Source - https://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Madhyamaka
Svabhava - essence[edit]
Nagarjuna follows his own logic to its end, wondering what the subsequent conseq
uences are of his propositions. Since all "things" are dependently arisen, how t
hen can a non-existing "thing" cause another "thing" to come into being? In Chap
ter 15 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika Nagarjuna centers on the words svabhava [note
1] parabhava[note 2] bhava [note 3] and abhava:[note 4]
Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature[note 5] (Mk. ch. 15) argues tha
t anything which arises according to conditions, as all phenomena do, can have n
o inherent nature, for what is depends on what conditions it. Moreover, if there
is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' (para-bhav
a), i.e. something which is dependent for its existence and nature on something
else which has own-nature. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other
-nature, there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature (bhav
a). If there is no true existent, then there can be no non-existent (abhava).[13
]
In chapter 15 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Nagarjuna is playing on the word 'th
ing'".[web 1][note 6] Nagarjuna uses the ambivalence inherent in the term svabha
va:
[T]he word "svabhava" can be interpreted in two different ways. It can be render
ed either as identity [...] or as causal independence.[14]
This ambiguity is easily lost in translation:
When one reads Nagarjuna's argument in Sanskrit, it is not immediately obvious t
hat the argument has taken advantage of an ambiguity in the key term. But when o
ne tries to translate his argument into some other language, such as English or
Tibetan, one finds that it is almost impossible to translate his argument in a w
ay that makes sense in translation. This is because the terms in the language of
translation do not have precisely the same range of ambiguities as the words in
the original Sanskrit. In English, we are forced to disambiguate, and in disamb
iguating, we end up spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument.[14]
The doctrine of dependent arising cannot be reconciled with "a conception of sel
f-nature or substance".[11] Nagarjuna refutes "the commentarial doctrine of the
'own-being' of principles as contrary to the Tripitaka":[7]
Nagarjuna had no objection to the Abhidhamma formulation of causal relations so
long as the relata are not regarded as having a unique nature or substance (svab
hava).[8]
The rejection of inherent existence does not imply that there is no existence at
all.[10] What it does mean is that there is no "unique nature or substance (sva
bhava)"[8] in the "things" we perceive. This may not necessarily be in contrast
to the Abhidhamma point of view, given the ambivalence in the terms used by Naga
rjuna:
What Nagarjuna is saying is that no being has a fixed and permanent nature. What
the abhidarmikas maintained was that every thing has features that distinguish
it from other things.[15][note 7]
Two truths[edit]
Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, conventional truth and ultimate truth,[
4] to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence. Ultimately, we r
ealize that all phenomena are sunyata, empty of concrete existence. Conventional

ly, we do perceive concrete objects which we are aware of.[17] Yet, this perceiv
ed reality is an experiential reality, not an ontological reality with substanti
al or independent existence.[17]
The ultimate truth of sunyata does not refer to "nothingness" or "non-existence"
; it refers to the absence of inherent existence.[18]
According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life
: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The high
est goal is the liberation from attachment, both material and intellectual.[19]
Insight into the emptiness of "things' is part of developing wisdom, seeing thin
gs as they are. Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging
and suffering. Buddhapalita says:
What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unski
lled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion c
onceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with
regard to them.
?Buddhapalita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2[20]