Subject Matter: Rights and/or Privileges

Relevant Codal Provisions/Doctrine (if given):

Free Exercise Clause (First Amendment)
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
Adell H. Sherbert (appellant) v. Charlie V. Verner et al, as members of South Carolina Employment Security
Commission, and Spartan Mills
374 U.S. 398 (17 June 1963)
Ponente: Mr. Justice Brennan
Facts:
Timeline:

1957 - Adell H. Sherbert became a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Her employer then, a
textile-mill operator, permitted her to work a five-day week.
1959 Work-week changed to six days (including Saturdays) for all three shifts in the mill.
After discharge, appellant sought employment with three other mills in the Spartanburg area, but found no
suitable five-day work available at any of the mills.
She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act.
- South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be
able to work and is available for work; and further, that a claimant is ineligible for benefits if he
has failed, without good cause to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment
office or the employer.
- In filing her claim she expressed willingness to accept employment (at other mills and in any
industry), so long as Saturday work is not required.
- Of the 150 or more Seventh-day Adventists in the Spartanburg area, only appellant and one other were
unable to find a suitable non-Saturday employment.
No question has been raised concerning the sincerity of appellants religious beliefs. There is also no
doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is a basic tenet of the religion.

Employment Security Commission (appellee): Appellants restriction on doing Saturday work brought her within the
provision of disqualification (without good cause to acceptable suitable work when offered).
Common Pleas Court (Spartanburg County, South Carolina) sustained Commissions finding.
-

Rejected appellants contention that disqualifying provisions, as applied to her, abridged her right to
the free exercise of her religion (Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment Rights)
Held specifically that appellant's ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because such a
construction of the statute "places no restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion, nor does it
in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in
accordance with the dictates of her conscience."

Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the courts judgment.

Issue/s:
According to the Supreme Court, there are three questions that need to be considered in determining whether the
government has violated an individuals constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.
1. WON the government has burdened the individuals free exercise of religion.

If the government pressures an individual to forego a religious practice, whether by imposing a

penalty or withholding a benefit, then the government has burdened the individuals free exercise of
religion.
2. If the government did burden the individuals free exercise of religion: WON there was a compelling state
interest that justifies the substantial infringement of individuals First Amendment constitutional right.
3. If a compelling state interest does exist, are there any alternative means by which the government can achieve
its goal without infringing on the free exercise of religion?
Holding:
In Sherberts case, the Court stopped at the second question.
1. YES. There was clearly an infringement on the appellants right to free exercise of religion because she was
placed in a position of having to choose between the benefits and her religious tenets.
- According to the Court, to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness
to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties.
- South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which
thereby infringes the Sabbatarians religious libery.
2. NO. According to the Court, in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation". No such abuse or danger existed
in the case.
According to the Supreme Court, South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to
constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.
Supreme Court: In view of the result we have reached under the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of free
exercise of religion, we have no occasion to consider appellant's claim that the denial of benefits also deprived her of
the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Therefore, only the First Amendment right
was considered in the decision.)
Dispositive: The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Dissents: J. Harlan and J. White: South Carolinas Unemployment Compensation Law was enacted in 1936 in
response to the grave social and economic problems during the depression of that period.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly applied this law in conformity with its clearly expressed
purpose. It has consistently held that one is not "available for work" if his unemployment has resulted not from the
inability of industry to provide a job, but rather from personal circumstances, no matter how compelling.
In the present case, all the state court has done is to apply these principles.
Concurring: Mr. Justice Stewart concurs but states that the court has yet to find a resolution to the dilemma brought
about by religion cases. The Free Exercise Clause is in contrast with the Establishment Clause (Establishment
Clause: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...). Several court rulings before hinged on the Establishment Clause (wherein state was insensitive to ones
religion). Examples:
Everson vs. Board of Education - "a government . . stripped of all power . . . to support, or otherwise to
assist any or all religions. . . ," and no State "can pass laws which aid one religion. . . ."
As adopted in the Schempp case (words of Mr. Justice Rutledge of the Everson case) - the Establishment
Clause forbids "every form of public aid or support for religion."