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Governing culture of the ruling elite in Bangladesh

M A N ZU R U L M A N N A N

Two Rajas (kings) rule our country; all of us are Projas (subject)
a commoner
THE political system of governance in Bangladesh is evolving by
producing a ruling elite that consists of democratic dynasties. The
present ruling elite comprises of two major and one minor political
dynasty with their respective tribunes. Prior to independence in 1971,
Bangladesh had neither a dynasty nor a ruling elite. Bangladesh was the
outcome of a Bengali nationalist movement whose political leadership
originated from the urban middle class with strong roots in the peasantry.
The Bengali middle class opted for Bangladesh because they found nonBengali Pakistanis a stumbling block in their aspiration to become the
ruling elite in Pakistan.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the nationalist movement, was
crowned as the Father of the Nation in post-colonial Bangladesh. He
formed the first post-colonial government in 1972 with his political party,
the Awami League, a middle class led party closely woven by kinship.
The government was quick to nationalize the industry owned by
Pakistanis and the Bengali economic elite, but simultaneously allowed the
middle class to transform itself into a noveau riche with financial help
and patronage of the state.1 This noveau riche class laid the foundation
for the making of dynasty in Bangladesh.
Three historical moments in Bangladesh politics created three democratic
dynasties: the accession to power by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1972,
the emergence of General Ziaur Rahman in 1977 and the assumption of
power by General Ershad in 1982.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-1975) became the first prime minister to
head a parliamentary form of government in 1972. But in 1975, he
replaced the multi-party system with an authoritarian one-party system
led by the BAKSAL (the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League,
created out of a merger between the Awami League and the Krishak
Sramik Party). This prompted the military coup that claimed Sheikh
Mujibs life.
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In 1977, General Ziaur Rahman (1977-1981) emerged as a military

strongman, but after a brief interregnum he decided to return to
democracy. Given the political culture of Bangladesh, Zia knew well that
he had to work through political channels to legitimize military rule. He
could not perpetually rely on the military and bureaucracy to mobilize the
masses against the Awami League (AL), which had strong grassroots
support and thus floated the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). As Zia
opened space for political participation, Awami League leaders were
quick to install Sheikh Hasina daughter of Sheikh Mujib as party
chief. In 1981, Zia was killed in a military putsch, but BNP politicians
made Zias wife Khaleda Zia the party chief.

Meanwhile,

General H.M. Ershad assumed power in 1982 in a

bloodless and peaceful military coup. He soon formed his Jatiya Party.
Since then his kin, especially the relatives of the first lady, Raushan
Ershad, have come to play a powerful role in politics. Raushan Ershads
sister Momota Wahab has been a minister from time to time. The
husband of one of her sisters was the chief of Bangladesh Overseas
Employment. Her brother, Mohiuddin, a senior diplomat, is married to
the daughter of the late left leader Moshiur Rahman, who worked as an
influential minister in Zias cabinet. His son Shafiqul Haque Ghani
Swapan also worked for a time as a minister in the Ershad regime.
General Ershad was forced out of power in 1990. Without state power,
the Ershad dynasty has been struggling to survive and keep intact the
leadership of the Jatiya Party in a situation in which Ershad has to
balance the fight between his wife and brother. In 2009, Ershads
brother, G.M. Quader, insisted on an election alliance with the Awami
League. Ershads wife opposed this. She wanted the Jatiya Party to
participate in the election on its own. Ershad decided to form an alliance
in order to ensure access to the state. The Awami League and its alliance
won the election and Ershads brother became a minister in Sheikh
Hasinas cabinet.
By 1990, a consensus had developed among the dynasties that the only
way to legitimate change of government was through democratic
elections. Since then, state power has alternated between AL and BNP:
the BNP winning the 1990 elections, the Awami League the 1996
elections, the BNP returning to power in 2001, and the Awami League
following in 2009. Their long spells in power indicate that while the
Ershad dynasty is struggling, the Mujib and Zia dynasties are sufficiently
consolidated to control the nitty-gritty of democratic politics. Indeed,
Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina are now grooming their sons, Tarique
Zia and Sajeeb Wazed Joy, to succeed them, leading to two threehttp://india-seminar.com/2011/622/622_manzurul_mannan.htm#top

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generational ruling dynasties in Bangladeshs short history as an

independent state: Zia-Khaleda-Tarique and Mujib-Hasina-Joy.2

The ruling dynasties are glued by family and kinship ties. Across the
various South Asian countries, families have used political parties to
enhance their personal standing and influence, and these parties in turn
have relied more on kinship structures instead of binding ideologies and
principle.3 The dominance of dynasties in a democratic system is
influenced by two primordial factors. First, the descendants or family
members enter politics at a crucial moment when political parties face
crises, usually upon the sudden demise of a tribune. The absence of a
designated political successor result in the formation of factions with the
party. The party elites aspiring to leadership are invariably drawn into an
internal factional fight, usually unable to elect a new party leader.
Consequently, the feuding actors natural choice falls upon the tribunes
immediate kin to provide an alternative viable candidate who can
symbolically integrate the party and temporarily prevent it from falling
apart. The kin of the deceased are required to mediate internal
factionalism. They all fall into the category of leaders whose assumption
of power is mediated by relatives, as opposed to those whose careers
are shaped from the beginning by their own choice, attributes and efforts,
and by a strong sense of their own political efficacy.4

Second,

the political families create a context which routinizes the

participation of family members in politics. Politicized from the outset
within their family environment, these actors enter politics primarily
because they have someone either a father, mother, brother, friend, or
uncle in politics, irrespective of their ideological leanings. It is a system
of preparing ones kin as a political successor that is endorsed by public
support.5
Combined with the hierarchical and hereditary values of Bengali culture,6
these kin-based political parties are marked by a relative absence of
inner-party democracy. They spawn despotic hierarchical behaviour
instead of nurturing the democratic value of equality within political
parties. The tribunes initially rely both on kin-based and non kin-based
loyalists to control their parties, balancing power between the two. But
over time, both sets of loyalists expand their support base and network
with their own kin and kin-based politics spreads from the party leader
to the leadership of other factions within the party as well.
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Intra-party factions are generally comfortable about grooming their kin

as successors, but feel threatened by the presence of others. This culture
inhibits the rise of leaders without kinship ties, who are at a disadvantage
in climbing the ladder of leadership within the party. In many cases, the
non-kin actors and disgruntled rising leaders, at an appropriate time, play
an instrumental role in overthrowing the tribunes and their regimes.7

Indeed, the prevalence of kinship is not only observed at the national

level, but pervades even local level politics. In July 2010, for example,
conflict broke out within the ruling Awami League party between the
deputy leader of Parliament and the minister of labour. The deputy
leader of Parliament is a non-kin loyalist of Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina. She was also a close aide of her father, Sheikh Mujib. But the
son of the labour minister is married to the prime ministers daughter.
The aging deputy leader patronized and groomed her elder son,
Shahadab Akbar, to take control of the Awami League in her
constituency. The labour minister, who vehemently opposed such a
move, mobilized his own kin to oppose Akbar. Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina and the district administration had to be called in to mediate this
local conflict between nationally known families.

Once it takes root in political parties, familial politics also spills over into
the broader public sphere. The democratic public sphere is organized in
both primordial and civic groupings. Primordial groups created by the
concept of desh are bound by moral principles and operate on the
same imperatives as kinship. The civic structures associated with
democracy the civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, the election
commission, and so on in contrast, are not organized around the norms
of family and kinship. Dynasty based politics thus encourages primordial
politics and weakens civic institutions.
For example, when Sheikh Hasina became prime minster, she appointed
as the chief justice of the Supreme Court a person from her home
district, Faridpur. When Khaleda Zia was prime minister, civil-military
bureaucrats from her district Noakhali became powerful. People
understand such appointments as promotion of the prime ministers desh.
Bengalis understand desh as country, but culturally they also equate the
notion of desh with local country, wherein primordial groups maintain
separate boundaries. The local desh acquires a sociological reality
distinct from the concrete extension of kinship and other social ties
across space.8 Thus, adhering to the code of kinship relations in the
public space is considered as justified or acceptable moral behaviour.
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Competitive elections, in particular, do not always conform to the

hierarchical values that drive dynastic politics. When political parties with
hereditary leadership participate in competitive elections, these
contestations can work as a countervailing pressure on the structure of
dynasty. The countervailing pressures continuously form and develop
numerous factions which the dynastic system has to delicately balance.
Party members face a dilemma because they have to choose party
leaders based on family ties, often at the expense of competent leaders
who may have greater popular support or ability. The dynastic system of
political governance is thus unable to create the needed space for nonkin leaders. This breeds conditions for inner-party conflict, factions, and
sometimes open revolt.

When dynastic parties try to impose their hierarchical rules and oneparty dictatorship over a multiparty democratic system, they tend to
deny the democratic rights of the opposition tribunes and parties, and
consequently generate political resistance. In response, the opposition
tribunes mobilize their political parties, frequently call for hartals
(political strikes) and often do not shy away from unleashing violence. As
a result, the democratic system and the economy descends into chaos.
Suffering from insecurity, people begin to look for an alternative
leadership beyond tribunes and their parties. Historically, this has created
an opportunity for the military to replace the ruling tribune.
For example, when Sheikh Mujib introduced a one party state,
BAKSAL, by abolishing the parliamentary system, the military
intervened. When the late President Ziaur Rahman manipulated the
democratic system to establish his autocratic rule, a military putsch in
1981 resulted in his killing. In both coups, the military officers involved
were close kin.9 In 1990, dynastic parties mobilized people against the
Ershad regime and he was forced to resign. In 1996, BNP was coaxed
to hold elections only to experience defeat. In 2001, the Awami League
reluctantly participated in the election, but refused to accept the election
result. In 2006, the country experienced serious violence as the BNP
tried to manipulate the electoral system, a move which was opposed by
the Awami League. The ensuing political confrontation destabilized the
country and prompted a military backed caretaker civilian government
to intervene and remove political families from power on 11 January
2007. This event is popularly termed as 1/11 that destroyed the twin
tower of two political families. However, each military coup and
intervention has only resulted in further weakening rule-based democracy
and strengthening the dynastic system.

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The relationship between dynasty and state is a critical one. When a

tribune assumes the responsibility of government, his/her network seeks
to establish political supremacy over state institutions and public
servants, so that the latter are forced to work at the behest of political
extended families. They insist that public servants express their loyalty to
kin and family of tribunes rather than to the people. This process has two
serious implications for democracy and state institutions. First, ruling
parties transform the core decision-making structure of government into
a political club at the hub of state power in Parliament and the prime
ministers office. Those belonging to the political club/coterie end up
alienating many dedicated party members whose contribution to party
development is significant. Many become disenchanted as they do not
have access to the political club, resulting in enhanced inner-party rift.
This rebellious group questions the credibility of the dynasty, sometimes
leaving the party, only to ensure that the opposition dynasty comes to
power in the future election. Second, the dominance of political families
and their loyalists has a negative impact on the development of
achievement oriented democratic institutions.

The sustenance of dynasty depends on two institutions: the state and

political parties. The tribunes are the head of political parties, but they
control parties by transforming them into extended political families. The
extended political family is critical in winning elections, which in turn gives
political parties control of state resources. The access, manipulation and
control over state power and spoils solidifies the economic foundations
of political dynasty. In the absence of a strong market, the state is a key
source of capital. Dynasties manipulate the states economic activities
and largesse to fill their financial coffers. In the process of capital
accumulation, both state institutions and industry become dysfunctional
and sick, enabling the government to disinvest in favour of the private
sector. The same political families then buy back sick state enterprises to
generate further profits in the market. They thus gain in both ways. First,
they accumulate capital by manipulating state institutions, and second, the
accumulated capital is used to buy back sick industry.
This process, over the years, has contributed to the development of a
crony capitalism, which requires the support of the political system for its
protection and nurturance.10 In 2011, for example, according to a
government investigation, the share market crashed because the
manipulators swindled Taka 20,000 crore ($ 2739 m). However, the
finance minister refused to publish the name of these manipulators as they
are all connected to and protected by political parties.11

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The process of participation in elections and alternating control of state

power by democratic dynasties brings a certain kind of equilibrium in the
political system. Over the years, the practice of democracy has
produced the following informal governance pattern: tribune-kinshipparty-government-state-politicization. Many smaller parties aspire to be
members of these extended political families by forming political alliances
with them.

It may seem that the effort by political families to rely on old institutions
and structures to define their new class realities and accumulate capital
creates an enormous contradiction. In reality, the synthesis of traditional
hierarchical culture and the modern forms of democracy has developed a
consensus on governance. Legitimate governance depends on elections,
which are held every five years to select a national leader from among
the dynasties. People also alternate between dynasties despite the efforts
of each ruling tribune to continue in power. Paradoxically, the enhanced
political participation of a competitive electoral process produces
democratic dynasties to govern the country.

Footnotes:
1. M. Mannan, The State and the Formation of a Dependent Bourgeoisie in
Bangladesh, South Asia Journal 3(4), 1990.
2. M. Mannan, All in the Families, The Daily Star, 6 November 2006.
3. J. Jiggings, Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1976.
4. R. Jahan, Women in South Asian Politics, Third World Quarterly 9(3), 1987.
5. M. Mannan, Bangla Democracy, Forum 2(9), 2008.
6. M. Mannan, Enslaving Development: An Anthropological Enquiry Into the
World of NGOs. PhD thesis. The Department of Social Anthropology, Durham
University, UK, 2010. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/340/
7. M. Mannan, An Anthropology of Power Structure: The Making of Tribunes
and Dictators in Bangladesh, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern
Studies 16(2), 1993.
8. P. Bertocci, Islam and the Social Construction of the Bangladesh Countryside,
in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed), Understanding the Bengal Muslims: Interpretative
Essays. University Press, Dhaka, 2001.
9. M. Mannan, Kinship Nexus and Class-Politics: The Case of the State in the
Post-Colonial Bangladesh Society. Cand.Polit (M.Phil) Thesis, Institute of Social
Anthropology, University of Bergen, Norway, February 1990.
10. M. Mannan, 2008, op cit., fn. 5.
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11. TDS. Tk 20,000cr swindled. Stock crash probe also finds Tk 15cr siphoned off
country, reveals deep collusion between regulators and market players. The
Daily Star, 8 April 2011.

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