for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no
reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by
respondent Ombudsman.
Admissions
Constantino v Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of
an estate which needed to be proportionally subdivided among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and
respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is an
unregistered parcel of land
Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children
nullification of a document denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman
simulated, fabricated and fictitious document denominated as
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman, wherein the petitioners
misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of Tax Declaration

No. 9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr., including
the petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent heirs of
Pedro Jr. would no longer share and participate in the settlement and
partition of the remaining lot covered by the Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman.
Pre-trial conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be
litigated.
RTC: In favor of respondents
CA: Ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968
they executed covering the 192 sq m lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr.,
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr.,
did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto themselves to the exclusion of
all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the document
entitled Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968
pertains to a different property and is valid absent any evidence to the
contrary. Hence, it is erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties
in pari delicto.
ISSUE: erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions
during the pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine
of in pari delicto was based.
HELD: We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the
signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor common to
them and another set of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves
portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds came into being out
of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their coheirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in
reality, an assignment of specific portions of the estate of Pedro Sr.,
without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs
intended to exclude the other heirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions

made no less by the respondents during the pre-trial conference where

they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534
consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr.
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents
interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was transferred to
respondents mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre- trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of
judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial
order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby,
defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In
Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., this Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who
made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may
not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the
consequences of the disadvantage.
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial
admissions for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the
course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in
the pre-trial can still be taken up.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court,
the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon
the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two
exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was
in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission.
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation
before and during the trial.

The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declaration

unsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive the stipulations
made during the pre-trial conference. Consequently, respondents are
bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right
over the property subject matter thereof.