DOES PANTAWID FOSTER DEPENDENCE OR ENCOURAGE WORK?

EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT

By
Aniceto Orbeta and Vicente Paqueo1
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
September 2013

A. Introduction
The Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program (4Ps or Pantawid) is the centrepiece social
protection program of the Philippine government. Like conditional cash transfer programs in
many other countries it provides cash grants to beneficiaries provided they comply with
specified conditionalities such as keeping their children in school, getting health check-ups, and
attending family development sessions. One of the main concerns of the program is the fear
that the monetary assistance could foster welfare dependency. On this point, the commonly
held hypothesis is that income transfers from the Government tend to reduce work incentives
and encourage dependency on public assistance.
Past studies had examined this hypothesis in relation to the impact of CCT (Fiszbein,
Schady, et al., 2009). Generally, they concluded that the dependency concern was overblown.
There was little empirical evidence of CCT having a significantly negative impact on the work
efforts of adult household members. And, where they appear to have an impact, its size was
deemed negligible. And in regard to child labor, the evidence indicates that CCT has a
significantly negative effect, as expected. The initial findings of Nazmul, Friedman and Onishi
(2013) regarding the Philippine experience appear consistent with the lessons learned from the
Latin American CCT experience. They find no evidence that the introduction of the Pantawid
Pamilya encourages beneficiaries to work less or make less effort at obtaining more work.
Despite this evidence from local and international experience, critics of Pantawid Pamilya
continue to assert that the program encourages laziness and dependency on public assistance
and that, therefore, it should be de-funded.
This paper seeks to present further evidence on the impact of Pantawid Pamilya on the work
efforts of members of beneficiary households. The study provides a much more detailed
analysis of the impact of program on work efforts, using the first wave of the Pantawid
evaluation data that has been publicly provided in the program website. In Nazmul, Friedman
and Onishi (2013) cited above, the analysis only looked at the main labor market outcome
variables such as employment, hours worked and proportion of seeking work in addition to their
existing one. Moreover, the analysis was limited to the average outcomes of adults 17-60 years
old. In contrast, in our present study, we examine in more detail the work efforts of household
members, including those of household heads, spouse of the head, and analyze the data by
gender and age groups. It also looked at the impact on the labor market participation of school-

Senior Research Fellow and Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Opinion
expressed here are solely of the author and not of the Institute. Initial work on this was done while A. Orbeta was
consultant to the Social Weather Stations who was contracted to do the survey. This analysis could not have been
done without DSWD putting the dataset in public domain to encourage independent analysis using the dataset.

2
aged children. In disaggregating the data, we hoped to unearth whatever was hidden in more
aggregative analysis.
Using a disaggregated approach yields some intriguing findings. Pantawid has indeed no
significant negative impact on work efforts, as found in previous studies. But what is surprising
is that it seems to drive a greater desire to work more on the part of household heads and his
female spouse, all adult members 18 years and above and middle-aged workers 35-54 years
old. In regard to child labor, the program significantly reduces the number of hours of work for
pay of elementary school-aged children (6-11 years), but it did not significantly affect the
incidence of child labor.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the analytical framework and
briefly reviews the literature. This is followed by a description of the methodology and data used.
The findings are then discussed and, in the final section, summarized.
B. Framework and Review of the Literature
Channels how CCTs can affect labor market outcomes
Even if there is no work requirement for Pantawid beneficiaries, economic theory tells us
that the transfers and conditionalities will likely affect labor supply and work incentives. One
criticism even hurled at the program is that it may encourage dependency. One important way
of providing evidence on this debate is to look at the work efforts of beneficiary households and
their members.
The review of Alzua, Cruces and Ripani (2013) has identified four channels through
which CCT programs can affect labor market outcomes. First, the cash transfer increases
unearned non-labor income which can induce pure income effects and reduced the number of
hours work or increase leisure because presumably leisure is a normal good. Second, the
human capital accumulation conditionality will affect households allocation of time. Children
attending school could free up time previously spent on child care. But at the same time
complying with the conditionalities can also be time consuming particularly for mothers. Third,
the anticipated reduction in child labor diminishes the net impact of cash transfer. This can also
trigger the other members of the household to take up the slack left by the children who are
presumably attending school. Finally, there can be several types of spillover effects. One is that
the changes in labor supply of beneficiaries may affect the aggregate wage levels affecting both
the wages of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Another is the consumption of ineligible
households in program communities may be affected indirectly through aggregate demand
effects.
Review of Previous Studies on the Impact of CCTs on Labor Market Outcomes
Before the advent of CCT programs in developing countries the evidence on the impact
of income-support programs on labor supply come mostly from studies using data from
developed countries. Most of this literature showed convincingly the work disincentive effects of
these programs (e.g. Moffit, 2002; Lemieux and Milligan, 2008). It is not then surprising that one
of the main criticisms of CCT programs is its likely impact on labor market outcomes. The most
recent review of the impact of CCTs on labor market outcomes by Alzua, Cruces and Ripani
(2013) paints an entirely different picture. They concluded that while the impact is mostly
insignificant there are notable variations to this general result. There are also differences based
on the cohort being observed and the on location of the program. Since the motivations for adult
and child labor market outcomes are different, we deem it instructive to discuss the impact
separately.

3
Impact of cash transfers on labor supply of adults. Most of the studies find no impact
of CCTs on the labor supply of adults implying that there appears to be no disincentive effects
on work. There are, however, several variations to this theme such as internal reallocation of
work within the home, positive indirect impacts and even shifts in sector of work. The impacts
may be different by location.
The basic result is that there appears to be no significant impact on income-generating
work (Attanasio et al, 2010; Alzua, Cruces and Ripani, 2013), on leisure time for both male and
females (Parker and Skoufias, 2002; Skoufias and Maro, 2008; Hassan, 2010) and on sleep
(Hassan, 2010). Alzua, Cruces and Ripani (2013) even found a small positive effect on the
number of hours worked by female beneficiaries and a bigger increase wages of male
beneficiaries in the case of PROGRESA.
There are also corroborating results from the impact of similar cash transfers but not
necessarily CCT programs. Cash transfers in the form of remittances were also not found to
affect adult labor supply (Yang, 2008). Pensions were even found to positively affect
employment of prime-aged adults by facilitating their migration both by underwriting the cost of
migration and by the presence of pensioners providing child care that allowed prime-aged adults
to look for work elsewhere (Ardington et al., 2009)
There is evidence on internal reallocation of work within the home. For instance, there is
evidence on an increase in time spent satisfying program obligations particularly for women
(Parker and Skoufias, 2002). Hassan (2010) also found that mothers of eligible children
increase time spent on household work per school day and reduced time spent on childrens
need.
Shifts in sector of work were also found to result from the CCT programs. For instance,
Skoufias et al. (2008) found shift labor from agriculture to non-agriculture activities.
There is also evidence that the impact can be different by location. Attanasio et al.
(2010) finds more pronounced impact can be observed in more urbanized areas even if there is
no discernible impact in more rural areas.
Impact on child labor. The impact on child labor is either negative or insignificant. This
can mean that CCTs are not generally successful in preventing child labor. It has been pointed
out that one reason is that the benefits may not be large enough incentive to forgo of existing
source of household income for the poor. In addition, there is also evidence of shifts in the
allocation of child labor depending on the nature of the benefits provided.
The negative impact on child labor are found in Nicaraguas CCT (Del Carpio and
Loayza, 2012), in Costa Ricas CCT (Dueyea and Morrison, 2004) and in Mexicos
PROGRESSA (Parker and Skoufias, 2002). But there are also those who did not find significant
impact arguing that perhaps the transfers was too small to provide enough incentives to forgo
existing sources of labor income (Cardoso and Sousa, 2004)
There is evidence on the impact not only the quantity but also of the quality of child labor.
Del Carpio and Loayza (2012) found evidence of the shift from home chores and farm work
towards skills-formation activities in response to Nicaraguas CCT. They explained that these
were perhaps the results of the business grant component of the program rather than the
transfers for schooling and health.

C. Methodology and Data

This paper uses the randomized control treatment (RCT)2 dataset of the first3 wave impact
evaluation of 4Ps. The evaluation design is described in Nazmul, Friedman and Onishi (2013).
The RCT dataset generated from 130 randomly selected barangays from eight municipalities in
four provinces (Lanao del Norte, Negros Oriental, Occidental Mindoro and Mountain Province)
representing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Half of the barangays are randomly assigned as
treatment and the other half as control. The subject population are households from Set 1 Batch
4 which was programmed to be served in December 2008. The enumeration was done between
October to November 2011. The treatment households, therefore, were with the program for
nearly two years at the time of the enumeration.
It is noteworthy that randomized assignment to treatment and control provides the highest
internal validity among the evaluation designs. It often referred as the gold standard.
Randomized assignment to treatment and control prior to application of intervention is the
preferred method of generating identical treatment and control groups eliminating biases that
beset other methodologies. This is why estimates from RCT studies are often given premium
over other evaluation designs.
The analysis dataset4 consist of 1,418 eligible households based on the proxy means test
estimates of the DSWDs NHTS-PR. It is presumed that the randomized assignment of
barangays into treatment and control generated identical treatment and control households5.
The eligible households in treatment barangays received benefits as planned while the release
of the benefits of eligible households in control barangays was postponed until the impact
evaluation survey was completed.
This paper follows the analysis done in Nazmul, Friedman and Onishi (2013). In particular,
it estimates the impact of the program by estimating regressions of dependent variables of
interest yijk on the treatment assignment variable T (1 if treated, 0 otherwise), i.e. estimate the
following equation

yijk Tj k ijk
where i, j, k refers to individuals, barangays, and municipalities respectively. The parameter
provides the estimate of the impact of 4Ps. The estimates uses municipal fixed effects (k) to
account for whatever observable and unobservable differences there are across municipalities.
Given the sampling design, the estimates also account for clustering at the barangay level.
Since the households are considered treated if they reside in treatment barangays regardless of
their actual treatment status, the estimates generated should be considered intention to treat
(ITT) effects. A treatment of the treated (TOT) effects can be easily estimated using difference
in compliance rates between treatment and control barangays.

There is also an accompanying RDD dataset which has not been released yet
It is envisioned that there will be three waves of impact evaluation of 4Ps.
4
The RCT dataset includes 3,742 households but includes non-eligible households which are included to capture
possible spillover effects.
5
The comparison of treatment and control household using variables from the Household Assessment Form (HAF)
provided in Nazmul, Friedman and Onishi (2013) showed that they are indeed similar.
3

5
D. Labor Market Impacts
To determine the impact of the 4Ps on labor market outcomes, we looked at several
indicators of labor market outcomes for several cohorts. We looked at the labor outcome of the
household head, the female spouse of head and adult members of the households. Then we
disaggregated the analysis by sex and age groups. Finally, we look at the child labor outcomes.
The labor outcomes we looked at include labor force participation, employment, number of
hours worked, whether looking for additional work even if currently employed, whether looking
for work if unemployed.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the different labor market outcomes for the different
cohorts of adult household members.
Household head
About 92% for treatment and 90% for control of household heads are in the labor force6.
An even higher proportion of household heads who are in the labor force are employed. Most of
them work for about 42 hours a week in their primary job and on average work about 2 more
hours in other jobs. As a measure of underemployment, the proportion of those who are
employed and looking for additional work is found to be between 18% for the treatment group
and 13% for the control group. Finally, the proportion of the unemployed who are seeking jobs is
22% for treatment and 14% for the control group. It is noteworthy that among the labor market
outcomes mentioned only those seeking more work who are currently employed is significantly
different between treatment and control groups. What is even more telling is that a higher
proportion (5% more) of household heads in the treatment group are seeking additional work
compared to the control group.
Female spouse of head
The labor market outcomes of the female spouse of head shows that less than half of
them (42% for treatment and 47% for control) are in the labor force. That the labor force
participation rate of women is less than half that of men is a well-known pattern of Philippine
labor force. Employment rates of female spouses who are in the labor force are slightly lower
than that of household heads at 91% for treatment and 92% for controls. The hours worked in
primary jobs are also slightly lower at 38 hours per week for treatment and 39 hours per week
for controls. About 12% female spouses of household heads in the treatment group and 8% for
the control group are seeking additional work even if employed. Those looking for work when
unemployed is shown to be 21% for the treatment group and 26% for the control group. Again
only the proportion of employed seeking for work is significantly different for the treatment and
control groups. About 5.2% of female spouses who are currently employed are seeking
additional work.
Adult members 18 years and above
Turning to all adult members of the household 18 years and above, about 68% of them
are in the labor force. About 94% of the treatment and 92% of the controls of those who are in
the labor force are employed. They are working about 41 hours a week on their primary jobs
and another over an hour on average working on other jobs.
About 14% of those in the
6

The 4Ps evaluation data does not the availability question so the definition of in the labor force is similar to the
old definition prior to 2005.

6
treatment group and 10% in the treatment group who are currently employed are seeking
additional work. Finally about 21% of the treatment group and 26% of the control group who are
currently unemployed are seeking jobs. Similarly, the comparison between treatment and
control groups shows that only those currently employed and seeking additional work are
significantly different and more adults in the treatment group are seeking additional work.
Male adult members
Disaggregating further to male adult members 18 years and above, Table 1 shows that
88% of the treatment and 86% of the controls are in the labor force. About 95% of the treatment
and 93% of the controls are employed. Again they are working about 41hours a week in their
primary jobs and work an additional two hours more per week on other jobs. About 15% of the
currently employed in the treatment group seek additional work while this is only 11% in the
control group. About 24% of the currently unemployed are seeking jobs for the treatment group
and 26% for the control group. These comparisons show that a higher (by 2.4%) proportion of
males in the treatment group are employed and 4.2% more of the currently employed males in
the treatment group are seeking additional work.
Female adult members
For female adult members 18 years and above, about 46% of those in the treatment and
47% of those in the control group are in the labor force. Ninety percent of those in the treatment
group and 91% of those in the control group are employed. They work slightly lower work hours
per week compared to men adult members. About 11% of those who are currently employed
are seeking additional work in the treatment group and about 7% in the control group. About
19% of the currently unemployed female adult members are seeking jobs in the treatment group
while 26% of the currently unemployed in the control groups are seeking jobs. The numbers
shows us that the 4Ps did not create significant difference in labor market outcomes among
female adult members.
Members 18-34 years old
We next look at the impact on young workers. About 62% of those in the treatment and
60% of those in the control are in the labor force. Ninety two percent of those in the treatment
and 88% of those in the control are employed. The registed the highest average working hours
per week in their primary jobs at 42.7 hours for the treatment group and 41.5 hours for the
control group. Another hour or so of work is spend on other jobs. About 11% of the employed in
the treatment group are looking for additional work while the corresponding number in control
group is 7%. A high 29% of those who are unemployed are seeking jobs in the treatment and
28% for the control group. Again these comparison shows that there is no significant impact of
4Ps on this cohort of workers.
Members 35-54 years old
Turning to middle-aged workers shows that 75% of those who are in the treatment group
and 77% of those in the control group are in the labor force. Ninety six percent of those in the
labor force are employed. Those in the treatment group work about 40 hours per week in their
primary jobs while those in the control group work about 42 hours per week. About 17% of the
currently employed seek additional work in the treatment group and about 12% in the control
group. About 11% in the treatment group and 21% in the control group who are currently

7
unemployed are seeking jobs. For this cohort 4P only created a difference on the desire to seek
additional jobs for the currently employed.
Members 55-64 years old
Finally for the older workers 55-64 years old, about 77% in the treatment group and 80%
in the control group are in the labor force. About 95% of those in the labor force are employed.
Understandably they work fewer hours per week in their primary jobs at 37 hours for the
treatment group and 38 hours for the control group. They also hardly put any more hours in
other jobs. Nonetheless, about 12% of the employed in the treatment group look for additional
work while this is 8% for the control group. About 17% of the unemployed in the treatment group
seek jobs while 40% seek jobs in the control group.
These results indicate that the program did not generate disincentives for work among
adult members of the household. This is consistent with results from other CCT programs
reviewed recently in Alzua, Cruces and Ripani (2013). But what is even more noteworthy is that
there is even evidence that the program has created more drive for work for both the household
head and his female spouse, for all adult members 18 years and above and for middle-aged
workers 35-54 years.
Child Labor
In the case of child labor we grouped children by sex and by age groups. The age
groups correspond to the elementary grades (6-11), those who are expected to be in the high
school but still covered by the program (12-14), and the rest of school-aged children (15-17). In
terms of outcomes, we looked at incidence of working for pay, and the number of works hours
for pay.
Table 2 shows estimation results for child labor.
The table show that about 8% of children 6-17 years old in the treatment group and 7%
in the control group are working for pay. As expected, this is slightly higher for male children at
11% for treatment and 10% for control. A smaller proportion of 6% for treatment and 4.5% for
control of female children 6-17 years are working for pay. Again as can be expected, the
proportion of children working for pay rises as one goes from elementary school age children to
secondary and tertiary school age. Only 2% of children in the elementary grades (6-11 years
old) are working for pay. This rises to 12% for the treatment group and 9% for the control group
of children 12-14 years old. Finally, this his expectedly higher at 18% for the treatment group
and 16% for the control group are working for children aged 15-17 years old. It is noteworthy
that in terms of incidence of child labor there is no significant difference between children in the
treatment group and those in the control group. This indicates that 4Ps have not induced
significant number of household to keep their children out of the labor force.
Looking at the hours of work in the past week, it shows that children in the treatment and control
group are working at about 17 hours per week. The number of hours working for pay per week
also rises with age. Children 6-11 years old worked for 4 hours for the treatment group and 9
hours for the control group. The number of hours working for pay rises to 12 hours for the
treatment group and 11 hours for the control group for the 12-14 years old. This rises further to
25 hours for the control group and 22 hours for the control group for those aged 15-17. The only
notable difference between the treatment and control groups is the decline by 4 hours in number
of hours worked for younger children 6-11 years old.

8
These results show that Pantawid reduced the number young elementary school-aged children
are spending working for pay but it did not make a significant impact on the incidence on child
labor. This is perhaps because the beneficiaries did not find the cash grant substantial enough
to substitute for earnings from child labor except for young children who are not earning much
anyway.
E. Summary
This paper seeks to provide further evidence on the impact of Pantawid Pamilya on the work
efforts of beneficiary households and its members. It uses RCT data from the first wave of the
4P evaluation. Among the different evaluation designs, RCT studies are the most preferred
because it has stronger internal validity.
The paper has shown that contrary to the expectations of many there is no evidence of work
disincentives among adult workers regardless of how one divides up the population. This is
consistent with results from other CCT programs reviewed recently in Alzua, Cruces and Ripani
(2013). What is noteworthy is that, on the contrary, it appears that Pantawid Pamilya has
encouraged greater drive for work for both the household head and his female spouse, for all
adult members 18 years and above and for middle-aged workers 35-54 years. In terms of child
labor, the result seems to indicate that the program succeeded in reducing the number of hours
working for pay of elementary school-aged children but not the incidence of child labor. The
grant may not be large enough to make families forgo a source of household income except for
younger children who may not be earning much anyway.
In order to do a richer analysis of the impact of the program on labor market outcomes, it
may be good to include a time use module in the subsequent surveys and a richer theoretical
model that could be used to lay out and test the underlying mechanisms to explain why CCT
appears to cause a positive impact on the work efforts of beneficiary households and their adult
members. This additional analytical and empirical work can potentially capture the adjustments
households have made in response to the cash grants as well as to the conditionalities that may
require time for specific household members.
F. References
Alzua, M. L.; Cruces, G. & Ripani, L. (2013), 'Welfare programs and labor supply in developing
countries: experimental evidence from Latin America', Journal of Population Economics 26(4),
1255-1284.
Ardington, C.; Case, A. & Hosegood, V. (2009), 'Labor Supply Responses to Large Social
Transfers: Longitudinal Evidence from South Africa', American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics.
Attanasio, O.; Fitzsimons, E.; Gomez, A.; Gutierrez, M. I.; Meghir, C. & Mesnard, A. (2010),
'Childrens Schooling and Work in the Presence of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in
Rural Colombia', Economic Development and Cultural Change.
Cardoso, E. & Souza, A. P. (2004), 'THE IMPACT OF CASH TRANSFERS ON CHILD LABOR
AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN BRAZIL', Technical report, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS,
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.

9
Del Carpio, X. V. & Loayza, N. V. (2012), 'The impact of wealth on the amount and quality of
child labor', Technical report, World Bank.
Duryea, S. & Morrison, A. (2004), 'The Effect of Conditional Transfers on School Performance
and Child Labor: Evidence from an Ex-Post Impact Evaluation in Costa Rica', Technical report,
Inter-American Development Bank..
Fiszbein, A., Schady, N. et al. (2009), Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and
Future Poverty, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Hasan, A. (2010), 'Time allocation in rural households : the indirect effects of conditional cash
transfer programs', Technical report, World Bank.
Lemieux, T. & Milligan, K. (2008), 'Incentive effects of social assistance : A regression
discontinuity approach', Journal of Econometrics 142, 807--828.
Moffitt, R. (2002), 'Welfare Programs and Labor Supply'(9168), Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Nazmul, C., J. Friedman and J. Onishi (2013) Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program
Impact Evaluation 2012, Worldbank Social Protection Unit.
Parker, S. W. & Skoufias, E. (2002), 'The impact of PROGRESA on work, leisure, and time
allocation', Technical report, IFPRI.
Skoufias, E. & Maro, V. D. (2008), 'Conditional Cash Transfers, Adult Work Incentives, and
Poverty', The Journal of Development Studies 44(7), 935-960.
Skoufias, E.; Unar, M. & Gonzlez-Cosso, T. (2008), 'The Impacts of Cash and In-Kind
Transfers on Consumption and Labor Supply', Technical report, World Bank.

10
Table 1. Impact on Adult Labor Outcomes
Variables
Treatment
Household Head
In labor force
0.915
Employed
0.972
Hours per week, Primary work
41.874
Hours per week, total
43.859
Employed but looking additional
work
0.179
Unemployed and seeking job
0.222
Female spouse of head
In labor force
0.419
Employed
0.910
Hours per week, Primary work
38.175
Hours per week, total
39.182
Employed but looking additional
work
0.127
Unemployed and seeking job
0.167
Adult members 18 years and above
In labor force
0.681
Employed
0.936
Hours per week, primary work
41.116
Hours per week, total
42.693
Employed but looking additional
work
0.136
Unemployed and seeking job
0.214
Male adult members 18 years and
above
In labor force
0.879
Employed
0.954
Hours per week, primary work
41.290
Hours per week, total
43.082
Employed but looking additional
work
0.147
Unemployed and seeking job
0.244
Female adult members18 years and above
In labor force
0.460
Employed
0.898
Hours per week, primary work
40.722
Hours per week, total
41.794
Employed but looking additional
work
0.111
Unemployed and seeking job
0.186
Members 18-34 years old
In labor force
0.623
Employed
0.917
Hours per week, primary work
42.741
Hours per week, total
43.923
Employed but looking additional
work
0.106

Control Coef.

PValue

Obs.

0.899
0.967
41.397
43.259

0.018
0.005
0.916
0.959

0.248
0.605
0.512
0.507

1401
1271
1106
1208

0.132
0.143

0.049
0.100

0.030
0.455

1232
39

0.468
0.923
38.769
39.806

-0.044
-0.013
0.000
0.124

0.158
0.599
1.000
0.961

1085
482
404
430

0.078
0.308

0.052
-0.158

0.050
0.207

554
50

0.678
0.924
41.239
42.663

0.002
0.012
0.448
0.620

0.903
0.249
0.727
0.644

3949
2682
2221
2395

0.097
0.260

0.042
-0.067

0.016
0.324

2494
188

0.857
0.929
41.464
43.134

0.020
0.024
0.343
0.491

0.198
0.040
0.790
0.731

2093
1816
1520
1648

0.109
0.262

0.042
-0.026

0.028
0.778

1710
106

0.473
0.912
40.774
41.668

-0.013
-0.017
0.616
1.014

0.643
0.363
0.783
0.643

1856
866
701
747

0.072
0.256

0.043
-0.152

0.067
0.100

784
82

0.603
0.876
41.466
42.704

0.017
0.039
1.727
1.828

0.499
0.053
0.331
0.319

1852
1135
895
950

0.074

0.035

0.094

1018

11
Unemployed and seeking job
Members 35-54 years old
In labor force
Employed
Hours per week, primary work
Hours per week, total
Employed but looking additional
work
Unemployed and seeking job
Members 55-64 years old
In labor force
Employed
Hours per week, primary work
Hours per week, total
Employed but looking additional
work
Unemployed and seeking job

0.292

0.275

0.008

0.924

117

0.752
0.955
40.416
42.558

0.766
0.957
41.780
43.340

-0.012
-0.002
-0.920
-0.483

0.538
0.847
0.577
0.770

1662
1262
1071
1180

0.175
0.111

0.117
0.207

0.060
-0.178

0.012
0.122

1206
56

0.765
0.949
37.417
37.537

0.800
0.952
38.287
39.464

-0.023
-0.016
-0.974
-1.717

0.619
0.530
0.770
0.610

283
221
197
205

0.117
0.167

0.081
0.400

0.019
-0.231

0.704
0.361

210
11

12
Table 2. Impact on Labor Outcomes of School-aged Children
Variables
Work for pay
All children, 6-17 years old
Male children, 6-17 years
old
Female children, 6-17 years
old
Children 6-11 years old
Children 12-14 years old
Children 15-17 years old
No. of hrs working for pay past
week
All children, 6-17 years old
Male children, 6-17 years
old
Female children, 6-17 years
old
Children 6-11 years old
Children 12-14 years old
Children 15-17 years old

Treatment Control Coef.

PValue

Obs.

0.084

0.073

0.015

0.193

3098

0.106

0.100

0.012

0.460

1605

0.061
0.023
0.122
0.182

0.045
0.021
0.093
0.163

0.019
0.003
0.038
0.028

0.121
0.689
0.100
0.313

1493
1573
810
715

16.884

16.811

0.976

0.694

240

15.190

18.342

-1.802

0.504

163

20.044
4.111
11.694
24.694

13.031
9.067
11.081
22.373

6.810
-3.636
2.394
3.192

0.158
0.033
0.408
0.383

77
33
86
121