ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS.

COMELEC
FACTS: In the run up to the 1995 Elections, former First Lady Imelda RomualdezMarcos (IMR)filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Congressperson of the 1st
District of Leyte, whichencompasses the city of Tacloban and the towns of the
northeastern Leyte, including Tolosa, versusthe inc
umbent Cirilo Roy Montejo In her COC, IMR stated that she had been a resident of
Tolosa for several years prior to the election. CMR moved for her disqualification,
arguing that IMRs residency fellshort of the 1-year residency requirement. IMR
sought to amend her COC entry to since birth (which isactually futile since she
was born in San Miguel, Manila). The COMELEC refused the amendment,
correctlyholding that it was filed out of time, and disqualified IMR. IMR trounced
CRM and appealed to the SupremeCourt, on the contention that she did not lose
her residency even when she went to Manila, married thenCongressman Marcos,
lived in Malacanang and fled to Hawaii, since she was only following the residence
of her husband, who under the Civil Code then in force, had sole authority to
determine the family residence.
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner has lost her domicile based on the foregoing
facts to be a ground for disqualifying her for the congressional election.
The Court ruled that:For purposes of election, residency and domicile are
synonymous to each other. It is onlyin Civil Law that we keep the distinction
between the two, which is: Residence where one stays at the moment Domicile
where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence at one point,with
animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus revertendi (intent to retun
if absent). In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity
( domiciliumnecessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose
her domicile, and her father choseTolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to
Ferdie did not necessarily result in the loss of that domicilein favor of a new
one since (1) a woman follows only the actual residence of her husband and nothis
domicile and (2) as a rule, change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of
threeelements, (1) actual removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon
domicile, and (3) actseffecting that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but
the animus revertendi remained asevinced by her celebrating her birthdays,
fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban and Tolosa,and her careful cultivation
of a political base in that district, thereby negating the last tworequirements.
Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when, by her acts she
provedher intent to follow her husbands domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for
the recovery of her ancestral house in Tolosa, and public announcement
to represent the 1st District in Congress after she returned from US exile and almost
three years before the 1995 elections, showed her decisionto re-establish her
domicile there ( domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying
theminimum residency requirement.Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying
her.
Osmea vs Pendatun

Political Law Immunity

Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun
and others in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of
infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. He further asked that the respondents
should not require him to substantiate his charges against the president with the
admonition that if he failed to do so he must show cause why the House should not
punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A
Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as
the then President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity upon member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal
or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a
member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

CASCO Philippines vs Gimenez

Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said
glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to
RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines
issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance,
Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea
and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for
refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to
honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec
2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary
Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco
maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and,
formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea
and formaldehyde.
HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed
as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce
when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a
fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of
Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the
enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled
bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde
is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing
of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC
a Petitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list
elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the
party
list system
wasintended
to benefit
the
marginalized
and underrepresented;not the mainstream politicalparties, the none-marginalized
or overrepresented.
Issues:

a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list electionsb.Whether

or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
COMELECwhich will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy
the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court
directed the COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the last party-list
election, shall remain in force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported
its compliance.a.Yesb.No.
Rationale:
a.
Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondentscannot bedisqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8,
Article
IX
(C)
of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its
part,
Section
2of
RA 7941
also provides
for
"a party-list system
of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly statesthat a "party" is"either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
b.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean,however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter
-- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed
with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was
thus up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 wasenacted.
Senate vs. Ermita
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and

void
for
being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine
National
Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house
of
Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house
of
Congress,
valid
and
constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor
and
why
it
must
be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as
the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill
did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by
Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB

11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways &
Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill
1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate
Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments
to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according
to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having
the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Bengzon vs Drilon
Political Law Veto Power of the President
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and
the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a
resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been
enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired
justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside
and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president
to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents
to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the

implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in
this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory
of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights
may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a
well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law
of
the
land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that
the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Estrada vs. Desierto; Estrada vs. Arroyo

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the
beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly
eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a
longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited
reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001,
by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met
by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter,
the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government.
Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned
from
their
posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath
to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner
issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the
same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law
and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the
letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same
day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set
in
motion.
Issues:
(1)
Whether
or
not
the
petitioner
resigned
as
President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President
Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent
disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can
be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show
that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving

Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be

determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on
the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara
serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between
Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second
round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given
fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the
parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of
the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the
press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the
country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive
national
spirit
of
reconciliation
and
solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily
unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President
on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent
to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo
as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of
Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Mison and
Guillermo Carague
FACTS:
When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment

is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not
approved by the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE: Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing on Section 16,
Article VII.
RULING:
Misons appointment is constitutional. Sec. 16, Article VII states that:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x
It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA. Also, it can be
seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and third
groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the
CoA. In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the CoA is required.
Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states
that Sec. 601. x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
De Castro v. JBC
Facts:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May
17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated
that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent
Chief Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

There is a justiciable issue

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief
Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to
submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in
this case being unresolved.

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for
judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the
proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the
fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the
preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional
experts, as may be needed.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass
the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a
midnight appointment.

The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging
questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it
already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the
process.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March

30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively,
shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section
15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO

APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO
OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,
2010.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

ISSUES
W/N the petitioners have legal standing?
W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?
W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?
W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC?
RULING
Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by
the Court.
Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases,
suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of
a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are
not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Justification of the Supreme Court:
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that
the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of
the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of

what the Constitution should contain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the
awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative
(Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII).
The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that
underlies the political structure
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded.
Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a
definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated
by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII
prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in
the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as
part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an
outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and

screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior
process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to
the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize
the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on
Appointments.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to
appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice
Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question
raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court
of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the
basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no
application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was
accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the
nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and
Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to
appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of
ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and
Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme
Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a
presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead
of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect,
and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become
beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent
President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence,
precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the
incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief
Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there
will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII
remaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring
from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply
Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second
Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the
latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the
prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full
mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that
there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible
period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in
which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the
constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that
the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on
whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a
Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the
outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of
candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting
justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which
it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is
not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff
has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to
perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects
the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is

ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Villena vs Secretary of the Interior
Political
Law Control
Government Official

Power

Supervision Suspension of

a Local

Villena
was
the
then
mayor
of
Makati.
After investigation,
the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of
the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena
averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or
jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has
power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the
constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are
those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words,
the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if
he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be
followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the
Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under
investigation.
HELD: There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a
mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power
appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code
which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction
by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the
power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to
the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and
precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance,
counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the
Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater
power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised
conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law,
remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid
of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if,
possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec.
2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a
municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive.
Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.

David v. Arroyo (the EX-Pres.)

Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
&
Niez Cacho-Olivares vs Exec Sec Ermita
-Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of
a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMAshe declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally
which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA
articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)
was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for
his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c
declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. OlivaresCacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of
natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is
an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected
due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time
some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and

Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP

1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape
of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections
in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report
and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between
the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness
of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar
are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows
that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA
has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They
assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that
such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos
legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article
6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
1 There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to
it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are

merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the
armed
forces
is
subject
to
judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and
the
civilian
character
of
the
PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may
revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for
their
revocation
and
review
without
any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent
to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to
call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic
civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress
and
review
by
the
Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged

with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none
of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines
in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran
Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of
Estafa through Falsification of PublicDocuments. She was found guilty and was
sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a
letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it
was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance
referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos
request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does
not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon,
she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by
her acts.

thePCSO
from
conducting
lotteries
in
cooperation
with
anyentity2.RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresionalfranchise before a telecom
system (public utility) can beestablished3.Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution
prohibitscompanies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership fromoperating a public
system4.PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042(Foreign Investment
Act) to install an online Lottosystema.The contract shows that PGMC is the
actualoperatior while it is a 75% foreign-ownedcompany. RA 7042 puts all forms of
gamblingon the negative listRespondents answered the allegations by
contending:1.PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is noshared
franchise2.PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecomsystem is an
indispensable requirement of an onlinelottery system. Petitioner interpretation
of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow.3.There are no violations of laws4.The issue of
morality is a political one and should not beresolved in a legal forum5.Petitioners are
without legal standing, as illustrated inValmonte vs. PCSOa.The PCSO is a corporate
entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives.Arguing that
PCSO will operate a public utility,it is still exempted under Section of Act
3846,where legislative franchisees are notnecessary for radio stations
Issues:

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

1.Whether or not petitioners have standing

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past. It affords no relief for what has beensuffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which
has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from
crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for
any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

2.Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169

challenged provision.
KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
Facts:Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunctionwith a prayer for a TRO
& preliminary injunction against theimplementation of the Contract of Lease betwee
n PCSO &PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners
aresuing in their capacity as members of Congress and astaxpayers. On DECEMBER
17, 1993 the Contract of Lease wasexecuted and approved by the president on
DECEMBER 20,1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OFTHE
PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount toa lack of authority by
entering into the contract, because:1.Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits

Held:
1.Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only aprocedural technicality that can be
set aside dependingon the importance of an issue. As taxpayers andcitizens to be
affected
by
the
reach
of
the
lotto
system,petitioners
have
standing.2.No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in thenegative arguing that
whatever is not unequivocallygranted is withheld. PCSO cannot share the
franchisein any way. The contracts nature can be understood toform the intent of the
parties as evident in the provisionsof the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides
that theintent of contracting parties are determined in partthrough their acts. The only
contribution PCSO will begiving is the authority to operate. All risks are to betaken
by the lessor; operation will be taken by thePCSO only after 8 years. Further proof
are:a.Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension / breachb.Rent
not fixed at 4.9% and can be reducedgiven that all risks are borne by the
lessor c.Prohibition against PGMC involvement incompetitor games; strange if
gaming is PGMC;businessd.Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years,which is
unreasonable for a lease contract. Itindicates that PGMC is the operator and
thecondition an attempt to increase public benefitthrough public
involvement.e.Escrow
deposit
may
be
used
as
performancebond.f.PGMC operation evident in personnelmanagement, procedural an
d coordinatingrules
set
by
the
lessor.g.PCSO authority to terminate contact uponPGMC insolvencyThe contract
indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the

indivisible communitybetween them.Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid

and TRO madepermanent
BRILLANTES vs. YORAC
192 SCRA 358, 1990
Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had
been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December
1989 coup d etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary
to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on
Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that (I)n
no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes contends that the choice of
the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President
of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation
made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of
administrative expediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the
COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the
COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman.
Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions
as independent. They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines
in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts
its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise
of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary
chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That
discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in
favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of
the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and
not the President to make.
Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10
Nov 2003]

Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the
constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the
rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question has resulted in a political crisis.
Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient
to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods
of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable coequality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law
or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an

invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives

with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other
two great branches of the government.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a
misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's
moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is
most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application
to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence.
The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court.
But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in
law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective
of his station in life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.