CONSULTATION REPORT

Ensuring Stability in Sudan: the Interim Period and Beyond

Nairobi, Kenya 25 – 27 May 2009

Part of the Sudan Peace-Building Initiative, financed by the European Commission

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The
contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Concordis International and can
under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
Introduction

As part of the Sudan Peace-Building Initiative financed by the European Commission, Concordis
International facilitated a consultation on ‘Ensuring Stability in Sudan: the Interim Period and Beyond’ in
Nairobi, Kenya, from 25 to 27 May 2009. Preparations for the event were undertaken by Concordis
with the support of the Secretariat for Peace and Political Affairs of the Council of the International
People’s Friendship (CIPF) in Khartoum, which is an organ of the Presidency.

In total, 26 Sudanese participants attended the consultation in their personal capacity. Participants
came from a number of different commissions and committees within the Government of National
Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan mandated to contribute towards peace, security and
the success of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Senior staff of the peace departments
of Sudanese universities as well as leaders of Sudanese NGOs and civil society networks also
attended. Discussions, other than the presentations, took place under the Chatham House Rule1 in
order to ensure a frank and open exchange of views on the potentially sensitive issues covered.

Concordis primarily understood its role as assisting the Sudanese participants in working together
towards a common understanding of current and forthcoming challenges and in developing common
visions and strategies for addressing them. Concordis put together a programme of topics for
discussion and arranged a series of presentations by Sudanese and international experts for the
consideration of the participants. This programme was developed in consultation with staff of
Sudanese university peace departments and a range of other actors working to support the peace
agreement. The presentations shared analysis of current and forthcoming challenges, as well as
principles and approaches potentially relevant to the successful implementation of the CPA over the
remaining two years of the interim period and beyond.

Three thematic areas, relevant to the stability in Sudan over the interim period and beyond, were
addressed during the course of the meeting:

One related to ensuring that the elections and the referendum are conducted in a sufficiently
credible, robust and accepted manner so that there is less chance that their outcomes be
manipulated or are used as triggers for violence and instability.

The second concerned establishing principles and mechanisms to ensure effective, secure and
stable relationships across regions and borders. Such principles should be of relevance to a
peaceful and successful relationship across the border between Northern and Southern Sudan,
whether or not it becomes an international border as an outcome of the referendum on Southern self-
determination.

The third addressed progress and challenges in the security transitions established by the CPA
including the DDR process and the nature of security provision and security governance more
broadly.

In plenary sessions and in smaller working groups, participants were able to develop some points of
consensus on each of these three related areas, identifying challenges and suggesting potential
ways forward. The following report summarises presentations, discussions and points of consensus
achieved during the meeting. Concordis hopes that this report will contribute towards distilling and
consolidating what was achieved over the course of the three days, and that it will provide a useful
resource to inform future activity.

An additional outcome of the consultation was that participants agreed to establish and organise a
forum whereby they could continue to meet to discuss and develop strategies for combining their
respective individual and organisational efforts to ensure stability in Sudan. The forum would be
named “Anna Peace Motivators’ Forum” and would seek to sustain the collective engagement of the

1
"When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the
information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other
participant, may be revealed".

2
participants who attended the consultation as well as widening participation and including other
institutions conducting relevant work to support the peace process.

1. Where are we now? Identifying the challenges ahead.

Presentation: Dr Elhag Hamed – The CPA Interim Assessment: Civil Society Vision on the
Future.

Dr Elhag presented the conclusions of a workshop for Sudanese civil society which was convened in
Khartoum on 21-22 January 2009, by Social and Human Development Consultancy Group in
collaboration with Norwegian Church Aid. That workshop assessed the interim implementation of the
CPA and articulated a vision for the future. A summary of the conclusions and recommendations of
that meeting follows:

Civil society should be neither for, nor against, the government; rather it should be either for or
against specific policies. Civil society should engage positively by advising policy and decision
makers to act above factional interests. It should endeavour for a national programme of
concordance that commits to consensus on an action plan for the peaceful exchange of power, for
independence of the judiciary, for the rule of law and for the exaction of right and legal justice driven
from the bill of rights as stipulated in the interim constitution.

The efforts made by the Government of the National Unity (GoNU), the Government of Southern
Sudan (GOSS) and the governments of states are recognised. Nevertheless, civil society
organisations have to act as pressure groups on the decision makers to strictly commit to fully
implementing the peace agreement and the associated democratic transformation.

The institutional structure as established in Sudan’s peace agreements remains incomplete. It needs
to be completed by taking a number of measures, including ensuring observance of human rights,
establishing the Land Commission and completing the demarcation of states’ boundaries.

The Commissions established by Sudan’s agreements need to be activated and supported in their
work. For them to be effective, the CPA parties need to negotiate, delimit and restrict the authority of
Ministries so that there is clarity over institutional roles and responsibilities and so that resources are
allocated effectively. A trained cadre is essential to effective public service provision. Training such
a cadre is particularly essential for Southern Sudan.

The right to self-determination for the people of the South is recognised. Ultimately, though, the
issue of democratic transformation remains the overarching priority. Whether Sudan is united or
separated, democracy and peaceful transfer of power should be the priority, regardless of how many
states are there. Civil society must work efficiently as a third partner in putting into effect and
realising the peace agreement, especially the protocols of the Three Areas.

More resources need to be made available at the level of the locality and good governance at the
local level must be a priority.

The amendment of laws to comply with the peace agreements should not be selective and it should
aim to integrate the values of democracy, justice, strict commitment to the rule of law and the
independence of judiciary.

The National Security law should work as defined in the CPA. An efficient security system is needed.
It should act under the specific and clear terms of reference as set out in the Interim National
Constitution. It should be highly professional, with qualified experts and staff. It should be fully under
the hegemony of law workers and the judiciary. All arrests under the security law should be issued by
an investigation level judge and the accused should be held under the normative criminal
procedures. The press law must strictly adhere to the bill of rights of the interim constitution and
protect journalists, ensure press freedom and commit the state to freedom of information and
transparency

Ultimately, it is recognised that if the Darfur crisis is not addressed, the CPA is in danger of
collapsing.

3
Presentation: Dr Samson Wassara – The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan:
Institutional Developments and Political Trends in Focus Areas.

“[T]he CPA has provided the basis for the creation of the Interim National Constitution, the Interim
Constitution of Southern Sudan and various state constitutions. These organic documents provide for
the establishment of institutions to represent all branches of government and empower the
government to build mechanisms of administration to assist in the management of the state
apparatus. Both the CPA and the federal system of government complement each other in the
business of conflict resolution and peace building. The function of a federation is to decentralize
power as a means of defusing conflicts in societies that are diverse in their compositions, and to
enhance social and political development within this diversity. This is particularly relevant to
conditions in the Sudan, a nation that experienced protracted conflict and violence before achieving
independence in 1956.

The CPA provides for the institutions which are crucial in creating a new political environment after a
prolonged period of social disharmony in the Sudan. ... [T]here is no shortage of institutions to make
the political system work. However, it is the problem of attitudes that has hindered progress in
establishing the necessary political institutions. The main challenges are to banish distrust and fear
among the custodians of the CPA in the competition for the influence and control of territories where
they prevail. These are all psychological barriers in the implementation of the agreement, which
contribute to the underdevelopment of functional institutions.

Furthermore, the political will needed to implement the CPA is lacking in the behaviour of the
partners in the agreement. This fact is demonstrated by the deadlocks in the governance of the
Three Areas, and in the recurring spiral of violence in the border areas between Northern and
Southern Sudan, particularly in South Kordofan, Abyei, Unity State and Northern Bahr el Ghazal
State. The parties to the CPA pay scant attention to the empowerment of institutions that could settle
these disputes as can be substantiated by the cases of the Abyei Boundary Commission and the
North-South Boundary Commission.

In addition, ... GOSS is suffering from a lack of experience in the business of government, which is
reflected by the fact that institutions were created without the laws necessary to govern their
operations. Progress in enacting relevant legislation and regulatory mechanisms has lagged behind...
. It is this issue that allows people to think that corruption is rampant in GOSS and the lower levels of
government. Nevertheless, ...mismanagement ... can be attributed to the absence of substantial laws
and regulations that govern institutions in Southern Sudan.

Finally, the overall problems of institutional development in the context of the CPA are closely linked
with the political attitude and behaviour of the NCP, SPLM and the other political parties that are
spectators of the political machinations taking place between the signatories of the agreement. The
lack of progress in the development of political institutions is therefore attributable to the
unpredictable relationships between these partners, who are the custodians of the peace agreement.
It remains to be seen how the partners will overcome these shortcomings in the process of pursuing
peace in the Sudan.”2

Presentation: Fleur Just – Where are we now?

Much of the CPA has already been implemented. However, there are still real tensions in Sudan,
especially between the NCP and the SPLM and on some occasions these difficulties have led to
incidents of significant violence and fighting, even after the CPA was signed.

When there are problems of trust or consensus between partners to an agreement like the CPA, this
can lead to people implementing the agreement in a purely technical way without fostering it in the
spirit in which it was devised. One of the challenges in monitoring the progress in the CPA is to
examine whether there are peace dividends coming out of the agreement. A big benchmark will be
the elections. Sometimes the technical elements of an election can be in place, but does that

2
This text is a citation from the paper, which formed the basis of Dr Wassara’s presentation: S. Wassara The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan: Institutional Developments and Political Trends in Focus
Areas Samson, Chr Michelson Institute, Sudan Working Paper 2009: 1 available at
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?3359=the-comprehensive-peace-agreement-in-the-sudan

4
necessarily mean that there has been a real change in the nature of politics or the system of
government?

There is an interconnectedness between all of the conflicts in Sudan - North, South, East, and West.
The CPA needs to prevent further violence in the peripheral areas (including Darfur), not just
between the North and South. Dealing with such structural challenges can often happen through a
change in the system by which the country is governed.

Another key challenge is the referendum in 2011. We must be able to discuss the fact that the South
may elect to become independent. This leads on to the following question: Is there enough
programming going on (internal and external) that promotes good relations between the North and
South, whether the future holds secession or not? Is enough happening right now to ensure that the
North and the South can become good neighbours? And are we ready to discuss scenarios post
2011? The subject remains controversial and it currently seems it can only be discussed in a
whisper. This lack of planning and open dialogue leads to considerable risks.

Group Discussion – Accomplishments of the CPA so far and recognising the challenges
ahead.

There has been significant progress in the implementation of many of the provisions of the CPA and
this should be a source of encouragement. (One of the participants provided the group with a
summary of the achievements in CPA implementation so far - the associated notes are available as
an appendix to this document). Nevertheless, there remain many outstanding provisions to be
implemented as well as broader underlying tensions and challenges to the agreement, both in the
relationship between the parties and in the broader social, political, economic and security situation
in Sudan.

The forthcoming elections and referendum were noted as very significant sources of uncertainty.
More generally speaking there was expressed a sense that there is a lack of trust between the CPA
parties. The need for economic development, especially in Southern Sudan was seen as a major
challenge. Domestic violence and gender based violence was alos raised as an unspoken challenge
to security and stability in the country.

Ultimately, signing the CPA is not the final step in achieving peace in Sudan, because the agreement
is not a solution in itself. Rather, is a means of towards building peace among the Sudanese, and it
provides a framework with which to manage Sudan’s conflicts. The signing parties need help from
the international community to implement the CPA, and they need to be held accountable to its
provisions.

2. Voting Processes and Stability

Presentation: Victor Shale – Elections and Conflict Prevention

Elections denote a deliberate process of choosing national and local leaders by citizens to run affairs
of the nation on their behalf. They form an important ingredient of democratic governance. However,
elections should not be considered synonymous with democracy. Neither do they necessarily amount
on their own to democracy, but the latter is incomplete without credible and legitimate elections. That
is why it is possible for a country to have regular elections, even if its governance is authoritarian in
both form and content. Conversely, a country cannot be democratic without upholding the principle
and culture of regular multiparty selections.

Elections hold functions such as legitimisation of the political system and government. They transfer
national trust to leaders and parties and are responsible for orderly succession of governments, the
election and recruitment of leaders, the representation of interests and opinions of the citizens, and
political mobilisation and education. Elections are also a constructive way to manage conflict.
Elections integrate social pluralist and orderly political competition and form parliamentary majorities
as well as establishing a capable parliamentary opposition and linking political institutions with voters’
preferences. While regular elections have brought stability in some countries, the opposite is the
case in others. Despite significant transition, democratic consolidation is very slow. African countries
are still battling to deal with conflict.

5
The following table summarises some typical characteristics of competing perspectives and
dynamics often apparent in the contestation of elections and in competition over the control and
conduct of electoral processes:

The Ruling Party Opposition Parties

Issues Need to have election and to begin with processes Gerrymandering; voters roll
according to legal framework (set date, manipulation; use of state resources;
demarcate boundaries, administer voters roll, vote rigging
campaigns, voting, vote counting and result
tabulation and announcements)

Structures to deal with Judiciary, EMB (Election Management Body) None

issues
Source of power Judiciary, state machinery (Police, army None
municipal police), public media

Actions and Processes Propaganda, arrests, banning of private media Protests, law suits, petition regulation,
regional & international bodies, boycott
of elections
Assumption about the Transgression of electoral laws and tarnishing Legitimate need for level playing field
nature of the Conflict country image and engagement in criminal acts and to have free and fair elections

Again in general terms, elections may lead to best case or worst case scenarios, such as:

- Acceptance of results (best case)

- Post-election political stability (best case)
- Use of arms in protest to results (worst case)
- Savimbi option (worst case)

Elections are a competition and therefore cause conflict which can be triggered by delimitation of
boundaries, political campaigns, media coverage of elections, voter registration and voters roll, and
results management. Elections can reopen old wounds, thus escalating conflict, but they can also
heal wounds and therefore ushering peace. Conflicts may be managed through setting up conflict
management structures such as party liaison committees, conflict management and mediation
panels, multi-party liaison committees, the electoral court or tribunal. Enhancing the capacity of the
Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and pursuing citizen diplomacy in fragile peace environments
are both methods of conflict management, which can support a stable electoral environment.

Conflict Management Structures are panels that complement the formal mechanisms of dispute
resolution by the courts and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) over the electoral period and
could deepen the peace process of the CPA. Such structures were established in the DRC and in
South Africa under the supervision of those countries’ EMBs. While the EMB usually supervises the
overall electoral process, the actual coordination, deployment and monitoring should be carried out
by an external agency on behalf of the EMB. Other roles of EMBs in mitigating violence should be to
regularly consult and dialogue with key stakeholders every step of the electoral process, to candidly
manage the voter roll, to conduct civic and voter education with emphasis on conflict management,
and to develop programmes on alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The EMBs should not only train
election staff with emphasis on conflict management and ADR, but also train party agents on
electoral matters including conflict management and ADR. Both international and domestic observers
should be invited and accredited. Electoral reforms with a view to entrench peace and political
stability should be embarked on and other institutions need to play their roles as well such as a
professional and ethical media, political parties, independent judiciary, professional and non-partisan
security establishment and a vibrant civil society.

6
Besides the formal conflict management processes, citizen diplomacy is crucial. It complements
official diplomacy, therefore opening opportunities for communication, cross-cultural understanding,
and joint efforts to address parties’ needs. Citizen diplomacy also seeks to bridge the divide between
elite and grassroots levels within communities, and between different cultural world views on how to
manage conflicts.

The electoral process should be conceived holistically. Elections should not be one off events, rather
part of a cyclical process which can be represented according to the following “Electoral Cycle”:

In conclusion, evidence shows growing trend of post-election conflict, and therefore conflict
resolution mechanisms and structures are very important when elections are taking place. EMBs
should adopt the electoral cycle approach in managing electoral disputes and mitigating violence.
Conflict prevention and management should be a central pre-occupation of EMBs throughout the
three stages of the electoral process, namely (a) pre-voting, (b) voting, and (c) post-voting stages. It
is advisable that following elections, EMBs engage in post-election reviews, electoral audits to inform
appropriate electoral reforms. On their own, EMBs may not be able to thwart political violence, hence
there is a need for other institutions to become part of the process. Citizen diplomacy is equally
important in the mitigation of conflict.

Group discussion – Elections and Referendum

Challenges

Accomplishments since the signing of the CPA are the existence of an electoral law and election
commission, the existence of peace commissions, and the positive role of civil society. However,
there are still a number of challenges and concerns. There is a possibility that the elections may not
represent the will of the people due to the challenges concerning the arrangements for people whose
way of life takes them away from the place where they are registered, the exclusion of Sudanese
living abroad and refugees, the weakness of civil society in the South, and the general public’s lack
of knowledge about the elections and the electoral system. Many think that the elections and the
referendum are the same thing, and some are unaware of the fact that the outcome of the
referendum will tell whether there will be unity or separation. The registration system may also be
disenfranchising and the question remains whether Darfurians will be able to vote or not. There is
also the risk that votes may not reflect people’s views, particularly because of state controls on the
media and oppressive laws. There are also security problems in the south that may compromise the
voting. Other obstacles can be possible forgery of the system and vote rigging. Practical challenges
concerning the elections are boundary demarcation and the time frame set for the electoral
commission. A last issue concerns the willingness of people to return to violence due to lack of
reconciliation and small arms dissemination.

7
Possible ways forward

There are several proposals for solutions. Technical matters such as adapting the way of voting to
the ability of the voters and making the electoral process more transparent, should be addressed. A
method of public education should be set to educate the people about the system of elections and
referendum. The role of the civil society should be enhanced and a Sudanese identity should be
encouraged through the process.

The Electoral Law should ensure a fair, free and transparent process, guaranteeing wide-ranging
participation in order to make stability more likely. Several steps that should be taken to achieve this
including the formation of Committees based on qualifications rather than political appointments, the
provision of human and financial resources to CSOs – i.e. the empowerment of civil society through
funding and training - mobilisation of voters, setting up registration committees to reach out to the
public, provision of minimal level of security in all states including ceasefire during elections and
corridors of tranquillity, de-politicisation of the police, security force and state institutions referring to
existing laws, voter education, training of female candidates, and gender sensitisation of political
parties. These steps should be carried out by the NEC, the GoNU, international donors, civil society,
and all political parties. The international community should be involved, especially the AEC, IGAD,
AU, UNMIS and UNAMID.

3. Stable and Effective Regional Relationships

Presentation: Lucian Harriman – Thinking about borders and border relationships3

This presentation concerns the nature of the border between North and South Sudan, the
relationships across this border and the management of these relationships. We are asking what are
the characteristics of a stable and effective border relationship. Such characteristics may be the
same whether or not the border is internal or international, and wherever the border is drawn.

Boundaries and frontiers are two terms associated with borders, which describe potential
characteristics of borders. Boundaries can define limits of ownership and authority, defence lines
and safety. They can also define differences between groups, they are about inclusion and exclusion.
A frontier can be the front line of colonisation. They are often moving and can be characterised by
violence, and contestation.

International/state borders tend to be seen as fixed. They have legal and political significance. They
tend to demarcate sovereignty and they set limits of authority and ownership. State borders regulate
relationships and there need to be principles in place regarding how those relationships should best
be managed.

Borderlands are areas on either side of a border, and may also be regional. The populations in these
areas have to deal with the system by which the border is regulated. They have to figure out a way
to deal with these systems to go on with their lives.

One way of conceiving borders is as “hard” or “soft”. Hard borders can be associated with:
obstruction, barriers, restriction of movement, separation, militarisation, tension, and perceptions of
threat. Soft borders on the other hand may facilitate mobility and interaction and be associated with
perceptions of safety, opportunity, trust, and common interest.

People in border areas have to negotiate the regulations from a higher power. Even though the local
populations often have their own initiatives and solutions to the challenges posed by border
regulations - if a border is regulated at all - it is still up to policy makers to consider the consequences
of regulatory systems for local populations. Governance at the high political level does have
significant consequences for people on the ground.

3
Most of the concepts included in this presentation were drawn from a lecture for post-Graduate students of
Violence, Conflict and Development presented by Dr Jonathan Goodhand, Senior Lecturer in Development
Practice at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, in 2008.

8
The border between North and South Sudan may become an international border. In any case, a
question for Sudanese to consider is, whatever the outcome of the referendum, whether they want it
to be a soft or a hard border.

Presentation: Emmanuel Salliot - Cross-Border Co-operation Experiences in West-Africa.

The case of West Africa may be illuminating for the Sudanese, when they consider how to manage
their own border relationships. In West Africa, border zones are the place where almost all foreign
trade passes between the global market and land-locked countries, and between Sahelian countries
and coastal countries. The zones also structure regional - local trade whose intensity has definitely
increased. The main goal of ECOWAS is to create an economic union in West-Africa through
progressive abolition of customs duties on imports and exports, adoption of a common external tariff
and a common trade policy, and removal of obstacles to the free movement of goods and people
and to the right of residence and establishment. The main issues are the small size of national
markets, lack of competitiveness of regional production and trade, and a Regional Economic
Partnership (EPA) with the European Union.

Border zones are the front line in achieving regional economic integration, and therefore face
increasing risks and the need to regionally manage the consequences of arising conflicts.
Local/national conflicts have significant regional effects: proliferation of small arms, illicit trafficking of
goods and resources, cattle raiding, rackets, circulation of armed groups, etc. A regional response
through local and national demobilisation and reconstruction processes is necessary. A political
approach should be adopted, but at the grassroots level the initiatives are more often based on
personal relationships rather than on official collaborative procedures. In the field of peace and
security there is a lack of support for cross-border initiatives.

Economic and social trade is quite strong in West Africa, linking various sub-regions despite different
ethnicities, religious believes, nationalities, languages, monetary differences, administrative
inheritance, etc. Currently the traditional socio-economic solidarity is rarely taken into account in
regional strategies. Therefore a grassroots regional integration process is paramount. ECOWAS (the
Economic Community of West African States) supports such a process by introducing and
developing of a participatory approach favouring more modest projects. This approach could
reconcile the populations with the sub regional institutions. Examples of African regional institutions
and cross-border co-operation are: 1) ECOWAS: launch of the Cross-border Initiatives Programme in
2005 and submission of the Cross-border Co-operation Convention to ECOWAS Heads of State in
May 2009. 2) WAEMU (the West African Economic and Monetary Union): incorporation of cross-
border co-operation in its regional integration strategy in 2004. 3) African Union: Launch of the
Border Programme in June 2007.

Cross-border cooperation can be beneficial at the political, institutional, economic and socio-cultural
level. Socio-cultural co-operation is one of the linchpins to achieve functioning cross-border areas by
which the three other aspects will be enhanced. Therefore there is also the need for strengthening
communications and exchange of information.

The WABI (West African Border Initiative) initiative wants to capitalise cross-border cooperation. Its
objectives are to limit the regional diffusion of instability and insecurity by promoting cross-border co-
operation, and to speed up the regional integration process within the ECOWAS zone. These
objectives will be achieved by promoting pilot operations on the ground which are taking into account
the views of populations, NGOs and local agencies, by capitalising on and disseminating cross-
border experiences through effective communications tools, and by promoting local experience.

Experiences in West-Africa show several benefits of regional cross-border cooperation. At the

political level there is confidence, trust, and security. At the institutional level the capacity of state
institutions can be developed. At the economic level, regional cross-border cooperation benefits the
building on existing economic interaction between groups straddling borders. On the social/cultural
level cross-border cooperation facilitates the interaction enabling of social groups to practice
traditions. Concerning security, in addition to higher level political interaction, localised grassroots
initiatives for peace and development are also necessary for facilitation of communication across
borders. Local cross-border peace conferences can discuss issues and develop action plans for
local economic development initiatives to strengthen livelihoods and foster co-operation, and to
convene cross border cultural traditional events to build on local solidarity.

9
Group Dialogue – Borders

Discussion

Borders and boundaries have profound consequences for those who live in the border area. People
who set out the type of boundary/border need to think carefully about how it will effect those people
in the border areas. There is a consensus on the need for a soft border, but it needs to be clearly
demarcated in order to make explicit the respective rights and responsibilities of the different
authorities and communities in the effected areas. An increased level of understanding between
cross-border populations is necessary to improve their relationships and build confidence and
security in border areas. Also necessary is the need to support and augment common markets and
meeting places.

In Sudan, conflict is often escalated according to the narrow interests of the most powerful parties.
However, historically there have been common markets and meeting places in the border areas, and
some existing traditions of cross-border relations could bolster political and economic stability, in
spite of higher-level tensions. If the Sudanese really want to make the border ‘soft’, they need to
augment such shared markets. Assessment of what is going on the ground is necessary. The way
forward is by identifying and developing existing positive aspects, and minimising the negative
aspects of current cross-border relationships.

Proposed ways forward

Principles to make stable border relationships more likely are clarity and mutual recognition of
respective sovereignty and authority and cooperation in working towards common interests and a
soft border, which encourages interaction and mobility. Steps which should be taken in order to
achieve these principles include the development of local authorities enabling them to interact across
the border. Empowerment of traditional authorities and building on existing mechanisms for border
interaction such as mechanisms used by traditional leadership in border areas for maintaining
security and moving people will also be beneficial. Another step to take concerns technical
cooperation; a regional body could play such a purpose. The authorities should also enable and
encourage the free and fair exchange of information across the border. Markets should be supported
in border areas through local promotion, as well as regional and international cooperation. A next
step is the empowerment of local traditional authorities along side those borders whilst keeping past
experiences of living as neighbours in mind. Also, the image of good neighbouring countries needs
to be promoted, for instance through international trade. Other steps are demobilisation and the
development of resources. Steps need to be taken by the national government, state governments,
countries, regional cooperation bodies, international and local NGOs, media, academia, CSOs, local
and national Chamber of Commerce, international cooperation, governors, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the DDR on national, regional and international level.

4. Ensuring Security in Sudan

Presentation: Jeremy Brickhill - Concepts and Phases of Post-Conflict Security
Arrangements.

There are four phases in security transitions. Ceasefire process, transitional security process, final
status of forces, and security sector reform/transformation. Phase 1 is the Ceasefire Process, which
is important because it is the first step to show that both parties want to stop war and find a
resolution. Without Phase 1, you cannot move to the next phase. Basic ceasefire tasks are
disengagement and redeployment, prohibitions and control mechanisms such as advanced warnings
of movements, etc., verification and monitoring usually by third parties, mutual threat reduction,
security guarantees, and finally the setting up of joint security management systems to manage
ceasefires.

Phase 2 is Transitional Security Management which is meant to build trust and confidence between
the parties by their taking joint responsibility for security. This stage is the most important, but also
the most neglected. It entails disengagement, joint ceasefire management, implementation and
monitoring: It entails interim joint command and joint responsibility for security, and preparations for
final status negotiations - i.e. asking what will happen in the future. Finally, confidence building is of
utmost importance during this phase.

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Phase 3 is Final Status of Forces. This phase encompasses restructuring of security governance
institutions and legislative framework, restructuring of security command and management systems,
integration of forces, substantive DDR planning (DDR Commission), development of security sector
transformation strategy (initial SST planning), deciding on the role of Third Parties, and other related
(political, economic, social) reform.

Phase 4 is the Security Sector Reform/Transformation. This phase requires security assessments
and the development and implementation of a security sector transformation strategy, restructuring
security governance institutions and the legislative framework, defence review and force reduction
processes, associated DDR programming, and the strengthening of Rule of Law (Police Reform,
Judiciary, Civil Society).

Several issues pose challenges to ensuring stability in Sudan. Ongoing processes include managing
the Transitional Security System, managing and maintaining security, addressing ongoing conflict,
preparing Final Status, undertaking initial Security Sector Transformation, and commencing DDR. All
of these processes are going on in Sudan at the same time and that is a lot to manage. But is there
an overarching strategy? How can you manage all of this at once? Current challenges are residual
and unresolved security threats (militias, not implemented parts of the CPA, issues around the Three
Areas, etc.), unresolved grievances, small arms proliferation, normal sources of conflict (resources,
etc.), tensions arising from structural transformation and DDR such as reduction or expansion of
armed forces, referendum/elections, and spoilers (including losers!) and “Dissidents”: There are
losers in peace because they stop making money. War makes some people rich. Dissidents raise
critical voices and that is a problem to the elite because they do not want you to make the process
difficult.

The CPA provides a set of rules and instruments to assist the parties to manage transitional security
processes: they are a system of tools and don’t provide you with answers. The end of transition sets
new challenges which are not addressed in the CPA. Is there a need for preparation and negotiation
of a CPA Security Arrangements PLUS?

Managing and mitigating conflict should happen through several processes:

1. Mutual Threat Reduction and Confidence Building which is one of the key elements of the
Machakos agreement.
2. DDR and Small Arms Control: This does not mean only the demobilisation of the current round,
you still have a large group of people outside of formal construction such as militias.
3. Community Peacebuilding: how are you going to do it? This should include small arms,
grievances, resource conflicts.
4. Peace mobilisation: Everybody should work together: professors, DDR, peace commission,
youth, women groups, etc.
5. Multi-sectoral peacebuilding: you need the multi-sectoral force because this cannot done by one
sector. You have to defend peace, because it cannot defend itself. Therefore you have to build
capacity.

Also, in peacebuilding you should not make your enemy weak, because he will be your partner in
peace. And you need a strong partner in peace, because peace will collapse without strong partners.
Interesting organisations and people to contact regarding security transitions are:
- African Security Sector Network (ASSN),
- Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), Birmingham University,
- SADSEM, Southern African (SADCC) Security Sector Support

Presentation: William Deng Deng – Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration Commission

Throughout human history, there have been wars; armed forces have demobilised at the conclusion
of conflicts. In most cases, this was achieved with no involvement by the international community. In
certain situations, this is not possible, whether due to the lack of resources required to permit
‘natural’ re-absorption of ex-combatants, or to ongoing security concerns. In such cases, the
presence of ‘idle’ ex-combatants can of itself constitute a threat to peace-building and development
efforts. DDR, for our purposes, refers to the model of Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration of ex-combatants supported by the United nations since 1992 (Cambodia), with
forerunner demobilization operations in Latin America since 1989 (Nicaragua). Since 1989, DDR has

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been supported by the UN in 18 post-conflict situations, through the implementation of 23 separate
DDR programs. Each DDR effort is a reflection of the conflict which led to it – each is unique. DDR in
Sudan is the most recent UN-supported program . Provision for it is clearly laid out as part of the
Security arrangements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The DDR effort in Southern Sudan
is the largest and most complex ever attempted worldwide.

The following factors complicate DDR in Sudan:

- Scale: the needs of 180,000 ex-combatants must be addressed - more than in any previous DDR
program yet attempted.
- Nature of Conflict: The length of the conflict means that ex-combatants in Sudan must be re-
integrated into a civilian society from which many of them have been cut off for decades. Many are
completely adapted to ‘barracks culture’, and require strong support to help them re-integrate into
the small communities to which they will return.
- Nature of Forces: The forces to be demobilized include many who were members of Other Armed
Groups (OAGs), some of which were fairly recently integrated into SPLA/SAF. This means special
care must be taken to avoid inflaming the resultant political and social tensions.
- Nature of Ex-Combatants: In Sudan, ex-combatants include 35,000 Special Need Groups- the
elderly veterans, disabled veterans, women & children associated with armed groups. Crucially,
many have been deprived of access to formal education.
- Geographical Factors: The sheer size of the country and the post-war problems of transport
infrastructure create particular logistical problems. Particularly in Southern Sudan, simply
transporting ex-combatants to their home areas is a huge problem.
- Economic Factors: Above all, ex-combatants need to be enabled to be economically productive.
This poses potential problems in our fledgling economy. The negative effects of the global
economic crisis are yet to be understood.

DDR offers several opportunities in Sudan. Effective DDR is the cornerstone for maintaining peace
and security, and also for the rapid development that Sudan requires. Properly demobilized and
reintegrated, our ex-combatants constitute a huge potential workforce – they are crucial to
implementing large-scale infrastructure projects. Our ex-combatants, despite their perceived
problems, have been exposed to many experiences and can be effective agents for change in their
home communities. Our ex-combatants, given the chance to return to civilian life in the spirit of
respect and honor, will be positive about contributing to the building of their nation, in whatever
capacity we may call upon them. Let us take the chance to build our peoples’ self-respect. Through
successful DDR, we in Sudan can demonstrate, once again, our ability to overcome adversity and
achieve success. This is an opportunity of historic proportions, and a natural progression from our
work to achieve the implementation of CPA.

Achievements by the SSDDRC are:

- Reorientation of Sudan’s DDR to bring it back into line with the Security arrangements defined
within the CPA.
- Reorganization of the DDR priorities, putting Special Needs groups and senior officers at the top of
the list.
- Achieving greater co-operation with the SPLA/SAF.
- Bridge-building to create positive relations with potential funders of the DDR effort in Sudan, and
other stakeholder institutions.
- Raising the profile of the SSDDRC and its work through active engagement with the media sector.
- Establishment of a Reintegration Technical Committee with representation from all stakeholder
institutions.
- Reorganization of the structure, staffing and administrative systems of the SSDDRC in order to
foster effectiveness, fairness and transparency.
- Building State offices- the first, in Torit, is now operational.
- Procurement of essential vehicles- 11 cars have now been secured, one for the Headquarters and
one for each of the 10 States.
- Organization of the DDR Round Table conference in Juba on 16 February 2008.
- Organization of a 2-day national retreat for the whole of SSDDRC.
- Provision of IT training for SSDDRC personnel.

In the future, it is crucial that DDR is prioritized at the highest level within the Governments of
National Unity and Southern Sudan. Without this support, DDR in Southern Sudan faces serious
problems- with negative consequences for security and development. Increased funds are required
from within GOSS. We urgently request an increase in the Commission’s budget. We request the

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right to conduct independent audit of the SSDDRC, in order to allow us to demonstrate transparency
to the international community. SSDDRC must quickly recruit Southern Sudanese personnel from
among the diaspora and skilled ex-combatants, who are competent to build it’s systems and existing
human capacity. In order to do this, it is essential that we are permitted to recruit outside the Public
Service system. We request the Council of Ministers to give us permission to do so.

Presentation: Simon Monoja - Security Sector Reform

Recent research into the current state of policing in Southern Sudan has identified a number of
challenges and accordingly produced a number of findings and recommendations, briefly
summarized here:

There is a need for clarity of the legal framework concerning the variety of security organs. Survey
results indicate that people would usually approach traditional leaders for security rather than the
police. There is apparently a lack of confidence in the police and mechanisms need to be developed
to enable them to provide an effective and accessible service.

The budget for police reform should be increased and should cover equipment, training and
infrastructure. The police force severely lacks resources, they have barely enough to cover salaries.
In addition, communities in conflict are better armed than the police, reducing the police’s prospects
of enforcing the law or protecting populations.

Greater co-operation between the police and other security institutions should be promoted so that
other institutions do not undermine the development of the police force. Police recruitment should be
focussed on younger forces - a police academy should be established, and police training should be
gender sensitive. Most people currently being recruited are illiterate - they need to be literate to be
able to take statements or carry out other necessary tasks. Collaboration is necessary between the
DDR programme and broader security reform including reform of the police.

Group Dialogue – Security

Security planning needs to happen in a consistent manner and a common broadly inclusive and open
platform needs to be created to do so. Concerning community security, militia and other armed
groups need to be dealt with and a method of collecting and retention of small arms locally should be
designed, which at the same time does not leave a “security vacuum” for the communities in the
area. On a national level, the police force needs to be reformed. It should be a community-oriented
police force, not one in a military style. Members of the police force who are ex-military should be re-
trained accordingly. Also, The police force should be more of a service-style organisation. A
distinction should also be made between the role of the intelligence service and the role of the police.
The intelligence service is not a law enforcement agency, but the police force is. Most importantly,
we should ask ourselves what we are able to do individually to contribute towards security and
stability, rather than pointing the finger at others.

There are several principles that could make stability concerning the issue of security more likely.
Security should be conceived holistically as human security, which has economic, political, and social
dynamics. The State should play a moderating role of providing the necessary atmospheres such as
public safety and peaceful co-existence, for individuals and society at large.

Security should be provided in a way that contributes to the overall stability of the Sudan. By
necessity, this will require ensuring various forms of reform or transformation in the institutions of
security governance. The national security organs and security sector should be non-partisan and
not affiliated to any political party. They should be inclusive and judicially accountable. For stability to
be achieved, one has to redefine the role of the security organs in terms of the following principles -
inclusivity, professionalism and accountability.

Some steps, which should be taken to achieve these ends, are to call, lobby, and campaign for
legislation, which addresses the need for security, sector transformation including the expansion of
power among the organs of a government responsible for the rule of law. The security sector should
be restructured to meet national requirements and a national vision, developed through consultations
and based upon national consensus. A common platform for exchange of information and a
common research programme from the various actors working in the field of security sector and

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peace should be established. Democratic forces should be encouraged to support the
transformation of the security sector.

Conclusion

Participants agreed that following the consultation they would engage policy makers, all civil society
sectors, mosques, churches, researchers, media, traditional leaders, civil administration and others,
to support and participate in an inclusive and broadly representative forum for the purpose of the
dissemination of information about the burning issues that threaten stability in Sudan.

They agreed to set up a platform for this purpose under the name “Anna Peace Motivators Forum”
The terms of reference for this platform are as follows:

1. Support & follow CPA implementation and moderate the challenges facing the implementation
process

2. Encourage CSOs participation in conflict resolution and peace building processes

3. Support national reconciliation

4. Exchange of experiences

5. Research & training in peace building and peace making policy and advocacy

6. Coordination of peace networking to expedite the process.

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